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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

—

PARTS 36 & 37

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## FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

## EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXXVI

JANUARY TO JUNE 1935



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## CONFIDENTIAL.

## Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

## PART XXXVI.

## CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 59/19/91]

No. 1.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 10.)

*Foreign Office, January 10, 1935.*

Sir,

BY correspondence ending with that enclosed in my despatch No. 6 of the 3rd January you have been kept informed of the general course of events with regard to the negotiation of the Koweit Oil Concession. It may, nevertheless, be convenient if in this despatch I recapitulate briefly the recent history of this question.

2. In February 1934 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Gulf Oil Corporation of California, who had previously been competing against one another for an oil concession in Koweit, combined to form the joint Koweit Oil Company with a view to prosecuting negotiations for such a concession together. On the 5th March a political agreement was concluded between the Koweit Oil Company and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom by which the latter were assured of their essential requirements should a concession be granted. The company, for their part, were given to understand that, if they succeeded in negotiating a concession agreement with the sheikh on generally satisfactory lines, the approval of His Majesty's Government would not be withheld. His Majesty's Government also examined and approved the draft concession agreement which formed the basis of the negotiations.

3. Negotiations between the Koweit Oil Company and his Excellency the Sheikh, for which permission had been given before the end of February, were begun without delay. Considerable progress was made, but at the beginning of June the negotiations were suspended, at the sheikh's request, for three months in order that the company's negotiators might consult with their principals in London. According to the company, the sheikh undertook that during this period of three months he would not receive or consider applications for the concessions from other parties. The company understood this period to end on the 14th September, but the sheikh, as afterwards became apparent, considered himself bound until the 30th August only.

4. The negotiations were, in fact, resumed early in October and made good progress. Agreement had been reached on all but one or two minor points when, on the 19th November, His Majesty's Government learnt circuitously from a private source that the sheikh had granted the concession, "subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government," to a new British group named Traders Limited. The principal member of this concern was stated to be Mr. P. Ll. Hunting, a director of the British Oil Development Company (now known as Mosul Oil-fields Limited). Although it was understood that that company itself was not involved, various other directors of it were said to be associated with Mr. Hunting.

8195 [12357]

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5. Information was immediately sought from the political authorities in the Persian Gulf with a view to establishing the accuracy of this report. The exact position was, however, still unknown when, on the 28th November, His Majesty's Government, who on the 26th November had been informed that the negotiations between the sheikh and the Koweit Oil Company had now been concluded save for one or two final points, were officially informed by Traders Limited of the agreement which had been reached with the sheikh and were requested to approve it. Traders Limited at the same time communicated to His Majesty's Government the texts of the draft concession which they stated that they had negotiated with the sheikh, and of a letter which, they stated, the Sheikh of Koweit had written on the 2nd September to Mr. Gabriel, the sheikh's Basra lawyer, who was acting as their local representative. From this letter, a copy of which is enclosed, you will observe that Traders Limited were asked to seek the approval of His Majesty's Government for the draft concession which the sheikh (subject to certain minor points) was ready to sign, and were to ask His Majesty's Government to telegraph their decision to Koweit.

6. The financial terms which this draft concession offered appear to have been more favourable to the sheikh than those offered by the Koweit Oil Company, but, although Traders Limited were ostensibly an entirely British concern (whereas the Koweit Oil Company contained a 50 per cent. American interest), British control was not satisfactorily assured by the terms of the draft concession, and no agreement, of course, existed between Traders Limited and His Majesty's Government to safeguard the essential requirements of the latter. Further, nothing was known to His Majesty's Government of the financial and general standing of the company or of their technical ability, or indeed as to their intention, to work any concession which they might obtain.

7. As a first step towards confirming the statements of the new applicants, His Majesty's Government instructed the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to seek an immediate explanation from the sheikh of the circumstances in which he had negotiated this concession, and of his exact intention in writing his letter of the 2nd September to Mr. Gabriel. Meanwhile, the Koweit Oil Company, who had been pursuing their discussions with the sheikh in regard to the minor points still outstanding, and who appeared now to have gathered that there was another company in the field, enquired of His Majesty's Government whether this was, in fact, the case. They were informed that an application had, in fact, now been received from a second company and that it could not be ignored. On the 17th December the Koweit Oil Company, in the light of further discussions between their local representatives and the sheikh, informed His Majesty's Government that complete agreement between them and the sheikh had been reached. On the same date it was learned from the Political Agent at Koweit that the sheikh, having heard no more from Traders Limited since he wrote his letter of the 2nd September, had already on his own initiative, and before discussing the matter with the Political Agent, warned Mr. Gabriel by telegram on the 12th December that he was about to come to terms with the Koweit Oil Company, and that his Excellency had telegraphed again to Mr. Gabriel on the 15th December stating that, as he had now reached agreement with the Koweit Oil Company, further conversations with Traders Limited must cease. The sheikh, moreover, when questioned by the Political Agent, denied that his letter of the 2nd September in any way meant the actual "grant" of a concession, as had been stated by Traders Limited, and affirmed his readiness to sign the concession which had been negotiated by the Koweit Oil Company.

8. The sheikh having thus of his own free will given an unequivocal decision in favour of the Koweit Oil Company, His Majesty's Government saw no ground for withholding their approval of his decision, of which the company were accordingly informed by letter, more especially as they had already made it plain to the Koweit Oil Company, before any other applicant had entered the field, that, if certain conditions which His Majesty's Government regarded as essential were fulfilled, the consent of His Majesty's Government to the grant of the concession would not be withheld. At the same time a letter was addressed to Traders Limited informing them of the decisions which had been reached by the sheikh and by His Majesty's Government. Copies of these two letters are enclosed.

9. It is relevant in this connexion to bear in mind that the sheikh, apart from his obligation embodied in the agreement of the 27th October, 1912 (of

which he is well aware), not to grant any concession without the prior consent of His Majesty's Government, was reminded as recently as the 23rd April last that His Majesty's Government would expect him to consult them before even opening negotiations with any company. This warning, which is in clear conformity with the spirit and intention of his written engagement, the sheikh, in his dealings with Traders Limited, did not observe.

10. On the 23rd December the sheikh, having been informed that His Majesty's Government had given their approval of his decision, signed the Koweit Oil Company's concession agreement.

I am, &c.  
JOHN SIMON.

[E 7570/160/91]

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

*Sheikh of Koweit to Mr. Gabriel.*

My dear Agob,

September 2, 1934.

AFTER compliments and enquiry about your health, I received two copies of the concession, retained one and returned you the other, that you may despatch same to the company and inform them to communicate with His Britannic Majesty King George's Government in London and produce to them the copy of the concession; that if His Majesty's Government assent to it, they may please telegraph their assent to the Political Agent in Koweit.

We have accepted the conditions of the concession, and I will affix my signature thereunto on hearing the result from the Political Agent in Koweit to the effect that His Majesty's Government have sanctioned the agreement of the concession and assented thereto, provided that you undertake for us that the company agrees to the points undermarked in red pencil in the Arabic version of the exact text of the concession.

Wishing your existence,

Yours sincerely,

AHMED ALSABAH.

True translation:  
J. GABRIEL.

[E 7671/160/91]

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

*India Office to Koweit Oil Company.*

Gentlemen,

December 21, 1934.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to refer to your interview at the India Office on the 17th December, in which you reported that agreement had now been reached between you and his Excellency the Sheikh of Koweit on the subject of the terms of an oil concession in respect of Koweit, and that his Excellency was prepared to sign the concession in your favour immediately, subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government.

2. It was understood in the earlier discussions between your company and His Majesty's Government that no objection would be raised to the grant of a concession by the sheikh to your company, subject to certain specified conditions. These conditions have been fulfilled, and having regard to the understanding in question and to the fact that the sheikh has now decided to grant the concession to your company, I am directed to inform you that His Majesty's Government have approved the sheikh's decision and to say that it is assumed that you will now take the necessary steps to complete the signature of your agreement with his Excellency.

I am, &c.  
J. C. WALTON.



[E 7673/160/91]

Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

*India Office to Mr. P. L. Hunting (Traders (Limited)).*

Sir,

December 21, 1934.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to state that he has had under consideration your letter of the 28th November on the question of the grant of an oil concession in Koweit to Messrs. Traders Limited.

2. On receipt of your letter of the 28th November, which was the first intimation which he received from your company that they were interested in the matter, the Secretary of State took steps to ascertain from the Sheikh of Koweit the position in regard to his relations with Traders Limited. The sheikh has now stated, in reply to this enquiry, that the letter of the 2nd September to Mr. Gabriel, of which a copy was enclosed in your letter under reference, was not in any way intended to represent the grant of a concession to your company by him. He added that, as he had heard nothing further from your company subsequently to the date of that letter, he informed Mr. Gabriel on the 12th December that he was about to come to terms with the Koweit Oil Company, and that on the 15th December he telegraphed to Mr. Gabriel that he had done so and that further conversations with your company must cease.

3. I am to explain that His Majesty's Government have for some considerable time been guided in regard to the question of the grant of oil concessions in Koweit by certain definite principles which they felt bound to adopt in view of the special circumstances of the case, and which are well known to the sheikh and to the various applicants who have from time to time approached His Majesty's Government in the matter. The effect of these principles is that the responsibility for deciding as to the grant of an oil concession shall rest with his Excellency, subject to the following conditions:—

- (a) That the sheikh (and similarly any applicant for a concession) should consult with His Majesty's Government before entering into negotiations for a concession, and that His Majesty's Government should be kept fully informed of all negotiations in connexion with the grant of any concession.
- (b) That arrangements should be made to ensure that the interests of His Majesty's Government should be specifically safeguarded in the event of any concession being granted.
- (c) That the interests of the sheikh himself and of his principality should be sufficiently safeguarded in any concession granted.

4. As you are aware, the Koweit Oil Company have for a considerable period been in negotiation with the sheikh. Before initiating those negotiations, the Koweit Oil Company placed themselves in touch with His Majesty's Government and were informed of the conditions set out above. Having undertaken to satisfy those conditions, they were informed that no objection was seen to their initiating negotiations with his Excellency, and they were also given to understand, long before it was known that your company were in the field, that, in the event of their reaching agreement with the sheikh as to the terms of a concession within the limits indicated above, the approval of His Majesty's Government to the grant of such concession would not be withheld.

5. In the case of the negotiations between Messrs. Traders Limited and the sheikh, no approach was made to His Majesty's Government by your company, and no information that they desired to secure a concession in respect of this area was received by His Majesty's Government until the 28th November, although from the papers submitted with their application on that date it appeared that discussions with the sheikh had reached an advanced stage by the 2nd September. Despite the request in the opening paragraph of the sheikh's letter of the 2nd September (which, as explained above, the sheikh states that he did not in any way regard as constituting a grant of a concession to your company) that your company should place themselves in communication with His Majesty's Government and obtain a telegraphic reply, a delay of almost three months took place before any communication was made to His Majesty's Government by your company, by which time the negotiations between the sheikh and the Koweit Oil Company had been completed except for one or two minor points.

6. Having regard to the understanding with the Koweit Oil Company referred to in paragraph 4 above, to the fact that the conditions referred to in paragraph 3 have been satisfied by that company, and that the sheikh, in the exercise of his choice, has elected to grant a concession to that company, and to the communication which his Excellency states he has made to Mr. Gabriel, the Secretary of State now directs me to say that His Majesty's Government are not prepared to interfere with the decision which the sheikh has reached. They have therefore informed his Excellency, in accordance with the understanding previously reached with the Koweit Oil Company, that they concur in his granting the concession to that company.

I am, &amp;c.

J. C. WALTON.

[E 317/280/91]

No. 2.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 13.)*

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic. Extract.)

Jedda, January 13, 1935.

YOUR telegram No. 6.

3. As far as I can judge at present, I think Ibn Saud would view with suspicion any attempt to bring him under the League of Nations arrangements, but might be tempted to accept an invitation to accede to article 2 (a) [of International Slavery Convention, 1926] if he thought His Majesty's Government would consent to suppression of article 7 of Treaty of Jedda in consideration of his having done so.

4. Do you wish me to raise the question of possible accession to article 2 (a) with Fuad and to take the risk of his raising point mentioned at the end of preceding paragraph, or would you prefer me in the first instance to explore possibility of direct Anglo-Saudi agreement?

5. I incline towards the latter course, though I doubt possibility of an agreement on basis of your despatch, having regard more particularly to your insistence on point mentioned in paragraph 6 of the despatch.

6. I see no advantage in suggestion that notes might be exchanged on lines of those attached to Anglo-Yemeni Treaty. From our point of view they are weaker than article 7 of Treaty of Jedda. From that of Ibn Saud they certainly constitute a public bilateral commitment no less repugnant to him than that article.

[E 318/318/25]

No. 3.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 16, 1935.

YOUR telegram No. 5 of 14th January: Anglo-Saudi relations.

Following is position regarding main questions at issue with the Saudi Government:—

2. *General Settlement.*(<sup>1</sup>)—His Majesty's Government approve conclusion 3 of Middle East Official Sub-Committee meeting of 8th November.

3. Questions of Koweit blockade (my telegram No. 7 of the 12th January), of Bahrein transit dues (Government of India semi-official letter of the 24th December to India Office), and of Saudi-Transjordan frontier are still under consideration, but instructions will follow as soon as possible.

(<sup>1</sup>) (3) On the question whether or not His Majesty's Government should aim at a general settlement, i.e., the simultaneous settlement by comprehensive agreement of major outstanding questions, the sub-committee recommend that His Majesty's Government should adhere for the present to the idea of securing such a settlement, but that Sir Andrew Ryan should be given full discretion to revert to the idea of separate settlement of the various questions at issue should he see fit.

[12357]



4. *Slavery*.—Instructions were sent to you in my despatch No. 452 of the 13th December, but further instructions will follow as soon as possible on points raised in your telegram No. 4 of 13th January.

5. *South-Eastern Boundaries of Saudi Arabia*.—After consideration of views of political authorities in the Persian Gulf and Government of India, His Majesty's Government suggest following programme for negotiations with Saudi Government. Concessions in each case are intended to form part of general settlement:—

6. First stage.—Request for clearer indication of King Ibn Saud's desiderata. If the King merely repeats his claim to the whole of the desert except for the coastal belt, he might be told that so vague and extensive a claim to so vast an area, to which His Majesty's Government do not recognise him as possessing any valid title, can form no basis for discussion, and that while His Majesty's Government are prepared to make some friendly concession, this can only be within reasonable limits.

7. In any preliminary conversation with Ibn Saud you may not wish to proceed beyond this stage. But I fully realise the difficulties with which you may be faced, and I do not desire to tie your hands unduly. Matter is mainly one of tactics, as to which you are necessarily the best judge, and you are therefore authorised, if you consider that no settlement is likely to be obtainable otherwise, to proceed, either with the King at Riyadh, or subsequently with Fuad Hamza, as and when you consider it necessary or desirable, to either of the further stages suggested in paragraphs 8 and 9 below.

8. Second stage.—Offer to concede to Ibn Saud in full sovereignty a relatively small area or strip immediately to the east of the blue line as far as a line running from the head of the Dohat-es-Salwa to a point slightly south-east of Sakak (but leaving that place to Saudi Arabia), thence (leaving to Qatar and Abu Dhabi a strip of territory extending inland for not less than 25 miles to the west of the head of the Khor-el-Odeid) to the north-western extremity of Aqal, thence due southwards via (but to the west of) Banaiyan to parallel 20° N., whence it would gradually rejoin the violet line.

9. If this offer proves insufficient, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider, in addition to it, as a third stage, a settlement on the lines suggested in Mr. Rendel's letter of 7th November to Mr. Laithwaite (copy in my despatch No. 436 of 28th November), involving creation of a desert zone under a special régime, for a period of ten or twenty years, subject to reconsideration at the request of either party at the end of that time. (See also conclusion 1 of Middle East Sub-Committee meeting of 8th November.<sup>(\*)</sup>) Ibn Saud would maintain in this zone any personal rights which he at present effectively exercises over the nomadic tribes there, e.g., the right to levy zakat, but would not possess territorial sovereignty and would therefore not be able to grant concessions. The desert zone and special régime would be defined by a separate agreement. The boundaries of the desert zone would be approximately those suggested in Mr. Rendel's letter, but would exclude Banaiyan.

10. If you are eventually convinced that no satisfactory general settlement can be reached on the basis even of this concession, His Majesty's Government would be prepared in the last resort, and in order to secure their desiderata in other directions, to concede to Ibn Saud in full sovereignty a part at least of the desert area referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph, subject, however, to the servitude that no concessions would be granted therein by Ibn Saud except after consultation with His Majesty's Government and to concessionaires approved both by His Majesty's Government and by the Saudi Government. Precise limits to be suggested for this additional area are still

(\*) (1) That in the light of the discussion and on the information at present available, the sub-committee were impressed by the possibility of a settlement on the broad general lines suggested in Mr. Rendel's letter to Mr. Laithwaite of the 7th November, on the understanding that the special régime would be one of renunciation or limitation and not of administration, and subject to a satisfactory disposal of the question of concessions in the desert area.

The question was raised whether it would be necessary, in order to improve the hope of Ibn Saud's acceptance of a settlement on the lines in question, to recognise him as sovereign in the desert zone, though subject to servitudes, but this question was reserved.

In these circumstances they recommend that the proposal be more closely examined with a view to a conclusion being reached, once the information awaited by the Political Resident has been received and has been considered.

under consideration, and further instructions on this point will reach you as soon as possible. Idea at present being explored is that the part of the proposed desert zone lying to the west of meridian 52 might possibly be thus conceded to Ibn Saud. South end of this line would appear to join "ring fence" line approximately at the northern end of the boundary between the Aden Protectorate and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, assuming latter to run inland from Ras Dharbat Ali at right angles to the coast.

11. In any case, however, it will be important to obtain from Ibn Saud a categorical renunciation of any rights, or claim to any kind of sovereignty outside the frontier line suggested in paragraphs 8 or 10 or outside the "ring fence" of the desert zone (see paragraph 5 of Mr. Rendel's letter to Mr. Laithwaite). It would also be desirable for His Majesty's Government to retain flying rights not only over the desert zone, but also over any area which might eventually be conceded to Ibn Saud under paragraph 10.

12. You will no doubt in any negotiations make such use as you can of fact that any of these concessions would involve acquisition by Ibn Saud of rights over very large areas to which he has at present no legal claim, and would release him from obligations of existing "Blue Line" frontier, from which he could not otherwise escape without the greatest difficulty.

13. If you see any objection to any part of above programme I shall be glad to consider any observations you wish to offer. I trust, however, that present telegram will at any rate give you sufficient idea of general desiderata of His Majesty's Government to enable you to conduct preliminary discussions with King Ibn Saud at Riyadh if you proceed thither, or with Fuad Hamza.

14. Instructions on such points as landing-grounds and flying rights, Saudi Government's debts, &c., will follow by despatch as soon as possible.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 8. Repeated to India, No. 8, and Bushire, No. 3.)

[E 496/318/25]

No. 4.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, January 22, 1935.

MY telegram No. 6.

I had long conversations with Fuad 20th January and 21st January. In the first, which was informal and discursive, we discussed (a) proposal for comprehensive negotiations; (b) Bahrain transit; (c) Koweit blockade; (d) eastern and south-eastern boundaries of Saudi Arabia.

2. As regards (b) and (c), see my separate telegrams Nos. 8 and 9.

3. As regards (a), I understood Fuad to say that Saudi Government would do anything we liked. He disconcerted me by approaching (d) from the standpoint that His Majesty's Government were bound under promise to King Hussein to recognise Arab independence. At one moment he said precise statement of King's desiderata would be produced, but he seemed to suggest that while Saudi Government might be willing to make important concessions to "their Arab brethren" we should not come in between them. I naturally scouted this and repeated on 21st January my warning against danger of taking such a line officially. On this occasion Fuad told me that all he had said on the previous day, except about (b) and (c) above, was personal and unofficial.

4. I gave a definite official turn to the second conversation. I asked whether the Saudi Government as such were ready to accept proposal which His Majesty's Government had indeed approved for comprehensive negotiations on the lines suggested in London last September and whether they would produce precise statement of Ibn Saud's desiderata regarding boundaries. I added that if comprehensive negotiations produced no result the parties could only return to their positions in regard to legal question and expressed the hope that any statement of desiderata would be such as to provide for reasonable basis of discussion, as His Majesty's Government contemplated only moderate concessions. I said that I was making these observations under instructions.

5. Fuad postponed his reply.

6. Nothing was said about invitation to Riyadh

[12357]

B 4



7. My general impression is that Saudi Government attach little importance to distinction between comprehensive negotiations and alternative of dealing with every question on its merits. My present object is to tie them down to the former in the first instance, but I propose to play for time until I have your instructions on all points and then to suggest definite agenda if, in the meantime, Saudi Government agree to comprehensive negotiations.

8. Fuad's talk about Arab independence may be important if the King is allowing himself to be swayed by the ideas of pan-Arabism, *e.g.*, in form of Federation of Arab States which he might hope to dominate. It need not be taken more seriously than that at this stage.

9. Conversations and further comments follow by bag.

(Repeated to Government of India, No. 5, and Bushire, No. 6.)

[E 350/350/25]

No. 5.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, January 23, 1935.*

MY despatch No. 439 of 29th November: Proposed visit of Emir Saud to United Kingdom.

Sheikh Hafiz Wahba has telegraphed to Saudi Legation here that King Ibn Saud has agreed to his suggestion that the Emir Saud should pay an unofficial visit to this country early in June.

Please take next opportunity of informing Saudi Government that His Majesty's Government will welcome this visit, and, if you visit Riyadh, please speak in the same sense to King Ibn Saud.

[E 557/557/25]

No. 6.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 25.)*

(No 1. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, January 1, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for December 1934.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 6.

JEDDA REPORT FOR DECEMBER 1934.

I.—Internal Affairs.

295. Ibn Saud remained at Riyadh throughout the month. The Amir Feisal, who was also there at its outset, stayed on until the 25th December, when he left for the Hejaz, getting back to Mecca on the 29th December. Fuad Bey Hamza, who, as stated in paragraph 267 of the last report, returned from leave on the 2nd December, visited Jedda on the 7th December, and had a conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, but three or four days later he proceeded from Mecca to Riyadh, where he remained in attendance on the King up to the end of the month.

296. The absence of these high personages at Riyadh reduced the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to a shadow and deprived the foreign representatives in Jedda of any opportunity of dealing with affairs requiring personal intercourse. The stillness of the diplomatic air was intensified by the fact that the fasting month of Ramadan, always a period of slackness, began on the 6th December.

297. The assemblage at Riyadh was to be reinforced about the end of the month by the arrival of the Saudi Minister in London, who left England on the 3rd December and arrived in Egypt on the 13th December. He left Cairo, apparently by air, on the 18th December, and when last heard of had got to Bagdad.

298. There was no news of any further development in the Teima area (paragraph 271 of the last report), or of any important happening towards the Yemen border. It was freely rumoured in Jedda, however, that a grave situation had arisen in the Royal circle at Riyadh, with a reflex in the form of tribal unrest in the central area.

299. These reports were almost certainly much exaggerated and are not worth reproducing in detail. Their central features were that the Amir Feisal was supposed to be an unwilling guest, detained in Nejd for political reasons, and that an acute quarrel had occurred between the King and his brother Muhammad, who was said at one moment to have been put to death. There were many variants on the current stories, and other princes were named as rebels or potential rebels. So far as the Amir Feisal is concerned, he left Riyadh, as already stated, on the 25th December, but the rumourists, not to be defeated, then put it about that he had tarried at Shaqra, presumably to deal with the tribal unrest.

300. Mr. Philby's reaction to the rumours was that no importance need be attached to tales of dissension in the Royal Family, but that all the bigwigs at Riyadh were "in a great muddle," a state of affairs which he attributes to the King's failure to keep his old firm grip on the affairs of his country, and to some extent to His Majesty's increasing obsession with sport. This, from so great an admirer, is significant, and it may well be that jealousy, *e.g.*, between the heir apparent and his brother Feisal, and criticism of Ibn Saud, even in his own circle, are affecting the machine of Government at the centre. Mr. Philby, it may be noted, tends to be increasingly critical of Saudi ways and persons in private conversation, though he gave a fairly glowing account of Saudi affairs in the *Egyptian Gazette* of the 11th December, and a very similar article in the *Near East* of the 20th December. Incidentally he puts the King's cash payments to tribesmen in the autumn (paragraph 266 of last report) at about £2,000 gold per day for some two months.

301. The Saudi Air Force (paragraph 272 of the last report) has continued to show some activity, mainly, however, in the form of flights in the immediate neighbourhood of Jedda, where two Wapitis, marked S.4 and S.8 have been kept parked by the roadside outside the town on the inner edge of the piece of flat coast used as an aerodrome. They were moved into hangars on the 27th December. It is still uncertain whether a third machine is in working order and, if so, where it is. It is possible that the machine which crashed at Taif on the 5th July (paragraph 152 of report for July) has never been reconditioned as was supposed, but is still there.

302. The pearl-fishers, referred to in the report for October, paragraph 240 (f) and earlier, who have been operating under the Qusaibi concession in southern waters of the Red Sea, returned to Jedda early in December. They were favourably impressed with the potentialities of the Southern Saudi shores, but at present shells were too small and the waters over-fished. Sheikh Abdurrahman Qusaibi informed His Majesty's Minister that he had so far lost money over this enterprise. It is stated that he proposes to urge Ibn Saud to impose a close season for pearl fishing. Meanwhile, the Venezuelan divers were making preparations for departure at the end of the month.

303. The Minister of Finance was active in spite of Ramadan. He is said by some to have gone Sufi, and his devotional fervour in Mecca has attracted attention. This piety has not, however, prevented him from constantly dashing down to Jedda or caused him to relax his hold on the purse-strings. It was reported about the 21st that all payments to officials had been suspended, though they were promised something at the after-Ramadan festival in January, and that drafts on the customs were no longer to be accepted in part payment of duty on newly imported goods. Orders in the latter sense would appear to have been issued, but they may be of merely temporary operation.

304. The negotiations for an agreement between the Saudi Government and the mainly British group, represented by Mr. Twitchell (paragraph 277 of the last report), viz., the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited), were completed.



on the 23rd December. Full information is not yet available, and the agreement has still to be ratified. It is understood that the syndicate are to have exclusive rights, over an area comprising the Hejaz and a good part of Asir, of prospecting for minerals other than oil and other liquids, gold being the principal bait. The Government are to get 15 per cent. of the shares in any company formed to exploit particular concessions, 5 per cent. of any gold, &c., extracted, and customs duty at a flat rate of 10 per cent. on all material, &c., imported. Mr. Twitchell left for Egypt and Syria on the 26th December, and is believed to be already making active preparations for his prospecting campaign.

305. The Minister of Finance was also busy with the scheme for an overland pilgrim route between Najaf and Medina (paragraph 278 of the last report). Sheikh Abdulla Suleiman is not thought himself to favour this enterprise, but the Iraqi survey party visited Mecca and Jedda during December, and, when they left overland for Iraq about the 27th December, it was understood that the matters had been advanced sufficiently to enable the route to be used for the forthcoming pilgrimage. It is said, however, that the charges will be very high.

306. Mr. Philby's firm, Sharqieh (Limited), have imported something like ninety Ford vehicles under the agreement referred to in paragraph 279 of the last report and earlier. The arrangements for paying for cars supplied to transport companies seem to be satisfactory. Mr. Philby has had to go easier with the Government themselves, but he claimed early in the month to have extracted from £2,000 to £3,000 from them. The Government have taken advantage of a saving clause in the agreement with Sharqieh to buy some twenty-five cars of other makes through Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., whose business is, however, adversely affected by the agreement.

307. The zeal of the Jedda Committee of Virtue in driving citizens from café to mosque at the outset of Ramadan produced a fracas, in the course of which two minions of the committee were beaten. This fracas led to the arrest of numerous citizens, as many as eighty, it is said. Most of them were released within a few days, having been beaten, but a small number were kept in gaol.

308. The *Umm-al-Qura* took the trouble on the 21st December to deny a report that a niece of Ibn Saud had arrived in Cairo and entered a school for the daughters of shereefs.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

309. Reference has already been made in paragraph 305 to the proceedings of the Iraqi survey party, which visited Mecca and Jedda in connexion with the proposed Najaf-Medina pilgrim route. There is little else to record in this chapter, except that the Saudi-Yemen situation appears to be satisfactory, if stationary, as regards the frontier delimitation contemplated in article 4 of the Treaty of Taif. It is stated that the Deputy Minister of Finance, Hamad-as-Suleiman, and Sheikh Khalid-al-Qarqani have been selected to serve as the Saudi Commissioners for this purpose, but they had not left up to the end of December.

## III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

310. By a note dated the 28th November, Ibn Saud offered to His Majesty the King his congratulations and good wishes on the occasion of the marriage of the Duke and Duchess of Kent. On the 2nd December His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, by command of the King, transmitted to Ibn Saud His Majesty's reply.

311. When Fuad Bey Hamza called on His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 7th December, as stated in paragraph 295 above, he expressed the personal view that it would be an excellent plan, if the proposed negotiations on questions outstanding between his Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom could be conducted in Riyadh. It would probably be impracticable from a British point of view to conduct systematic negotiations there, but it is possible that Sir Andrew Ryan may receive, early in the New Year, an invitation to Riyadh, which was somewhat definitely foreshadowed at the time of his visit to Taif last July. Meanwhile, Sir Andrew Ryan has had no personal intercourse with the Saudi Government since his return, excepting an exchange of personal telegrams with Fuad Bey Hamza, who intimated on the

21st December that he expected to be detained at Riyadh until the end of Ramadan, but hoped to see the Minister immediately after the ensuing festival, which should end on the 5th January.

312. The Saudi Government agreed, in a note dated the 25th December, to exempt from customs duty the medical supplies for the Government of India dispensary (paragraph 283 of the last report) to be imported for the forthcoming pilgrimage season, but they made it clear that they were making the concession for this occasion only, without prejudice to their views on the various issues, in regard to the medical organisation attached to the Legation, which are to be discussed in due course, when Fuad Bey is available.

313. The French consulate in Jedda is to be raised to the status of a Legation on the 1st January, and the present Chargé d'Affaires is to have the rank of Minister Resident. M. Maigret professes to have no ambition other than that of ending his career in Jedda and makes no secret of the fact that he owes his retention here, with a higher rank, to the good word which Fuad Bey said for him in Paris in the autumn. He is about to proceed to Hodeida *en route* for Sana and proposes after a brief visit to the King of the Yemen, apparently of a complimentary nature, to go to Syria for a short time.

314. Major or Colonel Ibrahim Depui (paragraph 114 of the report for June) the French ex-officer who apes the Lawrences and Philbys of Arabia, again arrived in Jedda about the middle of the month. He distinguished himself on this occasion by putting it about that he had come as Belgian consul, apparently on the ground that he once held that position and had never lost it. The French Chargé d'Affaires not unnaturally declined the request by Depui for delivery of the Belgian archives in the French consulate, which has long looked after Belgian interests. There is no present reason to suppose that the Belgian Government are behind this move, but Depui himself may desire an official status for the furtherance of commercial schemes.

315. The Persian Minister returned to Jedda on the 10th December, smiling as hard as ever.

316. There is no confirmation of a rumour circulated some time ago in Egypt that the Japanese Government intended to appoint a certain As Saqqaf as consul in Saudi Arabia. It has been denied in Tokyo.

## IV.—Miscellaneous.

317. His Majesty's Minister and Lady Ryan returned to Jedda on the 13th December. This restored the Diplomatic Body proper to its full strength of eight heads of mission, but the new Egyptian consul is still awaited, the German consulate is still vacant and the Afghan representation more than nebulous.

318. The French sloop *Vimy* arrived in Jedda on the 13th December and left on the 15th. It is worth mentioning, because it is so unusual, that her commander and two officers lunched at the British Legation on the 14th December, following on meetings when Sir Andrew and Lady Ryan were in Port Sudan. The *Vimy* brought as a passenger Mrs. Bennett, wife of the Director of Customs in the Sudan, who stayed at the British Legation for three days.

319. A Dutch official from Java, M. Pfeffer, stated to be an Arabic scholar, stayed for several days at the beginning of the month with the Dutch Chargé d'Affaires before leaving for Egypt. It is believed he intends to spend some time touring Arabic-speaking countries.

320. A Dutch bacteriologist, M. Van der Hoog, who ran a useful laboratory in Jedda some years ago, is expected to return in the near future. In the interval he has embraced Islam, apparently in order to increase his opportunities for scientific work.

321. Copious rain is said to have fallen in Riyadh (paragraph 292 of the last report) towards the middle of December and there was a further fall in Jedda about the same time. These early rains give promise of a good winter and spring throughout all the northern parts of Saudi Arabia. The country round Jedda has been positively verdant. Varied, if uninspiring, wild flowers can be gathered by those prepared to affront the harsh winter winds which blow when the thermometer falls to 70 degrees and even lower.

322. Despite these favourable climatic conditions about a third of the European residents in Jedda were stricken with diseases, mostly sharp fevers, in the last ten days of December. This unusual wave of illness must be set down to



the treachery of the climate and the mosquitoes, not to dissipation. Indeed, the British community, though afflicted, has suffered less in proportion than others despite considerable revelry on the evenings of the 24th and 25th December.

323. The approximate number of pilgrims who had reached Jedda from the principal countries of origin up to the end of December was as follows:—

From the Straits Settlements:—

Steamship <i>Poelairoebiah</i>	...	...	1,083
Steamship <i>Alcinous</i>	...	...	373

From India:—

Steamship <i>Jehangir</i>	...	...	430
Steamship <i>Islami</i>	...	...	835

324. A new addition to the Turner Morrison fleet, the steamship *Islami*, arrived in Jedda on the 31st December. She is a vessel of 5,878 tons built on modern lines for the pilgrim traffic, with *inter alia* increased accommodation for pilgrims of the richer class.

325. The position as regards the manumission of slaves during the month of December was as follows:—

- On hand at the beginning of the month: 1 female.
- Took refuge in December: 2 males and 1 female.
- Manumitted in December and repatriated: 1 male.
- Locally manumitted: 1 female.
- Left Legation voluntarily: 1 male.
- On hand at the end of the month: 1 female.

326. One of the above cases presents the peculiar feature that the woman is *enceinte* by the son of a well-known shereef. Fortunately the woman herself does not desire repatriation, which for reasons of religious feelings and others would present great difficulty. The Legation is trying to arrange for local manumission, with adequate guarantees for the woman's safety, pending confinement.

[E 600/291/25]

No. 7.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.*—(Received January 28.)

(No. 2.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him the annual report on the heads of foreign missions at this capital.

Jedda, January 6, 1935.

Enclosure in No. 7.

*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda.*

(Paragraphs marked with an asterisk are reproduced from the previous reports indicated at the end of each.)

*Afghanistan.*

NOTHING further has been heard in Jedda of Salahuddin Khan Saljuqi, who was Afghan consul at Bombay in 1933 and was appointed consul in Jedda also, but stayed for only a short portion of the pilgrimage season. A certain Sayyid Abdul Hamid Khan, who was understood to have succeeded him in Bombay, arrived in Jedda on the 16th March, 1934, and left some weeks later. He apparently regarded himself as being consul during his stay, but the Saudi Government do not seem to have made any announcement, and he did not establish official relations with the British Legation. So far as there is any Afghan consulate in this country at all, it is run by an obscure clerk at Mecca.

*Egypt.*

Abdul Hamid Munir Effendi was appointed consul in August last in succession to Hafiz Amer, the late consul, who was transferred to a post at Bagdad, while on leave. The new consul had not arrived in Jedda up to the end of December. He is described as a man of 36, who was employed as Chancellor in the consulate at Geneva in 1923. He served subsequently as vice-consul at Lyons and at Rome, and has been since 1928 attaché at the Legation in Madrid. Pending his arrival, the consulate at Jedda remains in charge of a colourless but amiable vice-consul named Hasan Abou Alam.

*France.*

\*M. Roger Maigret holds the position of permanent Chargé d'Affaires, but the French Government have shown unwillingness to make his post more than a consulate, despite the conclusion of a general treaty with Ibn Saud in November 1931. He is a man of perhaps 60, and has had a long career in the French Near East service. He was employed in Morocco for many years prior to 1921, and appears to have had only a moderate reputation there. He was subsequently consul-general in Iraq. He is intelligent and witty, has a considerable knowledge of Arab countries, and boasts in his lighter moments of an equal knowledge of the Parisian underworld, as a result of having cultivated *apaches* in his conscript days. When I first knew him he was always very ready to talk about Morocco, which we both knew, but was more reticent about affairs nearer to us, notwithstanding professions of friendship which were sometimes almost "smarmy." I found him rather more communicative in 1932, but we met rarely during my short stays here, as M. Maigret seldom leaves his house, except to leave Jedda, and eschews social intercourse almost completely. His health is poor and he was much taken up with an aged mother until her death in August 1932. He does not appear to carry much weight with Saudi officials, whom he found inconceivably tiresome when negotiating his treaty. He is understood to have a considerable book knowledge of English, and has translated Mr. Philby's *Arabia* into French. (Written in January 1933.)

Since the foregoing account was written, M. Maigret continued to lead the life of a grass-widower, consoled, it is thought, by a permanent lady guest, in Jedda. He attracted attention in 1933 by a visit to Riyadh, which had some official purpose, though he concealed it under the pretence of having gone by invitation of the King to obtain material for a book. After his return, he continued to isolate himself greatly, but towards the end of 1934 he showed less agoraphobia, driving frequently outside the town, and appearing somewhat oftener than was his wont in society. He let it be known in December that it was intended to raise his post to the status of a Legation as from the 1st January, 1935, and that he would remain at the head of it with the rank of Minister Resident. No official announcement has been made up to the time of writing.

*Germany.*

The German consulate has remained unoccupied since the departure in 1933 of M. Heinrich De Haas, the honorary consul appointed in 1931.

*Iraq.*

Sayyid Kamil-al-Gilani, formerly Iraqi consul-general in Beirut, was in January 1934 appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Saudi Arabia and consul-general at Jedda. He arrived in Jedda on the 17th June. This young man of 35 was thought in Bagdad to have derived little benefit from his education, which included a sojourn of some years at the American University in Beirut, and to owe his advancement rather to the influence of his brother, Rashid Ali Bey Al Gilani, a former Prime Minister of Iraq, than to any marked ability. When we exchanged visits last June, I had little reason to question this appreciation, though his smile mitigated my first impression of shifty eyes in a sombre face, and I was struck by his apparently considerable knowledge of Arabian affairs and certain persons concerned in them. Few opportunities have since offered of getting to know him better. Though correct and friendly in his relations with Mr. Calvert, when they have met, he has shown no inclination to frequent the British Legation and seems to prefer the society of members of the French consulate. He has a very moderate knowledge of English. He does not appear to have a wife in Jedda.



### Italy.

Signor G. Persico, whose appointment as Italian Chargé d'Affaires was announced late in 1933, arrived in Jedda on the 24th March, 1934, coming direct from a post in the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. His previous career had been spent largely in Russia, with interludes in Istanbul and Cairo. His age is probably about 40. He had no special knowledge of Arabian affairs when he came to Jedda, and does not seem to have acquired more than a very general grasp of them since. It was understood, when he arrived, that he was intended for the post of Minister, as soon as the situation between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen should have become easier, but his promotion has not yet been announced. During the acute stage of that situation, he impressed Saudi officials by his moderation and readiness to see their point of view; and in his relations with the British Legation he has proved himself an agreeable colleague, very ready to be helpful in connexion with the one important matter of common interest which has arisen, apart from the question of Saudi-Yemen relations. His chief claim to distinction has been the zeal and efficiency with which he has created a garden in the strip of ground outside his house, with soil imported from Egypt and plants from various sources. This garden is one of the wonders of Jedda and has cost M. Persico a pretty penny, which he can afford the more easily as he is unmarried and has so far entertained very little. He speaks French well and English moderately.

### Netherlands.

\*M. C. Adriaanse, who succeeded M. van der Meulen as Chargé d'Affaires in 1931, is, like him, a member of the Dutch East Indian civil service. He is large, loose-limbed and a good fellow. He does not speak English as well as his predecessor, but has quite an adequate command of it. He has made a serious study of classical Arabic at the feet of Professor Snouck Hurgronje, and acted as general secretary to the Orientalists' Conference at Leiden. He can get on in the spoken language. Although far from brilliant, he makes a very good colleague and maintains the traditional good relations between the British and Dutch missions in Jedda.

\*M. Adriaanse has a wife and family in Holland, but has lived a consistently bachelor life in this country. (Written in January 1933.)

There is nothing to add to previous accounts of M. Adriaanse, except that his winter visit to Sana is now an annual event.

### Persia.

Mohamed Ali Khan Mogaddam, to adopt his own spelling, arrived in Jedda early in January 1934, and proved to have been appointed a full Minister, unlike his predecessor. He does not appear to be much more than 40, but had had twenty-seven years service before coming here. In old days he was employed in the Persian Embassy at St. Petersburg, and was later, after the war, counsellor in London. He subsequently became consul-general at Tashkent, and finally served for two years as "chef de cabinet" in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Tehran. He does not seem to have made any particular impression on British officials in his previous posts. I have seen comparatively little of him here, but he is an agreeable colleague, with pleasant manners and a most ingratiating smile. He has some knowledge of English, but prefers to speak French, which he knows fairly well. As a Moslem he is eminently latitudinarian. He keeps his family in the Lebanon, and was away with them from early in June until December. He did not treat this as absence from Jedda, regarding the Lebanon, presumably with the consent of his Government, as one of our outer suburbs.

### Soviet Russia.

\*M. Nezir (or Nezir Bey) Turakoulov is the doyen of the Diplomatic Body. He is a round-headed Moslem from Turkestan and has distinctly Tartar features. His age is 38. He seems intelligent and has a considerable aptitude for languages, having acquired a good working knowledge of Arabic, greatly improved his French and started on English since he came to Jedda about three years ago. We converse a good deal in Turkish, the language in which he is most at his ease.

\*We are quite good friends, but meet comparatively rarely, as M. Turakoulov goes little into European society. In the summer of 1932 he appeared to avoid

me on purpose, possibly owing to the complications of the then situation. When we do see each other we never approach any kind of political subject, but exchange *politesses* and simple stories. In this sort of talk M. Turakoulov displays a lively sense of humour. I think that he is genuinely more interested in commercial and economic subjects than in politics, and is content to devote himself to the uphill task of marketing Russian goods (he did an important deal in petroleum products in 1931, but is still whistling for the money), and securing the removal of the restrictions still imposed by the Saudi Government, in principle at least, on direct trade with Russia. He presents no appearance of wishing to make a splash, but after my departure in September 1932 he came out of his shell again and even gave a diplomatic dinner. I used to think him a good Moslem, but have modified this opinion. He, nevertheless, poses as a believer, is attentive to local personages and affects Arab head-dress. (Written in January 1933.)

M. Turakoulov hardly ever leaves this country, and his wife, a plump and blonde non-Moslem from Samara, now lives with him uninterruptedly. She engages in dispensary work in Jedda, and during a long stay they made at Taif last autumn she apparently helped to doctor the Royal harem. M. Turakoulov's own qualities tend on the whole to become more and more negative, but he gave another diplomatic dinner recently, and he no longer pretends in European society to be a strict Moslem. He will drink whisky on occasion, even in Ramadan.

### Turkey.

\*Celâl Bey has been Turkish Chargé d'Affaires for a little over a year, in which time he has spent about eight months here. He was formerly an army officer and did part of his service in the Yemen up to the time of the Turco-Italian War. He is now a man of perhaps 45 or more. He seems to know Arabic well, and, I believe, speaks Italian, but his French is elementary. He entered the Turkish foreign service some years ago and before coming to Jedda had held consular posts at Rhodes, Damascus, Cyprus and, I think, Alexandropol. From the little I know of him I should judge him to be a pleasant and easy-going man, a superficially modernised example of the old Turkish school, not highly competent in any direction. If he has any impetuosity, he shows it in the handling of his wireless sets, which are powerful but very apt to go wrong under his management. His wife, a good example of the modern Turkish woman, not spoilt by progress, could not bear Jedda. Though apparently quite attached to him, she fled after a stay of barely a month to superintend the education of their son in Istanbul, and left Celâl Bey to lead the simple life of an *ancien militaire*. This dispenses him from making any attempt to entertain while in Jedda, though he is reputed to be quite well off. (Written in January 1934.)

Celâl Bey has changed in no respect, except that one hears less of his wireless and more of the precautions which he thinks necessary to preserve his apparently excellent health. Islam sits lightly on him, as on most Moslem foreign representatives in this country. His wife has never again faced up to Jedda, but his prolonged absences enable him to see much of her elsewhere.

[E 602/602/25]

No. 8.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 4. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 7, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my confidential despatch No. 204 of the 2nd July last, relative to the activities of Mr. K. S. Twitchell, representative of the Saudi Arabia Mining Syndicate (Limited), and to Jedda report for December 1934, paragraph 304, and preceding reports, where the varying fortunes of Mr. Twitchell, engaged over a period of some six months in negotiating with the Saudi Arab Government a concession to exploit minerals in this country, have been periodically recorded. The successful conclusion of these negotiations was noticed in the report under reference and was announced in the Mecca *Umm-al-Qura* of the 28th December in a short article, which



described the concession, signed on the 23rd December, 1934, as one for the exploitation of the gold and other mineral resources of the country, with the exception of oil and other liquids, over a restricted area. The agreement, the article stated, would shortly be ratified, and thereafter the text would be published.

2. Pending the publication of the text of the concession, the following particulars, partly disclosed in conversation by Mr. Twitchell himself, and partly received from other sources, are of interest: (a) The Government are to be assigned 15 per cent. of the shares in any companies to be formed to work particular concessions, a provision which, it is gathered, proved unpalatable to Mr. Twitchell, who favoured the assignment of 15 per cent. of the initial nominal capital rather than 15 per cent. of shares actually issued, as and when issued, a point on which he found himself obliged to yield. Mr. Twitchell stated that he successfully resisted the desire of the Saudi Government to participate, to the extent of 15 per cent. of the shares, in the existing syndicate, a holding for which the Government were even prepared to pay. (b) The Government is to receive 5 per cent. of any gold eventually extracted. (c) Customs duty is to be paid at a flat rate of 10 per cent. on all material, &c., imported. (d) The area finally agreed on under the concession is, roughly, the whole of the Hejaz and Asir as far south as Birk, with the exception of certain reserved areas, notably about the Holy Cities. This general description was given by Mr. Philby, who said that the area first approved by the King extended as far as meridian 44 degrees, thus including a considerable slice of Nejd, but that it was later decided to set the eastern limits much more to the west. Mr. Twitchell, who did not allude in any detail to this point, expressed himself generally as quite satisfied with the area actually allotted. (e) The agreement, according to Mr. Twitchell, must be ratified by the syndicate, after which it will be published.

3. It is gathered that Mr. Twitchell is to be joined by M. Van de Poll, the Dutch Moslem who has for some years resided in this country, where formerly he had commercial interests in work connected with the concession, although presumably in some non-technical capacity. Mr. Twitchell left Jedda for Egypt and Syria on the 26th December and is understood to be actively engaged in making arrangements for prospecting, and, if a report from Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. that a large consignment of pit-props has been ordered through them by Mr. Twitchell is to be believed, for early mining operations as well.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 318/318/25]

No. 9.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 43.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 31, 1935.*

WITH reference to paragraph 14 of my telegram No. 8 of the 16th January regarding the proposed negotiations for a settlement of the principal questions outstanding between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Saudi Government, I now send you the following instructions regarding the question of emergency landing grounds for the Royal Air Force on the Hasa coast and that of the debts owed by the Saudi Government to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of India.

2. You are already aware from previous correspondence of the desire of the Air Ministry to obtain the landing grounds in question and should not hesitate to avail yourself of any opportunity which may present itself in the course of the negotiations in order to obtain them. At present, however, the Air Ministry are engaged in drawing up a full revised list of their desiderata. It will therefore be unnecessary for you to take any steps in connexion with this matter until you have received this list, which will be sent to you as soon as possible.

3. In regard to the settlement by the Saudi Government of their debts to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of India, in respect of the supply of arms to King Ibn Saud in 1929 and in respect of the expenses of the Macdonnell Enquiry in 1930, you should consider whether the time has not come to remind the Saudi Government of their plan for repaying these debts, which was mentioned to you by Fuad Bey Hamza on the 21st November, 1933, and which was referred to in the subsequent Saudi note as one which that Government were intending to carry out without the slightest hesitation, had it not been for recent developments in the political situation. While His Majesty's Government recognise the practical difficulty of obtaining cash payments from King Ibn Saud, it seems to them important to keep the question of these debts alive. If King Ibn Saud is made to understand that His Majesty's Government attach importance to that question, it may be that, even if early recovery of the debts proves to be impracticable, it will prove possible to secure some concrete concession in return for a further postponement. If, on the other hand, the question is dropped, he may be inclined to attribute less importance to it, and it will in consequence lose any value even as a negotiating counter.

4. I shall be glad if you will report what prospect you see of obtaining any such concrete concession by this means. His Majesty's Government might be prepared, for example, if there seemed to be little prospect of early repayment of these debts, to consider an arrangement by which a further postponement or an abatement of payment would be granted in consideration for permission to create emergency landing grounds for aircraft on the Hasa coast, or possibly in return for the grant of other Air Ministry desiderata.

I am, &c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 325/325/25]

No. 10.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, February 4, 1935.*

YOUR telegram No. 4 of the 13th January: Slavery.

Paragraphs 3 and 4. I agree that it would not be worth while to sacrifice article 7 of Treaty of Jedda in order to secure Saudi accession to article 2 (a) of International Slavery Convention. But if Saudi Government were to attempt to drive such a bargain, could it not be pointed out to them that the two articles in question do not overlap, but are complementary, one embodying Saudi Government's general willingness to suppress slave trade and the other a particular agreement to co-operate with His Majesty's Government to that end? Publicity value of accession might also perhaps be suggested. In general, while unwilling to give up hope of securing Saudi accession to article 2 (a), I am prepared to treat it as supplementary advantage to be obtained if possible, but not at the risk of weakening present treaty position or jeopardising His Majesty's Government's chances of a satisfactory general arrangement regarding slavery. Possibility of latter should be explored first.

2. Paragraph 6.—I agree.

3. Paragraph 6.—I appreciate difficulty of position, but either His Majesty's Government or Saudi Government must trust the other to take promised action after their own concession has been made. From Ibn Saud's point of view connexion between action and concession must be concealed as far as possible. His Majesty's Government, on the other hand, will not be able to justify abandonment of right of manumission except in return for real progress towards suppression of slavery, *e.g.*, either actual Saudi legislation to that end or undertaking by Ibn Saud to enact such legislation. Second alternative would presumably injure Ibn Saud's standing with his own people more seriously than the first.

4. In these circumstances do you not consider that His Majesty's Government could arrange privately with Saudi Government for enactment of necessary legislation—as to general efficacy of which they would of course have to be

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satisfied—in advance of abandonment of right of manumission, but on basis of confidential but binding guarantee that right would be given up when legislation has been enacted? You will remember that solution on these lines was suggested by Mr. Rendel to Fuad Hamza at meeting of 20th September, and that Fuad Hamza thought that something on these lines might be possible.

[E 930/318/25]

No. 11.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 10.)*

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jedda, February 9, 1935.

MY telegram No. 7.

In a further conversation on 7th February Fuad conveyed in studiously disarming language King's view that it would be preferable not to make outstanding questions the subject of general negotiations, but to deal with each on its merits as in the past. When the conversations from which the present proposal had emerged were begun last June, the King's objective was a co-ordination of general policy. His Majesty's Government had diverted the course to the settlement of outstanding questions. His Majesty feared that if such questions were dealt with by way of general negotiations, and these failed, their result would be dangerously misinterpreted.

2. After some discussion of this communication, in which I took no strong line, but was mildly critical, Fuad turned to the question of the eastern frontiers. He asked what form settlement would take. Would local Arab rulers be in any way parties to the discussion of it? He assured me that Ibn Saud had no desire to interfere between His Majesty's Government and those rulers, but said that the King must consider Moslem and Arab opinion, and must avoid any appearance of disregarding their position as Arabs.

3. I replied that His Majesty's Government had never approached the matter otherwise than as a question of determining the boundaries between Saudi Arabia and the area with which they and the local rulers were alone concerned. I stressed the fact that the latter had placed themselves in our hands as regards foreign relations.

4. Fuad said that opinion which the King had in mind was very ill-informed. He suggested that settlement would be easier if the rulers could be represented in some way, e.g., by experts, or if they would affirm their desire to be represented by His Majesty's Government.

5. In view of the new turn given to the whole matter by Fuad's communication, I refrained from pressing him for a precise statement regarding Ibn Saud's desiderata, for which I had asked on 21st January.

6. I promised Fuad a communication about Koweit, but deferred it until I could study your telegram No. 23 in the light of the previous correspondence. I said that I was awaiting instructions about the agenda for the proposed local conference at Bahrein. We touched on other questions, including that of Transjordan frontier, but only incidentally.

7. My own view is that the proposal regarding the general negotiations cannot usefully be pursued any further. I do not consider now that any of the concessions contemplated in paragraphs 8 to 10 of your telegram No. 8 would attract Ibn Saud sufficiently to induce him to give us satisfaction on the first question for the sake of such concessions. On the other hand Fuad was so profuse in assurances of the King's desire to settle all questions as to suggest that His Majesty is nervous. This may facilitate independent settlement in regard to Koweit, and possibly other matters.

8. The concessions contemplated in your telegram No. 8 were intended to form part of a comprehensive settlement of outstanding questions. If these are to be dealt with separately question arises whether His Majesty's Government are still prepared to offer them. There can be no settlement if they simply fall back on Anglo-Turkish conventions. The difficulty of settlement on any basis whatever is greatly increased by the introduction of the Arab national factor. I have explained the importance of this in my despatches Nos. 17 and 28 which should reach you about 11th and 18th February. Its significance is enhanced by

moderation of Fuad's language under the King's instructions on 7th February as compared with his private expression of his own sentiments on 20th January.

9. You may prefer to shelve the question for the present. If so, I can play for stalemate, but this presents the disadvantage that Ibn Saud will be left with a sense of grievance and dissatisfaction as to the future attitude of His Majesty's Government. The alternative is in my opinion to follow out programme in your telegram No. 8 and to work simultaneously but independently for the termination of Koweit blockade, which is the next most important outstanding question.

10. We must, however, be prepared for rejection of all the proposed concessions not merely because of the greatness of Ibn Saud's pretensions, but because of his acceptance of the principle that he must base his public action to some extent on Arab nationalist view. I have been speculating very tentatively as to the possibility of a scheme based on that of Mr. Rendel, i.e., that His Majesty's Government should promote an agreement between Ibn Saud, Sultan of Muscat and Oman, and themselves representing all rulers from Mokalla to Qatar, with the express consent of those rulers on the following general lines:—

- (a) All parties to recognise each other's independence.
- (b) All parties to recognise for a fixed period the existence of a desert zone in which none would exercise any rights of territorial sovereignty.

11. This solution may be completely impossible. I cannot say that it would be acceptable to Ibn Saud. In any case it would obviously require long preparation and possibly some sort of an eventual conference to define the desert zone and to elaborate other details. Nevertheless, I think it is worth examining.

12. I am sending a full record of the conversation by bag.  
(Repeated to India, No. 13, and Bushire, No. 20.)

[E 933/318/25]

No. 12.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 11.)*

(No. 17.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 22, 1935.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 7 of to-day, I have the honour to forward herewith a fairly full account of my conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza on the 20th and 21st January, in so far as they related to the proposed negotiations with the Saudi Government regarding the "blue line" controversy and other important outstanding questions. I will confine my detailed comments to two matters, as I have been unable so far to complete my study of your telegram No. 8 of the 17th January. The text was somewhat corrupt and Fuad Bey has taken up a great deal of my time.

2. The position as regards my suggested visit to Riyadh is worth recording. Just after I returned to Jedda on the 13th December the idea that I was going there and that I was going on important business seemed to be widespread. Mr. Philby assured me that I was to be asked and the Minister of Finance spoke on the same assumption to my Indian vice-consul. Some little time ago Mr. Philby changed his note and intimated to my wife and myself that the invitation would depend on what I brought in the way of proposals. I need hardly repeat what I have said so often, namely that Mr. Philby is by no means in the inmost political secrets of the Saudi Government, but he hears a great deal of backchat and his later remarks were made after the Amir Feisal had returned from Riyadh. Fuad Bey and the King preserved complete silence.

3. I was therefore prepared to receive no invitation, although I thought it well to be ready for one and gave you in my telegram No. 6 of the 18th January my reasons for thinking that a visit to Riyadh at this juncture would be undesirable. In the event Fuad Bey made no reference to the subject and passed without comment a remark of mine about expecting to see the King here in the latter part of March. To complete my tale of agreeable disappointment, I may say that Mr. Philby, who is shortly going to Riyadh via Medina, happened to be present when Fuad Bey called on my wife last evening and asked me whether I should be going to Riyadh with him. I passed this off with a joke about my

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inability to go via Medina without turning Moslem. Fuad Bey then asked, as he had done on at least one previous occasion, whether I still cherished an idea, of which I had once spoken to him, of visiting the Persian Gulf and asking permission to make the journey one way via Riyadh. I infer from all this that I may be asked to go there some time but not just now.

4. I turn to the more important subject of Fuad Bey's language about Arab independence. This must be considered in its general setting. Fuad Bey is, as you know, in his personal sentiments an ardent Arab nationalist. He is intimate with many who profess the same faith in Syria and Palestine. When I threw out a mention of the Amir Shekib Arslan and Ihsan Jabri on the 20th January, he dubbed them mere idealists but confessed his sympathy with their ultimate aims or some such aims, even though, as a statesman, he realised the importance of practical politics.

5. The question of Ibn Saud's position *vis-à-vis* the minor principalities east and south-east of him has become very much a question of practical politics. This makes it necessary to consider, even though one may see only as in a glass darkly, how His Majesty himself has evolved in regard to Arab nationalism during the last twelve months. You will remember the stress laid on Arab and Islamic brotherhood in the Saudi-Yemen treaty of last May. You are aware that the war, which it ended, brought a party of Palestinian, Syrian and Egyptian would-be mediators to the Court of Ibn Saud where, if they did not materially influence the issue, they had an admirable opportunity of ventilating their ideas. You know of the spurt in pan-Arabism in Syrian and Palestinian circles last summer and you know how ready many outside Arabs were after the termination of the war to acclaim the greatness and the goodness of the King. Finally you will remember Fuad Bey's language in London last September about possible rapprochements between Saudi Arabia and other Arab States as well as Iraq and his private remarks to me about Nuri Pasha As Said and the possibility of a meeting between the Pasha and Ibn Saud.

6. It is clear that the King is surrounded by influences which might tempt him in the direction of aspiring to be the Monarch of a Greater Arabia or, and perhaps more probably, to patronise the idea of a federation of independent Arab States, in which, now that King Feisal has gone, he might easily hope to be the most dominant figure besides being the most central. Whether in the depths of his own politic mind he is attracted by these temptations is uncertain; but he is not unamenable to influence and he must in any case now, more than ever, play to the Arab gallery.

7. To come back to the King's eastern neighbours, it is perhaps not sufficiently realised how this need for playing to the Arab gallery affects his attitude. He is ready enough to admit privately the importance of the British rôle in Arabia. He dare not come to an acute quarrel with Great Britain over Koweit, Bahrein, Qatar and the Trucial Sheikdoms. That being so, one might suppose that he could not object to anything so anodyne as article 6 of the Treaty of Jeddah. Nevertheless he disliked it at the time, even in the form to which it had been reduced and Fuad Bey reverted to it last year in the manner described in paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 135 of the 8th May regarding the future of the treaty. What Ibn Saud dislikes is not so much the obligation implied in the article but the public admission that his relations with "his Arab brethren" can be the concern of an alien Power. He may hope at least to lead His Majesty's Government along the path, not of disinteresting themselves, but of allowing it to appear that the relations are direct. Fuad Bey would go further perhaps and try to pave the way for a future in which the States in question might figure in Great Arabia as satellites to Ibn Saud, himself the greatest star in a constellation composed of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Yemen and possibly Muscat. Neither, I think, would go so far at present as to think of encroaching on definitely British spheres like the Aden Protectorate, but there is no limit to dreams of the ultimate.

8. One isolated remark made by Fuad Bey is worth mentioning, as it bears on our own problem in regard to the protection of the coastal principalities. He glibed at His Majesty's Government for having declared that their undertakings during the Great War to protect Asir against attack would not apply in the event of aggression by an Arabian ruler.

9. This review points generally to the conclusion that any statement of Ibn Saud's desiderata regarding his eastern and south-eastern frontiers is

unlikely to be moderate. He may, as likely as not, play for stalemate on the further discussion of that question and get back to a position in which other outstanding questions will have to be discussed on their several merits.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to his Excellency the Viceroy of India, Foreign and Political Department, and to the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 12.

*Record of Conversations held between Sir Andrew Ryan and Fuad Bey Hamza on January 20 and 21, 1935.*

I HAD a long conversation with Fuad Bey yesterday morning at his office. It was of a general and exploratory character, largely personal and unofficial, and so discursive that I cannot attempt a complete record. I ran Fuad Bey through a list of questions discussed or mentioned during the conversations in London last September. When introducing the subject, I purposely started in a minor key, expressing disappointment at the little progress made on the Saudi side. I dwelt on the unsatisfactory nature of the communications made by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba to the Foreign Office on the 3rd and 15th October regarding the "blue line" question; on the lack of any response so far to our suggestion that an effort should be made to settle the Bahrein transit question by a local conference in time to admit of its being dealt with in general negotiations if that failed; on the length of time since my return, during which I had had no opportunity of discussing serious business; and, speaking more privately, on the King's apparent omission to acknowledge my telegram of congratulations on the Id. (This last matter has since been disposed of by the discovery that a reply was sent, but delivered at the Netherlands Legation, where it was kept by mistake until to-day.)

2. Fuad Bey intimated that the King was not indisposed to agree to the proposed local conference on the Bahrein question, but would like to be informed of the questions which it was proposed to discuss. I promised to follow this up.

3. As regards the Koweit blockade question, Fuad Bey renewed the suggestion he had made in London that His Majesty's Government should make proposals. I explained the position generally, referring to the old proposal that the question should be examined by a joint Saudi-Koweiti commission, which had been side-tracked, and the sheikh's proposal for customs posts; also to the Saudi proposal of last year that Koweit should assimilate her customs tariff to that of Saudi Arabia, which had been ruled out on both economic and political grounds.

4. As regards the controversy over the eastern and south-eastern frontier of Saudi Arabia, Fuad Bey disconcerted me by approaching it from the standpoint that His Majesty's Government had undertaken, by a promise given to King Hussein, to recognise Arab independence, with reservations only as regards Basra and Aden. (If I remember rightly, he tacked this on first to what had passed about Koweit.) The whole of the conversation which ensued was more discursive and less official than the rest. The following points may be said to have emerged from the rough-and-tumble of argument, but they are stated without any attempt to reproduce the exact language used or the sequence:—

- (a) I insisted more than once that the King's imprecise but enormous claims provided no basis of agreement. I reminded Fuad Bey of his own more reasonable, though quite unofficial, suggestion for a possible frontier last year and to the incomplete frontier shown in his book (see paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 149 of the 23rd June, 1934, and last paragraph of my telegram No. 30 of the 5th March, 1934).
- (b) Fuad Bey belittled the importance of people like the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. I demurred, and suggested that, though they were now diminished in comparison with Ibn Saud, it was no reason why they should be reduced to the status of town mayors.



- (c) Fuad Bey at one moment promised a positive statement of Ibn Saud's claims. Later, he said that the Saudi Government might make considerable concessions to "their Arab brethren." I said that, if this meant that His Majesty's Government were to be regarded as having no legitimate concern, it rested on an impossible view.
- (d) Fuad Bey harped on the British promise of independence. Would we respect the independence of the Arab States in question? I said that independence was a word of variable meaning. We had by treaty control of the foreign affairs of those States. Was Fuad Bey suggesting that we had no *locus standi*, and that it was for Ibn Saud to protect their independence? Fuad Bey asked whether, if the States themselves wished it, we should leave them to deal with their own affairs. I refused to be drawn.
- (e) Fuad Bey countered my frequent references to the "blue line" by asking why I went on talking about it. He said that it had been got out of the way. I said by no means. We had discussed in London the possibility of a settlement, without too much regard to legal considerations, as part of a comprehensive settlement of outstanding questions, in regard to some of which we on our side desired satisfaction. If there were no such settlement, we should go back to the legal position, which was admittedly disputed, because there would be nothing else to go back to. My Government had approved in principle of the proposal to attempt a comprehensive settlement, although they had not drawn up a final list of subjects. What was the attitude of the Saudi Government? Fuad Bey said they would follow any procedure we wished.
- (f) I referred to the actual position east of the "blue line." I said I knew that Ibn Saud had done certain things not very far east of it. He had established Ikhwan settlements, but I knew of only two, Sikak and Anbak, which had sent representatives to the conference at Riyadh in 1929. Fuad Bey said that there were others, and mentioned Baraimi. I pointed out that I was speaking of created settlements and that Baraimi was on quite a different footing. I referred to claims founded on the collection of zakat, and suggested that they led to no conclusion. The Saudis said that the payment of zakat proved the payers to be their subjects. Others said that they had no right to collect zakat outside their territory.
- (g) I urged the importance of a settlement in regard to areas, which had previously been of little importance, in view of recent economic developments. Better a settlement now than a war over oil-fields at some later date. The Saudi Government had carefully concealed the definition of the area of the Hasa Oil Concession. Fuad Bey professed not to know what had been published or left unpublished. I expressed surprise, and reminded him that the question of the "blue line" had come up internationally in consequence of an enquiry by the United States Government. His Majesty's Government had replied, and we had informed the Saudi Government of what had passed. That enquiry had certainly not been inspired by academic curiosity about Arabia. I did not succeed in drawing Fuad Bey regarding the limits of the Hasa Concession.

5. When we were arranging our next meeting, Fuad Bey asked me to call on him again to-day. I agreed, but showed quite openly that I had hoped he would call at the Legation. Our practice has been to hold business meetings both at his office and in my study. There are many local reasons for preserving this practice. Fuad Bey invoked, however, the custom in London, and referred to an incident last September, when he had suggested my calling on him at the Savoy Hotel, and I had expressed a preference for a meeting at the Foreign Office. We both grew heated, but parted friends. The only reason for mentioning the breeze in this connexion is that, when I did call on Fuad Bey this morning, it enabled me to be, especially at the start, very stiff and formal, and thereby to try and get the question of the proposed negotiations on to firm ground. I told Fuad Bey that I should have to report to my Government and wished to be clear as how much of what had passed yesterday was to be taken as official on the

Saudi side. I read him a note of what I had deduced from our first conversation and drew his attention to certain points, notably the magnitude of the question which would arise if the Saudi Government as such contested the right of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to concern themselves in questions affecting the position between Saudi Arabia and Arab States with which we were in special relations.

6. Fuad Bey said that he regarded the whole of yesterday's conversation as unofficial, except what he had said about Bahrein and Koweit. I then asked him certain questions, a reply to which I should expect in due course, and made various observations. The questions, in the form to which I finally reduced them, were these:—

- (1) Did the Saudi Government agree to the proposal that an attempt should be made to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of the major questions outstanding between them and His Majesty's Government on the basis suggested by the latter, namely, that they were willing to consider the possibility of seeking an amicable settlement regarding the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia, without too much reference to strictly legal considerations, if it could be made part of a general settlement of all other important outstanding questions?
- (2) Would the Saudi Government confirm Fuad Bey's intimation that they were prepared to furnish a precise statement of the desiderata of King Abdul Aziz?

7. I summed up my official observations on these two matters on the following lines, saying that I was making them under instructions:—

- (1) If the comprehensive settlement were not effected, the parties could only return to their positions in regard to the legal aspects of the frontier question.
- (2) It was to be hoped that any statement regarding Ibn Saud's desiderata would not put forward claims so extensive as to offer no prospect of settlement. His Majesty's Government, while prepared for concessions, had in view moderate concessions in abatement of what they considered to be the legal position.

8. Nothing else in this second conversation is worth recording in detail. We wrangled amicably a good deal on the subject of our tiff of the previous day, and I think Fuad Bey realised that he would do well not to insist on my always going to talk business at an office which is merely a branch of an inaccessible Ministry with a Royal prince at its head; an office served only by a subordinate, however distinguished, and served quite irregularly at that. We parted like brothers, though Fuad Bey said gaily that I had always been difficult and had become more difficult than ever. He did not know what to do with me, he said. I blamed it all on him and his Government.

ANDREW RYAN.

January 21, 1935

[E 962/588/25]

No. 13.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 19.)  
Sir,

Jedda, January 27, 1935.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 12 of to-day's date, I have the honour to forward herewith a translation of the identic note addressed to my French colleague and myself by the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 18th January regarding the proposal to hold a conference to deal with technical problems connected with the Hejaz Railway. Fuad Bey Hamza handed this note to me on the 20th January, saying that he had delivered a similar note to the French Chargé d'Affaires the evening before. I delayed reporting until I had time to compare notes with the French consulate, which M. Maigret left in charge of his Syrian assistant on the 21st January, in order that our translations should agree.

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2. The translation now enclosed agrees in all material particulars with that made by the French consulate, and I have reason to hope that it is at least as accurate in detail. I am a little doubtful, however, about two points. The first relates to the words rendered "from its establishment" in paragraph 2. An alteration of the pronoun might relate the material word to the preceding word "question" and give the sense "the question of the line from its foundations" or "in its fundamental aspects." This distinction is not worth pursuing, but the second point is of great material importance. My translator has used the word "reservation" in the phrase immediately preceding the reservation formula and the word "reserve" in the formula itself. The French translator takes the same view and uses the conventional "fait toutes ses réserves" in his version of the formula. The Arabic words, however, are inflexions of two different verbal derivatives from the same root, and it might conceivably be held that the word used in the actual formula meant "preserve" rather than "reserve." I attach sufficient importance to this that I enclose a copy of the Arabic formula in case you should wish to consult experts.<sup>(1)</sup>

3. The two most striking features of the substance of the note are the evasiveness of the language used regarding the Lausanne declaration and the definiteness of the reservation, especially if the meaning I have suggested can be read into it.

4. The language of the Saudi Government regarding the Lausanne declaration must be read in conjunction with their note of the 16th March, 1929, a copy of which was enclosed in Mr. Jakins's despatch No. 83 of the 10th April, 1929. In that note they contested the validity of the declaration on various grounds, the most important of which were that it did not take account of the Wakf character of the line and the Sharia Law and that they had not themselves been a party to it. They now express readiness to modify their attitude, but I do not think that this means that they abandon the position which they took up in 1929. It means rather that they abandon the position which they took up in 1928, when they sought to insist on a discussion of the fundamental questions of the ownership and the alleged Wakf character of the railway, as a condition of discussing the technical questions.

5. I confess my own inability to see how the British and French Governments can on their side insist on the acceptance of the Lausanne declaration as a necessary preliminary to a technical conference. They did not do so in the note which their representatives addressed to the then Hejazi Government on the 12th January, 1928, in pursuance of the instructions in Foreign Office telegram No. 52 of the 29th December, 1927. What they did later was to say that, if the question of ownership, &c., were to be discussed, they could only be discussed on the basis of the declaration, but the third paragraph of Sir Austen Chamberlain's despatch No. 234 of the 26th November, 1928, shows that they were still prepared for a resumption of the purely technical conference without laying down other conditions than that it should have the limited scope contemplated in their proposals of the 12th January, 1928. It appears to me to be difficult now to enforce a different view, and I think that the Saudi Government have some ground for considering that they could not accept the Lausanne declaration without prejudice to the question of the status of the railway, which they wish to reserve.

6. Quite apart from these considerations, it seems to me that the British and French authorities might be considerably embarrassed if, after a technical conference had taken place on the basis of that declaration, Ibn Saud then held us to the strict letter of the declaration and insisted on an advisory board at Medina.

7. It is all the more important to examine closely the form given to the Saudi reservation in the enclosed note, as their own contentions regarding its status and character have in the past been more positive than any counter-statements by the British and French Governments in correspondence with the Saudi Government. The two Governments have relied on the Lausanne declaration, but that declaration did not in terms define the status of the railway. It merely affirmed its religious character and assumed that its ownership had passed to the succession States. I am aware of the strong arguments in favour of this assumption, but I am now concerned only with what has passed between us and the Saudi Government.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

8. My conclusion, which I state with some diffidence, is that the question of acceptance of the Lausanne declaration as a basis of the technical conference should not be pressed; but that the reply to the Saudi reservation should be most carefully considered so as to make it clear (a) that it is allowed to stand on record as a reservation and nothing more; (b) that His Majesty's Government and the French Government do not accept the claims implied in the reservation; and (c) that if the Saudi Government should at any time reopen the question of the status and the character of the line, they would be on their side entirely free to contest these Saudi claims.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 13.

*Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir A. Ryan.*

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs,*

*Mecca, Shawwal 13, 1353 (January 18, 1935).*

THE great importance which the question of the repair of the Hejaz Railway Line and the resumption of train services thereon to Medina holds in the eyes of the Moslem world and in the eyes of the Governments through whose territories the line passes, and more especially in the eyes of the Government of His Majesty the King, is not unknown. Nor is it unknown that the question of the repair of the part of the line located within the dominions of His Majesty the King and its reopening has already been discussed. For this purpose the Conference of Haifa was held and was attended by representatives of the Governments concerned; but the divergence of their views on political matters relating to the unity, status and the future of the privileges conferred on the line prevented their reaching a satisfactory result. The line has since that time remained in its ruined state and no benefit could be derived from it, neither could the objects for which it was originally established be realised.

My Government had suggested in the correspondence exchanged between them and the British and French Governments immediately after the break-up of the Haifa Conference, ending with the note dated the 15th Shawwal, 1347 (the 16th March, 1929), that the conference should be resumed by plenipotentiaries deputed by the Governments concerned and empowered to discuss and settle the question of the line from its establishment and not limited, as was the case in the Conference of Haifa, to the consideration of the technical part relating to the repair of the line, the resumption of train services and the details that come under the same head. The British and French Governments, however, did not agree to that suggestion, and insisted upon the point that any discussions my Government desire to enter into regarding the Hejaz Railway should be based on the Lausanne declaration of the 27th January, 1923. The result of the adherence of each party to its point of view was that the question has till recently been relegated to one side.

My Government have already explained their definite attitude regarding the said Lausanne declaration, but, being desirous that their persistence in this attitude of theirs should not be an obstacle in the way of the repair of the line and the resumption of train services, and being convinced of the great advantage which will be enjoyed by pilgrims generally, and in particular by the countries through which the line runs, have found it better to modify their former attitude and to accept an intermediate solution in order to reconcile the viewpoints of all concerned, and have decided to agree to the separation of political matters relating to the line, namely, its ownership, unity, privileges, and the like, from the technical matters relating to the repair of the line and the resumption of services. In accordance with the readiness shown by the British and French Governments, by the oral communications conveyed by your Excellency, to agree to a renewal of discussions on technical matters, as had already been decided before the Conference of Haifa was held, the Government of His Majesty the



King desire to make the following reservation in regard to other than technical questions :—

"The Government of His Majesty the King reserve their full rights in the matters relating to the ownership, unity and privileges, &c., of the line and (their right) to raise these questions at a suitable time with the authorities concerned, and agree now to the holding of a conference, of which the time and place will be fixed, for the discussion of the technical matters upon which depend the repair of the line and the resumption of train services."

I should be very grateful if your Excellency would be good enough to communicate this to the British and French Governments, and to inform me in due course of the place and time which they suggest for holding this conference, in order that the Government of His Majesty the King may take the necessary steps for their participation therein.

I have the honour to add that a true copy of this has been sent to-day to your French colleague, and I take this opportunity to offer my best compliments and highest respects.

FEISAL,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 967/7/25]

No. 14.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 11.)*

(No. 25.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 29, 1935.

THERE has been no occasion for some time past to deal in any separate despatch with the general internal situation in this country. Such meagre information as has been available and such rumours as have seemed to deserve attention have been embodied in the monthly Jedda reports. In chapter I of the report for December reference was made to the presence of various high personages at Mecca and the dissension and muddle thought to exist there. It now begins to emerge that various important matters of internal policy have been under consideration, and some of the results are gradually coming to light.

2. One of these results has been the publication in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 25th January of a decree regarding the readmission of *émigrés*, a translation of which I enclose. On the face of it, it is a document of considerable importance. Closer examination suggests a good deal of doubt as to its real scope, and the doubt is the more difficult to resolve, as the unofficial comments in the *Umm-al-Qura* are merely laudatory, and, if one can speak of such a thing as public opinion, its attitude towards such announcements is apt to be one of sceptical inertia.

3. The heading of the decree describes it as a general pardon or amnesty, and the word pardon recurs in article 2, but article 1 contains nothing in the nature of an amnesty for political offences, nor does it indicate the conditions to be imposed on *émigrés* taking advantage of it. It is clear that it should enable certain persons to return whose absence has been due to the general political situation resulting from the change of régime, *e.g.*, various members of the Shereefian family, and perhaps some persons who served the Hashimite Government, but have not been active abroad. Such persons will doubtless be expected to give assurances of their submission to the present régime and of their acceptance of Saudi nationality.

4. It is much more doubtful whether the decree amounts to an assured amnesty for persons, of the Dabbagh type, who have conspired against Ibn Saud, or for tribal personages who have been concerned in past revolts.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to his Excellency the Viceroy of India, Foreign and Political Department; his Excellency the High Commissioner for Transjordan; His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad; the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire; His Majesty's Chief Commissioner at Aden; His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt; and his Excellency the Governor-General of the Sudan at Khartum.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 14.

*Extract from the Mecca Umm-al-Qura of Shawwal 19, 1353 (January 25, 1935).*

ROYAL DECREE No. 23.1.19.

*In respect of General Pardon granted to Political Deportees.*

(Translation.)

WE, Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdurrahman-al-Feysal-al-Saud, King of the Saudi Arab Kingdom, having placed our reliance on God,

In view of the fact that we desire all people of our nation to aid each other and to co-operate in serving their home and nation, and in view of the disappearance of the reasons which had caused the imposition of certain restrictions and measures directed against some people of this country living abroad, to prevent them from returning to their country and residing therein, we hereby give the following orders :—

Article 1. Measures taken against some of our subjects who are prevented from entering, residing in or returning to the country are to be abolished, and those who wish to return, enter and reside should be allowed to do so if they fulfil the conditions imposed in this respect.

Art. 2. Any person who desires to avail himself of the pardon granted in article 1 should approach the Government in this respect either direct or through one of their representatives abroad for the accomplishment of the necessary action.

Art. 3. The Ministers of the Interior and Foreign Affairs should see this, our order, enforced.

Issued on the seventh day of Shawwal 1353 (12th January, 1935).

[E 980/980/25]

No. 15.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 12.)*

(No. 27.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 29, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 92 of the 23rd March, 1933, regarding the relations between the Saudi Arab Government and the Soviet, I have the honour to state that a Soviet official named Guertik has been attached for commercial work to the Soviet Legation here for three or four weeks past. I gathered at first that he might be a permanent addition to the staff, but it now seems more likely that he will not stay long and is merely on a tour of inspection. This is borne out by a statement in the Aden Intelligence Report for the fortnight ending the 2nd January that he is expected at Hodeida shortly. He is there described as "inspector-general of Russian oil business."

2. The following is a summary of an account given of M. Guertik by the local manager of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited): He appeared to be agreeable, unaggressive and less reserved than many Soviet officials. He disclaimed any idea of launching a commercial offensive and declared: "Je ne veux pas la lutte." He discussed with Mr. Black the position in regard to certain staple imports here and appeared to recognise that in some lines, *e.g.*, sugar and petrol, the Soviet trading organisations would find it difficult to compete in Saudi Arabia at present prices. M. Guertik seemed to be interested in the marketing of Soviet manufactured goods and actually sounded Mr. Black as to whether Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited) would accept an agency for their sale.

3. It may be worth mentioning that another Russian commercial expert named Kondrachoff recently visited Jedda. He is a member of the Soviet Agency in the Yemen and stayed here only a short time, awaiting an opportunity of proceeding to Russia via Port Sudan.

4. Apart from the above facts, I have observed no recent signs of any special activity on the part of the Russian Legation here. The Soviet Government may, however, be planning a fresh commercial campaign and there have been some indications of a desire on the part of the Legation to cultivate relations with the powerful Saudi Minister of Finance. On the other hand, there was a story last



October that the Soviet Minister gave as one reason for hesitating to commit himself to a ten years' contract for a house the possibility that his Government might at any time abolish his post.

5. I take the opportunity of mentioning that the personnel of the Soviet Legation, not including M. Guertik, is now composed as follows:—

Nezir Turakoulov, Minister, Moslem, with a non-Moslem wife.  
Shakir Ismailoff, Moslem, with wife, possibly Moslem.  
Dr. Toukov-Rowanski, doctor, with wife, non-Moslems.  
Morsen, dentist.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, His Majesty's Chief Commissioner, Aden, and to the Government of India (Foreign and Political Department).

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.

[E 934/318/25]

No. 16.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 11.)*

(No. 28.)

Sir,

Jedda, January 29, 1935.

SINCE writing my despatch No. 17 of the 22nd January, I have studied more closely than I had previously been able to do paragraphs 6 to 11 of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 8 of the 17th January regarding the proposed negotiations with the Saudi Government, that is to say, the paragraphs which deal more particularly with the question of Ibn Saud's eastern and south-eastern frontiers. As you know, I have already taken action in the sense of paragraph 6 of the telegram and am now awaiting the reaction of the Saudi Government. As I do not anticipate rapid developments, I submit by despatch some general observations on paragraphs 6 to 11.

2. If the reaction of the Saudi Government indicates any readiness on their part to be content with moderate concessions, I propose to go on at once to the second stage in the programme. I have not the smallest hope of effecting a settlement on that basis, but as the stage has to be gone through, I suggest that it would be better not to define the suggested boundary with reference to points so geographically uncertain as the head of the Khor-al-Odaid and the north-western extremity of Aqal. The head of Dohat-al-Salwa, Sakak and Banaiyan are more determinate. Would it not produce the same practical result, if we proposed a line from the head of Dohat-al-Salwa to a point, say, 5 miles, north-east of Sakak, thence to a point, say, 5 miles, west of Banaiyan and thence due south to parallel 20 degrees north? As for the further course of such a line, I do not quite understand the word "gradually" in paragraph 8 of your telegram, and I should prefer to avoid any mention of the violet line as such, in view of Ibn Saud's hatred of the Anglo-Turkish agreements. It might be better simply to suggest a line running south-west from the terminal on parallel 20 degrees of the north-to-south line.

3. The proposals in paragraphs 9 and 10 of your telegram present, subject to what I shall have to say presently about paragraph 11, a slightly better prospect of success. I am, however, doubtful, now that I have tried to reproduce it on a map, of the effect of Mr. Rendel's suggestion in his letter to Mr. Laithwaite of the 7th November as regards the south-western end of the more easterly boundary of the "desert zone," which may now become the proposed boundary of a desert zone or of territory conceded to Ibn Saud in full sovereignty. Mr. Rendel's suggestion was, of course, at the time purely tentative. Once it has been adopted as a basis of possible proposals, it would help me to have a more accurate notion of how it would operate in the south-west. I realise the difficulty there may be at present in determining the northern terminal of the boundary between the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and the Aden Protectorate and the further difficulty arising from the fact that the Saudi-Yemen frontier is not defined further east than Najran. By the time this reaches you, His Majesty's Government may have further information on the former subject and may perhaps be able to produce a sketch-map of the suggested desert zone.

4. Whatever frontier be proposed, I anticipate great difficulty in connexion with paragraph 11 of your telegram, for reasons which emerge generally from my despatch No. 17 of the 22nd January. If Ibn Saud is formally to renounce rights beyond any of the lines suggested, we shall at once be faced with the question: "In whose favour is he asked to renounce them?" I will not elaborate this consideration now, but the question is likely to be crucial, owing to Ibn Saud's difficulty in publicly recognising anything in the nature of a purely British sphere in South-Eastern Arabia and our own difficulty in either relinquishing our interest in the coastal rulers or claiming sovereignty for them up to the lines we propose.

5. I should be grateful if I may be informed by telegraph when this despatch has reached you.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the Viceroy of India, Foreign and Political Department, and the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire.

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.

[E 567/350/24]

No. 17.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 15, 1935.

YOUR telegram No. 23 of the 9th February: Anglo-Saudi relations.

I have no objection to your reverting to separate simultaneous settlement of outstanding points as suggested in paragraph 9 of your telegram. In that case, however, you will no doubt consider possibility of following up suggestion you yourself made at end of Middle-East Official Sub-Committee meeting of 8th November, that discussion of Koweit blockade question should be taken first.

2. Paragraphs 2-5 of your telegram. It is, I suppose, possible that Ibn Saud may be allowing Fuad his head in order to see how much he can extract from His Majesty's Government, but that if His Majesty's Government react violently, Ibn Saud will tighten rein. In any case, it must be made clear to Saudi Government once for all that His Majesty's Government will not abandon their established policy in the Persian Gulf in order that Ibn Saud may play with greater effect to the pan-Arab gallery, of whose intelligence they hold the same estimate as Fuad. If the King seriously intends to press this point, negotiations on frontier question will not be possible, and a serious question affecting Anglo-Saudi relations as a whole will arise. It is therefore essential to disabuse Fuad on this point without delay.

3. I approve generally your language to Fuad on this question. His queries recorded in paragraph 4 (d) of the enclosure in your despatch No. 17 of 22nd January were impertinent. If he should again allude to promise given to King Hussein (I assume he refers to McMahon-Hussein correspondence), short answer is that in that correspondence His Majesty's Government expressly reserved their rights under their treaties with Arab rulers of Persian Gulf. These treaties have been officially communicated to Saudi Government.

4. While speaking generally in the above sense with whatever degree of firmness you consider necessary to drive home the main point, viz., refusal of His Majesty's Government to be exploited in the pan-Arab interest, you may see fit to add that for their own part, as Ibn Saud is aware, His Majesty's Government have constantly been at pains to promote good relations between Arab States. It is for this reason that they attach particular importance to question of Koweit blockade, settlement of which they hope to negotiate with Saudi Government even if general negotiations are abandoned.

5. Scheme for general agreement proposed in paragraph 10 of your telegram under reference is being considered in connexion with your despatch No. 28 of 29th January, on which I hope to address you shortly.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 29. Repeated to Government of India, No. 21, and Bushire, No. 11.)



*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 20.)*

Sir,

*India Office, February 19, 1935.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to refer to Bushire despatch of the 21st December and connected correspondence, copies of which have been sent from time to time to the Foreign Office, on the subject of the negotiations which took place last year between the Sheikh of Koweit and Messrs. Traders (Limited) for an oil concession over Koweit territory.

2. The Secretary of State agrees with Colonel Fowle that the two points in respect of which the conduct of the sheikh is open to criticism are—

- (a) That in face of the warning conveyed to him by Colonel Dickson on the 23rd April, 1934, he entered into and conducted negotiations with Traders (Limited) without consulting His Majesty's Government; and
- (b) That he broke his promise to the Koweit Oil Company not to conduct negotiations with any other party for three months as from the 14th June, 1934.

3. As regards the second of these points, the Secretary of State is prepared to assume that there may have been some genuine misunderstanding in the mind of the sheikh as to the date from which the period of three months during which he undertook not to conduct negotiations with any other party was to run. The matter is in any case one primarily between the sheikh and the Koweit Oil Company, and subject to Sir John Simon's views, the Secretary of State agrees with the Resident that it is unnecessary to take it up with his Excellency.

4. As regards the first point, the Secretary of State takes a serious view of the conduct of the sheikh, both in entering into negotiation with Traders (Limited) in face of the explicit warning given him on behalf of His Majesty's Government on the 23rd April, 1934, and in failing to disclose to His Majesty's Government or their local representatives until a very late stage the existence or nature of the negotiations in question. The result, as Sir John Simon is aware, has been to produce a situation which might well have placed His Majesty's Government in a difficult position, and which may even now have embarrassing reactions for them.

5. Subject to the views of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of State agrees, in these circumstances, that the Resident should be authorised to write to the sheikh in the terms of the draft enclosed in his despatch of the 21st December. He would, however, suggest that the last sentence of the second paragraph of that draft should be strengthened in the following sense (the exact wording to be left to the Resident): "In these circumstances His Majesty's Government have instructed me to inform your Excellency that they take a serious view of your disregard to their wishes in this matter having regard both to your treaty obligations and to the pains which, as you are aware, His Majesty's Government have throughout these long and troublesome negotiations taken to safeguard your Excellency's interests in this matter. On their instructions I am addressing your Excellency separately as to the steps to be taken to avoid any similar misunderstandings in the future."

6. The incident under consideration in this letter has emphasised the extremely loose wording of the specific engagement which precludes the sheikh from granting any oil concessions in respect of his territory save with the approval of His Majesty's Government. This latter point is one which is still of some importance, since, as Sir John Simon is aware, while the oil concession granted to the Koweit Oil Company covers the whole of Koweit proper, no concession has yet been granted in respect of the Koweit neutral zone.

7. The Secretary of State would therefore suggest, subject to Sir John Simon's views, that (not only by way of bringing home to the sheikh the view held by His Majesty's Government of his conduct in the present case, but on general grounds) the opportunity should be taken to tighten control in respect of oil (and possibly other) concessions in Koweit, and that the sheikh, simultaneously with the receipt of the letter referred to in paragraph 5 above, should be required to enter into an amended undertaking in regard to the grant

of concessions, the effect of which would be that he undertook to grant no concession and enter into no discussion with any party in regard to a concession save with the prior approval of His Majesty's Government, who should be kept fully informed confidentially of all details in regard to any such negotiations. The line might be taken with the sheikh that the misunderstanding which had occurred in connexion with Traders (Limited) (one unfortunate result of which had been to involve the sheikh in the displeasure of His Majesty's Government) had emphasised the importance of a clearer understanding as to the position, and that it was in these circumstances that His Majesty's Government thought it desirable that his undertakings to them in regard to the grant of concessions should be expressed in a clear and unambiguous form, which would prevent a recurrence of the unfortunate confusion which had arisen in connexion with the recent oil negotiations.

8. In view of the fact that the Principality of Koweit is under British protection, its growing political and strategic importance, and the necessity of maintaining effective control over its external relations, the Secretary of State has also had under his consideration the question whether it might not be desirable to take up without further delay the question of substituting for the series of letters and informal undertakings by which relations between His Majesty's Government and Koweit are at present regulated a comprehensive treaty on the lines of the treaty with Qatar of 1916. Sir John Simon will remember that the advantage of a consolidating treaty of this type (which would, of course, involve no addition to the commitments of His Majesty's Government in regard to Koweit), was accepted in a letter from this Office to the Foreign Office, dated the 1st February, 1934, and in a letter from the Foreign Office to this Office, dated the 24th February, 1934, but that it was decided to leave the matter over until further progress had been made with the questions of the relations between the sheikh and King Ibn Saud and of the oil concessions in respect of Koweit itself and its neutral zone. The grant of an oil concession for Koweit has removed the most important of these reasons for delay; there is some prospect that an arrangement may be reached in the near future in regard to the Koweit blockade (though the attitude adopted by the sheikh on the question of his claims against Ibn Saud may prove an obstacle to this); and the question of the neutral zone oil concession, a decision of which may well be deferred for some considerable time, is not perhaps of great importance from this standpoint. On the other hand, the fact that the Koweit Oil Company, with its substantial American element, may shortly be commencing operations in the State appears to furnish an additional argument for embodying the relations between the sheikh and His Majesty's Government at as early a date as possible in a regular treaty, to which reference could be made in the event of any challenge to our position by foreign interests. Subject to Sir John Simon's views, the Secretary of State would, in these circumstances, be disposed to suggest that the Government of India and the Political Resident should be consulted on the question of approaching the sheikh without further delay in regard to a consolidating treaty on the lines already discussed.

9. The Secretary of State directs me to say, in conclusion, that, in considering the question of sanctions, if any, to be applied in respect of the sheikh's conduct in his dealings with Traders (Limited), he would have felt in a much stronger position had it not been for the fact that, so long as the question of the sheikh's date gardens in Iraq remains in an uncertain state, it is open to his Excellency to reply to any criticism advanced by His Majesty's Government of his failure to comply with his engagements, that His Majesty's Government on their side have failed to honour the pledges formally given by them. The present case is an illustration of the difficulties with which His Majesty's Government may be faced in dealing with Koweit so long as this question remains open, and in Sir Samuel Hoare's view, which he feels confident will be shared by Sir John Simon, it is a further argument for leaving nothing undone to secure the earliest possible disposal of the questions both of title and of exemption from taxation which are in issue in that matter.

I am, &c.

J. G. LAITHWAITE.



Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Fowle to India Office.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Koweit, December 21, 1934.

IN amplification of telegram, dated the 16th December, 1934, from the Political Agent, Koweit, I have the honour to enclose copy of a letter, dated the 20th December, 1934, from him, and of its enclosures, regarding the Sheikh of Koweit's negotiations with Traders (Limited).

2. It will be seen from the sheikh's letter, dated the 16th December, 1934, that his Excellency confirms generally the information communicated by Traders (Limited) to the India Office, but denies that his letter of the 2nd September, 1934, to Mr. Gabriel can be read as the grant of a concession to that company, and from his letter, dated the 15th December, 1934, that Mr. Gabriel's translation of the sheikh's letter to him, dated the 2nd September, 1934, is correct.

3. The criticisms against the sheikh are—

(a) That in the face of the warning conveyed to him by Colonel Dickson on the 23rd April, 1934, he conducted negotiations with Traders (Limited) without consulting His Majesty's Government.

(b) That he broke his promise to the Koweit Oil Company not to conduct negotiations with any other party for three months as from the 14th June, 1934.

4. With regard to (b) above, the sheikh maintains that he made it clear to Messrs. Chisholm and Holmes that the period of three months expired at the end of August. In any case, as the difference in time is only a fortnight, and as the matter is one between the sheikh and the company, I do not think that this point need be taken up with the sheikh.

5. As regards (a) (*vide* his letter of the 16th December, 1934), I do not think that the sheikh's explanation is a satisfactory one. In the first place, he could have mentioned the fact of these negotiations, without going into details, to Major Watts, who knows sufficient Arabic to understand such a communication; or to Colonel Loch, who can speak Arabic, when he was here at the end of September. Moreover, he did not inform Colonel Dickson, who had returned to Koweit on the 16th October, about these negotiations until the middle of November. In the second place, when he did inform Colonel Dickson, he did not divulge the name of the company, and merely stated that he had been approached by the company, not that he had intimated to them as far back as the 2nd September that, subject to their securing the approval of His Majesty's Government, and their acceptance of certain conditions, he himself approved the terms of the concession and was prepared to sign it.

6. I suggest, therefore, that I may be authorised to write to the sheikh in the terms of the enclosed draft.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Government of India and the Political Agent, Koweit.

I have, &amp;c.

T. C. FOWLE,

*Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson to Political Resident, Koweit.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Koweit, December 20, 1934.

WITH reference to your printed letter, dated the 10th December, and India Office telegram of the 12th December, 1934, instructing me to take action (*vide* Secretary of State for India's telegram, dated the 4th December, 1934), I have the honour to enclose copies of correspondence, which is self-explanatory.

I have, &amp;c.

H. R. P. DICKSON,

*Political Agent, Koweit.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 18.

*Confidential Letter, dated December 14, 1934, from the Political Agent, Koweit, to His Excellency the Ruler of Koweit.*

(After compliments.)

I HAVE the honour to address your Excellency on the following important matter:—

His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London, has directed me by telegram, through the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to inform your Excellency that he has received a letter, dated the 28th November, 1934, from a certain firm calling themselves Messrs. Traders (Limited), of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England, in which the latter state that your Excellency has granted an oil concession to them covering the whole of Koweit territory, subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, and further request that the formal and official approval of His Majesty's Government be given to the grant of such concession, and that your Excellency be informed accordingly.

2. As enclosures to their letter, Messrs. Traders (Limited) also sent the following three appendices:—

- (a) A list of the companies and gentlemen associated with their application.
- (b) Copy of the "terms" agreed upon between your Excellency and the aforesaid firm.
- (c) English translation of an autograph letter granting the oil concession to Messrs. Traders (Limited), said to have been sent by your Excellency to Mr. Gabriel, advocate of Basra.

3. His Majesty's Secretary of State for India directs me to ascertain from your Excellency without delay whether you confirm or otherwise the information given by the firm in question, namely, Messrs. Traders (Limited).

4. I would request, therefore, that your Excellency be so good as to give me a very early reply to His Majesty's Secretary of State's question, as I have been asked to send a telegraphic answer to London and to Bushire.

(Usual ending.)

Enclosure 4 in No. 18.

*Confidential Letter, dated December 14, 1934, from the Political Agent, Koweit, to His Excellency the Ruler of Koweit.*

(After compliments.)

REFERENCE my confidential letter of to-day's date regarding the statement of Messrs. Traders (Limited), that your Excellency had granted them an oil concession, and that you had sent a letter to this effect to Mr. Gabriel, a copy of which was sent to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India by the said company.

2. I am directed by His Majesty's Government to remind your Excellency that on the 23rd April, 1934, I visited your Excellency at "Bayan," and read out to your Excellency (word for word) telegram No. 963, dated the 17th April, from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, in which, amongst other things, I was instructed "to remind your Excellency that you were not at liberty to grant any oil whatsoever to anyone without the prior consent of His Majesty's Government," and further, "that His Majesty's Government would expect your Excellency to consult them before you even opened any negotiations with any company."

3. I am further directed by His Majesty's Government to draw your attention to the fact that on the 14th June, 1934, your Excellency gave "your promise" to Messrs. Holmes and Chisholm, negotiators of the Koweit Oil Company, "that for three months, as from that date, you would not receive or consider offers for an oil concession from any party other than themselves," which promise was officially communicated by the representatives of the Koweit Oil



Company to this agency in their letter dated the 16th June, 1934, and by the Political Agent to the Hon. the Political Resident on the 18th June (telegram No. 215), and by the Hon. the Political Resident to His Majesty's Government in London on the 20th June (telegram No. 568).

4. I am therefore instructed by His Majesty's Government to ask your Excellency to explain the circumstances under which you secretly carried on negotiations with Messrs. Traders (Limited), and also addressed your letter dated the 2nd September, 1934, to Agoob Effendi (Mr. Gabriel), advocate, of Basra, in face of His Majesty's Government's warning, as stated in paragraph 2 above, and in face of your Excellency's "guarantee" to the Koweit Oil Company negotiators, as stated in paragraph 3 above.

5. Lastly, I would request that your Excellency give me as early a reply as possible, as His Majesty's Government desire a telegraphic reply.

(Usual ending.)

Enclosure 5 in No. 18.

*Confidential Letter, dated December 14, 1934, from the Political Agent, Koweit, to His Excellency the Ruler of Koweit.*

(After compliments.)

REFERENCE my letters of to-day's date, as well as my verbal conversation with your Excellency regarding the communication of Messrs. Traders Company (Limited), to His Majesty's Secretary of State, and also regarding the letter of the 2nd September, which your Excellency wrote to Agoob Effendi (Mr. Gabriel) at Basra.

I am directed by the Hon. the Political Resident (under orders of His Majesty's Government) to request you to ask Agoob Effendi (Mr. Gabriel) by telegraph to come to Koweit at once, and bring with him the original of the autograph letter dated the 2nd September, 1934, which your Excellency sent him, in order that I may compare same with the translation which was made by Mr. Gabriel for Messrs. Traders (Limited), and which was forwarded to His Majesty's Government by the latter company.

(Usual ending.)

Enclosure 6 in No. 18.

*Translation of a Confidential Letter, dated Ramadan 8, 1353, corresponding to December 15, 1934, from the Ruler of Koweit to the Political Agent, Koweit.*

(After compliments.)

I HAVE, with pleasure, received your letter dated the 7th instant (the 14th December, 1934), and understood the order issued by the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, under instructions of His Majesty's Government, that I should ask Agoob Effendi to come to Koweit and bring with him the original of the letter dated the 2nd September, 1934, which I sent to him, so that you may compare same with the translation he made for Messrs. Traders Company.

I beg, therefore, to enclose copies of two letters, which I sent to the said Agoob, one dated the 2nd September, 1934, and the other the 5th Ramadan, 1353 (the 12th December, 1934), from which you will be able to know the manner in which negotiations were carried on in respect of the above-mentioned company.

I may further mention that, to-day, I telegraphed to the said Agoob, regarding my coming to terms with the Koweit Oil Company (Limited).

(Usual ending.)

Enclosure 7 in No. 18.

*Translation of a Letter dated September 2, 1934 (Jamad Auwal 22, 1353), from the Ruler of Koweit to Mr. Gabriel, Advocate, Basra.*

(After compliments.)

My dear Agoob Effendi,

I HAVE received two copies of the concession. One I have retained and the other I have sent to you, so that you may despatch it to the company and advise them to communicate with His Majesty King George's Government in London, and submit the said copy to them. Should His Majesty's Government agree to the same, they may telegraph to the Political Agent, Koweit, to this effect. I myself accept the terms of the concession and shall affix my signature to them when I hear the result from the Political Agent, Koweit, namely, that His Majesty's Government have approved the concession agreement and had agreed to it, provided always that you give me your word that the company shall agree to the points marked with red pencil on the Arabic text of the concession.

Enclosure 8 in No. 18.

*Translation of a Letter dated Ramadan 5, 1353 (December 12, 1934), from the Ruler of Koweit to Mr. Gabriel, Advocate, Basra.*

(After compliments.)

I HAVE received your letter dated the 28th Sha'ban 1353 (6th December, 1934), and have understood what you stated regarding the contents of the letter received from your company.

I should therefore inform you that Messrs. Holmes and Chisholm's Company have agreed to all my demands. I have been so long alleging pretexts to them for my delaying of their question that I have become verily ashamed of the abundance of my promises. All this time I have been waiting for your company to make a move, but up to date, unfortunately, I have not received from them anything of a satisfactory nature that I can depend on. It is not I, therefore, who have failed your company by delay. Actually, the matter has not as yet been quite settled with Messrs. Holmes and Chisholm's Company, but it is on the point of being so finally settled. I cannot now refuse them at this stage. You will have to excuse me, after all.

You state you have got some references to make, which you prefer not to expose by writing, but will personally disclose them to me; and that on account of press of business you could not proceed (come to Koweit). Permit me to say that your business (i.e., looking after my date gardens) concerns you more than anything else. You will, Insha'Allah, do your best in the administration of same. There is no longer need for you to come now.

(Usual ending.)

Enclosure 9 in No. 18.

*Translation of a Letter dated Ramadan 9, 1353, corresponding to December 16, 1934, from the Ruler of Koweit to the Political Agent, Koweit.*

(After compliments.)

I HAVE, with pleasure, received your letter dated the 7th instant (14th December, 1934), and have understood what you have stated with regard to the contents of the telegram emanating from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in London, and dealing with the letter dated the 28th November, which he received from a certain firm calling themselves Messrs. Traders Company (Limited), and with what the said company had stated, namely, that I had granted to them an oil concession covering the whole of the Koweit territory,



subject to the formal and official approval of His Majesty's Government to the grant of such a concession. That, also, the said company had enclosed in their letter three appendices, namely:—

- (a) A list of the companies and gentlemen associated with their application.
- (b) A copy of the "terms" agreed upon between me and the said company.
- (c) An English translation of a letter emanating from me, granting an oil concession to the said company, which was forwarded through Mr. Gabriel, advocate, of Basra.

And that finally His Majesty's Secretary of State for India had directed you to ascertain from me whether I confirmed or otherwise the aforesaid statement.

I accordingly beg to lay before you the real facts. During negotiations with Messrs. Holmes and Chisholm, and at one of our first meetings, Mr. Gabriel, the lawyer, was in Koweit. He informed me then that there was a British firm which desired to take the Koweit oil concession and on terms which would satisfy me. I told him (Mr. Gabriel) then that negotiations were in progress with Messrs. Holmes and Chisholm, and that they had asked my leave to depart in order to consult with their company on certain points (in London), and that a decision had been arrived at between them and myself (to postpone negotiations) till the end of August 1934, during which period I was not at liberty to open negotiations with anybody else. That when that period expired, if the company he (Mr. Gabriel) represented was a purely British concern, he could communicate with them, but on the one condition that they should apply, through their local representative (in England) to His Majesty's Government for the issue of an order to me, as without such an order I could not see my way to grant any concession.

After Messrs Holmes and Chisholm had left (for England) and after the time limit which I promised had expired, namely, on the 30th August, 1934, the said Mr. Gabriel brought me two copies of the terms of the concession (of Traders (Limited)). I examined these terms and found them suitable. I next wrote on the 2nd September to Mr. Gabriel, a copy of which, giving exact wording, I forwarded to you under my letter dated the 8th instant (15th December, 1934). Was there, I ask, anything in the wording of that letter from me to justify the company in assuming (as they have done) that I had actually granted them the concession?

(Usual ending.)

Enclosure 10 in No. 18.

*Translation of a Letter dated Ramadan 9, 1353, corresponding to December 16, 1934, from His Excellency the Ruler of Koweit to the Political Agent, Koweit.*

(After compliments.)

I HAVE, with pleasure, received your letter dated the 7th instant (14th December, 1934), and have understood what you stated therein, namely, that you had been directed by His Majesty's Government to ask me to explain the circumstances under which I secretly carried on negotiations, which were contrary to the warning you conveyed to me at "Bayan," under instructions of His Majesty's Government, and to the promise I gave to Messrs. Holmes and Chisholm, which the latter communicated to you in their letter dated the 16th June, 1934.

I beg to say that, God willing (Insha'Allah), I will never go against an order of His Majesty's Government and that I do and shall always obey the behests of His Majesty's Government, in every respect. The nature of the negotiations that had taken place were as outlined in my letter to you dated the 8th instant (15th December, 1934). Indeed, at the time, I wished to inform Major Watts of these negotiations, but they were of a very secret nature and as he did not know Arabic, and discussions with him had to be carried on by means of an interpreter, I kept the knowledge of them to myself, for fear of being betrayed. On your return (from England) we both were kept very busy for some time, with date-garden questions, but soon afterwards I informed you verbally and very confidentially of everything. I trust you informed His Majesty's Government at the time of what I told you.

As regards my promise to Messrs. Holmes and Chisholm that it was for a period of three months with effect from the 14th June, 1934, as they presumed to be the case in their letter (which you showed me), I admit that I gave a promise to the said gentlemen, but I carefully told them that the period would expire at the end of August 1934. It was I who disclosed to them that I had received a telegram from a British firm in London which desired to negotiate for a concession. This also you heard from me. Further, I warned them that should they fail to settle the question with me within this period (i.e., by the 30th August, 1934), I should be compelled to open negotiations with the above-mentioned new company. These are the real facts.

I have never thought, nor would I think, of going against His Majesty's Government's orders, because I am quite sure that His Majesty's Government have got no other intention or wish than the peace and welfare of ourselves and our country. We are always most grateful to His Majesty's Government.

(Usual ending.)

Enclosure 11 in No. 18.

*Draft Letter to Sir Ahmed-al-Jabir-as-Subar, Ruler of Koweit.*

My esteemed friend,

WITH reference to your letter of the 16th December, 1934, to Colonel Dickson regarding the negotiations entered into by you with Messrs. Traders (Limited).

I have communicated to His Majesty's Government your Excellency's letter explaining the circumstances in which you did not inform them earlier of your negotiations with Messrs. Traders (Limited). In view of the clear intimation of their wishes communicated to your Excellency by Colonel Dickson on the 23rd April last to the effect that His Majesty's Government would expect your Excellency to consult them before you even opened any negotiations with any company, His Majesty's Government feel that your Excellency could have communicated the mere fact of these negotiations either to Major Watts, whose knowledge of Arabic is sufficient to understand such a communication, or to the Acting Political Resident, Colonel Loch (who speaks Arabic), when he was here from the 21st to the 29th September. They note also that your Excellency did not inform Colonel Dickson till about the middle of November, though he had returned to Koweit on the 16th October. Further, they note that when your Excellency did inform Colonel Dickson you did not divulge the name of the company nor the fact that you had written to them as far back as the 2nd September stating that, subject to their securing the approval of His Majesty's Government and their acceptance of certain of your conditions, you were ready to accept their terms, and were prepared to sign their concession. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government have instructed me to inform your Excellency that they are disappointed at your disregard of their wishes in this matter, and that they will find it difficult to assist your Excellency in questions affecting your interests unless you, for your part, keep them fully informed thereon.

I desire to express the high consideration which I entertain for your Excellency and to subscribe myself,

Your Excellency's sincere friend.

No. 19.

*Air Ministry to Foreign Office.*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*Air Ministry, February 20, 1935.*

I AM commanded by the Air Council to refer to Mr. Johnstone's demi-official letter of the 23rd January, forwarding a copy of draft instructions to Sir Andrew Ryan dealing, *inter alia*, with the question of air facilities on the Hasa coast, and to acquaint you, for the information of Sir John Simon, of their desiderata in that regard.

2. As Sir John Simon is aware, Sir Andrew Ryan has previously attempted to secure concessions for air facilities along the Hasa coast, but negotiations broke down largely owing to the extravagant financial demands put forward



by Ibn Saud. At that time, it was of considerable importance to secure landing places and seaplane anchorages for Royal Air Force aircraft flying between Koweit and Bahrein; and Ibn Saud, appreciating the possibility of forced landings, and fearing (or professing to fear) that his control of the inhabitants of the Hasa coast was so slender that any agreement with His Majesty's Government would make it necessary for him to provide permanent guards and officials at the landing grounds, endeavoured to rate the requirements of His Majesty's Government much too highly.

3. On the present occasion the council would suggest that, subject to the concurrence of the Foreign Office, Sir Andrew Ryan should be instructed to put the matter before Ibn Saud in a different light.

4. Since the previous discussions on the subject took place, aviation has become a normal and recognised method of transport between Iraq and India and a regular British air service, operating two or three times weekly, flies along the Hasa coast but outside the territorial waters of Ibn Saud. In addition, military aircraft are constantly flying between Koweit and Bahrein on duty, also keeping outside the 3-miles limit.

5. Owing to the increasing reliability of aircraft engines, to the various technical improvements in navigational instruments and in D/F facilities and to a more efficient meteorological service, forced landings in the Persian Gulf area are to-day of rare occurrence. They can never, however, be entirely eliminated and the strain imposed on pilots by having to fly outside the territorial waters of Saudi Arabia while passing along the Hasa coast is considerable.

6. The council, therefore, suggest that Sir Andrew Ryan should put this point of view before Ibn Saud and suggest to him that on humanitarian grounds and in accordance with normal international practice—

- (i) He should grant permission for aircraft belonging to British regular civil air services and the Royal Air Force to fly within gliding distance of the Hasa coast whilst on passage between Koweit and Bahrein.
- (ii) He should grant general permission for cars, vessels or aircraft to go to the assistance of forced landed aircraft, notification of all such assistance being sent to the Saudi Government.
- (iii) He should mark out, and keep marked out for use primarily in emergency, the landing grounds which, it is understood, already exist at Qatif (Darin), Jinnah and Ras-al-Safaniyah. This is, of course, in accordance with normal international practice. If he should prefer it, the Air Ministry would be prepared to co-operate in marking out these landing grounds, or to mark them out for him and maintain them at their expense until such time as he is willing to undertake this service himself. It would, in any event, be clearly understood that these are purely Saudian landing grounds and would normally be used only by Ibn Saud's aircraft, although they would be available in emergency for aircraft of British regular civil air lines and the Royal Air Force. As far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, no facilities of any description would be required at these landing grounds.
- (iv) He should agree to the location on Jinnah Island of an airway beacon to guide aircraft flying along the coast by night. Such a beacon would be installed at the expense of His Majesty's Government and would require attention (which would be provided by them) only every two or three months. It would, no doubt, be of great value to local shipping.

7. The Air Council trust that every effort will be made to persuade Ibn Saud, on humanitarian grounds, to accept the above proposals. As Sir John Simon will appreciate, such acceptance would be no more than his recognition of a practice already of general application. No expense on his part would be involved; nor would his sovereign rights on the Hasa coast be in any way infringed, or his authority diminished.

8. The council assume that Sir Andrew Ryan would be able, at the same time, to arrange that Ibn Saud will grant general authority for local inhabitants to give, on repayment, in the event of forced landings, any assistance in their power—this arrangement being similar to the procedure for the succour of sea-going vessels in distress.

9. The council would be glad to obtain from Ibn Saud one further concession, but as it is of much less importance than those outlined above and might prejudice the chances of obtaining the more important concessions referred to, they would prefer to leave it to Sir Andrew Ryan's discretion to raise it if the course of the negotiations is favourable. The additional concession is an arrangement whereby weather reports from the Saudian W/T station at Riyadh would be sent daily to some central forecasting station in the Persian Gulf in order to improve the organisation there and so lessen the chances of forced landings along the Hasa coast.

10. It will be remembered that during the previous negotiations Sir Andrew Ryan was instructed that he might offer up to £3,000 per annum for the use of the numerous air facilities desired at the time along the Hasa coast. It is thought, however, that during the forthcoming negotiations no question of payment for the facilities laid down in paragraph 6, which are purely of an emergency nature, should arise, and the council would be extremely reluctant to make any payment for facilities which are normally granted as a matter of international courtesy. If, however, in Sir Andrew Ryan's opinion it would be advisable to offer Ibn Saud a small rental for the establishment of an airway beacon at Jinnah, they would be prepared to agree. If the question of payment cannot be altogether avoided, Sir John Simon may wish to consider whether some arrangement might be made with Ibn Saud whereby he would grant the facilities required in return for the cancellation of some of his debts.

11. Copies of this letter have been sent to the India Office, Admiralty and Treasury.

I am, &c.

J. M. SPAIGHT.

[E 1240/318/25]

No. 20.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 21.)*

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, February 21, 1935.*

YOUR telegram No. 29, and paragraph 9 of my telegram No. 23 referred only to questions of eastern frontiers and Koweit blockade and contemplated simultaneous *negotiation*, not necessarily simultaneous settlement, of those two questions. My present idea is to run them more or less together without definitely linking them up and to deal with all other questions separately.

I am still anxious to give priority to Koweit blockade, but not to the extent of making settlement of it a condition of settlement regarding eastern frontiers lest Ibn Saud should think he was being asked to terminate blockade under threat and that failure to do so would cause His Majesty's Government to refuse any compromise regarding frontiers.

If you approve, I suggest His Majesty's Government should take earliest possible decision as to whether they are prepared to offer concessions in regard to eastern frontiers, notwithstanding Ibn Saud's refusal to bring it into a general settlement of outstanding questions. I strongly recommend this course, as insistence on blue line would create a hopeless *impasse* and because of the doubt cast on tenability of position by your legal adviser's minute of 29th August.

Hafiz Wahba told me 19th February that he thought the King would be prepared to meet us half-way as regards the eastern frontiers. He advocated settlement on basis of allocation of the tribes and seemed to think such allocation would establish adequate territorial division, though on this point his language was vague. He admitted that Saudi pretensions regarding the tribes might be excessive and suggested that experts would have no difficulty in allocating them fairly.

Hafiz Wahba represented Koweit blockade question as much more difficult. He assured me that customs post would really be too expensive and would not prevent smuggling. He urged payment of lump sum by Sheikh of Koweit to Ibn Saud in respect of duty on goods destined for Nejd. I explained the Sheikh's objection to this.

I started conversation with Fuad on 20th February by reading formal statement, text of which is given in my immediately succeeding telegram.

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I explained that, though oral, it represented definite view of His Majesty's Government as telegraphed to me. Fuad copied out its exact terms. He offered no comment, but presently reverted to the question reproduced in paragraph No. 2 of my telegram No. 23. I parried this, adding, however, that I had so far no detailed instructions, as position had to be reconsidered in the light of his communication of 7th February regarding King's refusal of general negotiations.

It is easy enough to refuse to entertain Fuad's question on technical ground that His Majesty's Government alone are concerned, but on wider political grounds I consider it important to meet it in the manner which will take some account of Arab sentiment and also to be prepared with answer to question suggested in paragraph No. 4 of my despatch No. 28.

In my conversation with Fuad I emphasised the urgency of Koweit blockade question and the importance attached to it by His Majesty's Government, who would like to see it settled in advance of anything else.

Further report follows by despatch.

(Repeated to India, No. 21, and Bahrein, for Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 35.)

[E 1241/318/25]

No. 21.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 21.)*

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jedda, February 21, 1935.*

FOLLOWING is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"His Majesty's Government cannot fail to be disturbed by any attempt to cast doubt on their position in regard to matters affecting foreign relations between Qatar and trucial sheikhdoms. That position, which is the result of a long historical process, is established by agreements between them and the rulers, which have been communicated to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz. Any attempt to question it would make a solution of the question now at issue impossible, and would seriously affect relations between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government. At the same time they draw the attention of the Saudi Government to the fact that it has been a constant object of their policy to promote good relations among all Arab States."

(Repeated to Government of India, No. 22, and Bahrein, for Political Resident, No. 36.)

[E 930/318/25]

No. 22.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 33.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, February 22, 1935.*

YOUR telegram No. 23 of the 9th February: Anglo-Saudi relations.

Paragraph 8.—Although idea of general settlement is no longer being pursued, His Majesty's Government are still prepared to offer territorial concessions outlined in my telegram No. 8 of 16th January. You should therefore proceed with original programme as suggested in paragraph 9 of your telegram, but if possible with the qualification added in paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 29 of 15th February.

2. I note from your despatch No. 28 that you are doubtful whether concession described in paragraph 8 of my telegram No. 8 will satisfy Saudi Government. I fully realise this, but am quite willing that negotiations on this question should proceed slowly and that original three-stage programme should be adhered to. India Office are particularly anxious that even this opening concession should not be made too easily, and that fullest play should be made with each stage, particularly now that general settlement is not to be attempted and His Majesty's Government will not in consequence be receiving a *quid pro*

*quo* for any concessions they may make in respect of the blue line. They emphasise that discovery of oil in Dohat-es-Salwa region (see my despatch No. 45 of 31st October, and Mr. Rendel's letter of 6th February), of which Saudi Government are almost certainly aware, should make coastal strip more attractive acquisition than was at first appreciated, even though this point cannot be specifically made with Saudi Government. I am prepared, however, to leave you full discretion as to best tactics to pursue.

(Repeated to Bushire, No. 14, and Government of India, No. 24.)

[E 1308/557/25]

No. 23.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 25.)*

(No. 31.)

Sir,

*Jedda, February 2, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for January 1935. Copies have been distributed as per the list annexed to the report.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 23.

JEDDA REPORT FOR JANUARY 1935.

I.—Internal Affairs.

THE month passed very quietly in Jedda, which was little favoured by the presence of high Saudi personages. Ramadan ended on the 5th January to the great relief of the Hejazis, who feared that it might last a day longer. Owing to a muddle in the beginning, this would have entailed a fast of thirty-one days in the Hejaz, though not in Nejd; and a fast of more than thirty days is not merely trying to impatient stomachs, but is open to grave theological objection. Happily for all, the Id festival began in the whole country on the 6th January. The King spent it at Riyadh, and stayed there until the 22nd January, when he went to his favourite country resort, Rawdat Al Khafs, for a few weeks' change of air and hunting.

It was incorrectly stated in paragraph 295 of the report for December that Ibn Saud spent the whole of that month at Riyadh. A report from Koweit shows that he prolonged the expedition mentioned in paragraph 265 of the November report until the 7th December. It is of some importance to make this correction, as the King was in the Mutair country, and, though his main occupation was sport, it may have been one of his objects to impress and reconcile the Mutair. The same report from Koweit affords evidence (*cf.* paragraph 6 (c)) that the King is pursuing a policy of winning back tribal émigrés; and has had a notable success in the case of Khalid-bin-Hithlain of the Ajman. This young man, who has long been in Iraq, and who has nursed anti-Saudi projects, passed through Koweit on his way to Nejd in December, after having made terms with the King.

2. Practically nothing was heard of the Heir Apparent. His brother Feisal came to Jedda on the 8th January, to preside at the dinner given there in honour of the King's accession. This anniversary is now no longer celebrated in Mecca and the ceremonial in Jedda has been greatly reduced. The dinner, however, is an annual event, got up largely for the edification of the foreign representatives. The prince returned to Mecca on the 10th January. The general opinion was that he looked rather mouldy, but he was livelier in conversation than he sometimes is.

3. Fuad Bey Hamza returned from Riyadh to Mecca on the 17th January and resumed his duties as Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. He left behind him at Riyadh the Saudi Minister in London, who had arrived there on the 4th January, and is expected to pass through Jedda in February. Fuad Bey came to Jedda on the 19th January, thus giving the foreign representatives their



first opportunity for many weeks of discussing serious business. He returned to Mecca on the 22nd January, and was not again seen during the remainder of the month.

4. The rumours of dissension in the Royal Family (paragraph 298 of the report for December) died down in January. The last which reached the Legation on the 2nd January were, however, the best. The King's brothers, it was said, had left Riyadh for a strong place not far off, and had declared that they would not accept the Amir Saud as heir. Ibn Saud, to minimise the matter, had put it all down to a rivalry between his son the Amir Feisal, and his nephew Khalid, the son of the Amir Muhammad, for the hand of another cousin, the daughter of Nura, favourite sister of the King. The Crown Prince had quarrelled with Khalid over the matter and had slapped his face. It was, perhaps, to give the lie to these reports that the Amir Muhammad, complete with Khalid and two other sons, came to Mecca to visit the sacred precincts. They stayed a few days and left again for Riyadh about the 12th January. Even now the gossips were not at a loss. The King's brother, they said, had brought off in Mecca a little marriage with the daughter of an illustrious divine, one of the more fanatical descendants of Abdul Wahhab, the reformer; and this alliance would so increase his influence with the tribes of Nejd that he could raise them against the King any day. No apology need be made for reproducing these stories, so charged with passion and with love.

5. No more was heard of trouble on the Yemen frontier or at Teima, though in January renewed reports, perhaps belated echoes of the old, came from Damascus regarding alleged important Saudi concentrations at Hail and Jauf. Almost the only other news of any consequence was that of a terrific breeze between Ibn Jiluwi, Governor of Hasa and the King's cousin, and Muhammad Tawil, the important Hejazi, who now directs the financial and economic affairs of that province. A breach between these two might have important repercussions. On the 24th January Sheikh Hamad Suleiman, Deputy Minister of Finance, who was supposed to be standing by to act as a delegate for the delimitation of the Saudi-Yemen frontier, went to Hasa instead. This lends some support to a report that the King had ordered an investigation on the spot.

6. Fuad Bey Hamza brought back from Riyadh three important announcements, which were duly published in the latter part of January after the first two had been officially communicated to the foreign missions on the 18th January. They seemed to indicate a victory for moderate counsels in the King's entourage, but a victory the value of which is diminished by ambiguity, due perhaps to compromise or perhaps only to slovenly drafting. They were as follows:—

- (a) A communiqué prolonging by two months the time allowed for producing proof of foreign nationality (see paragraph 284 of the report for November 1934).
- (b) A communiqué purporting to interpret in a reassuring sense the Regulations on Real Property promulgated last October (see paragraph 241 of the Report for October 1934). In terms it goes but a little way to remove the objection raised in foreign circles to the regulations.
- (c) A Royal proclamation sanctioning the return to Saudi Arabia of Saudi subjects previously excluded for political reasons.

7. The last of these announcements is described in the heading as an amnesty, but the text does not grant pardon for political offences. Its true effect can only be shown by the event. It may facilitate the return of certain members of the Shereefian family and possibly some tribal personages. One does not yet, however, quite see people like the Dabbaghs dashing back with joyous shouts of *Dulce Domum*.

8. Fawwaz, the grandson of Nuri-bin-Shalan, left Jedda by sea on the 2nd January after staying with the King at Riyadh. According to a subsequent report from Damascus, he went back well pleased with an arrangement he had made regarding the future of the Ruwalla tribe in the Jauf area.

9. The activity of the two Saudi aeroplanes noted in paragraph 301 of the report for December and earlier has continued intermittently on the same limited lines.

10. There were no new economic or financial developments during the month. Reports of doubtful authenticity were received of urgent demands for gold to be

sent from the Hejaz to Riyadh. The following paragraphs deal with projects and concessions mentioned in earlier reports:—

11. Abdur Rahman Qusaibi left for Europe on the 9th January, having apparently abandoned all hope of making anything out of his concession for pearl-fishing in the Red Sea (paragraph 302 of the report for December).

12. Mr. Twitchell (paragraph 304 of the last report) is still away. He was last heard from at Rutba, in Iraq, and had shown interest in a gold mine in that country, which has been talked about for years. He is now understood to intend to visit England before returning to Saudi Arabia. It was confirmed early in the month that he had enlisted the services of the Islamised Dutchman, van de Poll, for prospective prospecting. M. van de Poll left for Medina early in the month.

13. The Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires gave a good deal of information to Sir Andrew Ryan on the 30th January about the projected motor route from Nejif to Medina (paragraph 305 of the last report). He confirmed previous information to the effect that Iraqi cars will undertake the transport all the way to Medina and said that, while no special company had been formed in Iraq and no monopoly had been given, five existing concerns had registered themselves with a view to working the route. The Chargé anticipated that it would be used by large numbers of Iraqi and Persian pilgrims, besides some 250 Indians. He put the possible total of users as high as 4,000 persons. He did not name a figure for the actual cost of transport, which a writer in the *Times* of the 15th January put as low as £5 for the run from Iraq to Medina. He said that it would be quite cheap but for the avarice of the Saudi Government, who wanted to make money out of benzine, road taxes at the rate of £3 gold per pilgrim and a registration tax of £10 gold per car. He spoke as though there were still some minor points outstanding with the Saudi Government, but not as though they would prevent the route from being used this year.

14. Sharqieh's car business still seems to be going to the satisfaction of Mr. Philby (paragraph 306 of the last report). He mentioned in conversation on the 15th January that he had recently got a payment of £7,000 in this connexion from the Government. He remarked on the fact that it had taken the form of a draft on the Banque Misr.

15. Mr. L. N. Hamilton, the London representative of the Standard Oil Company of California, arrived in Jedda from Hasa via Riyadh on the 12th January, accompanied by Mr. Miller, the principal geologist of the company in Hasa, and a young American, who looks after the cars and who also flies. This young man returned overland with the cars on the 15th January, leaving Messrs. Hamilton and Miller to proceed by sea to the Sudan and Egypt on the 20th. They confirmed previous reports that drilling is to be started at Damman, on the west side of the Gulf of Bahrein, in the near future. They seemed hopeful. They professed to have no difficulties at present with the Saudi Government, but one casual remark suggested that At Tawil (see paragraph 5 above) was not always easy.

16. Nothing more has been heard of the projects of Talaat Pasha Harb and the Banque Misr. Mr. Philby's remark quoted in paragraph 14 is, however, interesting. One of the two small vessels mentioned in paragraph 276 of the report for November again called on the 29th January.

17. Two persons were put to death at Mecca on the 11th January. This appears to have been the result of a casual affray between smugglers and preventive men near Sharaya, in which two of the latter were killed.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

18. Nothing definite was heard in connexion with the delimitation of the frontier contemplated in article 4 of the Treaty of Taif (see paragraph 309 of the last report and *cf.* paragraph 5 above). Relations with the Yemen seemed to be perfect. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 11th January denied that the Saudi Government were in any way interested in the case of a certain Muhammad Said-as-Saqqaf, about whom reports had appeared in the Egyptian press to the effect that he had been put on trial (according to one account as a British spy) or even executed at Sana, and that the Saudi Government had made representations, as he was a Saudi subject. This man may possibly be identical with the



As Saqqaf who has been variously mentioned as Japanese representative at Sana and more recently (paragraph 316 of the last report) as having been appointed Japanese consul in Saudi Arabia. The identification is, however, most uncertain.

19. The same *Umm-al-Qura* of the 11th January recorded a meeting of Saudi and Iraqi representatives to discuss frontier questions at Ramadhi. This announcement seems to relate to a meeting known from other sources to have followed soon after the Palmyra Conference (paragraph 249 of the report for October).

20. The position regarding the Nejif-Medina motor route is described in paragraph 13 above. In the conversation there mentioned, the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires stated that the present relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq were in the main good, and much better than they were some little time ago.

21. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 11th January announced a projected meeting at Dhat-al-Haj in Saudi Arabia between the Officer Commanding, Desert Patrol in Transjordan, and the Amir of Tebuk. A similar meeting took place in Transjordan territory in June 1934, but the Legation in Jedda has not heard of the further meeting from any other source.

### III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

22. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom definitely approved in January of the proposal, which had emerged from the conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza in London last September, that an attempt should be made to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of all major questions outstanding between them and the Saudi Government on the basis that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider making some concession in regard to Ibn Saud's eastern and south-eastern frontiers, without too much regard to strict legal considerations, if other questions could be settled satisfactorily. Important instructions were issued to Sir Andrew Ryan on the 17th January, and he had long conversations with Fuad Bey on the 20th and 21st January. He enquired definitely whether the Saudi Government were on their side prepared for the attempt at a comprehensive settlement, and whether they would produce a more positive statement of the King's desiderata regarding his eastern and south-eastern frontiers than they have hitherto done. Fuad Bey approached the latter subject, rather startlingly, in the private part of the conversation, from the point of view that His Majesty's Government had promised to recognise the independence of Arabs, and that this should be applied in the case of Ibn Saud's neighbours in the Persian Gulf. He reserved his official reply to both Sir Andrew Ryan's questions. He intimated officially that the King was now more favourably disposed towards the British proposal than the Bahrain transit question should be examined in the first instance by a local conference, but would like to have a list of suggested agenda. He invited His Majesty's Government to formulate proposals for a settlement between Ibn Saud and Koweit. His Majesty's Government are still considering these and various other matters which would or might come into the proposed negotiations (see paragraph 311 of the last report and previous reports *passim*).

23. The supplies for the Government dispensaries (paragraph 312 of the report for December) were cleared from customs without difficulty in January, and the Mecca branch was opened without incident on the 12th January, though on receiving an unofficial intimation that this would be done, the Saudi Government showed extreme anxiety to safeguard their position in the proposed discussions with Fuad Bey on the whole subject. These have not yet begun.

24. Several missions in Jedda are greatly concerned over the questions of real property and nationality (see paragraph 6 (a) and (b) above), especially those principally interested in persons now their nationals who were formerly Ottoman subjects and had therefore a clear legal right to acquire real property in the Hejaz, when persons, who were already aliens, could do so only by a tolerance in favour of such as were Moslems. The French Chargé, acting on behalf of Syrians, and the Turkish and Iraqi representatives are all in the same boat.

25. No official announcement has yet been made regarding the conversion of the French consulate into a Legation or the promotion of the present Chargé d'Affaires (paragraph 313 of the last report). M. Maigret left for Hodeida,

*en route* for Sana, on the 21st January. His journey appears to have no political significance.

26. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires continues to cultivate his garden. The creation of this pleasure on a strip of ground outside his Legation, with another strip across the road to serve as nursery, has been about the greatest diplomatic achievement of any during the past year in Jedda.

27. The Netherlands Chargé, accompanied by the late manager in Jedda of the Netherlands Trading Company and the same engineer from Holland who was of the party a year ago, left for Sana via Hodeida on the 21st January. This visit has now become an annual event. The Dutch may hope to nurse a market in the Yemen, but there is nothing to suggest any definite political object.

28. Arising out of an incident at the important Sultiyya School at Mecca, founded by Indians and frequented by Moslems of many nations, a new school for Dutch East Indians and Malays was started there in January. Two teachers and over a hundred students of those nationalities had walked out of the Sultiyya School in November owing to the alleged offensiveness of the Indian director. The new school has probably as little connexion with the Netherlands authorities as the Sultiyya with any British authority.

29. There is nothing worth recording about other Powers and their representatives, except that a member of the Soviet Agency at Hodeida was in Jedda for a few days early in the month, and that the staff of the Russian Legation has been temporarily strengthened by the presence of another commercial representative named Guertik. He appears, however, to be merely on a mission of inspection in the Red Sea. The regular staff of the Legation consists of the Minister, a vice-consul, a doctor and a dentist. They are all married, and all their wives live with them. They all live together, and they mostly walk out together in the evenings. The ladies take the housekeeping in turns. Whatever may be said of Bolsheviks elsewhere, they are an example to all of us in Jedda, though the Moslems are perhaps a bit weak in their Islam.

### IV.—Miscellaneous.

30. An unusual number of occidental visitors appeared in Jedda in January. The most important have been mentioned in various connexions above. The others included yet another Dutch *savant* from the Dutch East Indies, Dr. A. H. Cense and two officers on leave from the Transjordan Frontier Force, who came ashore for a few hours.

31. Mr. Philby spent a good part of the month in Jedda, partly owing to his wife's illness, but left on the 28th January for Medina and Riyadh, intending to return shortly before the pilgrimage. He intends to go to England soon after the pilgrimage and to stay until next winter. What, then, of the business of Sharqieh (Limited)? Still inspired by genius, it will have to be actually run by a newly-imported British accountant and an engineer lent by the Ford Company.

32. The coolth recorded in paragraph 321 of the last report did not last. The New Year came perspiring, and most of the month was hot and sticky. There were, however, one or two better spells, and a twenty-four hours' cold wave provided the most exhilarating topic of conversation at the Accession Day dinner. Seventy souls shivered in unison in the garden of the Khuzam Palace. The dinner also was pretty cold.

33. The health of the foreign community (paragraph 322 of the last report) has improved, but illness delayed the progress of the Jedda Golf Tournament, which began on the 16th January. American and Dutch competitors have been eliminated without international ill feeling. The victor of two hopes of the British Legation, who have still to compete, will play in the final against a member of the staff of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co.

34. The number of pilgrims already in the country at the end of January is estimated at 3,211 Dutch East Indians, 2,178 Indians, and perhaps 971 of other nationalities. It may be noted that a Dutch ship, which arrived on the 30th January, brought only Chinese, to the number of some 137. The work of repatriating the large numbers of British West Africans, who had accumulated in the Hejaz from previous years and could no longer support themselves, was practically completed by a shipment of fifty-two of them to Massawa on the 27th January. The total number of those repatriated has been 1,466.



35. The position as regards the manumission of slaves during January was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month, one female.  
Took refuge in January, three males and one female.  
Manumitted in January and repatriated, nil.  
Locally manumitted, one female.  
On hand at the end of the month, three males and one female.

The unusual case mentioned in paragraph 326 of the last report still presents difficulty, but hopes are still entertained that it will be disposed of on the lines there foreshadowed.

36. Copies of this report have been distributed as follows:—

His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo.  
His Excellency the Governor-General of the Sudan, Khartum.  
The Commissioner at Port Sudan.  
His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa.  
The Governor at Lagos.  
His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem.  
His Majesty's Consul-General, Beirut.  
His Majesty's Consul, Damascus.  
His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.  
His Majesty's Consul, Basra.  
The Political Agent, Koweit.  
The Political Agent, Bahrein.  
The Political Resident, Bushire.  
His Majesty's Chief Commissioner, Aden.  
His Excellency the Viceroy of India, New Delhi.  
His Excellency the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Singapore.  
The High Commissioner, Kuala Lumpur.  
The Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean Station, Malta.  
The Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops.  
The Royal Air Force Officer commanding in Palestine and Transjordan.

[E 1309/1309/25]

No. 24.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 25.)*

(No. 32.)

Sir,

*Jedda, February 4, 1935.*

IN my despatch No. 29 of the 1st February, dealing with another subject, I mentioned a general statement by the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires here in conversation with me that the relations between his Government and the Government of this country were, in the main, good and much better than they had been some time ago. When I returned Seyyid Kamil's call on the 2nd February, he repeated this more emphatically and in a more precise form, saying that so great a change for the better had come over the attitude of the Saudi Government during the past two months that they must certainly want something.

2. I think this worth recording as the date assigned by Seyyid Kamil to the beginning of this marked improvement almost coincides with that of the elections in Iraq. You will remember the emphasis laid by Fuad Bey Hamza in conversations at the Foreign Office last September on the desire of his Government for closer relations with Iraq and the language he used to me more privately about Nuri Pasha As-Said, when he spoke of the pasha as the man really destined to fill the place in Iraq left vacant by the death of King Feisal and as a man who had satisfied him, Fuad Bey, of his soundness as an Arab. He also spoke very confidentially of the possibility of a meeting between Nuri Pasha and Ibn Saud, if the elections went well for Nuri.

3. I gather from Sir F. Humphrys's despatch to you No. 701 of the 12th December, which I have seen in print, that the Iraqi elections did not, in fact, go particularly well from Nuri Pasha's point of view. The political situation in Bagdad seems, however, to be so confused, if I can trust my Iraqi colleague's account of it, that Saudi personages of Fuad Bey's way of thinking may still hope that Nuri Pasha will emerge as the strongest statesman in Iraq and may think that he would work with them for Arab union, in some shape or form.

4. Ibn Saud may have another reason for courting Iraq at the present time. Both His Majesty and Fuad Bey expressed last year apprehension lest Persia and Turkey should have designs upon Iraq. The expressed suggestion was that the hostility of these Powers might be a danger not only to Iraq, but to Arabs generally and to Saudi Arabia in particular. This may have veiled a very different apprehension, namely, that Iraq might be drawn into a combination with Turkey and Persia and that the combination might menace Saudi Arabia. Whether the apprehension was that which was expressed or that which I have just suggested, the recent crisis in the relations between Iraq and Persia might well appear to Ibn Saud to afford a favourable opportunity for binding Iraq more closely to himself and to the cause of Arab union in some shape or form, as I have already said.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 1240/318/25]

No. 25.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, February 28, 1935.*

YOUR telegram No. 38 of 21st February: Anglo-Saudi relations.

Paragraphs 1 and 2.—His Majesty's Government agree to tactics proposed.

2. Paragraph 3.—See my telegram No. 33 of 22nd February.

3. First necessity is to elicit some concrete proposal from Ibn Saud which will indicate extent of his claims. Hafiz Wahba's remarks suggest that he may endeavour to press for a settlement entirely on a basis of allocation of tribes. His Majesty's Government would not be able to agree to this—not least because they might find great difficulty in rebutting extensive claims based by Ibn Saud on payment of zakat at one time or other by individual tribes or sections of tribes. On the other hand, if detailed proposals for allocation of tribes are made, His Majesty's Government cannot, of course, refuse even to consider them. In that event you should intimate that you will refer them for instructions, but add that, in view of migratory character of certain of the tribes, you are aware that His Majesty's Government regard a settlement on a territorial basis as the only one likely to be really satisfactory, although they would have no objection to a subsidiary agreement, if necessary, to provide for the allocation of any doubtful tribal elements.

4. Paragraphs 6 and 7.—I approve your language. I assume, however, that you mentioned only Qatar and the trucial sheikhdoms because they will be mainly affected by proposed frontier settlement, but your observations regarding their foreign relations apply, of course, equally to Koweit and Bahrein.

5. No encouragement can be given to Saudi Government to hope that His Majesty's Government will allow direct participation of Arab rulers in frontier negotiations. If, therefore, question in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 23 of 9th February is pressed, reply should be that eventual frontier agreement will be between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and Saudi Government, but that views of Arab rulers affected by it both have been and will continue to be taken into account by His Majesty's Government, who are responsible for their foreign relations. This does not necessarily apply in the case of Muscat, but I hope that question of a coterminous frontier with Muscat will not arise, at any rate for the present.

6. I will telegraph further regarding renunciation of rights in desert zone, but you will recollect from article 16 of Treaty of Lausanne that there is no insuperable objection to a renunciation of rights without specifying that they are renounced in favour of any particular party.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 36. Repeated to Government of India, No. 27, and Bushire, No. 17.)



[E 1217/1217/25]

No. 26.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 71.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 28, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 43 of the 31st January, I transmit to you the accompanying copy of a letter from the Air Ministry regarding the air facilities which they wish to obtain from the Saudi Government along the Hasa coast.<sup>(1)</sup>

2. I realise that, in view of the fact that the project for a general settlement of all major outstanding questions between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Saudi Government has had, for the time at least, to be abandoned, it may be more difficult for you to raise this particular question with the Saudi Government. I shall, nevertheless, be glad to receive your observations on the Air Ministry letter and to learn whether you consider that any or all of the requirements outlined in it can be obtained from the Saudi Government.

I am, &amp;c.

JOHN SIMON.

(1) No. 19.

[E 1435/318/25]

No. 27.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 3.)*

(No. 49.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, March 2, 1935.*

YOUR telegram No. 36.

I informed Fuad on 1st March that His Majesty's Government had agreed to the separate handling of outstanding questions. I said that, notwithstanding this separation, they were prepared to deal with the question of eastern frontier on same conciliatory basis as that foreshadowed in proposal for general negotiations, but emphasised the moderate character of concessions they contemplated. I renewed request for precise statement of Ibn Saud's desiderata. Fuad promised to consult the King, but could not hope to produce statement pending His Majesty's arrival in Mecca about eight days hence. I hinted there was no hurry.

May I have your views on paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 28? Assumption in paragraph 4 of your telegram under reference is correct. As regards paragraph 6, I was not thinking of legal but of political considerations, importance of which I have further stressed in my despatch No. 53 of 22nd February.

(Repeated to India, No. 32, and Bushire, No. 51.)

[E 1459/318/25]

No. 28.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 37.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a memorandum respecting the proposed negotiations with the Saudi Government, dated the 7th February.

*Jedda, February 9, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 28.

*Memorandum respecting the proposed Negotiations with the Saudi Government.*

I RESUMED my conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza yesterday. We hardly got on to the subject of the proposed negotiations, as I was anxious to get on with other business which has been accumulating. I reminded him, however, of the two definite questions which I had put on the 21st January. He countered by asking me whether I could reply to what he on his side had said about Koweit and Bahrein. I explained that His Majesty's Government were actively considering both these subjects, but that I had not as yet received definite instructions. We agreed to revert to my own two questions to-day.

2. This morning Fuad Bey made a statement in reply to my first question, *i.e.*, whether his Government were prepared to enter on comprehensive negotiations on the basis which had been proposed. He reminded me that this proposal had originated in a suggestion made by himself in our conversations last June. The Saudi-Yemen settlement had just been effected, and he had approached me as to the possibility of discussions with a view to a co-ordination of British and Saudi policy, having regard to possible future contingencies in other directions. He again dwelt on the advantages which might ensue from such a co-ordination of policy. His Majesty's Government were at present on good terms with all the Powers in the Near and Middle East, his enumeration of which included Russia. No one could foresee, however, what less happy developments might occur at any moment. The peace of Europe had been threatened twice in the recent past, after the assassinations of Herr Dollfuss and the Marseilles crime.

3. Having thus defined the nature of the original Saudi approach, Fuad Bey suggested that His Majesty's Government had given a different turn to the matter by concentrating on questions outstanding between them and the Saudi Government.

4. I admitted this substantial accuracy of what Fuad Bey had said, but I reminded him of two things. The London conversations had fallen into two parts, even though the second, *i.e.*, the discussion of outstanding questions, might have proved greater in actual volume than the first. The first part had related to the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the suggested rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq and towards the possibility of similar rapprochements with other Arab States. A straightforward reply had been given regarding the rapprochement with Iraq. His enquiry about other rapprochements had been couched in very general terms, and the reply had been guarded for a very good reason. What were those other Arab States? There had just been a very close rapprochement with the Yemen. We had discussed the possibility of one with Iraq separately. There had been a recent treaty settlement between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan, which had produced good results. There remained Koweit, Bahrein, Qatar and the Trucial Sheikhdoms and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, all of which occupied special positions, though not all similar positions *vis-à-vis* His Majesty's Government. As regards Koweit, His Majesty's Government did, indeed, desire a rapprochement, but one of an economic rather than a political nature. They would not wish to see Koweit become a satellite of Saudi Arabia. Bahrein was an island State, and the question of its relations with Saudi Arabia was again an economic question, not, in my opinion, difficult of solution. Our position in regard to the Trucial Sheikhdoms was again of a special nature, for, while we had charge of their foreign relations, we concerned ourselves very little with their internal affairs. The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman was definitely independent, though bound to us by economic considerations.

5. Fuad Bey asked whether there was not another independent State in the hinterland governed by an Imam. I said that I knew much less about Muscat and Oman than about any other part of Arabia and could not pronounce upon this. There was a personage known as the Imam and his position had varied, but I rather thought he would fall to be regarded as a frequently recalcitrant subject of the Sultan. I was careful to stress the fact that I could speak with no authority about Muscat and Oman.

[12357]

E



6. My second comment on Fuad Bey's statement so far was a reminder that, when we had discussed his suggestion in June, I had been authorised to make a statement, the terms of which were not fresh in my memory, but the general effect of which was that, if the important questions outstanding between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government could be settled, means might be found to affirm in some appropriate manner the special friendship between them. (I find that on this point my memory misled me. I had in mind Foreign Office telegram No. 127 of the 10th July last regarding the line to be taken during my visit to Taif. Paragraph 6 of that telegram did not instruct me to make a statement, but authorised me in cautious terms to proceed on the assumption indicated in it. It was not, therefore, to Fuad Bey that I spoke of closer friendship, but to the King at Taif, and to him only in very general terms (see paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 166 of the 15th July last, and paragraph 6 of the detailed record of my conversations at Taif).)

7. Fuad Bey, proceeding with his statement, assured me on behalf of the King of his desire for the friendliest relations with His Majesty's Government, who, though they had not made him what he was, had contributed much to his rise by their past attitude. His Majesty had suggested a co-ordination of policy. He would not enforce on His Majesty's Government his view as to the advantages of this. It was for them to decide, but if there were to be negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of outstanding questions, he feared that any failure of such negotiations might create a false impression. He would, therefore, prefer that the questions should be discussed, as had been done previously, separately and each on its individual merits.

8. I promised to convey this to His Majesty's Government. I observed that the principal reason for proposing comprehensive negotiations was that they would have enabled His Majesty's Government to offer certain concessions in connexion with the most difficult question of all, that of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia, in consideration of a satisfactory settlement of other questions.

9. I ran over the questions which might have come into the proposed general negotiations. The most important was that of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers. Next in importance, and first in urgency, was that of the Koweit blockade, about which the Sheikh of Koweit, for all his personal friendship with Ibn Saud, felt very sore, and which His Majesty's Government were most anxious to get settled. As for the Bahrein transit question, it was, as I had said, one which in my opinion could be settled easily by some adjustment limited to a term of years. It had been envenomed by a single incident, that of the Ahmedi. If the local conference failed, I should be able to disabuse the Saudi Government of any impressions which that incident had suggested regarding the policy of His Majesty's Government. I indicated in general terms the nature of the reassurance which I should be in a position to give. Then there was the question of slavery. I divided the remaining questions discussed in London into those which would clearly be outside the scope of comprehensive negotiations and some which might or might not be included, *e.g.*, the Transjordan frontier question. Finally, I mentioned the future of the Treaty of Jedda, as a matter which had been mentioned in London, but which, except as regards the question of the language of the treaty, was found to turn on particular matters, which had been considered separately.

10. Fuad Bey intimated that he would prefer to put the last point rather differently. His Government, I understood him to say, would approach particular questions with reference to their bearing on the position in regard to the Treaty of Jedda. I invited him to develop this, but something turned us aside and we did not pursue the subject.

11. Turning to the question of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers, Fuad Bey asked what form the settlement of it would take. What would be the position of the rulers affected? Would they have any part in the discussion? He assured me on behalf of the King that His Majesty had no desire to intervene in any relations between His Majesty's Government and the rulers, but the King had to consider the effect on Arab and Moslem opinion, if he did anything which might be thought to place the rulers in a condition of inferiority, which, as a result of some elucidation, I took to mean that the King was afraid of appearing to let his fellow-Arab rulers down by disregarding their position as such and (to quote a word actually used by Fuad Bey) "selling" them to Great Britain. He

referred to the participation of Iraqi delegates in the settlement of the Nejd-Iraq frontier question, while Iraq was still under a British mandate.

12. I said that His Majesty's Government had never approached the present subject otherwise than as a question of determining as between themselves and Ibn Saud the boundary between his territory and an area beyond it, in which they and the local rulers were alone concerned. The real trouble was, I suggested, that the King was unwilling to admit openly the position of His Majesty's Government in regard to the area under discussion. That position, however, rested on a long historical evolution and a system of treaties by which the rulers themselves had placed themselves, so far as foreign affairs were concerned, in the hands of His Majesty's Government. If Fuad Bey spoke of Arab brethren, I could retort by speaking of our Arab children.

13. Fuad Bey admitted the substantial truth of what I said. He suggested that the Arab and Moslem opinion which the King had in mind was very ill-informed. He suggested that some means should be found to make the position clear, *e.g.*, by having the rulers represented in any negotiation, by experts, for instance, or obtaining from them some affirmation of the fact that they wished to be represented by His Majesty's Government.

14. I said that I myself could see what was in the King's mind, but intimated that His Majesty's Government would have the greatest difficulty in proceeding on any theory other than that which I had described (see the first sentence of the last paragraph but one). I said that I must reflect and consult His Majesty's Government. I intimated that, if in the circumstances he preferred to postpone an answer to my second question of the 21st January regarding Ibn Saud's desiderata, I should not press it at the moment. He said he would prefer to wait.

15. I am recording separately a short passage in the conversation relative to the Transjordan frontier. It did not bear on the essential features of that question, and I did not wish to advert to them without further instructions from His Majesty's Government.

16. Fuad Bey gave me a definite message from the King, reaffirming his friendly dispositions and his sincere desire for a settlement of all questions between him and His Majesty's Government, no matter how they were approached. I said that I welcomed this assurance and echoed it, saying that, in doing so, I could speak for His Majesty's Government as well as for myself.

17. Finally, I told Fuad Bey that I had just received instructions (Foreign Office telegram No. 23 of the 6th February) which would enable me to state the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Koweit business. I wished, however, to look up certain previous papers before making the communication.

18. This conversation, though more coherent than many I have had with Fuad Bey, was interspersed with digressions and trivialities, which I need not reproduce. Otherwise this is as accurate a record as I can make of the main course of the conversation. We agreed to postpone any further discussion until Fuad Bey's next visit to Jedda.

ANDREW RYAN.

February 7, 1935.

[E 1461/403/25]

No. 29.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 40.)

Sir,

*Jedda, February 12, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 26 of the 29th January, I have the honour to state that on the 6th February I discussed at some length with Fuad Bey Hamza the effect of the Saudi regulations on real property promulgated last October, and of the interpretative communiqué of the 18th January. As this discussion was of a general nature, exploratory on my part and explanatory on the part of Fuad Bey, I do not think it necessary to record it in detail. The principal thing that emerged from it was that Fuad Bey, who had nothing to do with the promulgation of the regulations, is greatly embarrassed and has been trying to make the best of a bad job. His conversations with the foreign representatives, several of whom have shown interest in the subject, may encourage

[12357]

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him to make a further effort to undo the mischief wrought by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and others in his absence.

2. Another fact of some importance which emerged from my conversation with Fuad Bey is that the Saudi Government have made the mess, into which they have got themselves by their ill-considered legislation, still messier by trying to import into it conceptions and one or two terms derived from the former Ottoman legislation on one particular kind of property, viz., Government or "Miri" land. This was, as you are aware, the subject of elaborate Turkish legislation (see Young's *Corps de Droit ottoman*, Vol. VI, p. 45 ff.), which defined the quasi-proprietorial rights of private occupants of land, the fundamental ownership of which was vested in the State. It dealt, *inter alia*, with the nature of the titles, which occupants could acquire. I do not know whether that legislation was ever applied in the Hejaz, but there is certainly no machinery now in existence in this country which could give effect to its principles, even if the position as regards the legal character of all titles were not, as Fuad Bey confessed to me, hopelessly confused.

3. I have embodied a short general account of my conversation with Fuad Bey in paragraph 7 of the enclosed memorandum, which I have thought it advisable to circulate to the posts indicated in it, in view of the repercussions of this question in various directions.

4. As the enclosed memorandum brings the whole situation up to date, and as the special question of Hashimite properties is now the subject of separate telegraphic correspondence, I am not sending copies of this covering despatch to any other British authority.

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 29.

*Memorandum by Sir Andrew Ryan on Foreign Ownership of Real Property in the Hejaz.*

(Copies sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Bushire, Aden, Cairo, Khartum, Government of India, Singapore, Lagos and Cyprus.)

THE Saudi regulations on real property, which were mentioned in paragraph 241 of the Jedda report for October and have been referred to in later reports, have proved to be of wider interest than was anticipated. I am therefore circulating this general account of the matter for the benefit of the above posts, although some of them are already fully or partly aware of the facts.

2. The regulations in question were published in two instalments in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 19th and 26th October last. They reasserted the principle that no foreigner may acquire real property in the Hejaz, subject to a relaxation already admitted by regulations promulgated in 1931 and reincorporated with slight alterations of form only in the regulations now in question. This relaxation was that a foreign Moslem could acquire property for the sole purpose of converting it simultaneously into a Wakf, but only a Wakf, for the perpetual benefit of Moslems in the Hejaz.

3. What was really new in the regulations was the provision regarding persons who had acquired their property as Ottoman subjects but who had become aliens *vis-à-vis* Saudi Arabia. Such persons were required to sell their property to a Saudi subject or to convert it into Wakf, as above, within one year and were deprived, by an obscurely worded article, of the right of disposal in the meantime. It was provided that the period might be prolonged on application to the Government, subject to the payment of a tax of 15 per cent. per annum of the income from the property during any extended period allowed. Foreigners inheriting property were similarly required to sell it to a Saudi or convert into Wakf.

4. The basic principle that foreigners may not acquire real property in the Hejaz was incorporated in an Ottoman Law of 1867, the famous "Law of Sefer," which conferred on foreigners the right to hold real property in the Ottoman Empire, except in the Hejaz, subject to their Governments adhering to an instrument known as the Protocol of Sefer. The principle has more than once in the recent past been reasserted by the Saudi authorities. In itself it cannot be

contested on any ground of international law or special treaty enabling British subjects to acquire real property in the Hejaz. Nevertheless two classes of question arise, as follows:—

- (a) In practice many British subjects and protected persons were in the past allowed to acquire property *qua* Moslems. Can they now be deprived of rights which they acquired by tolerance under previous régimes?
- (b) Many persons who were Ottoman subjects and had therefore a clear legal right to acquire property are now subjects of States other than Saudi Arabia which have emerged from the ruin of the Ottoman Empire. Can they now be compelled to part with their property? And, if not protected in any other way, are they protected by article 33 of the Treaty of Lausanne?

5. Arising out of earlier correspondence regarding the regulations, I drew the further attention of His Majesty's Government to the questions at (a) and (b) above in a despatch No. 3 of the 6th January. Shortly after I had done so, the Saudi Government issued a communiqué dated the 18th January, which was by way of remedying the grievances created by the regulations of last October, which it purported not to amend but to interpret. The main points in this communiqué were as follows:—

- (a) The regulations rested on a basis of Islamic principle applicable only to the Hejaz, not to other parts of Saudi Arabia.
- (b) The Government were considering possible legislation to enable foreigners to hold Government ("Miri") property "by way of long lease and other proper Sharia means."
- (c) The Government did not wish to take retroactive measures against persons, now aliens, who, as Ottoman subjects, had acquired property under the Turkish régime or persons who had acquired it under the Hashimite régime. It had therefore given them the right of applying for an extension of the period of one year.

6. This communiqué has not placated the interested foreign missions, least of all perhaps the Iraqi Legation, which apart from its general interest, is specially interested in the case of the properties owned by members of the Hashimite family. Certain restrictions on the exercise of their rights by members of that family were removed in 1933 and it is now suggested that the regulations of last October may undo the effect of that removal of restrictions.

7. I discussed the whole subject unofficially with Fuad Bey Hamza on the 6th February. He admitted that the article in the regulations which deprives owners of the right of disposal of their properties pending sale or conversion into Wakf was badly worded and said that it did not mean that they could not let their property. He said that the provision of the communiqué mentioned at (c) in paragraph 5 above was intended to be promissory, *i.e.*, that if applications were made for an extension of time they would be granted, and granted for an indefinite period. He admitted that the special 15 per cent. tax remained in force. He was vague on various minor points I raised, including the unfortunate political effect of the action of the Government in so far as it might affect the interests of the Hashimites. Incidentally he admitted that the state of tenures in the Hejaz was hopelessly confused and that, though the law refers to Government or "Miri" property, which was the subject of important Turkish legislation, it would be very hard to say what the tenure of any property was.

8. Fuad Bey made no secret of the fact that he disapproved of the regulations, which were promulgated in his absence. He told me that he had had them by him for a long time, but had always been unwilling to see them promulgated both for economic and political reasons. He has had to face so much criticism by the foreign representatives, although I do not think that any mission has taken the matter up officially as yet, that he may make a further effort to remedy the mischief. In any case, I am inclined to think that Ibn Saud would find some means of meeting the special grievance of the Hashimites, but at present those of the family who are not Saudi subjects are in the same position as other ex-Ottoman owners of property.

ANDREW RYAN.

February 11, 1935.



[E 1466/599/25]

No. 30.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 46.)

Sir,

*Jedda, February 17, 1935.*

IN my telegram No. 27 of the 14th February I reported briefly an announcement in the local press that fourteen named persons had left this country for Italy on the 9th February to be trained in aviation. The announcement, which first appeared in the *Saut-al-Hejaz* newspaper of the 11th February, adds little that is material, except that the postulants hail from Mecca, Medina and Jedda. Their names would hardly interest you.

2. On my mentioning this news to my Italian colleague on the 15th February, he related to me without further encouragement, and with much incidental humour, the following story. The Italian Government reserved last year for Saudi Arabia two of the bourses provided for foreign students. The Saudi Government expressed regret that they were not in a position to avail themselves of this, but some time afterwards Fuad Bey Hamza asked whether the money represented by the bourses could be made available for students in aviation. After various difficulties had been overcome, the Italian Government agreed to accept not more than ten students and quoted favourable terms for training them. I rather gathered that they had agreed to Fuad Bey's request that all charges should be covered by a *somme forfaitaire*; and, added M. Persico, they waived any charges for breakages.

3. When the matter had been arranged, M. Persico suggested that, as the candidates would have to undergo severe medical tests in which some might fail, it would be cheaper to send them to Massawa for that purpose. They accordingly left on the Massawa-bound Italian steamer on the date mentioned. M. Persico commented on the fact that the party contained no Nejdīs, and that it included some Syrians, one of whom, the leader, struck him as a bright lad. He was not impressed by the intelligence of the others or by their physique, and expected that several would fail to pass the tests.

4. Except in so far as the affair originated in the offer of the two bourses, M. Persico attributed it entirely to the initiative of the Saudi Government, and rather laughed at their recent manifestations of air-mindedness.

5. I was entirely unprepared for the news that the Saudi Government had turned to Italy. As you are aware, there were definite indications some time ago that they were seeking Turkish assistance in connexion with their air force, and less definite indications of more recent date that the French Government might help in this as well as in other directions. My Turkish colleague told me on the 16th February that the negotiations with his Government had broken down mainly on questions of money, both as regards a possible mission of students to Turkey and as regards a possible loan of Turkish airmen. The Turkish Government had been prepared to quote favourable terms for training students, but considered certain expenditure essential. They had not been prepared to lend airmen without a guarantee that they would not be used in war, and without provision against certain contingencies like death or incapacitation. Celal Bey understood that the students sent to Italy were to be trained for six months only, a fact not mentioned in the press announcement or by the Italian Chargé in his conversation with me.

6. Incidentally, Celal Bey told me that, when approached with a view to any sort of assistance to the Saudi Government, *e.g.*, in the matter of armament or the opening of a bank, he always urged them to go elsewhere, more especially to Great Britain. He was emphatic in his disavowal of any Turkish concern with or pretensions in Arabia.

7. The decision to despatch the student-aviators to Italy has, according to the press, given a fresh impetus to the work of the Arab Aeronautical Society, the creation of which I reported in my despatch No. 14 of the 14th January, 1931. Little or nothing has been heard of this body since about three years ago, when Mr. Hope Gill forwarded under cover of his printed despatch No. 139 of the 20th March, 1932, a summary of a report on the first year's work. It is now announced that the society has held a meeting, the results of which will be published later, to determine its attitude in view of the new development. The

departure of this mission was also preceded by a jollification in certain Government offices in Mecca, at which speeches were delivered. I can imagine them to have been very eloquent and airy.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Bushire and Aden.

I have, &amp;c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 1468/318/25]

No. 31.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 50.)

Sir,

*Jedda, February 19, 1935.*

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with your telegram No. 29 of the 15th February regarding the settlement of questions outstanding between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government, I have the honour to state that the Saudi Minister in London arrived in Jedda on the 18th February, after spending about three days in Mecca on his way from Riyadh, or rather from Rawdhat-al-Khafs, where he had been staying with Ibn Saud.

2. I met Sheikh Hafiz Wahba at a small tea-party on the 18th February at the house of my Indian vice-consul, who is an old and intimate friend of his. We gave a dinner in his honour that evening, and included in the party the Russian, Persian and Turkish representatives, as well as the Governor of Jedda. Fuad Bey Hamza excused himself on the ground that he had a previous engagement in Mecca. These social amenities are worth mentioning briefly as indications of the friendly atmosphere which prevails here, as in London, whenever Sheikh Hafiz Wahba is about. I am reporting separately on the only matter of business, about which I spoke to him that day, *viz.*, the Amir Saud's projected visit to England.

3. Sheikh Hafiz called on me yesterday afternoon, at his own suggestion, to talk over matters of common interest. I enclose a record giving the gist of a long *tête-à-tête* conversation. The sheikh was at a disadvantage owing to his imperfect knowledge of English, and, as you know, he requires a good deal of drawing out. Much of what he said was nevertheless of great interest, especially as affording evidence, independent of that of Fuad Bey Hamza, of what is the King's mind. If he has a fault, it is that he is apt in conversations of this kind to minimise difficulties and give play to his own conciliatory sentiments. His whole attitude was very friendly, and he expressed his firm conviction that the interest of Saudi Arabia lay in good relations with Great Britain.

4. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba left for Port Sudan and Egypt, *en route* for London, by the Egyptian steamship *Kawthar* this morning.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to his Excellency the Viceroy of India, Foreign and Political Department, the Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf at Bushire and His Majesty's High Commissioner for Transjordan at Jerusalem.

I have, &amp;c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 31.

*Questions outstanding between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government.*

SHEIKH HAFIZ WAHBA called on me this afternoon and we had a longish general conversation. I understood him to say that the King had asked him to see me on his way through. He said more explicitly that when the question had arisen of his taking part in conversations here, in conjunction with Fuad Bey, he had demurred, because he felt that he could do more in case of difficulty by coming in on the questions in London than if he were involved in difficulties arising in the course of discussions conducted jointly by Fuad Bey and himself. (All his references to Fuad Bey throughout were correct but not cordial. He doubtless knows that I know that he detests Fuad.)

[12357]

E 4



2. I said I understood that the King was opposed to the idea of general negotiations. Sheikh Hafiz confirmed this. I said that I was in communication with His Majesty's Government. My own view, I explained, was that general negotiations would have been useful, because they might have facilitated a settlement of the question of the eastern frontiers. Otherwise I was not sure that it mattered very much.

3. When we approached particular questions, Sheikh Hafiz mentioned Bahrein. I explained the present position. I mentioned the fact that His Majesty's Government had preferred not to over-elaborate the agenda, but had indicated two main heads, putting the question of direct shipments to Hasa first. If the local conference took place, it would be possible to disabuse the Saudi Government of false fears regarding our attitude, fears which had envenomed a question, the settlement of which did not otherwise appear to me to present insuperable difficulties.

4. In the course of our conversation about Bahrein transit, I asked Sheikh Hafiz whether he could tell me privately about the position of Muhammad-at-Tawil. I explained that, while it was not for us to suggest a Saudi representative at the local conference, we had always hoped that Tawil might be employed, as he understood the business and knew the people of Bahrein. I now heard rumours of two kinds, viz., that Tawil had quarrelled violently with Ibn Jiluwi and that there was friction between him and the California Arabian Standard Oil representatives. It was said that the trouble was the real reason for the despatch of the Deputy Minister of Finance and Khalid-al-Qarqani to Hasa. These things, I said, did not concern me, but I wondered whether they might affect the possibility of Tawil being employed for the Bahrein Transit Conference. Sheikh Hafiz denied the rumour of a quarrel between Tawil and Ibn Jiluwi. He admitted vaguely that there was some other trouble, but did not think it would affect the Bahrein negotiations. (As a matter of fact, I know from Standard Oil sources that there has been much friction between Tawil and the company's representatives. The company's agent here seems to think that business concerning their affairs will be taken out of Tawil's hands, but that he will retain his other functions.)

5. Sheikh Hafiz intimated that the thought the King would be prepared to meet us half-way over the question of the eastern frontiers. I said (without giving away all that Fuad Bey had said to me unofficially) that, while the King had disclaimed any desire to interfere between His Majesty's Government and the local rulers or between the rulers themselves, he had alarmed us by an approach, which seemed to imply that he looked on those rulers as "Arab brethren" and on ourselves as outsiders. Sheikh Hafiz referred to the presence of a representative of the Sheikh of Koweit at the negotiations regarding the Koweit frontier. He suggested that a letter from the rulers (*i.e.*, a letter affirming our right to act for them, though he did not say this in terms) would suffice. I asked why this should be necessary, seeing that they were bound to us by treaties, which had been communicated to Ibn Saud after the conclusion of the Treaty of Jedda.

6. Sheikh Hafiz suggested that the best means of settling the question at issue would be on a tribal basis, *i.e.*, an allocation of tribes. He admitted that his own Government might have exaggerated ideas as to what tribes were dependent on them, but thought that experts could assign them, *e.g.*, the Hanasir were divided into many sections, whose dependence might be different. He recalled the history of the determination of the Iraq-Nejd boundary.

7. I tried to find out whether Sheikh Hafiz thought that an allocation of tribes would provide the basis for an allocation of territory, *i.e.*, whether, if tribes were allocated, the limits of their diras could be used as territorial boundaries. He was not very precise on this point, but seemed to think that a settlement on a tribal basis, as to the desirability of which he was emphatic, would amount to a territorial settlement. I outlined the reasons of economic possibility which, in my own view, made it undesirable to leave the territorial situation indeterminate, although it had only become important quite recently, *i.e.*, when prospects of oil in Hasa, Qatar, &c., had directed attention to possibilities further afield.

8. Sheikh Hafiz minimised the importance of the frontier question. On the other hand, he thought the Koweit blockade question most difficult. He admitted that he had been the medium of proposals made by Ibn Saud to the

sheikh in 1930. Things had changed, however, since then. Saudi Arabia was at that time prosperous. In present conditions the maintenance of customs posts would be too costly and the danger of smuggling too great. I said that until last spring Ibn Saud had maintained a very effective embargo on trade, which had then broken down somewhat owing to abnormal tribal movements. Why should customs posts be more expensive than the prevention of trade? Sheikh Hafiz insisted that they would be too costly and would not prevent smuggling. He advocated the payment of a lump sum by the sheikh to Ibn Saud. He cited the analogy of Transjordan, where he thought the Amir Abdullah received a lump sum payment from Palestine in respect of customs duties, and recalled a time (I think he said in 1916) when Feisal-ad-Dawish used to collect certain dues in Koweit himself and provide caravans with rafiks to ensure their safe access to the Mutair country. I glanced at the political objection to an arrangement which would give the Sheikh of Koweit the appearance of paying tribute to Ibn Saud.

9. Sheikh Hafiz said he had heard of my complaint of the lack of opportunities for regular intercourse with the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I explained my views of this subject, to which I had again drawn Fuad Bey's attention on the 20th-21st January, after I had waited six weeks for an opportunity of oral discussion of important subjects. Sheikh Hafiz told me secretly that arrangements had been made for Fuad Bey to reside in Jedda, and that they would take effect after the pilgrimage (I did not disclose the fact that Fuad Bey had confided to me the same secret).

10. On my turning to other questions, Sheikh Hafiz mentioned the Hejaz Railway. I said that this was well in hand, and that I foresaw no difficulty in establishing the bases of a technical conference, as proposed by his Government.

11. Sheikh Hafiz referred to the future of the Treaty of Jedda. I asked what was the King's outlook. Sheikh Hafiz said that His Majesty would like some modification, but in regard to a very limited number of points only, in fact, only the question of language and slavery. I said that the question of slavery might be very difficult. Sheikh Hafiz said that he thought the King would be prepared to create a special court to deal with slave cases, but he did not know the details of this proposal.

12. I mentioned the Transjordan frontier, but spoke guardedly, explaining that I was not conversant with all the aspects of the matter. There had been difficulties about Hazim, and there was now a fresh difficulty about Thaniyya Taraif, which I understood to be close to the southern end of the Transjordan-Nejd boundary close to where the Transjordan-Hejaz boundary turned off. As regards the latter, I said there was one thing I did not quite understand. Fuad Bey had said in London that unless the Aqaba-Maan question could be settled, the Saudi Government would prefer to have no discussion at all about the Transjordan-Hejaz frontier. The Aqaba-Maan question was insoluble, but I did not see why we should not try to overcome practical difficulties in regard to the *de facto* frontier, just as we might try to overcome practical difficulties in regard to the legal Transjordan-Nejd boundary. Sheikh Hafiz intimated that the King did not wish to reopen the Aqaba-Maan question, but he did not take my point about the *de facto* frontier. On my asking whether he thought it would be worth while to try and clear up difficulties in regard to the Transjordan-Nejd frontier on the ground, he replied with some emphasis in the affirmative.

13. Towards the end, Sheikh Hafiz observed that his was a small Government. They had come out of the desert and were unversed in diplomacy. I suggested that they sometimes wanted to rush ahead too fast, as if they were for all practical purposes, as they unquestionably were in the legal sense, in the same position as European Powers. I gave as an instance controversy over the Government of India dispensaries and expounded my views at some length, stressing the fact that the Government of India were satisfying a great need which the Saudi Government were at present unable to meet. I had aimed at maintaining the present position, subject to certain arrangements which would show respect for the position of the Saudi Government. I was all for collaboration with the Saudi medical authorities, but saw great objection to their exercising effective control. Sheikh Hafiz was generally sympathetic towards my point of view, and expressed the hope that the matter could be settled easily enough with Fuad Bey. He attributed the trouble a good deal to personal ill-feeling between the Director-General of Public Health and the Indian doctors.



I urged that such feeling, if it existed, should not be allowed to imperil a work which benefited pilgrims and incidentally large numbers of Saudi subjects. It was not, I said, in the interests of the Saudi Government themselves to do anything which might discourage pilgrims from coming to this country.

14. As he was leaving, I observed to Sheikh Hafiz that I was getting on in life and might be leaving Jedda, say, in one, two or three years. I was anxious to get questions settled. Sheikh Hafiz echoed my wish and renewed promises, which he had given me earlier and which I had welcomed, of his genuine desire to help.

*Jedda, February 18, 1935.*

[E 1435/318/25]

No. 32.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, March 7, 1935.*

YOUR telegram No. 49 of 2nd March: Anglo-Saudi negotiations. Eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia.

With regard to the first sentence of paragraph 2 of your despatch No. 28 of 29th January, please see my telegram No. 33 of 22nd February.

2. I concur in your suggested redefinition of section of proposed frontier line from Dohat-es-Salwa to parallel 20.

3. For further course of frontier, see Eastern Department letter of 21st February and sketch map enclosed in it. For purposes of general discussion with Fuad it should be enough, provided Resident at Aden (who is being consulted by telegraph) concurs, to describe frontier line as running from point on parallel 20 reached by the north-south sector of the frontier to the north-easterly terminal point of the Aden Protectorate-Yemen frontier (wherever that may be). The use of a sketch map should sufficiently illustrate intentions of His Majesty's Government. More precise verbal definition can be devised later when actual settlement approaches.

(Addressed to Jedda, No. 43. Repeated to Government of India, No. 33, Koweit and Aden.)

[E 1637/318/25]

No. 33.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 11.)*

(No. 53.)

Sir,

*Jedda, February 22, 1935.*

I HAVE commented by telegraph on the principal points in your telegram No. 29 of the 15th February, relative to the discussions now in progress between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government with a view to the settlement of outstanding questions. I need add little to my telegram No. 38 of the 21st February, but I feel bound to express, with great deference, my personal opinion that the indignation of His Majesty's Government over the attitude of the Saudi Government has led them into an attitude on their side of undue severity towards Ibn Saud and Fuad Bey Hamza.

2. No one has emphasised more than I Ibn Saud's tendency to play to the Arab gallery. Nevertheless, I think it is hardly fair to suggest that he is asking His Majesty's Government to abandon their established policy in the Persian Gulf in order that he may play to the pan-Arab section of that gallery with greater effect. His resentment at the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding his eastern and south-eastern frontiers is deep and genuine, but he has consistently disclaimed any wish to contest their position in regard to territories actually under the control of the coastal rulers. In so far as he wishes to disguise his acceptance of it, I think his position is that in certain ways he must dance to the tune of the pan-Arabs. I gather from a telegram which I have seen recently that the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs has taken a similar line about the position of the Arabs of Syria in regard to Franco-Iraqi negotiations.

3. Fuad Bey Hamza is a bumptious young man, but, as I have frequently pointed out, he has two personalities, that of the Fuad who is personally imbued with sentiments of Arab nationalism and that of the Fuad who serves Ibn Saud, without enjoying his master's entire confidence and without sharing all his master's views, because he sees in him the best present embodiment of the Arab idea and perhaps the best provider of a career for Fuad Bey Hamza, a convinced nationalist, but at the same time a man of great ambitions. For the rest, Fuad Bey often speaks to me unofficially with a frankness which is sometimes useful and sometimes embarrassing. The nature of our relations is such that I would myself acquit him of impertinence, though not of indiscretion, in his language of the 20th January. Sobered by the vigour of my reaction and by the consciousness of his official responsibilities, he modified it very considerably the next day and still more on the 7th February when he had taken the King's instructions. I do not think he will again invoke lightly the McMahon-Hussein correspondence. Should he do so, I will bear in mind the short answer in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 29 of the 15th February. In the meanwhile I trust that the statement reproduced in my telegram No. 39 of the 21st February will have a good effect, though it will not eliminate the factor of Arab nationalist sentiment.

4. On a point of detail, I would observe that Fuad Bey did not describe the Arab and Moslem opinion of which he spoke on the 7th February (see paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 23 of the 9th February) as being unintelligent but as being ill-informed. Having myself spent nearly four years in Arabia before I began to understand the relations between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Gulf rulers, some aspects of which still elude me, I should be sorry to regard ignorance on the subject as a sign of defective intelligence.

5. I have not thought it necessary to make a separate record of my conversation with Fuad Bey on the 20th February, as I have embodied all the essential points in my telegrams. When Fuad Bey reverted to his question as to the form which any settlement of the frontier question would take and whether the local rulers would be in any way parties to it, I said that, in principle, my formal communication seemed to contain the answer, but added that I had not yet received instructions on the specific reply to be returned. Any settlement, I said, could only be a settlement between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government, but the question of what experts might be used, if necessary, was another matter. On my referring to what he had previously said (see paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 23 of the 9th February) about the possible participation of local experts or a possible affirmation by the rulers of their wish to place themselves in the hands of His Majesty's Government, Fuad Bey denied that he had made any definite suggestion. He had merely put the question, he said, and had told me what was in his mind when putting it.

6. In this connexion, Fuad Bey referred to the past participation of representatives of Iraq and Koweit in negotiations regarding the frontiers of those countries with Nejd. I observed that these negotiations had taken place during a transition period both as regards the status of the territories concerned and as regards the relations between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud. The latter had been placed on a completely normal international basis by the subsequent Treaty of Jedda of 1927, and the agreements between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Gulf rulers had been officially communicated to the King after the conclusion of that treaty.

7. Having got so far, Fuad Bey and I agreed to postpone further discussion of the question of the eastern frontiers until I should have further instructions. We went on to the questions of the Koweit blockade and Bahrein transit dues, on which I have reported separately by telegraph.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the Viceroy of India (Foreign and Political Department) and to the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.



[E 1638/1638/25]

No. 34.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 11.)*

(No. 54.)

Sir,

*Jedda, February 23, 1935.*

WITH reference to Mr. Calvert's despatch No. 362 of the 4th December, 1934, relative to Saudi-Egyptian relations, I have the honour to state that on the 11th February the Saudi Minister of Finance told my Indian vice-consul that the Egyptian Government were sending 20,000 ardebs of wheat for distribution to the poor at Medina, and that certain Egyptians in Egypt had collected in a few days only £1,200 for the relief of the inhabitants of that city. I understand that an ardeb is about 5½ bushels.

2. The news that the wheat was a gift from the Egyptian Government, as such, was confirmed in a grateful article in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 15th February, which stated that the Saudi Government had agreed to exempt the gift from customs duty and other charges. The first consignment arrived in the Misr Navigation Company's pilgrim steamer *Kawthar* on the 16th February.

3. The position as regards the money is not quite so clear. There may be a fund in Egypt for the relief of the poor of Medina, but, if so, the *Umm-al-Qura* did not mention it. On the other hand, the same issue of the 15th February stated that the Misr Navigation Company, with the participation of the Banque Misr and other benefactors, had given donations to the total of £2,250 gold, through Talaat Pasha Harb, for specific purposes connected with Saudi hospitals at Mecca and Jedda. The Pasha had already given £E. 10 on his own account, when he was last here, and had promised further assistance.

4. These charitable activities have attracted a good deal of attention in local circles. They are worth recording in connexion with the peculiar state of Saudi-Egyptian official relations and with the commercial enterprises of the Banque Misr in this country, into which they seem to be putting a good deal of money.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt, Cairo, and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &amp;c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 1640/602/25]

No. 35.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 11.)*

(No. 56.)

Sir,

*Jedda, February 24, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 4 of the 7th January, I have the honour to state that the text of the agreement between the Saudi Government and the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited) was published in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 15th February, together with a Royal decree dated the 12th February sanctioning the agreement. It may be assumed that the syndicate had already ratified it.

2. The agreement is a fairly lengthy document, and I consider it unnecessary to trouble you with all the details. I enclose a synopsis showing the principal conditions. In the absence of the annexed map it is difficult to trace the exact boundaries of the assigned area on the south and east, but a very fair idea of them can be formed with the aid of the ordinary maps and the *Handbook for Arabia*. You will observe that the northern boundary is the *de facto* frontier between the Hejaz and Transjordan, starting from "Point E," the position of which is defined as in the Hadda Agreement.

3. Mr. Twitchell duly visited Egypt and Syria as foreshadowed in my despatch under reference and travelled as far east as Rutba, whence he went to see the alleged gold mine at Gaara. He then proceeded for a short time to England. He returned to Jedda on the 17th February and is now making active preparations to start his prospecting campaign at four places, all of which are in the northern part of the assigned area and the most important of which is the "Cot of Gold," where he has previously done some preliminary work. He has collected two mining engineers, a British subject named George, who has had much experience

in India, and a United States citizen named Ballard, besides a clerical assistant named Bisshopp. He expects a third mining engineer from Australia. M. van de Poll, who was mentioned in my despatch under reference, has already been busy up Medina way and Mr. Twitchell describes him as having done magnificent work. I gather that the general headquarters of the prospectors will be in the first instance at Yanbu', where a house has already been rented. Mr. Twitchell is certainly tackling his enterprise with great energy.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Department of Overseas Trade and his Excellency the High Commissioner for Transjordan at Jerusalem.

I have, &amp;c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 35.

*Synopsis of the Principal Clauses in the Agreement of December 23, 1934, between the Saudi Government and the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited).*

THE Syndicate to have exclusive rights of prospecting and digging for metallic substances in the assigned area, for two years.

2. The area to be that shown in the attached map (not reproduced) and to be bounded as follows:—

From the intersection of meridian 38 degrees east and parallel 29 degrees 35 minutes north, westward, by the frontier of the territory now under the Saudi Government towards Transjordan. On the west by the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea as far south as the Bay of Birk at parallel 18 degrees 10 minutes north. Thence by a line from Birk north-eastward to the village of Raghdan, Ghamid; thence north-westward to Dirth Samuda; thence north to Ashira; thence to Mahdatha and Kharaba; thence to Maran and Iqba, waters on the western border of Kashb (? Qishab); thence in a straight line to Mahd-udh-Dhahab (the "Cot of Gold") at an estimated distance of about 20 kilom. east of Jureysiya; thence in a straight line north-westward to Hanakiya; thence in a straight line to the station of Hadiya on the Hejaz Railway, leaving Khaibar outside the area; thence north-westward in a straight line to the intersection of meridian 38 degrees east and parallel 29 degrees 35 minutes north. Specified areas round Mecca and Medina are excepted.

3. Work to begin within three months and to be pursued, saving *force majeure*. Equipment to be ordered within thirty days. The Syndicate to designate by the end of one complete year the places which it wishes to prospect further. The Syndicate to designate by the end of two years places to be leased for fifty-eight years, for effective mining operations, to companies formed by it for the purpose.

4. No rent payable during the first year. Four shillings sterling per feddan to be payable in advance for the second year in respect of areas selected for further prospecting. Annual rent of £1 per feddan to be paid in respect of areas finally chosen for mining operations. Five per cent. of the gross value of minerals extracted to be paid during the search less the rent of 4s. per feddan, the Government receiving whichever amount is the greater. Payments to be made in any currency at current rate of exchange into a bank designated by the Government. The Syndicate to notify the Government of any transfer of rights to any other company, but the Government shall not refuse sanction unreasonably.

5. Enumerates various undertakings by the Government, including exemption of the Syndicate and its transferees from all taxes, &c., subject to payment of 10 per cent. on all materials imported. Such materials not to be sold in the country unless the Syndicate has made this up to the ordinary customs duty. The Government promises all facilities for camps, houses, &c., and means of communication, but the use of aeroplanes and wireless is to be the subject of a special agreement. The Government to have the use of all railways, roads and ports created by the Syndicate, subject to not damaging the Syndicate's interests. This also shall be the subject of a special agreement. This article deals with a great many other details.



6. Enumerates various undertakings by the Syndicate. Employees shall be subject to local law. Saudi labour to be employed where suitable. Engagement of foreigners for work which cannot be done by Saudi subjects to be subject to the sanction of the Government, which may be assumed if no answer is returned within a month of notification. Several other matters are provided for in this article, the most important being that, when final leases for areas selected for effective mining operations are granted, the Syndicate shall form companies to work them and shall give the Government 15 per cent. of the shares of such companies, fully paid up. Ten per cent. of the shares are to be reserved for subscription by Saudi subjects within thirty days of notice being given to the Government. The companies shall pay to the Government half-yearly 5 per cent. of the gross value of the output, but the rent previously payable shall lapse from the date of the leases.

7. Provides for cancellation of the agreement by one side or the other in specified circumstances and defines the effects of such cancellation.

8. Miscellaneous provisions, mostly of minor interest but including provision for arbitration in case of dispute. Each party to name one arbitrator, with a third arbitrator to be named by the two arbitrators or, failing agreement, by the parties, or, failing agreement between the parties, by the president of the Permanent Court of International Justice. This article also provides for ratification of the agreement.

[E 1170/19/91]

No. 36.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 13, 1935.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir John Simon to request you to inform Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare that he has had under consideration your letter of the 19th February regarding relations between His Majesty's Government and the Sheikh of Kuwait.

2. As your Department has already been informed orally, Sir John Simon fully shares the views expressed by Sir Samuel Hoare and the Political Resident regarding the sheikh's negotiations with Messrs. Traders (Limited) in respect of the Kuwait oil concession. He therefore concurs in the terms of the letter which Colonel Fowle proposes to address to the sheikh on this matter, subject to the amendment suggested in paragraph 5 of your letter under reply.

3. Sir John Simon also agrees that steps should be taken in the near future to obtain from the sheikh a fresh undertaking in respect of oil and other concessions in the sense indicated in paragraph 7 of your letter.

4. With regard to Sir Samuel Hoare's further proposal for the conclusion of a new and comprehensive treaty with the sheikh, he will already be aware from previous interdepartmental discussion of this subject that Sir John Simon is, in principle, entirely in favour of any action which would establish relations between His Majesty's Government and the sheikh upon a more definite basis than the present separate and incomplete series of undertakings, and would, if possible, give His Majesty's Government a closer control over the sheikh's conduct than they can at present exercise. He therefore concurs in the proposal contained in paragraph 8 of your letter that the Government of India and the Political Resident should be consulted without further delay as to the desirability of concluding a consolidating treaty on the lines suggested. In concurring in this action, however, Sir John Simon would suggest that, before any final decision is taken to conclude a new treaty with the sheikh, the whole question of the future relations between His Majesty's Government and the Sheikh of Kuwait should be considered by the Middle East Official Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

I am, &amp;c.

G. W. RENDEL.

[E 1805/74/25]

No. 37.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 64.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of an extract from the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 15th February respecting the overland route agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

*Jedda, March 1, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 37.

*Extract from the Umm-al-Qura of February 15, 1935.*

*Temporary Agreement concluded between the Royal Iraqi Government and the Royal Saudi Arab Government in respect of the Pilgrimage Overland Route.*

## ARTICLE 1.

THE Royal Iraqi Government and the Royal Saudi Arab Government undertake to repair the pilgrimage overland route between Iraq and the Hejaz, each within their frontiers, and to maintain peace and security on the road.

## ARTICLE 2.

The two Governments undertake to appoint guides to accompany the pilgrim cars on the outward and homeward journeys, each within their territories.

## ARTICLE 3.

The Government of the country from which the caravan sets out should inform the Government of the country to which the caravan intends to go, and such information should be given three days before the start and a telegram should be sent on the day of departure to the competent authorities at Hail, if the caravan proceeds from Iraq, and to the authorities concerned at Najaf, if the caravan starts from Hail.

## ARTICLE 4.

The two Governments undertake to supply petrol, oil, grease and the spare parts necessary for the repair of cars at Idaha, Najaf, Hail and Medina, each within their territories.

## ARTICLE 5.

The Saudi Arab Government permit the transport of pilgrims in Iraqi motor cars from Iraq to Medina and *vice versa*, and undertake to provide sufficient cars for the transport of pilgrims to Mecca and back.

## ARTICLE 6.

The Royal Iraqi Government permit the transport of pilgrims, who did not go by the overland route, in Saudi motor cars to Najaf, and undertake to prepare sufficient cars for the transport of pilgrims thence to other parts of Iraq.

## ARTICLE 7.

The Royal Saudi Arab Government allow owners of private cars to travel in their cars, together with their effects, to Mecca and back. Private cars are excepted from the provisions of articles 5 and 6.

## ARTICLE 8.

The Royal Iraqi Government allow private owners coming from the Hejaz to travel in their cars, with their effects, into Iraq.



## ARTICLE 9.

The Royal Saudi Arab Government will receive the following fees from pilgrims who travel by the pilgrimage overland route, exception being made of chauffeurs and caravan leaders who will be appointed by the authorities concerned to accompany pilgrim caravans to Medina :—

	£ Gold.	Piastres Miri.
Quarantine dues per head ...	1	10
Passport fees ...	$\frac{1}{2}$	...
Kusham and road fees ...	2	...
	$3\frac{1}{2}$	10

## ARTICLE 10.

The Iraqi Government reserve for themselves the right of imposing fees similar to those mentioned in article 9, exception being made of chauffeurs and caravan leaders who will be appointed by the authorities concerned to accompany pilgrim caravans to Najaf.

## ARTICLE 11.

The Saudi Arab Government will collect registration fees on the Iraqi cars which are engaged in the transport of pilgrims by the overland route, in accordance with the following scale :—

	£ Gold.
Motor car for four passengers ...	2
Motor car for six passengers ...	3
Lorry ...	5

provided that the said fees are collected once only, as long as the car is used for the pilgrimage route.

## ARTICLE 12.

The Royal Iraqi Government will collect registration fees on the Saudi cars which are engaged in the transport of pilgrims by the overland route, in accordance with the following scale :—

	£ Gold.
Motor car for four passengers ...	2
Motor car for six passengers ...	3
Lorry ...	5

provided that the said fees are collected once only, as long as the car is used for the pilgrimage route.

## ARTICLE 13.

The Royal Iraqi Government agree to arrange for the petrol which will be used by the Iraqi cars between Hail and Medina and between Medina and Hail to be bought at the local price from the depots which will be prepared by the Saudi Arab Government; and the Royal Saudi Arab Government agree not to collect dues on the petrol which the cars may take from Iraq for the journey to Hail and from Hail to Iraq.

## ARTICLE 14.

The two Governments undertake to put into force, within the limits of their frontiers, the regulation for the control of cars, which is attached to this agreement.

## ARTICLE 15.

Each of the two high contracting parties has the right to reconsider this agreement, provided that one party informs the other party of its wish to do so within a period of not less than five months before the approach of Id-al-Adha (Corban Bairam).

## ARTICLE 16.

The two Governments undertake to open the road in the pilgrimage season for the year 1353 A.H.

Signed in Jedda on the eighth day of the month of Dhu'l Qa'da of the year 1353 of the Hijira, corresponding to the 12th day of February, 1935.

On behalf of the Iraqi Government :

KAMEL-AL-GILANI,

*Chargé d'Affaires of the Iraqi Legation.*

On behalf of the Saudi Arab Government :

ABDULLAH-AL-SULEYMAN-AL-HAMDAN,

*Minister of Finance.*

*Summary of Regulations for the Control of Cars operating on the Najaf-Medina Overland Route.*

1. Only touring cars and 1-ton trucks will be allowed to use the road at present. They should travel in convoys of not less than five cars.
2. There will be two guides and a convoy-leader with each caravan. The latter will be held responsible for the carrying out of the regulations.
3. Cars must carry signal flags of various colours for the information of the convoy-leader in case of a halt or breakdown.
4. The police must arrange for the examination of all cars by competent engineers and issue certificates of roadworthiness to the drivers. The police must also make sure that passports are in order, that cars are not overloaded and that water, ropes and other necessities for desert travel are carried by every car.

[E 1806/1217/25]

No. 38.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 65.)

*Jedda, March 2, 1935.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 43 of the 31st January regarding the negotiations now proceeding between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government, and I have duly noted that, while I am to take any opportunity of endeavouring to secure the desiderata of the Air Ministry in connexion with landing grounds on the Hasa coast, I am to await a revised list of those desiderata before taking action. As the proposal for a comprehensive settlement of major outstanding questions has now been abandoned, it is not urgent that I should broach the question with the Saudi Government, but you will remember that they themselves expressed anxiety some little time ago to clear up the position in regard to unauthorised landings and flying-over.

2. As regards paragraphs 3 and 4 of your despatch under reference, I would observe that, while the question of the debts of the Saudi Government to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of India has not been strongly pressed since the end of 1933, it has been kept quite alive. I spoke about it very pointedly to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin early in last July. The attention of Fuad Bey Hamza was again drawn to it during his visit to London in September. I again mentioned it on the 20th January, when enumerating the subjects to be considered in connexion with the present negotiations.

3. There is as little prospect as ever of obtaining an early cash settlement of the debts in question. So far as I can judge, mere postponement could not be used as a lever to obtain any countervailing concession on the Saudi side, but an offer of some important abatement or total remission of the debts might be used to secure reasonable desiderata in connexion with landing grounds. I shall be able to judge of this possibility better when I know what these desiderata are,

[12357]



but I may observe generally that the offer could only be made usefully as part of a business transaction and not to secure any concession to which political significance might be attached.

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.

[E 1807/557/25]

No. 39.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 66. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 2, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for February 1935.  
2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 39.

JEDDA REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 1935.

I.—Internal Affairs.

36. Ibn Saud remained in camp at Rawdat-al-Khafs, except for at least one outing in the neighbourhood, throughout the month. It is stated that, apart from constant visitors, no less than 3,000 people have been settled in an encampment of some 500 tents. Rosalinds and Celias are not lacking in this Arabian Forest of Arden, for the Saudi Minister in London told Sir Andrew Ryan roguishly on the 17th February that there were *two* camps, one for the ladies.

37. Nothing of interest was heard during the month about the other members of the Royal family and their alleged dissensions, but it seems certain that there was at least a breeze between the King and his brother Muhammad. The Amir Feisal kept his state at Mecca, as Viceroy. His Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs came twice to Jedda. He had important conversations with Sir Andrew Ryan on the 6th and 7th February. On the second occasion, Fuad Bey's objects included the meeting of his wife, who arrived from Syria on the 19th, and the seeing off of the Saudi Minister in London. The latter had arrived in Jedda from Rawdat-al-Khafs via Mecca on the 17th, and left for London via Egypt on the 19th. Fuad Bey found time for a further interview with Sir Andrew Ryan on the 20th.

38. No events of importance were reported from the country near the Yemen border, Hasa or any part of the interior. As regards the Governor of Hasa and Muhammad-at-Tawil (paragraph 5 of the report for January), it now seems doubtful whether they have quarrelled, but certain that Tawil has been at loggerheads with the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, and that his position is shaken.

39. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 1st February gave prominence to loyal addresses to the King by Hejazi notables and pilgrim guides, *à propos* of the measure of clemency mentioned in paragraph 6 (c) of the last report and to the King's gracious and self-justifying reply. As was anticipated there has been no spectacular homeward rush of exiles, but the press has announced the return of two persons. One is a certain Lieutenant-Colonel Muhammad Sadiq, of whose presence in India the Saudi Government complained in 1933, and in whose movements His Majesty's Government have since interested themselves. The other is one Sheikh Omar Saleh Seyrafi, of whom the Legation knows nothing, but who is said to have been expelled from Mecca some eight years ago and to have now returned from Lahej.

40. Liberalism has had another triumph. A circular from the Saudi Government to the foreign missions, dated the 12th February, confirmed previous information to the effect that the existing ban on wireless apparatus had been removed. The regulation reserves the general rights of the Saudi Government in their territory, territorial waters and air. It provides in principle for the

authorisation by special Royal decree of transmission stations in certain cases. Receiving sets may be imported and installed in certain areas which are not specified, but which are understood not to include Mecca, under annual licence. The duties are, however, very high; an import duty of 60 per cent. *ad valorem* on transmission sets; £5 gold import duty on receiving sets up to a value of £10; £10 gold on sets valued at £10 to £20; £15 gold on sets valued at more than £20; 60 per cent. *ad valorem* on all spares, &c.; and £2 gold annually for the licence to use a receiving set.

41. This is a step in the right direction, but a small one. Gramophones, alcohol, parsons, &c., continue to be prohibited, though gramophones and alcohol abound. There is talk of a relaxation of the restrictions on the latter in favour of European business houses. Football is another of the acid tests of tolerance and intolerance in the Hejaz. The press announced that the overland pilgrims from Iraq (see paragraph 53) would include certain young men keen on athletics, and that a football match might be arranged for them in Mecca.

42. The aircraft mentioned in paragraph 9 of the last report ceased early in the month to haunt the Jedda air. They are understood to have been moved to Taif. The most interesting development in aviation was the departure on the 9th February of fourteen students to be trained in Italy. It had been arranged for the sake of economy that they should undergo their medical examination at Massawa. Only four passed; the others returned to Jedda on the 22nd February. The Italian Chargé states that the initiative lay with the Saudi Government, who had been offered two of the bourses reserved in Italy for oriental students, had declined them, and had then said they would like to have potential aviators trained instead.

43. Great enthusiasm for the air marked the send off of the fourteen lads, who were loudly clapped and whose path was strewn with flowers. The episode gave a renewed impetus to the work of the Arab Aeronautical Society, which had attracted no general attention since the publication of the report mentioned in paragraph 73 of the report for January to March 1932. The promoters have now again met, made speeches and launched appeals.

44. The concession granted to the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (paragraph 12 of the last report) was published on the 15th February. The general lines are those foreshadowed in paragraph 304 of the report for December. The syndicate is allowed three months to get to work, a year for general prospecting and another year for further research in selected areas, after which mining leases for fifty-eight years will be granted to it or its subsidiaries for areas chosen for definite operations. Mr. Twitchell returned on the 17th February, having collected two more mining engineers, British and American, followed by an Australian on the 27th February and a British clerical assistant. Four areas are to be prospected in the first instance. Mr. Twitchell is full of hope and hustle. The syndicate's cars are the wonder of the town. They are painted a bright pillar box red and inscribed conspicuously S.A.M.S. As the enterprise is now so largely British, it is to be hoped that the bad little Badu boys will not be misled by Mr. Twitchell's American aspect into scrawling "Uncle" behind those letters.

45. The total of lorries imported under the arrangement with Sharqieh (Limited) (paragraph 14 of the last report) was at the end of February close on 300. It is doubtful, however, whether that company will make much money out of it. They were said (by a rival) in February to be owed £20,000. There has been trouble in customs owing to the wish of the local authorities to assure themselves that the cases contained lorries only and not wireless sets. Certain cases were opened by the customs officers and were found in due course to have been robbed of portable parts like headlamps, &c.

46. Talaat Pasha Harb and the Bank Misr (paragraph 16 of the last report) are again going strong. Their first pilgrim ship arrived on the 18th February, with some 1,149 pilgrims and a first consignment of the wheat mentioned below. The pilgrims were landed in a special barge drawn by a tug, both of which had been brought from Egypt. The group have presented a sum of over £2,000 gold for the benefit of certain named Saudi hospitals. The Pasha has ventilated publicly a scheme for an air service between Jedda and Medina, which would enable the devout to get to Medina and back for their visit to the Prophet's Tomb in one day or two. The attitude of the Saudi Government is not known, but the era of the potted pilgrimage may be in sight.



47. A smaller and more local enterprise commended itself to the notice of pilgrims on the 4th February in an announcement of edifying modesty. Its authors admitted that the quality of the cloth was poor and its price high. They urged, however, that the price was not enough to cover expenses, and suggested that the cloth might be bought for presents from the Holy Land, shrouds, pilgrim garb and servants' clothes.

48. An electric lighting plant for the sacred precincts at Mecca, presented by Sir Muhammad Muzammil-Ullah Khan, K.C.I.E., O.B.E., of Bhikampur, Alighah, arrived from India on the 12th February.

49. The Saudi authorities, anxious to remedy certain nuisances in and about the sacred precincts at Mecca, have provided a refuge capable of accommodating some 1,500 poor people, without beds, but with free food.

50. There is no truth in a report published in the *Moscow Daily News* of the 28th November, and perhaps in other papers, that Russian engineers have installed an automatic telephone service in Jedda. The Soviet Government did present twenty-five instruments and a central instrument to Ibn Saud last summer and sent experts. No other apparatus is known to have been imported since. The presentation outfit is installed in the Royal palace at Taif.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

51. Fuad Bey Hamza assured Sir Andrew Ryan on the 20th February that there was no trouble of any sort on the Yemen frontier. He said that a delimitation of the frontier (paragraph 18 of the last report) was in view, but that it was not for that that the Deputy Minister of Finance and Khalid-al-Qarqani had been standing by. It had been intended to send them on a mission of administrative organisation only. Fuad Bey mentioned the presence at Riyadh of a Yemeni emissary, who had taken over forty days to get there overland with a letter, apparently, from the King of the Yemen.

52. Incidentally, Fuad Bey said that the alleged spy and the alleged Japanese representative mentioned in paragraph 18 of the last report were distinct persons and the resemblance in their names merely superficial. The first, he said, was a man named Skaf (or "Cobbler"), who was born in Syria, had spent some time in the Hejaz and had got into trouble in the Yemen last year over some business involving the use of forged seals, for which he had been sentenced to two years' imprisonment. This may afford a sidelight on the most highly coloured story yet circulated in this connexion, namely, that the failure of the Yemeni troops to counter-attack last year, when they seemed fully prepared to do so, was due to orders issued by this Skaf, at Saudi instigation, over a perfect replica of the seal of the King of the Yemen. As for the other man, Fuad Bey said that he belonged to the well-known Saqqaf family, who have large interests in the Dutch East Indies and elsewhere.

53. The Saudi Minister of Finance and the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda signed a provisional agreement on the 12th February regarding the motor route for pilgrims from Nejef to Medina (paragraphs 13 and 20 of the last report). The press had already announced the arrival of the first pilgrims by this route, but the report may have been premature. In a conversation early in February the Iraqi Chargé was even more eloquent than he had previously been (paragraph 20 of the last report) about the improvement in Saudi-Iraqi relations, which he dated from about two months earlier. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* newspaper of the 11th February referred in particular to the friendly intercourse of tribes on the frontier. Finally, on the 20th February, Fuad Bey Hamza spoke to Sir Andrew Ryan of the expected visit of an Iraqi delegation, which might be headed by Nuri Pasha-as-Said, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs. This will probably be delayed by the fall of the Iraqi Cabinet in the last days of February. Nevertheless, the indications of a political rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, of which Fuad Bey spoke in London in September, are gathering volume.

54. The sudden death at Bagdad on the 13th February of King Ali seemed to create no emotion among his and his father's former subjects. The Iraqi Chargé when announcing it naturally gave the deceased his titles, but very correctly mentioned his relationship to King Ghazi, thus making it a matter of Iraqi Royal mourning. This minimised any delicacy there might have been about mourning in Jedda. The British Legation and most of the other foreign missions

duly half-masted their flags. Ibn Saud sent telegrams of condolence to King Ghazi and the Amir of Transjordan.

55. Certain matters affecting Transjordan, Koweit and Bahrein are reserved for the following section as they closely concern Anglo-Saudi relations.

## III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

56. Following on earlier consultations of an informal kind, the Saudi Government were informed by Sir Andrew Ryan on the 6th February that His Majesty's Government would welcome a suggested unofficial visit by the Saudi Heir Apparent to England next summer. If this comes off, the Prince will also visit France and probably Italy.

57. Fuad Bey intimated to Sir Andrew Ryan on the 7th February the King's distaste for general negotiations on the lines indicated in paragraph 22 of the last report, adding, however, a strong affirmation of his wish to get as many questions as possible settled on their several merits. His Majesty's Government have acquiesced. Some progress has already been made with two questions, Bahrein transit dues and the Koweit blockade. The King has agreed that in each case the position should be examined by a local conference of delegates in the hope of their being able to submit agreed recommendations. His Majesty's Government have informed the Legation of their readiness still to offer certain concessions to Ibn Saud in regard to his eastern and south-eastern frontiers, but they wish the advance to be made more slowly than if the possibility of a comprehensive settlement of major questions were in view and they would like to get the Koweit question settled first. They are still studying the subject of attempting to secure a satisfactory clarification of the Saudi-Transjordan frontier, a matter to which the Saudi Government reverted independently in February to the extent of reasserting after a long silence their claim to Thaniyya Taraif (paragraph 250 of the report for October).

58. Various other questions have been discussed with Fuad Bey, including the possibility of an agreement between the Saudi Government and Cable and Wireless (Limited), at a conference at Jedda, which has been agreed to in principle; the question of real property legislation; and the question of the Saudi nationality regulations. A note on the present position in regard to the last named is attached for the benefit of British authorities, whom it has not been possible to keep informed of all the stages.

59. Mention should have been made in the last report of an identic note to the British and French missions in Jedda, in which, on the 18th January, the Saudi Government proposed a technical conference to arrange for the reconditioning of the Hejaz Railway, without prejudice to their views as to its ownership and alleged Wakf character. They had assured themselves beforehand of a generally sympathetic attitude on the part of the British and French Governments, but details still require consideration.

60. The French Chargé d'Affaires returned to Jedda from Sana on the 10th February, but left within a few days for a short holiday in Syria (paragraph 25 of the last report).

61. The Italian Chargé has again shown no special activity, but see paragraph 42 above regarding the despatch of would-be Saudi airmen to Massawa.

62. The Netherlands Chargé has not yet returned from Sana (paragraph 27 of the last report). News was received from London in February that he had been appointed Dutch representative at Bagdad as well.

63. M. Guertik (paragraph 29 of the last report), whose card reads "Agent général pour le Commerce de l'U.R.S.S.," left for Istanbul, his headquarters, on the 10th February. It now appears that he had already been in Hudeida before he arrived in Jedda on the 7th January, and that he paid a previous visit to Jedda in 1931.

64. The dream of Lieutenant-Colonel Sherif Ibrahim Depui has come true (paragraph 314 of the report for December). He was appointed Belgian consul by a Royal decree of the 30th January. He disclaims all interest in politics, and states that he is severely restricted as regards personal commerce. Study, he says, is the lure.

65. The Egyptian Government have given 20,000 ardebs (about 3,800 bushels) of wheat for the poor of Medina, and a collection of money for their relief has been started in Egypt. These developments may be connected with the efforts



of Talaat Pasha and the Banque Misr to stimulate Egyptian interest in the Hejaz, other indications of which are mentioned in paragraph 46.

66. The *agrément* of the Afghan Minister in Cairo for the additional post of Minister in Saudi Arabia was announced in Mecca and Bagdad in February. He comes on pilgrimage in any case every year. The usual small-scale Afghan Medical Mission arrived during the month.

#### IV.—Miscellaneous.

67. H.M.S. *Hastings*, Captain the Hon. C. P. Hermon-Hodge, D.S.C., visited Jedda from the 9th to 13th February.

68. Mr. A. S. Calvert, who was promoted to the rank of His Majesty's consul on the 1st January, went on leave on the 10th February.

69. Dr. van der Hoog, the Dutch bacteriologist mentioned in paragraph 320 of the report for December, arrived in Jedda on the 3rd February. It now appears that he became a Moslem before he last left, but had not qualified for access to Mecca by length of service in the faith. This is now all right, and he left for Mecca soon after his arrival. He appears to be well versed in his science, but to be somewhat of a cheery eccentric. He claims, *inter alia*, to possess the secret of a really remarkable hair tonic. Another European doctor named Brunelli arrived in Jedda on the 27th February, to act as medical officer of the Italian Legation and at the same time engage in private practice.

70. Other occidental visitors have included the Hon. C. C. Farrer, of the Department of Overseas Trade, and Mr. G. H. Selous, senior commercial secretary at Cairo, who rounded off an official tour in the Sudan with a short stay in the Legation; a Mrs. Edwards from the United States of America; a swiftly-passing Dutchman named Axler; and a young German journalist from London named Marcus, who came on from Massawa because he had been refused permission to land there; the representative of a French North African bank, who will stay over the pilgrimage for the benefit of pilgrims; and lastly, Mr. Dickerson, commercial secretary of the United States Legation at Cairo, who arrived on the 27th February. Even this list is probably incomplete.

71. All thoughts are turning towards the pilgrimage, as Arafat day will fall on the 14th or 15th March. The prospects are distinctly better than last year. It was announced on the 22nd February that the total of overseas pilgrims up to date was 16,425. An analysis of the complete figures is reserved for next month.

72. His Highness the Nawab of Bahawalpur arrived on pilgrimage, with considerable state, on the 3rd February and stayed two nights in the Legation before proceeding to Medina. The Saudi Government have done him great honour, and even greater honour to the senior Begum of His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad, who arrived less ostentatiously on the 27th February. Nawab Wali-ad-Dawlah, a Minister and near relative of the Nizam, who had arrived on the 1st February, died of pneumonia at Medina on the 22nd. Other notable pilgrims this year up to date include a brother of the Sheikh of Debai and the chief of the Hadehdowa tribe in the Sudan. The Glaoui, the greatest of the Moroccan Grand Kaid, is expected.

73. The position as regards the manumission of slaves during February was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: 3 males and 1 female.  
Took refuge in February: 1 male, 1 female.  
Manumitted and repatriated: 3 males.  
Locally manumitted: 1 female.  
Left voluntarily: Nil.  
On hand at the end of the month: 1 male, 1 female.

The case of the enceinte slave woman referred to in paragraph 35 of the last report was at last disposed of by an arrangement that she should be locally manumitted, housed with a relative of the former owner pending confinement, and visited regularly by the Indian medical officer with her host's consent.

#### Appendix.

##### *Note on the Present Position in regard to Persons claiming British Nationality or Protected Status in Saudi Arabia.*

1. This note is intended to be read in conjunction with the consolidated text of the Saudi regulations on nationality appended to the Jedda report for January and February 1931, and Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch to the Foreign Office, No. 193 of the 19th June, 1934, copies of which were distributed to the British authorities most likely to be concerned.

2. The Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs forwarded to the Legation on the 7th July, 1934, an advance copy of a communiqué, which was in due course published on the 13th July. This communiqué fixed a period ending the 5th February, 1935, within which persons claiming foreign nationality were to present proof of it. The language of the communiqué suggested that it was meant to apply only to persons long settled in the country. The consequences of failure to produce proof of foreign nationality were not specified in the communiqué itself, but the evident intention was to regard defaulters as being Saudi subjects in virtue of article 10 of the amended regulations on nationality. The French consulate understood orally from the Saudi authorities that failure to furnish such proof within the time allowed would entail loss of the foreign nationality in the case of persons (a) born in the Hejaz of foreign parents, (b) born abroad, but resident for a number (unspecified) of years.

3. The Secretary of State issued instructions on the 10th October to the effect that no objection should be raised to the terms of the Saudi communiqué. He anticipated, however, that the time allowed might prove inadequate for the verification of applications, in which case the Legation was to urge that a further period should be allowed. The Saudi Government were also to be informed privately that British subjects and protected persons resident in Saudi Arabia would not, even in the absence of papers, lose such status merely by reason of their acquiring Saudi nationality under article 10 of the Saudi regulations, but that His Majesty's Government would not claim to afford such persons protection while they remained in Saudi territory. Mr. Calvert acted on these instructions in a personal letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 15th October and asked him to consider favourably "a further extension, to be announced for general information on more than one occasion so that all may be aware of the matter and have adequate time to produce their proofs of nationality."

4. No reply was returned to Mr. Calvert's letter, but on the 18th January the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs forwarded to the foreign missions a further communiqué of the same date extending the period for the production of proof of foreign nationality to the end of the Moslem year, *i.e.*, until the 5th April, 1935. This was published in both the Mecca papers.

5. It is probable that knowledge of the situation created by the communiqués is fairly widespread, and that the paucity of applications for passports by British subjects and protected persons, who may be affected, is due less to ignorance than to a very natural fear of the eventual consequences of asserting claims to foreign nationality. There may be cases of complete ignorance and there are probably more in which British subjects and protected persons have only vague ideas as to the consequences of not taking out proper papers. Nevertheless, it is difficult to contest the right of the Saudi Government to object to foreigners residing in their territory indefinitely without regularising their position. Sir Andrew Ryan therefore informed Fuad Bey Hamza on the 20th February that he would have preferred the prolongation of the period of grace to be greater, but that he would be personally satisfied with the position created by the latest communiqué if—

(a) The period were further prolonged in the case of persons producing evidence that they had applied for documents establishing their foreign character, but that the formalities had not been completed; and if

(b) The Saudi Government would undertake to consider on their merits cases arising in the future in which the interested persons claimed to have been ignorant of the requirements of the Saudi Government.

6. The reply of Fuad Bey and the views of His Majesty's Government on the suggestions made by Sir Andrew Ryan, as from himself, are awaited.



7. Attention must be drawn to a particular question which arises in the case of persons born in the Hejaz of foreign parents, when the Ottoman Law on Nationality was in force. As that law treated such persons as having been born foreigners, His Majesty's Government do not admit that they can now be claimed as Saudi subjects merely by reason of birth in the Hejaz or Nejd. The Secretary of State has, however, approved of the suggestion in paragraph 12 (d) of Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 193 of the 19th June, 1934, *i.e.*, that Saudi nationality should not be contested in the case of persons of Arabian origin, not being British subjects, who were born in the Hejaz before the promulgation of the Hejazi regulations on nationality, which was issued in 1926 and amended in 1931.

[E 1714/77/91]

No. 40.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 55.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, March 22, 1935.*

ADEN telegram No. 11 of 13th March to Colonial Office shows that any new boundary cutting violet line should not do so south of parallel 18. It also now appears most desirable (see Aden despatch No. 42 of 12th February to Colonial Office, copies to you by bag of 21st March) that northern boundary of Aden Protectorate north of Hadramaut should run at least 20 miles north of southern edge of great sands (so as to leave strip of desert within Protectorate), and not along edge itself as suggested in paragraph 7 of Mr. Rendel's letter of 7th November to Mr. Laithwaite and subsequent correspondence. It appears that this object could be achieved, and a clear and reasonable boundary secured, if the line in this area, whether as marking the southern boundary of the desert zone, or for the purposes of paragraphs 9 and 10 of my telegram No. 8 of 16th January, were (instead of following the edge of the sands) to run along parallel 18, between its intersection with the violet line and its intersection with meridian 52.

In that event it would probably be simpler and better (notwithstanding the now familiar objections to definition by geographical co-ordinates in imperfectly surveyed areas) to redefine the eastern and south-eastern boundaries of the proposed desert zone as follows:—

"From the intersection of parallel 22 north and meridian 55 east, down that meridian to its intersection with parallel 20; thence in a straight line to the intersection of meridian 52 with parallel 18; thence along that parallel to its intersection with the violet line."

Latter need not be referred to as such, but could be separately defined.

Northern terminal of frontier between Aden Protectorate and Sultanate of Muscat and Oman would then be at intersection of meridian 52 and parallel 18.

Unless you, Resident at Aden or Government of India see serious objection, you should adopt this definition in future instead of definitions for these sectors given in my telegrams Nos. 8 of 16th January and 43 of 7th March.

(Repeated to Aden, No. 24, and Government of India, No. 41.)

[E 2232/325/25]

No. 41.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 5.)*

(No. 80.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, April 4, 1935.*

YOUR telegram No. 21 of 4th February.

I postponed action until question should come up in sequence of general negotiations. This happened on 30th March when Fuad asked me to study preliminary draft of a personal letter covering draft regulations which would be adopted by Saudi Government and in return for which they would ask His Majesty's Government to abandon right of manumission.

2. Draft letter is not clear as to procedure, and regulations in the present form leave much to be desired. I am, however, taking the latter as basis for

discussion with Fuad with a view to certain improvements on the understanding that I cannot commit His Majesty's Government even if text is amended in accordance with my suggestions. I have also warned him that value of any regulations must depend largely on prospect of effective enforcement.

3. I have not broached the question of accession to article 2 (a) of international convention. I feel even more strongly than before that this would merely complicate matters.

4. I defer further observations until more advanced stage of discussions with Fuad.

[E 2281/77/91]

No. 42.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 6.)*

(No. 84.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, April 6, 1935.*

MY telegram No. 77.

Fuad produced statement in memorandum form on 3rd April. He explained that, though it proposed a geographic boundary, it was based on Saudi claim to areas frequented by Murra, Dimran and Beni Hajir tribes and certain sections of Manasir, to the exclusion of all other tribes. Memorandum expressly defines proposed frontier as being between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, tracial sheikhdoms, Sultanate of Muscat, Hadhramaut, and other sheikhdoms, &c., in East-South-East and South Arabia.

Following is summary, omitting less important place names:—

Boundary with Qatar starts from coast of Dohat-es-Salwa, between Jebel Naksh and Jebel Dukhan, leaving former to Saudi Arabia and latter to Qatar. Proceeds south and south-east along line of Eastern Qalail to Ariq Mashash-bin-Shafi, and thence to Aqal as far as coast, where the Naqiyan are left to Qatar and Khor-al-Odeid is claimed for Saudi Arabia.

Line restarts from point on coast 25 kilom. from Khor and follows line of Majann, Sabakhat Matti and Kufat Liwa to intersection of meridian 56 and parallel 22, leaving last-named area to sheikhdoms. Continues along meridian 56 to parallel 19, thence in a straight line to intersection of meridian 52 and parallel 17, thence along parallel 17 to its intersection with violet line.

Fuad anticipated objection to claim to Khor-al-Odeid by saying it was necessary for control of smuggling by Murra. When we discussed the subject further on 5th April he insisted that an honest effort had been made to include only tribes named above, and said that if experts discovered flaws, they could be rectified, as Hadhramaut tribes may extend further north than Saudi Government had supposed.

I offered line suggested in your telegram No. 8 as modified by paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 43.

Comments will follow when I have studied position further. I am sending text of statement by bag 8th April.

(Repeated to Government of India, No. 52; Bushire, No. 89; and copy to Aden (by bag).)

[E 2298/602/25]

No. 43.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 8.)*

(No. 80.)

Sir,

*Jedda, March 18, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 56 of the 27th February relative to the concession recently granted by the Saudi Government to the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited), I have the honour to state that the Royal decree sanctioning the concession referred to an agreement and contract as having been signed by the Minister of Finance and the representative of the syndicate. It now appears that these were two separate instruments as, after the agreement



summarised in the enclosure to my despatch under reference had been published, the *Umm-al-Qura* proceeded to publish, in instalments, an even lengthier document described as a contract concluded on the same date as the main agreement.

2. Although the further document is described as above, it is clear from internal evidence that it is a form of mining lease for fifty-eight years, in respect of areas to be finally selected for definite mining operations in accordance with article 3 of the main agreement. The procedure contemplated would appear to be that the Government will lease these areas to the syndicate on the conditions laid down in the "contract," and that the syndicate will form subsidiary companies to work the individual properties. As the general conditions are stated in the main agreement, I do not think it necessary to report at length on the "contract," the detailed stipulations of which appear to follow normal lines. The following points, however, may be noted:—

- (a) The Government are to receive during the period of the lease a rent of £1 per feddan of the leased area plus the excess, if any, of 5 per cent. of the product of the mine over the rental so fixed.
- (b) The special arrangement for payment of customs duty on imported supplies, &c., at a flat rate of 10 per cent. will operate throughout the period of the lease.
- (c) The Government are not only to receive gratis 15 per cent. of the share capital of the eventual subsidiary companies, fully paid up, but they are to have the right to nominate a director to serve on the board of each company, the total membership of which shall not exceed six persons.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Department of Overseas Trade and his Excellency the High Commissioner for Transjordan at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2302/7/25]

No. 44.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 86.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 22, 1935.

I HAD the honour to inform you briefly in my telegrams Nos. 60 and 61 of the 15th March of the attack on Ibn Saud and the heir apparent in Mecca that morning. As usual on such occasions, the affair rapidly became the subject of a mass of varying and often conflicting rumours, but none of the variants appeared to me to be of sufficient importance to telegraph. I now enclose translations of two communiqués which were telegraphed to the foreign missions on the 15th and 20th March.<sup>(1)</sup> These, especially the latter, are probably more trustworthy than any of the numerous other versions that have reached me.

2. The facts that the attempt was made within the precincts of the mosque and was made during the greatest festival of the Moslem year not only add to its dramatic interest but invest it in the eyes of Moslems with a peculiarly sacrilegious character. The religious law may be susceptible of different interpretations, but the broad principles may be summed up in the statement that gratuitous bloodshed, whether of man or animals, is at all times forbidden in the sacred precincts of Mecca and that the festival entails a sort of Truce of God between enemies. The principles are so strongly held that the question may be raised in quarters critical of Ibn Saud whether the slaying of his assailants in the Holy Place was not more than was necessary to stay their impious hands and therefore unlawful. The historical instances of bloodshed in the actual mosque would appear to have been extremely rare. Indeed, one informant states that the only case on record is that mentioned in Muir's *Life of Muhammad* (p. 410 of the 1923 edition), and that that is doubtful.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

3. Even the second communiqué leaves certain points indeterminate. It is not clearly stated that the two policemen, who were struck down, lost their lives, but it is probable that one if not both were killed. The wound of the heir apparent is understood to have been rather more serious than is implied, but in any case it was not grave. It is tacitly suggested that the King suffered no hurt. I am assured, however, that he was slightly wounded in the leg by flying splinters. It was thought at first that a bomb might have been thrown, but the more accredited theory now is that the splinters were struck out of the marble pavement by the firing of the guards. The communiqué discloses doubt regarding a point of some importance, i.e., whether there was a fourth assailant, who got away.

4. There was some panic in Mecca and a great deal at Mina, where large numbers of pilgrims were congregated for the festival. There is no doubt that feeling in the King's entourage was greatly inflamed. There was talk of a general onslaught on Yemenis and of arresting Abdullah-al-Wazir, who, as you will remember, came to the Hejaz last year for the peace negotiations and established intimate personal relations with Ibn Saud and who is now back again as a greatly honoured pilgrim. Happily, the King himself displayed both courage and good sense. It appears to be true that he and the heir apparent completed the sevenfold circuit of the Kaaba, though I believe that they abandoned the further rite of passing the prescribed number of times between Safa and Marwa. The King, moreover, gave stringent orders that there were to be no gratuitous reprisals. The police are said to have made a good many arrests, and even to have used torture, but there was no promiscuous attack on Yemenis, which might have led to massacre.

5. There have naturally been various theories as to the origin of the incident. Some suggest that it was due merely to the indignation of the assailants at being thrust aside by the guards to make way for the King. Yemenis are said to be very quick with their daggers, when offended. This theory is possible, but on the whole improbable, as, if the men had not gone to Mecca with the special object of making their attempt, they would probably have performed the pilgrimage. Assuming that they did go there with that object, it becomes a question whether they did so from motives of private vengeance or by instigation. People in Mecca have been very ready to believe that they were set on by high personages in the Yemen, not, indeed, by the Imam Yahya, but by others with rankling memories of the past, e.g., the Imam's eldest son Ahmed, whose dissatisfaction with the issue of the war and general restiveness are notorious. It might be inferred from the stress laid by the Saudi communiqués on the fact that the criminals were not only Yemenis but Zeydis, and from the account given of their passports, that the Saudi Government lent to this view. If they adopted it definitely, the incident might possibly have important political repercussions. I am told, however, by Mr. Philby (a) that it is recognised in high quarters that, although the passports were signed by one of the Imam's sons, this is a normal way of issuing passports at Sanaa; and (b) that in an interview given to journalists on the 19th March the King himself exonerated the King of the Yemen and his sons from any responsibility for the outrage. I have not yet seen this interview, but, if Mr. Philby's statement is correct, it would appear that Ibn Saud has already taken his line and will not let the affair outwardly affect the relations of this country with the Yemen.

6. I am told that the first telegrams of congratulation on his escape which reached Ibn Saud were that of His Majesty King George and that of the Imam. The latter is said to have disclaimed responsibility, and suggested that the outrage was the work of some unspecified "foreign finger." This is not the first time that the Imam Yahya has adjured his brother-Arab King to beware of foreigners, meaning Powers that are neither Arab nor Moslem. Ibn Saud has sometimes echoed the Imam's sentiments in this respect, but it is interesting to note in the present connexion that, three days before the incident at the Kaaba, when addressing the notable pilgrims assembled at his annual banquet, he scouted the theory that foreign influences had brought about the Saudi-Yemen quarrel of last year.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosures to the Government of India, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Bushire, Aden and Cairo.

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.



[E 2373/77/91]

No. 45.

*Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Stanley Baldwin.—(Received April 10.)*

(No. 89.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, April 10, 1935.*

MY telegram No. 84.

Although Ibn Saud's territorial demands are very extensive, he is showing many signs of present anxiety to settle outstanding questions generally. It may be advisable to take advantage of this and expedite further discussion of frontier question rather than adhere to policy laid down in your telegram No. 33. For one thing, it is desirable to make as much progress as possible before Fuad leaves next month.

2. I gave Fuad yesterday memorandum confirming offer mentioned in penultimate paragraph of my telegram under reference. Only value of this is to show conservative character of His Majesty's Government's approach. It cannot be basis of agreement. I have mentioned oil consideration, but I do not think Saudi Government know much about it or attach anything like as much importance to economic considerations as to extension of influence in the desert.

3. I should now be disposed to proceed quickly to stage contemplated in paragraph 9 of your telegram No. 8, and suggest that desert zone should be recognised for ten years, for which Saudi Government wish to prolong the Treaty of Jedda. Inducement might be held out that while territories adjoining limits of zone would accrue to respective Arab rulers, no one would be committed as regards the zone itself, and there would be time for complete study of tribal considerations before the end of ten years.

4. I suggest that zone should be defined as in correspondence ending with your telegram No. 55. If desert zone solution is agreed to, further limitation proposed in Aden telegram No. 19 seems to me unnecessary, as Hadhramauth tribes would have same access to zone as the others.

5. It would be necessary to indicate at very early stage principle of régime proposed for zone. I suggest the following:—

- (a) All question of sovereignty to remain in abeyance as between rulers concerned.
- (b) Rulers to have access to zone to control tribes normally frequenting the areas under their sovereignty.
- (c) Parties to concert measures in the event of any serious dispute in the zone involving tribes of different allegiance.
- (d) No flying over except in exercise of right at (b) or to give effect to measures at (c).
- (e) No economic concession.

6. I have worded above proposals so as to recognise position of Arab rulers without defining their status or that of His Majesty's Government, whose position would be affirmed by the fact of agreement being concluded by them. I am not sure whether point (d) above will be acceptable to His Majesty's Government, but it would probably improve the chances of agreement.

7. If Saudi Government should refuse desert zone outright, I should propose to offer without further delay area west of green and brown lines on map enclosed in Eastern Department's letter of 21st February, as far as intersection with parallel 18 and north of line along that parallel as far as violet line. If this also were refused, I should again slow down the negotiations.

(Repeated to Government of India, No. 55, and Bushire, No. 94; copy to Aden (by bag).)

[E 2373/77/91]

No. 46.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 66.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, April 12, 1935.*

YOUR telegram No. 89 of 10th April: Frontier negotiations with Saudi Government.

Whole question is being reconsidered interdepartmentally on 15th April. Pending fresh instructions, which I hope to send you soon, please suspend further action.

[E 2569/74/25]

No. 47.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 23.)*

(No. 89.)

Sir,

*Jedda, March 24, 1935.*

AS you are aware, Ibn Saud makes it his annual practice to give a great banquet in Mecca for notable pilgrims of all nations just before the pilgrimage. I find that I sent no separate report on this event last year, but I included some account of it in my despatch No. 85 of the 31st March, 1934, on the Saudi Yemen situation. This year the occasion merits separate treatment.

2. This year's pilgrimage has brought to the Hejaz an unusually large number of Moslems of high standing and a good many politicians of less note, but of some importance in their own countries. The former have included ex-King Amanullah of Afghanistan; His Highness the Nawab of Bahawalpur; the chief Begum of his Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad, with Sir Nizam Jung in attendance; another Begum of the Hyderabad family; the Glawi from Morocco; Abdullah-bin-Wazir, the Governor of Hodeida, who was here last year as Yemeni delegate at the peace negotiations; Nawab Sir Umar Nayat Khan, honorary A.D.C. to His Majesty the King; and a brother of the Sheikh of Dibai.

3. Most of the male personages just mentioned were among the 500 guests or so whom the King entertained on the evening of the 12th March. As the King had arrived only on the 10th March, the arrangements were made hurriedly. Among the absentees were the Nawab of Bahawalpur, who pleaded illness, and Sir Umar Nayat Khan, the reasons for whose non-appearance I do not know. The Nawab may have been worried about questions of precedence, but members of his suite attended the dinner. The King had ex-King Amanullah on his right, with Sayyid Hasan-al-Idrisi, and, I believe, the Glawi beyond. The second place of honour on his left was given very significantly to Abdullah-al-Wazir.

4. The King's principal speech was reproduced, as usual, in the *Umm-al-Qura*, probably in an edited version. The published version is not worth submitting to you in full, but a few points may be noted. He began with his customary exhortations and insistence on the importance of close adherence to Moslem tenets, especially the doctrine of the Unity. He and his were Bedouins, possessing nought except the blessing of God and desiring the co-operation of Arabs and Moslems. The King then spoke of the events of last year and referred specially to the past enmity between himself and the Idrisi and Al Wazir, who were now sitting at his table. The war had shown, he said, the disadvantages of discord to both sides. Moslems generally had welcomed the peaceful ending and he invited them all to work together. The most interesting passage in his speech was that in which he scouted the idea that foreign influence had caused the quarrel. Moslems and Arabs were themselves responsible for their differences. In their press utterances they raged rudely against each other, but were polite to occidentals. If they respected themselves, co-operated and followed the right path they would succeed.

5. Ex-King Amanullah delivered a speech which was also reported in the *Umm-al-Qura*, but in a very anodyne form. The published version contains no mention of his two principal points in trying to make which he dropped two bricks. He urged the desirability of general Moslem conferences at pilgrimage time, and boggled when his remarks were coldly received. You will remember that Ibn Saud convened such a conference in 1926 and has never repeated the embarrassing experiment. Amanullah Khan's other point was that traffic in



slaves was all wrong and should be abolished in Saudi Arabia. The moment was clearly ill chosen for the expression of this sentiment, so admirable in itself, and means were found to silence the orator.

6. There were, I understand, numerous other speeches, including one by a speaker whom I have not identified, who applauded the present régime in Afghanistan. The only orators named in the official report, besides the King and Amanullah Khan, were Muhammad-al-Ghumaymi-al-Taftazani and a certain Muhammad Sadiq-al-Mujahid. The latter I take to be the adversary of Ibn Saud on whom His Majesty's Government have long had their eye, but who recently returned to this country under the terms of the recent so-called amnesty. Al Taftazani belongs to a family of some religious consequence in Egypt, who claim descent from the Prophet. His importance lies in the fact that in the past he has been a violent critic of Ibn Saud, especially, if I remember rightly, but I have not verified this, at the time of the Idrisi revolt in Asir in 1932. He is understood to have praised the King highly in his speech at the dinner. The sincerity of these conversations may be doubted, but the lip-service of such former enemies shows how greatly the events of last year have enhanced Ibn Saud's credit in outer Moslem and Arab circles.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, Aden and Cairo.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2574/7/25]

No. 48.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 23.)*

(No. 96.)

Sir,

Jedda, March 27, 1935.

THE Mecca newspaper *Umm-al-Qura* of the 21st March reached me too late to be used in drafting my despatch No. 86 of the following day, relative to the attack on Ibn Saud in the Great Mosque at Mecca on the 15th March. When received it proved to contain a great deal of interesting matter besides the two communiqués enclosed in that despatch. The leading article, headed: "They Wished Evil for him, but their Intrigue has been Frustrated," presents few features of interest. The most salient were perhaps references to the sword by which this country was conquered and from which the incident would remove the rust that might gather if it remained long in the sheath. The writer was reserved regarding the position which the affair had created.

2. The paper printed twenty telegrams received from heads of States and other personages, together with the King's replies. Fuad Bey Hamza tells me that many other telegrams were received, but it must be assumed that, so far as heads of States are concerned, the list was complete up to date, in which case several even of those who are in relations with Ibn Saud seem to have neglected to congratulate him. The heads of States whose telegrams were published were, in the order of printing, those of Great Britain, &c., Iraq, France, Yemen, Italy, Transjordan, Persia, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Koweit. The other personages were M. Mussolini, Prince Omar Toussoun, Nahas Pasha, "on behalf of the Wafd and the Egyptian nation," the President of the Supreme Moslem Council of Palestine, Prince Muhammad Ali of Egypt, two Syrian notables, viz., Nasib Bey Al Bakri and Hashim Bey Al Atasi, Hamad Pasha Al Basil of Egypt, Mr. C. R. Crane of New York, and the Saudi agent in Cairo. The telegram of the last-named was presumably included because the abnormal position between Egypt and Saudi Arabia had been held to preclude any direct official expression of sympathy and congratulation. The agent reported that visits of congratulation had been paid to him by the Egyptian Prime Minister, the Governor of Cairo and other personages, as well as by foreign representatives. He also mentioned numerous telegrams, including one from His Majesty's High Commissioner and one from Sheikh Al Maraghi.

3. By far the most interesting telegrams were those exchanged with the Imam Yahya. There were two telegrams from the Imam. One of these was directly inspired by the incident. The other began as an acknowledgment of the receipt of a letter which his courier had just brought back from Ibn Saud, but this also was almost entirely devoted to the attempt on the King's life. Both,

especially the second, abounded in the author's usual pious rhetoric. The kindness of the King's letter almost broke the Imam's heart. As for the attack, it had caused that same heart to drip with grief and had filled his eyes with tears. For the rest, he refused to believe that the crime had been the work of Zeydi Yemenis. If it was, they must have been set on by an evil hand outside the Yemen, the hand of enemies disappointed over the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif. He and his were as innocent of it as was the wolf of the blood of Joseph. He had instructed Abdullah-al-Wazir to give every assistance to the Saudi authorities in their enquiries. Replying to both telegrams at once, Ibn Saud affirmed his appreciation of the Imam's feelings in regard to a sorrow common to them both and his confidence in Abdullah-al-Wazir. He himself, he said, had discountenanced any molestation of Yemeni pilgrims and had charged Al Wazir to quiet and comfort them. The assailants were, however, undoubtedly persons from the Yemen, and full particulars had been obtained regarding them. The King completely exonerated the Imam himself.

4. The *Umm-al-Qura* published also a telegram from the Imam Yahya to Abdullah-al-Wazir expressing his grief at the incident, adjuring him to do all in his power, and again expressing the belief that, if the assailants were Yemeni, they had come from some wicked place outside the Yemen to create disturbance. All the same sentiments run through a long telegram from the Yemeni Minister for Foreign Affairs to Fuad Bey Hamza, in reply to a telegram from the latter, which, perhaps significantly, has not been published. Qadhi Raghib was even more eloquent than his master and supported what he said by curse and oath.

5. The same number of the *Umm-al-Qura* includes, in a short general account of this year's pilgrimage, the reply given by the King to those who offered him their congratulations at Mina. This is of less interest than the interview mentioned in paragraph 5 of my despatch under reference, which also appeared. In the interview the King explained why he had resisted the suggestions of his own people that he should visit foreign lands. He expressed his cautiousness, as a simple Bedouin, unfamiliar with tricks of language, in regard to journalists, who were accustomed to manipulate it. He was, however, ready to answer any questions. Three of the questions put to His Majesty related to the attempt on his life. Speaking of it generally, he convicted his assailants of irreligion. He caring only for the Unity and the protection of what he possessed. He had been saved by God, but his first concern had been the safety of the pilgrims. He described the measures he had taken to close the doors of the Haram and to prevent bloodshed therein, after which he had completed the circumambulation of the Kaaba and returned to Mina. Replying to a second question regarding the investigation and the position of the Imam Yahya in the matter, the King expressed his conviction that the Imam had had nothing to do with it, as "the man was not devoid of religion" and their relations were excellent. He left it to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to inform his interlocutors regarding the enquiries which had been made. His Majesty returned a more guarded reply to a third question about the suggestion that Seif-al-Islam Ahmad had been responsible for the affair. There was much talk, he said in effect, about many persons and he could not go by rumours. He went on to speak of a presentiment he had had at Arafat, how he had thought of means to deal with and arrest an assailant, if one should mingle with the crowd, and how he had then, confiding in God, let it pass from his mind. He went on to say more about the Unity and the purity of the belief of the people of Nejd, who took their stand on the Koran and tradition, as expounded by the four Imams.

6. The King replied to various other questions, which bore less directly on the subject of the present despatch. As his utterances, except as regards Palestine, were not of sufficient importance to report separately, I may as well sum them up briefly here as follows:—

- (a) He was favourably impressed by the sympathy shown by the Egyptians, who were brethren and with whom there was no cause for dispute.
- (b) On the Iraqi journalists expressing pleasure at what he had said to the party of Iraqi boy scouts, the King affirmed solidarity with Iraq.
- (c) I am reporting separately His Majesty's remarks about Palestine.
- (d) Replying to an expression of Moroccan sympathy with himself and his people, the King said that many of the tribes of Morocco were of Nejd origin and that Arabs were all of one race.



7. The *Saut-ul-Hejaz* of the 25th March adds nothing of interest to the above, except a reference to a sympathetic telegram received by it from an Egyptian lady named Labida Ahmad, who had played a certain rôle in the past in Ibn Saud's entourage.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Bushire, Aden and Cairo.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 2657/134/91]

No. 49.

*Political Resident, Bahrein, to Government of India.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 26.)*

(Express Letter No. C/64. Secret.)

*Bahrein, April 2, 1935.*

IN continuation of Government of India telegram No. 825, dated the 29th March, 1935, I enclose herewith copy of letter No. 81/S, dated the 28th March, 1935, from the political agent, Muscat.

With reference to the last paragraph of Major Bremner's letter, I concur in his action and approve of the results obtained.

T. C. FOWLE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*  
*Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 49.

*Political Agent, Muscat, to Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire.*

(No. 81/S.)

Sir,

*Muscat, March 28, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith a report on the result of my negotiations with his Highness the Sultan in connexion with Khor Quwai (Ghanam Island).

2. On the 13th instant I sought an interview with his Highness and approached him on the lines indicated in your telegram of the 8th instant. I explained to his Highness our requirements, *i.e.*, the use of the whole island for recreational purposes, a place where officers and men of His Majesty's navy could come ashore for exercise, without let or hindrance, and where they could be free to enjoy themselves after the cramped quarters on board ship.

3. For this purpose it was desired to erect a small building to serve as an officers' club, with other modest buildings to accommodate a storekeeper, stores with personnel to look after the same, and to provide a canteen for the men. It was also desired to have moorings for an oil barge.

4. I pointed out to his Highness that at times it might prove necessary to maintain a sloop or sloops in Muscat territorial waters for his assistance, as, for example, was the case at Khasab and Sur in 1929 and 1932 respectively. In such eventuality it would be impossible for long periods at a time for the personnel to get any relaxation from their arduous duties, as no place existed close at hand where ships' companies could come ashore unfettered by disciplinary restrictions.

5. His Highness's attitude was at first pensive and silent; so, to reassure him, I judged it opportune to say that I trusted he would not think that the proposal involved any attempt to acquire territory, and that, as at Mokalla coal depot, no flag would be flown.

6. His Highness immediately brightened up, and said that no such idea had occurred to him, but that he was reflecting on what protection, if any, would be necessary. He said that he must see the island himself and enquire into the local situation generally before giving any reply.

7. Avoiding the term "depot," I stressed the fact that if his Highness did grant the permission sought, the little establishment would be on a very modest scale and might prove of great value to him.

8. His Highness, who now appeared to view the proposal very favourably, then asked if a sloop could convey him at a later date from Khasab to Jazirat-el-Ghanam to view the island. He jumped at the possibility of a sloop being placed at his disposal for his journey to Khasab.

9. As the result of this interview, I issued my telegram No. 70 of the 13th instant to you, followed by the proposal contained in my No. 72 of the 15th March. The opportune announcement that I was thus enabled to make privately, and in the guise proposed in this latter telegram, was most gratifying to the Sultan.

10. Embarking on the 20th instant in H.M.S. *Shorcham*, his Highness steamed via Khor Quwai at Khasab, passing close inshore to Jazirat-el-Ghanam, which he was thus enabled to view at close quarters. The Sultan thereafter stated that he did not require to land at the island, but requested me to furnish him with a tracing of it showing our probable requirements and the adjacent mainland. He further desired me to formulate the requirements in writing.

11. During his stay at Khasab his Highness prosecuted various necessary enquiries, but, although the subject was tactfully pressed on the 24th and 25th instants, the Sultan displayed a certain reluctance to give any decision pending further reflection. I considered that to push him unduly would be fraught with undesirable results, in which opinion the senior naval officer entirely concurred.

12. On the morning of the 26th instant, shortly prior to our arrival in Muscat, his Highness informed me verbally that he had made up his mind and that he would gladly accord the permission sought, with certain minor provisos. He promised to send me his written reply the same afternoon.

13. A somewhat rough passage had, however, upset his Highness, and he was unfortunately indisposed for the rest of the 26th March and most of the next day. His written reply in Arabic, copies of which are herewith appended, was received late at night on the 27th instant, and a translation was available by dawn to-day.

14. As, however, a slight element of doubt remained in the Sultan's letter as to the meaning of the phrase: "I do not agree that the whole of the island should be used by you," I sought an interview to-day with his Highness to clear the point up.

15. His Highness explained that his intention was that personnel of the Royal Navy should be at liberty to move about the whole island quite freely, but that the restriction implied in his above-quoted sentence applied to building operations. These were to be limited to the places already pointed out to him, both *in situ* and on the tracing, in the northern portion of the island.

16. Regarding other stipulations. The island abounds with "wild" goats, which in reality are flocks owned by his subjects on the adjacent mainland. These animals are turned loose on the island for grazing purposes, and their owners very occasionally land to remove some for festival and other purposes. His Highness desires therefore that access to the island for his subjects shall in no way be restricted. As no fresh water exists on the island, no local inhabitant from the mainland is likely to migrate there.

17. This stipulation of the Sultan seems in every way reasonable, and was concurred in by the senior naval officer when verbally mentioned to him here.

18. I also sounded his Highness's views regarding the provision of arms for the permanent personnel ashore. He considered that they certainly should be in possession of rifles.

19. His Highness appears to have misunderstood my verbal statement to him concerning a flagstaff. My statement was that no flag (implying the national flag or ensign) would be hoisted. I feel sure, however, that if a flagstaff, purely for signalling purposes, is subsequently required, the Sultan will not raise any objection.

20. His Highness verbally mentioned to me that, in view of the fact that the whole island would be at the disposal of the Royal Navy for recreation, he hoped that parties would normally avoid the mainland and villages thereon, thereby eliminating any chances of friction between elements, neither of whom knew the other's language or habits.

21. I trust that you will concur with my actions and approve of the results obtained.

I have, &c.

C. E. U. BREMNER, *Major.*



Enclosure 2 in No. 49.

*Sultan of Muscat and Oman to Political Agent, Muscat.*

(Translation.)

(After Compliments.)

March 27, 1935.

I HAVE received your letter dated the 26th March, 1935, and understood its contents, in addition to the conversation which we had with regard to the Jazirat-al-Ghanam, a dependency of my country Khasab.

You have been directed by the Honourable the Political Resident to ask my permission to use the whole of the island for the purpose of constructing small buildings for His Majesty's navy to be used as a club for the officers, a canteen and a store for keeping provisions. Also a mooring for the oil barge at Khor Quwai. I have also received the plan of the island and the Khor, and noted the places required by you for the construction of small buildings, the mooring, the beach for bathing and the place for the sports.

I have thought over this matter, and, in view of the friendly relations which exist between me and the British Government, I inform you in reply that with great pleasure I accord you permission to use the northern part of the island for the places mentioned in the plan.

As there are goats in the island, I do not agree that the whole of the island should be used by you. It is said that the goats are wild, but they are not, and belong to some of my subjects, who often visit the island and see the goats.

Besides the places mentioned in the plan, I allow the British navy to go for a stroll in the rest of the island if they wish to do so, but they should not erect buildings in any place other than those mentioned in the plan.

It should also be understood that the British navy should not catch any of the goats in the island, as they are not wild ones and belong to my subjects. They should not prevent my subjects from visiting the island and using places other than those specified in the plan for building, &c. I regret that I cannot accord permission for the use of the whole island, as my subjects cannot do without it. They would not be able to use it if the British navy use the whole island, and I am unwilling that any misunderstanding should arise between them, the storekeeper and the naval men living in the island. Moreover, my subjects should be at liberty to land and go about in the island except to places which I have allowed you to use.<sup>(1)</sup>

During our conversation you pointed out that no flagstaff will be erected in the island, that only small buildings will be constructed and that the places mentioned in the plan will be used.

I would like to know at what time the work starts so that I may be able to inform the Vali who represents me in these parts. I would also like to know how many persons are going to live in the island, and whether they are in possession of any arms or not.

I request you to convey the contents of my letter to the Honourable the Political Resident and confirm what I have explained in it.

<sup>(1)</sup> *I.e.*, building sites, bathing and games places.

[E 2700/77/91]

No. 50.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 29.)*

(No. 109.)

Sir,

Jedda, April 7, 1935.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 84 of the 6th April, I have the honour to forward a translation of the statement which Fuad Bey Hamza handed to me on the 3rd April regarding the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia. As the text is not very clear in certain places I enclose also a copy of the original.<sup>(1)</sup>

2. I am unable to identify several of the places named in the statement under head 1. Most of them would appear to be particular portions of the system known under the general name of Qala'il. This is shown in the maps and is

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

described in Philby, *The Empty Quarter*, p. 50, as "the long escarpment of Qala'il, which forms the westward face of the Qatar plateau." I doubt whether the portions of it named in the Saudi statement will be found in any map. I gather that the Saudi Government have relied on tribesmen for some of their information.

3. Otherwise the statement is pretty clear so far as it goes, except for the repeated use of a word which, according to my interpreter, means "parallel." When it is applied to co-ordinates, it obviously means only that the line follows the parallels of latitude and the meridians, but in other places the sense may be more doubtful.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, Bushire and Aden.

I have, &amp;c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 50.

*Statement handed to Sir A. Ryan by Fuad Bey Hamza, April 3, 1935.*

(Translation.)

*Statement regarding the Frontier Line dividing the Saudi Arab Kingdom and Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Debai, Sharjah, Ras-el-Khaima and other Arab Emirates and Sheikhdoms situated on the Persian Gulf, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, and the Territories of Hadhramaut and other Arab Sheikhdoms and Emirates situated in the East, South and South-East of Arabia.*

THE Government of the Saudi Arab Kingdom consider that the frontier line which divides them and the Amirate of Qatar passes through the following places:—

The said line begins at a point on the coast of the sea known as Dohat Salwa and follows (literally, runs parallel to) a line extending from the junction of Jebel Dukhan and the neighbouring territory in a western direction, leaving the area (literally distance) which is situated on its west and which is located between Jebel Dukhan and Jebel An-Nakhsh to the Saudi Arab Kingdom, and Jebel Dukhan and what is behind it on the east to Qatar. The line then turns to the south and the south-east parallel to the slope of the eastern Qala'il (? eastern slope of the Qala'il), leaving the Qala'il known as Qalalat Ad-Darb, Mashash As-Samim, Al-Mafsal, Al-Maghdar, At-Ta'z, Um-Samra, Ariq-Mashash Ibn-Shafi and the territory situated to the west thereof known as Ariq and Qala'il to the Saudi Arab Kingdom, and those to the east of this line to Qatar. The line then extends from Mashash Ibn-Shafi to Al-'Aql as far as to the coast of the sea, leaving Naqiyan Qatar to Qatar and the Khor Al 'Odeid to the Saudi Arab Kingdom.

2. The Government of the Saudi Arab Kingdom consider also that the said frontier line which divides them and the Arab emirates and sheikhdoms situated on the Persian Gulf runs through the following places:—

The said line begins at a place on the sea coast 25 kilom. distant from the Khor Al 'Odeid and extends to the south and south-east parallel to the lands known as Majann, Sabakhat-Matti and Kufat-al-Liwa, leaving the lands belonging to Kufat-al-Liwa to the Arab emirates and those to the west to the Saudi Arab Kingdom.

3. The said line runs from the limits of the territory of Kufat-al-Liwa as far as the intersection of meridian 56° E. with parallel 22° N., and it then follows (literally, runs parallel to) meridian 56° E. as far as the point where it meets parallel 19° N. It then goes direct until it comes to the intersection of parallel 17° N. with meridian 52° E. and then goes direct in the western direction along (literally, parallel to) parallel 17° N. until it cuts the line known as the violet line.



[E 2701/557/25]

No. 51.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 29.)*

(No. 110. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, April 7, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for March 1935.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &amp;c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 51.

JEDDA REPORT FOR MARCH 1935.

## I.—Internal Affairs.

74. THE King, having left Rawdat-al-Khafs about four days earlier, arrived in Mecca on the 10th March with a *posse* of princes. He was preceded by at least two of his brothers, including the Amir Muhammad, with whom he is still believed to have been at loggerheads some little time ago. He was closely followed by the heir apparent, a rare visitant to the Hejaz. An unusually large number of notabilities attended the King's annual dinner to distinguished pilgrims on the 12th March. Ex-King Amanullah of Afghanistan sat on his right, and on his left was Seyyid Abdullah-al-Wazir, who had come last year as representative of the King of the Yemen for the peace negotiations.

75. The event of the month was the attempt on the King's life three days later. He and the Amir Saud had returned from Arafat early on the 15th and were engaged in the last important rite of the pilgrimage, *i.e.*, the circumambulation of the Kaaba, followed by the Sai or running between Safa and Marwa. They were about halfway through the circumambulation when a man armed with a dagger attacked the King. He was shot down, as were two others who followed on. The King sustained no injury, except a slight peppering in the leg, which was at first attributed to a bomb but afterwards, more plausibly, to splinters struck out of the pavement by the firing of his guards. The Amir Saud, who had come to his father's assistance, was slightly wounded in the shoulder. Two guards were wounded, and one or both may have lost their lives. Both the King and his heir completed the circumambulation, but apparently gave up the Sai and returned, according to custom, to Mina.

76. Opinion in the King's entourage was greatly inflamed. There could be little doubt that the assailants were Zeydis from the Yemen, and it might have gone hard with the thousands of Yemenis who had come on pilgrimage, perhaps also with other pilgrims in Mecca and at Mina, had not Ibn Saud himself used a restraining influence. With a good sense equal to his courage, he forbade all reprisals. The police naturally made some arrests, but there was no disorder after the first surprise. Abdullah-al-Wazir continued to be treated as an honoured guest. The investigation confirmed the Saudi authorities in the conviction that the assailants were Zeydi Yemenis, and people in Mecca were very ready to believe that they were set on by high personages, not indeed by the Imam Yahya himself, but by others, possibly by his eldest son, Seyf-al-Islam Ahmed, who has been notoriously dissatisfied and restless since the war. The Saudi Government have been very careful not to endorse these suggestions. Ibn Saud himself exonerated the Imam in an interview to journalists on the 19th March. He was more guarded in his reply to an enquiry about Seyf-al-Islam Ahmed, saying that many things were said about many persons and that rumour could not be taken as a guide.

77. Telegrams of congratulation poured in on the King, one of the first being that from His Majesty King George. It is curious, however, to note how many heads of States, especially republics, who have relations with or have recognised Ibn Saud, ignored the occasion. These defaulters included Messrs. Ataturk, Roosevelt and Stalin. The most interesting telegrams were two from the Imam, who, using all his habitual forms of piety, expressed horror and joy,

refused to believe that the assailants were Yemenis and suggested that, if they were, they must have been instigated by some evil hand outside the Yemen. The King's own subjects were profuse in their loyalty. A Hejazi national tea-party was given in Mecca on the 20th March to celebrate His Majesty's escape. A smaller party in Jedda on the 31st March was attended by the foreign representatives, and four orators spoke the sentiments of the inhabitants in the presence of the king and the heir apparent. Two of the speakers stressed the note that the crime had been engineered by the enemies of Islam. Their language was very much stronger than the tea.

78. Among the many functions at Mecca during the month was a great parade of Nejd troops, numbering, it is said, 30,000. The King was present, but the Amir Saud led the sword dance, which, it appears, has been a regular feature of such displays in the capital since its revival in 1931 (see paragraphs 9 and 8 respectively of the reports for January–February and March–April of that year).

79. The King and the heir apparent came to Jedda early on the 30th March. The usual reception of foreign representatives was delayed a day owing to a king's colic and the remedial measures it necessitated. On the 31st March His Majesty appeared to be in good form, if not so spontaneously lively as he sometimes is. The heir apparent gave a series of separate audiences concurrently with the King. The physical resemblance between them was again noticed both by those who had not seen the prince since 1930, when he was last in Jedda, and those who saw him for the first time. He was very self-possessed and very amiable, but does not impress one as having anything like his father's personality.

80. Fuad Bey Hamza was in Jedda on the 1st March, on the 24th–25th March and from the 29th March over the end of the month.

81. The Saudi aircraft would appear to have remained in Taif throughout the month. Another batch of six youths were chosen to go to Italy to be trained in aviation, and were stated to have been passed fit after a medical examination in Jedda. If they proceed to Italy, they will bring the total of students up to ten, the maximum number which the Italian Government promised to accept. Little more has been heard of the Arab Aeronautical Society, except as the recipient of fairly handsome subscriptions from certain distinguished pilgrims. It may be inferred that its promoters are working hard in Mecca.

82. No new economic developments were reported during the month. Mr. Twitchell and his colleagues in the service of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (paragraph 44 of the last report) duly started for their possible gold-fields in the first week of March, and nothing has been heard of them since. Mr. Philby was extremely dissatisfied with the motor transport arrangements for the pilgrimage and accuses the Government of manipulating the distribution of pilgrims among cars in a manner disadvantageous to Sharqieh (Limited) (paragraph 45 of the last report). He is promoting a scheme for a single transport organisation to supply all the requirements of the Government and the pilgrims, who are catered for at present by four companies under Government auspices and a larger number of private concerns.

83. The electrical plant intended for the Great Mosque at Mecca (paragraph 48 of the last report) is still lying in Jedda. This was a great disappointment to the donor, who himself came on pilgrimage for the first time in a long life and hoped to see the result of his benevolence in Mecca.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

84. No trouble was reported from the Yemen frontier. The courier mentioned in paragraph 51 of the last report would appear to have returned to Sanaa, as one of the Imam's telegrams to Ibn Saud, after the attempt on the King's life, began by acknowledging the receipt of a letter the kindness of which had almost broken the recipient's heart, to quote his own phrase. It is too soon to say whether Saudi-Yemeni relations are likely to be affected by the attempt. No conclusion can safely be drawn from the King's continued graciousness towards Abdullah-al-Wazir with whom he had had personal relations different from those usually subsisting between a sovereign and an envoy. On general grounds, however, it seems probable that Ibn Saud will not wish to let the affair affect outwardly his relations with the Yemen. This probability is strengthened by a communiqué in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 29th March denying officially a report in an Egyptian paper that the Saudi Government had addressed



a memorandum to the Government of the Yemen regarding the alleged connexion between the criminals and Yemeni officials and had requested them to enquire into the matter and punish the guilty.

85. It is entertaining to read in the same number of the *Umm-al-Qura* a statement that Seyf-al-Islam Ahmed (paragraph 76 above) had presented 100 sacks of millet for the poor of Medina.

86. Abdullah-al-Wazir was in Jedda on the 25th March arranging for the return by sea of certain Yemeni pilgrims. A day or two later he went on to Medina.

87. The Saudi Government have been following with close attention the evolution of the political situation in Bagdad. They were probably gratified to see Nuri Pasha included as Minister for Foreign Affairs in both the Cabinets formed there in March. One of the first acts of the second of these was apparently to instruct the Iraqi Chargé in Jedda to get on with negotiations on various matters. These are not in themselves, so far as is known, of high political importance, but they have long been outstanding. The Iraqi Chargé was expecting on the 30th March to receive the text of a draft agreement prepared by the Saudi Government.

88. Four convoys of cars are said to have been run from Nejef to Medina under the motor route agreement mentioned in paragraph 53 of the last report. The results of the experiment have not apparently been unsatisfactory from the point of view of the trying out of a new route, but the smallness of the number carried has caused disappointment. Exact figures have not been published, but the total probably did not exceed 450 at the outside, including a party of boy scouts.

89. The Iraqi boy scouts, many of them stalwart adults, added a new feature to the pilgrimage. The King himself entertained them in Mecca and made a speech applauding their movement and stressing the importance of Saudi relations with Iraq. The well-grown lads were a conspicuous feature at a reception at the Iraqi Legation in Jedda on the 21st March in honour of King Ghazi's birthday. They provided a guard of honour to receive the guests. They also sang.

90. In the interview mentioned in paragraph 76 the King allowed the journalists to elicit expressions of his sympathetic interest in various Arab or quasi-Arab countries, viz., Egypt, Iraq, Palestine and Morocco. The omission of Syria may have some significance. In this connexion it may be noted that the official communiqué mentioned in paragraph 84 above also denied a report in the same Egyptian newspaper that delegates from Syria had suggested to the King the creation of an Arab Empire.

91. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 29th March published a sort of encyclical addressed by Ibn Saud to the Moslem world, Arabs generally and his own subjects thanking all those who had manifested sympathy on the occasion of his escape, especially Moslems and Arabs, to whom he ascribed as one motive devotion to the sanctuary which had been profaned.

92. There have been notable signs this year of a tendency to make use of the Hejaz in pilgrimage time for the ventilation of Arab propaganda. Various politicians came from Palestine and a very hot anti-Jewish pamphlet was circulated. There was talk of the formation of a Palestinian pilgrims' club in Mecca. A so-called delegation from Syria consisting of Dr. Jamil Mardan, Fakhri Bey Barudi and Shafiq Bey Jabri arrived via Bagdad and the overland route from Nejef.

### III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

93. Some progress has been made with the negotiations for the settlement of various questions outstanding between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government. The position in regard to several of these underwent no substantial alteration in March, but the following points may be noted:—

(a) The Saudi delegates to the local conference at Bahrein (see paragraph 57 of the last report) arrived there on the 9th March. The conference was still proceeding, apparently on promising lines at the end of the month.

(b) It is hoped that the same delegates will go on to Koweit in the near future for the proposed local conference, which the Saudi Government have agreed should be held there.

(c) Fuad Bey Hamza communicated to Sir Andrew Ryan on the 30th March two documents relative to the future of the Treaty of Jedda and to slavery. The objective of the Saudi Government is to induce His Majesty's Government to renounce their right of manumitting slaves in consideration of the promulgation of regulations on slavery, a draft of which Fuad Bey submitted for consideration; and to arrange for the validity of the Treaty of Jedda to be prolonged for ten years subject to certain provisos of which this renunciation would be the most important.

(d) His Majesty's Government approved on the 28th March of the attitude of Sir Andrew Ryan in regard to the question of nationality, as described in paragraph 5 of the appendix to the report for February.

(e) Admiral H. W. Grant, C.B., R.N., retired, a director of Cable and Wireless (Limited), and Mr. H. R. Staples, the Port Sudan manager of the Eastern Telegraph Company, arrived in Jedda on the 31st March to negotiate with the Saudi Government regarding the external telegraphic communications of Saudi Arabia (see paragraph 58 of the last report).

94. Few other matters of importance to Anglo-Saudi relations were discussed during the month. The atmosphere has been one of extreme friendliness and desire to appear accommodating on the Saudi side. When the King received His Majesty's Minister in formal audience on the 31st March he wound up the conversation with an outburst of extreme cordiality, appealing for Sir Andrew Ryan's services as a "mediator" and treating him to the most prolonged Royal handshake that he has ever enjoyed.

95. There is little to record in connexion with the relations of other Powers with Saudi Arabia or their representatives. The French and Netherlands Chargés returned to Jedda in March from Syria and the Yemen respectively. The Netherlands representative has now been appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad also. The Turkish Chargé left a day or two before the pilgrimage. The new Belgian consul (paragraph 64 of the last report) went to Brussels at the beginning of the month. The Afghan Minister in Cairo (paragraph 66 of the last report) was in the Hejaz for the pilgrimage and attended many functions, but had not presented credentials as Minister in this country up to the end of the month, doubtless because the Saudi Government cling to their doctrine of no diplomacy in Mecca. To anticipate by a day he presented them in Jedda on the 1st April.

96. The relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt continue to evolve on lines of much unofficial sympathy, the manifestations of which may be the prelude to Egyptian recognition of Ibn Saud, if the factor of King Fuad's personal hostility to the idea can be eliminated. Although no direct messages could pass on the occasion of Ibn Saud's escape, the Saudi agent in Egypt (who seems to be treated with increasing consideration) reported expressions of sympathy by high Egyptian personages, including the Prime Minister, as well as by other persons; and a good many of the telegrams addressed to the King came from distinguished Egyptians, including Prince Mohammad Ali, Prince Omar Toussoun and Nahas Pasha "on behalf of the Wafd and the Egyptian nation."

### IV.—Miscellaneous.

97. H.M.S. *Penzance*, Commander R. H. Bevan, R.N., visited Jedda from the 12th to 17th March. She took part in the usual regatta for the pilgrim fleet, which was held on the 16th. One of the features of this year's regatta was a new pulling race, for a challenge cup presented by the Central Sports Committee of the Mediterranean Fleet. This presentation gave all the more pleasure as it was made expressly to mark appreciation of the almost unique opportunity which the occasion affords for close intercourse between the navy and the merchant marine.

98. The Pilgrimage Day was fixed for the 14th March, after prolonged discussion as to when the new moon had been seen. Many hoped that the King would accept the view that it had been seen a day late, in which case the pilgrimage would have fallen on Friday, the 15th. His Majesty probably took an honest decision on the evidence, but many were disappointed at being deprived of the special blessing of a Friday Haj. There were some to suggest that he was



influenced by an ancient superstition that, whatever the virtue of a Friday Haj for the multitude, it is unlucky for rulers to have two Khutbas or ceremonial religious addresses on one day.

99. It is probable that from 65,000 to 70,000 persons "stood on Arafat" on the 14th. The official estimate of overseas pilgrims was 33,898, including 11,113 Indians, 5,361 Egyptians, 4,609 Dutch East Indians and 2,880 North Africans, these being the largest contingents. The improvement on last year's total was even greater than had been expected. Sanitary conditions were again good. There was no difficulty in accepting the verdict of cleanness passed by the Saudi Government on the 21st March, so that ships returning south to British destinations were dispensed from calling at Kamaran. The Alexandria Quarantine Board declared the pilgrimage clean on the 29th March.

100. This year's pilgrimage has been remarkable for the number of highly placed personages who took part, as well as for the number of what may be called intellectuals. Ex-King Amanullah of Afghanistan came at short notice, ostensibly to enable his mother to make the Haj, but not without political motives as well. He was much frequented by certain Afghan elements and by numerous Indians. He wept copiously during his receptions and was overcome by emotion at the King's banquet and during the ceremonial washing of the Kaaba, in which only the highest take part. Luckily his stay was short, as he arrived from Italy only on the 10th March and left for Massawa *en route* again for Italy on the 24th March, after a quick dash to Medina. The Nawab of Bahawalpur (paragraph 72 of the last report) was followed by the senior wife of the Nizam of Hyderabad with a large suite and by a widow of the late Nizam travelling separately. Perhaps the most notable of the other Indians was Colonel Nawab Sir Umar Hayat Khan, G.B.E., &c., an honorary A.D.C. to His Majesty the King. The Glawi, grandest of Moroccan Grand Kaidas, also came, but so unostentatiously as to attract little attention. The surfeit of great personages has imposed a strain on the Saudi Government, but has made them very happy as boost for the pilgrimage. They have published a list of sums given for benevolent purposes, headed by the name of a wealthy Egyptian lady named Qut-al-Qulub or Food of Hearts. The Badshah Begum of Hyderabad is down for donations to a total of 7,000 rupees, including 1,000 for the Arab Aeronautical Society, which has had some other windfalls as well. One English Moslem lady from Egypt, a Miss Wentworth-Fitzwilliam, in Islam "Aisha," also made the pilgrimage.

101. The overland pilgrimage by car from India was again attempted in spite of the warnings issued by the Government of India and with results which justified them. The exact facts are not yet known, but parties which travelled via Nejed had to change into Iraqi cars, and one party which travelled via Koweit arrived too late.

102. Dr. van der Hoog (paragraph 69 of the last report) has abandoned all idea of remaining in the Hejaz. He saw no prospect of adequately remunerated official employment, and leaves the bacteriological field clear for a Turkish doctor, very deaf, who has been here for some time.

103. Occidental visitors were less numerous than in January and February. None call for special mention except the cable and wireless delegates already named.

104. The position as regards the manumission of slaves during March was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: 1 male, 1 female.  
Took refuge in March: 1 male, 1 female.  
Manumitted and repatriated: Nil.  
Locally manumitted: 1 female.  
On hand at the end of the month: 2 males, 1 female.

[E 2703/1309/25]

No. 52.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 112.)  
Sir,

Jedda, April 11, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 32 of the 4th February, I have the honour to state that the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq still seem to be evolving in the direction of some form of closer understanding, although the evolution has not quite followed the lines foreshadowed some time ago, when Fuad Bey Hamza spoke of the possibility of a visit being paid by Nuri Pasha As Said to Ibn Saud. This is probably due, partly at least, to the two Cabinet crises which occurred in Bagdad last month, and to Nuri Pasha's preoccupations at home. The Saudi Government have followed the political situation there with great interest, all the greater possibly because the slight cloud cast on their relations with the Yemen by the attempt on Ibn Saud's life might enhance the value of a definite rapprochement with Iraq.

2. My Iraqi colleague has spoken to me more than once of prospective negotiations on such matters as passports, trans-frontier trade and the like. I gathered that these negotiations had been contemplated for some time, and that the Saudi Government had prepared a draft agreement. Shortly after the advent to power of Yassin Pasha Al Hashimi in Iraq, Sayyid Kamil told me that one of the first acts of the new Government there was to instruct him to get on with the preliminaries. I now understand that the Saudi Government at last communicated their draft to him about a week ago. He left for Bagdad on the 7th April, perhaps to submit the draft to his Government, perhaps merely using that as a pretext for getting away from Jedda. He told me a day or two before his departure that he hoped to get a transfer and never to return here.

3. Fuad Bey Hamza also spoke to me the other day about the draft agreement. He seems now to think that he will himself go to Bagdad sooner or later to negotiate, but he is awaiting the Iraqi reaction to the draft before making his plans. My Iraqi colleague also spoke of the probability of a visit by Fuad Bey to Bagdad.

4. Both sides seem to attach more importance to the proposed negotiations than might be inferred from what I have been told about the specific subjects to be discussed. It is possible that these are merely the screen for something of greater political importance. Fuad Bey gave a hint of this when telling me that there was some idea of consolidating the agreements governing the relations of the two countries in a comprehensive instrument. This plan, he said, had been favoured by the late Sir Gilbert Clayton, who might have furthered it but for his premature death. Fuad Bey added to the list of questions requiring attention one of which my Iraqi colleague had not spoken, namely, the renewal or revision of the existing Extradition Treaty of the 8th April, 1931, which came into force on the 10th May, 1932, and which was concluded in the first instance for three years only.

5. Meanwhile, the relations between the two countries continue to be cordial. I have mentioned in another despatch Ibn Saud's friendly reference to Iraq in an interview he gave to journalists after the attempt on his life. I have now before me the translation of a longer utterance, namely, the speech which His Majesty addressed just before the pilgrimage to the Iraqi "boy" scouts, who came here by the new overland route. Having applauded their movement, so beneficial to the progress of Arabs, he went on to stress the community of interest between this country and Iraq. He described the latter as a bulwark, which would prevent hostile penetration of Saudi Arabia. He vowed three things. He would uphold among Moslems the principle that the Holy Book should prevail over everything. He, his sons and his soldiers would fight for the Arabs and their victory. So long as he lived, he would maintain friendship with Iraq.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.



*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 29.)*

(No. 113.)

Sir,

Jedda, April 11, 1935.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 82 of the 5th April, relative to the future of the Treaty of Jedda, I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of the draft note which Fuad Bey handed to me on the 30th March. This document is intended as the basis of an eventual exchange of notes providing for a prolongation of the validity of the treaty for ten years from the date of signature, subject to certain provisos. If the principle of the extension were agreed to, I presume that there would be no objection to effecting it by an exchange of notes, but the drafting would, I think, require considerable amendment. In particular, it would be necessary to define the position when the end of the ten years was approaching.

2. I had conversations in general terms with Fuad Bey Hamza on the 3rd and the 5th April regarding his draft. I expressed personal sympathy with the idea of a prolongation of the treaty for ten years, subject to agreement being reached on the specific matters mentioned in the draft. I now submit the following observations, based on my study of these matters and partly on my conversations with Fuad Bey.

3. Fuad Bey wishes to reaffirm the position as regards traffic in arms, &c., created by letters (5) and (6) attached to the treaty. I suggested that this might require careful consideration, not because His Majesty's Government would wish to prevent the Saudi Government from purchasing arms, &c., from British sources in normal circumstances, but because the situation to-day was different from that in 1927. Bearing in mind the correspondence ending with Foreign Office despatch No. 120 of the 25th March, 1931, I observed that the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 had never come into force, and that there was now practically no chance of its ever doing so. I observed, also, that the question of the purchase of arms in abnormal circumstances, *i.e.*, by belligerents, had of late attracted great attention.

4. Fuad Bey's proposal regarding the estates of pilgrims relates not to letters (7) and (8) attached to the treaty, but to article 4 of the treaty itself. I see no objection to the principle of the proposal, which would appear to have been suggested by the correspondence regarding the sale of certain effects at Medina, to which I referred in my telegram. It is for consideration whether the opportunity should not be taken of getting rid of the inconvenient definition of international practice in letter (8). This formed the subject of correspondence ending with your despatch No. 332 of the 22nd August, 1931 (see paragraph 8 below).

5. I do not think that exception can be taken to the proposed reservation regarding Aqaba and Ma'an. It would be hopeless in present circumstances to attempt to get the Saudi Government to waive their claim, and its maintenance in the form proposed might, if anything, be advantageous in the sense that the exchange of notes would imply, even if it did not legally establish, the preservation of the *status quo* for ten years.

6. The proposal that His Majesty's Government should renounce the right of manumission is crucial. My own view is that, if it were decided to abandon this right in consideration of the promulgation of regulations on slavery, which satisfied His Majesty's Government, it would be a very good plan to provide for the renunciation in the proposed exchange of notes, provided that the regulations had been made public at some earlier date. When discussing the subject of slavery with Fuad Bey, I put it to him that this would be the proper order of two transactions which it was not desired to connect publicly with each other, lest the Saudi Government should appear to have adopted the regulations under foreign pressure. I will deal with the whole of this subject further, when our discussions on the slavery question have advanced further.

7. The formula regarding the language of the treaty seems to me to be unduly tortured. The principle appears to me to be one which His Majesty's Government might well accept in deference to the strong motive of *amour-propre*, which animates the Saudi Government in this matter. The present text of article 10 of the treaty is to some extent contradictory. As no dispute over matters of the linguistic interpretation has ever, so far as I am aware, arisen, I

should be personally prepared to renounce the stipulation in favour of the English text. Other Powers, *e.g.*, France and Italy, have accepted the principle of equal validity. His Majesty's Government themselves accepted in their treaty with the Yemen the ascendancy of the Arabic over the English text. It is, of course, true, as Mr. Rendel pointed out to Fuad Bey last September, that that was not intended as a compliment to the King of the Yemen or his language; but the fact remains that it has become a point of honour with the Saudi Government to insist that the "noble Arabic language" is as good as any other for all purposes.

8. It has also to be considered whether, if His Majesty's Government should in due course agree to the prolongation of the validity of the treaty, subject to provisos desired by the Saudi Government, they should not seek on their side to impose conditions of their own. In this connexion, I would refer to paragraphs 8 and 9 of my memorandum of the 17th October, 1933, a copy of which was sent to this post with your printed despatch No. 290 of the 26th October, 1933. I have not materially altered the views expressed in that paper. Broadly speaking, I do not attach very great importance from a practical point of view to most of the points to which I drew attention in the paragraphs referred to, and I consider that, in present circumstances, it would be wise to limit any conditions on the British side as far as possible. This does not apply to paragraph 9 (7), the subject matter of which has grown not less but more important since 1933. It has been the subject of so much separate correspondence that I need not now enlarge on it, except to say that the proposed exchange of notes might conceivably be a convenient vehicle for any settlement of the question of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia, if such a settlement proves possible in the near future.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to the Government of India, Transjordan and Bushire.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 53.

*Draft Note to be Addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British Legation.*

YOU are aware that after the expiry of the period of seven years fixed for the validity of the Treaty of Jedda, *viz.*, September 1934, the relations established between the Saudi Arab Kingdom and the United Kingdom in Great Britain, in accordance with that treaty, have become susceptible of abrogation, (and) after one of the contracting parties shall have given the other six months' notice of his intention to abrogate it. In view of the fact that it would be to the mutual interests which both parties must desire to strengthen and consolidate, the Government of His Majesty the King desire to agree with the Government of the United Kingdom in Great Britain on a new and stable arrangement. Therefore, and in accordance with the mutual desire shown by the two parties on numerous occasions in regard to the prolongation of the effect of the provisions of the Treaty of Jedda for a long period, my Government wish to take the following steps in this connexion:—

(1) With the exception of what is stated in the following paragraphs, the Government of His Majesty the King of the Saudi Arab Kingdom agree to the extension of the effect of the Treaty of Jedda, which was signed on Friday, the 18th Dhu'l Qada, 1345 A.H. (the 20th May, 1927), for a period of ten complete years as from to-day's date.

(2) The two letters exchanged between His Majesty the King and General Clayton, dated the 17th Dhu'l Qada, 1345 (the 19th May, 1927), in respect of trade in arms, shall continue in force as long as the treaty itself remains in force.

(3) The two letters exchanged between His Majesty the King and General Clayton, dated the 19th Dhu'l Qa'da, 1345 (the 20th May, 1927), concerning the handing over of the effects of deceased pilgrims, shall remain in force as long as the treaty remains in force, provided that the competent authorities in the Saudi Arab Kingdom may, at the express request of the British Government, sell such effects and pay over their value in cash.



(4) The Government of His Majesty the King reserve their rights in the district of Aqaba and Ma'an, as indicated in the letter of His Majesty the King, addressed to General Clayton, dated the 18th Dhu'l Qa'da, 1345 (the 20th May, 1927), in reply to General Clayton's letter, dated the 19th May, 1927 (the 17th Dhu'l Qa'da, 1345).

(5) The operation of the two letters exchanged between His Majesty the King and General Clayton, dated the 18th Dhu'l Qa'da, 1345 (the 19th May, 1927), relative to the right of manumitting slaves, exercised by the British agents and consuls, shall be abolished as from to-day's date.

(6) The text of article 10 of the Treaty of Jedda, providing that the English text shall prevail in case of divergence, does not imply discrimination between the Arabic and English languages, the equal validity of which is established by the said article, but is a matter of scientific facility when it may be necessary for authorised persons to make comparison between the texts. I therefore wish to receive from your Excellency confirmation of the fact that the Arabic and English texts are of equal validity in sense and in interpretation, and that neither of the two texts has preference over the other.

I therefore request that your Excellency would be good enough to inform me whether the Government of the United Kingdom in Great Britain approve of this arrangement, in which case my letter and your reply thereto shall be considered as a formal document recording the agreement between the two Governments.

With highest respects, &c.

(NOTE.—The dates in the above translation are as in the text of Fuad Bey's draft, but do not in all cases agree with those in the English official version of the treaty, &c.)

[E 2705/77/91]

No. 54.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, May 1, 1935.*

MY telegram No. 66 of the 12th April: South-eastern frontier negotiations.

Question was considered by Middle East Official Sub-Committee on the 15th April with following result:—

2. When desert zone solution was originally proposed last November it was anticipated that far larger area would be subject to special desert régime than that now contemplated. Information since received shows that southern frontier of any concession to Ibn Saud, whether in full sovereignty or in form of a desert zone, should not lie further south than a line starting from intersection of parallel 18 and the violet line and running roughly east-north-eastwards up to and through the intersection of parallel 19 and meridian 52 (and, if necessary, onwards in same direction—see paragraph 6 below).

3. There is also little question that final concession contemplated in my telegram No. 8 of 16th January, *i.e.*, area (south of Baniyan) up to meridian 52 in full sovereignty will have to be made in the end. This would further reduce proposed desert zone to a trapezoid between meridians 52 and 55.

4. Sub-committee consider that in these circumstances complicated zone régime, which might have been suitable for large area originally in question, is too elaborate a solution for this very reduced and inaccessible area. They think that it will be better not to attempt possibly difficult task of working out its details and of imposing it on Ibn Saud and to abandon the whole idea of desert zones or of special servitudes in this area, proceeding direct to offers of further limited concessions in full sovereignty by one or possibly two stages.

5. First and second stages contemplated in my telegram No. 8 of 16th January, *i.e.*, definition of Ibn Saud's claims and offer of our opening concession, have now been concluded and next stage will presumably open with Saudi reply to your offer of so-called "green line" (see your telegram No. 84 of 6th April, paragraph 6). If, as you anticipate, this offer is rejected

as entirely insufficient, you are now authorised to offer Ibn Saud in full sovereignty and without any servitudes further area enclosed by line running from a point on the green line to the south of, and distant at least 5 miles from Baniyan to the intersection of meridian 52 and parallel 22° 30', thence due south along meridian 52 to its intersection with parallel 19 and thence in a straight line to the intersection of parallel 18 with the violet line. This can be referred to as the "brown line" concession.

6. If this also proves insufficient you may, as a last resort, and if you think there is hope of it leading to agreement, make a further offer in full sovereignty and without servitudes of area bounded by a line running from the intersection of parallel 22° 30' and meridian 52 due east to meridian 53, thence due south to the intersection of meridian 53 with the prolongation in a straight line of the southern boundary of the (brown line) concession described in the preceding paragraph. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to make any concession to Ibn Saud to the east of meridian 53. There is no evidence of his having any rights or permanent influence to the east of this line greater than or as great as that of any of the other rulers concerned, and there are other serious objections to allowing Ibn Saud to acquire such rights or influence there. You should not, however, allow yourself to be drawn into argument on this point and if this third offer fails to satisfy the King it will probably be necessary to suspend the negotiations. Consequently, while appreciating the point in paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 89 of 10th April, I consider that, unless agreement is in sight, this concession should only be offered very cautiously. In possible event of negotiations not leading to early result, their subsequent resumption would be on basis of position reached at end of present discussions, and if the concession to meridian 53 is offered now without result, we shall have lost our last concession for purposes of future bargaining.

7. As you are aware, and have yourself advised, there are strongest objections to allowing Ibn Saud to acquire access to the sea on the eastern side of the Qatar Peninsula or to establish a position for himself as one of the Trucial Coast rulers. Moreover, territory claimed to east of green line in this region has already been recognised by His Majesty's Government as belonging to the Sheikhs of Qatar and Abu Dhabi, His Majesty's Government having formally recognised the rights of latter (which they have maintained against Turks) in Odeid, and also in Aqal (compare India Office memorandum B 430, enclosed in Mr. Rendel's letter of 15th March, 1934). There can accordingly be no question of any concession to Ibn Saud in this region. You should make this clear to the Saudi Government and explain that you are unable to discuss any further concession east of green line north of Baniyan.

8. Sub-committee also agreed that, in view of legal and practical difficulties likely to arise, it will be best not to attempt to define Saudi frontier in a purely negative sense as against a vacuum in the east (*e.g.*, by mere recognition by His Majesty's Government that south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia are so-and-so), nor to secure purely negative renunciation by Ibn Saud (even if it could be obtained) of all rights or claims beyond those frontiers on lines of article 16 of Treaty of Lausanne. They consider best course will be to specify frontier, in a single comprehensive instrument, as being "between Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Muscat and Aden Protectorate on the other," without specifying the boundaries dividing the four latter territories from each other, and to regard full sovereignty of other States concerned as extending right up to boundary line. Sheikhs of Qatar and of Abu Dhabi and Aden Protectorate will be represented in negotiations by His Majesty's Government. Position as regards Muscat is more difficult and has not yet been fully explored, but for your confidential information India Office would be prepared if necessary, and subject to consent of Government of India, to endeavour to obtain from Sultan authority for yourself or other British delegate to represent him.

(Repeated to Government of India, No. 55; Bushire, No. 38; and Aden, No. 34.)



[E 2955/66/25]

No. 55.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 13.)*

(No. 115.)

Sir,

*Jedda, April 18, 1935.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 96 of the 17th April, I have the honour to submit a summary report on the proceedings connected with the agreement reached on that date between the joint owners of the Jedda-Port Sudan cable and the two companies concerned, the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) and Cable and Wireless (Limited).

2. Admiral H. W. Grant, C.B., and Mr. H. R. Staples, the joint representatives of the companies, arrived in Jedda on the 31st March in the cable ship *Lady Denison Pender*, accompanied by Mrs. Grant and an interpreter. Just before they arrived the Saudi Government expressed a wish themselves to entertain the delegation, but they deferred to my suggestion that it would be more practical for Admiral and Mrs. Grant and Mr. Staples to stay at the Legation during their visit.

3. On the 1st April I introduced the delegates to Fuad Bey Hamza, with whom were Sheikh Abdullah Kazim, the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs, and two of his subordinates. The formal negotiations began that afternoon. It was decided at the outset not to attempt to amend or supplement the working agreement of 1926, but to work out an entirely new and comprehensive agreement.

4. The negotiations were conducted in the first stage by Fuad Bey Hamza and the above-mentioned experts on the Saudi side, and by the above-mentioned delegates of the companies. Fuad Bey twice returned to Mecca, and was detained there the second time by indisposition. He was replaced by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin for a short time. The two texts were finally agreed on the 16th April, and were duly signed at the Khuzam Palace early on the next afternoon. As a result of correspondence with the Sudan Government, I signed the agreement on their behalf, subject to the terms of the declaration annexed to it, having secured your approval for this procedure in your telegram No. 67 of the 13th April.

5. I enclose copies of the following papers:—

- (a) A letter addressed by me to Fuad Bey on the 14th April; (1)
- (b) The English version of the agreement; and
- (c) A despatch which I addressed to the Governor-General of the Sudan after the signature. (1)

6. I have seldom known a negotiation conducted in a better spirit or in a better atmosphere. The delegates of the two companies approached the matter with great largeness of view and, though the Saudi Government wanted and got a good deal, they also were animated by an evident desire to come to terms. Although I took no part in the formal negotiations, I was in constant touch with Admiral Grant and Mr. Staples, and had one or two private exchanges with Fuad Bey and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin.

7. As for the more general setting, I may mention that the King, to whom I presented the companies' delegates on the 2nd April, did them the honour, not very usual in Jedda nowadays, of himself giving a dinner in their honour on the 3rd April. The Heir Apparent with a number of junior princes and other high personages visited the *Lady Denison Pender* on the afternoon of that day. After the agreement was signed, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman gave us an enormous luncheon at the palace, and in the evening my wife and I entertained him, Fuad Bey and the various delegates at dinner. I report these incidents because the cordiality shown reflects a desire on the part of Ibn Saud and his Government for good relations not only with the companies but with His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to promote the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement.

8. The agreement itself calls for few comments. The reduction of rates will be a boon to the public and to some extent to His Majesty's Government, who are at present, unfortunately, the largest users of the cable. Article 9 effects a more equitable distribution of rates collected for wireless transmission when the cable is interrupted, and one to which the Sudan Government readily assented on my consulting them. Article 14 was the only clause which gave rise to material difficulty, as it qualifies the monopoly accorded by article 11 to a greater

(1) Not printed.

extent than Cable and Wireless (Limited) were at first ready to accept. I was myself opposed to the possible creation of independent public services in Arabia, and I should have preferred to see the provision for independent official communication with Syria limited to trans-frontier messages. The Saudi Government, were, however, adamant on both points. The arrangements regarding wireless communication between Hasa and Bahrein are, I think, satisfactory.

9. The delegates of the companies left for Port Sudan in the *Lady Denison Pender* on the 18th April.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures (where not already forwarded to Khartum) to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, Bushire, Cairo and Khartum.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 55.

*Agreement between the Saudi Arab Government and the Sudan Government, owners of the Jedda-Port Sudan Submarine Cable, and the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) and Cable and Wireless (Limited), their Successors or those who may take their place in Ownership.*

WHEREAS the Government of the Hejaz (now replaced by the Saudi Arab Government) and the Sudan Government are owners under an agreement concluded on the 18th December, 1926, of the submarine cable extending from Jedda to Port Sudan, and whereas under article 3 of the said agreement they authorised the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) to work the cable and to assure communication thereby between Jedda and Port Sudan under an agreement duly concluded between them and the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) on the 18th December, 1926, and whereas it has been found advantageous to reconsider that agreement and to modify it in a manner appropriate to the changes which have taken place, it has been agreed between the Saudi Arab Government and the Sudan Government, as owners of the Jedda-Port Sudan cable, and the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited), of Electra House, Victoria Embankment, London, W.C.2, and Cable and Wireless (Limited), of the same address, to conclude an agreement and for this purpose they have appointed:—

The Saudi Arab Government—

His Excellency Sheikh Abdullah-as-Suleiman-al-Hamdan, Minister of Finance.

The Sudan Government—

His Excellency Sir Andrew Ryan.

The Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited), and Cable and Wireless (Limited)—

Admiral H. W. Grant and Mr. H. R. Staples.

as representatives on their behalf and have authorised them to sign the said agreement. The representatives have accordingly agreed upon the following articles:—

#### Chapter 1.—Terms.

##### ARTICLE 1

The following terms used in this agreement shall have the meanings shown opposite each:—

- (1) "The cable" means the submarine cable extending from Jedda to Port Sudan.
- (2) "The two owners" means the Government of the Saudi Arab Kingdom and the Sudan Government.
- (3) "The two companies" means the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) and Cable and Wireless (Limited).
- (4) "The cable terminal" means its end whether in Jedda or Port Sudan.
- (5) "Gold franc" means the gold franc as provided for under the International Telegraph Regulations.



Chapter 2.—*Reciprocal Undertakings between the two Owners and the two Companies.*

ARTICLE 2.

The two owners agree to entrust to the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) the working of the cable and the maintenance of the communication thereby under the conditions and obligations set forth in this agreement, and the said company undertake on their part to be responsible for the maintenance and working of the cable and for keeping it in working order throughout the period during which the provisions of this agreement shall remain in operation and without charging the two owners anything other than what is provided for in this agreement.

ARTICLE 3.

The cable terminal in Jedda shall be worked by the Administration of Posts and Telegraphs of the Saudi Arab Government and the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) undertake to assist the Saudi Arab Government at all times to keep the cable in working order for the purpose of an efficient service. They also undertake to pay the Saudi Arab Government an annual sum of £240, so long as this agreement remains in force, in respect of the salaries of two employees to undertake the working of this terminal.

ARTICLE 4.

The Jedda cable terminal charge shall accrue to the Saudi Arab Government. As the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) deal direct with the public in Port Sudan the cable terminal charge in that place shall accrue to the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) in respect of messages which originate in or terminate at Port Sudan. This terminal charge shall also accrue to the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) in respect of all messages transmitted by them over their cables which may be received from or forwarded to the Saudi Arab Kingdom.

As regards the cable terminal charge at Port Sudan in respect of messages exchanged with the Saudi Arab Kingdom and dealt with by the Sudan Telegraph Administration this shall accrue to the Sudan Government.

ARTICLE 5.

For each of the terminals of the cable in Jedda and Port Sudan shall be a charge amounting to 25 centimes gold per full rate word. Other categories will be charged for in accordance with the proportion provided for in the International Telegraph Regulations.

ARTICLE 6.

The two owners agree to allow the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) to charge a sum entitled "Cable Charge" amounting to 62½ centimes gold per full rate word transmitted over the cable. As regards messages of other categories (urgent, deferred, press, &c.), the charges per word in each category shall be in accordance with the proportion agreed to under the International Telegraph Regulations.

ARTICLE 7.

The Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) undertake to charge only half the cable charge on all telegrams of the Saudi Arab Government and of the Sudan Government.

ARTICLE 8.

The contracting parties undertake to submit statements of accounts and to settle the balance thereof monthly, and the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) in Port Sudan undertake to submit the statements of accounts to the Saudi Arab Government as early as possible after the end of each month.

ARTICLE 9.

During any interruption which prevents the working of the cable owing to any damage to it, arrangements shall be made for one of the wireless stations of

the Saudi Arab Government to work with one of the wireless stations of the Sudan for the transmission of telegraph messages between the two sides.

The Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) undertake to expedite the repair of the cable in the shortest possible time. During the interruption of the cable, the cable charge on full rate messages shall be apportioned as follows:—

25 centimes gold to the Saudi Arab Government.

25 centimes gold to the Sudan Government.

12½ centimes gold to the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited).

For messages of other categories the apportionment shall be in the same ratio.

ARTICLE 10.

The Saudi Arab Government agree to exempt from sanitary, port and other dues any cable ship belonging to or chartered by the company that enters the waters of the Saudi Arab Government. They also agree to allow to enter free of charge all tools and instruments that may be landed for the repair or the extension of the cable, provided that after the repair is finished they shall be removed.

If they are sold in Saudi Arab territory, duty shall be collected thereon.

Chapter 3.—*Special Stipulations as between the Saudi Arab Government and the two Companies.*

ARTICLE 11.

Subject to the exceptions provided for in this agreement the Saudi Arab Government undertake not to use or permit to be used for external communications any wireless or cable station except by way of the Jedda-Port Sudan cable, the wireless belonging to Cable and Wireless (Limited) in Bahrein, and any wireless or cable service that may be provided by Cable and Wireless (Limited). All these routes will be ready to exchange telegraphic messages in Latin characters at all times and in Arabic characters with countries that use such characters.

ARTICLE 12.

The full rate charge per word for ordinary telegraphic messages exchanged between the Saudi Arab territory and the wireless station in Bahrein shall be at the rate of 1 fr. 12½ c. gold, to be divided equally between the Saudi Arab Government and Cable and Wireless (Limited). Rates for other categories (urgent, deferred, &c.) shall be charged in accordance with the proportion fixed under the International Telegraph Regulations.

ARTICLE 13.

Cable and Wireless (Limited) agree that the charges for telegraphic messages of the Saudi Arab Government and the Government of Bahrein, which are exchanged by wireless in this manner, shall be at half rates between the two stations.

ARTICLE 14.

Notwithstanding the undertakings of the Saudi Arab Government in article 11 above, they shall be entitled—

- (1) To use their wireless stations for official Government communications originating from Yemen, the Arab principalities on the coast of the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Transjordan and Syria, or terminating therein.
- (2) To establish wireless or land-line service for the public between the Saudi Arab Kingdom and Yemen, Iraq, Transjordan and Syria for the exchange of messages originating from those countries or terminating therein, provided that the charge collected in respect of those messages shall not be less than those fixed in this agreement for the cable or Bahrein routes.
- (3) To use their wireless stations for communication with ships and aeroplanes.

The Saudi Arab Government undertake not to use the telegraphic services in their territories and in the above-mentioned territories, viz., Yemen, Iraq, Transjordan and Syria for the despatch of messages, whether official or otherwise,



beyond those territories or to receive such messages from foreign countries by way of the said territories. The Saudi Arab Government also agree to send all telegrams from places on the coast of the Red Sea to all territories other than Iraq, Yemen, Transjordan and Syria and *vice versa* over the cable route.

#### ARTICLE 15.

In consideration of the fact that the Saudi Arab Government have granted to the two companies the concession for the transmission of telegraphic messages between their territories and abroad (subject to the exceptions stated in the preceding article), the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) agree to pay a sum amounting to one-fifth of their income from the cable charge to the Saudi Arab Government as from the entry into force of this agreement.

#### Chapter 4.—General Stipulations.

#### ARTICLE 16.

The Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) undertake to deliver the cable to the two owners in working order on the termination of the validity of this agreement.

#### ARTICLE 17.

This agreement shall remain in force for a period of twenty-five years as from the 1st June, 1935, and the two owners jointly, or either of them or the two companies, shall be entitled once in every five successive years to give notice in writing of their desire to terminate the operation of this agreement or to modify it, provided that such notice shall be given at least six months before the expiration of the five years. If notice is not given before the beginning of the period of six months which terminates the five years, the operation of this agreement shall continue for another period of five years, and so on until the end of the twenty-five years.

#### ARTICLE 18.

Any dispute which may arise between any two or more of the contracting parties shall be referred to a single arbitrator to be agreed on by the parties to the dispute, and if they cannot agree on such arbitrator the matter shall be referred to a single arbitrator to be nominated on the application of whichever of the parties to the dispute first applies by the president who shall be for the time being at the head of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. Such arbitrator shall be free to determine the procedure in the arbitration and by whom the costs thereof are to be paid, and this decision shall be final and conclusive on all the parties to the dispute.

#### ARTICLE 19.

This agreement shall come into force as from the 1st June, 1935, and on this date the agreement dated the 18th December, 1926, between the Sudan and Hejaz Governments and the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) shall be abrogated and shall become inoperative except as regards any settlement of accounts relating to the period of the said agreement.

#### ARTICLE 20.

This agreement has been drawn up in the Arabic and English languages in four originals of each text, and a signed copy of each text shall be given to each of the four parties. The English and Arabic texts are of equal validity.

Written in Jedda on this thirteenth day of the month of Muharram, 1354 A.H., corresponding to the seventeenth day of the month of April, 1935 A.D.

Representative of the Saudi Arab Government:	Representative of the Sudan Government:	Representative of the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) and Cable and Wireless (Ltd.):
ABDULLAH-AS-SULEIMAN.	ANDREW RYAN.	H. W. GRANT. H. R. STAPLES.

#### Annex to Enclosure.

The undersigned representatives take note of the fact that Sir Andrew Ryan has signed the foregoing agreement on behalf of the Sudan Government in virtue of a telegraphic authority, and that one of each of the Arabic and English original texts will be forwarded by him to the Sudan Government, and if that Government approves it in this final form they will confirm the telegraphic authority by a formal instrument, certified copies of which Sir Andrew Ryan will communicate in due course to each of the other three parties.

ABDULLAH-AS-SULEIMAN.

H. W. GRANT.

H. R. STAPLES.

Dated the 13th Muharram, 1354 A.H. (the 17th April, 1935 A.D.).

#### Annex.

To all and singular to whom these presents shall come, greeting!

Whereas an agreement between the Saudi Arab Government, the Sudan Government, the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) and Cable and Wireless (Limited) relative to the working of the Jedda-Port Sudan submarine cable, a true copy of which is annexed hereto, was signed at Jedda on the 17th April, 1935, by representatives of the parties thereto and by Sir Andrew Ryan, K.B.E., C.M.G., His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Jedda, on behalf of the Sudan Government, and whereas the authority of the said Sir Andrew Ryan to sign as aforesaid had been conveyed by telegram only,

Now I, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Stewart Symes, K.C.M.G., K.B.E., D.S.O., Governor-General of the Sudan, having seen and considered the English and Arabic texts of the said agreement, hereby confirm and ratify the said signature of Sir Andrew Ryan on behalf of the Sudan Government, and declare that the said agreement shall therefore be binding as between the Sudan Government and the other parties thereto for all purposes concerning the Sudan Government in the same manner as if there had been no limitation of the authority conferred upon Sir Andrew Ryan prior to the date of the signature of the said agreement.

In witness whereof I have signed this instrument of confirmation and ratification and have affixed thereto my seal.

Done at Khartum this 6th May, 1935.

G. S. SYMES,  
Governor-General of the Sudan.

(Seal.)

[E 3291/557/25]

No. 56.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 132. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, May 1, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for April 1935.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &c.  
ANDREW RYAN.



Enclosure in No. 56.

# JEDDA REPORT FOR APRIL 1935.

## I.—Internal Affairs.

105. Ibn Saud returned from Jedda to Mecca on the 4th April accompanied by the heir apparent. His Majesty spent the rest of the month in Mecca except for occasional jaunts into the country for hunting.

106. The King's brother, Muhammad, left Mecca for Riyadh on the 9th April, and was followed by the heir apparent on the 16th April. Nothing was heard of the Amir Feisal, who, as usual, left all matters of foreign affairs to Fuad Bey Hamza. The latter paid several short visits to Jedda, but was incapacitated more than once by a form of heart disease from which he suffers.

107. One of the principal topics of the month was the projected tour of the heir apparent in Europe. (Paragraph 56 of the report for February.) He is to leave Jedda for Naples on the 14th May. He will visit Italy and France and will probably make short stays in Switzerland and Holland. He is due in London on the 15th June and proposes to stay about a month in England. It is understood that on his return journey he will visit Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Fuad Bey Hamza left Jedda on the 1st May to deposit his wife in Syria before rejoining the Prince at Port Said and attending him on his travels.

108. No internal events of importance were reported during the month.

109. The Saudi aircraft were not seen in Jedda. The additional six student-aviators selected for training in Italy (paragraph 81 of the last report) duly proceeded thither. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* of the 23rd April announced the receipt of a letter from one of them saying that they had been most kindly received and had been allowed to fly alone in a special aeroplane, after preliminary training.

110. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* of the 30th April announced the departure of a mission of inspection and administrative reorganisation for Asir.

111. The Dutch Moslem, M. Van de Poll, who has gone in with the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (paragraph 82 of the last report) came to Jedda for a night on the 18th April to collect some assaying plant. He brought news that Mr. Twitchell and his companions were busy investigating the tailings left from ancient workings at the Cot of Gold and one or two other places and potential alluvial gold at Yanbu' Dagh. They had not yet found gold, but were full of hope.

112. Mr. Abdul Ghani Ydlibi (paragraph 122 of the report for last June) arrived in Jedda on the 19th April. His principal objective appeared to be to make further efforts to secure the Koweit Neutral Zone Oil Concession for his group. He assured Sir Andrew Ryan that he had as good as got a concession for the whole Red Sea littoral, including the area in the North-Western Hejaz, Asir and the Farsan Islands. He hoped also to get an option for the construction of a Mecca-Jedda Railway. Little has been heard of this project since the cancellation of the Jeelani Concession (paragraph 123 of the report for June), but a French group are said to be interested, and Mr. Ydlibi thought he might as well try to cut them out. He admitted that there were difficulties in the way of the scheme for a bank which he propounded last year, but not that he had abandoned it. He said nothing about another project with which he is said to be associated, viz., the provision by Roumanian interests of bulk storage for oil, &c., at Jedda, Rabigh and Yanbu'. Nor did he refer to an episode in his past, which may now lead to legal proceedings between the Calico Printers' Association (Limited) and two British shipping lines. The association supplied him some five years ago with large quantities of goods which were shipped to Jedda and some of which were cleared by his agents on the guarantee of the latter, without production of the bills of lading. The guarantee was not redeemed. The amounts left unpaid by Mr. Ydlibi are said to exceed £20,000.

112A. The California Arabian Standard Oil Company started their drilling operations at Jebel Dhahran on the 30th April, after some delay due, according to one report, to labour difficulties, but, according to their agent in Jedda, to difficulties in connexion with the water supply, which have now been overcome.

113. Mention will be made later of the most important economic event of the month, the conclusion of a new agreement regarding the external telegraphic communications of Saudi Arabia.

114. Two announcements of medical interest were made during April, viz., that a hospital was to be established in Najran and that a doctor was being sent to Jauf to combat an outbreak of some sort of fever in that area.

115. The 24th April was a red-letter day in Jedda. On that evening a Marconi wireless receiving set began to make itself heard in the "Jedda Hotel." It has attracted admiring audiences, and we can now compete with Tebuk, where, according to a report from Transjordan, the Governor and his entourage have a set and have fallen, through the ether, for the charms of an Egyptian lady artiste named Umm Kalthan. The Jedda set is very powerful and the Jedda Hotel is next door to the British Legation.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

116. There was again no news from the Yemen frontier. Nothing further has been disclosed of what has passed between the Saudi and Yemeni Governments about the attempt on Ibn Saud's life in March.

117. Abdul Aziz-al-Idrisi, one of the three important members of the former ruling family of Asir, whom the Imam surrendered to Ibn Saud last year, died about the 5th April.

118. The Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires left by sea on the 7th April, having received the draft agreement mentioned in paragraph 87 of the last report. Uncertainty seemed to prevail as to the further course of the negotiations. There was some question of Fuad Bey Hamza going to Bagdad to conduct them, but he himself intimated later in the month that this mission might be entrusted to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin.

119. The *Umm-al-Qura* published on the 12th April the numbers of pilgrims who had come by overland motor routes. The figures for Iraq were 73 boy scouts and 311 others. These numbers were even more disappointing than had been expected, but the boy scouts seem to have been a success, witness an announcement early in April that the young men of Mecca were preparing a record in book form of the visit, to include all the speeches and poems to which it gave rise. One hundred and six pilgrims were stated to have come by car from Koweit.

120. The nationalist delegates from Syria, who were mentioned in paragraph 92 of the last report, returned early in April to Damascus, again travelling via Bagdad. It is now clear that these were the same delegates whose alleged proposals to the King for the creation of an Arab Empire elicited the denial mentioned in paragraph 90 of the same report. Whatever they were after in Iraq and the Hejaz, there is no reason to suppose that they got much encouragement from Ibn Saud, or that the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs is identified with their schemes to the extent suggested in certain circles in Syria. Towards the end of the month a party of merchants and transporters arrived overland from Damascus by car. Their object is to study the possibilities of organising regular motor transport from Syria. They were so long on the road and the scheme is so likely to be frowned upon by the French authorities in Syria that its success must be regarded as very doubtful.

121. Further evidence has accumulated of the activities of Palestinian agitators in Mecca during this year's pilgrimage. On the 18th April, however, Fuad Bey Hamza assured Sir Andrew Ryan that the Saudi Government had warned the distributor of the pamphlet mentioned in paragraph 92 of the last report and seized the remaining copies of it. Fuad Bey declared emphatically that it was the policy of his Government not to allow the exploitation of the pilgrimage for political purposes and foreshadowed measures next year to cope with the problem presented by the annually increasing numbers of intellectuals, politicians, &c., who make the pilgrimage. It was intended not to discourage them from coming but to restrain them from undesirable activities.

## III.—Relations with Powers Outside Arabia.

122. Some little further progress was made with the negotiations between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government for the settlement of outstanding questions. On the 3rd April Fuad Bey handed to Sir Andrew Ryan a statement of the Saudi Government's views regarding their eastern and south-eastern frontiers. As was to be expected, their claims are enormous. Sir Andrew Ryan riposted with the offer which His Majesty's Government had decided to make in the first instance and confirmed the offer in a memorandum



on the 9th April. The subject has not been further discussed, as, in view of Fuad Bey's approaching departure, it was agreed later in the month that the conversations on this and various other questions should be resumed during his visit to London in the summer.

123. The Saudi delegates to the Bahrein Conference (paragraph 93 (a) of the last report) left the island on the 10th April after exchanging letters with the Bahrein representative. These letters appeared to represent an agreement in principle on the various issues discussed, which could be embodied in a formal Anglo-Saudi exchange of notes. A conversation between Sir Andrew Ryan and Fuad Bey on the 30th April suggests doubt as to whether the Saudi Government regard the letters as constituting more than a partial agreement. The situation still requires clearing up.

124. The same Saudi delegates are to attend the Koweit Conference, but they have been slow movers, and seem unlikely to reach Koweit before the middle of May.

125. The Saudi Government have extended for six lunar months from the 5th April the period within which persons permanently resident in the country, who claim foreign nationality, must produce evidence of it.

126. An agreement between the Saudi and Sudan Governments, as joint owners of the Jedda-Port Sudan cable, and the two interested companies (paragraph 93 (c) of the last report), was signed in Jedda on the 17th April. The principal effects of it are (a) to provide for a reduction of the full rate per word transmitted over the cable from 1.50 gold francs to 1.12½ gold francs; and (b) to give the companies a monopoly of all the external telegraphic communications of Saudi Arabia, whether by cable or wireless, except as regards countries in the Arabian Peninsula, including Syria and Iraq. The charges for wireless messages will be the same as for those sent by cable. The agreement was made for twenty-five years, but either party may terminate it at the end of each successive period of five years. There is no space for an account of various details, some of which are important. The agreement was signed by Sir Andrew Ryan on behalf of the Sudan Government, subject to confirmation on receipt of the final text, of which they had already received an adequate preliminary draft. The delegates left Jedda on the 18th April.

127. The friendly atmosphere described in paragraph 94 of the last report was maintained throughout April. In particular, great attention was shown to the cable and wireless delegates. The King sent the heir apparent and several junior princes to a party aboard the cable ship on the 3rd April, and he himself entertained the delegates and members of the Legation at dinner that evening.

128. A small Ethiopian mission arrived in Jedda on the 7th April, bringing rich gifts and proposals for a treaty of friendship, on the same lines, apparently, as one they had just concluded at Sana. They were well received, and the King gave them an audience and a dinner on the Mecca-Jedda road on the 10th April. Nothing important seems to have come of the visit, however, as the Saudi Government thought the moment inopportune for the conclusion of even an anodyne treaty. The mission left for Suez on the 15th.

129. There were no important developments in the relations between Saudi Arabia and other Powers. The Italians are showing their usual eagerness to oblige in connexion with the heir apparent's tour. An Italian ship will call for him at Jedda on the 14th May, and he will be accompanied by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires. The Corps diplomatique as a whole is rapidly disintegrating as summer comes nigh. The Netherlands Chargé left on the 22nd April to take up his additional post at Bagdad (paragraph 95 of the last report), and hoped to go on to Holland for the Saudi Royal visit. The Afghan Minister, who had presented his credentials in Jedda on the 1st April and then gone to Medina, returned to Egypt on the 15th. The Egyptian acting consul was to leave on the 1st May, without awaiting the new incumbent of the post, who was appointed last autumn, but has not yet appeared. The departure of the Iraqi Chargé has already been mentioned.

#### IV.—Miscellaneous.

130. The French sloop *Bougainville*, a smart new vessel, arrived in Jedda on the 6th April, with Rear-Admiral Rivet, commanding the Naval Division in the Levant, on board. She had made an extensive voyage from the Persian Gulf and left for the last lap of it on the 9th April.

131. Mr. H. St. J. B. Philby, accompanied by his wife, left by car for Koweit on the 3rd April, intending to go all the way by car to London. He was still dissatisfied with the attitude of the Saudi authorities as regards his motor business (paragraph 82 of the last report), but maintains his friendship with the King. He will be away for some time, but there is probably no truth in one story, namely, that he intends to spend two years in England and to stand for Parliament.

132. Captain G. S. H. V. de Gaury, who has for some years been seconded from the army for service under the Air Ministry, joined the staff of the Legation in Jedda as temporary honorary attaché on the 22nd April. By the same ship arrived Lord Alington, on a private visit, and a new addition to the staff in Jedda of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company. Other Western visitors included a Mr. Haliburton, a United States citizen, who has some name as a writer and journalist. He is a young man of great assurance and a strong sense of the commercial possibilities of the lighter and less accurate literature of travel.

133. The majority of the pilgrims had left the Hejaz by the end of April. Hardly any remain of the high personages and intellectuals mentioned in paragraph 100 of the last report. The Badshah Begum of Hyderabad and her party sailed on the 22nd April in the steamship *Islami*, the latest addition to the Turner Morrison fleet. A reception on board this vessel on the 19th April enabled people in Jedda to see for themselves the improvements described in paragraph 324 of the report for December.

134. Some interest attaches to the participation in this year's pilgrimage of four Japanese, who are understood to have recently embraced Islam.

135. The Saudi Government have prohibited the departure to the Dutch East Indies of mutawwifs, i.e., pilgrim guides. They are said to be considering a similar restriction in regard to India. The practice whereby these persons go to the countries of origin to recruit pilgrims leads to various abuses, and it is held in certain Saudi circles that the object of stimulating the flow of pilgrims may be better achieved by intensifying their own propaganda. Various schemes for doing this have been much talked of. One, which has an indirect bearing on the subject, is the proposed despatch of a non-official mission, enjoying the moral support of the Government, to urge the claims of the Holy Land to the revenues of the Haramayn Wakfs in various countries.

136. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the British Legation was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: 2 males, 1 female.

Took refuge in April: 1 male.

Manumitted and repatriated: 1 male, 1 female.

Locally manumitted: nil.

Left voluntarily: 1 male.

On hand at the end of the month: 1 male.

One of the male slaves who took refuge in April belonged to the King's brother, the Amir Muhammad, but the Saudi authorities have offered no opposition to his being dealt with in the usual manner. Cf. paragraph 331 of the report for September-October 1932.

[E 3248/269/91]

No. 57.

Political Resident at Bahrein to India Office.—(Communicated by India Office on May 24, 1935.)

Office of the Political Resident  
in the Persian Gulf,

Camp, Bahrein, May 12, 1935.

IN continuation of my telegram No. T/136 of the 11th May, 1935, I enclose herewith copies of (1) letter No. C/128 of the 11th May, 1935, to the Sheikh of Qatar; (2) letter No. C/129 of the 11th May, 1935, to the Sheikh of Qatar; (3) letter dated the 11th May, 1935, from Hamad, son of the Sheikh of Qatar; (4) letter No. C/130 of the 11th May, 1935, to the Sheikh of Qatar; (5) letter

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dated the 11th May, 1935, from the Sheikh of Qatar; (6) letter dated the 11th May, 1935, from Mr. C. Mylles, Anglo-Persian Oil Company.<sup>(1)</sup>

2. Letter (1) makes clear to the sheikh that the protection given by His Majesty's Government is on condition that the oil concession is given to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (paragraph 2 (a)), and that the protection is external against serious and unprovoked attacks, and refers to serious incursions and not to small raids. That His Majesty's Government expect the sheikh to take all reasonable steps for his own defence and for maintaining order within his own frontier (paragraph 2 (b)). The letter goes on to explain (paragraph 2 (c)) that His Majesty's Government propose to assist the sheikh through the Royal Air Force, while paragraph 2 (d) covers the air facilities which His Majesty's Government expect should be put at their disposal. It was stated in India Office telegram No. 585 of the 2nd March, 1934, that two landing grounds would be required. In my letter the number is not specified, so if more are necessary they can be used. The last part of paragraph 2 (d) covers the visits of aircraft and officers to Qatar whenever the Air Officer Commanding considers necessary, while the last sentence of this paragraph covers intelligence activities on the part of the Royal Air Force.

3. Letter (2) recapitulates all the points in connexion with jurisdiction. Paragraph 6 limits His Majesty's Government's support in internal affairs to difficulties arising from the presence of the oil company. The last sentence of this paragraph was inserted at the sheikh's request and is innocuous. Paragraph 7 mentions what is, of course, obvious, that the arrangements entered into are subject to the oil concession being given to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

4. Letter (3) is from Hamad, promising to accept on his accession the treaty of 1916.

5. Letter (4) is to the sheikh, suggesting that the treaty of 1916 should be converted into an heirs and successors one, and in letter (5) the sheikh agrees.

6. Letter (6) is from Mr. Mylles. Mr. Mylles informed me that the sheikh insisted on this alteration at the last moment, and has doubtless reported fully to his company. The effect of this alteration may be to exclude interests other than the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, e.g., the Iraq Petroleum Company. However, that is a matter for the company to settle.

7. The delay of two or three days in signing the Commercial Agreement, referred to in paragraph 3 of my telegram quoted above, was due to the following attitude taken by the sheikh, which illustrates the almost childish suspicious nature of himself and his son Hamad: At my final interview with him, when I settled our political points, I suggested that the Commercial Agreement should now be signed with Mr. Mylles. The sheikh said: "No. He wanted his payment-on-signature before he actually signed." I suggested that Mr. Mylles could telegraph to the bank in Bahrein, and the latter could then wire the sheikh that the money had been put to his credit. The sheikh replied "that this would never do. How could he know if the telegram from Bahrein really came from the bank? The company might send the telegram themselves in the name of the bank and not deposit the money at all! He (the sheikh) would have to send a man of his own to ascertain that the money was really in the bank." Finally, it was agreed that Mr. Mylles would telegraph to the bank and the sheikh's man would be sent to Bahrein to bring back the credit note and show it to the sheikh.

8. Some of Mr. Mylles's difficulties in dealing with such an individual may be imagined, and as I have already said in paragraph 11 of my telegram No. 372 of the 22nd April, 1935, he has conducted his negotiations with much patience, tact and skill. Moreover, I received useful assistance from him during my two visits to Qatar.

9. H.M.S. *Fowey* was kindly put at my disposal for both my visits to Qatar, and I am grateful to Commander Harvey and his officers for their hospitality.

T. C. FOWLE, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

# Letter (1).

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Qasim-al-Thani,  
C.I.E., Ruler of Qatar.

(No. C/128 of 1935.)

(After compliments.)

H.M.S. *Fowey* at Doha, May 11, 1935.

WITH reference to your letter No. 8/54, dated the 18th April, 1935 (14th Muharram, 1354), on the subject of the protection which His Majesty's Government are prepared to extend to you on land. In this letter you enquired what measures Government intend to take with reference to this protection.

2. I am instructed by His Majesty's Government to reply to you as follows:—

(a) Protection will be afforded you on the condition, which I have already explained to you verbally, that you give the oil concession about which the Anglo-Persian Oil Company have been negotiating to that company.

(b) The protection from His Majesty's Government, as already explained to you verbally, will be external, i.e., against serious and unprovoked attacks which may be made on your territory from outside your frontier. This protection, as I explained to you verbally on my last visit, and with which you agreed, naturally refers to serious incursions, and not to small raids. In this connexion, therefore, His Majesty's Government naturally expect you to take all reasonable steps for your own defence and for maintaining order within your own frontier.

(c) With regard to the methods with which His Majesty's Government propose to assist you. They propose to carry out this object through the Royal Air Force.

(d) You will, of course, understand that, in order that in case of emergency the aircraft should be able to come to your assistance as soon as possible and be able to take action swiftly and effectively when they have arrived, it is necessary that the Royal Air Force should have certain facilities in your territory. These facilities should be as follows: Freedom to use wireless telegraphy when necessary, since, as you will realise, the essence of defence by aircraft is speedy communication. Some landing grounds will also be necessary as well as arrangements for storing petrol and other requirements necessary in order that the aircraft may take effective action. Royal Air Force aircraft and officers will also require to visit Qatar from time to time whenever the Air Officer Commanding thinks suitable in order to inspect the Royal Air Force defensive arrangements, and in order to get information in collaboration with you which will be necessary for them in making their plans for your defence.

(Usual ending.)

T. C. FOWLE, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

# Letter (2).

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Qasim-al-Thani,  
C.I.E., Ruler of Qatar.

(No. C/129 of 1935.)

(After compliments.)

H.M.S. *Fowey* at Doha,  
May 11, 1935.

WITH reference to your letter No. 7/54, dated the 18th April, 1935 (the 14th Muharram, 1354), which you gave me on my last visit, and our conversations on my present visit, I am authorised by His Majesty's Government to address you as follows:—

2. In your letter you agreed that disputes between British subjects, British-protected persons and the subjects of non-Moslem foreign Powers should be settled by the nearest officer of the High British Government, i.e., the Political Agent, Bahrein, or his representative.

3. You also agreed to my suggestion that disputes between British subjects and the subjects of non-Moslem foreign Powers and your subjects should be dealt with by a joint court, on which you and the Political Agent, Bahrein, will sit, or on which your representative and the representative of the Political Agent, Bahrein, will sit. The place and the sitting of this court will be at Doha.



4. His Majesty's Government agree to what you explained to me verbally, i.e., that the subjects of Koweit, Bahrein and the Trucial Coast should come under your jurisdiction, but that all other British-protected persons should come under the joint court.

5. In your letter you requested that your son Hamad should be recognised by His Majesty's Government as your successor. His Majesty's Government agree to this request, provided that Hamad now agrees to accept on his accession the treaty of 1916.

6. In your letter you further asked that His Majesty's Government should accord yourself and Hamad, when the latter succeeded you, full support. You explained to me verbally that what you meant by this was full support in internal matters. His Majesty's Government are unable to accord you the measure of support you ask for, since this would involve an undesirable degree of interference in your administration. His Majesty's Government, however, are prepared to support you and your successors in any difficulties arising from the presence of the oil company. In other matters which concern you, the Government will not interfere.

7. It is understood, of course, that the above arrangements are subject to your granting the oil concession, about which the Anglo-Persian Oil Company have been negotiating, to that company.

(Usual ending.)

T. C. FOWLE, *Lieut.-Colonel.*

Letter (3).

*Translation of Letter, dated May 11, 1935, from Hamad, Son of Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Qasim-al-Thani, C.I.E., Ruler of Qatar.*

(After compliments.)

WITH reference to your letter No. C/129, dated the 11th May, 1935, to my father, Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Qasim-al-Thani. I agree to accept on my succession the treaty of 1916 made by my father with His Majesty's Government.

(Usual ending.)

Letter (4).

*Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Qasim-al-Thani, C.I.E., Ruler of Qatar.*

(No. C/130 of 1935.)

(After compliments.)

*H.M.S. Fowey at Doha,*

*May 11, 1935.*

WITH reference to my letter No. C/129, dated the 11th May, 1935, in the course of our conversations I pointed out that, since His Majesty's Government had recognised your son Hamad as your successor, and since the latter had agreed to accept on his succession the treaty of 1916, it would be convenient and would strengthen the position of your successors if the treaty in question were now extended to cover all your heirs and successors.

(Usual ending.)

T. C. FOWLE, *Lieut.-Colonel.*

Letter (5).

*Translation of Letter, dated May 11, 1935, from Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Qasim-al-Thani, C.I.E., Ruler of Qatar.*

(After compliments.)

WITH reference to your letter No. C/130, dated the 11th May, 1935, I agree that the treaty which I made with His Majesty's Government in 1916 shall be binding on my heirs and successors.

(Usual ending.)

[E 3296/325/25]

No. 58.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 27.)*

(No. 137.)

Sir,

*Jedda, May 6, 1935.*

WITH reference to paragraph 2 (c) of my telegram No. 98 of the 20th April last and previous correspondence relative to the slave trade and slavery in Saudi Arabia, I have the honour to submit a general report on what passed between Fuad Bey Hamza and myself on this subject before Fuad Bey left for Syria and Europe on the 1st May. I trust that this will facilitate further discussion when our conversations are resumed in London.

2. I reported in my telegram No. 80 of the 4th April that Fuad Bey had asked me to study the preliminary draft of a personal letter with draft regulations on slavery. He handed me these documents simultaneously with the draft note on the future of the Treaty of Jedda, on which I reported in my despatch No. 113 of the 11th April. Having dealt with the question of procedure in that despatch, I need not pursue it further here.

3. As I stated in my telegram No. 80 of the 4th April, the draft regulations suggested by Fuad Bey left much to be desired. I preferred, therefore, to keep the discussion on a personal plane and not to submit them for your consideration without making an attempt to get them recast in a more acceptable form. As, however, they still represent the only definite proposals made by Fuad Bey, I now enclose translations of his draft letter and the two enclosed regulations, which I have marked A and B.

4. I told Fuad Bey on the 5th April that I saw no chance of the proposed regulations sufficing to induce His Majesty's Government to renounce the right of manumission. Among other things, I drew his attention to various ambiguities in the wording, and suggested that article 1 of Regulation B would read to the uninitiated almost more like a legalisation of the slave trade than as a condemnation of it. Fuad Bey expressed readiness to amend the ambiguities and said that Regulation B was not intended for publication. This caused me misgiving, as it is this regulation which contemplates the registration system. After some discussion, I offered to give Fuad Bey privately my own suggestions as to how the regulations might be improved. He accepted this offer, which I made on the distinct understanding that I could make personal suggestions only and could not commit His Majesty's Government in any way.

5. Some delay ensued owing to pressure of other business on my side and indisposition on that of Fuad Bey, but I gave him my suggestions on the 18th April in the form of an unofficial memorandum. I enclose a copy of this document, in the preparation of which I kept well in mind the various points raised in the correspondence on the subject, including your instructions and, so far as I consider them practicable, the considerations urged by Sir George Maxwell. When I handed the paper to Fuad Bey, I again explained that the suggestions were entirely personal. I pointed out that I might seem to be asking for a good deal from the Saudi point of view, but that the question presented very great difficulties for His Majesty's Government also.

6. Fuad Bey fell ill again after this and we were unable to discuss the matter further except for a few minutes during our last conversation on the eve of his departure. I gathered that he was not unfavourably disposed towards my suggestions. He was honest enough to say, however, that the total prohibition of the importation of slaves might present difficulty in the case of the Yemen, as slavery prevailed there also, and it would be going very far to say that no slave could be brought across that frontier. As we were not discussing the matter closely, I did not pursue this, but I took the opportunity of saying that, whatever might be thought of persons born in slavery, the case of persons wrongfully enslaved deserved serious attention. I mentioned instances which had come to my notice of children who had been kidnapped from Moslem families, it might be in the past, but who still remembered their origin.

7. Fuad Bey's remark about importation from the Yemen may appear discouraging, but it has at least the advantage of showing that he is approaching the problem seriously and not merely in the spirit of giving every sort of assurance lightly in the hope of getting round His Majesty's Government. He made one other interesting admission when I stressed my point about kidnapped slaves, and mentioned two cases, in one of which he is personally interested. He



said that a large proportion of the existing slaves were persons who had been kidnapped in childhood. I did not suggest to Fuad Bey, and I do not believe, that there are many cases of kidnapping nowadays.

8. I postpone any further observations, as I hope to be in London soon after this despatch reaches you.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 58.

*Fuad Bey to Sir A. Ryan.*

(Translation.)

Dear Sir Andrew,

*Mecca, March 30, 1935.*

YOU will remember that we have on several occasions discussed the position arising from article 8 [*sic*] of the Treaty of Jedda and the two letters attached thereto concerning the slave trade and the emancipation of slaves under certain conditions. Having regard to the discussions now in progress regarding the renewal or the extension of the operation of the Treaty of Jedda and to the desire of my Government to manifest their wish for co-operation within the scope of article 7 of the said Treaty of Jedda; to abolish the slave trade gradually and to institute a new system for the manumission of slaves more suited to present circumstances; to secure at the same time the general humane object; and to put an end to an irregular state of affairs in regard to the purely internal administration of the Government of His Majesty, I send your Excellency a copy of the arrangements drawn up by the Government for action in accordance therewith. It is evident from this that the co-operation provided for in article 7 of the Treaty of Jedda has been accomplished in the most perfect and complete manner, and consequently there will be no reason remaining for the British consul at Jedda to interfere in the matter of the slaves who approach him of their own accord applying for emancipation.

I shall be glad to obtain the consent of the British Government to the proposed cancellation, because the authorities concerned in our Government will act in accordance with the arrangement referred to.

With, &c.

FUAD HAMZA.

Enclosure 2 in No. 58.

#### *Regulation A.*

*In respect of Slave Trade in the Saudi Arab Kingdom.*

**ARTICLE 1.**—In view of the rules of the "Shar'a Sharif" (religious law), which lay down that no subjects of the countries with which treaties exist should be enslaved or purchased, it is strictly forbidden to allow the entry or the purchase of slaves from foreign countries with which treaties exist. Every slave proved to have been brought into the country after publication of this regulation will be regarded as free and his sellers will be severely punished.

**Art. 2.**—The slave has the right from his owner, or from the person whom he is lawfully under, to provisioning, clothes, and a place to live in. He has also the right to be well treated and employed with kindness and clemency and without any cruelty. He is also entitled to be medically attended to and to payment of the expenses of his medical treatment. He is generally entitled to all the rights due to the children of his owner or others under his care, as is imposed under the rules of the Shar'a Sharif.

**Art. 3.**—Should any slave complain of bad treatment by or the cruelty of his master, or failure of the latter to keep him in the legal manner, the authorities concerned will summon both the complainant and the one complained against

and will decide according to their discretion the conditions each of them has to fulfil towards the other. Should the one complained against fail to fulfil the conditions, the authorities concerned have the right to warn him a second time, and if he does not obey, or repeats the ill treatment, they will have the right to compel the one complained against to release the complainant from his control altogether.

**Art. 4.**—The authorities concerned referred to in this regulation are the Ministry of Interior in the Metropolis and the Amirates in the districts. When the complaints referred to in the preceding above article are to be considered, the authorities concerned will constitute a committee, consisting of a representative on their behalf, the Director of Police, and a member of the Administrative Council, for the consideration of the case and judgment therein.

#### *Regulation B.*

**Article 1.**—It is forbidden to engage in slave trading except by an annual licence under specified conditions.

**Art. 2.**—Every conveyancing of slaves must be done with the knowledge of the chief of the profession. The same should be recorded in an official register approved by the authorities concerned in the Government. Anyone who makes or helps in making any transactions concerning slave trade without registering it in the special register will be severely punished.

**Art. 3.**—All slaves existing at present should be registered in a special register of the authorities concerned. Every slave should be given a paper of identity to be kept by him or his owner, and therein his photograph should be affixed. All particulars which show his personality should also be mentioned therein. Dealings relating to him should likewise be shown therein. Owners of slaves should accomplish the registration formalities within one year from publication of this regulation.

**Art. 4.**—At the time of conveyance of slaves from the hands of the master to another, they should be submitted to one of the health doctors for a certificate of good health.

**Art. 5.**—Any slave whose master fails to register him as is provided for in this regulation has the right to approach the authorities concerned and request to be granted a manumission certificate.

**Art. 6.**—The punishment to which those who act contrary to the provisions of articles 1, 2, and 3 above are liable is a cash fine and imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months.

Enclosure 3 in No. 58.

*Personal Suggestions by Sir Andrew Ryan regarding Papers A and B (Slavery Drafts).*

IT would be better if all the provisions of the papers, except paragraphs 1 and 2 of Paper B, were included in a single public regulation and to embody paragraphs 1 and 2 of Paper B in instructions to the authorities concerned.

2. The public regulation might be divided into two chapters dealing with (1) Enslavement and importation, *i.e.*, slave trade in the usual sense, and (2) slaves existing in the country.

3. Chapter I would correspond with article 1 of Paper A. As the conditions under which the Shari'a sanctions enslavement no longer exist as between Saudi Arabia and any other country, would it not be possible to prohibit absolutely (a) all importation of slaves into Saudi Arabia by land or by sea; (b) the enslavement in the country of free persons; and (c) the purchase or possession of any slaves imported after the date of the prohibition; and to fix separate penalties for violation of the prohibitions under each of these three heads for persons violating them or aiding and abetting in their violation?

4. Chapter II would correspond to articles 2 and 3 of Paper A, and articles 3 to 6 of Paper B. Article 2 of Paper A lays down an excellent general principle,



but article 3 does not seem to go far enough in the direction of preventing hardship. The following suggestions are made:—

- (a) If a slave complains of ill treatment, the parties shall be summoned and, if the complaint seems justified, the owner shall be warned as suggested; but the owner shall be bound to produce the slave within a stated period, say one or two months, for further examination. If the authorities consider that there has been a continuance of serious ill treatment they shall compel the owner to manumit the slave forthwith. If the case is less serious, they may warn the owner a second time and require him again to produce the slave after a similar period and, if the ill-treatment has continued, they shall then compel the owner to manumit the slave. A penalty should be fixed for failure to produce the slave.
- (b) Any slave who can prove that he was born free and was unlawfully enslaved at any time in the past may apply for manumission, and the courts shall not refuse on any ground to entertain the application. (This raises a question of how *bona fide* owners should be compensated.)
- (c) Married slaves shall not be separated against their will or deprived of their children. A penalty shall be fixed for violation of the prohibition.
- (d) If any slave applies for a Kitaba, the owner shall not refuse it, and if they cannot agree on the amount to be paid the authorities shall fix the amount and the instalments to be paid. The existence of a Kitaba will not interfere with the operation of (a) above.
- (e) Any slave born outside Saudi Arabia and manumitted under (a), (b) or (d) above, or otherwise (Ataq Istilad, &c.), shall be free to return to his or her country of origin.

5. *Article 3 of Paper B.*—It would be better if the identity paper were made out in three copies, one to be kept by the slave, one by the owner, and one by the local authorities. Particulars of marriage and children should be registered as well as transactions affecting the slave. Failure to observe the rules regarding registration to be punishable as proposed.

6. Articles 4 and 5 of Paper B to be maintained.

7. A third chapter might contain miscellaneous provisions, e.g.:—

- (a) No person to be allowed to engage in transactions concerning slaves, as agent or broker, except such as are permissible under the regulation. No such person to act otherwise than as an intermediary for *bona fide* lawful transactions, or to be allowed to hold slaves for re-sale. Penalties to be fixed for violation.
- (b) An inspector of slavery to be appointed, with a suitable number of travelling inspectors under his orders.
- (c) Local authorities to report once every six months on the general operation of the regulations, giving a summary of cases dealt with under them. These reports to be submitted with the comments of the inspector within one month of receipt to the Minister of the Interior (? President of the Council of Ministers).

8. *Guarantees of Execution.*—While the central authorities can be relied on to give effect to the regulations, local authorities may require to be educated. It is suggested that in the non-public instructions addressed to them they should be given to understand that they will be held personally responsible for the enforcement of the regulations in their districts. Consideration might also be given to the possibility of avoiding difficulty in the Shari'a courts by some sort of pronouncement recognised under the Sharfat. It cannot be hoped that the restrictions will be observed in all tribal areas for some time to come, but means might be devised for bringing home their responsibility to tribal sheikhs. Information as to what can be done under these heads might make it easier for His Majesty's Government to justify the proposed abandonment of the right of manumission.

9. *Procedure.*—The renunciation of the right of manumission, if agreed to by His Majesty's Government, should follow the promulgation of the regulations after a suitable interval so as to avoid any appearance of *marchandage*.

If the regulations were published in good time on a private understanding that the right of manumission would be renounced in due course, the formal renunciation might well be recorded in any eventual exchange of notes regarding the future of the Treaty of Jedda, as proposed by Fuad Bey. It might be a part of the understanding that the British Legation would have the right to draw the attention of the Saudi Government unofficially to any cases of violation of the regulations coming to its notice, and to be informed, also unofficially, of the result of the enquiries made.

A. R.

April 17, 1935.

[E 3299/1217/25]

No. 59.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 141.)  
Sir,

Jedda, May 10, 1935.

IN my telegram No. 109 of the 8th May relative to the claims of His Majesty's Government against the Saudi Government, I adverted to your despatch No. 71 of the 28th February regarding air facilities on the Hasa Coast, and explained that I had so far been unable to frame any useful observations of the kind called for in that despatch. As, however, I shall be leaving early next month for London, where the subject may come up in conversation with Fuad Bey Hamza, it may be well to review the question as I see it at present.

2. The subject has now a double setting, as follows:—

- (a) In the note enclosed in Mr. Calvert's despatch No. 344 of the 24th November, 1934, the Saudi Government intimated, in connexion with a particular case of forced landing by service aircraft, that Fuad Bey would discuss the matter on his return with a view to a final settlement. He made no approach to it, however, from the angle of forced landings and flying over during our subsequent conversations. Indeed, except that I mentioned the general subject when enumerating the questions discussed informally in London last September, it was not approached from any angle at all in those conversations.
- (b) The Air Ministry suggested a new approach to the general subject in their letter to the Foreign Office of the 20th February. In your covering despatch to me, already quoted, you expressed appreciation of the fact that on the situation existing at the end of February, I might have difficulty in raising the question with the Saudi Government. The actual position was that I might have pursued it tentatively with Fuad Bey, if he himself had raised it, but preferred not to raise it myself, until further progress had been made with the other questions which we had to discuss.

3. My difficulty in framing useful observations in the above circumstances was that the position on both sides has greatly changed since the time of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 2 of the Air Ministry's letter of the 20th February. On the one hand, the Saudi Government have shown this year a marked eagerness to settle questions affecting their relations with His Majesty's Government, so far as they can do so without sacrificing anything that they consider essential to their independence and vital interests. On the other hand, the present desiderata of the Air Ministry are much more moderate than those formulated in 1932. I could form no confident estimate of the probable reception of the Air Ministry's new suggestions by the Saudi Government in their present mood, without at least sounding the latter as to their present attitude.

4. So far as I can form any tentative views, in the absence of such soundings, on the numbered proposals in paragraph 6 of the Air Ministry's letter of the 20th February, they are as follows:—

- (i) I think that Ibn Saud might now be induced to accept this.
- (ii) I think that Ibn Saud would hesitate to grant permission in such general terms, but might be induced to accept a more qualified formula.



(iii) Ibn Saud might agree to this, though he would probably prefer to keep the matter in his own hands rather than rely on British assistance. He has no present use himself for landing grounds on the Hasa Coast, and would still expect His Majesty's Government to bear the cost of maintenance in some shape or form. He might raise the question of allowing aircraft of other Powers to use the landing grounds in the same conditions as British aircraft.

(iv) Ibn Saud might agree to the erection of a beacon, and even to its being visited periodically by the British authorities, but I think he would certainly expect the matter to be placed on a rental basis, as suggested later in the Air Ministry's letter.

5. The following are my equally tentative views on paragraphs 7 to 10 of the Air Ministry's letter:—

(a) Paragraph 7.—Ibn Saud would not be ready to accept the proposals on humanitarian grounds. If he accepted them, with or without remuneration, he would do so on the ground of wishing to consolidate his friendship with His Majesty's Government.

(b) Paragraph 8.—Ibn Saud would be loath to give such authority to the local inhabitants as such, and would probably prefer that the necessary assistance should be given by any local authorities.

(c) Paragraph 9.—I do not know how much this would involve, and doubt whether Saudi weather reports would have much value. Ibn Saud might agree in principle, on grounds of vanity, to communicate available information from Riyadh or Hofuf to, say, Bahrain.

(d) Paragraph 10.—An effort might be made to secure the facilities on grounds of friendship, without repayment except as regards actual initial expenditure and rental for the beacon. I imagine, however, that Ibn Saud would rate the running costs involved in the maintenance of landing grounds higher than the Air Ministry, and would argue that he himself could derive no immediate benefit from the landing grounds, &c. I think that we should still bear in mind the possibility of obtaining the facilities in consideration of a remission of debt, offered with such delicacy as to preclude Ibn Saud from suggesting that he was being asked to sell morsels of independence.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3300/3300/25]

No. 60.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 27.)*

(No. 142.)

Sir,

*Jedda, May 10, 1935.*

WITH reference to the last paragraph of your telegram No. 69 of the 26th April, I have the honour to state that on the 30th April Fuad Bey Hamza, whom I had sounded privately as to the possibility of my visiting Riyadh on my return from leave early next winter, informed me that the King welcomed this suggestion with great satisfaction. He conveyed to me a definite invitation from His Majesty and said that the Saudi Government would wish to send transport for me to Koweit, which I indicated as my probable starting-point for the interior. He suggested three cars. Fuad Bey and I discussed more airily incidental details, including the possibility of our meeting in Beirut and travelling together.

2. At our first business meeting of the 6th May, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who is acting for Fuad Bey, confirmed the invitation in very cordial and explicit terms. He said that the King expressed the hope that I would accept his hospitality during the whole journey from Koweit and enquired as to my intended dates in order that all preparations might be made.

3. On both occasions I expressed suitable gratitude and readiness to avail myself of the King's proffered hospitality. I explained to Sheikh Yusuf that

I could not work out my programme until I arrived in England, but that I should probably reach Koweit about the middle of November or a little later.

4. I will take an early opportunity of discussing the details of the proposed journey with your Department after my arrival in London. In the meanwhile I need only observe that, in view of the special nature of the occasion, it will be desirable to accomplish the journey with some ceremony and that, while little expense will be incurred for actual travelling once I reach Koweit, the expenditure on gifts and gratuities will be somewhat heavy. In principle I would propose to travel from Koweit to Riyadh with one Arabic-speaking companion and one servant, and to be met at Riyadh by two members of my staff here.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Koweit, Bagdad, Bushire and the Government of India.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3304/350/25]

No. 61.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 27.)*

(No. 148.)

Sir,

*Jedda, May 14, 1935.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 113 of to-day, relative to the departure of the Saudi heir apparent on his European tour, I have the honour to state that His Royal Highness arrived in Mecca from Riyadh on the 7th May, and came down to Jedda yesterday morning, closely followed by the Amir Feisal. The Amir Saud received the foreign representatives in succession in the forenoon, and presided in the afternoon at a tea party at the palace, to which they were also invited. I understand that he attended a local dinner in his honour at the Governorate last evening.

2. The Amir Feisal received the guests at the tea party in the usual princely fashion, but effaced himself greatly when the heir apparent joined us. I was much impressed by the deference he showed to his elder brother.

3. The Amir Saud left the quay early this afternoon, seen off by a fairly numerous gathering. Everything was done to make the occasion impressive, but there was a complete absence, usual in Jedda, of any signs of general public interest. I have never been so struck by the prince's resemblance to his father as when he walked past the guard of honour. Seen at the little distance that separated us, he had the carriage of Ibn Saud and the facial likeness was marked.

4. The Italian destroyer *Pantera* arrived from Massawa on the 12th and remained to escort the *Victoria* out of the roads, not intending, I understand, to try and keep pace with that swift vessel for more than a couple of hours before returning to base.

5. I enclose a translation of a programme of the prince's tour, which was distributed at the tea party yesterday afternoon. It gives the names of four persons who are to accompany him besides Fuad Bey Hamza, who will join up in Egypt. The King's personal physician and the diplomatic secretary are both Syrians. I know nothing of the personal secretary, Fahd-bin-Kreydis, but presume him to be a Nejdî belonging to the prince's entourage in Riyadh. There is no reason to expect any change in the composition of the party before it reaches London.

6. I have no official information regarding the Amir's intended movements after leaving England, but, as I stated in paragraph 107 of the Jedda report for April, it is understood that he will return via Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Moscow appears to be definitely outside the programme.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.



Enclosure in No. 61.

*Programme of the Tour of His Royal Highness the Amir Saud, Heir Apparent of the Saudi Arab Kingdom.*

(Translation.)

- (1) Departure from Jedda on Tuesday, the 11th Safar, 1354 (the 14th May, 1935), on the Italian steamship *Victoria*.
- (2) His Highness the Amir will be accompanied by Fuad Hamza, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Midhat Sheikh Al Ard, the private doctor of His Majesty the King, Muhammad Sheykho, secretary of the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Fahd-bin-Kreydis, secretary of the Amir, and Saleh Al Ali, private attendant of His Highness the Amir.
- (3) Arrival at Naples on the 19th May, 1935. One day stay there.
- (4) Departure from Naples and arrival at Rome on the 20th May in the evening. Four days' stay in Rome.
- (5) Departure from Rome to some cities in Italy for excursions and sight-seeing from the 24th to the 27th May.
- (6) Departure from Turin to Paris on the 27th or the 28th May, and arrival on the next day.
- (7) Stay in Paris until the 7th or the 8th June.
- (8) Departure from Paris to The Hague on the 8th June.
- (9) Arrival at London on the 15th June.

[E 2614/403/25]

No. 62.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Ryan (Jedda).*

(No. 153.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 29, 1935.*

I HAVE had under consideration your despatches Nos. 3, 26 and 40 of the 6th January, the 29th January and the 12th February respectively, regarding the recent Saudi Regulations on the subject of the ownership by foreigners of real property in Hejaz.

2. The explanatory communiqué issued by the Saudi Government (a translation of which was enclosed in your despatch No. 26 of the 29th January), and the record of your conversation with Fuad Bey Hamza (as reported in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the memorandum enclosed in your despatch No. 40 of the 12th February), suggest that there is now less danger of a rigorous and inequitable application of these regulations. Should, however, the Saudi authorities proceed against British subjects or protected persons who have been suffered in the past to acquire ownership of land in the Hejaz despite their foreign nationality (class (1) in paragraph 6 of your above-mentioned memorandum), I fear that it will not be possible to do more than to urge in their favour the general tolerance which, in default of direct evidence or of written permission, must presumably have existed to make the acquisition possible, and in the last resort to press for a reasonable opportunity for them to sell their land under equitable conditions. The regulations themselves do not expressly refer to the case of persons who have been suffered in the past to acquire ownership of land in the Hejaz, but as pointed out in paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 446 of the 11th December, 1934, it would presumably be open to the Saudi Government to maintain that such ownership was contrary to the law as reaffirmed in article 4 of the regulations. At the same time their contention would surely be weakened by the fact that "previous Governments" in the form of the Ottoman and Hashimite régimes did in fact tolerate the acquisition of land by Indian and other Moslem "foreigners." I am unfortunately not in possession of any information which would answer the enquiry at (b) in paragraph 3 of your despatch No. 3 as to the attitude adopted under the Hashimite régime towards the ownership of land by foreign Moslems, but it appears at least to have been tolerated since cases have survived into the present régime.

3. As regards the case of British subjects or protected persons in class (II) in paragraph 6 of your memorandum, viz., those owning land in the Hejaz, who at the time of acquisition were Ottoman subjects, but who have subsequently

become aliens *vis-à-vis* the Saudi State (e.g., Palestinians and Cypriots), it would not be possible to invoke the Treaty of Lausanne since the Hejaz did not become a party to it and the Saudi Government are clearly under no obligation to observe its provisions. The most that could be done on behalf of this class of person would be to insist on their obtaining a fair and reasonable opportunity to dispose of their land, such as the regulations themselves appear to allow. It now seems possible, however, from paragraph 3 of the translation of the Saudi communiqué enclosed in your despatch No. 26 that these persons will be allowed to retain their properties indefinitely, subject to the tax imposed by article 11 of the regulations.

4. I assume from telegram No. 7 of the 16th February from the High Commissioner for Transjordan to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (repeated to you as telegram No. 4) that the position of the Hashimite properties has now been satisfactorily settled, and that there is no longer any danger of the regulations being applied in their case.

I am, &amp;c.

JOHN SIMON.

[E 3357/350/25]

No. 63.

*Sir E. Drummond to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 30.)*

(No. 616.)

Sir,

*Rome, May 28, 1935.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 293 and my telegrams Nos. 318 and 321, I have the honour to report that Emir Saud, heir apparent of Saudi Arabia, has just completed a short visit to Italy in the the course of his journey to England.

2. The Emir Saud, who was accompanied by Fuad Bey Hamza, Midhat Sheikh El-Ard (Ibn Saud's doctor), and Mohammed Sheikho (secretary), arrived at Naples on the 19th May. Signor Persico, Italian Minister at Jedda, travelled with the party. On the arrival of the *Victoria*, in which the visitors were travelling, a salute of twenty-one guns was fired. Signor Caffarelli of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs met the Emir Saud, who also received a representative of the High Commissioner, the Commander of the Port and other officials. During the day he visited the sights of Naples, and in the evening received the ten Saudi airmen who are being trained at Grottaglie. On the 20th May the Emir was given lunch by the Prince of Piedmont, leaving for Rome the same afternoon.

3. On arrival in the capital on the evening of the 20th May, the party were received by Signor Suvich, Signor Medici del Vascello (Under-Secretary to the Presidency), Signor Bottai (Governor of Rome), Count Geriodi di Monastero (Master of Ceremonies of the Court), and Major Roero di Cortanze (aide-de-camp of the King of Italy). On the 21st May the Emir had lunch with the King, and in the afternoon was received by Signor Mussolini. Next day the Emir visited the Air Ministry, leaving for Florence on the 23rd May. He returned to Rome for the Fascist Levy on the following day, and then left again for the north of Italy, where he is at present.

4. Nothing has appeared in the Italian press in regard to the subjects discussed with Fuad Bey Hamza during the present visit; but it is fairly evident that a certain amount of business was done. From a well-informed source I learn that the chief Italian *desiderata* were that Fuad Hamza should request King Ibn Saud to consider the possibility of—

- (1) Taking steps to counteract the propaganda in the Hejaz of the Senussi *émigrés* which, in the opinion of the Italian Government, is doing much to foster anti-Italian sentiments among the Arabs as a whole;
- (2) To assist recruitment of Arabians by the Italian authorities in Eritrea; and
- (3) To accept the view that the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia is simply a quarrel between two Christian nations, in regard to which the Saudi Government should maintain a strict neutrality.

[12357]



5. Finally, I have the honour to enclose a memorandum<sup>(1)</sup> by the military attaché on a tactical demonstration stages by the Italian military authorities for the benefit of the Crown Prince.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Jeddah.

I have, &c.

ERIC DRUMMOND.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 63.

*Memorandum respecting the Tactical Demonstration for the Saudi Crown Prince.*

ON Thursday, the 23rd May, I attended a tactical demonstration held near Civitavossia for the special benefit of the Saudi Crown Prince. His Majesty the King was present, together with General Baistrocchi and a number of Italian officers.

The exercise does not call for any detailed description. It consisted in an attack by two infantry battalions against an imaginary enemy holding a line on a ridge facing the spectators and marked by white screens. The attack was supported by four groups of artillery (twelve batteries), including a group of 105-mm. guns and a group of 149-mm. (6-inch) howitzers. After a time the advance was supposed to be checked, and a flank attack was launched by a battalion of bersaglieri, with eight tanks and some cavalry.

Apart from the fact that, for the benefit of the spectators, the turning movement was not as wide as it would have been in a real battle, the whole exercise was realistic and well carried out. The artillery and machine guns fired live ammunition and expenditure was on a liberal scale.

An Italian officer, who was bear-leading the Saudi Crown Prince, told me yesterday that the latter was duly impressed, particularly by the artillery fire which was apparently a novelty to him.

R. G. STONE, Colonel, G.S.,  
Military Attaché.

Rome, May 25, 1935.

[E 3783/77/91]

No. 64.

*Eastern and South-Eastern Boundaries of Saudi Arabia.—(Communicated by Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Sterndale Bennett, May 31, with reference to Jeddah Telegram No. 89 of April 10.)*

HIS Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are willing to meet the views of the Saudi Government by not insisting strictly on the legal position resulting from the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of 29th July, 1913, and 9th March, 1914, but they cannot admit that the Saudi Government are entitled to any greater extension of the territory accruing to Turkey under those conventions than would be represented by drawing the boundary from the head of the Donat-as-Salwa to a point about 5 miles north-east of Sikak and running from that point in a direct line, so as to leave Banaiyan about 5 miles to the east, up to the intersection of the line with parallel 20 degrees north. The boundary proposed would run from this intersection in a south-westerly direction to a point to be agreed later on the line known as the violet line.

Jeddah, April 9, 1935.

[E 3604/7/25]

No. 65.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 11.)*

(No. 149.)  
Sir,

Jeddah, May 15, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 108 of the 5th April, I have the honour to state that the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 3rd May published a fairly long report, dated the 26th April, by the special commission appointed by the King of the Yemen to enquire into the circumstances of the attempt on Ibn Saud's life on

the 15th March last, together with a short formal letter of the 29th April, in which the Yemeni Minister for Foreign Affairs forwarded the report to Fuad Bey Hamza. These documents are not worth submitting to you in full.

2. The Yemeni Commission stated that they had investigated the antecedents of the persons implicated in the outrage and named in the second communiqué enclosed in my despatch No. 86 of the 22nd March. One, Ali-bin-Ali-al-Hadhri, proved to be a subordinate officer in the Yemeni army, of good previous character, who had got leave to make the pilgrimage. His brother Salih had returned to the Yemen last year after two protracted absences separated by a short interval, the first in unnamed foreign countries, the second in Abyssinia. He had taken out a passport and accompanied Ali on the Haj. The third, Mabkhut-bin-Mabkhut, was a soldier, belonging to the same village, Beyt Hadhr, as Ali and Salih. He had set forth on the pilgrimage without leave, and therefore counted as a deserter. The commission could find no trace of any person corresponding to the passport in the name of Mes'ad-bin-Mes'ad (or some similar name, for variants are mentioned) which was found among the effects of Ibn Saud's assailants.

3. The commission confessed their complete failure to discover anything about the proceedings of the three or four men, their connexions with other people, or any plot. They surmised that the passport of Mes'ad, or whatever his name was, had been taken out in a false name by someone not belonging to the Yemen, who might have escaped after the outrage. They noted darkly the absences of Salih from the Yemen and hinted that the clue might be found in the countries he had visited, but observed plaintively that they had no means of investigating his activities abroad.

4. The *Umm-al-Qura* published this inept document without comment. It is increasingly evident that the Saudi Government have no intention of magnifying the affair into a cause of open quarrel with the Yemen. The Yemeni authorities, though compelled to admit that the assailants killed at the Haram were Yemenis, cling fondly to the suggestion that they must have been egged on by outside instigators.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Bushire, Aden and Cairo.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3606/1012/25]

No. 66.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 11.)*

(No. 151.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jeddah presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copies of two notes to the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs dated the 16th May, respecting the acknowledgment of the payment of outstanding debts.

Jeddah, May 16, 1935.

Enclosure 1 in No. 66.

*Sir A. Ryan to Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Royal Highness,  
(After Compliments.)

Jeddah, May 16, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your Royal Highness's note of the 6th Safar, 1354 (9th May, 1935), enclosing a draft on the Netherlands Trading Society, Bombay, for the sum of 41,916r. 5a., being 10 per cent. of the amount, not including interest, due in respect of arms, &c., supplied by the Government of India to the Government of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz in 1929. I shall not fail to inform His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of India of the action taken by the Saudi Government to advance the final settlement of this outstanding affair.

With highest respects,

ANDREW RYAN.



Enclosure 2 in No. 66.

*Sir A. Ryan to Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*Your Royal Highness,  
(After Compliments.)*Jedda, May 16, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your Royal Highness's note of the 8th Safar, 1354 (11th May, 1935), together with the enclosed draft on Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., London, for the sum of £1,726 7s. 8d., being the amount due in respect of the investigation made by Mr. MacDonnell in 1930 into claims arising from incidents in the neighbourhood of the Saudi-Transjordan frontier.

I am duly bringing this payment to the knowledge of my Government, to whom the settlement of this outstanding affair will be a subject of gratification.

With highest respects,

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3611/325/25]

No. 67.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 11.)*

(No. 156.)

Sir,

*Jedda, May 21, 1935.*

WITH reference to my Savingram No. 13 of the 23rd May last and previous correspondence relative to the manumission and repatriation of "Royal" slaves by this Legation, I have the honour to record two recent cases as follows:—

- (i) On the 15th April a slave belonging to the King's brother, the Amir Muhammad, took refuge in the Legation. I delayed the usual action for a couple of days, in case the Saudi Government should themselves approach me. They did not do so, and the procedure followed its usual course, unopposed by the local authorities. The man was embarked for Abyssinia on the 3rd May.
- (ii) On the 14th May a slave belonging to another brother of the King, the Amir Abdullah, took refuge. In view of the recent precedent at (i) the usual procedure was followed. On this occasion the local authorities demurred at the last moment to the man's embarkation, which had been arranged for the 20th May, and intimated that Sheikh Yusuf Yasin would probably speak to me. He did so that morning and invoked the alleged understanding between the King and the late Sir Gilbert Clayton. It was clear, however, that Sheikh Yusuf was merely making a half-hearted personal attempt to get round me. He desisted when I offered to telegraph to you, but said that, having regard to the precedents, I would wish to be able to explain the difference between the Amir Abdullah and the Amir Muhammad. The man was embarked later in the day, as arranged.

2. It must not be inferred from the ease with which these cases have been disposed of that Ibn Saud and his Government feel less strongly than they did about the Legation's right of manumission and the question of Royal slaves in particular. It is merely that they do not wish to become involved in controversy over individual cases at a time when they hope to secure by other means the abandonment of the right of manumission. Even Sheikh Yusuf Yasin has the sense to see that this is sound policy, though his feelings on the subject are so strong that he could not resist the temptation to make a little demonstration in connexion with the second case.

I have, &amp;c.

ANDREW RYAN.

[E 3823/173/25]

No. 68.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Fowle to the Secretary of State for India.—(Enclosure in India Office Letter, No. P.Z. 4127/35, of June 19.)*

*Office of the Political Resident  
in the Persian Gulf.*

*H.M.S. Bideford, at Doha,  
June 5, 1935.*

(Express Letter No. C/202.)  
Sir,

I ENCLOSE a copy of the complete text of the Oil Agreement between the Standard Oil Company of California and Ibn Saud, dated the 27th May, 1933, which has been procured by the Political Agent, Kuwait. As far as I know the only copy of the concession previously known to us was the abridged edition published in Mecca newspaper *Um-al-Qura*, of 21st Rabi-al-Awal, 1352 (14th July, 1933), translation of which was sent to the Foreign Office, London, under British Legation Jedda despatch No. 235, dated the 25th July, 1933, with revised translation under Legation's No. 3256, dated the 28th November, 1933.

2. Comparison between the enclosed copy and the abridged edition shows many differences.

T. C. FOWLE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.*

Enclosure in No. 68.

*Text of the Oil Agreement between the Standard Oil Company of California and His Majesty King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud.*

THIS agreement made between his Excellency Sheikh Abdulla Suleiman-al-Hamdan, Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia, acting on behalf of Saudi Arab Government (hereinafter referred to as the "Government"), of the one part and L. N. Hamilton, acting on behalf of the Standard Oil Company of California (hereinafter referred to as the "Company"), of the other part.

It is hereby agreed between the Government and the Company in manner following:—

## ARTICLE 1.

The Government hereby grants to the Company on the terms and conditions hereinafter mentioned, and with respect to the area defined below, the exclusive right, for a period of sixty years from the effective date hereof, to explore, prospect, drill for, extract, treat, manufacture, transport, deal with, carry away and export petroleum, asphalt, naphtha, natural greases, ozocerite, and other hydrocarbons, and the derivatives of all such products. It is understood, however, that such right does not include the exclusive right to sell crude or refined products within the area described below or within Saudi Arabia.

## ARTICLE 2.

The area covered by the exclusive right referred to in article 1 hereof is all of Eastern Saudi Arabia, from its eastern boundary (including islands and territorial waters), westward to the westerly edge of the Dahana, and from the northern boundary to the southern boundary of the Saudi Arabia, provided that from the northern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana the westerly boundary of the area in question shall continue in a straight line north, 30 degrees west, to the northern boundary of Saudi Arabia, and from the southern end of the westerly edge of the Dahana, such boundary shall continue in a straight line south, 30 degrees east, to the southern boundary of Saudi Arabia.

For convenience this area may be referred to as the "exclusive area."

## ARTICLE 3.

Within the time agreed in article 16 of this agreement, the Company shall make a payment to the Government of £30,000 gold, or its equivalent.

[12357]



## ARTICLE 4.

The Company shall pay the Government annually the sum of £5,000 gold, or its equivalent. For convenience this payment is termed an "annual rental" and it is payable in advance. The first annual rental shall be paid within the time agreed in article 16 of this agreement; thereafter so long as the contract is not terminated, the annual rental shall be due upon each anniversary of the effective date hereof, and shall be payable within thirty days after such anniversary, provided that upon the commercial discovery of oil no further annual rental shall be due or payable.

## ARTICLE 5.

If this contract has not been terminated within eighteen months from the effective date hereof, the Company shall make a second payment to the Government, amounting to £20,000 gold, or its equivalent. The due date of such payment shall be eighteen months from the effective date hereof, but the Company shall have fifteen days from the due date within which to make the payment.

## ARTICLE 6.

Upon the effective date of this agreement the Company shall commence plans and preparations for geological work, so planning the work as to take advantage of the cooler season for more efficient work in the field, and of the hotter season for the necessary office work of compiling data and reports. In the event the actual field work shall commence not later than the end of September 1933, and it shall be continued diligently until operations connected with drilling are commenced, or until the contract is terminated.

## ARTICLE 7.

Within ninety days after the commencement of drilling, the Company shall relinquish to the Government such portions of the exclusive area as the Company at that time may decide not to explore further, or to use otherwise in connexion with the enterprise. Similarly, from time to time, during the life of this contract, the Company shall relinquish to the Government such further portions of the exclusive area as the Company may then decide not to explore or prospect further, or to use otherwise in connexion with the enterprise. The portions so relinquished shall thereupon be released from the terms and conditions of this contract, excepting only that during the life of this contract the Company shall continue to enjoy the right to use the portions so relinquished for transportation and communication facilities, which, however, shall interfere as little as practicable with any other use to which the relinquished portions may be put.

## ARTICLE 8.

The Company shall commence operations connected with drilling as soon as a suitable structure has been found, and in any event if the Company does not commence such operations within three years from the end of September 1933 (subject to the provisions of article 25 hereof), the Government may terminate this contract. Once commenced, these operations shall be continued diligently until oil in commercial quantities has been discovered or until this agreement is terminated. If the Company should fail to declare so sooner, the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities shall be the date upon which the Company has completed and tested a well or wells capable of producing in accordance with first-class oil practice, at least 2,000 tons of oil per day for a period of thirty consecutive days.

Operation connected with drilling include the ordering and shipping of materials and equipment to Saudi Arabia, the construction of roads, camps, buildings, structures, communication facilities, &c., and the installation and operation of the machinery, equipment and facilities for drilling wells.

## ARTICLE 9.

Upon the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the Company shall advance to the Government the sum of £50,000 gold, or its equivalent, and one year later the further sum of £50,000 gold, or its equivalent. The due date of the first advance shall be the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities, as provided in article 8 hereof, and the due date of the second advance shall be one

year later. In each case the Company shall have sixty days following the due date within which to make the advance. Both of these advances are in account of royalties, which may be due to the Government, and, consequently, the Company shall have the right to recover the amount of these advances by way of deductions from one-half of the royalties due the Government.

## ARTICLE 10.

Since it has been agreed that the annual rental of £5,000 gold, or its equivalent is payable to the date of the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, and since it has been agreed also that the annual rental is to be payable in advance, it may happen that the last annual rental paid prior to the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities will cover a period beyond the date of such discovery. In case that this period should be equal to or greater than one-fifth of a year, the proportionate amount of the £5,000 gold, or its equivalent corresponding to such period, shall be treated as an advance on account of royalties due the Government, and consequently it should be recoverable by the Company by way of deductions from one-half of the royalties due the Government.

## ARTICLE 11.

As soon as practicable (*i.e.*, allowing a reasonable time for ordering and shipping further materials and equipment to Saudi Arabia and commencing further work), after the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the Company shall continue operations connected with drilling by using at least two strings of tools. These operations shall continue diligently until the proven area has been drilled up in accordance with first-class oil-field practice, or until the contract is terminated.

## ARTICLE 12.

The Company shall pay the Government a royalty on all net crude oil produced and saved and run from field storage, after first deducting—

- (1) Water and foreign substance; and
- (2) Oil required for the customary operations of the Company's installation within Saudi Arabia; and
- (3) The oil required for the manufacturing the amounts of gasoline and kerosene to be provided free each year to the Government in accordance with article 17 hereof.

The rate of royalty per ton of such net crude oil shall be 4s. gold, or its equivalent.

## ARTICLE 13.

If the Company should produce, save and sell any natural gas, it will pay to the Government a royalty equal to one-eighth of the proceeds of the sale of such natural gas, it being understood, however, that the Company shall be under no obligation to produce, save, sell, or otherwise dispose of any natural gas. It is also understood that the Company is under no obligation to pay any royalty on such natural gas as it may use for the customary operation of its installation within the Saudi Arabia.

## ARTICLE 14.

The Government, through duly authorised representatives, may, during the usual hours of operations, inspect and examine the operations of the Company under this contract and may verify the amount of production. The Company shall measure, in accordance with first-class oil-field practice, the amount of oil produced and saved and run from field storage, and shall keep time and correct accounts thereof, and of the natural gas it may produce and save and sell, and duly authorised representatives of the Government shall also have access at all reasonable times to such accounts. The Company shall within three months, after the end of each semester, commencing with the date of commercial discovery of oil, deliver to the Government an abstract of such accounts for the semester, and a statement of the amount of royalties due the Government for the semester. These accounts and statements should be treated as confidential by the Government, with the exception of such items therein as the Government may require to publish for fiscal purposes.

The royalties due the Government at the end of each semester commencing with the date of commercial discovery of oil, shall be paid within three months



after the end of the semester, such portion of the amount as may be unquestioned shall be tendered the Government within the period hereinabove, and thereupon the question shall be settled by agreement between the parties or failing that by arbitration as provided in this contract. Any further sum which may be payable to the Government as a result of this settlement shall be paid within sixty days after the date of such settlement.

#### ARTICLE 15.

It is agreed that all gold payments provided in this contract, whether pounds gold or shillings gold, are to be based on the gold pound standard according to its weight and fineness at the time the payment may be due. It is also agreed that wherever it is stipulated in this contract the equivalent of any sum or amount in pounds gold or in shillings gold may be paid, such equivalent may be in dollars in United States currency, or pounds sterling.

It is agreed, furthermore, that the equivalent of pounds gold or shillings gold, for any payment which may be made hereunder in dollars, United States currency or in pounds sterling (with the exception of the first payment provided for in article 16 hereof), shall be based on the average of the rate of exchange as computed over a period of three months immediately preceding the due date of the payment.

#### ARTICLE 16.

All payments provided in this contract to be made to the Government may be made by tendering such payment directly to the Government, or by depositing the amount due to the credit of the Government in some bank which the Government designates in writing, and which the Government may change from time to time by giving written notice to the Company long enough in advance, so that Company will have sufficient time to make future payments to the new bank. It is agreed that Government will designate such bank in Saudi Arabia, or in the United States of America, or in England, or in Holland, but that no bank in Saudi Arabia will be so designated unless such bank has a correspondent in United States of America, England or Holland, through which bank transfers of money to Saudi Arabia may be made. Once the Company has made the proper payment to the Government or has deposited the proper sum to such correspondent for transfer to a bank in Saudi Arabia, the Company shall be free of all further responsibility in connexion with payment.

It is agreed, however, that the first payment of £35,000 gold, or its equivalent (comprising the first payment and the first annual rental), shall be made, within fifteen days after the effective date of this agreement, to a correspondent in New York or in London, of Netherlands Trading Society (Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij) at Jedda, Saudi Arabia, to be transmitted without delay, and at the expense of the Company, to said society and to be delivered to the Government upon obtaining a proper receipt from the Government for such payment. If this first payment is not made in gold, it will be made in pounds sterling at the current rate of exchange at the time the Company makes the payment to such correspondent.

#### ARTICLE 17.

As soon as practicable after the date of discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the Company shall select some point within Saudi Arabia for the erection of a plant for manufacturing sufficient gasoline and kerosene to meet the ordinary requirements of the Government, providing, of course, that the character of the crude oil found will permit of the manufacture of such products on a commercial basis by the use of ordinary refining methods, and provided further that the amount of oil developed is sufficient for the purpose. It is understood that the ordinary requirements of the Government shall not include resale inside or outside of the country. Upon the completion of the necessary preliminary arrangements, and as soon as the Company has obtained the Government's consent to the proposed location, the Company shall proceed with the erection of such plant. During each year following the date of completion of this plant, the Company shall offer free to the Government, in bulk, 200,000 American gallons of gasoline, and 100,000 gallons of kerosene, it being understood that the facilities provided by the Government for accepting these deliveries shall not impede or endanger the Company's operations.

#### ARTICLE 18.

The Company, at its own expense, will employ the necessary number of guards and guides to protect its representatives, its camps and installations. The Government promise to co-operate fully in supplying the best soldiers and men available for this responsibility, and in furnishing every reasonable protection, at rates not exceeding those customarily paid by the Government or others for similar services, it being understood that the expense for such services shall be paid by the Company through the Government.

#### ARTICLE 19.

In return for the obligations assumed by the Company under this contract, and for the payments required from the Company hereunder, the Company and enterprise shall be exempt from all direct and indirect taxes, imposts, charges, fees and duties (including, of course, import and export duties), it being understood that this privilege shall not extend to the sale of products within the country, nor shall it extend to the personal requirements of the individual employees of the Company. Any material imported free of duty may not be sold within the country without first paying the corresponding import duty.

#### ARTICLE 20.

It is understood, of course, that the Company has the right to use all means and facilities it may deem necessary or advisable in order to exercise the rights granted under this contract, so as to carry out the purposes of this enterprise, including among other things the right to construct and use roads, camps, buildings, structures and all systems of communication, to instal and operate machinery, equipment and facilities in connexion with the drilling of wells, or in connexion with the transportation, storage, treatment, manufacture, dealing with, or exportation of petroleum and its derivatives, or in connexion with the camps, buildings and quarters of the personnel of the company; to construct and use storage reservoirs, tanks and receptacles; to construct and operate wharves, piers, seaload lines and all other terminal and port facilities; and to use all forms of transportation of personnel, or equipment, and of petroleum and its derivatives. It is understood, however, that the use of aeroplanes within the country shall be subject of a separate agreement.

The Company shall also have the right to develop, carry away and use water. It likewise shall have the right to carry away and use any water belonging to the Government, for the operations of the enterprise, but so as not to prejudice irrigation or to deprive any lands, houses or watering places for cattle, of a reasonable supply of water from time to time. The Company may also take for use, but only to the extent necessary for the purpose of the enterprise, other natural products belonging to the Government, such as surface soil, timber, stone, lime, gypsum stone and similar substances.

Government officials and agents, in pursuance of official business, shall have the right to use such communications and transportation facilities as the Company may establish, provided that such use shall not obstruct or interfere with the Company's operations hereunder, and shall not impose upon the Company any substantial burden of expense.

In times of national emergency the use of the Company's transportation and communication facilities by the Government shall entitle the Company to fair compensation for any loss it may sustain thereby, whether through damage to the Company's facilities, equipment or installation or through the obstruction or interference with the Company's operations.

#### ARTICLE 21.

The enterprise under this contract shall be directed and supervised by Americans who shall employ Saudi Arab nationals as far as practicable, and in so far as the Company can find suitable Saudi Arab employees it will not employ other nationals.

In respect of the treatment of the Saudi Arab nationals as employees, the Company shall abide by the existing laws of the country applicable generally to employees of any other industrial enterprise.



## ARTICLE 22.

The Government reserves the right to search for and obtain any substance or products, other than those exclusively granted under this contract, within the area covered by this agreement, except land occupied by wells or other installations of the Company, provided always that the right thus reserved by the Government shall be exercised so as not to endanger the operations of the Company or interfere with its rights hereunder, and provided also that a fair compensation shall be paid the Company by the Government for all damage the Company may sustain through the exercise of the right so reserved by the Government. In any grant of such right so reserved by the Government, the concessionaire shall be bound by the provisions of this article.

## ARTICLE 23.

The Company is hereby empowered by the Government to acquire from any occupant the surface rights of any land which the Company may find necessary to use in connexion with the enterprise, provided that the Company shall pay the occupant for depriving him of the use of the land. The payment shall be a fair one with respect to the customary use made of the land by the occupant. The Government will lend every reasonable assistance to the Company in case of any difficulties with respect to acquiring the rights of a surface occupant.

The Company, of course, shall have no right to acquire or to occupy Holy Places.

## ARTICLE 24.

The Company shall supply the Government with copies of all topographical maps and geological reports (as finally made and approved by the Company) relating to the exploration and exploitation of the area covered by this contract. The Company shall also furnish the Government, within four months after the end of each year, commencing with the date of commercial discovery of oil, a report of the operations under this contract during the year. These maps and reports shall be treated as confidential by the Government.

## ARTICLE 25.

No failure or omission on the part of the Company to carry out or to perform any of the terms or conditions of the contract shall give the Government any claim against the Company, or be deemed a breach of this contract, in so far as such failure or omission may arise from *force majeure*. If through *force majeure* the fulfilment of any term or condition of this contract should be delayed, the period of the delay, together with such period as may be required for the restoration of any damage done during such delay, shall be added to the terms or periods fixed in this contract.

## ARTICLE 26.

The Company may terminate the contract at any time by giving the Government thirty days advance notice in writing, whether by letter or by telegraph, provided that the telegraphic notice is promptly confirmed by letter. Upon the termination of this contract through such notice or through any other cause, the Government and the Company shall thereafter be free of all further obligations under this contract, except as follows:—

- (1) The Company's immovable property, such as roads, water or oil wells with their casings, permanent buildings and structures, &c., shall become the property of the Government free of charge.
- (2) The Company shall afford the Government an opportunity to purchase the movable property of the enterprise in Saudi Arabia at a fair price equal to the replacement value of such property at the time, less depreciation. Any controversy about this fair price shall be settled by arbitration in the same manner as provided in article 29 of this contract. If the Government declines or fails, within two months following the date of the termination of this contract, to purchase such movable property, or if the Government fails to tender the purchase price within thirty days after it has been decided upon, by agreement or arbitration, the Company shall then have six months within which to remove such property.

## ARTICLE 27.

In case of the breach by the Company of its obligation to make the second payment of £20,000 gold, or its equivalent as provided in article 5 hereof, or of its obligation to commence operations connected with drilling as set forth in article 8 hereof, or of its obligation to make two advances of £50,000 gold, each, or its equivalent under the terms and conditions provided in article 9 hereof, or of its obligation under article 28 hereof to pay the amount of any damages which may be assessed upon the Company, the Government's remedy shall be the right to give the Company notice at once for such breach, and thereupon if the Company does not take immediate steps to comply with the obligation so breached, the Government may terminate this contract.

## ARTICLE 28.

Except as otherwise provided in article 27 hereof, the penalty for the breach by the Company of any of its obligations under this contract shall be damages which shall be payable to the Government under the following conditions:—

The Government shall at once notify the Company of any alleged breach on the part of the Company, setting forth the nature of such breach. Any controversy which may arise as to whether or not the Company has committed the alleged breach shall be settled by arbitration in the manner provided in this agreement. Once that the fact of the commission of the breach has been established, the failure of the Company to take immediate steps to remedy the breach shall subject the Company to the payment of damages to the Government, and if such damages cannot be agreed upon they shall be determined by arbitration in the manner provided in this contract. The amount of any damages which may be determined shall be paid to the Government by the Company within sixty days after such determination.

## ARTICLE 29.

If any doubt, difference or dispute shall arise between the Government and the Company concerning the interpretation or execution of this contract, or anything herein contained or in connexion herewith, or the rights and liabilities of the parties hereunder, it shall, failing any agreement to settle it in another way, be referred to two arbitrators, one of whom shall be chosen by each party, and a referee who shall be chosen by the arbitrators before proceeding to arbitration. Each party shall nominate its arbitrator within thirty days of being requested in writing by the other party to do so. In the event of arbitrators failing to agree upon a referee, the Government and the Company shall, in agreement, appoint a referee, and in the event of their failing to agree they shall request the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice to appoint a referee. The decision of the arbitrators, or in the case of the difference of opinion between them the decision of the referee, shall be final. The place of arbitration shall be such as may be agreed upon by the parties, and in default of agreement shall be The Hague, Holland.

## ARTICLE 30.

The Company may not, without the consent of the Government, assign its rights and obligations under this contract to any one, but it is understood that the Company, upon notifying the Government, shall have the right to assign its rights and obligations hereunder to a corporation it may organise exclusively for the purpose of this enterprise. Any such corporation or organisation, upon being invested with any or all of rights and obligations under this contract, and upon notification thereof to the Government, shall thereupon be subject to the terms and conditions of this agreement.

In the event that stock issued by any such corporation or organisation should be offered for sale to the general public, the inhabitants of Saudi Arabia shall be allowed a reasonable time to subscribe (upon similar terms and conditions offered to others), for at least 20 per cent. of such shares of stock so issued and offered for sale to the general public.

## ARTICLE 31.

It is understood that the periods of time referred to in this agreement shall be reckoned on the basis of the solar calendar.



## ARTICLE 32.

The effective date of this contract shall be the date of its publication in Saudi Arabia, following the notification of this contract by the Company.

## ARTICLE 33.

This contract has been drawn up in English and in Arabic; both texts shall have equal validity.

## ARTICLE 34.

It is understood that the contract, after being signed in Saudi Arabia, shall be subject to ratification by the Company at its offices in San Francisco, California, before it shall become effective. After both texts of this contract have been signed in duplicate in Saudi Arabia, the signed copies shall be sent by registered mail in the next out-going mail to the Company in San Francisco, California, and within fifteen days after receipt in San Francisco the Company shall transmit to the Government by telegraph whether or not it ratifies this contract. If the contract is not ratified by the Company within fifteen days after that period, it shall be null and void and of no further force or effect.

Likewise, if the amount of the first payment and the first annual rental is not made within the time agreed upon in article 16 hereof, the Government may declare this contract to be null and void and of no further force or effect.

Upon ratification of this contract by the Company, one signed copy of each text, together with the necessary evidence as to ratification by the Company, shall be returned to the Government. Also upon ratification of this contract by the Company, the contract shall be published in Saudi Arabia in the usual manner.

Signed this 27th day of the month of May 1933.

[E 3857/350/25]

No. 69.

*Sir H. Montgomery to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received June 22.)*

(No. 329.)

Sir,

*The Hague, June 19, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Netherlands were, during the past week, honoured with a visit from His Royal Highness the Emir Saud-bin-Abdul Aziz-al-Saud, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia.

2. The Emir was received by Her Majesty Queen Wilhelmina, who conferred upon His Royal Highness the Grand Cross of the Order of Orange Nassau. He also took lunch with the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs. I took an early opportunity of writing my name in the Emir's visitor's book at the Hôtel des Indes.

3. In connexion with the visit the press has reported an interview accorded by the Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs. In this interview the Minister is recorded as pointing out the importance of the pilgrim traffic between the Netherlands East Indies and his country, which used to amount to 60,000, but has since then decreased considerably. As regards his own country, the Minister stated that the number of motor cars and trucks in Arabia amounted to 2,000. The economic relations between the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies were maintained by an office of the Netherlands Trading Society, which was the first to open a bank in Arabia; the late representative of the society had, at the request of the King, arranged the finances of the country.

3A. The sanitary services had also been organised by a Dutchman, Dr. van der Koog, who was a specialist in tropical hygiene.

4. Although there was no broadcasting station in Arabia the number of receiving sets was steadily growing, as the programmes from the Arabic station in Cairo were easily received.

5. The Minister added that he had had an interview with M. Plesman, the director of the Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, and the possibility had been discussed of this company taking its route across Arabia instead of across

Persia, which would mean a reduction of 1,500 kilom. The Arabian Government had promised co-operation, though a decision had not yet been arrived at.

6. The principal imports from Java consisted of sugar, but the Minister anticipated that other produce could also be obtained from that country.

7. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

I have, &c.

HUBERT MONTGOMERY.

[E 3899/557/25]

No. 70.

*Mr. Oppenheim to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received June 24.)*

(No. 170. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, June 8, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda Report for May 1935, written by Sir Andrew Ryan before his departure on leave on the 7th June.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &c.

A. C. OPPENHEIM.

Enclosure in No. 70.

JEDDA REPORT FOR MAY 1935.

I.—Internal Affairs.

137. The King's hunting seems to have taken up more of his time in April than was suggested in paragraph 105 of the last report. He spent all or most of his time in Mecca from the beginning of May until he left for Riyadh on the 19th May, arriving there on the 25th. This unusually early departure was put down to the absence from Nejd of the Amir Saud, but it may be suspected that His Majesty was glad of the excuse, as he cares little for any climate in the Hejaz and hates that of Taif, the summer capital. He did not pay his usual visit to Jedda before leaving.

138. The heir apparent left Riyadh on the 4th May and got to Mecca on the 7th. He came to Jedda on the 13th, attended by the Amir Feisal, and embarked next day for Naples in the Lloyd Triestino *Victoria*, which called specially. Everything was done to mark the importance of the occasion. The prince received the foreign representatives on the morning of the 13th and presided at a solemn tea-party at the palace that afternoon. His send-off on the 14th was highly official. His suite, however, was modest, consisting only of the King's doctor, two secretaries and a servant. Fuad Bey Hamza duly joined the party at Port Said on the 16th May. The principal stages in the tour as far as London were to be, by dates of arrival, as follows:—

Naples: May 19.

Rome: May 20 for a stay of four days to be followed by three days elsewhere in Italy.

Paris: May 28 or 29 for eight days.

The Hague: June 8 for four days.

London: June 15.

The further programme has not been announced, but it is understood that the prince will stay about a month in England, when he will be the guest of His Majesty's Government for the first fortnight, and that he will visit Turkey, Syria and Iraq on his return journey. As regards Transjordan, see paragraph 154 below.

139. The Amir Feisal tarried in Jedda only long enough to see his brother off, and moved into summer quarters at Taif a day or two after the King's departure from Nejd. He made himself felt even less than usual, if possible, in foreign affairs, Fuad Bey Hamza having left for Syria on the 1st May



(paragraph 107 of the last report), these were attended to by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, the announcement of whose appointment as Acting Deputy Minister reached the foreign missions on the 6th May. Sheikh Yusuf did some business in Jedda during three short visits on the 6th-7th, 13th-15th and 20th May. He, too, left for Riyadh on the 21st, and though he still appears to be Acting Deputy Minister the foreign missions have since had to make the best of a little bottle-washer in the Ministry at Mecca. Even this young man went to Taif on the 30th. Then the telephone line to Taif proved to have broken down.

140. No events of importance were reported from the interior. There has been much talk, however, of the proposed administrative changes. The Governor of Jedda faded away, rather than vacated his post, some weeks ago. He was spoken of for Medina, but has been appointed to Taif. There was talk of a Royal prince for Jedda or of Fuad Bey Hamza eventually combining the post of Governor with that of Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Another alternative which was considered was that of reviving the old system of making a local merchant Governor of the town only with the title of kaimakam. The post was apparently offered to the nephew of the last bearer of that title but was declined. An interim arrangement has now been made under which Sheikh Muhammad id Rawwaf, an Under-Secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, hardly known to the foreign missions, will be Acting Governor.

141. The cruel old Governor of Medina, who was technically acting for one of the King's sons, was recently summoned to headquarters and has been spoken of for Najran. His position at Medina may have been shaken by reports of poverty and perhaps some disorder in that area. The Legation has had to concern itself with one case, the facts of which are somewhat obscure, but in which a party of Palestinian pilgrims alleged that they had been waylaid and robbed between Yanbu and Medina.

142. A murderer was executed in Mecca early in May. These rare cases of lawful bloodshed in the holy city always attract some attention.

143. An Indian doctor was sent to Najran in or just before May in accordance with the decision mentioned in paragraph 114 of the last report. The difficulty of providing for the medical needs even of places much less remote is shown by the fact that the Government have recently advertised for a surgeon and an X-ray specialist to replace two men who are said to have been discontented because they, being Hejazis, were treated less favourably than the imported Syrians. These still form the bulk of the score or less of Government doctors in the whole of Saudi Arabia.

144. Changes were made in the customs tariff on or about the 14th May. The duty on petrol was reduced from 65 piastres miri gold to 55 piastres miri gold per case. Reduced duties were also fixed for artificial silk, tobacco, perfumes, Indian metal-ware and silver thread. Carbolic acid was exempted from duty, presumably to encourage its use as a disinfectant. The Government refrained from announcing these changes in the press, apparently for fear of attracting too much attention to their tolerance in the matter of tobacco and luxury articles.

145. Two other financial developments deserve mention. One of these, the payment of certain monies to His Majesty's Government will be dealt with in paragraph 157 below. The other was the importation from India of 400,000 rupees. These would appear to have been purchased for account of Ibn Saud or his Government, possibly with the financial assistance of a local firm which does much business with the Government. This transaction has given rise to various conjectures. The most plausible explanation is that the King has decided to distribute his largesse in Nejd in Indian currency. Saudi riyals have never been popular in Eastern Arabia, and the lack of connexion between the Maria Theresa dollar and any outside currency has increased its disadvantages in official eyes, perhaps also in the eyes of the Nejd public.

146. Mr. Twitchell's gold-mining parties (paragraph 111 of last report) are still at work. Early in May they had collected some 400 samples for assay, but news of the result has not reached Jedda. There has been no confirmation of a rumour that a large number of workmen were killed by the collapse of a shaft.

147. Mr. Ydlibi left Jedda on the 1st May in the same steamer as Fuad Bey, with whom he is intimate. Nothing further has been heard of the projects mentioned in paragraph 112 of the last report.

148. The most important economic event of the month has been the promulgation of a decree relative to the creation of the single motor transport company foreshadowed in paragraph 82 of the report for March. The general idea is to put all commercial transport, but not apparently Government vehicles, into the hands of the new concern, which will be divided into two sections, with various sub-sections each having its own manager. Existing cars are to be valued, and shares to the value thereof are to be assigned to the former owners. Details must be omitted, and the decree is obscure in many respects, e.g., as to how the concern is to provide itself with liquid capital, and how running expenses, &c., are to be financed until it shows a profit. It is also uncertain how, if at all, the new arrangements will affect Sharqieh's (Limited) monopoly (paragraph 191 of the report for last August).

149. On the 7th May two machine guns, mounted on lorries, were observed in the desert some miles from Jedda, apparently being demonstrated by one or two Europeans. One of the party is understood to have been a Czechoslovak, but he left Jedda soon after and there is no evidence of his having done business.

150. On the 13th May Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., concluded a further contract on behalf of the Egyptian Shell to supply the Saudi Government's requirements of benzine, &c., for another year. It was on much the same lines as that mentioned in paragraph 97 (b) of the report for May 1934.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

151. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* of the 7th May published without comment a short note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Yemen to Fuad Bey enclosing the report of the special commission appointed by the King of the Yemen to investigate the attempt on Ibn Saud's life. The commission had been able to obtain some information regarding the antecedents of the assailants and their departure for the Hejaz, but admitted their complete inability to throw any light on their motives or connexions. Their most constructive suggestion was that, as one of the men had spent two long periods abroad, one in Abyssinia and the other in some unspecified foreign land, the plot might have been hatched abroad. "You know their methods, Watson," one can hear the commissioners saying to each other about those foreigners, and so say all of us regarding Yemeni sleuth work.

152. It was reported on the 21st May that a Zaydi Yemeni had been found in possession of three bombs in Jedda, and to have said that he picked them up outside the town. The affair does not seem *prima facie* serious, but it is too soon to judge.

153. A Saudi party of six armed persons entered Koweit territory on the 6th May, proceeded to certain places where Shammar and other tribesmen were encamped, and ordered them to move into Nejd. The party had apparently been sent by or under the authority of the Governor of Hasa. They were rounded up and taken to Koweit, whence they were allowed to return to Saudi Arabia. In pursuance of a request from the Sheikh of Koweit to the Political Agent, and with the approval of His Majesty's Government, the Legation addressed to the Saudi Government on the 19th May a protest couched in firm but courteous language, non-committal as regards the responsibility of the Governor of Hasa. The reply of the Saudi Government, very injured and defensive, did not reach the Legation until the 1st June. One intervening repercussion of the affair will be dealt with in paragraph 160 below.

154. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin informed Sir Andrew Ryan on the 15th May, with evident gratification, that the King had received a telegram from the Amir of Transjordan inviting the Amir Saud to visit him on his journey to or from Europe. The King had replied explaining that it was too late to alter the arrangements for the outward journey, as the prince was just leaving, but that he would gladly visit Amman on his way back. Four telegrams which passed between the two rulers were published in the *Umm-ul-Qura* of the 18th May.

155. The party from Damascus mentioned in paragraph 120 of the last report arrived in Jedda on their return journey on the 7th May having, it would appear, reached Medina on or about the 15th April, and Mecca about the 22nd April. They (or some of them, for some are reported from Damascus to have returned by sea) left a day or two later, intending to explore a shorter and easier route than that by which they had come.



156. A report was current about mid-May that the Amir Feisal was to marry a lady of the family of Nuri Ash-Sha'alan. This was doubtless the echo of a similar rumour circulated some time ago in Syria, where it had been denied.

### III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

157. Relations between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government have continued to be good, but, in the circumstances explained in paragraph 122 of the last report and in paragraph 139 above, little or no further progress has been made towards the settlement of outstanding questions. The Saudi Government have shown goodwill by consenting to the despatch of a R.A.F. aeroplane to convey Sir Andrew Ryan to Egypt in order to enable him to reach London in time for the arrival of the Amir Saud; and by agreeing to allow Captain G. de Gaury (paragraph 132 of the last report) to proceed overland to Koweit or Hasa on his way to Bagdad later in the summer. An even more remarkable attempt to please was the payment of the whole of the money due to His Majesty's Government in respect of the Saudi share of the cost of the MacDonnell enquiry in 1930, and of 10 per cent. of the money due to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India for arms, &c., supplied by the latter to Ibn Saud in 1929.

158. Further discussion regarding the effect of the Bahrein negotiations (paragraph 123 of the last report) and the form to be given to any definite agreement has revealed unexpected difficulties which have not yet been solved.

159. Despite the good state of Anglo-Saudi relations generally, the position in regard to two matters is unsatisfactory.

160. Arrangements had been made for the delegates to the Koweit Conference (paragraph 124 of the last report) to leave Hasa on the 23rd May. On the 26th May the Ministry for Foreign Affairs telegraphed that they would start next day, mentioned for the first time a Qusaibi as one of the delegates and renewed an enquiry which Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had addressed orally to Sir Andrew Ryan regarding telegraphic facilities. Four hours later the same official telephoned urgently that, in view of the protest relative to the incident mentioned in paragraph 153 above, the delegates could not start unless the Saudi Government were assured that the party would be allowed to carry arms. The Minister expressed extreme surprise at this attempt to couple two such disparate matters, but consulted the Political Agent at Koweit as to the acceptability of armed guards to accompany the delegates. The sheikh considered them unnecessary, but agreed, subject to a hope that the numbers would be reasonable. Further enquiries by the Legation elicited the facts that the delegates were to be Hamad Suleiman, Khalid-al-Qarqani and Abdul Aziz Qusaibi, and that it was proposed to send with them fifty attendants, including twenty-eight armed guards. This appeared to Sir Andrew Ryan to be a deliberate counter-demonstration inspired by a legitimate protest against a serious violation of Koweit territory, and he had to resubmit the whole matter to His Majesty's Government.

161. The question of the Government of India dispensaries continues to be a bone of contention. The discussion contemplated early in the year (paragraph 23 of the last report) was crowded out until the 30th April, when Fuad Bey gave Sir Andrew Ryan the draft of a proposed regulation on medical staff and dispensaries maintained by foreign missions. This gave rise to further inconclusive discussion in May with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who is never so contentious as when he asserts the abstract thesis that dispensaries on the present lines are *imperium in imperio*. The draft, which, however defensible on that ground, would gravely imperil the position of the dispensaries, has been submitted to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India. In the meanwhile, it has been necessary to order further supplies from Egypt, and customs duty on these will probably have to be paid under protest.

162. The Italian Government have made a great fuss over the Amir Saud. So far as the Jedda end is concerned, they not only arranged to divert the ship named in paragraph 139 above, but sent the destroyer *Pantera* from Massawa to escort the prince out of the harbour. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires accompanied the prince, who, on his way out to the *Victoria*, visited the *Pantera*. The increase in the number of official and unofficial Italians in Jedda has been a notable feature of the last few months. A *Chancelier* has been added to the Legation staff. The

Tripolitan dragoman has been replaced by a half-caste Italian with a white wife and a black sister. The doctor mentioned in paragraph 69 of the report for February is apparently not officially connected with the Legation and has moved with his wife to a home in the town. A merchant named Odello has set himself up in independent general business.

163. This *Saut-al-Hejaz* newspaper, which seems to take a special interest in the subject, continues to receive good news of "our Eagles in Italy," as in a happy recent flight it called the student aviators sent to be trained in that country.

164. Two members of the Soviet Legation left with their wives on the 19th May. One of them, the doctor, was said to have fallen foul of his Minister, a matter worth mentioning only because, according to one version, he had been consorting with the White Russian airmen. The King is said to have added to his household a Russian lady doctor, apparently a Moslem.

165. The local press stated on the 21st May that the Governor of Suez had met the Amir Saud officially on behalf of the Egyptian Government when the *Victoria* passed through. According to another account it was the Egyptian consul-designate in Jedda who met the prince. Anyhow, he was met, and he is reported to have addressed a message of greeting to the Egyptian nation. These are matters of some interest in connexion with the curious position between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. (Paragraph 96 of the report for March.)

166. Nothing else calls for mention under this head except that by the end of May only three titular heads of missions, the British, the Russian and the French, remained at their posts in Jedda; and that the new Afghan Legation showed its flag for the first time on the 24th May.

### IV.—Miscellaneous.

167. The Jubilee of their Majesties the King and Queen was celebrated in Jedda as adequately as local conditions permit. Isolated as it is, it is one of the historic meeting places of west and east. For that reason, if no other, the celebration merits some record, although various details must be omitted.

168. A general reception at the Legation on the 6th May was attended by about 130 guests, including Sheikh Yusuf Yasin who brought special messages from the King and the Amir Feisal, practically all members of foreign missions, many local notables and numerous Indians including some fourteen pilgrims of good standing. The British and Indian staff and the remnants of the European British community dined that evening at the Legation, a party of twenty-four.

169. A party for children, mostly Indian, on the afternoon of the 8th May was a greater *tour de force*. Every preliminary count differed from the last. Big girls in veils could not meet small boys in skirts. It had to be considered whether a married woman could still be rated as a child. There was whooping-cough about. Despite all these difficulties, Lady Ryan, greatly assisted by the Indian medical officer and others, mobilised about sixty children at a remote part of the seashore, where they showed great enthusiasm for games and races. Reinforced by the bigger girls, they were afterwards given a cinema show at the Legation, including a film by Mr. Oppenheim recording a journey from Liverpool to Jedda.

170. Three of the Legation houses were illuminated during the three days. The Indian vice-consul's display shone like a good deed far into the naughty desert.

171. Sir Andrew Ryan received memorials expressing loyalty from Indians in Jedda, Indians in Mecca and Hadhramis in Mecca. A telegram to the Foreign Office, conveying these and other British congratulations, elicited a gracious expression of the King's satisfaction.

172. A collection made, as the result of a private initiative, for King George's Jubilee Trust, with a maximum limit of £1 per individual yielded £44 odd subscribed by 85 persons, European British and Moslem.

173. Mr. Haliburton (paragraph 132 of the last report) was received by Ibn Saud on the Jedda-Mecca road on the 5th May. He asked the King whether, if he embraced Islam, he would be allowed to go to Mecca. The King replied that he was not an authority on religious law. The interpreter fainted after the first quarter of an hour. Mr. Haliburton persevered and got some not unsuccessful photographs. He had himself taken in pilgrim garb by a local artist before he left on the 12th May.



174. Princess Nigadama de Torhout (variant, Nirgidma of the Torgots), a Mongolian lady, who has lived in Peking and Paris, arrived in Jedda on the 26th May as an *envoyée spéciale* of the *Paris Journal*. She stayed at the local hotel but only until the 29th May when she left again for Suez. This lady was brought to the notice of Mr. Calvert in England last March by the secretary of the Royal Central Asian Society. She did not, however, call at the Legation.

175. Poets who write up May should be sent to do time in Jedda. This habitually unpleasant month surpassed itself in unpleasantness this year. Spells of great heat and humidity were punctuated by frequent bursts of simoon, hotter though less humid. The insect life was on the wing. The proceedings were varied on the 8th, 11th and 21st May, by three great storms, quite abnormal for the time of year. They brought all the discomforts of wind, rain, thunder and lightning but very little after-refreshment. One of them rounded off the Jubilee party for children on the 8th May.

176. Practically all this year's pilgrims from overseas had left Jedda by the end of May. The Legation had to repatriate as destitutes 512 Indians during the month.

177. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the British Legation was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: 1 male.  
Took refuge in May: 4 males.  
Manumitted and repatriated: 4 males.  
Locally manumitted: Nil.  
Left voluntarily: 1 male.  
On hand at the end of the month: Nil.

178. One of the slaves who took refuge had fled from the household of the King's brother Abdullah. In view of the precedent recorded in paragraph 136 of the last report, the usual procedure was followed. On the present occasion Sheikh Yusuf Yasin made a half-hearted attempt to bounce Sir Andrew Ryan out of repatriating the slave, but it was successfully resisted.

179. The ex-slave mentioned in paragraph 73 of the report for February gave birth to a little shérif on the 19th May, 1935. Mother and child are doing well. It is only fair to say that the former owner kept his bargain handsomely, and it is hoped that he will look after the woman as well as the baby.

[E 3887/1309/25]

No. 71.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received June 24.)*

(No. 315.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 11, 1935.*

WITH reference to Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 112 of the 11th April, I have the honour to inform you that Yasin Pasha informed me on the 10th June that Nuri Pasha had telegraphed to him from London requesting authority to continue negotiations with Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and Fuad Bey Hamza for the conclusion of a new Saudi-Iraqi treaty of friendship.

2. Yasin Pasha said that there was such a wide difference between the draft which had been prepared by Ali Jaudat's Government and the counter-draft which had recently been received from Jedda that the Iraqi Government were not yet in a position to agree to this proposal and he had instructed Nuri Pasha accordingly.

3. He further informed me that the appropriate departments were now carefully studying the latest Saudi draft and were preparing an analysis of the clauses which contained provisions not covered by the old treaties. He wished to discuss these with me when he had had an opportunity to examine them himself.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda.

I have &c.,

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 3944/77/91]

No. 72.

*Record of First Meeting with Fuad Bey Hamza held at the Foreign Office on June 24, 1935.*

THE following were present at the meeting:—

Mr. Rendel.	Fuad Bey Hamza (Deputy Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs).
Sir Andrew Ryan (His Majesty's Minister at Jedda).	Sheikh Hafiz Wahba (Saudi Arabian Minister in London).
Mr. Ward.	
Mr. Malcolm.	

Mr. RENDEL recalled the discussions which had taken place with Fuad Bey in London in September 1934 and had been continued in Jedda during the winter. The most important question dealt with during those discussions had been that of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia. The position was that the Saudi Government had communicated a statement of their claims to Sir A. Ryan on the 3rd April, and that Sir A. Ryan, on the instructions of His Majesty's Government, had offered the Saudi Government a strip of territory to the east of the Anglo-Turkish boundary (generally known as the "blue line"), which, as Fuad Bey was aware—although it had been agreed not to stress this aspect of the question for the present—His Majesty's Government regarded as the present legal boundary. The concession which His Majesty's Government had now offered was shown on the map of which Mr. Rendel gave Fuad Bey a copy, by a green line, and Fuad Bey would observe that it included the whole of the western shore of the Dohat-as-Salwa, the important strategic post of Qasr-as-Salwa, and the Akhwan settlements of Sakak and Mabak (Anbak) at the base of the Qatar Peninsula, whence it ran due south to the Abu Dhabi well of Banaayan. The Saudi Government had not yet replied to this offer, and Fuad Bey had left Arabia before it could be discussed. It had therefore been agreed that the conversations should be continued in London, and Mr. Rendel suggested that Fuad Bey should begin by giving his views on Sir A. Ryan's offer.

FUAD BEY HAMZA replied that he had the impression that the frontier line offered by Sir Andrew Ryan was not based upon any relevant material facts. The proposals contained in the Saudi memorandum of the 3rd April were, on the other hand, based upon the most important factor in the desert, namely, the recognised grazing grounds ("diras") of the various nomadic tribes. He was convinced that it would be impossible to draw the frontier on anything but a tribal basis of this kind, and he saw no alternative to the system proposed by the Saudi Government.

Mr. RENDEL observed that it would be difficult to base a line on purely tribal considerations. The greater part of the area concerned consisted of an immense expanse of featureless desert more comparable to a sea than to any ordinary land area. According to the information of His Majesty's Government the various tribes wandered very widely over this area, and it would be impossible to base territorial claims on the extent of these wanderings. Moreover, the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government was that many of these tribes were of uncertain and shifting allegiance. There were, of course, certain areas which were predominantly or exclusively frequented by certain tribes, owing a definite and exclusive allegiance to a particular ruler. His Majesty's Government had taken such circumstances into full account in making their proposals. But an arrangement based on tribal considerations alone would certainly prove impracticable.

SIR A. RYAN supported Mr. Rendel's view that a simple allocation of tribal areas could not replace a territorial frontier. Every attempt to leave territorial frontiers fluid, on the basis of the allocation of tribes only, had hitherto failed, e.g., on the Saudi-Iraq frontier, and it had always proved necessary to have a definite frontier establishing formal limits to territorial, as distinct from personal, sovereignty.

[12357]

K 3.



MR. RENDEL continued by explaining that His Majesty's Government fully realised, of course, that there was no question of attempting to establish a sharply defined frontier in the ordinary European sense, with frontier posts and a close frontier control. It was, however, necessary, as Sir A. Ryan had explained, to set some definite limit beyond which territorial sovereignty could not be exercised, even if such territorial sovereignty were not, in fact, exercised up to that limit. This would not prevent the tribes wandering freely from one territory to another, and no doubt suitable arrangements could eventually be made regarding their taxation, &c., as had been done in the case of the tribes which migrated between Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Syria, and Iraq. Arrangements could be made defining the allegiance of various tribes or sections of tribes. But whatever was done about this, it seemed clear that a definition of the ultimate limits of territorial sovereignty must now be established.

SIR ANDREW RYAN pointed out that although the line which His Majesty's Government had now offered the Saudi Government did not run very far to the east of the Anglo-Turkish line, it did definitely take into account existing facts, even though these facts might be at variance with what His Majesty's Government regarded as the technical legal position, since it conceded to King Abdul Aziz sovereignty over Qasr-as-Salwa and the Akhwan settlements which King Abdul Aziz had established to the east of the Anglo-Turkish frontier. His Majesty's Government were prepared to concede this, and other areas permanently inhabited by Murra tribesmen of Saudi allegiance, but they could not possibly concede the whole expanse of desert over which this tribe was accustomed to range at various times of the year.

FUAD BEY suggested that in drawing the northern end of the proposed frontier in the neighbourhood of the Qatar Peninsula, the political allegiance of actual settlements and recognised districts should be adopted as a guiding principle. He considered that King Abdul Aziz had an unassailable claim to an area considerably to the east and north-east of the line proposed by His Majesty's Government in this sector. As regards the desert area to the south, the only method of drawing the frontier, in his view, would be to take account of wells and grazing areas known to be under the predominant control or ownership of certain tribes. He maintained that the majority of such wells and areas in South-Eastern Arabia were definitely recognised as being the property of one particular tribe, although they might also be used by others, and that it would be possible to ascertain their ownership and to make use of this knowledge in defining the tribal areas.

MR. RENDEL said that His Majesty's Government had been influenced by the same considerations, and that it was for this reason that they maintained that the well of Banaiyan must belong to Abu Dhabi. They were satisfied on the information before them that the claim of the sheikh to this well, which was indeed a key-point in his territory, was a sound one; and from what had passed during the very full discussions of this questions which had taken place during the winter, he saw no hope of His Majesty's Government modifying their attitude on this point, although they were willing to discuss further concessions to the south of it, where such concessions might be easier to arrange.

FUAD BEY made it clear that the Saudi Government could not accept the views of His Majesty's Government about Banaiyan, which, he claimed, belonged exclusively to the Murra tribe. He invoked the evidence of Mr. Bertram Thomas on this point, but MR. RENDEL pointed out that Mr. Bertram Thomas's evidence showed that the allegiance of the tribes in this area was most uncertain, and further quoted the fact that Mr. Philby had apparently been obliged to turn westwards in this neighbourhood in the following year, since he had found himself reaching the limits of the area over which King Abdul Aziz exercised effective sovereignty. On this last point Fuad Bey replied that Mr. Philby had in fact only been turned back towards the west by his failure to find any water. FUAD BEY repeated his contention that Banaiyan could not be regarded as belonging to Abu Dhabi; but this point was not pursued at this meeting, although it was alluded to from time to time, and it was not until the next meeting on the following day that Fuad Bey developed it further.

FUAD BEY then reverted to the question of the northern terminal of the line now proposed by His Majesty's Government, and tried to show that King Abdul Aziz could claim not only Qasr-as-Salwa, but the hills to the north-east of it up to a point some 10 or 15 miles up the eastern shore of the Dohat-as-Salwa. He claimed that the frontier should run thence in an easterly direction, and then turn slightly southwards and run to the sea to the north of Khor-al-Odeid.

A long discussion followed on the question of this line. As regards the north-western end of it MR. RENDEL pointed out that the Qatar Peninsula was a clearly defined geographical feature. It was almost an island, and it was only reasonable that the frontier between it and its neighbours on the mainland should follow the natural geographical division between the mainland and the peninsula itself. It was because of this natural geographical division that His Majesty's Government had been prepared to concede to King Abdul Aziz the whole of the western shore of the Dohat-as-Salwa, but this same argument applied in turn with equal force against carrying the frontier up the eastern shore of the bay. If this were done the same anomaly would be created as that which at present existed on its western shore. His Majesty's Government had in fact offered King Abdul Aziz a most generous concession in this area, including the important strategic point of Qasr-as-Salwa. Moreover, the Jebel Naksh and the hills in its neighbourhood were part of the same geographical formation as the Jebel Dukhan, which was indisputably the property of Qatar. The case, therefore, for following the natural geographical frontier at this point appeared overwhelming.

The discussion on this portion of the line was resumed at intervals at various stages of the conversation, and eventually FUAD BEY asked whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to offer a line, which he indicated on the map, running eastwards and south-eastwards from the eastern shore of the Dohat-as-Salwa, and following for some distance the circumference of a circle with a radius of some 10 or 15 miles from Qasr-as-Salwa.

MR. RENDEL explained that he had no authority to offer any concession on this point. He had had the greatest difficulty in securing general agreement for so large a concession as that which had, in fact, been offered. As Fuad Bey no doubt knew, His Majesty's Government were, in fact, committed to the protection of Qatar against any major aggression. If His Majesty's Government were to make any further concession to the north-east of Qasr-as-Salwa, they would so weaken the position of Qatar strategically that they might not be able effectively to carry out this obligation. Just as Qasr-as-Salwa might be regarded as an important strategic outpost for Saudi Arabia, so the area to the north-east of it was an essential strategic area from the point of view of the safety of Qatar. Indeed, it was much more important for Qatar to retain this area than for Saudi Arabia to hold Qasr-as-Salwa, since Qatar was a very small State with no hinterland, whereas Saudi Arabia covered a vast area, and was therefore in a far stronger position from the point of view of defence.

FUAD BEY at a later stage of the meeting stated, in reply to a question by Mr. Ward, that he thought that King Abdul Aziz might be prepared to abandon his claim to the Jebel Naksh, which he described as an outlying spur of the Jebel Dukhan range.

Fuad Bey then raised the question of the Saudi claim to Khor-al-Odeid, which he described as being the most vital point at issue, and to which he maintained that King Abdul Aziz possessed an established and irrefutable right. He explained that the Khor-al-Odeid had in the past been well known as a landing place for merchandise for the Hasa coast, and that King Abdul Aziz could not abandon an outlet to the sea which possessed such important possibilities of commercial development.

SIR A. RYAN pointed out that Fuad Bey had told him at Jedda, when describing the Saudi claims, that King Abdul Aziz wanted to secure Khor-al-Odeid in order to stop smuggling through it into Saudi territory, and that this seemed rather inconsistent with the contention that it was needed for commercial development.

FUAD BEY replied that King Abdul Aziz did, indeed, wish to stop smuggling, but also had an eye to the possibilities of the future. He knew that the King felt strongly that he must have an outlet to the sea in this direction.



Mr. WARD and Mr. MALCOLM explained that, according to the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, the Khor-al-Odeid was, in fact, extremely shallow and practically useless as a harbour. Fuad Bey did not, however, pursue this point.

Mr. RENDEL explained to Fuad Bey that he saw no prospect of His Majesty's Government being able to modify their attitude on this part of the line. In the first place, they were committed to the recognition of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi's claim to the whole of the Khor-al-Odeid, having told the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, to whom they were bound by treaty, that they regarded his territory as extending round the Khor and up to the north-eastern point of the mouth of the Khor. They could not give away the Sheikh's territory. His Majesty's Government could not violate or disregard their obligations to these Trucial rulers, even when these obligations involved them in difficulties with other Powers. The same situation had arisen in regard to certain islands belonging to the Jowasimi Arab rulers which were claimed by Persia, where His Majesty's Government had been obliged firmly to resist the Persian claims. For the same reason His Majesty's Government could not admit any Saudi claim to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi's territory round the Khor-al-Odeid.

But apart from this, as Fuad Bey was aware, His Majesty's Government had long had a very strong interest in the whole stretch of the Arab coast of the Persian Gulf from Qatar to Muscat. The Sheikhdoms of Qatar, Abu Dhabi, &c., formed a chain of States with which His Majesty's Government had had special relations for a very long period, ever since the days when they had been obliged to assume a certain measure of control in this area in order to stop piracy, gun-running and the slave trade. The maintenance of this measure of British control was an important principle of British policy in the Persian Gulf. It had made it necessary for His Majesty's Government firmly to resist any attempts by any other Power to establish itself on the Trucial Coast, and it would be at complete variance with this policy for His Majesty's Government to acquiesce in any powerful State, such as Saudi Arabia, acquiring a new outlet to the sea on this coast. Moreover, it was a principle of the policy of His Majesty's Government on the Trucial Coast that the chain of these Arab sheikhdoms should be unbroken. His Majesty's Government had recognised the Sheikhdoms of Qatar and Abu Dhabi as being coterminous. They could not now agree to their being separated by a wedge of Saudi territory.

SIR ANDREW RYAN supported Mr. Rendel's argument and pointed out that if King Abdul Aziz were to obtain an outlet to the sea at the Khor-al-Odeid, Qatar would become entirely dependent on Saudi Arabia, which would become its only neighbour. The effect of this would be to reduce the sheikhdom in fact, if not in theory, to the position of a dependency of King Abdul Aziz.

This elicited from FUAD BEY a remark to the effect that he had seen in a British handbook on Arabia, issued at the time of the Paris Peace Conference, a statement to the effect that Qatar belonged to King Abdul Aziz. It was pointed out in reply that the Foreign Office were familiar with this statement, which was no more accurate or authoritative than many other slips which had crept into such hurriedly prepared works of reference, and only been discovered subsequently.

Fuad Bey eventually admitted that he realised the objections from the point of view of His Majesty's Government to recognising the Saudi claim to the Khor-al-Odeid. He did not, however, specifically abandon the Saudi claim, and took the line that the discussion had shown the existence of a complete deadlock in regard to the northern end of the line.

Mr. RENDEL repeated that he saw no hope of His Majesty's Government modifying their attitude about the line between the sea and Banaiyan, though he thought that the sector of the line to the south of Banaiyan might be open to further discussion. He made an earnest appeal to Fuad Bey, however, to reconsider his attitude towards the proposals which His Majesty's Government had made. The present position was that, whatever the Saudi Government might think about the validity or otherwise of the existing frontier, King Abdul Aziz did not in fact possess any internationally recognised rights to the east of it. The United States oil companies had been informed of this, and had not questioned the position. If the present proposals of His Majesty's Government

were accepted, King Abdul Aziz would obtain a valid, undisputed and permanent frontier, which would be a great advantage not only to him, but also—what was perhaps of even more importance—to his successors. Would it not then be wise to accept the present offer of a sound and permanent frontier, rather than perpetuate a situation which must inevitably be unstable and might lead to serious difficulty eventually? The frontier which His Majesty's Government had proposed was geographically sound and corresponded to the facts of the situation as they had been ascertained as the result of long and careful enquiry. He begged Fuad Bey to consider the question afresh on this basis.

FUAD BEY gave no indication that King Abdul Aziz would be prepared to modify his attitude. If Mr. Rendel's instructions were rigid, so were his own. It was eventually agreed, however, that Fuad Bey and the Saudi Minister should study the maps and material communicated to them and seek instructions from their Government. On the receipt of these instructions, the question would be considered how far the discussions could be further usefully pursued.

*Foreign Office, June 25, 1935.*

[E 3946/77/91]

No. 73.

*Record of the First Part of the Second Conversation with Fuad Bey Hamza held on June 25, 1935, at 11.50 A.M.*

THE following were present:—

Mr. Rendel.  
Sir A. Ryan.  
Mr. Ward.  
Mr. Malcolm.

Fuad Bey Hamza.  
Sheikh Hafiz Wahba.

Mr. RENDEL opened the conversation by informing Fuad Bey that in order to make it clear that His Majesty's Government were not adopting a purely negative attitude, he wished at once to state that they were ready to offer King Abdul Aziz a further concession of territory to the south and east of Banaiyan in addition to the "green line" offer which had been made by Sir Andrew Ryan in April last and had formed the subject of discussion at the meeting on the 24th June. This further concession was the area bounded on the north, east, and south by what was shown on the map, which he then handed to Fuad Bey, as a brown line, and might therefore be known in future as the "brown line concession"—a line, that is, running from a point on the "green line" to the south of, and distant at least 5 miles from, Banaiyan, to the intersection of meridian 52° E. and parallel 20° 30' N.; thence due south along meridian 52° E. to its intersection with parallel 19° N. and thence in a straight line to the intersection of parallel 18° N. with the "violet line" of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914. Fuad Bey was given a map on which the two concessions were marked.

FUAD BEY HAMZA, in reply, said that as a result of the first day's conversations he had re-examined the information in his possession regarding the proper attribution of Banaiyan, which His Majesty's Government had claimed on behalf of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. He was now satisfied in his own mind not merely that the well of Banaiyan belonged to the Murra tribe, but that sheikhs of this tribe, who were definitely in the service of King Abdul Aziz, controlled a string of wells (which Fuad Bey named) running eastward from Banaiyan as far as Safq (Sufuk).

Mr. RENDEL suggested that it would be of assistance to His Majesty's Government in considering these claims if Fuad Bey could provide a memorandum stating the Saudi view of the position in detail and giving the fullest possible evidence in support of it.

FUAD BEY agreed to do so.



It was then agreed to proceed to the discussion of various secondary questions, the first of which was the possible acquisition by His Majesty's Government of certain minor air facilities on the Hasa coast of Saudi Arabia. This part of the conversation is recorded separately.

*Eastern Department, Foreign Office,  
June 25, 1935.*

[E 3947/1217/25]

No. 74.

*Record of the Second Part of the Second Meeting with Fuad Bey Hamza, held  
at the Foreign Office on June 25, 1935.*

[NOTE.—The first part of this meeting, which is recorded separately, was taken up by resumed discussion of the question of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia.]

THE second part of the meeting was devoted to explanation and discussion of certain facilities desired by the Air Ministry on the Hasa coast of Saudi Arabia. The following were present:—

Mr. Rendel.  
Sir A. Ryan.  
Mr. Ward.

Fuad Bey Hamza (Saudi Deputy  
Minister for Foreign Affairs).  
Sheikh Hafiz Wahba (Saudi Minister  
in London).

Mr. RENDEL recalled that the question of facilities for British aircraft on passage between Koweit and Bahrein on the Hasa coast had formed the subject of negotiations with the Saudi Government on previous occasions. It had not been possible, however, to reach agreement in the matter, and he thought this was primarily due to the nervousness of the Saudi Government lest the extensive facilities desired at that time might amount to foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. Moreover, it had not been possible to reach agreement on the financial aspect. However, recent improvements in the range and reliability of aircraft had now greatly reduced the risk of forced landings on Saudi territory. This had enabled the Air Ministry to reduce very considerably their original list of desiderata, which in their present form could not possibly be held to constitute interference in Saudi affairs and would involve the Saudi Government in no expenditure.

Mr. Rendel then explained to Fuad Bey in detail the present requirements of the Air Ministry, as set out in the Air Ministry letter of the 20th February to the Foreign Office, as revised at the inter-departmental meeting held at the Foreign Office on the 24th June.

FUAD BEY replied that King Abdul Aziz had already shown his desire to help progress in aviation in the Persian Gulf. At the same time Saudi Arabia was not yet in a position to profit by reciprocity in such matters, and so King Abdul Aziz could not be expected to incur any expense in providing air facilities for other countries. But he could say that the Saudi Government would not have any objection in principle to granting the facilities mentioned by Mr. Rendel, subject to the following conditions:—

- (a) The sovereign rights of King Abdul Aziz and his successors would have to be respected and the facilities should be given in such a way as to avoid any appearance of foreign interference in the affairs of Saudi Arabia.
- (b) A guarantee should be given that facilities would not be used in the future so as to infringe Saudi sovereign rights.
- (c) The Saudi Government should not be put to expense of any sort through the grant of the facilities.
- (d) The question of the facilities required for the Royal Air Force should be kept distinct from that of those required for the aircraft of British civil air services, and the two sets of facilities should be dealt with separately.

Fuad Bey added that, while facilities for the Royal Air Force could be granted by means of a diplomatic exchange of notes, the Saudi Government would prefer to negotiate direct with Imperial Airways (Limited) in regard to facilities for their aircraft.

Mr. RENDEL expressed gratification at Fuad Bey's statement that the Saudi Government would be ready, *in principle*, to grant the desired facilities, and thought that there would certainly be no difficulty in recognising the first three out of the four reservations that Fuad Bey had just mentioned. He considered, however, that it would be unnecessary to make any distinction between facilities for the Royal Air Force and for British commercial aircraft on regular services (which amounted in practice to Imperial Airways (Limited)). As Fuad Bey was aware, Imperial Airways were closely connected with His Majesty's Government by reason of the subsidy which they received; moreover, the Air Ministry had charge equally of military and civil aviation, and, in matters connected with the organisation of the air route in the Persian Gulf, no distinction was made between the two branches. In any case, it would be necessary for negotiations about facilities for civil aircraft as well as those for the Royal Air Force to be conducted through the Foreign Office.

After further discussion it was agreed that Mr. Rendel should write a letter to Fuad Bey setting out the exact nature of the Air Ministry desiderata and recording his understanding of the attitude of the Saudi Government in the matter as explained by Fuad Bey earlier in the meeting. Fuad Bey would reply to this letter, and the question would be reconsidered by both parties in the light of the discussion which had taken place with a view to a further meeting on the subject in due course.

A copy of the letter which Mr. Rendel subsequently wrote to Fuad Bey, in accordance with the arrangements agreed upon at the meeting, and after the text had been concurred in by the Air Ministry, is attached.

*June 25, 1935.*

My dear Fuad Bey,

*Foreign Office, June 27, 1935.*

As arranged at our meeting on the morning of the 25th June, I write to confirm my oral statement of the revised desiderata of our Air Ministry as regards facilities for the aircraft of the Royal Air Force and of regular British air services flying along the air route on the south-western shore of the Persian Gulf between Koweit and Bahrein. These desiderata are as follows:—

(1) The aircraft of the Royal Air Force and of Imperial Airways proceeding between Koweit and Bahrein are at present obliged to fly outside Saudi territorial waters on the Hasa Coast. Although the range and reliability of aircraft have greatly increased in recent years, flying for long periods over the open sea with no possibility of making a landing in case of engine failure or other accident imposes a severe strain upon pilots and greatly increases the danger of a mishap proving disastrous. Accordingly, in order that this risk may be reduced as far as possible, and the margin of safety increased, the Air Ministry are anxious that permission may be given for the Royal Air Force and for British civil aircraft of regular commercial services to fly down the Hasa coast within Saudi territorial waters, and within gliding distance of the land, so as to be able to reach the land in the event of a forced landing proving unavoidable. The proximity to the land at which aircraft would be obliged to fly in order to reach safety in case of necessity would, of course, depend upon the height at which they were operating; but every effort would be made to avoid actually flying over the land itself. With the constant improvements taking place in aircraft construction, it is anticipated that forced landings will become increasingly rare.

(2) Although recent improvements in the range and reliability of aircraft have greatly reduced the risk of forced landings, they cannot yet be excluded as impossible, and since it is essential, in view of the barren and sparsely populated nature of much of the coast, for relief to be brought to the crews without delay, the Air Ministry would be grateful for a general permission to send the necessary minimum of assistance to any machine which has been compelled to land. Such permission would, of course, be subject to immediate notification of the action taken being given to the Saudi Government. Assistance would normally be despatched by means of other aircraft, but in the case of machines forced down



near the Koweiti frontier, or on the coast of the mainland or one of the islands in the Persian Gulf, it might be preferable to despatch motor vehicles or a vessel. The Air Ministry accordingly hope that it may be possible for discretion to be left to the authorities on the spot to use the most suitable means of transport at their disposal for the rescue of stranded machines.

(3) In order to add to the safety of air travel along the Hasa coast, the Air Ministry are anxious that a minimum number of landing grounds may be available for use in emergency by the Royal Air Force and the aircraft of British regular civil air services. They would accordingly be most grateful if the landing grounds that are understood already to exist at Jinnah, Qatif (Darin) and Ras-as-Safaniyah might be made available for this purpose. There would, of course, be no question of such an arrangement involving any expense on the Saudi Government or any obligation to maintain guards, &c., or of its implying any derogation to the full sovereignty of King Abdul Aziz over the landing grounds; and I should emphasise that we are only asking for permission to use them in emergencies in accordance with normal international custom, which, on the analogy of ships in distress at sea, allows special facilities to aircraft forced down by bad weather or engine failure. Nor would there be any question of permanent facilities (such as petrol stores) being required at the landing grounds.

As I explained to you on the 25th June, the only attention which the landing grounds would require would be the marking out in white of the corners and centre of the landing space and possibly some preliminary levelling. Subsequently, inspection and fresh markings might be necessary once or twice a year. The Saudi Government may prefer to execute this small amount of necessary work themselves, but I am authorised to inform your Excellency that the Royal Air Force will be glad to carry it out at their own expense, but on behalf of the Saudi Government, and also to undertake the necessary work of maintenance by sending an aircraft periodically to the landing grounds with the necessary personnel and stores, if the Saudi Government consider this course preferable.

(4) The Air Ministry would be very grateful if they might be accorded permission to establish on Jinnah Island an airway automatic light beacon for the guidance of aircraft flying down the Hasa coast by night. This beacon would be of use to all other aeroplanes operating in the Persian Gulf and also to shipping; but as the party principally interested in flying in this region, the Air Ministry would be prepared to install and maintain the beacon at their own expense. The beacon would be of solid construction and would not require guarding; it would be constructed to consume either gas or electricity, and would require attention and refuelling at intervals of two to three months. The necessary maintenance could, as was suggested in the case of the landing grounds, be performed by periodical visits of a Royal Air Force machine.

2. The Air Ministry have also expressed the hope that the Saudi Government might at some future date be willing to co-operate with the proposed central weather forecasting station in the Persian Gulf by furnishing daily weather reports through their wireless stations at Riyadh or on the Hasa coast. Such reports would be of the greatest assistance to aircraft of all nations, and would materially lessen the risk of aircraft being forced down on the Hasa coast by bad weather; but their provision is not a matter of urgency, since the central forecasting station (which will probably be established at Basra) is unlikely to be in operation for some time.

3. I understood you to say that you did not think that the Saudi Government would have any objection in principle to granting the above facilities, subject to the following reservations:—

- (a) The sovereign rights of King Abdul Aziz and his successors would have to be respected, and the facilities should be given in such a way as to avoid any appearance of foreign interference in the affairs of Saudi Arabia.
- (b) A guarantee should be given that the facilities would not be used in the future to infringe Saudi sovereign rights.
- (c) The Saudi Government should not be put to expense of any sort through the grant of the facilities.
- (d) The question of the facilities required for the Royal Air Force should be kept distinct from that of those required for the aircraft of British civil air services, and the two sets of facilities should be dealt with separately.

You will remember, however, that I pointed out the close interdependence of the two services in this part of the world, and explained that in either case the matter would have to be dealt with through the Foreign Office.

4. I shall be grateful if your Excellency will inform me whether I have correctly represented the views you expressed, and, if so, to have your further views regarding the particular desiderata indicated in the earlier paragraphs of this letter. I am in communication with the Air Ministry regarding various technical details, and would suggest that we might usefully have a further discussion of the matter before you leave London.

Yours very sincerely,  
G. W. RENDEL.

[E 3946/77/91]

No. 75.

*Mr. Rendel to Fuad Bey Hamza.*

My dear Fuad Bey,

*Foreign Office, June 27, 1935.*

YOU will remember that on the morning of the 25th June, during our conversation on the subject of the south-eastern frontiers, you promised to let me have a memorandum setting out in detail the precise reasons for which your Government regarded the wells from Banaiyan to Sufuk in the hinterland of Abu Dhabi as belonging to a section of the Murra tribe, which owed exclusive allegiance to King Abdul Aziz.

As I explained in the course of our conversation, His Majesty's Government, on the information at present in their possession, regard the well of Banaiyan as belonging to the Sheikdom of Abu Dhabi.

I will, however, gladly submit to my Secretary of State any arguments on this point which you may care to bring forward, though you will understand that I cannot give you any indication whether these arguments will lead His Majesty's Government to modify the attitude which they have adopted, as I explained it to you in the course of our discussions.

I will await the receipt of your memorandum before pursuing this question further.

Yours very sincerely,  
G. W. RENDEL.



## CHAPTER II—IRAQ.

[E 140/140/93]

No. 76.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 7, 1935.)*

(No. 726.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, December 24, 1934.*

WITH reference to correspondence ending with my telegram No. 223 of the 2nd October last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the notes which I exchanged with the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 20th December, providing that the revised regulations, drawn up in agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Iraqi Government, will form the schedule to future contracts between the Iraqi Government and officers of the British Advisory Military Mission.

2. Your department are already aware from semi-official correspondence that, although the officials concerned in the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs had previously intimated their concurrence in the text of the revised regulations enclosed in Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's despatch No. 517 of the 4th September, they nevertheless raised a number of unimportant points regarding the wording of this text, when it was suggested to them that an exchange of notes should be effected in order to bring it into force. Further discussions were accordingly necessary between members of my staff and the Iraqi officials concerned, and the final text of the regulations, which was enclosed in my note to Nuri of the 20th December, differs in certain passages from that which was approved in your telegram No. 174 of the 27th September. Your department has already been informed of nearly all these amendments, none of which introduces any material alteration or is of any real importance. A copy of the regulations is enclosed.

3. You will observe that, in his reply to my note, Nuri Pasha has enclosed an Arabic text of the revised regulations, and that his note itself accordingly contains an additional paragraph which was not included in the draft enclosed in Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's despatch No. 517 of the 4th September. This addition was made at the last minute request of the Iraqi Government, who explained that, as the text approved by the Council was in Arabic, they felt that some mention of the Arabic text should occur in the exchange of notes. This Arabic text had already been carefully examined by my Oriental Secretariat, who were satisfied that, though not an exact literal translation, it differed in no essential point of sense from the English text. I therefore thought it better to agree to the proposed alteration to Nuri Pasha's note rather than risk further long delays. In the unlikely event of any dispute regarding the two texts arising in the future, I consider that the terms of paragraph 2 of Nuri Pasha's note, in which he states that the revised regulations enclosed in my note—i.e., the English text—are equally acceptable to the Iraqi Government and will form the schedule to future contracts with officers of the British Advisory Military Mission, would justify His Majesty's Government in claiming that the English is the valid text.

4. I have informed the Inspector-General of the Iraqi Army that the exchange of notes has been effected and that the way is therefore now open for the members of the mission to sign their contracts with the Iraqi Government. When this has been done I will represent to the Iraqi Government the desirability of the contracts of officers appointed in the future to posts in the mission being signed before their departure from the United Kingdom.

I have, &amp;c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 76.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Nuri Pasha.*

Your Excellency,

*Bagdad, December 20, 1934.*

IN their note of the 20th June, 1933, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs indicated certain changes regarding salaries and allowances which the Iraqi Government wished to introduce into future contracts with officers of the British Advisory Military Mission in Iraq. Moreover, certain articles in the regulations which form the schedule to the existing contracts contain references to the High Commissioner for Iraq and to a currency no longer in use in Iraq, and these articles accordingly require amendment to meet changed circumstances.

2. As a result of discussions on this question which have taken place between representatives of our Governments, and of correspondence which has been exchanged between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and His Majesty's Embassy, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the revised regulations, of which a copy is enclosed herewith, are acceptable to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. I shall be glad to learn from your Excellency that these revised regulations are equally acceptable to the Iraqi Government, and that they will form the schedule to future contracts with officers of the British Advisory Military Mission.

I avail, &amp;c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 76.

*Nuri Pasha to Sir F. Humphrys.*

Your Excellency,

*Bagdad, December 20, 1934.*

IN your Excellency's note of to-day's date you were good enough to inform me that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom accept the revised version of the regulations attached to the contracts of officers of the British Advisory Military Mission in Iraq, which has been drawn up as a result of discussions between representatives of our Governments, and of correspondence between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and His Majesty's Embassy.

2. I have the honour to inform your Excellency, in reply, that the revised regulations enclosed in your Excellency's note are equally acceptable to the Iraqi Government, and that they will form the schedule to future contracts with officers of the British Advisory Military Mission.

3. I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency the corresponding Arabic text of these revised regulations.

I avail, &amp;c.

NOURY SAID.

Enclosure 3 in No. 76.

*Conditions of Service relating to the Officers of the British Advisory Military Mission employed under the Ministry of Defence of the Iraqi Government.*

*Period of Service.*

1.—(i) THE officer will be required on appointment to enter into an agreement to serve the Iraqi Government for a period of three years, extendible, if both parties agree, and, in the case of an officer of the Imperial forces or Indian army, subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or the Government of India, as the case may be, to five, seven, and ten years by successive renewals.

(ii) Such period of service will commence on the date on which an officer embarks to take up his appointment, or, in the case of an officer already serving in Iraq, on the date to be fixed in his contract. Any local, sick or ordinary leave granted in accordance with these conditions of service shall be enjoyed during the period of service. All such leave must expire on the termination of the contract.



*Salary.*

2.—(i) The salary of an officer will be that provided for his office in the Table of Grades annexed to these conditions of service (Schedule A).

(ii) *Half Salary during Voyage on Appointment.*—An officer proceeding to Iraq to take up an appointment under the Government of Iraq will be entitled to the full pay of his Iraq appointment from the date of arrival in Iraq, and for the period from the date of embarkation to the date of his arrival in Iraq (a) if an officer of the Imperial forces, to half pay of his Iraq appointment or to his British regimental pay (without allowances) of his substantive rank, whichever is the greater; (b) if an officer of the Indian army, to half the pay of his Iraq appointment or to the pay of his substantive rank without staff pay if proceeding from India to Iraq, or if not so proceeding the British regimental pay of his substantive rank, whichever is the greater; (c) in all other cases to half the pay of his Iraq appointment.

*Currency of Payment in Iraq.*

3. All salaries and allowances paid in Iraq will be paid in Iraqi dinars.

*Passage of Officers.*

4 (A)—(i) An officer will, on first appointment, be allowed a free first-class passage out to Iraq subject to his executing an agreement under which he will be bound to refund the cost thereof in the event of his relinquishing the appointment within three years from the date of his arrival in Iraq in order to take up other employment in Iraq, or within one year from the date of such arrival for any other reason except bodily or mental infirmity.

(ii) He will also, on the termination of his service, be allowed a free first-class passage to England; provided that, if the Government terminates his service under clause 18 of these conditions of service for misconduct or insubordination, or if the officer terminates it for any other reason than bodily or mental infirmity, the allowance of this passage shall be at the discretion of the Government.

(iii) During the currency of his contract an officer will be further allowed a free return first-class passage from Iraq to England and back, once on a three or five years' contract, and once again if the contract is extended beyond five years.

If an officer who has already taken the free return passage or passages to England, granted under this sub-clause (iii), or who is not entitled to any such free return passage, is sent to England on the ground of ill-health, a similar free return passage to England and back or equivalent value shall be granted to him.

(iv) The Government may provide the passage allowed under these conditions of service by any recognised route by which first-class passengers ordinarily travel between England and Iraq.

If the officer elects to proceed by a different route line or class, or to a destination other than the United Kingdom, he shall receive the actual cost of the passage he takes or the value of the passage allowed under these conditions of service, whichever is the less.

*Wives of Officers.*

(B)—(i) The wife of an officer already married at the commencement of his contract shall be allowed two free first-class single passages either way between England and Iraq if the officer's contract is for three or five years' service, and one further single passage if the officer's contract is extended beyond five years.

(ii) When the officer marries during the period of his contract, the wife shall be allowed two free first-class single passages either way between England and Iraq if and when the officer's contract is extended.

(iii) Passages allowed to wives shall be provided under the same conditions as those allowed to officers under 4 (A) of these conditions of service.

*Quarters.*

5. In the case of an officer occupying a house which is the property of the Government, rent will be charged on the following conditions:—

An officer who is occupying a house by himself shall pay rent at the rate of 8 per cent. of his salary, and an officer who is sharing a house with another officer

shall pay rent at the rate of 4 per cent. of his salary, provided that the payment made by the officer or officers occupying the house shall in no case exceed a fair rent for the house calculated on the basis of the actual rents of privately owned houses in the locality.

An officer occupying a house which is not the property of the Government will receive a fixed house allowance, as under, according to grade—

	ID. per month.
Grade A	10
Grade B	8
Grade C	6
Grade D	5
Grade E	4

*Equipment of Quarters.*

6. The Government shall, if possible, equip all Government houses occupied by officers with such electric light, fans and water as may be recommended by the Directorate of Health Services.

*Local Leave.*

7. An officer may, at the discretion of the Government, be allowed local leave not exceeding twenty-one days in each calendar year. Such leave shall not be cumulative and shall not be combined with ordinary leave. When on local leave an officer shall be entitled to full salary.

*Ordinary Leave.*

8.—(i) An officer shall earn one day's ordinary leave for each five days of effective service. No leave other than local leave shall count as effective service. The period spent on voyages (other than on first appointment) shall be reckoned as ordinary leave.

(ii) Ordinary leave shall be cumulative.

(iii) Subject to the exigencies of the service, an officer may be granted ordinary leave when so desired by him, and may claim the right to take such leave as may be due to him:—

In a three years' contract : Once.

In a five years' contract : Once.

In a seven years' contract : Twice.

In a ten years' contract : Twice.

(iv) When on ordinary leave an officer shall be entitled to full salary.

(v) Prior to the termination of his contract by the Iraqi Government, for any reason other than insubordination or misconduct, an officer shall be granted, subject to the exigencies of his service, the full amount of ordinary leave due to him. Should the exigencies of his service prevent the grant of leave due to him within the period of his contract, his contract shall, subject to the concurrence of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, be extended by such period as will admit of the leave due being granted in full prior to reversion to the Imperial forces or Indian army, as the case may be. In the event of His Majesty's Government being unable to agree to the extension of his appointment, either for the whole or part of the balance of leave remaining, he shall be paid a gratuity equal to the pay of his appointment for the period of leave not taken.

9.—(i) An officer will be allowed short periods of absence from duty owing to sickness, not exceeding ten consecutive days in Iraq on full salary. Any such absence extending beyond that period will be counted as sick leave.

(ii) The aggregate amount of sick leave which an officer may be allowed on a three years' contract shall be eight months.

(iii) If this aggregate amount is exceeded, the Government shall have the right of terminating the contract without further notice.

(iv) On each occasion of taking sick leave an officer shall receive full salary for a period up to four months and, thereafter, such leave as is due to him up to a further four months. If no leave or insufficient leave is due to him to cover the second four months, he may complete the period by additional sick leave on half pay.



At the end of this period of eight months the Government shall have the right to terminate his contract without further notice or compensation.

(v) If his original contract or his contract as extended under clause (1) hereof exceeds three years, he shall come under the regulations as to sick leave laid down for civilian officials, subject to the proviso laid down in sub-clause (vi) below.

(vi) Nothing in this clause shall in any way modify the obligations of the Iraqi Government to pay an officer of the Imperial Forces or Indian army on return from his employment until he is fit for duty in the Imperial or Indian establishment, as the case may be, subject to the maximum period of sick leave with full pay of his substantive rank and allowances as ordinarily issuable as provided in the regulations of the service concerned.

#### *Medical Attendance.*

10. In Iraq an officer will be entitled to free medical treatment by Government medical officers or Government health institutions, but this privilege shall not extend to his family.

#### *Termination of Contract by Government.*

11. In cases other than those provided for in clauses 9, 15 and 18, the Government shall have the right to terminate an officer's contract on giving him three months' notice in writing. Such notice shall only be given with the consent of both the Minister of Defence and the senior officer for the time being in Iraq of the British Advisory Military Mission.

12. Where an officer of the Imperial Forces or Indian army cannot be absorbed within the authorised establishment on termination of his service under the Iraqi Government, that Government shall be liable for his pay and allowances under the regulations of the service concerned for the period during which he is awaiting absorption.

#### *Special Compensation for Death, &c., due to Local Disturbances.*

13. Special compensation, which shall not be less favourable, in the case of an officer of the Imperial Forces or Indian army, than that to which he would be entitled under the regulations of his parent service, will be granted under rules to be laid down hereafter by agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Iraq in the case of death, injury and loss of property, &c., due to war or local disturbances, or in the case of permanent disability certified by a medical board to have arisen out of the circumstances of his employment. In the case of loss of property, no compensation will be paid unless it can be reasonably shown that it was impossible to insure such property, or that insurance could only have been effected at an exorbitant premium. In any case compensation will be paid only in respect of articles considered necessary and indispensable, and the Government will take no responsibility for the loss, theft or destruction of valuables, such as jewellery, works of art, &c.

#### *Gratuity.*

14. A non-regular officer who is not on the active list of the British army or the Indian army and in respect of whom no pension contribution is paid by the Iraqi Government shall be entitled on the expiry or termination of his contract, except under clauses 15 and 18, to a gratuity of one month's pay at the rate he is then drawing for every completed year of service, fractions of a year to be reckoned at the rate of one day's pay for twelve days' service.

In the case of regular officers on the active list of the British army or Indian army who would continue to qualify for pension payable by their parent service on condition that their pension contributions continue to be paid, such pension contributions (except in so far as they are payable by the officer himself under the rules of his parent service) shall continue to be paid by the Iraqi Government. Such officers will not be eligible for payment of service gratuity under this clause.

#### *Language.*

15. An officer will be required to comply with the provisions of such regulations relating to language examinations as may be drawn up by the Ministry of Defence in consultation with the senior officer for the time being in Iraq of the British Advisory Military Mission.

Such regulations may provide for the stoppage of promotion in the Iraq Service in the event of failure on the part of an officer to pass any examination prescribed as compulsory, and may further provide for the termination of the officer's contract without compensation in the event of repeated failures.

#### *Travelling Allowances. Acting Allowances.*

16. Travelling and transport allowances within Iraq and acting allowances shall be admissible in accordance with rules applicable to Iraqi officers.

#### *Discipline.*

17. An officer will, for the purpose of discipline, be under the senior officer for the time being in Iraq of the British Advisory Military Mission.

#### *Termination for Insubordination, &c.*

18. The Government has the right, subject to the concurrence of the senior officer for the time being in Iraq of the British Advisory Military Mission, to terminate without compensation the services of an officer who has been guilty of insubordination or misconduct.

#### *Termination of Contract by Officer.*

19. An officer will be entitled to terminate his contract on giving three months' notice in writing to the Minister of Defence, but in that case he will not be entitled to a free passage home unless he has completed at least eighteen months' service in the country since joining or since his last return from leave. He will be entitled to receive the gratuity due to him under clause 14, but not to any leave or gratuity in lieu of leave under clause 8 (5).

#### *Arbitration.*

20. If any question arises under the contract entered into by an officer, whether as regards its meaning or in any other respect, it shall be referred to the Disciplinary Board, which is empowered to arbitrate in matters arising out of the Treaty Contract for British Civilian Officials.

#### *General.*

21. Officers are not entitled to any rebate of customs duties on articles, including articles of military equipment, imported into Iraq, such duties being payable in full. They are not allowed, under any circumstances, to deal with the Navy, Army and Air Force Institute.

#### Annex 1 to Enclosure 3.

##### SCHEDULE A.

##### *British Officers employed under the Ministry of Defence of the Iraqi Government.*

	Table of Grades.	Salary per month.	
		Dinars.	Fila.
Grade "A"	...	216	000
Grade "B"	...	141	750
Grade "C"	...	121	500
Grade "D"	...	101	250
Grade "E"	...	81	000

These rates are consolidated rates subject to deductions in respect of accommodation as set forth in clause 5.

NOTE.—Officers are liable to payment of Iraqi income tax in respect of pay drawn from Iraqi Government funds.



[E 142/2/93]

No. 77.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 7, 1935.)*

(No. 731.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, December 27, 1934.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 717 of the 18th December last, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Diana, from which it will be seen that further attempts are being made by Assyrians from Urumia to enter Iraq.

2. As regards paragraph 4 of the enclosed despatch, I have drawn Mr. Finch's attention to the fact that the migration schemes under contemplation affect Iraqi Assyrians of ex-Ottoman nationality, and have asked him to bear this point in mind in his future conversations with the local Assyrian authorities.

I have, &amp;c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 77.

*Vice-Consul Finch to Consul Gybbon-Monypenny.*

(No. 37. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Diana Rowanduz, December 19, 1934.*

I HAVE the honour to refer you to paragraphs 84, 85 and 91 of my report and supplementary report for November, and to state that, as might be expected, further Assyrians from the Urumia district have arrived at the frontier. They have not been allowed to enter Iraq, and some are at Rayat and some at Khaneh. According to the kaimakam's information three days ago, nine were at Rayat, and according to Agha Izarya of Diana, seventeen persons are waiting at these places.

2. Ibrahim Effendi, the passport official at Rayat, has been summoned to Arbil, where he will certainly be reprimanded.

3. Agha Izarya visited me yesterday to plead the cause of these people. After disclaiming that the affair was my business, I enquired why, if economic pressure was driving Assyrians from Urumia, they should choose to come to a country which Assyrians have been clamouring to quit, and why they did not apply to the Iraqi consulate in Tabriz. He answered that (a) they hoped, by joining their relatives, to go with them when the latter were migrated from Iraq; and (b) the Persians forbade any fresh Assyrians to settle at Rezaieh, and would not allow any that left the district, e.g., to visit the Iraqi consul at Tabriz, to return to it; thus making it impracticable for them to apply for visas in Persia, and also placing the persons now at Rayat and Khaneh in a very awkward position.

4. I replied to (b) that this was a matter to be arranged with the Persians, and to (a) that contemplated schemes of migration covered only Iraqi Assyrians, and that Assyrians from outside who made their way to Iraq would risk finding themselves left high and dry there, exactly as the present people at Rayat, as there was no guarantee that they would be given visas for a place such as British Guiana, even if prepared to pay their own way there; and that what he had told me of the Persian attitude made it even more likely that they would fall between two stools.

5. Agha Izarya stated that most of the men in the parties that had recently left for Iraq with Persian passports had been in the levies. This confirms what one might expect as to the practice of assuming the nationality that serves the purpose for the moment.

6. But I believe the fundamental truth to be that Assyrians in this part of the world have no clear notion of the meaning of nationality other than that of the Assyrian nation, or millet. They know only that they are Assyrians, and do not understand why one Assyrian should not travel where another Assyrian does. This is the fruit of native ignorance probably no greater than that of their neighbours in these regions on such a subject, but emphasised in their case by adherence to a common schismatic religion and by the Patriarch's propaganda. And a by-product is the idea found in Mosul that by registering their names for a census they will cease to be "Assyrians" and become "Iraqis."

7. The statement recorded in paragraph 3 about Persian policy agrees with what I have heard several times from Mar Yussuf, and, to the best of my recollection, was confirmed in conversation by His Majesty's consul at Tabriz. It suggests that the Persians aim at dissolving the concentration of Assyrians in Western Azerbaijan and now see an opportunity to unload them on to Iraq, with the double advantage of getting some land cheap for Persians and causing embarrassment to Iraq.

8. I am glad to be able to report that at Diana there is a revival of cultivation in progress; thirty persons are reported to be ploughing. And I am told that at Batas, Harir, Darbandok and Armindan, but not at Khalifan or Alana, the same is happening; but I have not verified this. Perhaps the example of the villagers in the Mosul liwa is making itself felt.

9. A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

I have, &amp;c.

J. P. G. FINCH.

[E 277/277/93]

No. 78.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 14.)*

(No. 1. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 1, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the heads of foreign missions in Iraq for 1934.

2. The passages between asterisks have been reproduced from my report for 1933, but I have recast the sections dealing with the representatives of Persia, the United States of America, Germany and Italy.

I have, &amp;c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 78.

*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Iraq.*

## MINISTERS.

*Austria.*

HERR CARL BUCHBERGER, Austrian Minister at Angora, presented his credentials as Austrian Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary on the 22nd October, 1934. Herr Buchberger did not remain long in Bagdad before leaving for Tehran, where, I understand, he has also been appointed Austrian Minister. His headquarters will be in Turkey and I doubt if his visits to Iraq will be very frequent. During his short stay he made a most favourable impression.

*United States of America.*

Mr. Paul Knabenshue was appointed Minister Resident of the United States of America in November 1932. He has seen long service in the Near East, having been consul-general in Cairo and Jerusalem, where he and his Irish wife were popular.

This is Mr. Knabenshue's first diplomatic post. He confesses an ardent desire to find for America a place in the sun of the Middle East and is keenly interested in events in the Persian Gulf. In March 1934 he paid an official visit to Muscat in order to convey to the Sultan the good wishes of the President on the occasion of the centenary of the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the United States of America and Muscat. Mr. Knabenshue's real aim appears, however, to have been to make himself personally acquainted with the oil situation in the Gulf.

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L 3



During his first two years in Bagdad he was prone to bewail, in and out of season, the sad lot that obliged him to pay his way in depreciated dollars and to live in uncongenial premises. He is now better housed, near Hinaidi, and appears to be in a happier frame of mind.

His two children were educated in England.

#### Germany.

Dr. Fritz Grobba came to Bagdad in March 1932 as Chargé d'Affaires, and was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary in December of that year. He served, during the war, with the Turkish armies in Palestine, and has had a wide and varied experience of the Middle East.

Since I first met him in Kabul in 1924, I have found him an able, well-disposed and well-informed colleague, willing, when occasion arose, to take me into his confidence, in regard both to current questions of mutual interest and to such as affect him personally. Zealous and energetic, he has achieved no little success in extending German cultural influence amongst Iraqi students during the past two years and in fostering the interests of the growing German colony in Iraq.

I find it difficult to decide whether or not he is a thorough-going supporter of the Nazi régime. "He doth protest over-much." It is significant, however, that his house is frequented by German-speaking Jews; from which it would appear that Nazi anti-semitism, like fascism, is not an article for export.

Both Dr. Grobba and his wife speak excellent English and are thoroughly at their ease with the British colony, by whom they are well liked.

They entertain widely and well.

#### Persia.

Inayatullah Khan Samii presented his credentials as Persian Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary on the 14th January, 1934. He had held the same post previously, and in 1929 signed the Perso-Iraq "Accord Provisoire," which is still in force.

He speaks good French and is more agreeable and better liked than his predecessor, Saiyid Baqir Khan Kazemi. But however well disposed he may be personally, he can have little or no influence over Persian policy in regard to Iraq, which is dictated from Tehran. In the present state of relations between the two countries, his task can hardly be an enviable one.

#### Poland.

\* M. Stanislas Hempel, Polish Minister at Tehran, was accredited early in the year as Minister Plenipotentiary at Bagdad, and presented his credentials to King Feisal on the 1st May, 1933. After a short stay in Bagdad, M. Hempel returned to Tehran with his wife, but he reappeared at Bagdad in September and took part in the ceremonies attending the funeral of King Feisal.

My acquaintance with M. Hempel is too slight to permit me to add anything to the remarks passed upon him by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran in his report for 1932 on the heads of missions at Tehran. (1933.)\*

#### Sweden.

Baron Eric Gyllenstierna, Swedish Minister at Moscow, presented his credentials on the 16th October as Swedish Minister Plenipotentiary. This appointment was made in connexion with the visit of the Crown Prince and Princess of Sweden and it seems unlikely that Baron Gyllenstierna will often return to Bagdad.

#### Turkey.

\* Tahir Lutfi Bey has been Turkish Minister Plenipotentiary since 1930.

He is an agreeable but somewhat slow-witted Turk of the old school, whose previous service has been passed chiefly in the Balkans. He enjoys excellent relations with the Iraqi Government. His wife, who is a pleasant and intelligent woman, is very popular in English society. (1932.)\*

#### CHARGÉS D'AFFAIRES.

##### Belgium.

\* M. Robert van de Kerchove d'Hallebast presented his credentials as Belgian Chargé d'Affaires on the 6th May, 1933. He spent about a fortnight in Bagdad in the early summer, since when I have not seen him.

M. d'Hallebast also holds the appointment of Belgian consul-general for Syria and Palestine, with Beirut as his permanent headquarters. He is, I believe, married. (1933.)\*

##### Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Vladimír Fric presented his credentials as Czechoslovak Chargé d'Affaires in December 1934. Like his predecessor, M. V. Trčka, Dr. Fric is also in charge of the Czechoslovak Legation at Tehran and will reside there.

##### Egypt.

By Royal Rescript published in the *Journal Officiel* in Cairo on the 13th August, 1934, Muhammad-al-Mufti-al-Gazierli Beg, Egyptian Minister in Tehran, was nominated Egyptian Minister at Bagdad. Up to the close of the year he had not presented his credentials to King Ghazi.

In October, Hafidh Bey Amir arrived in Bagdad and assumed his duties as Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires. He has expressed strong views to me about recent developments in British policy in Egypt, but I do not consider him to be Anglophobe.

##### France.

\* M. Paul Lépissier was appointed French Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad on the 30th June, 1930. Much below the average height, he is handicapped by his insignificant appearance, and his extreme nervousness and excitability have made him something of a figure of fun among his colleagues.

Before coming to Bagdad, M. Lépissier was secretary to the High Commissioner for Syria for five years, and professes to hold strong views on what he describes as mismanagement of Syrian affairs by the French High Commission. He tells me that he is convinced that the only satisfactory solution of the Syrian problem is for the French Government to follow our example in Iraq, but he laments to me in private that the Quai d'Orsay is generally overruled by the military party in Paris. (1932.)\*

\* The action of the French authorities in Syria in rearming and returning to Iraq the insurgent Assyrians, their alleged disregard of his reports and warnings and the consequent resentment evinced by the Iraqi Government were the cause of much embarrassment to M. Lépissier, whose position at best is none too easy. These circumstances have goaded him on to further candid criticism of the administration of Syria.

The French consulate (as it is still called) has been enlarged and extensively rebuilt in the course of the year, and the consulate proper has been separated from the diplomatic offices and the residence of the Chargé d'Affaires. M. Lépissier doubtless hopes that this will be a step towards his promotion to ministerial rank. (1933.)\*

##### Italy.

Cav. Uff. Mario Porta was appointed Chargé d'Affaires in November 1932. He has already seen service in Bogotá and Addis Ababa, but is none the less depressed by living conditions in Bagdad.

Though his bearing towards this Embassy is correct, I suspect an inferiority complex. He complained to me at his first visit that he ought to have been allowed to deliver his letters of credence to King Feisal in person.

He set himself assiduously to study the politics of the Arabic world, and confidently hopes to be able to increase Italian prestige in the Middle East. Like his predecessor, he feels that England and France have divided the plums between them, and he is anxious that Italy should get her share.

He has an English wife and himself speaks excellent English.



Cav. Porta sports a trim Arab beard, which was cultivated in 1933 probably to curry favour in Arab *milioux* and to facilitate a journey to Riyadh, which he still contemplates.

I suspect him of a desire to intrigue, and I would not be prepared to stake much on his veracity. His "touchiness" has made him the subject of much mirth amongst his diplomatic colleagues.

#### *Saudi Arabia.*

\* Sheikh Ibrahim-bin-Muammar presented his credentials in June 1933 as the first Chargé d'Affaires for Saudi Arabia at Bagdad. A pleasant man with an attractive presence and courtly manners. He is said to have made efforts to overcome Shiah dislike of the Wahabi Kingdom by sedulously flattering the ulema, but otherwise he has not been noticeably active. (1933.)\*

In the summer of 1934 Sheikh Ibrahim paid two visits to Karbala and, it is alleged, spoke publicly in praise of King Abdul Azziz-al-Saud in a manner which gave offence to the Shiahs. He also annoyed the Iraqi Government by encouraging the Wahabi tendencies of certain young Moslem organisations in Bagdad. This called forth a protest at Jedda by the Iraqi Government, but conciliatory influence was exercised by His Majesty's representatives at Bagdad and Jedda and the affair blew over.

[E 278/278/93]

No. 79.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 14.)*

(No. 3.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 3, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 701 of the 12th December last, relative to the recent general elections, I have the honour to report that His Majesty King Ghazi opened the new Parliament on the 29th December.

2. The speech from the Throne, a translation of which is enclosed herewith,<sup>(1)</sup> contained no surprises. Touching first on foreign affairs, His Majesty referred to the frontier dispute with Persia and reaffirmed the willingness of his Government to enter into direct negotiations with the Persian Government if the latter so desired.

3. His Majesty then mentioned the important financial institutions which the Government were planning to set up—an allusion to the schemes for the establishment of Central and Agricultural Banks which, as you are aware, are at present occupying the attention of the Ministry of Finance. He also foreshadowed further amendments to the Capital Works Law. I am unaware of the nature of these amendments, but will make the necessary enquiries.

4. The reference in the speech to the "proposals for the improvement of existing judicial institutions" probably indicates a desire on the part of the Government to examine further the possibility of reorganising the Civil Courts of Appeal on the lines of the proposals discussed in my despatch No. 660 of the 10th November last. Your comments on these proposals have been communicated to the Minister of Justice, who is now aware that, before any change can be effected in the existing system, the consent of the Council of the League will have to be forthcoming. The Adviser to the Ministry of Justice has promised to keep me informed of any developments in this matter.

5. Referring to the Government's educational programme, His Majesty made special mention of the necessity for an increase in the number of primary schools and in technical education. I have already reported on Dr. Suedhof's recommendations in regard to the latter, and on the steps which the Ministry of Education are contemplating in order to give effect thereto. I gather that it is the intention of the Government to bring about an increase in the number of primary schools with a minimum of additional expenditure by reducing the primary course from six to five years, and employing the ensuing savings in money and personnel for the opening of new schools in districts where the existing educational facilities have proved to be inadequate.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

6. At the meetings of the Senate and Chamber, which followed the formal opening of both Houses, Saiyid Muhammad-al-Sadr was re-elected President of the Upper House, and Rashid-al-Khoja was chosen by an almost unanimous vote to be President of the Chamber. Both elections are, I consider, satisfactory, although it might possibly have led to greater accord within the Cabinet if, as at one time seemed likely, Jamil Madfai had become President of the Chamber, and Jafar Pasha had become Minister of Defence.

7. I learn privately that Yasin Pasha and several of his close personal followers in the Chamber are thinking of resigning their seats to take up active opposition to the Government outside the Chamber. The grounds on which they will do so have not yet been decided, but it is supposed that they will choose or create an opportunity for resigning as a protest either against the policy of the Government or the manner in which the elections were conducted. You will recall that Yasin Pasha carried out a similar manœuvre in 1931, but achieved very little thereby.

8. The Cabinet are at present facing this possibility with confidence and courage, and have agreed to close their ranks and carry on, trusting in the support of the solid majority which they undoubtedly have in the Chamber. Whether their determination will last I cannot foretell. At present they appear to realise that any Cabinet which governs firmly and administers wisely is in an exceedingly strong position, but Ministers in this country have never been distinguished for their moral courage, and it is by no means impossible that some adroit and well-timed manœuvre by Yasin Pasha will bring about their resignation before the present session comes to an end.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS

[E 429/74/25]

No. 80.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 16.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 8, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 675 of the 23rd November regarding the formation of a joint Iraqi and Saudi commission to inspect the proposed pilgrim route from Iraq to Medina, I have the honour to inform you that the committee has now made its report, which has been given considerable publicity in the Bagdad press.

2. The Iraqi committee have traversed the route in both directions and, accompanied by the Saudi delegation, returned to Bagdad on the 2nd January. The total length of the route between Najaf and Medina is said to be about 650 miles and the track is reported to be in good condition for travel. It is considered that the distance could be covered by car in three to four days, travelling by day only. One section of the track where it traverses the eastern extremity of the Nafud, known as Arj-al-Madhkur, is said to require attention. Wells are plentiful in the Iraqi section, while in Saudi territory there is a number of old water pools.

3. An initial agreement is said to have been reached whereby Iraqi transport companies will carry pilgrims to Medina, whence they will be conveyed to Mecca in Saudi vehicles. Private cars will be allowed to travel without restriction. In the press the opinion has been expressed that the fare by the proposed route will be about £5, but members of the commission have been guarded in their statements, confining themselves to saying that the cost will be considerably less than by the sea route. Hassan Fahmi Beg, head of the Iraqi Commission, has also been unwilling to commit himself with regard to the question of the date of opening of the new route, contenting himself with the observation that the Saudi Government have shown themselves strongly desirous of having it opened in the course of this year.

4. The local press has waxed enthusiastic over the project to an extent that is unjustified by the showing of the official commission, and has indulged in dreams of a new trade route uniting Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In the debate on the draft



reply to the Speech from the Throne on the 3rd January. Yasin Pasha Al Hashimi thought fit to refer to the proposed route, which he described as being more important from the Iraqi point of view than the Bagdad-Haifa route.

5. The surface of the Arabian desert appears to be, in general, similar to that of the Syrian desert, so that there is nothing extravagant in the project of a pilgrim route from Iraq to Medina. The date of its inception depends entirely on the energy displayed by the two Governments concerned, as the work involved by the organisation of the route and the necessary transport companies would not appear to be very great. There is, however, little probability that the route will be organised in time for this year's pilgrimage, which falls on the 14th March.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Jedda, Beirut, India and the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 319/2/93]

No. 81.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 15.)*

(No. 19.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 9, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to offer the following observations on your despatch No. 842 of the 6th December last, in which you discussed three main issues:—

- (1) What alternative solution to the Assyrian problem can be devised if the scheme now under examination for the resettlement, in British Guiana, of the ex-Ottoman Assyrians now in Iraq should prove abortive?
- (2) What measures can and should be taken to minimise the danger of an outbreak of disorder, similar to that which occurred in 1933, either pending the departure of the Assyrians for resettlement outside Iraq, or at some future date if they should be compelled to remain in Iraq owing to the failure of the League of Nations to find any other suitable country to which they could be transferred?
- (3) What action should be taken by His Majesty's Government in general, and by the British forces in Iraq in particular, if, in spite of all possible precautions, a fresh outbreak of Assyrian disorders should occur?

2. I will discuss these issues in the above order. As I have already informed you in my telegram No. 277 of the 19th December, I consider that if General Browne's Commission report unfavourably on the prospects of resettling the Assyrians in British Guiana, or if British Guiana is not accepted as a new home by those Assyrians who wish to leave Iraq, the possibility of finding accommodation for them in Syria should be carefully examined. In your despatch this proposal is dismissed on the grounds—

- (a) That there appears to be no real hope of a satisfactory resettlement of any large number of Assyrians in Syria (even if the French could be persuaded to accept them); and
- (b) That in any event, their resettlement in Syria is open to many serious objections.

3. As regards the first of these points, I would suggest that any solution of the problem which comes under examination should not only be judged on its intrinsic merits or defects, but should also be weighed in the balance with the alternative on which it will be necessary to fall back if this or that solution is not adopted. In this particular instance I submit that the defects of resettlement in Syria must be set against the insuperable obstacles which now lie in the way of satisfactory resettlement in Iraq. Is there, in fact, any greater hope of a more satisfactory future for the Assyrians in Iraq than in Syria? If that question cannot be answered with confidence in the affirmative, it will be premature to abandon the search for a new home for the Assyrians somewhere in the territory under French mandate. I do not think that we have yet any very

conclusive evidence of the attitude which the French Government are likely to adopt towards a proposal for the resettlement of a large number of Assyrians in Syria. The impression which I have gathered, however, from the observations of the French representative at the earlier meetings of the Council Committee, is that they have never categorically refused to consider the possibility of such a settlement. In fact, I am disposed to take the view that if they were approached by the League Council with a definite request and suitable means for financing the transfer could be devised, they would actually welcome a solution on these lines. As you are aware, when Major Wilson, the Administrative Inspector at Mosul, visited Syria about two months ago in charge of a large convoy of Assyrian families, he gathered from the local officials that the mandatory authorities were not at all averse from the idea of enlarging still further the Assyrian settlements which had been established in the basin of the Khabur.

4. There are, it would appear, a number of possible advantages to be gained by the French from the presence of a large Assyrian settlement in this area. It would hasten the economic development of a potentially fertile, but at present little cultivated, area; it would break up the Arab *bloc* and be a balance to the Kurdish element; it would provide valuable recruits for the local military forces, and would constitute an important factor in the organisation of defence against aggression, both from the direction of Nisibin and from the Sinjar. Politically, the presence of the Assyrians as the result of League action would be of great value in justifying the indefinite prolongation of French mandatory control, and would go some way to justify France in continuing to play her historic rôle of protectrice of the Christians in the East.

5. Bearing all this in mind, I feel that the French attitude is largely a matter of approach. In the event of the Guiana scheme proving impracticable, I believe that if a tactful appeal were made by the Council Committee, the French Government would, subject to the satisfactory adjustment of the pecuniary side of the question, be willing to receive in Syria a large number, if not all, of the Assyrians who wish to leave Iraq.

6. From the point of view of the welfare of the Assyrians themselves, the chief objection of their resettlement in Syria would be the fact that at some future date the French mandate will presumably come to an end. The Assyrians may therefore once more be left an alien Christian minority under a Mahometan Government amid a potentially hostile indigenous people. Actualities in Syria do not suggest that the termination of the French mandate is at all imminent; and even if the present French proposals for a treaty with the Syrian Government were to be put into effect, the situation then created would resemble that of Iraq under the treaty of 1922 with Great Britain rather than that under the Treaty of Alliance of 1930. The Assyrians could rest assured of adequate protection for their lives and property. It is true that the Khabur basin (the area in which any settlement is most likely to be undertaken) is a flat plain and may not be ideal for mountaineers. If, however, nothing better can be found, the best use must be made of what is available. With the gloomy prospect in their minds of remaining indefinitely in this country, I have no doubt whatever that, if given the choice between Iraq and Syria, a large number would elect to go to the latter country.

7. From the Iraqi standpoint, the objection might be raised that a large Assyrian settlement in the basin of the Khabur would be a potential menace to the north-west frontier of Iraq. Whatever the real extent of this danger might be, it should, I think, be possible to convince the Iraqi Government that active and discontented Assyrian elements in Iraq constitute a far greater menace than a contented and prosperous enclave in Syria, even if it were used at the spear-head of French penetration or as the fulcrum of French diplomatic leverage.

8. From your confidential telegram No. 230 of the 18th December, I gather that the final report of General Browne's Commission may not be so unfavourable as was anticipated when your despatch was written, and that it may prove possible to resettle the Assyrians in British Guiana by slow stages. At the same time it seems to me that the scheme of settlement which is likely to be advocated by General Browne's report may give rise to difficulties in regard to the time and expense of settlement, for which the League Committee may not be able to find a solution, and may in consequence, as you suggest, be tempted to revert to the idea of the resettlement of the Assyrians in Iraq itself under specific safeguards. I must strongly urge that every possible expedient should be employed to divert



the committee from such a course, and that, as a constructive alternative, the committee should be invited urgently to examine the possibility of resettlement in Syria.

9. In spite of the objections to which I have referred above, Syria does, in fact, offer a number of advantages not to be found in Guiana as a new home for the Assyrians. The idea of removal to so remote a place as Guiana is not popular among the Assyrians, and I understand from Major Wilson that propaganda against this proposal has already been fostered by the patriarchal house. Syria, on the other hand, is a country familiar to many of the Assyrians, and the Mar Shimun proclaimed himself in favour of it in 1933. Furthermore, the long delays inseparable from any scheme for transferring and establishing the Assyrians in Guiana, and the dangers to which such delays would give rise, would, to a great extent, be obviated by resettlement in Syria. Nor would there be such serious difficulty over the provision of sufficient money to provide for settlement in Syria as there would be in the case of settlement in Guiana or other similarly remote country.

10. I turn now to the danger of a fresh outbreak of disorders centred on the Assyrians. There are two main factors to be considered: the Assyrians and the Iraqi Government. In regard to the former, I agree generally with the opinion stressed in your despatch that the chief menace lies in the possibility of their committing some desperate act of folly, which might lead to cruel and promiscuous retaliation such as occurred in the summer of last year. I also agree with your appreciation of the importance of the influence of the Patriarch in this regard, and I consider that the chief risk of the occurrence of an act of folly of this kind lies in the intrigues of the Patriarchal party, and possibly in the direct incitement of Mar Shimun himself. The penury of some of the Assyrians at the present time may provide a favourable atmosphere for intrigues of this nature, but men of the tribal type are often far readier for desperate acts when their bellies are full than when they are empty. It will be recalled, for instance, that it was those who were settled in the most prosperous villages who were the most readily influenced by the Patriarch's political propaganda in 1933. The exact bearing on the question of the political danger of fresh disorders of the present admittedly exceeding unsatisfactory and unstable economic situation of many of the Assyrians is therefore somewhat difficult to appreciate.

11. The position of the Iraqi Government in this matter is more easily calculable. As I have already affirmed in my telegram No. 277, I am as confident now as I was in 1932 that, so long as the Assyrians abstain from some reckless act suggesting the threat of an armed movement against the authority of the Government, the Iraqi Government will neither initiate nor encourage any form of terror or active oppression against the Assyrians. Without provocation, their attitude would normally be one of comparative indifference. I am equally confident, in spite of the events of 1933, that neither the Kurdish nor the Arab tribes nor the townspeople of Mosul would, even under provocation, undertake any large-scale action against the Assyrians without some sort of a lead emanating from authoritative quarters. If, however, the Assyrians should once again organise a considerable armed movement or concentration, there is a danger that the Government may again, in panic, permit, or at least not disallow, general and indiscriminate retaliatory measures, in which the tribes may be encouraged to join.

12. These are the elements of the danger. What are the preventive measures which can be adopted? In paragraph 16 of your despatch under reply you suggest that the Iraqi Government should make it clearly and generally understood, in the Kurdish districts, that no victimisation of the Assyrians will be allowed even in retaliation for Assyrian provocation. Apart from the great difficulty of persuading the Iraqi Government to make a public pronouncement of this kind, either through the distribution of proclamations or some other similar means, I am certain that such a step would disturb rather than tranquillise the situation. It would inevitably give rise to the wildest and most exaggerated rumours, and, by creating an atmosphere of excitement, might well precipitate a crisis. In dealing with tribal peoples, the best aid to tranquillity is an atmosphere of normality; anything suggesting the imminence of unusual and important events must be avoided. Moreover, as I have endeavoured to make clear in paragraph 11 above, the danger of reprisals lies not so much in the tribes themselves, as in the temper and attitude of the Government. It

follows, therefore, that my efforts should aim at bringing home to the Iraqi Government: (a) the dangers inherent in the situation so long as the transfer of the Assyrians to a new home outside Iraq is deferred; and (b) the necessity for considering and bringing into effect, without delay, suitable measures to minimise these dangers.

13. You are already aware, from my telegram No. 8 of the 4th January, that I have already taken preliminary action on these lines. On the eve of the departure of the Prime Minister, to present at Geneva the case of Iraq in the frontier dispute with Persia, I discussed the Assyrian question in detail with him. I reminded him, incidentally, of the necessity for the goodwill of the League in this dispute, but warned him that if, as a result either of Iraq's indifference or encouragement, the Assyrians were to be subjected to molestation, Iraq would forfeit the sympathy of many of her friends at Geneva. His Excellency was quick to seize the point, and promised to leave, before his departure, definite instructions to the Mutessarifs of Mosul and Erbil to prevent the Assyrians from being molested even if their behaviour were provocative. I had purposely postponed action on these lines until I had had an opportunity of discussing the whole matter with Sir Kinahan Cornwallis and the Air Officer Commanding. I will report later on the actual steps taken by the Iraqi Government in this matter. In this connexion it is gratifying to know that the reports I have received of the new Mutessarif of Mosul, Umar Nazmi Beg, are most satisfactory and leave nothing to be desired.

14. In discussing preventive measures, you have stressed the need for action by the Iraqi Government, and I have accordingly given my first attention to this aspect of the question. It seems clear, however, that the disorders which we fear would arise mainly from a desperate act of folly by the Assyrians, and that, although there are other possible contributory factors, the principal danger lies here.

15. As you point out in your despatch, Patriarchal influence has already prevented many Assyrians in straitened circumstances from accepting monetary help from the Iraqi Government and from resuming their normal life pending emigration. As you also suggest, the Patriarch and his followers would not be averse from inciting a recurrence of the troubles of 1933, if it should appear to serve their personal aims to do so. It is therefore possible that some of the extremists among the Mar Shimun's supporters may create trouble if their departure from Iraq is much longer delayed. Bearing the above facts in mind, it appears reasonable that attention should not be directed exclusively to the palliative and preventive measures to be taken by the Iraqi Government, but that consideration should also be given to the possibilities of action calculated to curtail the intrigues of Mar Shimun and his party. I confess to some anxiety over that portion of your despatch in which I was informed that there are no means of influencing the Patriarch to change his attitude.

16. I understand that the Mar Shimun is at present in England enjoying the hospitality and protection of many men prominent in public life. He is supported by the charity of his English sympathisers. His family are political refugees on British territory in Cyprus. In short, he is at present almost entirely dependent on the goodwill and favour of His Majesty's Government and the British people. If he persists in abusing this favour by violating the conditions of his residence in England, he is doing the worst possible disservice to his people. It is freely said in Bagdad that he will never learn the meaning of discipline until he joins the Church of Rome. I should like to see this theory disproved.

17. I have limited my observations in the main to the dangers of an outbreak of disorder pending the removal of the discontented Assyrians to a new home outside Iraq, since, in my view, it is neither expedient nor possible at this stage to attempt to appreciate in detail the situation which would be created if the Council of the League were to abandon their present policy and were to fall back on schemes for resettling the Assyrians in Iraq. You have already pointed out in your despatch that, in such an event, a serious dispute between the League and the Iraqi Government would be likely to arise, with results that might be far-reaching. I need only add that these results, apart from the embarrassment which they would cause to His Majesty's Government, might be disastrous to the Assyrians, and might destroy all hope of safeguarding the religious, economic and cultural future of this pathetic remnant of a once mighty Church and people.



18. If, as the result of the further reports from General Browne, to which you refer in your telegram No. 229 of the 18th December, it becomes apparent that the British Guiana scheme has broken down, I most strongly advise that any public pronouncement which may be made in this sense should be accompanied by a statement to the effect that the possibility of further resettlement in Syria is being actively explored. If this is done, I do not anticipate that the news of the failure of the Guiana scheme will cause any very grave despondency among the Assyrians themselves, or serious complications with the Iraqi Government. Indeed, it may be that many, in both quarters, would be relieved. I feel, however, that every effort should be made to avoid the exceedingly disquieting situation which might arise from an announcement of the abandonment of the Guiana scheme unaccompanied by any hope of feasible alternative settlement outside Iraq.

19. I now come to the third issue raised in your despatch, viz., the action which should be taken by His Majesty's Government if, in spite of all the precautions which it may be possible to take, a fresh outbreak of Assyrian disorders should occur.

20. I agree with your view that an outbreak is more likely at the outset to take the form of an isolated incident than of another effort to effect a large armed concentration, though, if it were made known that the League had given up hope of finding a new home for the Assyrians outside Iraq, the latter contingency would be by no means improbable. In any event, however, once disorders began, the danger of their spreading and of the Christian minorities in Mosul and the surrounding villages becoming involved would be very much the same in character, though liable to vary considerably in degree.

21. It is exceedingly difficult to make detailed recommendations in advance as to the policy which His Majesty's Government should follow in the event of an outbreak of disturbances of this kind. So much would depend on an appreciation of the elements of the situation existing at the time when the outbreak occurred, and on the various courses of action which these elements might make possible, that I find it practically impossible to say now what policy it would be most appropriate for His Majesty's Government to adopt.

22. I am, however, convinced that any impulsive intervention by the personnel of the Royal Air Force Squadron and Armoured Car Section at Mosul, such as is contemplated in paragraph 13 of your despatch, could only lead to the most disastrous consequences. Such intervention would almost inevitably provoke the wildest possible outburst of fanaticism and frenzy throughout the country, from the fury of which the existing British forces would be quite inadequate to protect the Christian minorities, or, perhaps, to escape themselves. The lives of British and other European residents would also be endangered, and, long before the necessarily large ground force of all arms could be concentrated and transported to Iraq to undertake the operations and establish the physical control envisaged in paragraph 17 of your despatch, the situation would have got out of hand.

23. There is no need to paint a drab picture in alarming colours, and I have no wish to do so in this despatch. I would, however, propose that, should the necessity arise, all ranks of the Royal Air Force in Iraq should be warned that individual or collective intervention without orders constitutes a grave offence against discipline, and will not be tolerated. As regards authorised action by units of the Royal Air Force, I presume that no authority would be given except at the instance and in accordance with the wishes of the Iraqi Government, and after a decision by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

24. Nevertheless, I fully appreciate the gravity of the dilemma with which His Majesty's Government might be confronted should an outbreak such as is now under consideration take place, and it is because I fear that the abandonment of all schemes of resettling the bulk of the Assyrians outside Iraq might lead to a dangerous *impasse*, that I feel it in the highest degree impolitic to contemplate such a change of policy.

25. I do not propose to discuss, in this despatch, the possibility of resuming physical control in this country. No massacre of Iraqi subjects, however cruel and unprovoked, would justify so vast an outpouring of British blood and treasure which such a policy would involve. Physical intervention on behalf of a minority against the Central Government would eventually result in the total extermination or expulsion of the Christian minorities. We committed ourselves

fourteen years ago for better or for worse to an independent Iraq. We cannot now reverse this policy without injustice to the Arabs, the minorities and ourselves.

26. The Assyrian problem is difficult and complicated, but, in my view, is susceptible of a reasonable solution on the lines advocated in this despatch, if the League resolutely carry out the policy of finding a new home for those Assyrians who desire one, and we are prepared to share with the Iraqi Government the relatively small expense involved.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 432/432/93]

No. 82.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 20. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 9, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 5, Confidential, of the 4th January, 1934, I have the honour to inform you that the Iraq Petroleum Company paid in full the annual royalty due to the Iraqi Government on the 1st January. The amount paid this year in sterling was £678,000.

2. The payment due by the British Oil Development Company to the Iraqi Government has not yet been made, but they have a period of three months' grace.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 433/433/93]

No. 83.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 21.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 9, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 629 of the 26th October last, I have the honour to report that Khalil Khoshawi and his followers continue to commit savage outrages in the Barzan country.

2. During November and early December bands of his followers, operating from the Turkish side of the frontier, murdered five village headmen and attacked several villages, inflicting a number of casualties on the inhabitants.

3. His bands are now reported to number seventy to eighty well-armed men, all bad characters, who are intimately acquainted with the exceedingly difficult country in which they operate. Their main base appears to be in the neighbourhood of Berokh, a village which lies in a small valley just over the Turkish frontier to the south of the Govanda Plateau.

4. The commandant of police at Mosul recently visited the Turkish mudir of the district in which Berokh is situated and endeavoured to obtain the co-operation of the local Turkish forces in dealing with Khoshawi. His mission, however, was fruitless, as the mudir stated that he was unable to take any action against Khoshawi on account of the support given to him by the powerful Girdi tribe of the locality.

5. The commandant of police has therefore to rely entirely on his own forces, and he has a very difficult task so long as Khalil's bands can withdraw to safety across the border after their raids into Iraq.

6. Following a conference at Arbil in the middle of December, which was attended by the Director-General of Police and the mutessarifs and commandants of police of Mosul and Arbil, the police dispositions previously made with a view to dealing with Khoshawi were revised and reinforcements furnished from Rowanduz and Arbil.



7. These new arrangements do not, however, seem to have been effective, since His Majesty's vice-consul at Diana reports that, on the 26th December, Khalil Khoshawi and a band of followers attacked a working party of the Public Works Department on the Mergasor Road near Shaitana, only about 8 miles distant from the Diana vice-consulate—the most southern part to which Khalil has so far succeeded in penetrating.

8. Khalil Khoshawi has not yet assumed the rôle of a Kurdish Nationalist leader, and does not pose as anything other than an entirely self-interested scoundrel. Nevertheless, successful and savage banditry conducted on the scale on which Khalil is at present operating is necessarily a serious menace to the tranquillity of the north-eastern Kurdish areas, and I propose to bring this matter to the King's special attention at my next interview.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora and His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 434/278/93]

No. 84.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 22.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 10, 1935.*

WITH reference to paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 3 of the 3rd January, I have the honour to inform you that I now learn that Yasin Pasha and his political associates have, for the present, decided not to withdraw from the Chamber. Instead, they are apparently organising a centre of opposition to the Government in the Senate, where Naji Suwaidi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani, both clever debaters and experienced politicians, are now co-operating with Yasin Pasha.

2. The first attack was launched on the occasion of the debate on the speech from the Throne, which took place in both Houses on the 3rd January. In the Chamber Yasin Pasha spoke at length, but with his customary ambiguity. His main points of criticism were the action of the Government in dissolving the old Chamber without, he alleged, adequate justification, and the elections themselves, which he declared had been improperly conducted. Very few other speakers, however, gave him any support, and the reply to the speech from the Throne prepared by the Government, of which I enclose a translation herewith,<sup>(1)</sup> was adopted by a large majority without amendment.

3. In the Senate the attack was more successful. Led by Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Naji Suwaidi, a number of Senators hotly criticised the Government. Their strictures followed in the main the same lines as those of Yasin Pasha, but they struck, in addition, a popular note by calling in question the Government's drastic dismissals and disciplinary transfers of officials.

4. Jafar Pasha Al Askari, Jamil Beg Madfai (Minister for Defence) and Jamal Baban (Minister for Justice) did not appear to advantage in their defence of the Government. Their contention that the Government, in their dissolution of Parliament and their conduct of the elections on the usual lines, had only acted in the same manner as their predecessors and present critics, betrayed all the inherent weakness of the *tu quoque*. In the end, Rashid Ali succeeded in persuading the Senate to adopt a reply to the speech from the Throne which, as you will observe from the translation<sup>(1)</sup> enclosed with this despatch, amounted almost to a vote of censure on the Government.

5. The Opposition press was jubilant at this unexpected display of energy in the usually supine and amenable Senate, but the Prime Minister, whom I saw soon after the events which I have described above, evinced no anxiety for the future of his Cabinet and seemed to think that the Opposition group in the Senate would not be able to sustain the hostility to the Government which they had shown in the debate on the speech from the Throne.

6. His optimism may, I fear, prove to be mistaken. In a lengthy private talk which I had at the Embassy a few days ago with Yasin Pasha, he spoke

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

with some bitterness against Ali Jaudat Beg, the present Prime Minister and Acting Minister for the Interior, and alleged that he was using his position to further his personal enmity against Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Hikmat Beg Sulaiman, both of whom were, in consequence, working determinedly to bring about his fall. Yasin Pasha further explained to me that he had decided to drop the opposition to the 1930 treaty, which he had at one time sponsored, because he had become convinced that Iraq could not survive without an alliance with Great Britain and that this alliance was, under the treaty of 1930, offered on fair terms. He also assured me that, whatever quarrels might arise between Iraqi politicians and parties, they all recognised the neutrality of the Embassy and, he was pleased to add, the disinterested character of the advice which I and my predecessors had from time to time offered successive Cabinets on matters of importance touching the welfare and prosperity of the country. He pleaded, however, for a revision of the present Railway Agreement, which, he assured me, was unworkable and unpopular throughout the country.

7. It is always particularly rash to attempt to foretell the future in this country, but, although it appears likely that the present Government have a difficult and possibly stormy parliamentary session in front of them, there is reason to hope that Iraq's treaty relations with Great Britain will not be made one of the issues on which they will be attacked.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 431/431/93]

No. 85.

*Records of Leading Personalities in Iraq.—(Revised to January 9, 1935.)*

#### THE ROYAL FAMILY.

##### 1. *Ghazi, King of Iraq.*

YOUNGEST child and only son of King Feisal. Born in the Hejaz at Mecca in 1911. Came to Bagdad in 1923 with his mother and sisters. Was educated first by an English governess, and later at Harrow, where he made little progress, owing to the inadequate preparation which he had received before entering the school. On his return to Iraq he went through the normal course of training at the Iraqi Military Cadet College. He learnt to be a good horseman, but was a poor student of military science. Left the college early in 1933 and became aide-de-camp to his father, King Feisal. Acted as Regent during King Feisal's absence from Iraq in the summer of 1933. Succeeded to the throne on King Feisal's death on the 8th September, 1933. Soon after his accession he was betrothed to Aliyah, the eldest daughter of his uncle, ex-King Ali of the Hejaz. He has to shoulder heavy responsibilities for one who has so little experience of affairs.

##### 2. *Ali, ex-King of the Hejaz.*

Eldest son of Hussein, first King of the Hejaz, and eldest brother of the late King Feisal. He came to Bagdad in June 1926 after Ibn Saud had forced him to abdicate and abandon his country. Since then he has lived quietly in Bagdad on money supplied from the Royal Privy Purse. On several occasions he has acted as Regent during the absence of King Feisal from Iraq. He has one son, Abdul Illah, aged about 18. He would like to send him to Oxford or Cambridge, but it is very doubtful if the boy has sufficient general education to profit from a university course. His daughter, Aliyah, was betrothed to King Ghazi in September 1933.

King Ali has aspirations to the Syrian throne, and has more than once had secret conversations with the French Chargé d'Affaires in Bagdad regarding the creation of a monarchist Government for Syria. It is, however, more than doubtful whether the French have ever seriously entertained the idea of making him King of Syria. In the summer of 1933 he went to Switzerland for medical



treatment and a holiday, and was with King Feisal in Berne at the time of his death. In the autumn he again went to Europe and stayed a few weeks in Paris, where, it was rumoured, he had further conversations in political quarters on the subject of his candidature for the Syrian throne.

### 3. *Zaid, His Highness the Amir.*

Born in Constantinople in 1900. Youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz. Half-brother of King Ali, King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah (of Transjordan). His mother was a Turk. Educated in Constantinople. Fought with the Arab Nationalist forces during the Great War, and won the good opinion of the British officers with the Shereefian army.

Came to live in Iraq in 1922, and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. Acted as Regent for a short time in 1924 during King Feisal's absence.

In 1925 he went to England and studied agriculture at Oxford for nearly three years. During this period he took an active part in the social life of the university and rowed in the torpids for Balliol. In 1928 he joined his father in Cyprus and remained there until King Hussein's death in 1931. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in January 1932.

In 1933 it became known that one of his sisters had contracted a clandestine marriage with Atta Beg Amin, some time first secretary at the Iraqi Legation at Angora (and later at the Legation in London). The Royal Family were indignant, and Zaid was transferred to Cairo in January 1934 as the first Iraqi Minister at King Fuad's Court. He did not, however, proceed to this post, which he ultimately refused to accept. At the end of 1934 he was busy in Athens engaged in litigation concerning extensive properties which he claims to have inherited in Greece.

He is a pleasant, well-mannered man, and speaks excellent English and Turkish. Is generally regarded as the pick of the Hashimites.

### OTHER PERSONALITIES.

#### 1. *Abbas-i-Mahmud Agha.*

Chieftain of the Pizhder tribe (Kurdish) (see Babekr Agha). Generally on the side of disorder when trouble is brewing. Maintains a tradition of being at feud with Babekr Agha, but both take care that this enmity shall not weaken the strength of the tribe.

#### 2. *Abbas Mahdi.*

Shiah. Age 40. Secretary to Iraqi Legation in Tehran 1931. Minister for Education, November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of Tapu in October 1933.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in February 1934, but resigned with Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1934. Reappointed Director-General of Tapu, December 1934.

#### 3. *Abdul Aziz Bey Al Mudhaffar, M.B.E.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Speaks English, German and French well. Served as superintendent in Deputy Military Governor's Office, Bagdad Rasafah, under the Government of Occupation from March 1917, and in 1919 became Mudir of Rasafah. Secretary to the Ministry of Interior, December 1920, and Director of the Press Bureau in 1922. Director of Census Department 1927.

Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul, May 1931. Withdrawn September 1931 for incompetence and tried for misappropriation of public funds. Found not guilty and appointed to be member of Muntafiq Land Court. Lost this post when the court was abolished in June 1932. In the summer of 1933 was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Tehran, and in May 1934 was transferred to be consul-general in Beirut.

#### 4. *Abdul Aziz-al-Qassab.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Kaimakam of Kut under the Naqib's Provisional Government and did very well. In October 1921 he was appointed Mutessarif of Mosul on probation for six months, but refused to go without the salary of a full mutessarif. In the beginning of 1922 he went as Mutessarif of Karbala, was

transferred to Muntafiq in January 1923, and to the Ministry of Interior as Director-General of General Administration in June of the same year. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in January 1924. A capable and well-intentioned official without much strength of character. Minister of Interior, January 1928. Minister for Justice, November 1929.

Went out of office with the resignation of Naji Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Has not held any other Cabinet post since. Has an adequate pension. Appointed Chief Administrative Inspector, Grade I, November 1933.

#### 5. *Abdul Ghafur-al-Badri.*

Ex-cadet in the Turkish army and second lieutenant in the Shereefian army.

Since 1920 has been editor of extremist Nationalist newspaper, the *Istiqal*. This journal has been suspended many times for its violent attacks on the British Government and on British officials in Iraq.

Elected Deputy for Diyala 1933. Re-elected for Kut in the general election of 1934.

#### 6. *Abdul Husain Chalabi-bin-Ali-al-Hujaiji.*

Shiah of Kadhimain. Elder brother of Abdul Ghani Chalabi and representative of the house. Wealthy landowner of Kadhimain, aged about 45. He took a somewhat passive part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922, but went to Persia on business in July 1922 before the crisis. He returned in November 1922. Minister of Education, November 1922, and subsequently has frequently held this portfolio in different Cabinets. He has little influence in politics, but is usually included in Cabinets as an amenable Shiah.

Minister for Education in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet which came into office in March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Appointed Senator, November 1933. Again appointed Minister for Education in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934.

#### 7. *Abdul Latif Nuri.*

Born in Bagdad about 1890. Gazetted as officer in the Turkish army in 1908. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Promoted Aqid (lieutenant-colonel) in 1926 and brigadier-general (Zaim) in 1929. He has held the command of the Northern and Southern Districts, and has passed the senior and junior officers courses, and was posted to the Northern District in 1933. Promoted Amir Liwa (major-general) in 1932. A close friend of Nuri Pasha.

#### 8. *Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid).*

Shiah of Shutia (Muntafiq). Aged about 45.

Belongs to an influential family and owns a large estate (Abu Hawan Muqatah). Deputy for Kerbala in Turkish Parliament, and has sat in Iraqi Chamber since 1927. Minister for Education under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani, March-October 1933. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1934.

Since 1930 he has been a strong partisan of Yasin Pasha and a member of the Executive Committee of the party of National Brotherhood (Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani).

#### 9. *Abdul Qadir-al-Rashid.*

Sunni of Bagdad, related to the Gilani family. Age about 30. Speaks English well.

Appointed secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1924 in succession to Hussein Afnan. Remained in that post, the duties of which he discharged with noteworthy tact and efficiency until November 1932, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Was appointed an assistant manager in the Rafidain Oil Company in October 1933.

#### 10. *Abdul Wahid, Sheikh.*

Chief of the Fatlah tribe, son of Haji Sikkar, once the most powerful sheikh on the Euphrates. Abdul Wahid cultivates extensive properties on the left bank of the Mishkab from Abu Sukhair to the Ibrahim. Throughout recent years he has steered his course with a view to maintaining to the utmost his political and tribal influence. His support and loyalty were carefully cultivated by King



Feisal, and all political parties have thought it worth while to try to make him an adherent. On the whole he tends to stand in mostly with Yasin Pasha and the Ikha-al-Watani party. He has many friends and many bitter enemies, and is reputed to deal harshly with his fellaheen.

#### 11. *Abdullah-al-Damluji.*

Formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. A native of Mosul. Studied medicine in Constantinople and calls himself doctor, though it is believed that he did not graduate. Seems to have been serving in the Turkish army when Ibn Saud occupied Hassa in 1913, and to have transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Soon rose to a position of influence in Ibn Saud's Court, and came to Bagdad as his unofficial representative in 1921. Was Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 and signed the Uqair Protocol. Went with the Amir Feisal-al-Saud to London in 1926, and took part in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Jedda in 1927. After this his influence waned owing to the intrigues of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin.

In August 1928 he represented the Court of Nejd, the Hejaz and its dependencies at the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa. The conference was abortive, and when it terminated, instead of returning to the Hejaz, Abdullah Damluji came to Bagdad, posting his resignation to Ibn Saud. Arrived Bagdad, September 1928. Appointed Iraqi consul-general, Cairo, in 1930, recalled October 1930, and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. This at first was resented by Ibn Saud, and for a short time Damluji's presence at the head of the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed likely to embarrass Nejd and Iraqi relations, but when Nuri Pasha visited Jedda in April 1931 Ibn Saud stated that he no longer wished to raise any objection to Damluji's appointment. Was left out of office when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Director-General of Health, July 1932, and succeeded Safwat Pasha as Court Chamberlain at the end of 1933.

Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's second Cabinet in February 1934; resigned in July and was reappointed Director-General of Health in September.

#### 12. *Ahmad, Sheikh of Barzan.*

A chieftain of the Kurdish Zibar tribe. Headquarters at Barzan at the foot of the Chia-i-Shirin. Exercised powerful influence over the Barosh and Mazuri Bala areas to the north-west of Rowanduz. Friendly relations were established with him in 1919, but no administrative control was exercised in his tribal area. In 1920 he was implicated in the murder of two British officials. He and Faris Agha of Bera Kapra were declared outlaws with a price on their heads, and Barzan was destroyed by troops, but his country was not occupied. In 1922 he welcomed Turkish agents into Barosh and Mazuri Bala, and in September 1922 his men made an abortive attack on Amadiyah. A month later Barzan was again destroyed by the Royal Air Force co-operating with Assyrian irregulars. In 1923, the Turks having been driven from Rowanduz, Sheikh Ahmad turned on their retreating columns and came into Aqra to make peace with the Anglo-Iraqi authorities. His outlawry was cancelled, and he was permitted to continue in unmolested control of his tribal villages and mountains. In the summer of 1931 he began a private war with a neighbouring chieftain of Baradost, Sheikh Rashid of Lolan. He was everywhere successful, drove Sheikh Rashid to flight into Persia and set fire to his villages. Government intervention became necessary to restore order. Iraqi troops were concentrated early in 1932, and after some sharp fighting followed by intensive air action by the Royal Air Force, Sheikh Ahmad was defeated and driven across the Turkish border in June. He and his two brothers, Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, were interned for a time in Turkey, but the two latter contrived to find their way back into their old haunts in the following winter. After holding out in the mountains for some months they surrendered and were pardoned in July 1933 and allowed to return to their villages. A short time afterwards the Turks surrendered Sheikh Ahmad to the Iraqi Government on condition that his life should be spared. For a little over a year he lived in comfortable and honourable detention in Mosul, but in November 1934 it was found that he was in collusion with Khalil Khushawi, who was disturbing the peace of the Barzan area, and he was thereupon removed to Hillah.

#### 13. *Ahmad-al-Sheikh Daud, Saiyid.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Age about 55. He comes of a family of learned men, his father was a well-known teacher in Bagdad, under whom most of the men of Sheikh Ahmad's generation studied. In the early days of the occupation he was a prominent Nationalist. He was arrested and deported to Henjam in August 1920, but was allowed to return to Bagdad in February 1921. Elected to the Constituent Assembly in March 1924, he opposed the treaty of 1922 and voted against it. Failed to secure a seat in the subsequent general election, but was successful at a by-election. In October 1925 he became pro-treaty, but in January 1926 voted against ratification of the extension of the treaty period. Minister for Aqaf under Abdul Muhsin Beg in January 1928, but resigned office April 1929. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in October 1933, and retained this seat in the elections of 1934.

#### 14. *Ahmad Beg I Tawfiq Beg.*

A Kurdish notable of Suleimani, age about 40, who has had the advantage of a better education than most of his contemporaries. He has held a number of administrative appointments since the first days of the occupation of the Suleimani Liwa. Was appointed mutessarif after the reoccupation of Suleimani in 1924. The Iraqi Government have several times endeavoured to replace him by others less sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations, but those chosen have not been successful. Ahmad Beg has now (1933) been mutessarif without interruption since 1930. He is connected by marriage with the ruling families of the Pizhder tribe, and owns property in the Surdash nahiyah. A pleasant and presentable man, who has always been popular with British civil and military officers.

#### 15. *Ajil-al-Yawar.*

Paramount Sheikh of the Shammar Jarba (Arab) tribe of Iraq.

His tribal authority is exercised over the Northern Jazirah from the Sinjar to the Aqarquf depression to the west of Bagdad. A fine man physically, who has cleverly adapted himself to the changing political conditions which have followed the British occupation of Iraq. For some years after the division of the Jazirah between the British and French mandates, tribal troubles were caused by his rivalry with Diham-al-Hadi, the chief of the Shammar, whose territory now lies in Syria. Latterly (1933), however, both Diham and Ajil have settled down to a mutual acceptance of the division of the tribes, and have seemingly agreed to leave each other in peace. Ajil is eager to adopt modern methods of cultivation, and has a number of irrigation pumps.

His eldest son, Sufuq, is being educated at the American college at Beirut (1933), but during the holidays his father wisely makes him return to Bedouin life and habits.

#### 16. *Ali Jaudat.*

Sunni, of humble Mosul origin. Age about 45. Officer in the Turkish army, fought at Shuaibah; subsequently surrendered to the British and spent most of 1915 at Basra. Was there employed to encourage Turkish officer prisoners to join the Sharif. He was a member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. After the war he was Military Governor of Aleppo following the resignation of Jafar Pasha early in 1920, and was subsequently in Dair. Returned to Bagdad with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and in October 1921 was given the post of Mutessarif of Hillah, which he held till September 1922. He took a very active part in the anti-mandate agitation, and was finally dismissed (on the advice of the High Commissioner) for defrauding the Treasury by underestimating revenue demands on supporters of his political views. In January 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in the hope that he might be able to reconcile the mujtahids. He was unsuccessful, and in May was transferred to Muntafiq, where he did very well. Minister of Interior in the Askari Cabinet, November 1923-July 1924, and voted for the treaty. Appointed Mutessarif of Diyala, and later of Basra. In early 1930 was made Director of the Ministry of the Interior. Minister for Finance under Nuri Pasha, March 1930. Resigned from Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930, as a protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year, and his seat in the Chamber in 1931, together with



Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Yasin-al-Hashimi in March 1932. Re-elected for Mosul 1933. Appointed principal private secretary to the King, March 1933. Became Prime Minister and Acting Minister of the Interior in August 1934.

17. *Ali Mahmud.*

Sunni, lawyer. Extreme Nationalist, probably at heart pro-Turk; was one of the lawyer group who organised the disturbances during the debates on the treaty, the attack on Addai and Salman-al-Barrak, and the subsequent campaign of intimidation. A frequent contributor of anti-British articles to Nationalist newspapers. Deputy for Kut in elections 1933. Not re-elected in the elections of 1934.

18. *Ali Suleiman, Sheikh.*

The most influential chieftain of the Dulaim tribe. He has represented the Dulaim constituency since the first Chamber in 1924. He is interested in developing his properties with modern machinery, and has installed a number of irrigation pumps. These interests ensure his support for law and order. His tribe have their area on the right bank of the Euphrates from Ramadi to the Syrian frontier at Abu Kamal. He is very fond of horse-racing, and is friendly to British interests.

19. *Arshad-al-Umari.*

Of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Trained as an engineer in the days of the Turk. Municipal engineer in Constantinople. Staff officer during the war. Member of the first Iraqi Parliament and supporter of Abdul Muhsin Beg. Appointed by latter first Iraqi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Made Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad), November 1931, and during his two-year tenure of that appointment did much for the improvement of the amenities of Bagdad. Was appointed Director of Irrigation in November 1933, and is suffering at present from megalomania. Speaks French and understands some English. His brother is Mayor of Mosul. Joined Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934 as Minister for Economics and Communications.

20. *Ata Beg Al Amin.*

Appointed secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London, September 1932, on transfer from a consular post at Angora.

In the summer of 1933 it was discovered that he had, while in Turkey, married one of the sisters of the Amir Zaid, the Iraqi Minister in Angora and younger brother of King Feisal. This was regarded as a scandal, and, although he was temporarily retained in his post in London, Ata Beg's position in the public service became insecure. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Rome, October 1934.

21. *Babekr Agha.*

A powerful chief of the Pizhder (Kurdish) tribe of Qalah Diza (on the Lesser Zab River, north of Suleimani). Has always been honest and friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi. An able and most estimable man, who has been liked and respected by all who have had close contact with him.

His rival for tribal influence is Abbas Mahmud Agha, who has always tended to be against the Government. Both, however, visited Bagdad in October 1933 and protested their loyalty and obedience to the Iraqi Government.

22. *Bahjat Effendi Zainal.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Advocate. Studied in the Law School of Constantinople. During the war he was employed in legal work for the army; he was in Kut with Khalil Pasha; in Persia with Ali Ihsan. Left for Constantinople a month or two before the occupation of Mosul, and returned to Bagdad in 1919, spending eight months in Syria on the way. Very talkative, but has a slight impediment in his speech. His family came originally from Kirkuk, but have long been settled in Bagdad. Convinced Nationalist. In the spring of 1923 he was working against the elections in accordance with the Shiah fatwahs. Joined

Hizb-al-Nahdhah 1924. Always active in minor Nationalist intrigues, meetings and agitations. Elected Deputy for Bagdad in the general election of 1930. Not re-elected in 1932-33.

23. *Bakr Sidqi-bin-Shauqi.*

Born in Bagdad, 1890, of Kurdish parents. Passed out of the Turkish Military Cadet College in Constantinople in 1908. During the war attained the rank of colonel, and was appointed to the General Staff. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921, and was promoted aqid (lieutenant-colonel) in 1928. In the same year he was appointed G.S.O. 1, Operations Branch, in the Ministry of Defence. At times he has expressed both pro-Turkish and pro-Kurdish opinions. Commanded 2nd Cavalry Regiment 1930. Promoted zaim (brigadier-general) in 1931, and posted to command the Northern District. Studied at the Staff College at Camberley in 1932, and was well reported on. In the summer of 1933 he was in command of the troops which first opposed the Assyrians who were returning from Syria to Iraq, and afterwards indulged in the massacre of Assyrians at Simel. It was, however, never established that he issued the orders for this massacre. Shortly afterwards he was promoted amir liwa (major-general), and, following a period of leave, he was, in December 1933, posted to command the Eastern District, with headquarters at Kirkuk. He is probably the best commander in the Iraqi army.

24. *Daud Beg Al Haidari.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Age 40. Son of Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-al-Islam. The family comes from Arbil, where Ibrahim Effendi has a small property. Daud Beg was a Deputy and an aide-de-camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Speaks Turkish better than Arabic. He was in Constantinople during the war, and returned to Bagdad in 1921. Appointed, in October 1922, Amin-al-Umana (Chamberlain) in the King's palace. Quiet, well-mannered, insignificant, moderate man. Member for Arbil in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and Vice-President. Voted for the treaty 1924. Hazb-al-Shab and opposed treaty of 1926. Minister for Justice under Taufiq Suwaidi, April-November 1929. Disliked and distrusted in Arbil.

Re-elected to Chamber of Deputies to represent Arbil in general election of 1930, but has not held Cabinet appointment since Taufiq Suwaidi's Cabinet resigned in August 1929. In 1930 became lawyer for the British Oil Development Company in Bagdad, and has done quite well out of this work. Was not elected to the Chamber in the elections of 1934.

25. *Daud-al-Sadi, Saiyid.*

Prominent extremist, lawyer of Bagdad. Usually connected with all Nationalist agitations and intrigues. Sunni of Bagdad. Age 35.

26. *Fahmi Beg Mudarris Zadah.*

Age about 60. Superintendent of the Government press under the Turkish régime. Joined the Amir Feisal in Syria, and was with him in London in 1920. Appointed Chamberlain on King Feisal's accession. Was in close touch with the extreme Nationalists in 1922, and at the High Commissioner's request was dismissed from the Palace. In June 1924 he was appointed rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College, but lost this post in 1930 when the college was closed. In March 1932 he was expelled from Bagdad to Arbil on account of his subversive political activities, but was permitted to return to the capital a month later. Since then he has not been prominent in politics, but frequently contributes articles to the press in which he expounds Nationalist views.

27. *Fakhri-al-din-Jamil Zadah.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1879. Since the death of his cousin, Abdul Rahman, in 1919, he is the head of one of the most distinguished families of Bagdad. They have large estates on the Tigris and Khalis. Related to the Umari of Mosul. Fakhri's father, who was President of the Board of Public Instruction, had a great reputation. Fakhri is a moderate Nationalist, but he is a man of no moral courage; his opinions flicker in the wind of his fears. He was appointed



Minister without portfolio in the Naqib's Provisional Government in November 1920, an office which he held till the termination of the Provisional Government on the King's coronation in September 1921. He was piqued at not receiving Cabinet office in the next Government. In July 1922 he took a leading part in forming the Hizb-al-Hurr, under the presidency of Sayyid Mahmud Gilani, and remained with it until its collapse in 1924. He was consistently against the treaty of 1922, but was reduced to such a state of abject terror by the intimidation of the lawyer group (see Ali Mahmud), that he did not attend when the final vote was taken, and immediately afterwards removed himself into the safe retreat of the Lebanon. Member of Parliament. Kept in touch with Jafar-al-Askari in the hope that, should Jafar be called upon to form a Cabinet, he might have a chance of a seat in it. Finding Jafar Pasha unlikely to return, he attached himself to Yasin Pasha and the Hizb-al-Shab. Senator 1927. Elected to the Chamber in 1934 for Bagdad.

28. *Dr. Faiq Shakir.*

Became Deputy in the elections of 1930, and supported Nuri Pasha's Cabinet vigorously. Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs, November 1931. Transferred to be Medical Officer of Health, Kirkuk, in September 1934.

29. *Faris Agha.*

Chieftain of the Zibar tribe (Kurds), who lives at Huki in the Aqra district. From the time of the British occupation of the Mosul liwa in 1918-19 until 1923, he has a stormy record of hostility towards the authority of the Government. Since 1923 he has been quieter, though he and his tribesmen are always a perpetual danger to the peace of the Aqra district, and the local authorities have little real authority among his villages. He has an old feud with Ahmad of Barzan, whose territory lies adjacent to that of Faris on the opposite side of the Greater Zab River.

30. *Haji Kadhim Hashimoff.*

Russian subject by origin (now Persian subject). Born at Kadhimain about 1877. Moslem (Shiah). Originally from Baku, where his father (Hashim) is still living. Has had trade relations with Russia since the time of his ancestors and deals chiefly in skins. Also trades in other Russian goods, such as matches, piece-goods, samovars, glass and hardware. He came into prominence about 1928, when he was found to be dealing with Soviet merchants. Has trade agents in Persia, and has visited Resht and Moscow a few times for commercial reasons. Obtained his Persian passport for the second time from Persia in order to return to Iraq from Russia about two years ago (1929). When he returned he brought letters from Russia to Russian trade merchants in Iraq. On his return established connexion with the Russian commercial agents at Mohammerah. Visited Basra during the early part of 1931 and interviewed the Russian trade agent, who had come down from Mohammerah with the object of obtaining the Sharq Agency in Iraq. Beyond arranging the export of his skins by Russian ships, he had no success. He favours the Russian Government, calling them the supporters of the weak, and declares Russia to be England's worst enemy. Has lately (about 1931) been taking an interest in Iraqi politics. Is supposed to have given a large amount of money to the Hizb-al-Watani under an anonymous name. Organised a political meeting in his house during September 1931, which was declared to be against the King and in favour of a republic. Has three sons, Hashim, Jawad and Abdul Amir. Is a well-to-do trader. Has taken a keen interest in all Russian traders. While at Moscow gave a letter of recommendation, addressed to his son Jawad, to one Meshedi Abbas Mahmud Zade, a Russian Tartar of Baku, who arrived in Bagdad in April 1930, and whose funds come from the Bolsheviks. Also was sent by his son Jawad letters of a secret nature written by Jafar Abu Timman and Mohammad-as-Sadr, with a view to establishing commercial and other relations with the Soviet.

31. *Hamdi-bin-Abdul Wahab-bin-Haji Mahmud Pachahji.*

Sunni of Bagdad. He was at one time held in much esteem by the advanced party of young Bagdadi Nationalists. Arrested in August 1922 for organising anti-British demonstrations and interned in Henjam; returned in April 1923

on a guarantee that he would refrain from politics. In spite of this, he worked surreptitiously against the first elections in accordance with the Shiah mandates. Since then he has changed a good deal and takes a more moderate view. Was one of the original concessionnaires of the Asfar Concession. Sat in the Chamber from 1925 to 1930, and once held the portfolio of Auqaf. Not at present active in politics.

32. *Hanna Khaiyat.*

Syrian Catholic of Mosul. About 48. Medical diploma at Beirut and Paris, much medical and administrative experience and extremely able on both sides. Head of the Mosul Hospital under the Government of Occupation. Appointed Minister of Health 1921. When the Ministry was abolished in 1922 he accepted the post of Director of Medical Services. Speaks excellent French. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs October 1931. Appointed Inspector-General of Health in 1933. Became director of the Bagdad General Hospital and dean of the Royal Medicine College in September 1934.

33. *Hikmat Bey Ibn Suleiman.*

Sunni. Aged about 50. Well-mannered and cynical. Director of Education in Bagdad under the Turks. Also Assistant Governor. Member of C.U.P. Was in Constantinople at the time of the occupation. Returned in January 1921 and was a candidate for the Ministry of Education. Made Director of Posts in April 1922 and Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1923. Minister of Interior in the second Sadun Cabinet. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, but became Minister for Interior in March 1933. Resigned from Cabinet with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and from Chamber in November 1933.

34. *Husain Afnan Saiyid.*

Grandson on the maternal side of Baha Ullah, the Persian reformer. Born at Acre; educated at the Quaker School at Brumana, the American College, Beirut, and Cambridge, where he graduated. Freethinker, but very proud of his grandfather. Appointed Secretary to the Council of Ministers in November 1920, which post he filled with distinction until dismissed in 1924 by Yasin Pasha. He then took up commerce in partnership with Shafiq Haddad, but failed. In 1928 he was appointed "chef de protocol," and in January 1930 secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London. Transferred in September 1932 as secretary to the Legation at Ankara, but the post was abolished soon after his appointment. In May 1934 he was given a minor post in the Railways Directorate.

35. *Husain-al-Naini (Mirza).*

A leading Shiah divine (mujtahid) of Najaf. Like most of the mujtahids, he has latterly kept clear of political entanglements.

36. *Ibrahim Hilmi-al-Umar.*

Sunni of Bagdad; about 40. Clever writer and experienced journalist. Was in Syria during the war and at one time worked for T. E. Lawrence. Came back to Bagdad in 1921 and started the *Lisan-al-Arab* on pro-Feisal and pro-British lines. A year later he changed sides and joined the Shiah agitation against the first elections. Went to Persia with the Ulema and attacked British policy in the Persian press. Returned to Bagdad in March 1923, and in May 1924 became editor of the *Mufid*, a newspaper run by Jafar Pasha. Continued active in journalism until 1931, when he was made Superintendent of the Press Bureau in the Ministry of the Interior. Since then he has kept quiet. Ibrahim Hilmi is a thoroughly worthless and contemptible character, who will do anything (or anybody) for money or drink.

37. *Ibrahim Kamal-bin-Ahmed Mukhtar.*

Sunni. Captain in the Shereefian army. A very good officer in the field, where he commanded a battalion. Wounded at the first battle of Maan. Legal officer to O.C., Damascus, under Feisal's régime. Came to Iraq with Jamil-al-Madfa'i in 1919 making propaganda for the Shereefians. Was afterwards at



Dair, but not known to have participated in the attack on Tall Afar. He was in Damascus in April 1921, but subsequently returned to Iraq, and was said to be engaged in inciting people against any form of British control. Was appointed commandant of police, Bagdad, on the resignation of Abdul Latif Felahi. He did well in some ways and kept excellent discipline, but was removed after innumerable complaints of various kinds. After leaving the police he took up the legal profession. Entered Parliament as a Nationalist, but later gave up politics for a well-paid and influential post in the Ministry of Finance. Since then he has given no trouble. Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise in June 1934.

### 38. *Jafar Pasha Al Askari.*

Major-General; Bagdadi, son of a mukhtar; born 1885; studied in Turkish Military School and Staff College, and also in Berlin; served in Turkish, German armies, and with the Senussi in 1916. He was taken prisoner by the Dorset Yeomanry while with the Senussi; changed his allegiance and joined the Arab army under the Emir Feisal. Active service: Balkans, Yemen, Mesopotamia, Dardanelles, Libya and Arabia; speaks Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, Persian, German, French and English. Of unwieldy physique, he is by nature moody, honest, well-meaning and good tempered, though too lethargic to face the truth when it is unpleasant; inclined to take the line of least resistance and hope for the best. Has no aptitude for intrigue and is easily hoodwinked; is a good speaker; a fine tactician (no strategist), brave and alert in battle. G.O.C., Arab army, 1917-18; decorations: C.M.G., D.S.O., Iron Cross (1st Class), Croix de Guerre (Palms), Legion of Honour (officer), Osmanieh, Majidieh, Ordre pour le Mérite (Turk), Nadhah Arab (1st Class). Military Governor of Aleppo till beginning of 1920. Then military member of Feisal's Council of Advisers in Damascus; was a member of the convention which elected Emir Abdullah King of Iraq in March 1920. Returned to Bagdad October 1920. Minister of Defence in the Naqib's Provisional Government October 1920-September 1921. Attended the Cairo Conference March 1921. Minister of Defence under King Feisal till November 1922, when, prior to the dissolution of the Naqib's second Cabinet, he left for London to attend the Lausanne Conference, and held no office in the Cabinet headed by Muhsin Beg, with whom he was not on the best of terms. Remained in London as the King's personal representative, and while there began to read for the Bar. He was called in 1931. Returned to Bagdad in September 1923, and in November was persuaded to accept the post of Mutessarif of Mosul. He was made O.C. of the Iraq army in Mosul in addition to his civil duties. In November, on the resignation of Muhsin Beg, became Prime Minister. Member of the Constituent Assembly March 1924, sitting for Diwala. He and his Cabinet accomplished the ratification of the treaty and resigned on the dissolution of the Assembly in July 1924. Elected Deputy for Bagdad, but resigned, and became the Iraq diplomatic representative in London. Recalled in November 1926 by His Majesty to form a Government on the resignation of Abdul Muhsin Beg's Cabinet. Proved incapable of controlling the discordant elements of which his Cabinet was composed, and resigned in January 1928. At Council meetings he was a cypher, and only kept his Cabinet together by giving way to any Minister whose support he wished to retain. He was then appointed Iraqi Minister in London. Recalled in 1930 to go to Tehran as Iraq's first Minister Plenipotentiary at the Imperial Court. Did not take up this post, but became instead Minister for Defence in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Elected President of Chamber November 1930, resigned December 1930 and early in 1931 was reappointed Iraqi Minister in London. Recalled to Bagdad October 1931 and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Prefers London to all other cities, and has many friends in the British army. Returned as Iraqi Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of St. James December 1932. Received G.C.V.O. during King Feisal's State visit to London in the summer of 1933. He resigned his post in London on appointment to the Senate in December 1934.

### 39. *Jafar Ataifah, Sayyid.*

Shiah of Kadhimain, of Arab birth. Rais Baladiyah of the town in Turkish times and after the occupation. A very rich landowner. He was one of the Haiyat Muslihah (Conciliatory party) sent to Najaf by the Turks after the

trouble there of April-May 1915. Friendly, hospitable, pro-British. He led the movement for the presentation of a madhbatah in favour of British protection in January 1919, and remained staunch through the troubles of 1920 though often in great trepidation. His personal popularity stood him in good stead, and his loyalty to the British did him no harm, since in 1922, when a mayor was chosen by election, he headed the poll. He was still mayor in 1930. Forced to resign in February 1932 and was succeeded by a palace nominee, Mahmud Astarabadi. Is now bitter because he was not helped to keep his post by the Residency.

### 40. *Jafar Chalabi Hafidh-al-Haji Daud, Abu Timman.*

Shiah of Bagdad. Well educated, with a good deal of influence, age about 50. Always a strong Nationalist, he joined with Yusuf Suwaidi, Muhammad Sadr, Sheikh Ahmad Daud and Ali Bazirgan in the independence movement of 1920 and actively incited the tribes to rebellion. He evaded an attempted arrest in August 1920 and fled from Bagdad to Najaf. Returned in September 1921 and was energetic in promoting all extreme Nationalist movements, especially the anti-mandate agitation. Minister of Commerce from April 1922 till the end of June, when he resigned after a prolonged opposition to the terms of the treaty. He then organised the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party), of which he became general secretary. He was subsequently arrested and deported to Henjam, where he remained till May 1923. On his return to Bagdad he relapsed for a time into private life, and refused to join the Shiah Hizb-al-Nahdhah. Returned to politics on his election to the Chamber in a Bagdad by-election June 1928. Reformed the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) September 1928. Telegraphed congratulations to the Labour party on their success in the general election in England in 1929. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1930, but remained active as the secretary-general of the Nationalist party. Resigned from the Nationalist party in October 1933, declaring that he was withdrawing from politics until there should be a change of heart among those in public life.

### 41. *Jallal Beg Baban.*

Kurd of the Baban family. Age about 45.

In early days of British occupation he was actively associated with extreme Nationalists and was deported to Henjam in 1920. Released in 1921. Appointed kaimakam in 1923 and continued to serve in the civil administration, holding the posts of mutessarif in Nasiriyah, Karbala and Arbil until November 1932, when he became Minister for Economics and Communications in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Became Minister for Defence under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with the latter in October 1933. Appointed Minister for Education in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934, and was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in December 1934.

### 42. *Jamal Baban.*

A Kurdish lawyer (about 38 years of age). Served for some time as a judge in the Northern Liwas. Became Deputy for Arbil in the general election of 1928. Appointed Minister for Justice in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice in Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Retained his portfolio when Jamil-al-Madfai reformed his Cabinet in February 1934 and remained at the Ministry of Justice in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet formed in August 1934. Owes his continued presence in successive Cabinets perhaps more to the tradition that each Cabinet must have one Kurd than to his personal abilities.

### 43. *Jamil Rawi.*

A Bagdadi; officer in the Turkish army. Served in the Shereefian forces during the Arab revolt. Chief aide-de-camp to King Ali in Jedda, and came to Iraq with His Majesty after Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz. Protégé of the palace. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in the general election of 1928, became vice-president of the Taqaddum party and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. Minister for Communications and Works in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet formed in March 1930. Became Minister for Defence in January 1931, but lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Mutessarif of Kirkuk July 1932.



44. *Jamil-bin-Muhammad Agha Al Nainawi (Jamil Madfai).*

Of Mosul. Led the party which in June 1920 came from Dair and called upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Shereef. Entered Tall Afar after the murder of Captain Stuart, which he had instigated. Styled himself leader of the Northern Mesopotamian army. On the approach of British troops from Mosul returned to Dair. Returned to Iraq 1923. Soon after, appointed mutessarif and saw service in a number of different liwas. His early record as an official is not satisfactory, but latterly he has given no cause for complaint. Appointed Minister for the Interior under Nuri Pasha in March 1931. Became President of the Chamber in December 1930, following Jafar Pasha's resignation. Resigned October 1931, at the same time resigning from Nuri Pasha's party as a protest against the high-handed actions of Muzahim Beg Al Pachachi, then Minister for the Interior. Composed his quarrel with Nuri Pasha in November and was re-elected President of the Chamber on the 30th November. Again elected President in November 1932 and March 1933. Became Prime Minister in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but resumed office with a reformed Cabinet about ten days later. Resigned again in August 1934, but accepted portfolio of Defence in Cabinet which was then formed by Ali Jaudat.

Although a very competent soldier he is entirely lacking in administrative ability and is a mere figurehead in the political world. Is generally popular because he expresses his opinions in an honest, downright manner.

45. *Jamil Beg Al Wadi.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Hamid-al-Wadi, aide-de-camp to the Amir Abdullah, and Shakir-al-Wadi, aide-de-camp to King Feisal.

Appointed a judge in 1923 and became director of the Land Registry Department (Tapu) in 1931.

Appointed Minister for Justice November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of State Domains Lands (in the Ministry of Finance) October 1933. Returned to the Ministry of Justice in June 1934 as member of the Court of Cassation, and a month later was appointed Chief Public Prosecutor.

46. *Kadhim Dujaili, Sheikh.*

Shiah of Bagdad. A man of considerable literary gifts. In the early days of the occupation of Iraq he played a minor rôle in politics, but took no part in the Nationalist movement of 1920. Later seemed completely to have abandoned politics, and in the autumn of 1923 went to London as a teacher in the School of Oriental Languages. In autumn 1929 resigned his post in School of Oriental Languages and returned to Bagdad. Appointed supervisor of Iraqi students in England October 1931. Appointed Iraqi consul at Mohammerah in summer of 1933, but has remained in London at the Iraqi Legation apparently doing nothing.

47. *Khalid Sulaiman.*

Brother of Hikmat Sulaiman (*q.v.*). Age about 50. Returned from Constantinople, where he had spent most of his life in commerce, in 1926. Was Minister for Education under Taufiq Suwaidi in April 1929. In the reshuffle of portfolios which followed Abdul Muhsin Beg's suicide in November 1929, Khalid Beg was made Minister for Irrigation and Agriculture under Naji Pasha Suwaida. A pleasant, honest and likeable man, but has no influence in politics. Appointed Director-General, Public Works Department, January 1932. Transferred to be Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in September 1934.

48. *Khalil Zaki.*

Born in Kirkuk of Kirkukli parents. Served in the Turkish army and became a cavalry captain in 1906. Also saw service on the General Staff. Joined Iraqi army in 1921 and reached the rank of zaim (brigadier-general) in 1928. Has passed junior officers' course and cavalry course. Officer Commanding Northern District 1927-30. Officer Commanding Southern District 1930-31.

Officer Commanding Eastern District 1931-33. Reposted to Southern District December 1933.

A good officer and firm disciplinarian. Generally liked by the British officers of the military mission.

Retired on pension in summer of 1934.

49. *Khushaba, Malik.*

Assyrian chieftain of the Lower Tiari tribe, aged about 55. Presbyterian, and generally in disagreement with Mar Shimun. Well educated by American missionaries at Urumia. A striking personality with a romantic record as fighter and leader. Supported the Iraqi Government in their efforts to settle the Assyrians satisfactorily in Iraq and thereby incurred the bitter enmity of Mar Shimun. Many of his followers were, however, quite innocently massacred in August 1933 in spite of their friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Government. With most Assyrians he now (1933) desires to leave Iraq, but does not wish to be resettled in the same place as Mar Shimun.

50. *Mahmud Subhi Daftari.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Lawyer. Aged about 45. Went with his father to Constantinople during the occupation and returned in 1919. Pleasant, well intentioned and noticeably more moderate in politics than in his earlier days. Appointed Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad) April 1930, but was dismissed in September 1931. Appointed principal of the Law School November 1931, but resigned immediately after his appointment. Became Director-General of Tapu December 1932 and Amin-al-Asimah October 1933.

51. *Mahrut-bin-Hadhdhal, Sheikh.*

Chief of the Amarat, Anaiza (Arab) tribe of Iraq. He succeeded his father in 1927 and is about 37 years of age (1933). Intensely proud, but wiser than he appears. He has endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Iraq Government, though the Nationalist element in Bagdad regard him with some suspicion on account of his father's close friendship with the British. His tribal area is from the Euphrates southwards to the Nejd border.

52. *Mahmud, Sheikh.*

Of the family of Barzinja Sayyidis. He has inherited from his father and grandfather great tribal and religious influence throughout Southern Kurdistan. He was made Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1918, shortly after the British occupation. In June 1919 he revolted against British authority, was wounded and deported to Henjam Island in the Persian Gulf. He was reinstalled as Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1922, after the Turks had forced the British political officers there to withdraw. In 1923 armed action had to be taken against him to check his endeavours to establish his influence in the Kirkuk and Arbil Provinces. Suleimani was reoccupied in 1924, but Sheikh Mahmud was not brought to terms until 1927. These were that he was to abstain from politics and live outside Iraq in one of his Persian villages close to the border. He chose Piran and stayed there quietly until 1930, when an outbreak of Kurdish Nationalist feeling in Suleimani again tempted him into the political arena. Air and ground forces had again to be sent against him, and on the 31st May he surrendered at Panjwin. He was granted an allowance and sent to live at Hilla. From there he was later removed to Ramadi, and in the summer of 1933 he was permitted to take a house in Bagdad. He receives an allowance of 900 rupees per mensem from the Iraq Government. He has three sons, Rauf, Baba Ali and Latif. Rauf is quiet and industrious and lives in Suleimani. Baba Ali, after completing his secondary schooling at Victoria College in Alexandria, has been sent to Columbia University, New York, to study political economy. Latif is the pet of his father, and will follow closely in his footsteps, if he has a chance to do so.

53. *Mar Shimun.*

Eshai, Mar Shimun, Patriarch of the Assyrians (Catholikos of the Church in the East).

Succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child; now about 25 years of age. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury. Since coming of age and assuming the authority of his position, Mar Shimun has actively fostered



discontent among the Assyrians. Whatever his position as the head of a spiritual community, his temporal authority is not acknowledged by a large number of Assyrians, estimated at a maximum at 12,000. His aim has been to establish the whole community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. He was the inspirer of the mutiny of the levies in 1932 and of the exodus to Syria in 1933. Deported by the Iraq Government in the summer of 1933, he was given an asylum in Cyprus, where his father David and his aunt Surma joined him. In October 1933 he went to Geneva to protest to the League of Nations against the massacre of Assyrians which followed the Assyrian attack on the Iraq army at Dairabun (Faishkhabur) in August 1933, and in November went to England to obtain support from friends and sympathisers there. On his deportation King Feisal granted him and his family a provisional allowance of £780 a year, subject to his correct behaviour. This allowance was stopped by King Ghazi in the summer of 1934 on account of the propaganda which Mar Shimun persistently carried on against Iraq.

While paying lip service to the League of Nations and always ready to petition that body on behalf of the Assyrians, he has proved disloyal to its decisions whenever they have conflicted with his personal ambition. By preferring temporal power to spiritual leadership, he has been the means of inflicting much needless suffering on a deserving people. During the year 1934 he was mostly in England, paying several visits to Geneva when Assyrian affairs were under discussion.

54. *Maulad, Pasha Al Mukhlis.*

Sunni. Aged about 60. A fine soldier, he behaved with great gallantry with the Shereefian army and was badly wounded. His exploits do not lose in the telling. Served in Syria and was sent in 1920 to Dair, where the agreement between the British Government of Occupation and the Arab Government was reached under his auspices in April. A hot Nationalist, he continued to spread anti-British propaganda among the tribes until he was recalled by King Feisal in June. Remained in Syria after the fall of the Arab Government and returned to Bagdad in July 1921. He lost no time in joining the extreme Nationalist group. There was no post to offer him in the Iraq army, but he was given some land near Tikrit and settled down to cultivate it, with occasional visits to Bagdad and Mosul to take part in Nationalist activities. In May 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala, to deal with the Ulema. He is no administrator, but he kept things quiet at the time of the exodus of the mujtahids. An impulsive man, who allows his anti-British sentiment to rule his actions. Has been a Senator since 1925.

55. *Muaffaq-al-Alousi.*

Age about 40. Belongs to a learned family of Bagdad. He is a graduate of the Sorbonne whence he returned to Bagdad in 1926. Was appointed a professor in the law school and afterwards in 1928 Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Two years later he quarrelled with the Minister, Abdullah Damluji, and withdrew to Beirut. In 1931 he accompanied Nuri Pasha to Mecca to negotiate the Iraq-Nejd "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement. In the autumn of 1932 he went again to Mecca, this time to take up a post as judicial adviser to King Abdul Azziz-al-Saud. He remained in Arabia for about a year and then returned to Bagdad. In May 1934 he was appointed first secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran.

56. *Muhammad Amin Zaki Beg.*

A Kurd of Sulaimani, aged about 55. Well educated and speaks French, German and English. Formerly staff officer in Turkish army. Was made Minister for Communications and Works in November 1926, and subsequently held the portfolios of Education and Defence. Exerted little influence in the Cabinets in which he has held office. His policy is to try to please the Kurds by supporting Kurdish Nationalists while avoiding compromising his position with the Arabs. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930. Again Minister for Economics and Communications July 1931. Resigned October 1932. Appointed Director-General of Economics and Communications March 1933, but became unemployed when this post was abolished in September 1934.

57. *Muhammad-al-Isfahani, Sayyid.*

The most influential of the Shiah divines (mujtahids) of Najaf. Avoids political entanglements.

58. *Muhammad Husain Qashif-al-Ghatu (Saiyid).*

Shiah Alim of Najaf. One of the few Arab Divines of importance.

Attended the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931 as Iraqi delegate. Visited Persia on a prolonged tour in the summer of 1933, and returned to Iraq in February 1934.

He generally works for greater harmony between Shiahs and Sunnis.

59. *Muhammad Salih-al-Qazzaz.*

Bagdad mechanic, aged about 35 (1933). Has recently come into prominence as a labour leader and agitator. A professional demagogue, he always thrusts himself in the van of any bazaar troubles, and has been especially conspicuous in encouraging discontent among the labour employed by the foreign companies operating in Iraq. Played a leading part in organising the boycott of the Bagdad Electric Light Company in the autumn and winter of 1933.

60. *Muhammad-bin-Hasan-al-Sadr, Sayyid.*

Aged about 50. An influential Shiah divine of Kadhimain. Was a violent Nationalist in the early days of the British occupation, and played a prominent part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria when the insurrection was put down, but returned with the Amir Feisal in June 1921. Took an active part in the anti-mandate controversy of 1922, but after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1924 greatly modified his views. Appointed a Senator in 1925 and elected President of the Senate in 1929. He has subsequently been re-elected to this position at each new session.

61. *Muhammad Zaki.*

Basra lawyer, aged about 40. Close supporter of Yasin-al-Hashimi, and often elected Deputy for Basra. Returned to the Chamber in election of 1933, and became Minister for Justice in Cabinet of Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933.

62. *Musa Shabandar.*

Bagdadi Sunni, about 33 years old.

Elder son of Mahmud Shabandar, a wealthy land and property owner of Bagdad.

Went to Berlin soon after the armistice, and has since been living in Europe, mostly in Zurich and Berlin. Has frequently contributed anti-British articles to the Bagdad press, using the pen-name of "Alwan Abu Sharara." Believed to be in touch with the League against imperialism.

Came to Bagdad in autumn of 1932, and in January 1933 was appointed secretary of the permanent Iraqi delegation at the League of Nations.

Speaks English, French and German.

63. *Muzahim-al-Amin Pachahji.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Aged about 50, a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and sat in the first Chamber in 1925. Minister of Communications and Works in the Hashimi Cabinet, August 1924. In 1927, while in London, he made a close study of English politics. Recalled to Bagdad in February 1928 and joined the active Nationalists. His ideas seemed to be tinged with communism. Was prominent in anti-Zionist manifestations in summer of 1929. Became Minister of Economics and Communications in January 1931 and shortly after Minister for the Interior, in which post he unexpectedly gave satisfaction to his British advisers. Resigned in October 1931 on account of a difference with his colleagues regarding his dismissal of the Amin-al-Asimah. Towards the end of May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous anonymous letters, making allegations against the personal honour of the King. Resigned his seat in the Chamber and was committed for trial with four others by Bagdad magistrate's court. Acquitted in October 1932. Appointed Iraqi delegate at Geneva in October 1934.



64. *Dr. Naji-al-Assil.*

Bagdadi, born 1893. First became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. Continued to represent Hashimite interests in London until final conquest of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud. Dr. Naji then became destitute in England, and was deported to Iraq in October 1925. In Iraq he was soon employed under the Ministry of Defence in the Iraqi Military Medical Service. Appointed Iraqi consul-general and Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda in August 1931. Returned to Bagdad in June 1932 to be present during the visit of the Amir Feisal, son of King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud. Appointed consul, Mohammerah, October 1932. Acting Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs April 1933.

65. *Naji Beg Ibn Shaukat Pasha.*

Sunni of Bagdad, age about 48. Studied in Constantinople and became a reserve officer. Joined the Sharif and was at Aqabah with Colonel Lawrence, for whom he has a great admiration. Returned to Bagdad in 1919. Early in 1921 he was given an appointment under the Mutessarif of Bagdad, and subsequently became mutessarif. He showed considerable administrative ability, and maintained cordial relations with his British advisers. He was appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1922, of Hillah in 1923, and of Bagdad in 1924. Minister for Interior, June 1928, Minister for Justice, September 1929, and reverted to Interior in the changes which followed Abdul Muhsin's suicide. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in September 1930. Recalled to Bagdad in October 1931 to take up portfolio of Interior. Became Prime Minister in November 1932. Received the Order of Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy in January 1933. Resigned premiership March 1933. Minister for the Interior in November 1933, resigned February 1934. Again appointed Minister at Angora April 1934.

66. *Naji Pasha Ibn Yusuf Suwaidi.*

Born in Bagdad 1883. Educated at Bagdad and in the school of law at Constantinople. Speaks French and English. Public Prosecutor in the Yaman 1905; president of the Commercial Tribunal, Basra, 1908; member of the Bagdad Court of Appeal 1910; Kaimakam of Kadhmain 1910-11; of Najaf 1911; and of Hindiyah 1912; Civil Inspector for Diarbekr, Urfa and Mardin, 1913; Inspector for the Eastern Region (Adana to Mosul) 1915; Civil Inspector of the Adana Vilayet 1916, whence he was transferred to Konia; Civil Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior, Constantinople, 1917. Returned to Syria after the armistice and was appointed Deputy Military Governor of Bagdad, but resigned the appointment after a few days and returned to his former post in Aleppo. Returned to Bagdad in March 1921, and was active in the preparations for the reception of the Amir Feisal. Was appointed Minister of Justice in September 1921 and held the post till November 1923, having served for a short time also as Minister of Interior. Deputy for Bagdad in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924. He opposed the treaty and voted against it. Became Prime Minister in November 1929. His Cabinet resigned in March 1930. Re-elected for Bagdad in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931 as a protest against the alleged unconstitutional conduct of the Government. Accompanied King Feisal to Tehran in April 1932. Appointed Senator January 1933. Joined Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in February 1934 as Minister for Finance, and resigned with his colleague in August 1934.

67. *Naqib Zadah of Bagdad, Mahmud-bin-Abdul Rahman.*

Naqib of Bagdad, born 1867. Son of Saiyid Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Iraq. Succeeded his father in June 1927. As the Keeper of the Mosque and Shrine of Sheikh Abdul Qadir he controls large waqfs and is revered by adherents of the Qadiriyyah sect throughout the Islamic world. Many pilgrims come to visit him from all parts of India and especially from the North-West Frontier Provinces.

He has, however, little or no political influence in Iraq.

68. *Nasrat-al-Farsi.*

Minister for Finance November 1932. Lawyer of Bagdad about 1890. In early days of Iraq Government held somewhat extreme Nationalist views, which

he voiced as a Deputy in the Chamber. Was later given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice, where he served diligently for a number of years. Steady and intelligent, but inclined to be obstructive.

Resigned with Naji Beg Shaukat in March 1933. Appointed Minister for Finance in Jamil Beg Al Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934.

69. *Nishat Effendi Sanawi.*

Sunni of Bagdad, aged 45. Studied in the School of Law, Constantinople. He was in Bagdad before the occupation, went to Mosul with the Turks, and was employed in various capacities there. Returned after the armistice and took service under the British Administration. Was appointed Director of the Law School when it was reopened in 1919; criminal magistrate, February 1922; judge in the Court of Appeal, March 1923. Amin-al-Asimah, Bagdad, 1925-30. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior in April 1930, and became Principal of the Law School, February 1931. Reappointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior, November 1931. Appointed Administrative Inspector, November 1933.

70. *Nuri Pasha Said.*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated in Constantinople, speaks Turkish, German, French and English. Served in Balkan War. He was one of the founders of the Ahd in 1913, and came from Constantinople to Iraq in order to start branches there. He was in Basra at the time of the occupation as a patient in the American hospital; joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in June 1916, and commanded the troops till the arrival of Jafar Pasha (his brother-in-law); served as C.G.S. till the fall of Damascus. A good strategist very receptive of ideas, clever, hard-working, rash and hot-headed under fire. A modernist with an exceptionally alert intelligence. Was awarded the D.S.O. 1917 and the C.M.G. 1919, and accompanied Feisal in London, Paris and Syria in 1919 and 1920. He always wished for a reasonable rapprochement between the French and the Arabs, and dissuaded King Feisal from offering resistance to the French on the ground that he could not hope for support from the British. When the break came in July 1920 he went with Feisal to England. Returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and took charge of the Ministry of Defence during the absence of Jafar Pasha at the Cairo Conference. On his return he became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, and held these appointments till October 1922. Acting Minister of Defence from November 1922 to November 1923. Held the same portfolio in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet. Minister of Defence again in November 1926, and retained that portfolio with only short intervals out of office until he became Prime Minister in March 1930. Negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 1930. Visited Jedda in 1931 to negotiate a "Bon-Voisinage" Treaty with Nejd and the Hejaz. Resigned with the whole Cabinet the 19th October, 1931, but reaccepted office on the same day in a reformed Cabinet. Visited Ankara with King Feisal July 1931, and again in December-January 1931-32. During latter visit he signed with Turkish Government an Extradition Treaty, a Treaty of Commerce and a Residence Convention. Resigned premiership in October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1933, but did not proceed. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet of Rashid Ali Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and accepted portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Defence under Jamil-al-Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1934 under Ali Jaudat's premiership.

71. *Rashid-bin-Saiyid Abdul Wahab, known as Rashid Ali Beg Al Gilani.*

Sunni of Bagdad. A distant relation of the Naqib. In Turkish times was Bash Katib of Waqf. Strong C.U.P. man, unpopular with the Naqib Zadah. Fled to Mosul with the Turks on the capture of Bagdad, and after the fall of Mosul was appointed Mudir Auqaf under the British Administration. Practised as a lawyer, and in May 1931 was appointed a judge in the Court of Appeal. Became a professor in the Bagdad Law School. His work as a judge won him the good opinion of his advisers. Was appointed Minister of Justice in Yasin



Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's Concession in March 1925, which, at Yasin Pasha's instigation, he strongly opposed. Became Minister of Interior in the second Saduniyah Cabinet in June 1925, but resigned almost immediately on being elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. From November 1926 to January 1928 was Minister of the Interior. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931, in company with Yasin-al-Hashimi, Naji Suwaidi and Ali Jaudat as a protest against the conduct of Nuri Pasha's Government. Became a prominent leader of the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the party of National Brotherhood). He encouraged the general strike in July 1931, hoping thereby to embarrass Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Appointed Rais of the Royal diwan (chief private secretary to the King) in July 1932. Became Prime Minister in March 1933. Resigned October 1933. Appointed Senator in summer of 1934.

72. *Rashid Beg Al Khojah.*

Sunni of Bagdad. Staff officer in Turkish army. Came to Damascus after the armistice. Prominent member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. He returned to Bagdad in November 1920 and was appointed mutessarif in January 1921. He is weak and much under the thumb of the extreme National group. In February 1922 he was appointed Mutessarif of Mosul, where he was completely under the influence of Mustafa Sabunji. As his presence in a frontier division was considered inexpedient by the Iraqi Government, he was removed and reappointed Mutessarif of Bagdad. Appointed Iraqi consul-general at Cairo October 1928, and Director-General of Education January 1930. Consul-general, Beirut, August 1931. Chargé d'Affaires and consul-general at Jedda, August 1933, but did not take up post. Appointed Minister for Defence under Naji Shaukat, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Shaukat's Cabinet in March 1933. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies November 1933 after resignation of Jamil-al-Madfai. Reappointed Minister for Defence in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934. Re-elected President of the Chamber in December 1934.

73. *Rauf Beg Chadirji.*

Sunni of Bagdad. He was Mayor of Bagdad at the time of the cutting of New Street and earned a great deal of personal unpopularity thereby. Left for Berlin shortly before the occupation, and subsequently went to Switzerland, returning to Bagdad in the summer of 1920, up to which time permission to return had been refused him. Speaks French perfectly, English and German well. He set up practice as a barrister and consorted much with British officials. He took no part in the Nationalist agitation; nevertheless, when his father was deported to Constantinople in August, he was asked to return with him. He came back in 1921 and resumed his legal work without taking any part in politics. He has most of the business of foreign firms in his hands owing to his knowledge of English. He was in England on a visit during the summer of 1923, returning home in September. A retiring man of modernist opinions. Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly in March 1924. He was strongly opposed to the passage of the treaty without amendments and voted against it. Chosen director of the law school August 1924. Minister of Finance, Second Saduniyah Cabinet, and afterwards became Minister of Justice in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet in November 1926. Iraqi Minister to Angora autumn 1929. One of the most refined and most likeable men in Bagdad. Resigned post as Minister at Angora in December 1930, and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

74. *Rauf Beg Al Kubaisi.*

Sunni; of Kubaisah origin. He was commandant of gendarmerie in Aleppo under Jafar Pasha in 1919 and did useful work in keeping order before the advent of the French in July 1920. Refused office under the French and returned to Bagdad in February 1921. He was appointed Kaimakam of Suq in November 1921, but was removed in June. He then for a time joined the extreme Nationalist group in Bagdad. Appointed Director-General of Jails in 1924 and subsequently played no part in politics. Appointed Mutessarif of Basra January 1930. Dismissed for incompetence, April 1931. Appointed Director-General of Auqaf in summer of 1933.

75. *Rustam Beg Haidar.*

Shiah of Baalbak (Syria), where his family owns considerable estates. Well educated, speaks excellent French and English. Pleasant mannered, quiet and well bred. He came to Iraq with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and after the coronation was appointed head of the King's diwan. Appointed Minister for Finance November 1930, in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Acted as Prime Minister twice during Nuri Pasha's absence from Iraq. Went to Europe with King Feisal in summer of 1931. Resigned from the Ministry of Finance when Nuri Pasha's Cabinet fell in October 1932. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and was reappointed to the same Ministry under Jamil Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, and returned to the Palace as Rais of the Royal diwan in November 1934.

76. *Said Beg Ibn Ali Beg.*

Mir (chief) of the Yazidis. Lives at Baidra near Mosul. Weak character, drinks heavily and indulges in every sort of vice. Much under the control of his mother, Maiyana, who is a woman of personality and was at one time a noted beauty. The Yazidis are dissatisfied with Said Beg on account of his profligate living, and from time to time there is a movement to dispose him and substitute another member of the ruling family. So far, however, traditional loyalty has been stronger than their critical faculty, and Said Beg has succeeded in retaining his position.

77. *Salih Jabr.*

Young Shiah lawyer of Najaf employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and resigned from the bench. Acquired notoriety in the Chamber as a persistent asker of questions and ready speaker. Appointed Minister for Education under Jamil Madfai November 1933. Resigned February 1934.

78. *Taha-al-Hashimi Pasha.*

Brother of Yasin Pasha Al Hashimi (q.v.). Served in Turkish army and was employed in Arabia and the Yemen during the war. Was given a post on the Turkish General Staff in Constantinople in 1920, but returned to Bagdad in 1922 to join the Iraqi army, and was at once appointed Officer Commanding Troops in Mosul. Appointed chief of the General Staff and came to Bagdad in 1923. Was attached to Sir Percy Cox in May 1924 for the boundary negotiations with the Turkish Government which followed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The post of chief of the General Staff was abolished shortly after his return in August 1924, and for a while he acted as tutor to the (then) Crown Prince Ghazi. Appointed chief of the Census Department in 1926 and Director of Education in 1928. In 1930 he returned as chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence, and was promoted Fariq (general). In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahiyah of the Yemen and concluded a treaty of friendship between the Yemen and Iraq.

He is unpopular with the British officers of the military mission, whom he endeavours to isolate from general intercourse with the Iraqi officers of the army.

79. *Tashin Qadri.*

Sunni of Damascus. Was with Feisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in July 1920. Came with him to Bagdad in June 1921, and was appointed an A.D.C. to the King in August. Married the daughter and heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra. Speaks English and French. Pleasant and clever. Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the palace March 1932. Accompanied King Feisal on his State visit to England in 1933 and received the K.C.V.O.

80. *Talib Mushtaq.*

Sunni of Bagdad, aged about 38. Father was head clerk in Baquba. Took part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922 and in the spring of 1923 was one of those responsible for anti-British posters issued over the signature of the Supreme Committee of Iraq Secret Societies. Appointed Inspector of Schools in 1924 and held a variety of appointments under the Ministry of Education until November 1931 when he was appointed second secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Ankara.



81. *Taufiq-bin-Yusuf Suwaidi.*

Born 1889. Studied law in Bagdad and Constantinople and international law in Paris. In 1913 became first interpreter to the Ministry of Education, Constantinople. Represented Iraq at the Arab Conference held in Paris in July 1913. After the armistice went to Syria and was appointed peace judge in Damascus. Returned to Bagdad in October 1921 and in November was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School. Minister for Education January 1928. Prime Minister 1929. President of the Chamber 1929. Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1931. Joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in July 1934 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in August.

82. *Thabit Abdul Nur.*

Son of Aziz Abdul Nur, a prominent Jacobite Christian of Mosul. He was christened Nikole. Was an officer in the Turkish army, embezzled money and fled to Syria to join Shereefian cause. At this time he changed name to Thabit, became a Moslem and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Came to Bagdad in November 1921 and became prominent in extreme Nationalist politics. Elected Deputy for Mosul in general election of 1930, and appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1931. The post was abolished in March 1933. Tried in 1932 for misappropriating the funds of the Agricultural Exhibition (April 1932), but acquitted.

Appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in London December 1933. This post was abolished and he was appointed Iraqi Oil Representative in London in July 1934.

83. *Yasin Pasha Al Hashimi.*

Sunni; aged about 55. Of Kirkuk origin and probably Turkish (Saljuq) descent. His father was a Mukhtar of Bagdad. Yasin saw military service in Mosul in 1913 and was the founder and organiser of the local branch of the Ahd. G.O.C. at Salt and Amman in 1918, where, in the spring, he proved a good strategist. After the Turkish retreat Nuri Pasha found him at Damascus and persuaded him to join the Arab movement. He was made C.G.S. of the Arab army in Syria, a post he held till November 1919. In July 1920 he was appointed Prime Minister at Damascus, but held the appointment only for a few days. Remaining at Damascus, after the fall of the Arab Government, he dissipated in unsuccessful commerce the money which he had amassed while in office. Returned to Bagdad in March 1922. At first he kept out of all politics, but in June, at the King's insistent request, he accepted the post of Mutessarif of Muntafiq. In November 1922 he became Minister of Communications and Works in Abdul Muhsin Beg's Cabinet. Able in his Ministry he was unfailingly obstructive in the Cabinet, especially in regard to those parts of the Treaty of 1922, which dealt with the employment of British officials. He resigned office in November 1923, but joined the Constituent Assembly March 1924, where he persistently opposed the ratification of the treaty. Was Premier and Minister of Defence in 1924 and 1925. From June 1925 to November 1926 he headed an Opposition party. In November 1926 he again accepted office as Minister of Finance, and remained in this post until the Cabinet resigned in January 1928. Was once more Minister for Finance in Naji Suwaidi's Cabinet of November 1929, but resigned office in March 1930. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, and led the Opposition to Nuri Pasha's Cabinet together with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. Resigned his seat in March 1931 in company with Naji Suwaidi, Rashid Ali and Ali Jaudat. Played a leading part in giving political encouragement to the general strike in Bagdad in July 1931, hoping through the strike to deal a blow at Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. King Feisal was anxious to make him Prime Minister in October 1932, when Nuri Pasha resigned, but he would not accept the King's condition that he should announce his acceptance of the Treaty of Alliance of 1930. Became Minister of Finance in Cabinet of Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and did not join Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai.

84. *Yusuf Ghanimah.*

An intelligent and hardworking Chaldean Catholic of Bagdad; aged about 45. Diminutive and unimpressive, he mixes freely with Moslems and was made

Minister for Finance in January 1928, after having shown industry and ability as *rapporteur* of the Finance Committee of the Chamber. Has sat in Parliament for Bagdad since the first election. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, and then began to take part in the activities of the two Opposition parties, the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) and the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the Party of National Brotherhood). Appointed Director-General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance, December 1932, and Director-General of the Ministry in 1933. Became Minister for Finance in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934.

[E 622/622/93]

No. 86.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 28.)*

(No. 33.)

*Bagdad, January 16, 1935.*

Sir,  
I HAVE the honour to report that the Iraqi Government have decided to recruit six foreign engineers for various appointments which will require to be filled during the progress of the capital works development programme.

2. Certain members of the Iraqi Cabinet at one time desired to extend an opportunity to the French, German and Italian Governments of nominating engineers for any of these vacancies for which qualified British engineers could not be made available. When this was brought to my notice, I addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs (of which a copy is transmitted herewith) to remind him of the undertaking contained in the annexures to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, that preference would invariably be given to British candidates for any posts which require to be filled by foreign recruitment. A series of conversations with Nuri Pasha followed the despatch of this note, to which no written reply has yet been received. I was given a definite oral assurance, however, by Nuri Pasha, before he left for Geneva, that the salary offered had been raised at my suggestion to £60 a month and that preference would in all cases be given to British candidates, if available. I have now been informed by the Adviser to the Ministry of Economics and Communications, under which Ministry the engineers in question will be employed, that it has been decided to get into touch with suitable candidates for all these posts through the agency of Messrs. Coode, Wilson, Mitchell and Vaughan Lee, the consulting engineers to the Iraqi Government, and that their actual recruitment and appointment will be arranged through the Iraqi Legation in London.

3. Two engineers, one for work on the new bridge to be thrown across the River Zab and the other to be employed in connexion with the Kut Barrage, have already been appointed in consultation with Mr. Mitchell, a representative of Messrs. Coode, Wilson, Mitchell and Vaughan Lee, who has come to Iraq at the invitation of the Government to advise them on a number of matters arising out of the engineering works now being undertaken or in contemplation. Arrangements are also being made for the engagement of an Assistant Resident Engineer for the Kut Barrage, through the same agency, and I understand that the other three engineers will be recruited in the same way when occasion arises for their services. Suitable rates of pay are being offered, and the conditions of service are those set out in the revised contracts for foreign officials serving the Iraqi Government. As the consulting engineers have a practical knowledge of the work to be done and are aware of the qualifications and experience which it is desirable that selected candidates for the appointment should possess, the procedure which is being followed seems eminently suitable.

I have, &amp;c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 86.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Nuri Pasha.**Bagdad, November 19, 1934.*

My dear Minister,

YOU were good enough to explain to me this morning the procedure which the Iraqi Government wish to follow in recruiting the six foreign engineers which are required for the departments under the Ministry of Economics and Communications.

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2. I understand that it is proposed to invite His Majesty's Government to furnish the Iraqi Government with the names of suitable candidates to fill these posts and at the same time to inform the French, German and Italian Governments of the vacancies, in order that they may be in a position to nominate engineers for any of the vacancies for which qualified British engineers may not be available.

3. Your Excellency was good enough to ask me whether this procedure would be likely to meet with objection from His Majesty's Government as being in conflict with the third exchange of notes annexed to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. I do not feel that I can express a definite opinion on this question without referring it to the Secretary of State. For this purpose it will be necessary for me to have further details regarding the nature of the posts which the Iraqi Government desire to fill, of the terms offered and of the qualifications required. It is also important that I should be in a position to inform the Secretary of State more precisely of the form of the communication which the Iraqi Government are thinking of addressing to the other foreign Governments. Your Excellency will appreciate that, in order to avoid misunderstanding, it is important that these Governments should realise from the outset that preference will be given to suitable British candidates if available.

4. It would be convenient if your Excellency would furnish me with information on the above lines when you visit me at the Embassy next Thursday. We can then discuss the matter further. In the meantime I request that action be deferred.

Yours sincerely,  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 623/278/93]

No. 87.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 28.)*

(No. 35.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 17, 1935.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 22 of the 10th January, I have the honour to report that the Opposition group, in addition to their activities in the Senate, are now seeking to work up agitation against the present Government among the sheikhs of the Middle Euphrates.

2. Their chief instrument is Abdul Wahid-al-Haj Sikkar, sheikh of the Fatlah, one of the most troublesome and influential sheikhs of this area. In the recent general election he was not included in the Government's list of candidates for the Diwaniyah division, and, in consequence, lost his seat. He has taken this very much to heart and has readily fallen in with the plans of Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Hikmat Sulaiman. According to information which I have received, Abdul Wahid has been hurriedly settling personal and local differences with other sheikhs of the Middle Euphrates area with a view to forming a united front. He has also been in close touch with Saiyid Muhsin Abu Tabikh—an influential landowner of the neighbourhood and a member of the Senate who has a long record of intrigues against all Governments.

3. The Opposition have also obtained the support of other tribal sheikhs of the Euphrates who have either lost their seats in the Chamber or have been disappointed in their hopes of being elected for the first time. Among such men they find many ready to listen to their attacks on the Prime Minister, whom they accuse of having sold seats in the Chamber to the highest bidder, and of having kept the lion's share of these bribes for himself. So far, however, their efforts to widen the front of their attacks on the Government by bringing into the struggle the Ulema of Kerbala and Najaf, through the Shiah tribal leaders, have not proved successful, the Ulema being by no means disposed to take sides in what they have sufficient wit to see is only a struggle between two groups of Sunni politicians, neither of which is really concerned to further the communal interests of the Shiaks.

4. Other elements in the country have also been rallied to give evidence of hostility to the present régime, and many telegrams have been sent to the Opposition newspapers applauding the animadversions on the Government contained in the Senate's reply to the speech from the Throne. These have come mostly from Nationalist groups or from disgruntled office seekers, and have been

countered by other messages inspired by local officials, in which numerous signatories declare their faith in the present Cabinet. Many of the pro-Government sheikhs from the Middle Euphrates have gathered in Bagdad during the past few days to give assurances of their loyalty and support. The Government themselves are, I understand, quite confident of their ability to deal effectively with Abdul Wahid and have under consideration plans for bringing him to heel by threatening to take action against him for one of his many past misdeeds.

5. They are now more perturbed, however, by the situation in the Senate. It appears that the Opposition have succeeded in concentrating a strong group of about half the Senators, and it is feared that they may endeavour to block legislation passed through the Chamber by the Government majority. It is possible that, as soon as the Prime Minister returns from Geneva, he will try to improve the position in the Senate by making several changes in his Cabinet. He may decide to surrender the portfolio of the Interior to one of the many aspirants for a Cabinet post who are now standing in with the Opposition, and Arahad-al-Umari, the present Minister for Economics and Communications, whose drastic methods have made many enemies for the Government, may be asked to give place to someone less arbitrary.

6. From the point of view of the general welfare of the country, a struggle between the Government and the Senate need cause no anxiety. If the activities of those out of office are confined within the four walls of Parliament, nothing more momentous than a reshuffle of Cabinet Ministers is likely to result. But if influential public men deliberately incite disgruntled sheikhs and ignorant tribal elements to resort to force to overawe the Government, a serious situation may rapidly develop, which will severely test the statesmanship of the young King and his Ministers.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 624/53/93]

No. 88.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 28.)*

(No. 36.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, January 17, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the pipe-line of the Iraq Petroleum Company connecting the oil-field at Kirkuk with the Mediterranean port of Haifa was officially opened by His Majesty King Ghazi on the 14th January.

2. A fortnight prior to this event Sir John Cadman had arrived at Bagdad from Abadan to take personal charge of the arrangements for the ceremony; he and Lady Cadman and their two daughters were my guests during their stay in Bagdad, and Sir John was able to make many interesting and useful contacts with the Iraqi politicians, members of the Diplomatic Body, and senior British and Iraqi officials, who were present at the parties which were given at the Embassy in his honour.

3. On the 30th December Sir John paid a flying visit to Tehran in one of the company's aeroplanes to be received in audience by the Shah. On his return journey his machine was unfortunately compelled by bad weather to make a forced landing between Hamadan and Kermansbah. Happily, neither the aeroplane nor its passengers suffered any injury and, after a short delay in Hamadan, Sir John was able to reach Bagdad on the 5th January without further mishap.

4. On the 12th January some thirty-five distinguished guests of the company, the chief of whom was Lord Stanhope, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, arrived in Bagdad from Europe in two specially chartered passenger aeroplanes. British oil interests were represented by Major the Honourable Thomas Cochrane, Director of the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. Medlicott, Deputy-Director of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. M. Paul Bastid, President of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the French Chamber, and M. Robert Cayrol, director of

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the Compagnie française des Pétroles, were the principal representatives of France, while Mr. G. H. Siedel, director of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, represented the American holding in the company.

5. Lord Stanhope accepted my invitation to stay at the Embassy during his visit, and Colonel and Mrs. Medlicott were the guests of my first secretary. The other members of the party were accommodated in the Maude Hotel, which had been exclusively reserved by the company for this purpose.

6. On the same evening, King Ghazi dined at the Embassy and had an opportunity to exchange views with Lord Stanhope and the other principal British members of the party whose acquaintance His Majesty had particularly desired to make.

7. In all, over 250 guests were invited by the company to attend the opening ceremony, and elaborate arrangements were made for their transport. The majority of the guests from Iraq travelled to and from Kirkuk by a special train, while those who came from Europe made the journey in the aeroplanes in which they had flown to Iraq. Lord Stanhope accompanied me in my private aeroplane. One of the outstanding features of the day was the large part played by air transport, no fewer than fourteen aeroplanes landing on the company's aerodrome at Kirkuk.

8. The ceremony itself is described fully in the enclosed copy of the *Iraq Times*, which also contains the full text of Sir John Cadman's speech and the King's reply.<sup>(1)</sup> I need only add that the programme was carried out from beginning to end without a hitch and in a manner which does great credit to the efficiency of the company's organisation and personnel. The arrival of His Majesty in one of a flight of five Hart Audax military machines was particularly impressive, and the manner in which the Iraqi pilots handled these fast machines called forth universal admiration.

9. The next day King Ghazi entertained some of the senior British and foreign guests of the company, and the members of the Iraqi Cabinet, at a banquet at the Qasr-al-Zuhur. Unhappily, the King was overcome by the excessive heating of the dining-room and was obliged to leave the table after the third course. As His Majesty has been in indifferent health lately, and had already carried through a long and tiring programme at Kirkuk, it was considered inadvisable that he should attend the reception at the British Embassy which took place later in the evening. This was unfortunate, as His Majesty particularly wished to bid farewell to the distinguished foreign guests who had participated in the ceremony and were due to leave Bagdad for Syria next morning.

10. On the 16th January Sir John Cadman and his guests left by air for the official opening of the second sector of the line from Haditha to Tripoli.

11. Sir John Cadman may well be satisfied with the unparalleled engineering feat which has been achieved by the Iraq Petroleum Company under his inspiring guidance, and completed without a hitch one whole year earlier than had been thought possible. It is, indeed, a magnificent piece of work which will confer lasting benefits on this country and which should emphasise the identity of the interests of Great Britain and Iraq in future. The friendliness and good-fellowship displayed at the recent ceremonies has afforded welcome proof that responsible Iraqis of all shades of political opinion are proud to be associated with Sir John Cadman and his splendid team of engineers in the successful completion of this remarkable enterprise.

12. Among the most interesting comments by Iraqi statesmen and business men which I heard during the celebrations was the desire that the earliest opportunity should be taken for increasing the output of Iraq oil to the Mediterranean, and I understand that the Kirkuk oil-field, measuring about 51 miles in length and an average of 14 miles in breadth, which is probably the largest structure of its kind in the world, would be capable of exporting not less than 20 million tons of oil annually, if markets could be found for such a quantity. In any case, it seems safe to assume that additional pipe-lines will have to be constructed to the Mediterranean in the not far distant future, and I need not emphasise the effect which a railway from Bagdad to Haifa would have in determining the direction of future pipe-lines from the point of bifurcation at Haditha. It is significant that Yasin Pasha informed me at the

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

opening ceremony that Iraqis would much prefer that these additional pipe-lines should go to Haifa rather than to Tripoli. The extra distance of about 90 miles, however, which is involved by choosing the Haifa route must weigh heavily with the company unless some cheaper means of transport can be provided as a set-off against the extra cost of the pipes.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, the High Commissioner for Palestine, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 672/2/93]

No. 89.

*Record of the Thirty-Seventh Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, January 17, 1935, at 11 A.M.—(Communicated by United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva; received January 30, 1935.)*

THE committee first considered the letter of the 5th January from the Office centrale d'Entr'aide des Eglises (C. Min. Ass./94).

*The President* said that he had not felt able to take a decision on his own responsibility regarding the action to be taken as a result of this letter. As the Iraqi Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were in Geneva, it might be useful, if the committee decided to take up any particular attitude, to proceed orally with the two Iraqi Ministers rather than by correspondence. Before the committee discussed this matter, however, M. Oliván wished to explain that he had recently received a visit from a deputation headed by Professor Keller. The deputation had explained their concern regarding the present situation of the Assyrians in Iraq, and their desire to have this situation investigated by some impartial body. M. Oliván, on his side, explained the efforts of the Assyrian Committee to find a settlement of the question and the difficulties in the way of carrying out the proposals put forward by Professor Keller's organisation. He had promised, however, that the letter of the 5th January would be examined. The deputation had gone on to say that if a home were found for the Assyrians of Iraq, they hoped that the committee would also find a home for all the other Assyrians scattered throughout the world. M. Oliván had explained that it was sufficiently difficult to find a home for the 20,000 Assyrians of Iraq, and he asked the deputation not to complicate the committee's task.

Turning to the letter of the 5th January, M. Oliván said that if it was practicable to carry out the proposals made in the letter he personally would be extremely glad, as he could not help feeling considerable anxiety regarding the situation of the Assyrians.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that it was, of course, unlikely that the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq should be, at the moment, completely satisfactory. The Assyrians themselves were living in a state of uncertainty, not knowing whether they were going to be removed from Iraq or not, and were in consequence reluctant to resume their normal life and work. The Iraqis, on their side, were uncertain whether the Assyrians would leave Iraq. While it was impossible for the United Kingdom representative to give any authoritative information, the opinion which the United Kingdom Government had formed as a result of information from unofficial as well as from official sources was to the effect that, though the situation could not be regarded as satisfactory, there was no reason to suppose that there was at present actual destitution. Such distress as might exist was due in the main to the fact that the Assyrians had refused the assistance which the Iraqi Government had offered to enable them to return to their villages and restart cultivation. As regards the methods proposed by Professor Keller's organisation, the first, i.e., the despatch of an official commission of enquiry, had frequently been discussed by the committee, who had in the past fully realised the difficulties and dangers involved. In the first place, Iraqi consent would be necessary, and even if that consent were given there was always the chance of local disturbances if a commission went out. The despatch of a private relief committee might conceivably be less objectionable, but even



that might only complicate the problem. It seemed probable that, if it were known that relief were going to be distributed, those Assyrians who had already returned to their villages would leave them again and flock into Mosul, where the distribution of relief would probably have to be centralised, and the problem would be rendered still more acute than it was at present.

*The President* said that, with all respect for the information which the United Kingdom representative had furnished, the situation must, in his personal point of view, be very serious. In the letter of the 5th January the churches had given certain facts and had suggested certain procedure. It seemed very difficult to discourage the proposals made in the letter, unless the committee could say definitely that the facts on which they were based were incorrect. He understood that the opinion which the United Kingdom representative had given was to be regarded as a private expression of view. If the committee could state definitely, on the authority of the United Kingdom Government, that the situation was as described, the answer to the letter of the 5th January would, of course, be easier.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that naturally the United Kingdom Government were not in a position to give an authoritative statement. That the Iraqi Government alone could do, but he had given the committee in good faith the opinion which the United Kingdom Government had come to on the information available to them. They had been very anxious about the situation, and had taken such steps as were open to them to ascertain what the situation was. He could not say more. It was, of course, impossible for the committee to express any opinion of its own, as it had no means of acquiring the necessary information. He suggested, however, that the committee could at least say that it had no information to confirm that the situation was as Professor Keller's organisation described it.

*M. Oliván* said that he did not think that the committee could go so far. He thought it would look very strange if the committee used any wording to the effect that it was unaware of the nature of the situation. It had, after all, been entrusted by the Council with the task of looking after the situation of the Assyrians pending migration.

*The United Kingdom Representative* reminded the committee that it had not, in fact, been entrusted with the task of looking after the situation in Iraq. In the terms of reference contained in the original report of the *rapporteur*, the Iraqi Government had merely been asked to furnish the committee with periodical reports regarding the situation of the Assyrians. The committee had been entrusted with no task other than receiving these reports.

*The President* said that he thought the committee must be presumed to have power to take any necessary action or make any recommendations on the reports. One way of dealing with the present letter would, of course, be to ask Professor Keller's organisation to state on what the information contained in paragraph 1 of their letter was based. Another alternative was simply to put the whole matter before the Council and ask the Council to decide what action should be taken.

In answer to an enquiry from the Italian representative, the President said that he had not yet been in touch with the Iraqi delegation. He wished first of all to have this private exchange of views between the members of the committee.

*The Danish Representative* thought it might be wise to see Professor Keller and ask him orally from what source his information was derived. It might be that it came simply from the Mar Shimun.

*The President* was reluctant to take this course. The committee must be presumed to have opportunities of satisfying itself that the situation of the Assyrians was satisfactory, and it had a responsibility in this sense. He did not think it possible to throw doubt on the facts given in the first paragraph of the letter, or to pass over that paragraph in silence.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he would like the committee to consider another aspect of its responsibility. Its main task was to find a permanent solution for the Assyrian question, and it must be careful not to take any unnecessary action which might interfere with that main task. He also

felt bound to say that there was a certain section of the Assyrians which did not desire to see a satisfactory solution and which was bent on creating trouble. Due allowance must be made in the reports which were current about Assyrian destitution for propaganda directed to this end. It was natural that those of the Assyrians who wished to create further embarrassment should paint the picture in its blackest colours.

*The President* said that he thought the committee had in fact been extremely careful to discount propaganda, and had been extremely patient and moderate in its dealings with the Iraqi Government in regard to the situation of the Assyrians in Iraq. Taking into account, however, the various views which had been expressed, he thought that the best course for the committee to follow would be to send the letter to the Iraqi delegation saying that the committee would like a reply from the Iraqi Government on the statements made in the first paragraph, and also a declaration of the Iraqi Government's point of view on the proposals made in the letter. Provisionally a reply might be sent to Professor Keller saying that his letter had been sent for such action as might be possible to the Iraqi Government, and that the reply of that Government would be transmitted to Professor Keller on its receipt. If the committee decided to adopt this course, he himself would propose, in conversation with the Iraqi delegates, to emphasise the importance which the committee attached to this matter.

*The Danish Representative* asked the committee to consider whether it was in fact prepared to accept the responsibility involved in the first of the two proposals made in Professor Keller's letter.

*The Mexican Representative* said that he thought that Professor Keller ought in the first place to be asked to give the source of his information.

*The President* thought that this would be an unusual course to adopt in regard to a document which was in the nature of a petition, and he thought that in the case of a letter from the Churches it would be, in addition, somewhat ungracious.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he had been about to suggest a course very similar to that which M. Oliván had proposed. He thought, however, that the observation made by the Danish representative was very important. The committee had hitherto realised that in proposing the despatch of a commission of enquiry, the League would be taking upon itself what might be an extremely embarrassing responsibility. He thought that that objection still held good. But the second proposal was also somewhat dangerous. He knew that the question of sending out relief had been very carefully considered by ecclesiastical organisations in Great Britain. After hearing such evidence as was available, however, these organisations had apparently come to the conclusion that no special effort was necessary at the moment. He believed that they had also felt that any appeal for funds at this stage would probably militate against the success of the larger appeal which they contemplated should any settlement scheme come into being. But while special measures were not absolutely necessary, it was fairly obvious that any charitable contributions which could be sent to Iraq would be of great value. The ecclesiastical organisations in Great Britain realised this, but they also realised that any relief, if it were not to make the problem immensely more difficult and perhaps insoluble, must be distributed with the utmost discretion. He personally thought that anything like a special relief mission was bound to end in trouble. At the same time, that was only his personal opinion. He was not there to state the Iraqi case. The Iraqi Government must themselves decide, and he quite agreed that the letter should be transmitted to the Iraqi delegation for comments. He suggested, however, that M. Oliván in his subsequent conversations with the Iraqi delegation might indicate that the committee was fully aware of the difficulty of sending out any official mission of enquiry, but would be very glad in particular to know the views of the Iraqi Government on the second proposal made in the letter, namely, the despatch of a private relief organisation.

*The Danish Representative* asked what precisely were the dangers which the United Kingdom representative apprehended in the case of a private relief mission.



*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he thought that any mission would probably find it necessary to centralise its efforts in Mosul. Any attempt to go round the country distributing relief in various villages might be a matter of difficulty. But there were two difficulties which he foresaw. In the first place the Assyrians had grown accustomed during the past fourteen years to expect aid from outside whenever they were in difficulties. They had unfortunately developed a refugee spirit. He felt that it was certain, therefore, that if any relief organisation were opened it would be the signal for the majority of the Assyrians to desert their normal work and homes and flock into whatever place was chosen for the distribution of relief. He feared also that there might be actual conflict between the Assyrians and other communities. It must be remembered that the standard of living in Northern Iraq was very low, and that while the committee had in mind particularly the distress of the Assyrians, there were other categories of Iraqis who were extremely badly off and who had no relief. If these saw the Assyrians singled out for preferential treatment they might also clamour for it, and even vent their feelings on the Assyrians themselves. Apart from this, he thought that the question of responsibility ought to be carefully considered. If a relief mission went out to Iraq, the Iraqi Government would very probably consider themselves absolved from all further obligation towards the Assyrians. If the Assyrians flocked into Mosul, a semi-permanent problem might be created. So long as funds lasted there might be no difficulty, but there might easily come a time when the funds of the Churches were not sufficient for the task in hand and the Churches might find themselves in a very invidious position. If the mission had gone out, so to speak, under the auspices of the League, and if its despatch had been arranged by the League, the consequent responsibility would devolve upon the League. He did not know whether his colleagues were prepared to accept this position.

*The President* said that, judging from past experience, he did not think that there was any danger of the Iraqis accepting the despatch of an official mission. In view of what had been said, however, he was inclined to think that the best course would be for the committee to transmit Professor Keller's letter to the Iraqi Government, saying that the committee was not in a position to express any opinion either on the facts alleged in it or on the proposals suggested, but that it would be glad to have the Iraqi Government's views.

This course was agreed to, and it was also agreed to send a reply to Professor Keller on much the same lines, i.e., that the committee was not in a position to express an opinion on the facts alleged or on the proposals suggested, but that they had thought it best in the first place to send a copy of the letter to the Iraqi Government in order to obtain their views.

*The President* mentioned that at the last meeting of the committee the Iraqi representative had promised to obtain further information (1) regarding what had happened to the persons sent away from the Mosul camp; (2) regarding the incidents which had taken place on the occasion of their removal from the camp; (3) as to whether the measures taken by Iraq in October in relation to the Mosul camp were definitive, or if they were to be followed by others. *M. Oliván* said that when he saw the Iraqi delegates he proposed to mention these specific points and try to hasten the reply to them. He would also emphasise generally the concern which the committee felt about the whole Assyrian question and would try to induce the Iraqis to be more forthcoming.

This line was approved by the committee.

*M. Arocha* then mentioned that there were still certain countries, namely, Turkey, Canada, the Argentine and Columbia, which had not replied to the enquiries sent by the committee in June last regarding the possibilities of settlement in the respective countries. It had been suggested that the committee ought to take steps to clear up the attitude of the Governments concerned.

*The President* and the *Danish Representative* suggested that letters should at once be sent to the four Governments asking them to reply without further delay.

*The United Kingdom Representative* pressed for the reminders to be sent by telegram in spite of the expense to which *M. Arocha* had meanwhile referred. The *United Kingdom Representative* pointed out that it was urgently necessary

to clear up the attitude of these Governments. Assuming for a moment that General Browne's report was unfavourable, the committee might be compelled to wait for an embarrassing length of time before it could present a definite recommendation to the Council.

*M. Oliván* said that in such circumstances he for one would certainly not be in favour of any further delay. He would propose to take silence as refusal and to report accordingly to the Council that settlement outside Iraq was impossible. However, he agreed that it would be well to get replies if possible. The proposal to telegraph was accordingly approved.

*The French Representative* then said that he had been struck by the passage in General Browne's preliminary report of the 11th December which indicated that a home could not be found immediately in British Guiana for all the Assyrians, and that in General Browne's opinion it would be necessary to send out a first contingent as a practical experiment. Settlement might thus be spread over considerable time. There was a great similarity between this view and that taken by the administrative authorities in French West Africa. In fact, the settlement of all the Assyrians at the same time and at the same place seemed impossible and, in view of the fact that the removal of the Assyrians from Iraq appeared to be urgent, he wondered whether the committee ought not to inform the Council of the changed basis on which it was working.

*The President* said that as a general principle he was always in favour of keeping the Council as fully and as frequently informed as possible. If a report were now furnished to the Council it would have to contain the substance of General Browne's telegraphic report of the 11th December, which was, however, of a provisional nature only. If the committee were to tell the Council of the difficulty to which the French representative had referred, the *rapporteur* would have to accompany the report with views as to what action should be taken. He suggested that at the present stage this might be distinctly premature. He thought, therefore, it would be preferable to wait. Once the more detailed report from General Browne arrived, the position would be carefully studied by the committee and a report prepared for the Council. He wished, however, to go to the Council with definite recommendations.

*The Danish Representative* said that he was entirely in agreement with the President, and all the more so, seeing that General Browne had not given the reasons for his views nor yet the numbers who he thought could be settled in the first contingent. The question raised by the French representative was, however, an important one, since it seemed likely that the Council might not meet after the present session until next May. Before then important questions might have to be settled; for instance, the option which the United Kingdom Government had obtained to acquire the assets of the Rupununi Company expired on the 20th April.

*M. Arocha* pointed out that in the first instance the Council had specifically delegated wide powers to the committee, which could, in fact, regard itself as having *carte blanche* in this question.

*The French Representative* said that he had not meant to suggest an immediate report to the Council on the information so far available. What he felt, however, was that settlement, if it proved practicable, would not be precisely on the basis which the Council had contemplated, and he felt that the decision as to whether it should be proceeded with on the slower and more gradual basis should be a decision taken by the Council itself.

*The President* said that it would be preferable if the Council could take a decision. He was reluctant, however, to place the matter before the Council unless there was a realisable project or, in the absence of such a project, a clear situation. He felt, however, that matters could not be allowed to drag on and in the absence of any concrete scheme he would feel bound to lay the whole position before the Council at latest in May next.

*The Danish Representative* enquired whether, if General Browne suggested that a start should be made with, say 1,000 Assyrians, the committee would feel able to proceed on that basis without putting the matter before the Council in May.



*The United Kingdom Representative* said the answer depended on a factor which was perhaps in danger of being overlooked. Before the committee could express a definite opinion on the British Guiana scheme, it would be necessary to discuss General Browne's opinion (perhaps waiting for his detailed report for this purpose) with His Majesty's Government. So far His Majesty's Government were not committed to the British Guiana scheme. They had merely indicated the possibilities for investigation, but it was only natural that General Browne's reports should be discussed with His Majesty's Government in the first place, so that the latter might have an opportunity of considering whatever difficulties there might be and whether they could, in fact, be surmounted, and in the light of the discussions His Majesty's Government would have to decide definitely whether they were prepared to receive the Assyrians in British Guiana.

*The President* agreed. The United Kingdom Government were in this respect in much the same position as the Brazilian Government had been a year ago.

*The French Representative* recalled that the committee had asked for further information regarding French Guiana. A preliminary despatch has now arrived and further details were on their way by air mail. M. de Panafieu read an extract from the preliminary despatch which showed that land could be offered at three points in the territory, that at each point water was plentiful and that the cost of the land would be in the region of 10 fr. a hectare. In all some 50,000 hectares were available. The local administration calculated that room could be found for 40,000 persons, but that settlement would have to be progressive. But while there was no difficulty about the provision of land, the climate was tropical and the local authorities could not take the responsibility of deciding whether it was suitable for the Assyrians. It was for this reason that they had suggested that General Browne should visit French Guiana. M. de Panafieu thought that it should be possible for General Browne to settle this question as to whether the climate was suitable by a very brief visit to the colony without exhaustive investigation.

In reply to questions, the French representative said that the land offered was low-lying. There were plateaux in French Guiana, but it was not possible to make them available for Assyrian settlement.

A discussion then ensued as to whether General Browne should be asked to visit French Guiana or whether he would be able to express an opinion as to whether the climate was likely to suit the Assyrians from information available in British Guiana or from his experience of the coastal belt in British Guiana, which probably did not differ very much from the area suggested by the French. It was felt that for General Browne to pay a short visit to French Guiana merely to judge whether the climate was suitable was not a very practical proposition, and that in any case, if he thought it suitable, it would still be necessary for him to make a detailed investigation of the areas proposed. It was recognised also that the question must turn to some extent on the nature of his reports about British Guiana. A suggestion was made that a telegram should be sent to General Browne at Georgetown indicating the possibilities of French Guiana and asking for his views as to the desirability of proceeding there. Objection was seen, however, to placing the responsibility on General Browne in this way, and it was eventually decided to do no more for the time being than to make sure that he did not leave Georgetown for Europe without giving the committee a chance to send him further instructions in the light of his reports.

M. Arocha was accordingly instructed to send a telegram to General Browne asking him not to leave Georgetown pending the receipt of further instructions.

[E 673/2/93]

No. 90.

*Record of 38th Meeting of Assyrian Committee, January 22, 1935, 10-30 A.M.—*  
(Communicated by United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva; Received January 30.)

*THE President* said that at the last meeting the question of the extension of General Browne's mission to French Guiana had been left in suspense, as the members of the committee had felt that the decision must depend on the nature of General Browne's report regarding British Guiana. The French

representative had communicated confidentially to the secretariat certain information regarding the points of view of the local administration and of the colonial authorities in Paris. Although the local administration were apparently prepared to welcome the Assyrians, the view of the French Colonial Ministry on the possibilities of settlement was rather pessimistic. The President had thought it necessary to convoke the committee, therefore, to take a decision, and also to discuss the position of the British Guiana scheme, which seemed somewhat uncertain in the light of General Browne's last telegram. The question was whether the mission should now be told to go to French Guiana, or to return at once.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that the question appeared to turn on the interpretation to be given to General Browne's last telegram. The telegram did not appear very favourable, but he thought that the position would be clearer if all four telegrams from General Browne were read together. He pointed out that in the telegram of the 11th December General Browne had explained that the mission had examined the area to the south and north-west of the mountain of the Clackmannan area. The United Kingdom representative had been unable to identify this name on the map, and thought that it must refer to the Kanuku mountain. The area to the south was that in which the land of the Rupununi Development Company lay, and it was this area which His Majesty's Government had had principally in mind, though they had promised the investigation of the whole area marked purple on the map attached to the United Kingdom Government's memorandum on the subject. General Browne, in his telegram of the 11th December, had expressed the view that in the areas north-west and south of what might be presumed to be the Kanuku mountains settlement promised success, but would have to be carried out by gradual expansion. The telegram said that the mission was then proceeding to the northern area. The next telegram said that in the northern area the mission had divided, and that, as regards the area which he had seen personally, General Browne held the same opinion as previously expressed, namely, that the prospects were favourable, but that settlement must be progressive. The next telegram said that the mission had joined up again, and that as regards the north-west area, i.e., the one seen by Signor Giglioli, their opinion was again the same. The further telegram just received seemed, however, to denote a slight modification of this opinion, but only regarding that part of the territory which had been seen by Signor Giglioli. He did not think that the last telegram could be read as referring to the whole area which the mission had investigated, and as modifying the opinion three times expressed in earlier telegrams regarding the greater part of that area.

*The President* said that the effect of General Browne's telegram was not clear, and while the interpretation might well be that placed upon them by the United Kingdom representative, obviously the committee could not come to any authoritative interpretation. He thought that the whole matter must be allowed to rest until the mission itself had stated its views exactly in a detailed report. The position appeared to be that all the mission now wanted was instructions as to its future movements. The committee must therefore decide about French Guiana. The fact that there was uncertainty in British Guiana and also uncertainty in French Guiana made the situation difficult. Speaking personally, however, M. Oliván thought that if the French Ministry of the Colonies had expressed doubt, even though confidentially, regarding the prospects in French Guiana, his own impression was that it was dangerous for the Assyrian Committee to proceed with that scheme. He himself was frankly opposed to the expense and delay involved in sending General Browne and Signor Giglioli to French Guiana.

*The Italian Representative* agreed with the President, and pointed out that the French representative had himself stated that previous experiments in French Guiana had failed.

*The French Representative* said that he was bound to agree that the President's view was a wise one.

*The Danish Representative* said that he also had the same impression as the President, but he was bound to ask what the impressions of persons in Geneva were really worth. What concerned him was what reasons the committee could



give as to why it was not proceeding with the French Guiana scheme. The information given by the French Government could not be quoted. He therefore wondered whether it would be worth while to ask General Browne whether he could obtain in Georgetown such information regarding conditions in French Guiana as would enable him to say whether investigation there was likely to be worth while.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he did not think the difficulty raised by the Danish representative really serious. After all, the committee had examined various possibilities in the course of its work, and had in each case required to be satisfied that conditions were, *prima facie*, such as to justify detailed investigation, with all that that entailed. This plan had been followed in Brazil, and also been followed in British Guiana. It seemed to him perfectly easy for the committee, when eventually reporting to the Council, to say that French Guiana had also been considered, but that, on the information available, the committee had felt that there was not a *prima facie* case to justify the time and expense involved in detailed investigation.

*The President* concurred, and it was agreed that any report to the Council which might mention French Guiana should be on the lines suggested by the United Kingdom representative.

*The President* said that he thought the committee was in agreement to tell the mission to return to Europe without going to French Guiana. It remained to decide whether its task in British Guiana was completed. The last telegram from General Browne had spoken about the necessity of experiment and an enquiry on health as regards the north-western area. *The President* felt that the telegram could not be interpreted as referring to any but the north-western area. But the question was whether the mission should be allowed to return without an investigation into health conditions in that area. It might be necessary to ask General Browne whether it was possible for this enquiry to be completed by the local British authorities.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that if there were any doubt about General Browne's telegram it might be best to clear it up by a further telegram to General Browne before the mission left.

*The Danish Representative* said that it seemed to him that General Browne's last telegram obviously did not contemplate an immediate enquiry into health conditions, and it inferred that any enquiry could be conducted by the Colonial administration.

*The President* suggested that it would be sufficient simply to telegraph to the mission to the effect that if it considered its task concluded it should now return to Geneva.

*The United Kingdom Representative* suggested that this might be prefaced with a sentence to the effect that the committee assumed that the last telegram referred solely to the north-western area, which had apparently been visited by Signor Giglioli alone, and that the mission's opinion on the area as a whole still remained as expressed in the telegram of the 11th December.

*The President* said that he saw no advantage in clearing up this point at this stage. He felt it would be better to await the detailed report. He thought that the committee was agreed that the meaning of the various telegrams was that just placed upon them by the United Kingdom representative.

It was agreed to send the following telegram to General Browne: "Committee, concluding from your telegrams that, after visit to Trinidad, mission will consider its task completed, request that you return as soon as possible to Geneva. Please telegraph details of your movements."

*The President* suggested that when Brigadier Browne's report had been received, it should be distributed and a few days given to the members of the committee to consider it before a meeting was held at Geneva at which General Browne and Signor Giglioli would be present to give personal explanations.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

Geneva, January 22, 1935.

[E 1122/2/93]

No. 91.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.*—(Received February 18.)

(No. 77.)

Bagdad, February 7, 1935.

Sir,  
IN my despatch No. 19 of the 9th January last, I expressed the opinion that, if the French Government were tactfully approached by the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League, they would probably agree to the settlement of a large number of Assyrians in Syria.

2. The enclosed translation of a news item which appeared recently in a Bagdad newspaper appears to indicate that M. de Martel, if he has been correctly reported, is fully alive to the advantages of settling Assyrians in the Northern Jazirah, and is prepared to defend such a policy against local criticism.

3. It is, moreover, noteworthy that, in his *apologia* for the admission of Assyrians into Syria, the French High Commissioner did not employ the argument that the settlements already established were only temporary. This omission of an obvious answer to his critics suggests that the French Government do not intend to exercise the right reserved to them by their representatives at the thirty-third meeting of the Council Committee to claim priority for the inclusion of the Assyrian internees in Syria in any final Assyrian settlement scheme carried out elsewhere.

I have, &c.  
(For the Ambassador),  
C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure in No. 91.

*Extract from the Tariq of February 4, 1935.*

THE SETTLEMENT OF ASSYRIANS IN SYRIA.

*Statement by the French High Commissioner in Syria.*

(Translation.)

SYRIAN journalists have discussed a number of matters with the French High Commissioner. One of these was the settlement of Assyrians in Syria. His Excellency said to them:—

"There is nothing more surprising than your conduct in this country by hastening to raise your voices in opposition and protest before you have carefully examined a piece of work from all its various aspects. Take, for instance, the question of the immigration into Syria of certain elements, such as the Armenians, Kurds, Assyrians, &c., who were your fellow nationals under Ottoman rule. If you carefully consider the question of those of them who have taken refuge in Syria, you will find that they have benefited your country without doing it any harm. They have established towns in the neglected border regions of Syria, cultivated land which had been left barren for centuries, reopened trade routes in the north, and have been paying taxes and customs duty—all which things add to the country's public wealth. The progress and prosperity of a country grow gradually with the increase of working hands. I wonder whether you consider it harmful or beneficial for you to see your northern desert regions rear up new towns and produce fresh cultivated areas? Those undertaking this work are orientals like you, nay, most of them are your brethren. The Kurds who were forced to leave Turkey and come to Syria already have amongst you a number of their kinsmen who fill the Salahiyah quarter (in Damascus). Your fears of Zionist immigration are somewhat justifiable, because political ambitions exist in this case. But in the case of the Kurds, the Armenians and the Assyrians, it would be madness to imagine that they will aspire to establish for themselves new States on the ruins of your State. Why do you hate to see a ruined section of your country reconstructed?"



[E 1124/278/93]

No. 92.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 18.)*

(No. 80.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, February 7, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 35 of the 17th January, I have the honour to report that the situation in the area of the Middle Euphrates is still far from satisfactory, while a majority of Senators, by a process of non-co-operation, have brought the legislative business of the Government almost to a standstill.

2. The attack of the Opposition, which is led by Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Naji Pasha Suwaidi in the Senate, and by Hikmat Beg Sulaiman, ex-Minister of the Interior, outside, seems to be directed mainly at the person of the Prime Minister, who is regarded as chiefly responsible for the "unconstitutional" act of dissolving the Chamber, and Arshad Beg Al Umari, whose high-handed methods have provoked wide-spread dissatisfaction. The Prime Minister has informed me privately that he has decided to sacrifice Arshad Beg Al Umari at once and has offered the portfolio of Economics and Communications to Jafar Pasha, and is inclined to request Tewfik Beg Suwaidi to become Minister of the Interior, in order to silence his brother in the Senate. Jafar Pasha tells me, however, that he prefers the Ministry of the Interior, as he foresees great difficulties in the future in the application of the National Service Law, and thinks that he could use his influence tactfully to prevent undue precipitancy in applying conscription to the tribes. However this may be, I suspect that Jafar Pasha's real motive is to get into his own hands the extensive patronage for his friends which the Ministry of the Interior will afford him.

3. There are signs that the sheikhs of the Middle Euphrates, incited by Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and a considerable body of lawyers in Bagdad, will continue to work for the removal of the Prime Minister from office. The situation is rendered more than usually dangerous by the rumours that are prevalent in Bagdad that King Ali is secretly behind this movement, and is even playing with the idea of supplanting King Ghazi and becoming Regent himself.

4. It is reported that the Persian Minister in Bagdad has not been slow to avail himself of the opportunity of fostering dissension between the Sunnis and the Shiahs of Iraq with a view to preventing a united national front being presented to Persia in the matter of the frontier dispute.

5. I am watching the situation carefully, and have asked Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to arrange for the despatch of Mr. Ditchburn, who was for many years Administrative Inspector in Diwaniyah, to report on recent events which have occurred in the Middle Euphrates area, for my confidential information. I have also suggested to the Prime Minister various steps by which the situation can, in my opinion, be prevented from developing on dangerous lines. Unfortunately, the young King has been confined to the Palace for several days with a painful fistula and has been unable to take a hand in the transaction of public business. I am of opinion that Nuri Pasha's presence is urgently required in Bagdad, as he has the courage to act promptly and is not mistrusted by either of the parties in this dispute.

6. I shall not fail to keep you acquainted with future developments.

I have, &amp;c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 1176/2/93]

No. 93.

*Sir John Simon to Sir F. Humphrys (Bagdad).*

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, February 20, 1935.*

THE report of General Browne and Signor Giglioli, who have now arrived in this country, has been sent direct to Geneva and full text is, therefore, not yet available, but from information which they have furnished privately and confidentially to Foreign Office it is clear that British Guiana scheme can no longer be regarded as offering a solution of the Assyrian problem. While

suitability of physical conditions is not free from doubt, main difficulties are extreme pooriness of the soil, poor quality and high mortality of cattle, absence of communications and consequent difficulties of marketing. Even if measures which mission suggest to overcome these difficulties are taken, mission evidently regard eventual success of settlement as highly problematical and can only recommend that it be carried out experimentally and progressively on very limited scale. Their report suggests that a beginning should be made with not more than fifty families, and then only after certain additional enquiries have been made and elaborate preliminary measures taken in British Guiana.

In their informal discussions, mission could express no opinion as to when it would be possible to send out further batches, but made it clear that in their view it would be impossible to settle more than 400 or 500 persons within the next two years. Furthermore, they did not consider that the territory was ultimately capable of supporting in the best of circumstances anything approaching minimum number of Assyrians who must be removed from Iraq.

In paragraph 18 of your despatch No. 1 of 9th January you referred to the very dangerous situation which might result from announcement of breakdown of the British Guiana scheme, unaccompanied by any indication that an alternative scheme was being explored. I fully share your apprehensions and every effort must therefore be made to keep secret the above information regarding the nature of the report of the Mission of Enquiry until Assyrian Committee, whose next meeting is fixed for 6th March, has had an opportunity of considering situation. The report will be circulated as soon as possible by the League Secretariat to the members of the Assyrian Committee and probably to the Iraqi delegation in Geneva, but with a request in every case that its strictly confidential nature be respected.

The majority of the Assyrian Committee may be expected to take the line that possibilities of settlement outside Iraq have now been exhausted, that the Assyrians will have to remain permanently in Iraq, and that the League must concentrate on ensuring suitable conditions for them in that country. Every effort will, of course, be made to divert the committee from the adoption of a course which you have repeatedly shown to be so full of dangerous possibilities.

Only policy, in fact, appears to be to work for settlement in Syria, but matter needs very careful handling, as French Government have always been successful in evading the issue when Syria has been raised previously. Moreover, it is desirable, if possible, that combined pressure should be brought to bear upon them and that matter should not be allowed, by premature intervention by this country, to become an Anglo-French issue. Best method of approach is under urgent consideration here, and I shall welcome any observations which you may have to offer.

[E 1294/1030/93]

No. 94.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 25.)*

(No. 93.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, February 14, 1935.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 38 of the 14th February, I have the honour to report that King Ali, ex-King of the Hejaz, died at 7.50 p.m. on the evening of the 13th February from acute arterio-sclerosis.

2. His Majesty's doctors had for some time been gravely anxious regarding his health, but the final heart attack seems to have occurred with unexpected suddenness. Only a few days before his death King Ali had dined at the Embassy in excellent spirits, and had spoken to me of his hope of visiting England this summer.

3. Since his arrival in Iraq in 1926 as an exile from the Hejaz, King Ali had acted on several occasions as Regent during the late King Feisal's absence in Europe. At times the French Government seem to have regarded him as a possible candidate for the Syrian Throne. He was not, however, at any time a prominent figure in political life and, although endowed with a charming and most friendly personality, he had none of the gifts of a leader, nor any real liking for the responsibilities of government.

[12357]



4. I do not anticipate that King Ali's death will materially influence the political situation in this country. His passing, it is true, leaves King Ghazi even more lonely and isolated than before, but, latterly, personal jealousies had grown up between him and his uncle and had vitiated the advantages which, earlier in his reign, the young King had derived from the advice and experience of his elder relative.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem and His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 1315/278/93]

No. 95.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 25.)*

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, February 25, 1935.*

ALI JANDAT submitted resignation of Cabinet on the evening of 23rd February. This has not yet been accepted and the King is endeavouring to persuade Ali Jandat to remain in office and make a few necessary changes in the Cabinet. Failing this the King will endeavour to arrange formation of a coalition Government of leading personalities irrespective of party.

I have impressed on His Majesty importance of keeping Nuri as Minister for Foreign Affairs, especially in view of frontier dispute with Persia.

It will probably be some days before the new Government is formed, and in the meantime there will be suspension of important public business.

[E 1385/278/93]

No. 96.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 28.)*

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, February 28, 1935.*

MY telegram No. 52.

King Ghazi, who dined with me last night, informed me he had just accepted Ali Jaudat's resignation, and had asked Yasin Pasha to form a coalition Cabinet with Nuri Pasha as Minister for Foreign Affairs, after Yasin Pasha had given satisfactory assurances about the policy he would pursue.

[E 1450/1030/93]

No. 97.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 98.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, February 20, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 93 of the 14th February last, I have the honour to report that the funeral of the late King Ali took place on the afternoon of Thursday, the 14th February.

2. His Highness the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, who had set out hurriedly for Bagdad on receipt of the first news of King Ali's illness, arrived too late to see his brother alive, but, by dint of hard driving through a severe sandstorm, he reached Bagdad in time to take his place in the funeral cortège.

3. A full account of the funeral is given in the enclosed cutting from the *Iraq Times*.<sup>(1)</sup>

4. The Arabic newspapers have all paid generous tributes to the memory of the dead king, and a characteristic feature of their obituary notices is the stress which is laid on the serious gap which King Ali's passing leaves in the public life of the country. This is a point which has also been made to me and members of my staff by many Iraqis.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

5. King Ghazi is neither so accessible nor so comprehending as his father, and many who previously found comfort for their wounded feelings in pouring out their troubles and difficulties into the sympathetic ear of King Feisal have, since his death, been in the habit of resorting to King Ali.

6. It was generally believed that he could and would, if he thought fit, influence the King with advice, and people felt that their troubles and grievances were not altogether neglected so long as they had easy access to King Ali's diwan.

7. This means of finding a possibility of redress has now been removed. King Ali's son, though a pleasant youth, is far too young and inexperienced to be able to play his father's part, and there seems to be no one else who could step into the late King's shoes.

8. This is unfortunate, and unless King Ghazi cultivates a closer contact with his people and evinces a more sympathetic understanding of the problems and difficulties of their daily life, the death of King Ali may mark the beginning of the growth of serious discontent with the throne.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem and His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 1452/432/93]

No. 98.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 101 E.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, February 20, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith two statements showing the estimated receipts and expenditure of the Iraqi Government for the financial year which begins on the 1st April next.<sup>(1)</sup> These statements have been sent forward by the Government for consideration by the Iraqi Parliament, where they are now undergoing examination by the Financial Committee. The statements include, for purposes of comparison, figures of the actual and estimated expenditure under similar headings for the past three years.

2. The figures of revenue and expenditure contained in the estimates are as follows:—

	£
Revenue ... ..	3,970,500
Expenditure ... ..	3,968,997
Surplus ... ..	1,503

3. The estimates have been drawn up on the usual lines and give effect to the policy of financing normal State services from revenue, and the segregation of special receipts, such as oil royalties and dead rents, for expenditure on major works of capital development. The expedient adopted in 1933 of absorbing the dead rent payment from the British Oil Development Company into general revenues has not been followed in these estimates.

4. Revenue from all sources is estimated to bring in more than during the current year, and a gross increase of £151,000 is anticipated. This is an increase of 4 per cent. on the 1934 estimates. The expectation of increased revenue arises from the general improvement in trade now being experienced and the fact that the revenue collections during the current year up to date are in excess of the estimates. Customs and Excise receipts account for 57 per cent. (Customs 46 per cent., and Excise 11 per cent.) of the total revenue—a percentage which has shown an annual increase for some years. The revenue from agricultural produce and from animal taxation represents 18 per cent. of the total, the same percentage as during the current year. Property tax, income tax and stamp duties all show a small increase. No change in the rate or incidence of taxation is contemplated.

5. The additional revenue is counterbalanced by a corresponding increase in the expenditure allotments, which total £155,800 more than the estimates for

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



the current financial year. In pursuance of the policy adopted by successive Governments, the increased provision is to be devoted in the main towards augmenting the armed forces, and widening the scope of social services.

6. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is to be provided with funds for the creation of additional diplomatic and consular posts; amongst the latter being consulates at Istanbul and Haifa. The staff of the Ministry itself is to be increased and an attempt will be made to improve the efficiency of the personnel employed in and available for the various missions abroad.

7. Extra funds are provided under the Ministries of Finance and Justice for the training of further staff, and the provision of an additional court for Land Settlement operations. The Government were slow to initiate land settlement, but are now convinced of the lasting value of the work which is being done and view it with interest and benevolence.

8. Additional staff is to be provided for the work of general administration in the provinces, which has for years been recognised as being insufficiently supplied with efficient personnel. Attempts to expand and improve the cadres of State officials generally are foreshadowed, although the establishment of a permanent cadre for the Civil Service (a project which has been in the forefront of the programme of nearly every new-formed Government) still seems as distant as ever. More officials are to be provided for the Census Department, which has for years applied half-heartedly the measures designed to produce reliable statistics of the population. Even with the extra staff, however, there seems no reason to anticipate an early completion of the task.

9. Additional provision has been made for the development in the provinces of the services and facilities provided by the Health Department. New urban clinics are to be opened and more doctors are to be appointed to the Medical School.

10. The credits available for the Ministry of Defence are increased by a sum of £50,000 in order to provide for the formation of new units and the supply of additional modern equipment. This brings the total expenditure on the army and air force up to £930,000, which is 24 per cent. of the total State expenditure. The police force is allotted a further sum of £10,000 to allow an expansion of the force by a further 270 men. As this force accounts for 15 per cent. of the total expenditure of the State, it is clear that 40 per cent. of the State expenditure is taken up in providing for public security.

11. Educational expansion is to be pursued, and the estimates of the Ministry, which absorb 11 per cent. of the total State expenditure, are increased by a sum of £42,000 in order to cover the cost of a number of new schools and educational institutions. One hundred and ninety new teachers are to be recruited and provision is made for increasing the expert staff at the Ministry. It is interesting to note that the cost of education has trebled itself in ten years and has been increased by nearly 50 per cent. in the last three years. There should soon be an inexhaustible supply of potential applicants for clerical employment under the Government. The Antiquities Department is to be expanded and additional funds are provided to meet its increasing needs.

12. The estimates of the departments comprising the Ministry of Economics and Communications reflect the amalgamation which has been effected between Public Works, Surveys and Irrigation, and the fusion of certain sections of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs. The salary votes have thereby been reduced by about £13,000 and the funds released have been allocated for expenditure on works and equipment. This change has been brought about by the activities of the present Minister, Arahad-al-Umari, whose efforts to reduce the cost of personnel and thereby provide money for greater expenditure on material and undertakings will doubtless be belauded in Parliament. Criticism is, however, by no means lacking to the effect that the expert staff has been reduced below the point at which the expenditure of the additional funds can be adequately supervised.

13. The Government propose that the 5 per cent. cut in salaries and allowances of officers and employees, which was introduced as a crisis measure during 1930, shall continue to be applied in full during the financial year. This measure is not popular, and it is not surprising to hear of murmuring by the official class. Civil and military pensions, which were also made subject to a cut of the same amount, of which, however, half was restored last year, are now to be paid in full.

14. The estimates, as prepared, appear to have been framed with due regard to probability, and the Government should meet with little difficulty in meeting expenditure, even at the increased rate proposed, from current revenue. There is a good prospect of a moderate surplus being achieved during the current financial year without drawing upon the revenues earmarked for capital purposes. The financial position of the Iraqi Government remains good, and the outlook for the coming year is healthy. There is little likelihood of the estimates being altered appreciably in their progress through Parliament. Even should there be a change of Government, the financial policy of any possible combination of Iraqi politicians is almost certain to follow the sound, if unimaginative, lines on which the budget has been prepared.

15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 1455/163/93]

No. 99.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 104.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, February 21, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a statement containing particulars of the budget estimates of the Iraqi railways for the coming financial year, in the form in which they have been sent forward by the Government for consideration by Parliament.<sup>(1)</sup>

2. The estimates have been framed in the light of the actual receipts and expenditure of the current financial year. They compare as follows with the estimates of the current year:—

		1934-35.	1935-36.
		I.D.	I.D.
Revenue	...	506,000	525,150
Expenditure	...	502,600	521,770
Surplus	...	3,400	3,380

3. It is anticipated that the revenue from coaching and goods traffic will increase as a result of the improvement in the economic position, which has already manifested itself during the current year in greater movements of grain and local produce. The estimates for 1934-35 took into account the anticipated discontinuance of the heavy volume of oil traffic moved in transit through Iraq from Abadan to Northern Persia, but this traffic has continued throughout the greater part of the current year. The 1935-36 estimates, however, do not include provision for any substantial revenue from that source.

4. The increase in expenditure is attributable to the additional running costs and repairs necessitated by increased traffic and mileage. Full provision (I.D. 77,214) is made for depreciation and renewals.

5. The maintenance of the volume of oil transit traffic referred to above and the greater movement of goods (both imports and indigenous products) have brought in revenue in excess of the estimates, and it is anticipated that a surplus of approximately I.D. 55,000 will be realised on the current year's working after full provision has been made for depreciation and renewals.

6. Copies of the usual printed copies of the budget estimates are not yet available and will be furnished in due course.

I have, &c.  
F. H. HUMPHRYS.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



[E 1489/278/93]

No. 100.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 56.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, March 4, 1935.*

NEW Cabinet was formed this morning with Jamil Madfai as Premier. Nuri Pasha, Yusuf Ghanima and Abdul Hussein Chalabi retain their portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Education respectively, and Abdul Aziz-al-Qassab becomes Minister of the Interior, Tawfiq Suwaidi Justice, Rashid-al-Khoja Defence, Amin Zaki Economics and Communications.

This is not a strong Cabinet, but a much better than might have been expected at one time.

[E 1583/1583/93]

No. 101.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 10.)*

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, March 10, 1935.*

MY despatch No. 35 and my despatch No. 127.

Abdul Wahid and his armed followers have destroyed three road bridges in the neighbourhood of Diwaniyah and are adopting a generally truculent attitude towards civil Administration. Iraqi Government are sending a regular battalion to Diwaniyah, and an ultimatum to Abdul Wahid to repair bridges within twenty-four hours and to present himself in Bagdad. This outbreak may have serious consequences, and matter is engaging attention of Cabinet to exclusion of everything else.

[E 1634/1583/93]

No. 102.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 11.)*

(No. 122.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, February 28, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 80 of the 7th February, I have the honour to report that a few weeks ago, at a moment when reports of unrest on the Middle Euphrates were giving rise to anxiety in Bagdad, Major-General Hay informed me that he was apprehensive that, in the event of an outbreak of disorder in that area, the Iraqi Government might employ their aircraft to bomb tribal villages without warning and without consultation with the British advisers in the Ministries of Interior and Defence.

2. It appeared evident to me that, if ill-considered operations of this kind were undertaken, a dangerous tribal situation would result, with which the Iraqi Government might find it exceedingly difficult to deal. I therefore suggested to Major-General Hay that he should arrange for a series of lectures to be given to Iraqi officers by the senior Royal Air Force officer in the military mission on the tactics employed by the Royal Air Force in operations directed at the suppression of tribal disturbances; emphasis being given to the cardinal principle that such operations aimed at imposing order and obedience to authority not by inflicting casualties, but first by producing a moral deterrent effect.

3. Major-General Hay adopted my suggestion, and informs me that the first of these lectures was given a few days ago to the officers of the Royal Iraqi Air Force and was followed by another at which the senior officers of the Army Headquarters Staff were present.

4. At the conclusion of the latter the Chief of the General Staff gave a short address, in which he endorsed the main points of the lecture.

5. Other lectures on the same lines are now being arranged.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 1716/583/93]

No. 103.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 13.)*

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, March 13, 1935.*

MY telegram No. 60 of 10th March.

The situation is now as follows:—

The Faisaliyah Nahiyah, on Mishkhab branch of the Euphrates below Abu Sukhair, is entirely in the hands of tribesmen under Abdul Wahid, who has refused orders to come to Bagdad. Strong sections of Aqrah tribe have seized important irrigation regulator at Dagharah, and local reports indicate probability of further spread of movement to Rumaithah.

Tribes have committed no outrages since destruction of bridges already reported, but they are openly defying authority of Government.

The Government have sent one battalion and three sections of field batteries to Hillah, one battalion and one section of guns to Diwaniyah, and one battalion to Samawa. Arrangements are also being made for despatch of two battalions to Abu Sukhair. Plans are being matured for air action against tribes in Faisaliyah area.

Nuri Said confirms view of Cornwallis that situation is exceedingly critical.

Loyalty of army is doubtful. Officers are being tampered with by political propaganda, and many of the men are Shi'ahs and cannot be relied on in operations against Shi'ah tribes. Nuri Said feels strongly that Ministers of Interior and Defence are not the right men to deal with the situation.

I have advised that if Government desire to arrest spread of defiance to their authority, the instigation from influential quarters in Bagdad, which is mainly responsible for tribal movement, must be checked.

The King and Nuri Said agree, and ways and means are being actively considered.

The Id-al-Adha, which begins on 15th March and lasts for four days, introduces new complication. Opposition are believed to be organising mass demonstrations in Bagdad against Government, while hands of Government are to some extent tied by reluctance to embark on repressive measures during Holy Festival. On the other hand, if action is not quickly taken to restore authority of Government, the movement of defiance will undoubtedly spread and strengthen.

[E 1724/2/93]

No. 104.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received March 14.)*

(No. 37.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the thirty-ninth meeting of the Assyrian Committee on the 6th March respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

*United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva,*

*March 13, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 104.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

*Record of the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, held in Geneva, March 6, at 11 A.M.*

THE object of the meeting was to fix the procedure for the session.

The President said that, as the report by Brigadier Browne and Signor Giglioli was a long and complicated document, it was desirable that plenty of time for its consideration should be given. He proposed, in the first place, to take advantage of the presence of the mission to obtain orally any supplementary information which they might be prepared to furnish.



Brigadier Browne and Signor Giglioli then joined the meeting and were welcomed by the President, who expressed to them the sincere thanks of the committee and paid a tribute to the excellence and impartiality of their report. He asked whether the mission would wish to supplement the report by any oral statement.

*Brigadier Browne* observed that he and Signor Giglioli realised that they had been sent out to deal with a very urgent problem. The conclusions embodied in their report were all of a general nature, and they were conscious that the report scarcely provided the means of dealing with the whole problem. The area which they had visited could only be colonised gradually. The mission were unable to say what total number of Assyrians could eventually be taken there, but they realised that the area was only capable of affording a partial solution of the Assyrian problem.

*Signor Giglioli* said that it was difficult to give an exact idea of the importance of the difficulties. To take, for instance, the question of malaria. This disease was of no great importance at present, but if large numbers of new colonists went to the area, it might present a serious problem. If the work could be done gradually, the difficulties could be combated, but it was quite impossible, except in the light of experience, to express any opinion as to how far it might be possible to accelerate the work. There was also the question of animal diseases. The presence of rabies was not officially admitted, but, as he had pointed out in his own section of the report, there was evidence of cattle disease which strongly resembled rabies. Much further study of this aspect of the question was evidently necessary.

*The United Kingdom Representative* observed that Brigadier Browne had said that it was impossible to say how many persons the territory could eventually accommodate. Was it right to assume, however, from a section of Signor Giglioli's report, that, even under the most favourable conditions, and if all the measures which the mission recommended were successfully taken, the territory was not capable of supporting more than 1,000 families? The United Kingdom representative understood also that, while the mission was of opinion that the first batch of settlers must be limited to 250 persons, it could give no idea of the interval which must elapse before the success of the preliminary experiment could be judged or how many people could be sent out in subsequent batches. It looked, therefore, as if only a few hundred persons at most could be settled within the next few years.

*Brigadier Browne* said that, while the size of the first batch had been stated in the report and an estimate given of the total number of persons who could be accommodated in the area for the purpose of cattle-ranching, it was impossible to say anything more definite or to give anything like precise figures.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he noted that even the despatch of the first batch was to be dependent on the outcome of further preliminary enquiries, *e.g.*, into the cattle situation and cattle diseases, and also into the causes of the alleged decline of the Indian population.

In reply to a question, *Brigadier Browne* and *Signor Giglioli* said that they could not give an estimate of the time which these preliminary enquiries would take.

As no other member was immediately prepared to put any questions, the meeting was adjourned to give time for further consideration of the report and to see a film of the Rupununi district which Signor Giglioli had made.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

[E 1725/2/93]

No. 105.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received March 14.)*

(No. 38.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the fortieth meeting of the Assyrian Committee on the 7th March respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

*United Kingdom Delegation, Geneva,  
March 13, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 105.

ASSYRIAN QUESTION.

*Record of the Fortieth Meeting of the Assyrian Committee held in Geneva on  
March 7, 1935, at 4 P.M.*

*The President* said that it appeared fairly clearly from the Browne-Giglioli report that British Guiana could not be regarded as offering a solution of the Assyrian problem. He did not think it was necessary to go further into the details of the difficulties, though it would be necessary to do this at a later stage in order to present a reasoned report to the Council. What the committee now had to consider was the line of action to be taken in the new situation created by the breakdown of the British Guiana scheme. Since yesterday's meeting, private conversations had taken place between the United Kingdom and French representatives, and subsequently between those two representatives and himself. Briefly, the position was that the United Kingdom representative had put forward the suggestion that the possibility of settlement in Syria should now be re-examined. The French representative had indicated that his Government still saw considerable difficulties in accepting the Assyrians in Syria, but that they were prepared to re-examine the question on certain conditions. They felt that they could not consider the idea unless presented with an appeal to that effect from the committee as a whole, and then only if the appeal stated the number of Assyrians who would have to be provided for, and also guaranteed the French Government against financial responsibility.

The position was that every destination which the committee had so far examined had proved for one reason or another impracticable. The United Kingdom representative had drawn attention to the serious dangers which might arise if the committee was compelled to the conclusion that the Assyrians must remain in Iraq. What else was open? There was the suggestion made by the International Organisation for Inter-Church Aid regarding Abyssinia and there was the new possibility of Syria. Abyssinia might have to be considered in certain circumstances, more particularly as the ecclesiastical organisation concerned had apparently already taken steps to sound the Abyssinian Government. At the same time, the difficulties in the way of settlement in Abyssinia were evident, and, while the committee should reserve it for subsequent consideration, if necessary, the President felt that it ought to be left on one side for the time being and that the committee should now seriously consider the possibilities of Syria.

It was evident that the committee was not yet in a position to make an appeal to the French Government which would fulfil the conditions which the French representative had privately indicated, and, before the committee definitely decided to pursue the idea of Syria, the President felt that it would be prudent to obtain privately an assurance from the French Government that that Government would not merely examine but would accede to an eventual appeal from the committee, provided that it conformed to certain specified conditions which ought to be more closely defined.



The President said that the private discussions between the United Kingdom representative, the French representative and himself had been entirely without commitment, and he had felt that before any definite action were taken he ought to lay the matter before the committee as a whole, and he would be glad to hear the views of each member.

*The Mexican Representative* said that he entirely agreed that the British Guiana scheme could not be pursued and that the committee should now concentrate upon Syria. It was clearly right as a first step to obtain an assurance from the French Government on which to base subsequent action, and he suggested that it should be left to the President to take the necessary steps to obtain such an assurance.

*The French Representative* said that it must, of course, be understood that the French Government had not yet changed their point of view about settlement in Syria and could only agree to reconsider the matter if certain conditions were fulfilled. He would like to explain the reasons why they had indicated their readiness to reconsider it. A few days previously they had been approached confidentially by the Foreign Office in London, who had drawn their attention to the serious dangers which might arise if the British Guiana scheme broke down and no alternative could be announced. The Foreign Office had expressed the hope that, in the common interest of avoiding these dangers, the French Government should not reject out of hand any suggestion which might be made regarding settlement in Syria and that, if such a suggestion were made, the French Government should agree to consider it.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he would like to explain the reasons which prompted the Foreign Office to take the informal step to which the French representative had referred. Since the troubles of August 1933, the situation in Iraq had been relatively and surprisingly calm. This might be attributed to the fact that both the Iraqis and the Assyrians had been proceeding on the assumption that the early settlement of the Assyrians outside Iraq was assured. There was, however, reason to fear that, if hopes of such settlement were dashed, serious trouble might very quickly arise. It was quite clear that the Assyrians would not settle down as loyal subjects of Iraq on precisely the same basis as other communities. They would demand special treatment and special privileges which could not be granted to them in a country of mixed communities like Iraq without endangering the structure of the whole State. Any attempt to secure special privileges threatened to lead not only to a serious internal situation in Iraq, but possibly also to a serious conflict between Iraq and the League. There were, however, more immediate dangers. Although the Assyrians still possessed a certain number of arms, there was probably no great danger of any open rising on their part. At the same time, they were a simple and impetuous people, and if it were announced that the British Guiana scheme had failed and no alternative were visible, some of the more hot-headed among them might easily commit some act of folly which would provoke retaliation and lead to a situation of much the same kind as had occurred in August 1933. The Foreign Office were impressed by the seriousness of the danger, which seemed to them also to affect the French Government closely on account of the proximity of Syria and the repercussions in the mandated territory which any further inter-racial conflict in Iraq might have.

*The Italian Representative* said that he entirely agreed with the President. It was obvious that Syria was the most suitable place and would cause the least disturbance in the lives of the Assyrians. The only alternative appeared to be Abyssinia, and he reserved the right to go further into the objections to that scheme if it became necessary for the committee seriously to discuss it. But, quite apart from the present political situation, he was able from his own personal experience of Abyssinia to say that the proposal would be open to very serious objections.

*The Danish Representative* said that he entirely agreed with the President. He summarised some of the points which seemed to him to make the British Guiana scheme impracticable and said that he was of opinion that an effort should be made to reach a settlement in Syria.

*The United Kingdom, Italian and Danish Representatives* all associated themselves with the proposal of the Mexican representative that the task of sounding the French Government and of defining the conditions on which they would be prepared to accede to an appeal from the committee should be entrusted to the President.

*The President* said that the French representative had indicated to him the advantage of a visit to Paris for this purpose since the French High Commissioner for Syria was at present on leave in Paris. Obviously, any ostentatious visit might lead to a premature disclosure that the British Guiana scheme had been abandoned in favour of one in Syria. The President thought, however, that he could arrange a short private visit to Paris at the beginning of the coming week, subject, of course, to the consent of his Government, which he would have to obtain.

*The French Representative* said that he had just received a telegram from his Government to the effect that they had information, which they believed reliable, that the Mar Shimun had been engaged in instigating those Assyrians who still remained in Iraq to prepare an unauthorised mass exodus across the frontier into Syria. The French Government were making representations in Bagdad to warn the Iraqi Government of the danger and to request them to make investigations.

This announcement produced a considerable impression on the committee, and it was agreed that no time ought to be lost in pushing on with the Syrian scheme. The hope was expressed that the President might be able to begin discussions in Paris on the 11th March.

*The President* explained that he would have to be in Berne on the 9th March and that it would be impossible for him to leave there until the 10th March. A further difficulty was that the Chaco question was to be discussed in Geneva on the 11th March and his Government would probably want him to be there for that discussion. He would, however, do what he could to convince them of the necessity of an early visit to Paris.

The President added that, in Paris, questions of detail might be discussed and, owing to the multiplicity of the tasks which had fallen upon him, he was scarcely in a position to discuss details. He would therefore be very grateful if the United Kingdom representative could make an opportunity of being in Paris independently at the same time in order that his assistance might be available.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he would be glad to give any assistance in his power.

*The President* then said it was necessary to consider what action should be taken to keep up the illusion that the British Guiana scheme was still under consideration. The members of the mission of investigation were still in Geneva, and he thought that the best course would be to set up a sub-committee, which, in collaboration with the members of the mission, would prepare a short paper for eventual embodiment in a report to the Council summarising the mission's report and indicating the reasons why the committee had not felt it possible to proceed with the British Guiana scheme. The composition of this committee and the fact that the committee as a whole would meet again when the report of the sub-committee was completed could be announced and would serve to keep the press quiet.

This was agreed to, and a committee, under the presidency of the Danish representative, and consisting otherwise of the Italian, Mexican and United Kingdom representatives, was appointed.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.



[E 1762/1583/93]

No. 106.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 16.)*

(No. 73.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, March 15, 1935.*

MY telegram No. 68.

Threatened mass demonstration in Bagdad was avoided to-day.

Cabinet have been unable to face situation and resigned this afternoon. The King has again called Yasin Pasha to form a Cabinet. There is no substantial change in situation on Middle Euphrates.

[E 1787/1181/93]

No. 107.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 123.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, March 4, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 263 of the 10th May, 1934, I have the honour to transmit herewith two statements showing the budget estimates of the Port of Basra for the coming financial year, in the form in which they have been sent forward by the Government for consideration by the Iraqi Parliament.<sup>(1)</sup> A sub-committee has been formed from the Finance Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, and has proceeded to Basra to examine the estimates in consultation with the Port Director.

2. The figures, as compared with those of the estimates for the current financial year, are as follows:—

	Revenue. £	Expenditure. £	Surplus. £
1934-35	261,500	259,190	2,310
1935-36	273,140	272,651	489

The operations of the current year are expected to result in an actual surplus of approximately £10,000. The realisation of a revenue surplus greater than the estimate has been an annual achievement of the Port Director for some years past, and the estimates now under consideration have doubtless been framed on similarly conservative lines.

3. The revenue figures have been prepared on the assumption that the Government will approve a reduction, with effect from the 1st April, of 2 fils per ton in port dues "A." These dues are charged on all sea-going vessels of 10 tons and upwards crossing the outer Bar, and the reduction is estimated to cost the Directorate approximately £10,000 a year. Notwithstanding this, and further reductions which are being introduced in the scale of charges for services rendered on port premises, the total revenue is estimated to exceed that of the current financial year by £11,640. An increase in the volume of imports handled by the port is expected to follow the improvement in trade which is now visible. It is also anticipated that shipping tonnage entering port limits will increase, and that greater use will be made of the port creek dredger, from the hire of which substantial fees are derived.

4. The benefit accorded to vessels entering the Port of Basra by the reduction in port dues "A" will be tempered by the proposed imposition of a "sanitary due" of 3 fils per gross registered ton on all shipping entering the port. It is suggested that this due should be imposed with effect from the 1st January, 1936, in order to meet the cost of a new sanitary and quarantine service which is under consideration for establishment in the port to meet international health requirements. The charge will not be levied on tanker traffic and other vessels not actually entering the Port of Basra. The scheme for setting up a sanitary service has not yet received the formal sanction of the Iraqi Government.

5. The estimates include the anticipated receipts and expenditure of the Basra Power House, which generates and supplies power *in bulk* to the port, the Royal Air Force and the Basra Municipality at the rate of 10 fils (2½d.) per unit.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

It is proposed to reduce the rate to 8 fils (2d.) per unit, with effect from the 1st April next. Although the estimates of the power house show an excess of £254 only of revenue over expenditure, the undertaking represents a satisfactory investment of port funds, from which the Port Directorate receives interest. This has considerably reduced the cost to the port of the large quantity of electrical energy necessary for its normal operations.

6. Full provision is made in the estimates for the payment to His Majesty's Government in March 1936 of the twelfth instalment of the capital debt, and interest charges, amounting in all to £34,200. There is every reason to anticipate that this payment will be forthcoming on due date. Adequate provision has also been made for depreciation from revenue, of the additions to capital assets which have been financed from surplus revenues.

7. I also have the honour to transmit herewith two statements,<sup>(1)</sup> one of anticipated revenue and one of anticipated expenditure, of the Fao Bar dredging service for the coming year. The figures are as under:—

	£
Receipts	162,500
Expenditure	162,045
Surplus	455

The estimates of revenue are based on the assumption that the volume of shipping now using the dredged channel will be maintained. Allowance has been made for a further reduction of 15 per cent. in the dredging due charged on shipping, to take effect from the 1st April next. The estimates have been drawn up on the basis that the scale of charges should be no more than sufficient to meet the *bona fide* cost of the service. The rate of the dredging due will then have been reduced by 36·25 per cent. since the repayment to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company of the money lent by them for the purpose of dredging the channel.

8. The figures of expenditure take into account the cost of manning and operating the third dredger, the delivery of which is expected by the beginning of the new financial year. A serious set-back was experienced during the last flood season as the result of a heavy accumulation of silt within the dredged limits, which reduced the width of the channel. The efforts of the two dredgers now in use have, by working day and night, been sufficient to maintain the navigable depth of water in the channel only, without further consolidating and improving it. Although, therefore, it had been hoped to reduce the hours of dredging when the third dredger arrived, the estimates have had to be drawn up on the basis that the new dredger, as well as the other two, will work day and night throughout the year. Provision is contained in the estimates for the final payment of £20,000 on account of the purchase price of the dredger.

9. In addition to the revenue estimates of the dredging service, the Port Director has submitted a programme of capital works estimated to cost £79,000, spread equally over the financial years 1935-36 and 1936-37. Permanent buildings for staff and workshops at Fao will account for £55,500 of this amount, and the rest is to be expended upon improving and augmenting the craft, machinery and equipment available for the dredging service. The cost of this programme will be met from the reserve and surplus funds held by the Port Director on behalf of the dredging service.

10. The Port Director has also submitted a further programme of capital works for the Port of Basra for the coming financial year, which, together with that referred to in paragraph 10 of my despatch under reference, is still under the consideration of the Government. I will submit later a separate report regarding this item.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



[E 2093/1098/93]

No. 108.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 129.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, March 6, 1935.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 66 of the 20th February last, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I handed to His Majesty King Ghazi during the course of an interview on the 6th March, at which the Rais of the Royal Diwan and my oriental secretary were present.

2. I explained to His Majesty the circumstances in which, at the express wish of the late King Feisal, the present arrangements came into being whereby private touch is maintained between this Embassy and the advisers to the Iraqi Government.

3. His Majesty took note of my remarks, and I asked to be favoured with a reply to the enclosed letter before my departure from Iraq.

I have, &amp;c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

Enclosure in No. 108.

*Sir F. Humphrys to King Ghazi.*

Your Majesty,

*Bagdad, February 28, 1935.*

SHORTLY after the entry of Iraq into the League of Nations, His Majesty the late King Feisal expressed to me his desire that the closest touch should continue to be maintained between His Majesty's Embassy and the advisers to the various departments of the Iraqi Government.

His Majesty, with the full approval of the then Prime Minister, asked me to arrange that the advisers should keep me *privately* informed of developments affecting the mutual interests of our two Governments, although the *official* relations which formerly subsisted between the advisers and myself as High Commissioner had been definitely terminated.

I desire to record my grateful thanks to Your Majesty and the Iraqi Government for all these facilities and courtesies which have so greatly contributed to strengthen and perpetuate the close and cordial relations which happily exist between our two Governments.

I shall be glad to learn that I may inform my successor that Your Majesty approves that the Iraqi Government will extend to him the same facilities and courtesies as those given to me.

I remain, &amp;c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 1792/278/93]

No. 109.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 130.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, March 6, 1935.*

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 54 and 56 of the 28th February and the 4th March, I have the honour to report the circumstances of the resignation of Ali Jaudat Beg's Cabinet and the return to the premiership of Jamil Beg Al Madfai.

2. For the past two months Rashid Ali-al-Gilani, Hikmat Suleiman and Taufiq Suwaidi, together with a number of extreme Nationalists, have been seeking, by all the means in their power, to force Ali Jaudat to resign. They organised a strong Opposition *bloc* in the Senate, and, by intriguing with disaffected tribal elements in the Middle Euphrates area, they brought about a state of unrest which might have developed into an armed outbreak against the Government. Ali Jaudat also had difficulties with his colleagues. Arshad-al-Umari had made himself unpopular by his drastic dismissals of senior personnel

from the departments under his Ministry (Economics and Communications), and had incurred popular opprobrium on account of his loose living. Jamil Beg Al Madfai, who commanded the largest vote in the Chamber, threatened to resign whenever the smallest difference of opinion occurred between him and his chief.

3. Ali Jaudat endeavoured to face the situation with firmness, and sought to strengthen his position by reorganising his Cabinet. His plan was to drop Arshad-al-Umari and to persuade Jamil-al-Madfai to accept the Presidency of the Chamber. He failed, largely because Jamil-al-Madfai threatened to resign and join the Opposition if Arshad-al-Umari were asked to withdraw. Ali Jaudat's resourcefulness was not equal to dealing with this situation, and, in spite of encouragement from Nuri Pasha, he gave up the struggle and resigned.

4. Acting on the advice of the Presidents of the Senate and Chamber and of Ali Jaudat himself, the King then sent for Yasin Pasha and entrusted him with the task of forming a Cabinet. His Majesty stipulated that this should be a Coalition or National Cabinet, that none of those who had recently taken part in intrigues with the Euphrates tribes should be included, and that he should not be asked again to dissolve the Chamber. These conditions were, in my opinion, wise, and their necessity was recognised by Yasin Pasha himself. A party Cabinet chosen from the Ikha-al-Watani (party of National Brotherhood), to which most of the Opposition belonged, could not have secured a working majority in the Chamber, and to have dissolved a Chamber which had scarcely been in existence for three months would have made the machinery of parliamentary government appear absurd. Similarly, to have brought into office the men who had been principally instrumental in stirring up turbulent tribal elements would have created a dangerous precedent, which might have led to serious consequences in the future.

5. Yasin Pasha found, however, that these conditions presented insuperable difficulties. Representatives of the Wihdah, the majority party in the Chamber, would not serve with him unless Ali Jaudat was also given a portfolio, and his own associates in the Opposition would not agree to enter a Cabinet of which Ali Jaudat was a member. He was therefore obliged to admit failure and to give up the attempt to form a Government.

6. The King next sent for Jamil-al-Madfai, who, on the 3rd March, obtained Royal approval for the following Cabinet:—

Prime Minister: Jamil-al-Madfai.

Interior: Abdul Azziz-al-Qassab.

Finance: Yusuf Ghanimah.

Foreign Affairs: Nuri Pasha.

Justice: Tauriq Suwaidi.

Defence: Rashid-al-Khoja.

Economics and Communications: Amin Zaki.

Education: Abdul Husain Chalabi.

7. Considered individually the Cabinet has many good qualities. The Prime Minister is popular and enjoys a reputation for honesty. Nuri Pasha has an extensive experience of Iraq's foreign affairs, and always works amicably with His Majesty's Embassy. Abdul Azziz-al-Qassab combines a detailed knowledge of administration with the experience gained during several previous terms of office. Rashid-al-Khoja, Amin Zaki and Yusuf Ghanimah are moderate and reasonable men, well acquainted with the business of the departments which they will now direct. On the other hand, the Prime Minister is well known to hold unsound views on the subject of the Assyrians and to be ill-disposed towards the retention of British officials in administrative positions. Taufiq Suwaidi is not trustworthy, and his appointment to the Ministry of Justice is therefore not well conceived.

8. In spite, however, of the merits of the majority of its members, it is somewhat doubtful whether the new Cabinet will be able for long to carry on the government of the country, or to deal effectively with the present political situation. They are, it is true, assured of a strong majority in the Chamber, but this did not save the previous Cabinet from collapse. The presence of Taufiq Suwaidi brings the support of his brother, Naji Pasha, and a consequent diminution of opposition in the Senate, but there seems at present little likelihood that the change of Cabinet will result in any weakening of the



campaign of opposition which has recently been carried on by Rashid Ali and Hikmat Suleiman and their associates. Nor does it seem probable that this reshuffling of portfolios will in itself put an end to unrest on the Euphrates. Positive steps must be taken to deal with both these factors if the new Cabinet are to establish their authority and remain long in office, and I am by no means convinced that they are equal to the task.

9. At a meeting of the Chamber, held on the 5th March, the new Prime Minister made a short pronouncement of policy, the main part of which was a declaration of the intention of his Cabinet to carry on the construction work begun, but not completed, by their predecessors. At the same meeting Ali Jaudat Beg was elected President of the Chamber in the place of Rashid-al-Khoja.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ministers at Tehran and Jedda.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 1824/278/93]

No. 110.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 78.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, March 18, 1935.*

SIR F. HUMPHRYS'S telegram No. 73.

New Cabinet was formed yesterday as follows:—

Prime Minister and Finance: Yasin.

Interior: Rashid Ali.

Defence: Jafar.

Foreign Affairs: Nuri.

Justice: Muhammad Zaki.

Economics: Amin Zaki.

Education: Ridha Shabibi.

Government have issued proclamation declaring their intention to conduct the affairs of the country in accordance with the Constitution and appealing to those who have been disturbed by recent events to return quietly within three days to their normal avocations in order that the Government may undertake the necessary measures of reform. These are believed to include early dissolution of Parliament and new elections.

[E 1817/2/93]

No. 111.

*Sir G. Clerk to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 19.)*

(No. 421.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a memorandum by Mr. Sterndale Bennett, dated the 15th March, 1935, respecting conversations in Paris on the Assyrian question.

*Paris, March 18, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 111.

*Conversations in Paris respecting the Assyrian question, March 14, 1935.*

M. LOPEZ OLIVAN and I were met on arrival in Paris on the morning of the 14th March by M. de Panafieu, who said that preliminary meetings had been arranged between M. Chauvel and myself and between M. Olivan and M. de Saint-Quentin for 10 A.M. and 11.30 A.M. respectively. We were then to lunch with M. de Saint-Quentin, and in the afternoon there would be a meeting of all concerned, including M. de Martel.

2. When I went to see M. Chauvel he told me that he had wished to have a preliminary frank conversation with me in view of the Anglo-French aspect of the matter arising from Sir R. Vansittart's letter to the French Ambassador in London. He desired first of all to stress the local difficulties in Syria. The establishment of any fresh minority in Syria always called forth protests from the Arabs. It had been the case with the Armenians and also with the temporary Assyrian settlement last summer. The French Government were bound to take a serious view of Arab opposition. The mandate obliged them to look after the minorities existing in Syria, but it did not oblige them to do anything for minorities outside Syria and, if they accepted further minorities, the resulting Arab opposition might react to the serious detriment of the minorities already existing in Syria. For these reasons the attitude of the French Government towards any proposal for a permanent Assyrian settlement must be definitely unfavourable from the point of view of local considerations. When it had been suggested before, the local authorities in Syria had strongly opposed it. The French Government, however, were bound to look at the matter from a wider point of view and they had, on receiving Sir R. Vansittart's letter, considered whether there was anything which they could do. They had come to the conclusion, however, that they could only accept the Assyrians permanently if their hands were forced, that is to say if the Council were to appeal to them as mandatory and in the larger interests of the League to accept the Assyrians in spite of the local difficulties.

3. There were, in any case, material obstacles to settlement. To put about 20,000 Assyrians in the Khabur Valley where the provisional settlement had been made would, even if physically practicable, lead to serious trouble with Turkey. In fact, the existing provisional settlement had already caused difficulties with Turkey. No doubt land existed elsewhere in Syria, but in places where Assyrian settlement would lead to trouble with the tribes. The Lebanon was already too thickly populated and the most suitable place which the French Government could think of was the Ghar region on the border between the State of Syria and the Alawite territory. This region consisted of an area which was at present marshland, and a plateau to the east of it, some 500 or 600 feet in altitude. The marshland would have to be drained, but the French Government believed, as did the local Nansen Office representative, that it was capable of providing a fertile district in which the Assyrians would certainly thrive. The work of drainage could be done largely by the Assyrians themselves, which would be all to the good, and the reclamation of this land would be represented to the Arabs as adding to the prosperity of the territories under mandate.

4. M. Chauvel emphasised that everything would depend on the French Government being pressed by the Council to undertake this work, but they would probably be prepared to accede to an appeal from the Council on the same conditions *mutatis mutandis* as they had put forward in the case of the provisional settlement last summer. These conditions were, shortly: (1) That the French Government should act as mandatory of the League; (2) that the Assyrians accepted provisionally should be included in the first batch of those who would go to a permanent place of settlement when found; (3) that the operation of settlement should be controlled by some impartial body like the Nansen Office; (4) that the whole of the money required should be furnished by the Iraqi Government. The second condition, of course, was not applicable in the present case as it was now permanent and not provisional settlement which was being contemplated. The third and fourth conditions might require some modification. For instance, the French Government did not necessarily insist on the control being exercised by the Nansen Office if any more suitable body could be found, but it was necessary that the operation should be controlled by some League organisation or representative. As to the fourth condition, the French Government did not wish to specify the source from which the money should come. All they wanted was a guarantee that neither they themselves nor the Governments of the mandated territories of the Levant would be responsible.

5. I have summarised what M. Chauvel said in the course of a fairly long interview without recording in detail my own interjections, which were mainly directed to emphasising the need for a quick solution, the dangers which might otherwise be expected and the inevitable repercussions of such dangers in the mandated territories of the Levant. I asked whether it was really essential for the French Government to have an appeal from the Council itself. The Council



would not normally meet until May. The news about the British Guiana scheme could certainly not be held back for anything like that length of time. In fact it seemed impossible to postpone any announcement for more than a few days. The Council had purposely given the committee very wide powers in its terms of reference and I would ask that the possibility might be considered of acceding to an appeal, not from the Council itself, but from the committee. M. Chauvel did not rule out this possibility, and he also expressed the view that it would be preferable, if possible, to announce not merely that the Syrian scheme was under consideration, but that a definite decision, if only in principle, had been come to about it. Arab opinion in Syria would be easier to deal with if faced with a *fait accompli* and he did not think this need necessarily involve any great delay. The Ghar region had already been examined in other connexions, and he thought that all the information necessary to draw up detailed estimates of the work required and the cost involved existed, not in Paris, but in Beirut, whence it could be obtained quickly by aeroplane.

6. Finally, M. Chauvel said that there was an Anglo-French side to this. The close relations between the Syrian nationalists at Damascus and the Iraqi Government were a constant source of trouble to the French Government in the mandated territories. At least, however, their relations provided the means whereby the Iraqi Government could help to suppress nationalist opposition to Assyrian settlement in Syria, and to this end the French Government would have to rely on our influence in Bagdad. I said that, as the Iraqi Government had the greatest interest in getting rid of the Assyrian problem, it was only fair that they should help in every way, whether by helping to overcome nationalist opposition in Syria or by making a handsome financial contribution. I thought that we should certainly be ready to help to the utmost of our power in this direction, but I thought that pressure upon the Iraqi Government ought to be exercised not by His Majesty's Government alone, but in the first place by the Assyrian Committee as a body. M. Chauvel thought that it would be a good thing if the Iraqi Government as well as the Council Committee could bring pressure to bear on the French Government to agree to the scheme for settlement in Syria. If the Iraqi Government took an initiative in this sense it should be natural for them to help to silence nationalist opposition in Syria.

7. After this interview I had been asked to return to the Quai d'Orsay at midday to meet M. de Saint-Quentin and to go to lunch with him. When I arrived, however, we were joined by M. de Martel, and a meeting, which lasted for about an hour, immediately took place without my having an opportunity of ascertaining what had been said to M. Oliván in the meantime. M. de Saint-Quentin developed the theme that the French Government were, of course, bound by the mandate to protect the indigenous minorities in Syria, but that they had no obligation to take further minorities from outside, and that to do so might entail all sorts of difficulties with the Arabs. It would, therefore, only be possible for the French Government to act if pressed to do so by the League and on behalf of the League. M. Oliván observed that it was with the purpose of appealing to the French Government on behalf of the Council Committee that he had come to Paris. The committee was faced with a very difficult problem which, unless solved, might have the most disastrous repercussions. The committee did not feel that in such circumstances it could do otherwise than make an attempt to persuade the French Government to take the Assyrians, though it could not, of course, impose them upon the French Government.

8. M. de Saint-Quentin enquired what form the persuasion would take. It was necessary for the French Government to have something which could be published to explain to their own people, and particularly to the Arabs, why the Assyrians were being received in Syria. What they would like would be some resolution by the Council requesting the French Government to act.

9. M. Oliván and I pointed out that this would involve considerable delay seeing that the Council did not meet ordinarily until the middle of May, and in the meantime we could not postpone for very long some announcement regarding the breakdown of the British Guiana scheme. Unfortunately, there was reason to believe that, if the breakdown of this scheme were announced and no alternative put forward simultaneously, serious apprehensions among the Assyrians might be aroused, and it was even possible that they would immediately make an attempt to enter Syria whether authorised or not. M. Oliván said that he thought that the Assyrian Committee might certainly pass a resolution of the type suggested

by M. de Saint-Quentin, and that the committee would then embody this resolution in a detailed report to the Council, so that the whole matter would be very fully explained at the next session of the Council with a view to receiving the Council's blessing. As a first step, however, the committee had thought of addressing a written appeal to the French Government; the text of this appeal had been drawn up, and though he did not wish to sign it until assured of its favourable reception, he was prepared at once to communicate an unsigned copy of it to the French representatives. Its terms had already been approved by the Assyrian Committee, but he would naturally be prepared to consider any modifications which the French representatives might think helpful to them. The text of the proposed appeal (see annex<sup>(1)</sup>) was then read, and M. de Saint-Quentin undertook to examine it in detail as quickly as possible.

10. M. de Martel then expatiated on the opposition which was to be expected from the Arabs and on the financial difficulties involved. On the first point I said that I fully realised that the Arabs would need careful handling, but I felt sure that the French Government would not allow themselves to be deterred merely by petitions from professional propagandists like Ihsan-el-Jabri. Such petitions were inevitable, and the experience of our two countries as mandatories would have taught us both how much real value to attach to them.

11. M. de Martel did not pursue this point, but expressed anxiety to know precisely how many Assyrians might be expected. M. Oliván and I explained that this could not be ascertained precisely at this stage, that we were dependent entirely on information furnished by the Iraqi Government, and that it was because of this particular difficulty that in the proposed appeal we stated what we believed to be the maximum number of Assyrians in Iraq whose transfer was contemplated. M. de Martel professed to be not quite satisfied about this, since, whereas the appeal spoke of 20,000 Assyrians, he had heard various other figures mentioned varying from 30,000 to 60,000. I explained that it was a matter of some difficulty in a country like Iraq to state precisely the numbers of any particular community, but the figures which M. de Martel had quoted were those which the Mar Shimun was fond of quoting, and were, to the best of my belief, exaggerated. The figure of 20,000 was one given officially by the Iraqi Government, and was based on the best statistics available. It purported to cover all those Assyrians whose pre-war homes had been in Iraq, or who had otherwise acquired Iraqi nationality and all the ex-Ottoman Assyrians whose present nationality was doubtful. It did not include a certain number of Assyrians who were recognised as Persian subjects, and should presumably return to Persia if they wished to leave Iraq. M. de Martel said that the question was of importance as he did not wish a situation to arise where, after the adoption of a scheme based on a low estimate of the number of persons involved, the mandated territories would find themselves saddled with financial responsibility for persons over and above this number. M. Oliván and I explained that we had hoped to cover this point in our proposed appeal by the passage which made it clear that whatever the scope of the operation no financial responsibility ought, in the view of the committee, to fall either upon the French Government or the Governments of the mandated territories.

12. M. de Martel, who gave me the impression of having been put up to fight something to which he was not really opposed, then passed on to the practical difficulties of settlement. There was in existence a "Gentlemen's Agreement" between the French and the Turks that further minority settlements should not be made in a zone some 50 kilom. wide along the Turkish frontier. This prevented the extension of the existing Assyrian settlement in the Khabur Valley. A suitable alternative, however, might be the Ghar region. In reply to a question from me, he indicated that the existing settlement in the Khabur Valley would not necessarily be scrapped, particularly as a good deal of money had already been spent on it.

13. At this point we adjourned for lunch with M. de Saint-Quentin, but without M. de Martel. The French representatives indicated that after lunch they would like the opportunity of considering privately what had so far passed and they suggested a further meeting with us later in the afternoon. This took place about 4.30. M. de Saint-Quentin then said that the French representatives had considered the position and, although unable at such short notice to say

(<sup>1</sup>) Not printed.



definitely what the French Government's attitude would be, he thought he could say that the reply was likely to be favourable. It was necessary to obtain further information from Beirut about the Ghar region and the detailed estimates which had been prepared in another connexion in regard to its development. Telegraphic instructions would at once be sent to Beirut to send these details by aeroplane and they should arrive in Paris on the 18th March. He hoped therefore that it might be possible by the 19th March to indicate precisely on what conditions the French Government would be prepared to accede to the committee's appeal and to discuss the actual terms of the documents to be exchanged.

14. After this meeting M. Chauvel asked me to accompany him to his office, where he showed me on a large-scale map the area proposed for Assyrian settlement. While the French representatives considered that the Ghar Valley, if drained, would provide a fertile region for agriculture, they now thought it best, after further consideration, that the new villages should be located not in the middle of this valley, or on the plateau to the east of it, but at the foot or on the eastern slopes of the Jebel Ansariya, i.e., in the Alawite territory, and not in the State of Syria. This mountain range, which was of an average height of 4,000 to 4,500 feet and which, like the Ghar Valley, was practically uninhabited at present, would provide suitable grazing grounds.

15. M. Chauvel then read me the text of a telegram which was being sent to Beirut asking the High Commissioner to forward at once details regarding the cost of the development work which would be necessary and the time which the work would take. He then went on to discuss procedure. He repeated that it would help in dealing with Arab agitation if any announcement made could represent the Syrian scheme not merely as something which was under consideration, but as something decided upon at least in principle. The Quai d'Orsay fully realised the necessity for speed. Apart from anything else, it was desirable that the movement should be carried through with the greatest possible despatch in order that the Assyrians might not miss the time for spring sowing in Syria. He was now going to prepare a draft reply to the committee's appeal. His idea was that the French Government ought to be in a position to show locally that they had put the difficulties frankly before the League and were only agreeing under pressure. He thought therefore that the French reply would begin by stating the local objections to receiving the Assyrians and would indicate the reluctance of the French Government to contemplate the operation. The note would, however, be moderately worded and would leave the door open by indicating that the French Government realised the wider considerations involved and would be prepared to receive the Assyrians if the Assyrian Committee and the Council, after taking into account the local difficulties, still desired them to do so; and that in such an event they would receive the Assyrians on such and such conditions. I took the line that it was for the French Government to decide the manner in which they would agree and, provided that they did agree, I saw no personal objection to the line which he had sketched out. He must understand, however, that it was to M. Oliván that the mission of consulting the French Government had been entrusted and that I was for the moment merely M. Oliván's assistant. The actual terms of the communications to be exchanged would therefore have to be discussed with M. Oliván himself.

16. Turning to the conditions, M. Chauvel said that he thought the French Government would like, if possible, some more precise guarantee regarding finance. I explained to him the difficulties of giving any positive guarantee that funds of such and such an amount would actually be made available within a given time. He fully appreciated the difficulties of getting money out of any Government until a detailed plan could be presented and until it could be represented to the Governments concerned that, failing their contribution, the plan would break down. He said, however, that the point did cause serious anxiety to the French, particularly as they now had on their hands the 2,000 Assyrians in the Khabur Valley settlement. The 10,000 dinars paid by the Iraqi Government last summer had been entirely exhausted and a request by the French Government to the Nansen Office that money reimbursed to that office by Armenian settlers in Syria should be devoted to Assyrian settlement, subject to eventual refund, had been rejected by the Nansen Office, whose attitude the French Government found it very difficult to understand. I explained that the explanation possibly lay in the fact that in the matter of the provisional settlement in the Khabur Valley the Nansen Office was not acting as the direct agent of the Council Committee; the

position might be changed for the better if the new arrangements which we were now contemplating came into effect. I then said that I noted that M. Chauvel, in his outline of the French reply to the Assyrian Committee, contemplated a further appeal to the French Government not only by the committee, but by the Council. Might not this prevent the speedy action which M. Chauvel had himself contemplated? M. Chauvel said that what he had in mind was that, as soon as possible after receiving the French reply, the committee should pass a resolution to the effect that it had taken note of the French reply and of the local difficulties mentioned therein, but that, conscious of the wider considerations involved, it still felt that settlement in Syria was on balance the most satisfactory solution and that it accordingly renewed its appeal to the French Government to proceed with it and recommended the Council to endorse its appeal. M. Chauvel said that, speaking personally, he thought that the French Government would at that stage be prepared to go ahead without waiting for the Council at its next session to approve what the committee had done.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

March 15, 1935.

[E 1855/278/93]

No. 112.

*Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 19.)*

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, March 19, 1935.

MY telegram No. 78.

Personnel of new Cabinet implies policy of concessions to recalcitrant elements, but other sheikhs, who supported late Government and are hostile to Abdul Wahid, are by no means pleased by the latter's victory and are exceedingly restive.

Mutessarif, Diwaniyah, is, however, endeavouring to talk them over. Jafar is visiting troops with intention of restoring discipline and *moral*, which has been seriously weakened by political and religious propaganda. Men of the column at Abu Sukhair have been fraternising with local inhabitants and have been moved to tears by appeals of tribal women not to shed the blood of their brothers.

Generally considered, however, situation is now less tense, and with leader of Opposition to last Government at Ministry of Interior, there is fair hope of peaceful settlement.

[E 1989/1583/93]

No. 113.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 25.)*

(No. 84.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, March 25, 1935.

SERIOUS riot occurred in Kadhmain on 23rd March. Apparent reason for outbreak was construction of a new post office near a cemetery, but political influences are also suspected. Mob first seriously damaged half-finished building and then attacked Government offices. After one inspector and one constable had been killed, police were obliged to fire. Casualties amongst the crowd uncertain, but police report three killed and seventeen seriously wounded. This is believed to be an underestimate. Victims include nephew of President of Senate. Situation now quiet.

There is as yet no evidence that this incident is directly connected with troubles in the Diwaniyah, but fact that it occurred in Shiah holy city is likely to arouse Shiah anger throughout the country.



[E 2008/278/93]

No. 114.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received March 26.)*

(No. 85.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, March 25, 1935.*

(R.) MY telegram No. 79.

Abdul Wahid has dispersed his tribesmen and has repaired the bridges. Shalan-al-Atiyah has also withdrawn his men from Daggharah irrigation regulator, which is now occupied by a strong force of police. No punitive action has, however, been taken against either of these sheikhs.

Nuri and Rashid Ali spent 22nd March visiting Diwaniyah, Shamiyah and Hillah. They found Shalan-al-Atiyah truculent and the anti-Abdul Wahid sheikhs openly distrustful. The position is that Abdul Wahid and his group, having successfully defied the authority of Government with impunity, are under no effective control, while those who remained loyal to Government fear that the former will now not only dominate the province and be intolerable neighbours, but will also, through Rashid Ali, influence the policy of Government in all vital tribal interests, such as land and water disputes. They are consequently standing to arms and constantly demonstrating against the present Cabinet. (End of R.)

Problem for the Government is (a) to restore their authority over inflated and triumphant insurgents; (b) to find means of reassuring those who fear that they will be victimised by Abdul Wahid and Shalan-al-Atiyah.

Nuri advocates punitive action against Shalan-al-Atiyah by all available forces. This, if successful, would go far to achieve both (a) and (b), and is the sound course judged by all accepted standards, but if defeat is encountered either through inefficiency or disaffection of army, disaster would be immediate. On the other hand, Cornwallis is convinced that if authority of the Government is not restored, consequences will certainly be equally serious, though *débâcle* would be less swift.

Nuri is pressing his views on the Cabinet, but Prime Minister and Rashid Ali appear to be so committed to Abdul Wahid and Shalan-al-Atiyah that they are unlikely to agree. They are even contemplating using force against anti-Abdul Wahid tribes.

This conflict of views may possibly lead to resignation of the Cabinet. The King, whom I saw this morning, seems to favour the policy of the Prime Minister, but does not impress me as understanding the real significance of the situation.

[E 2093/1098/93]

No. 115.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 1.)*

(No. 156.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a letter dated the 14th March, 1935, from His Majesty King Ghazi respecting the Embassy relations with British advisers.

*Bagdad, March 20, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 115.

*King Ghazi to Sir F. Humphrys.**Bagdad, March 14, 1935.*

My dear Sir Francis,

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter dated the 28th February, 1935, and greatly regret to learn that you will soon be leaving this country.

The close intercourse which I have had with your Excellency in these latter times, so full of eventful happenings, has provided ample confirmation of the truth of the accounts which I so often heard from my father of your wise guidance and constant help in all that was conducive to the welfare of this country, its future prosperity and the strengthening of the foundations on which it has been established.

I shall always remember, with the greatest pleasure and appreciation, the times which we have spent together and the valuable advice which I have at all times received from you, and I have no doubt that my Government share my feelings in this regard.

You may be assured that my Government will not hesitate to afford your successor all the facilities which may be necessary to enable him to carry out the duties which will devolve upon him regarding our mutual interests.

Your sincere friend,

GHAZI.

[E 2096/278/93]

No. 116.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 1.)*

(No. 159.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, March 21, 1935.*

WITH reference to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's telegrams Nos. 78 and 79 of the 18th March, I have the honour to furnish you with the following further details of recent political developments in this country:—

2. Sir Francis Humphrys, in his despatch No. 130 of the 6th March, expressed doubt whether the Cabinet formed by Jamil Beg Al Madfai would be capable of dealing with the situation which had brought about the resignation of their predecessors. His misgivings were soon proved to be well founded. The change of Cabinet did nothing to appease the Opposition in Bagdad or to pacify the rebellious sheikhs in the Middle Euphrates. On the contrary, propaganda from Bagdad was intensified and tribal defiance continued to spread.

3. As a conciliatory measure the Mutessarif of Diwaniyah was instructed by the Government to tour the disturbed areas and to interview the tribal leaders with a view to ascertain their grievances. He met with little or no success, and Abdul Wahid (the outstanding personality of the Middle Euphrates) and his supporters declared their determination to maintain a defiant attitude until their demands had been satisfied. They alleged that these had been communicated to the King and Government and were of a nature which could not in any event be dealt with by local officials, to whom they refused to communicate details.

4. On the 10th March, while the Government were still undecided how to act, news reached Bagdad that Abdul Wahid's men had destroyed three small bridges in the neighbourhood of Abu Sukhair (about 12 miles south-east of Kufa). This caused considerable alarm and appeared to be a counter-move to the arrival of police reinforcements from neighbouring liwas. The Government sent an ultimatum to Abdul Wahid to repair the bridges and withdraw his men within twenty-four hours, and preparations were made for the despatch of troops to restore order. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, the adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, advised His Majesty's Embassy that the situation was graver than any he had known since his arrival in the country in 1921.

5. Abdul Wahid, in his reply to the ultimatum, declared that he stood for the defence of the Constitution, that his tribe had been concentrated for that purpose, and that he had destroyed the bridges to prevent a clash with the police. Thereupon the new Minister for the Interior himself visited Diwaniyah, but achieved nothing.

6. Meanwhile, in consequence of the irresolution of the Government, the situation further deteriorated. Tribesmen under Sheikh Shalan-al-Atiyah seized an important irrigation regulator above Dagharah (40 miles south-east of Hillah) and armed tribal demonstrations became increasingly frequent in the Shamiyah, Dagharah and Diwaniyah districts. The Abu Sukhair Nahiya passed entirely under the control of Abdul Wahid, and the Government officials were practically besieged in the local Government offices.

7. In these circumstances, military dispositions became necessary in order to protect the important provincial centres on the Middle Euphrates and to march a column into Abu Sukhair. Infantry units were despatched to Hillah, Diwaniyah and Samawah, and a column consisting of two battalions of infantry, three sections of field artillery and a motor machine-gun company was moved from Hillah on



the 13th March. It reached Abu Sukhair without opposition two days later. Several air reconnaissances were also carried out over the disaffected area by aircraft of the Royal Iraqi Air Force.

8. The Minister for the Interior continued to explore every possibility of persuading the insurgent sheikhs to disperse their tribesmen and to put forward their grievances for examination. His efforts were, unfortunately, fruitless, and the recalcitrant sheikhs refused to give way. On the 14th March an official communiqué was issued, a copy of which is enclosed herein.<sup>(1)</sup>

9. Not all the tribes of the Middle Euphrates joined the anti-Government movement. Those with long-standing or traditional hostility towards Abdul Wahid, and the section of the Fatlah tribe subordinate to his influence, rallied to the support of the Government and met the war-dances of the Fatlah with counter-demonstrations of warlike intentions. The local officials received offers from these tribes to attack the insurgent elements, but, not wishing to plunge the whole district into tribal warfare, they wisely declined them and counselled patience.

10. On the 15th March the troops were in position, but the Government, faced with the necessity for taking a decision, hesitated to employ force to restore their authority. It may well be that they were actuated by a genuine reluctance to embark on a course of action which, they were warned, would probably lead to civil war. On the other hand, they were by no means sure that the army would fight. Many of the officers were believed to be strongly in sympathy with the Government's opponents, and the majority of the rank and file, being Shiah, could not be expected to have much zeal for fighting against their co-religionists. Some few officers actually refused to proceed to the "front," and the men of the punitive column, on reaching Abu Sukhair, fraternised closely with the local inhabitants and were reduced to tears by the appeals of the women not to shed the blood of their brother Arabs and co-religionists. In any case, it was quite clear that most of the Cabinet shrank from the responsibility of taking the only course by which it seemed possible for the Government to assert its authority.

11. The advent of the religious festival of Al Adha offered an excuse for procrastination, and on the 14th March the Cabinet, still hesitating to strike, postponed a decision until after the holidays.

12. The following day they resigned. The source of the impulse which brought them to this decision is not accurately known, but it seems likely that the King caused them to understand that they were not in his view the right combination to deal with the situation either by force or conciliation. Most of the Ministers, it may readily be believed, were only too glad to escape from their dilemma. Indeed, it is surprising that they took office so full of hope and so cheerfully only a few days earlier.

13. The King immediately sent for Yasin Pasha and the formation of the following Cabinet was announced on the 17th March:—

Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Finance: Yasin Pasha Al Hashimi.  
Minister for the Interior: Rashid Ali Beg Al Gilani.  
Minister for Foreign Affairs: Nuri Pasha Al Said.  
Minister for Defence: Jafar Pasha Al Askari.  
Minister for Justice: Muhammad Zaki Beg.  
Minister for Economics and Communications: Amin Zaki Beg.  
Minister for Education: Sheikh Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi.

The same evening a further Royal iradah was issued appointing Rauf Beg Al Bahrani Minister for Finance.

14. With the exception of the Ministers for Education and Finance, all the members of the new Cabinet are well known in political life in Iraq, and details of their past careers are included in the annual lists of personalities prepared by this Embassy. Sheikh Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi is a Shiah of Bagdad belonging to a good family, who has long been one of Yasin Pasha's political associates and held the portfolio of Education in his Cabinet in 1924. Rauf Beg Al Bahrani is also a Shiah of Bagdad of a family of merchants. He graduated from the Law School and for some time served inconspicuously in the Ministry of Finance, where he rose, not, it is to be feared, altogether by merit, to be

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

Accountant-General. His appointment as Minister has caused some surprise, since he is reported to be stupid and has hitherto played no rôle in public life. It appears that his inclusion in the Cabinet is due to the Government's desire to placate the Shiahs, and it is probable that the effective direction of financial policy will remain in Yasin Pasha's hands.

15. Immediately on assuming office, the Cabinet issued a communiqué declaring their intention to govern justly in accordance with the Constitution, and appealing to those whose minds had been disturbed by recent events to disperse peacefully to their homes within three days. Copies of this communiqué were scattered by aircraft over the tribal centres of the Middle Euphrates. To those who read between the lines, this pronouncement of policy, coupled with the appointment of Rashid Ali-al-Gilani to the Ministry of the Interior, indicates the intention of the Government to make substantial concessions to the insurgents. It is difficult to say with precision what these are, since the insurgents themselves have never made their aims clear. There is reason to suppose, however, that their alliance with the political Opposition in Bagdad, which is largely Sunni, is based on a fuller recognition of what are called Shiah rights; that is to say, they agreed to join with Rashid Ali Beg, Hikmat Beg Sulaiman and Yasin Pasha in turning out Ali Jaudat, Jamil Madfai and the Wihda party on condition that, if the movement succeeded, Shiah demands should be satisfied. These demands, as formulated in January at a secret meeting of Shiah sheikhs and ulema (divines) at Najaf, include (a) the dissolution of the present Chamber and fuller Shiah representation in its successor; (b) the inclusion of four Shiah Ministers in the Cabinet; and (c) a substantial increase in the number of Shiahs employed in Government service.

16. That Yasin Pasha's Government propose to satisfy these desiderata, at least in part, is indicated by the inclusion of two Shiahs in his Cabinet and in the conviction held in well-informed circles that dissolution is not far off. It is also rumoured that he proposes to make two Ministries of the present Ministry of Economics and Communications, and to give one of these portfolios to a Shiah. Whether the personnel of the new Cabinet and the proclamation of their intention to govern according to right, justice and the Constitution will clear the air in the Diwanayah liwa is not yet certain. For a few days the atmosphere was certainly less tense, but the tribes have not yet dispersed. Those antagonistic to Abdul Wahid and his supporters are disappointed at the failure of the Government to crush him, and feel that after his success in overthrowing two Cabinets he will become an intolerably insolent neighbour. They also anticipate that he will, in future, dominate the Government officials in the liwa and that, in consequence, there will be small chance of their being given a square deal in the land, water and other disputes which are the main interests of tribal life in this part of the country.

17. Nevertheless, as the anti-Abdul Wahid groups constitute the better-behaved and more law-abiding elements in the province, the Government will, in all probability, win them over in the end by smooth talk and fair promises, to which end the mutessarif has already set out to visit them. With Abdul Wahid himself, a settlement is likely to be sought by giving him substantial satisfaction, while at the same time making provision to save the face of Government.

18. If events shape in this way, all may be well for a while, but I am advised that, in the long run, the elementary fact that a comparatively small tribal combination has successfully overthrown two Cabinets and brought about the dissolution of Parliament (if this occurs) will gravely impair the authority of the Government as a ruling institution, and that in the next few years serious consequences may ensue. Certainly, judged by all the accepted canons of good government, this appreciation seems justified. On the other hand, it is evident that if, in the prevailing circumstances, Jamil Beg Al Madfai's Cabinet had attempted to impose their authority on the Middle Euphrates by force, they would have run a very serious risk of disastrous failure, the consequences of which might well have been immediate and overwhelming. While I hesitate to form a positive opinion on this complex situation so soon after my first contact with the men and affairs of this country, it appears to me that the King has probably chosen the less dangerous of the two admittedly exceedingly hazardous and unsatisfactory alternatives which were open to him. If time can be gained by the early liquidation of the present situation, it may be possible to devise palliatives for the evils which may arise in the future.



19. From all the reports I have seen since my arrival, it appears clear that there is nothing anti-foreign in the unrest on the Middle Euphrates. There is, however, a distinct danger that the source of its inspiration may shift from Bagdad to Najaf and Kerbala, in which case the struggle would probably cease to be one between the Government and certain tribes, or even between one tribal group and another, and would become a religious war between Sunni and Shiah.

20. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ministers at Tehran and Jedda.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 2206/2/93]

No. 117.

*Record of the 41st Meeting of the Assyrian Committee held in Paris on March 20 at 11 A.M.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 4.)*

*The President* explained that as all the members of the committee, with the exception of the Mexican representative, happened to be in Paris, he had thought it advisable to call them together to report the gist of the conversations which he and the United Kingdom representative had had at the Quai d'Orsay since the last meeting of the committee in Geneva. M. de Saint-Quentin had drawn attention to the difficulties in the way of settlement in Syria, but had indicated that if pressed by the committee the French Government might be disposed in spite of these difficulties to consider the matter favourably. M. de Saint-Quentin had promised to try to give a definite reply by the 19th March regarding the conditions on which the French Government would be prepared to accede to an appeal from the committee. Unfortunately, this reply had not yet been received as the examination of possible places of settlement in Syria was still proceeding. The first place thought of, astride the River Orontes, had had to be abandoned owing to the cost of the work involved and the time which it would take. The French authorities, however, were studying alternative schemes. Without wishing to press them unduly, the president expressed the hope that their reply would be forthcoming before the end of the present week as it was naturally difficult for himself and the other members of the committee to remain in Paris indefinitely.

*The French Representative* said that he regretted that the French authorities had had to abandon the Orontes scheme, as it had promised to be most suitable in every way, and had the advantage of being far from the Iraqi frontier and unlikely therefore to cause complications. While the Jebel Ansariya would provide ample grazing facilities, it was not suitable for agriculture. For the latter purpose the Ghab Valley, which was at present marsh land, but a potentially rich agricultural area, would have to be drained. The first estimate of cost had been 30 million francs, but when the relevant dossier arrived from Beirut it was seen that it would be necessary to erect a barrage and construct a tunnel at the northern end of the Ghab Valley, and to create an artificial lake to the south of it. The land which would have to be turned into a lake was at present under cultivation, and the necessary expropriation of the existing landowners would be costly. The total cost would be in the region of 120 million francs, and the whole operation would in any case take twelve years to complete. M. de Martel and M. Burnier were now working on an alternative scheme for settlement on the Lower Khabur River. But this scheme raised political questions, both external and internal, and demanded very careful consideration. Nevertheless, the French Government realised the need for speed and their reply might be expected any day.

*The President* drew attention to various questions which would have to be discussed if the French reply, when received, was favourable. The first problem would be the provision of the necessary money and the composition of the local committee, which under existing arrangements would be charged with the task of consulting the wishes of the Assyrians. There was some doubt about Major Thomson's position on that committee, and it might be that the committee would have to be reconstituted. In any case, before anything further could be done, the Iraqi Government would have to be approached. M. Shabandar, who was now Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, had been asked some time ago to be in Geneva so that the committee might consult him as soon as it was in a position to do so.

M. Shabandar had now been for nearly a fortnight in Geneva, and the committee could not keep him waiting much longer. The important question of publicity would also require consideration.

*The United Kingdom Representative* asked whether the study of the alternative plan was sufficiently advanced to enable the committee to warn M. Shabandar that his presence in Paris might shortly be necessary.

*The French Representative* was unable to give a definite opinion. He said, however, that the French Government desired as soon as practicable to go ahead at full speed.

*The President* said that as regards procedure, it was proposed that if the French Government were willing to pursue the scheme, there would be an exchange of letters between them and the committee, and probably a resolution by the committee and a resolution by the Council would also be necessary.

M. Arocha observed, with regard to what the president had said about the local committee, that Major Thomson had not actually left his post. He was, so the secretariat understood, on leave without pay.

*The President* expressed the view that it was necessary to clear up with the Iraqi Government whether Major Thomson was still a member of the committee or not. So far as he recollected, the resolution of the 31st October, 1933, by which the committee had been set up did not specify the members of it by name. It referred to them by their office. The president of the committee was to be the land settlement expert, employed by the Iraqi Government, but Major Thomson was no longer employed in that capacity. The second member of the committee was to be an administrative inspector, but he did not know whether the competent administrative inspector was still Major Wilson.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that it was quite true that the resolution of the 31st October, 1933, referred to the members of the committee not by name but by their offices. It was clear, however, that the Iraqi Government did intend to recall Major Thomson to Iraq when the moment came to resume the post of president. Major Wilson was still administrative inspector in Mosul.

*The President* said that he, personally, was not satisfied with the present composition of the committee. Major Thomson and Major Wilson and the third member of the committee, i.e., the local kaimakam, were all Iraqi officials. For present purposes he thought that something less entirely Iraqi in composition was required. On the other hand, if it was the Council Committee's desire that the present local committee should be replaced by a new committee, it must consider very carefully what reasons it could adduce in trying to persuade the Iraqi Government to accept the change. He would like the views of the United Kingdom representative on this point.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he found himself in some difficulty in expressing a view on this point, since Major Thomson and Major Wilson were both British subjects and he had no reason to believe that they would fulfil their duties otherwise than conscientiously and efficiently. He was fully aware of the criticisms which had been directed against them, and it might well be that these criticisms did militate against keeping the committee constituted as at present. On the other hand, the task of the committee was an extremely difficult one, and the United Kingdom representative, for his part, felt that no one who had been in the position of Major Thomson and Major Wilson on the committee could have hoped to escape criticism.

With this view there was general assent.

*The United Kingdom Representative* continued that he would prefer to leave it to his colleagues to decide whether an attempt should be made to change the composition of the local committee. There might be difficulties with the Iraqi Government, and it might also be difficult to find other officials who had the necessary experience and knowledge, and who could take over from Major Thomson and Major Wilson, so to speak, in mid-stream. But he had no desire whatever to insist on the retention of Major Thomson and Major Wilson. The sole object of the Council Committee, he thought, ought to be to choose, regardless of personalities, the course which was most likely to lead to a speedy and satisfactory solution of the whole question.



*The President* said that the situation had changed greatly since the resolution of the 31st October, 1933, constituting the local committee had been passed. If a destination had actually been found, the Council Committee would be in a position to exercise much more pressure on the Iraqi Government. After all, the committee was working to rid Iraq of a tiresome problem, and if the Iraqi Government made difficulties for the committee in the execution of this task, the responsibility could be fixed upon them. Nevertheless, the committee naturally did not want an unnecessary struggle with the Iraqi Government. If the majority of the committee was satisfied with the present composition of the local committee, it would be better for the committee to reserve its ammunition for the greater purpose of inducing the Iraqi Government to make a substantial financial contribution. He proposed that the committee should for the time being leave the question unsettled and reflect upon it.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that a point which might have a bearing on the composition of the local committee, and which in any case needed urgent consideration, was how the necessary discussions with the Iraqi Government which must precede the transfer of the Assyrians to Syria was to be conducted.

*M. Arocha* observed that it had been assumed in the resolution of the 31st October, 1933, that a Nansen Office representative would join the local committee as representative of the Council Committee. But could he also represent the Council Committee in negotiations with the Iraqi Government?

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that the work of preparing and executing the Syrian scheme would fall into two categories—political and technical. The technical work could perhaps be left to the present local committee, with the addition of a Nansen Office representative, provided that all questions of principle were decided beforehand between the Council Committee and the Iraqi Government. It was the machinery for laying down these principles which was of immediate importance, as unless some special machinery could be set up there seemed a prospect of endless discussions in Geneva with an Iraqi representative, who might have to refer at every stage to his Government, whose decisions might be long in coming.

*The President* said that this was a very important point. He would propose that, as soon as the French Government had agreed in principle to accept the Assyrians in Syria, *M. Shabandar* should be asked to come to Paris so that, at a meeting of the Council Committee, the whole position could be explained to him. It should then be pointed out to him that whereas the Iraqi representative had hitherto been called to meetings of the committee for the most part to receive or to give information, a new phase had now been reached, where it was necessary to negotiate a definite settlement with the least possible delay. It could then be suggested to *M. Shabandar* either that he should himself obtain full powers from his Government, or that the Iraqi Government should send to Geneva a plenipotentiary to conclude a settlement with the minimum of reference to Bagdad.

This proposal was approved.

Before the meeting ended, the *French Representative* said that he would like to refer to one point which was causing the French Government some anxiety. They feared that if they declared their willingness to accept the Assyrians in Syria, they might find themselves saddled not only with the Assyrians of Iraq, but also with Assyrians at present living in Persia. The French Government had information that recently there had been an influx of Assyrians from Persia into Iraq at the instigation of Assyrians already in Iraq; he thought that the reluctance of the Assyrians to take part in the recent census in Iraq might have been due to a desire to keep up the existing uncertainty as to their numbers and status, so that it might be easier to introduce into any settlement scheme Assyrians who were not really habitually resident in Iraq.

At the close of the meeting, the *United Kingdom Representative* said that he felt he ought to give his colleagues some idea of recent political developments in Iraq, as these naturally had an important bearing on any future programme. He then explained briefly the recent unrest in the Diwanayah area, leading up to the formation of the new Cabinet with *Yasin Pasha* as Prime Minister.

*Record of the 42nd Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, held in Paris on March 22, 1935, at 11 A.M.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 4.)*

*The President* described a conversation which he and the United Kingdom representative had had the previous day with *M. de Saint-Quentin*. Briefly, the French Government considered it possible to receive up to 15,000 more Assyrians in Syria. For the moment they could only receive some 4,000, at a cost of 10 million francs. These newcomers would be added to the existing settlement on the Upper Khabur River. For the rest, before details as to numbers or cost could be given, a close survey of other areas, also on the Khabur River, would be necessary, and this survey was expected to take about three months. *M. de Saint-Quentin* had emphasised the difficulties which the French Government found in accepting the Assyrians at all. Their readiness to proceed as described above depended, in fact, on their being urged by the committee, and if possible by the Council, to proceed in spite of the local objections. *M. Oliván* had said that on this point he could not, of course, give a reply without consulting the whole committee. Assuming that the committee wished to go ahead, the first point to consider was what form was to be given to the proposed arrangement. The suggestion was that the committee should at once send to the French Government the appeal which had already been drafted and on the basis of which *M. Oliván* had been negotiating. The French Government were in possession of the draft of that appeal, and had prepared an interim memorandum in reply to it. (The memorandum was then distributed—see annex.) It was now proposed that the memorandum should be expanded into a formal note, and that the committee should then send to the French Government a further note, to the effect that it had taken into account the objections raised, but, nevertheless, felt bound to decide in favour of Syria. The question was whether the committee could proceed further without obtaining the approval of the Council. The French Government would prefer to have the authority of the Council, and the forthcoming special session of that body, which had been arranged to consider the German attitude towards the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, seemed to provide a suitable opportunity.

It was agreed that the second note from the committee to the French Government should conclude by saying that although the committee had been invested with wide powers by the Council, they thought it best, in all the circumstances, to obtain the approval of the Council at its forthcoming extraordinary session.

*The French Representative* pointed out that the memorandum which was now before the committee spoke of three possible projects for settlement in Syria. The committee must decide which of these projects to adopt.

After some discussion, it was agreed that the first and second schemes, *i.e.*, for settlement in the Orontes area and on the Lower Khabur, offered no solution for the urgent Assyrian problem, and that the committee would probably have to fall back, on that ground and on grounds of finance, upon the third proposal, *i.e.*, for settlement on the Upper Khabur.

*The President* said that one point was still not clear to him. He had understood that the French were prepared in principle to accept 15,000 more Assyrians, but that while 4,000 could be accepted at once, the exact figure of the remainder must depend on local surveys. The paragraph numbered 4 on p. 7 of the French memorandum, however, made it appear that the French were actually only agreeing at the moment to accept 4,000 Assyrians, and that their consent to receiving any more depended on local surveys.

*The United Kingdom Representative* pointed out that, on the other hand, paragraph C on p. 3 of the French memorandum said definitely that, subject to verification on the spot, the settlement of about 16,500 Assyrians in all, including those already admitted into Syria, could be anticipated.

*The French Representative* said that it was this latter passage which certainly represented the intention of the French Government. They were prepared in principle to receive 15,000 in all, if, as they thought probable, the areas which they had in view would accommodate that number. They were



prepared at all events to receive 4,000 as soon as possible, as they knew that the existing settlement would accommodate that number. The exact total of the remainder must be left to be determined in the light of the surveys, which would take three months to complete.

*The President* asked that the French representative would arrange that this point might be made clearer in the note which the French Government were preparing on the basis of the present memorandum.

*The French Representative* said that at an earlier meeting, the United Kingdom representative had enquired whether the Assyrians would be given land in ownership, or whether they would be merely tenants. He had referred this point to the authorities concerned, and it now appeared that some time would be necessary before land could be given in permanent ownership to the Assyrians. A detailed survey would have to be conducted in the first place, and the French authorities thought that some four years would have to elapse before the land could be finally parcelled out and title-deeds given.

*The President* said that before summoning M. Shabandar, there was one point arising out of the conversations with M. de Saint-Quentin which required settlement, namely, the question of publicity. It was obviously difficult to keep silent much longer about the failure of the British Guiana scheme, and the question was whether a communiqué should be issued at once and, if so, in what terms. M. de Martel had left Paris on the previous day and would be back in Beirut on the 30th March. He had been very anxious that nothing should be said about settlement in Syria before his arrival, as he wished to take certain measures in anticipation of local opposition. M. Oliván had felt that nothing could be decided on this point without consulting the whole committee, and it had merely been arranged that if it were decided to issue a communiqué at once, the terms as prepared by the committee should be discussed with M. de Saint-Quentin before publication. Since then, the president had had conversations with the United Kingdom representative and with M. Arocha, and all three were now in favour of issuing no communiqué for the moment. It was obvious that the Syrian scheme could not yet be announced as a *fait accompli*. It would have to be rather cryptic. If, therefore, the object in issuing the communiqué was to enlighten people about what was being done, this object would not be achieved. On the other hand, any obscure communiqué would lend itself to varying interpretations, and might have unfortunate repercussions both in Syria and in Iraq. On the whole, therefore, delay seemed best, and he would suggest that at all events nothing should be said until M. de Martel had arrived at his post.

*The French Representative* explained that M. de Martel had not wished the French Government's decision to be announced before his arrival in Syria. If, however, the committee merely wished to say that they had approached the French Government, there would be no objection.

*The United Kingdom Representative* pointed out that this might have just as bad an effect in Syria as an announcement that the scheme had been decided upon. It seemed likely to arouse Syrian opposition to an equal extent.

*The President* agreed. In fact, he thought it would have a worse effect in Syria to say that the French Government had been approached than to announce eventually that they had agreed to take the Assyrians. If the Syrian Nationalists thought that the scheme had not yet been decided upon, and that there was a chance of upsetting it, they would be all the more active.

After some further discussion, it was agreed that as the French Government would prefer that the scheme should, if possible, have the approval not only of the committee but of the Council as a whole, and as a special session of the Council in connexion with German disarmament seemed likely to be held about the beginning of April, the best course might be for the committee to present a report to the Council at that session, and to postpone any announcement until the report was considered by the Council. This decision was subject to the reservation that the issue of a communiqué prior to the meeting of the Council would be reconsidered should there be any leakage or any further development which might make an official pronouncement desirable.

*The Danish Representative* asked whether the committee might not at least publish immediately a short communiqué to the effect that it had met both in Geneva and Paris and was about to present a report to the Council.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that perhaps a reply to that effect might be returned to any direct enquiries. Issued in the form of a communiqué, however, it would only lead to speculation, and he would be in favour of issuing no communiqué. He added that he anticipated that there might be enquiries in the United Kingdom. Perhaps these would be in the form of parliamentary questions, and he proposed to recommend that the answer to such questions should be that the committee was about to present a report on the whole question to the Council, and that pending that report no statement could be made. The same answer would be returned to ordinary private enquiries, but there might be enquiries from ecclesiastical quarters, to which it would be desirable to reply more frankly. Where there was reason to believe that confidence would be respected, he proposed to explain the exact situation.

M. Shabandar then joined the meeting.

*The President* offered the apologies of the committee to M. Shabandar for any inconvenience which might have been caused to him by the delay in asking him to attend a meeting of the committee. The committee had, however, wished to be in a position to make some definite statement of the position to him. The report of the Browne-Giglioli Mission to British Guiana had already been communicated to M. Shabandar. The committee had examined this report, and had come to the conclusion that it offered no chance of success. It would involve the League of Nations in altogether too great a risk in which the Iraqi Government would be associated. The committee was, however, impressed by the necessity of finding urgently some alternative which could be announced at the same time as the failure of the British Guiana scheme. The committee had therefore turned to the French Government as mandatory in Syria, and he himself, as President, had come to Paris to discuss the matter with the French Government on behalf of the League. As a result, the French Government had prepared a memorandum regarding the possibilities of settlement in Syria.

This memorandum was then read and a copy handed to M. Shabandar.

M. Shabandar thanked the committee, and announced that he was entirely at its disposal for any co-operation. He would communicate the French memorandum the same day to the Iraqi Government, and would at once telegraph a summary of it.

*The President* said he wished to emphasise the strictly confidential nature of the memorandum. If the fact that Syria was under discussion was published at this stage, there were grave risks of developments which might hinder the success of the plan, and these risks were of the greatest concern to the Iraqi Government as the primarily interested party. The committee must therefore ask the Iraqi Government to make every effort to guard against any leakage. The President then pointed out that the French Government were prepared for the first contingent to move into Syria at an early date, and the committee was anxious to make progress as quickly as possible. There was much to discuss with the Iraqi Government. M. Shabandar had hitherto always shown readiness to co-operate with the committee, but hitherto his co-operation had necessarily been on a different plane. Everything had been tentative. Now there was a new situation; decisions had to be taken rapidly, and he ventured to suggest on behalf of the committee that either M. Shabandar himself or some other Iraqi representative should be furnished with wide powers to arrange the whole operation with the committee in such a way that it would not be necessary to refer every point to Bagdad. He did not, of course, mean to say that there should be no reference; that would be asking too much, but the Iraqi representative ought to be in a position to do more than simply to take note of and pass on communications made to him by the committee. If that method were followed, there would be unending delays. The committee would have to adjourn each time pending a reply from the Iraqi Government. Among the questions which had to be settled were the manner in which the wishes of the Assyrians should be consulted, and



the very important question of finance. He would therefore ask M. Shabandar urgently to persuade his Government to delegate a representative with adequate powers.

M. Shabandar promised to urge his Government to do this at once.

The President said that if the Council met at the beginning of April, as seemed likely, the question could be placed on its agenda. If not, the committee hoped to be able, during the first few days of April, to proceed without delay in consultation with an Iraqi representative fully empowered to take decisions. The committee wished to be in a position to begin the actual operation of transfer from Iraq to Syria towards the end of April.

M. Shabandar then left the meeting, and M. Burnier joined it.

The President said that the committee had been anxious to see M. Burnier because it appreciated how much he had done in connexion with the existing provisional settlement of Assyrians in Syria and with the French proposals for permanent settlement which were now before the committee. He invited M. Burnier to make any observations he wished on these proposals.

M. Burnier said that of the three proposals put forward in the French memorandum, the first two were clearly preferable to the third. He realised, however, that from the financial point of view and from the point of view of time it would be necessary to concentrate upon the third. The main question which concerned him was the manner in which the first batch of Assyrians was to be chosen. He would prefer that they should be selected from the same tribes as were already represented in the provisional settlement. These tribes were the Tkhuma and Upper Tiyyari and Diz. He would propose that the whole settlement should be on a tribal basis.

A discussion followed as to whether this would be practicable. It was realised that no conclusion could be come to on the material at present available, but that the tribes which M. Burnier had mentioned were those who were chiefly discontented with their lot in Iraq, and that it might not be difficult and might indeed facilitate matters generally to take first the remainder of those tribes in so far as they wished to leave.

M. Burnier expressed an inclination to combine the third French proposal with the second. He thought that the construction of a barrage on the Lower Khabur, which was an essential part of the second proposal, might be of great benefit to the country as a whole, might make more land available for Assyrian settlement and could, in part at least, be carried out by the Assyrians themselves at much less cost than had actually been allowed for in the second proposal.

M. Burnier said that he himself would be back in Syria about the first week in April and he thought it should be possible to begin the movement of the first batch at the end of that month. It would take most of May and June to transfer that batch. They would be, first of all, accommodated in tents, and more permanent dwellings would have to be prepared before the winter. In July and the first half of August no movement would be practicable on account of the heat, and the whole operation for the present year would have to be finished by the end of September, when the cold weather and snow would render further movement difficult. M. Burnier urged that if the operation were to be completed, or anything like completed, during the present year, no time must be lost.

The United Kingdom Representative said that he had already enquired whether the Assyrians would be given land in permanent ownership, and understood from the French representative that this would be done after a certain interval. Another question which he would like to put was, what would be the status of the Assyrians in Syria, e.g., what would be their nationality? The United Kingdom representative recalled that some of the Assyrians had acquired Iraqi nationality under the Treaty of Lausanne, but some had taken no steps to acquire it, and were, in fact, stateless. M. Burnier and the French Representative both said that they were unable to answer this question at once, and it was agreed that it should be examined further.

M. Burnier then left the meeting.

The French Representative then urged the necessity for speed. He hoped that everything would be done to induce the Iraqi Government to appoint a qualified representative as quickly as possible, and that if the meeting of the Council were delayed, the committee should find means of making further progress before the Council assembled. In this connexion he saw a great danger of delay in the proposal which the President had put forward tentatively that the composition of the local committee should be changed. Did the President in the circumstances really wish to proceed with that proposal? If so, he thought it ought to be discussed with the Iraqi Government forthwith, without waiting for the appointment of a special Iraqi representative.

The President said that he still maintained his objections to the present composition of the local committee. The question of changing it, however, was a delicate one, which required a considerable amount of thought as to procedure, &c. He did not think that the committee could take any immediate decision or take the matter further in any way pending the appointment of an Iraqi representative. He proposed that the committee should now adjourn, and that in the meantime the secretariat should prepare a list of points which would have to be settled with the Iraqi representative.

The French Representative still persisted in pressing the President either to approach the Iraqi Government at once about the local committee, or to withdraw his objection to it.

The President, however, maintained his attitude.

The United Kingdom Representative suggested that the question of the local committee might perhaps be allowed to stand over until it was clear in what way the direct discussions between the committee and the Iraqi Government would be carried on. It might be that if some expeditious procedure could be devised for settling the main lines to be followed regarding the consultation of the wishes of the Assyrians and their subsequent transfer, the work left to the local committee would be purely technical in character, and could safely be delegated to the present committee without change.

It was agreed to await the Iraqi reply to the suggestion that they should appoint a special representative, before proceeding further with the matter.

It was further decided that a reply should be sent by the President on behalf of the committee to the note which the French Government had under preparation. This reply should be to the effect that the committee had taken note of the objections to settlement in Syria raised by the French Government, but that, impressed by the dangers of not reaching a solution, it felt bound, in spite of the objections, to decide in favour of settlement in Syria. The reply would go on to say that the Iraqi Government had been informed of the position and invited to appoint a plenipotentiary to discuss details, and that while the committee had ample powers delegated from the Council, it thought it best in all the circumstances to report the position to the Council with a view to obtaining its approval if the opportunity of an early special session, as now seemed likely, presented itself.

It was left to the President and to the secretary to agree upon the exact terms of this reply; and to the President to decide the date of the next meeting of the committee.

#### Annex.

##### Memorandum communicated to the Assyrian Committee by the French Representative.

M. le Président du Comité chargé de l'établissement des Assyriens d'Irak ayant entretenu officieusement le Ministère des Affaires étrangères des possibilités d'installation définitive en Syrie des Assyriens d'Irak, ces possibilités ont fait l'objet d'une étude sommaire de la part des services du Département. M. le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Levant, de passage à Paris, s'est associé à cette étude.

Les inconvénients que présente, au regard de l'opinion locale, l'installation d'éléments minoritaires étrangers en un pays dont la population comporte une



majorité d'Arabes musulmans, sont suffisamment connus pour qu'il soit inutile d'y revenir. Le Gouvernement français, exerçant en Syrie un mandat qui lui a été conféré par la Société des Nations, ne peut s'abstenir de signaler au comité les conséquences possibles, sur le plan local, d'une décision que le comité serait appelé à recommander au Conseil, compte tenu des divers éléments du problème.

Les possibilités pratiques d'une installation de réfugiés sont fonctions de l'existence de terres disponibles et situées à proximité d'eaux suffisamment abondantes pour permettre l'irrigation.

Trois solutions ont été successivement examinées :

A. Installation des villages aux pieds des monts Ansarieh, en bordure des marais du Gharb, l'assèchement et l'irrigation de ces marais devant fournir aux Assyriens des terrains de culture et les terrains de pâturage étant à trouver sur les pentes des monts Ansarieh.

L'assèchement des marais permettrait la mise en culture d'environ 40.000 hectares, soit une surface plus que suffisante pour donner des terres aux Assyriens et dédommager les propriétaires dont les cultures et les villages se trouveraient submergés par la création, en amont du barrage à construire, d'un lac artificiel.

Mais l'étude du dossier communiqué par le Haut-Commissariat fait ressortir à 122.330.000 fr. l'estimation du coût des travaux. Ces travaux s'échelonnent sur dix à douze ans. Des problèmes délicats se trouveraient en outre posés en raison de la nécessité d'exproprier et d'indemniser, soit en espèces, soit en nature, les propriétaires des terrains inondés. Enfin, l'estimation ne couvre point les frais de construction des villages et de fourniture du cheptel et des instruments aratoires.

Par contre, l'entretien des réfugiés pendant la période des travaux se confondrait sans doute dans la plus large mesure avec les dépenses de main-d'œuvre comprises dans cette estimation.

B. L'irrigation du Bas-Kabbour avec barrage dans la région de Souar et installation des Assyriens dans cette région.

Le Bas-Kabbour n'étant point habité, la question des expropriations ne paraît pas devoir se poser.

Mais d'après les renseignements succincts fournis par le Haut-Commissariat, l'ordre de grandeur des dépenses serait de 230 millions de francs et la durée des travaux d'environ dix ans.

C. Installation des Assyriens en groupements échelonnés le long du Haut-Kabbour et du Kabbour moyen, où subsistent des terres libres et susceptibles d'être irriguées par pompage des eaux du fleuve. Cet établissement serait analogue à celui qui a été réalisé pour les 2.200 Assyriens admis en Syrie à titre provisoire.

Une étude sommaire permet de prévoir, sous réserve de vérifications auxquelles il devrait être procédé sur place, l'établissement d'environ 16.500 réfugiés, ce chiffre comprenant les 2.200 individus déjà admis en Syrie. Ces 16.500 réfugiés seraient répartis comme suit :

(a) Région située entre Safeh et Tell Nasser.

C'est dans cette région que se trouvent installés dès à présent 2.200 réfugiés. Les terres sont très bonnes, irriguées et susceptibles de cultures annuelles. Il est dès à présent possible de prévoir le renforcement de ce groupement jusqu'au chiffre de 6.500 individus.

(b) Région de Tell-Gourane et Hassetché.

Cette région est partiellement occupée par des autochtones. Elle paraît, sous réserve de vérifications, se prêter à l'établissement de 1.500 réfugiés, soit par groupe de 150 à 200 individus, soit en un seul groupe si les autochtones se prêtent aux échanges nécessaires.

(c) Région Tell-Taban-Chebdadi.

Les terres y sont assez bonnes. Elles appartiennent pour une grande partie à la tribu des Djebbours. Sous réserve d'une entente à établir avec cette tribu, cette région semble pouvoir recevoir 4.000 réfugiés.

(d) Plaine Fadghami-Tell Cheik Ahmed, sur la rive gauche du Kabbour.

Les terres sont de moins bonne qualité et d'irrigation plus difficile. Les possibilités d'absorption de cette région ne dépasseraient pas 3.000 personnes.

(e) Pentes sud du Djebel Abdul Aziz.

Les terres de cette région ne sont pas irrigables, mais sont très bonnes et se prêtent à la culture de céréales d'hiver.

Une combinaison peut être étudiée entre cette installation et celle des zones (a) et (b). Une entente préalable serait à réaliser avec la tribu des Beggara du Djebel, dont la zone de parcours comprend le Djebel Abdul Aziz; cette combinaison permettrait l'absorption d'environ 1.500 réfugiés.

Il convient de noter que seule la région (a) est suffisamment connue pour que la prévision qui la concerne puisse dès à présent être considérée comme une certitude. Les autres zones devraient faire l'objet d'une étude approfondie en ce qui touche l'étendue des terrains exploitables, les facilités d'irrigation, les accords à établir avec les occupants autochtones. Ces études ne pourront être terminées avant quatre mois, soit la fin de juillet.

Par voie de conséquence, ce n'est qu'à cette même date qu'un devis d'ensemble pourra être établi. Il apparaît dès à présent que les frais d'installation seront beaucoup plus considérables pour les nouveaux arrivants que pour le premier contingent déjà établi. Pour ce premier contingent, en effet, les services intéressés ont été attentifs à choisir un territoire présentant les meilleures conditions. Ces conditions deviennent moins bonnes à mesure que l'on descend le fleuve et que l'on s'éloigne de la zone habitée et du centre de ravitaillement. Le pompage et l'irrigation sont moins aisés à assurer. Enfin, les études préliminaires comportent des travaux tels qu'un levage de plans d'avion, représentant des frais assez élevés.

Il ne semble point que les frais de l'établissement du groupement (a) doivent dépasser 10 millions de francs. Pour l'ensemble, et à titre de simple indication, le chiffre de 60 millions de francs constitue une prévision vraisemblable.

L'étude de ces trois projets suggère les observations suivantes :

Du point de vue politique, le projet du Gharb serait le plus intéressant. Installés en pleine région habitée, appuyés aux monts Ansarieh peuplés d'Alaouites, les Assyriens constitueraient un groupement facile tout à la fois à contrôler ou à défendre.

Les deux projets du Kabbour ont par contre l'inconvénient d'augmenter la proportion des éléments minoritaires, dont de nombreux Kurdes, déjà établis en Haute-Djezireh. Cette province, excentrique par rapport à Damas, est déjà centrifuge. Elle risque de le devenir davantage. Le danger n'est donc point exclu de voir se reproduire l'état de choses qui rend aujourd'hui opportun l'exode des Assyriens d'Irak, et la protection des réfugiés contre les conséquences éventuelles de cet état de choses sera plus difficile à assurer en raison de leur éloignement de la côte.

Pour le cas où le projet C serait retenu, il convient en outre de tenir compte des remarques suivantes :

1. Les établissements (a), (b) et (c) se trouveraient situés à moins de 50 kilom. de la frontière turque. Le Gouvernement turc a déjà protesté contre l'installation du premier contingent de 2.200 réfugiés. Si 5.800 nouveaux venus viennent se joindre à ce contingent, ces protestations seront sans doute renouvelées.

2. Le Kabbour est fort proche de l'Irak. Cette considération est de nature à retenir l'attention du Gouvernement irakien.

Cependant les appréhensions éventuelles du Gouvernement de Bagdad peuvent être tempérées par l'assurance que les réfugiés seraient désarmés. Au surplus, les territoires irakiens voisins du Kabbour sont désertiques.

3. L'installation le long du Kabbour, dans les conditions prévues au projet C, fournirait aux Assyriens un refuge et la possibilité de pourvoir à leur propre subsistance. Mais, contrairement aux projets A et B, le projet C ne s'inscrit pas dans un plan général de développement économique du pays propre à intéresser l'opinion syrienne.

4. Enfin, si une décision peut être prise dès à présent en ce qui concerne les 4.300 réfugiés du groupement (a), en ce qui touche le surplus une réponse définitive ne pourra être donnée qu'en fin juillet. On peut prévoir qu'une certaine agitation se produira pendant la période comprise entre l'arrivée du premier contingent et la fin du mois de juillet.

Au cas où le comité déciderait, compte tenu des considérations ci-dessus exposées, de recommander au Conseil l'installation des Assyriens en Syrie, il conviendrait qu'une provision assez large fût mise dès l'abord à la disposition de l'organisme chargé de réaliser cette installation.



Aucune prévision en effet n'est inscrite aux budgets locaux en ce qui concerne les travaux du Gharb ni de Souar, et il est impossible de prévoir l'époque à laquelle des crédits pourraient être dégagés à ces fins.

Quant au projet C, l'autorité mandataire ne dispose pas d'une trésorerie suffisante pour assurer les avances nécessaires à son financement, et ne pourrait faire supporter ces charges par aucun budget local. Au surplus un dépassement de crédit de l'ordre de un million de francs demeure à combler sur les frais d'établissement du premier contingent.

[E 2291/3/93]

No. 119.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 8.)*

(No. 166.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 27, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 158 of the 21st March, I have the honour to inform you that on the 23rd March I delivered to the King of Iraq the King's letter accrediting me as His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad and the letter announcing the recall of my predecessor.

2. At 10-30 A.M. the Master of Ceremonies and the "chef de protocole," with five of His Majesty's motor cars and a troop of the Royal bodyguard as escort, arrived at the Embassy to convey me and my staff to the palace. We drove in procession through the principal thoroughfares of Bagdad, where the traffic had been temporarily held up and every precaution taken to ensure unhindered progress. The street was lined with police, and large and well-disposed crowds had gathered to watch the procession.

3. On my arrival at the palace, a guard of honour of the Royal Foot Guards, in full dress uniform, presented arms to the accompaniment of the Royal anthem. After inspecting the guard, I was shown into an ante-room, where I was introduced to Rustam Beg Haidar, the Rais of the Royal Diwan, to Saiyid Baqir, the Assistant Master of Ceremonies, and to other members of the King's household. A few minutes later I was conducted alone into the throne room, where Nuri Pasha, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, presented me to King Ghazi.

4. His Majesty received me cordially and referred gratefully to the personal friendship and interest with which King George had always honoured his late father. I made an appropriate reply, and gave to King Ghazi the messages with which the King had charged me. Then, having placed the letter of credence in His Majesty's hands, I asked for leave to present my staff. They were, of course, already known to His Majesty, and he exchanged a pleasant word with each one of them before we again withdrew to the ante-room. There we remained for a few minutes, and I had a further opportunity to talk with Rustam Haidar, who is His Majesty's principal confidential adviser.

5. As we left the palace, the guard again presented arms, while the band played the Iraqi national anthem. Our return to the Embassy was attended by the same ceremony as our outward drive. The programme throughout was admirably arranged, and I was impressed by the fine appearance of the troops.

6. At noon I paid official calls upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister. After luncheon I visited the Ministers for Interior and Defence.

7. On Tuesday I received a return call from the Prime Minister. At the conclusion of a long conversation on current events in Iraq, I remarked that it had been a pleasure to me to meet one of whom I had already heard so much in London, and I added that if his Excellency needed a friend in this Embassy he would find one in me. Yasin Pasha smilingly replied that he was sure that he would need such a friend, and that I should find the new Yasin very different from the old. From this I gathered that he wished me to understand that he had radically changed his views on Anglo-Iraqi relations. I told him that I was sure that I could look forward to the friendliest relations with him, and that I hoped that by mutual co-operation we should be able to do much for Iraq and

its people, whose happiness and welfare were, I felt certain, very dear to his Excellency's heart. He assured me that I need have no fears on this account.

8. During the next few days I propose to call upon the remaining Ministers and on the Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 2294/1583/93]

No. 120.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 8.)*

(No. 170.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 28, 1935.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 84 of the 25th March, I have the honour to inform you that the Iraqi Government have appointed Mr. Ditchburn to enquire into the rioting which occurred in Kadhimain on the 23rd March. His report is not yet complete, but some facts have come to light which I think it advisable to bring to your notice.

2. It appears that the trouble was primarily due to resentment aroused by the stupidity of the local kaimakam, who, ignoring the religious sentiments of people, permitted a post office to be built on ground which is venerated as having been a cemetery for over a thousand years.

3. In spite of the fact that work on the building had apparently been going on for nearly three months, the grievance of the populace was unknown to the interested Government departments in Bagdad. Nor had any inkling of the trouble reached the Embassy. This is the more surprising when it is remembered that Kadhimain lies only some 4 miles to the north of Bagdad, and that normally every event in the Holy City is immediately echoed in the capital.

4. These circumstances suggest that something more than popular indignation at the desecration of the ancient cemetery lay behind the sudden outburst of last Saturday. The obvious hypothesis is that this grievance, like others, was exploited by intriguers for political purposes, but it is premature to discuss this theory in detail until Mr. Ditchburn has finished his investigations.

5. Meanwhile, the shops in the bazaar of Kadhimain remain closed, the people are sullenly thronging the streets, and normal life is at a standstill.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 2295/278/93]

No. 121.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 8.)*

(No. 171.)

Sir,

Bagdad, March 28, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 159 of the 21st March, I have the honour to report the following developments in the political situation in this country:—

2. On the 20th March, yielding to the persuasion of intermediaries sent by the Cabinet, Abdul Wahid dispersed his tribesmen and repaired the four road bridges which they had previously destroyed.

3. On the following day Nuri Pasha and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani, the Minister of the Interior, left Bagdad for the Diwanayah liwa and spent the whole of the 22nd March and the morning of the next day visiting the towns of Diwanayah, Shamiyah and Afaj, where they interviewed large gatherings of sheikhs. Sheikh Shalan-al-Atiyah and Sadun-al-Rissan were brought in to see them by Saiyid Muhain-abu-Tabikh and Saiyid Alwan-al-Yasiri, two Senators who had been actively associated with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in his intrigues to overthrow Ali Jaudat and Jamil Madfai.

4. Shalan and Sadun are the two outstanding leaders of the disturbances in the Dagharah area. It was these men who seized the irrigation regulator and who were also responsible for destroying the crops and road houses of several villages belonging to another local tribe with whom they are at feud. Both



sheikhs were haughty and at first spoke truculently of insisting on the fulfilment of their demands. Ultimately, however, they were prevailed upon to disperse their armed gatherings, and on the following day their tribesmen were withdrawn from the Dagharah regulator, which was thereupon occupied by a strong force of police.

5. In Shamiyah the Ministers found a formidable group of armed tribesmen of the anti-Abdul Wahid and erstwhile pro-Government groups. In his talk with their leaders, Rashid Ali gave the most solemn undertakings that the Government would deal impartially with all the tribes and would show no special favour to any particular sheikhs. His audience remained unconvinced, and many of those present told him openly that they did not trust his word. Some even went so far as to demand the resignation of the Cabinet and the appointment of "neutral" Ministers. It appeared, therefore, that the Ministers' tour had achieved little. On his return, Nuri Pasha was gloomy and felt strongly that the authority of the Government would not be restored unless and until disciplinary action were taken. He advocated a concentration of force in the Dagharah district and the imposition of an exemplary fine on Shalan-al-Atiyah. Rashid Ali, true to his reputation, would express no sincere opinion. He endeavoured to claim that he had successfully cleared up all difficulties, but added that, in future, the Government should be supported by stronger forces. To this end, he hoped immediately to create five additional battalions, and appeared to think these could be produced overnight like mushrooms.

6. From conversation with Nuri Pasha, I gathered that, whereas he wished to take action against Shalan-al-Atiyah and believed that this was the best way to restore order and give satisfaction to the anti-Abdul Wahid sheikhs, Rashid Ali and Yasin Pasha contended that, as Abdul Wahid and Shalan had dispersed their tribesmen, there was no need to punish them for their recent defiant demonstrations. On the contrary, force should be used, if necessary, against the anti-Abdul Wahid groups to compel them to abandon their present hostility to the Cabinet. The truth appears to be that Rashid Ali, as the chief instigator of Abdul Wahid's recent activities, is too far committed to be able to move against him, though he is incensed by the hostile reception given him by the others when he visited them a few days ago.

7. Meanwhile, as I suggested in the final paragraph of my despatch under reference, the Ulama of Najaf have begun to make common cause with the anti-Abdul Wahid sheikhs. The Sheikhs of Shamiyah and Afaj have been persuaded to sign a manifesto of Shiah demands and Sheikh Muhammad Hasan Kashif-al-Ghata, one of the leading divines of Najaf, has issued a minatory fatwa (encyclical). Copies of both of these documents are enclosed herein.<sup>(1)</sup>

8. Many, indeed most, of the demands of the manifesto appear to be reasonable and, to a large extent, justified. If they had been advanced in a constitutional manner, they would have deserved the early and serious attention of all wise Iraqi statesmen. The present danger lies not in the demands themselves, but in the attempt to impose them on the Government by force. If the Government surrender to the tribes, they may find that they no longer have the authority to rule. On the other hand, if they resist, they may be drawn into a fatal struggle.

9. The sheikhs who have signed the manifesto and joined the Ulama have done so not so much because they are sincerely interested in Shiah ecclesiastical or political aspirations, but because they think that by this step they will rob Abdul Wahid of the initiative and put him in an impossible position. They think that he will now either have to break with the Ulama or come over to their side, not as leader, but as a suppliant follower. Their cunning is impressive, but their recklessness alarming. I understand that, although they have signed this manifesto of demands, they have stipulated that it shall not be presented to the Government until they have had a further meeting with Kashif-al-Ghata. Several thousand copies of the manifesto and fatwa have been printed and widely distributed.

10. It is not yet known how Abdul Wahid will react to this situation. In some quarters it is anticipated that he will join with the Ulama in the common Shiah cause. In others it is believed that he will stand by his friends in the Government and risk excommunication. The situation changes, however, with

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

such rapidity from day to day that I find it difficult to give more than a kaleidoscopic view.

11. The Government appear to be without a coherent policy and to be living on hand-to-mouth expedients. I do not, however, despair of their finding a way out of their difficulties, though their authority may be seriously impaired in the process.

12. I am reporting in separate despatches on the deplorable riot which occurred in Kadhmain on the 23rd March and on the delegation of Kurdish tribal leaders which is now in Bagdad. These matters have, however, their bearing on the general situation.

13. The dangerous connexion of the Kadhmain incident with the Euphrates troubles has not been realised as rapidly as at first seemed probable, but with Muharram only a few days ahead, it is impossible to dismiss anxiety. At the best the incident cannot fail to cause the Government serious embarrassment. The arrival of a Kurdish deputation consisting of about forty chiefs, while a far less urgent affair, is symptomatic of the dissatisfaction with the existing administrative inefficiency, which appears to be widespread throughout the country and which, apart from the political intrigues encouraged from Bagdad, in all likelihood lies at the root of the trouble on the Euphrates.

14. A further disquieting feature of the present situation is the increasing frequency with which printed circulars are appearing containing slogans of a kind made familiar by Soviet propaganda. Pamphlets of this kind calling for the overthrow of the Government and the eviction of the imperialist spoilers have, on several occasions, been scattered abroad in Bagdad and Najaf. There is as yet no evidence that those responsible are working in direct touch with Bolshevik agents, but there is little doubt that they obtain and are inspired by Soviet literature and are also influenced by propaganda broadcast from Moscow and Tiflis.

15. I shall continue to report important developments by telegram and to furnish by despatch such details as are obtainable.

16. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 2296/278/93]

No. 122.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 8.)*

(No. 174.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, March 28, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 171 of the 28th March, I have the honour to inform you that during the past week some forty chiefs, representing the principal Kurdish tribes of the Kirkuk liwa, and some of those in the Arbil and Sulaimani liwas, visited Bagdad with the object of representing grievances and asking for reforms.

2. Prior to their visit, the leading members of the deputation had met together and had prepared a petition for submission to the Prime Minister, a translation of which is enclosed herein. Subsequently, many other tribal aghas put their signatures to it. The requests put forward appear to be moderate, and, had the Administration been efficient, most of them would have been satisfied long since.

3. The deputation have not yet formally presented their petition, and I understand that Rashid Ali Beg hopes to dissuade them from doing so by giving them general oral assurances of redress. It is said, with what truth I do not know, that the aghas concerned have sworn on oath to continue to press their demands until they receive satisfaction.

4. The Kurds have no doubt taken advantage of the existing situation in the hope of finding the Government more ready than hitherto to listen to their grievances.

5. The officially inspired notices which have appeared in the press betray the Government's idea that there is something to be gained by winning the support of the north as a counterweight to Shiah agitation in the south. The



aghaz are represented as having come to the capital solely to pledge their support of and full confidence in the Cabinet. There is no mention of demands or grievances, and the newspaper readers are left with the impression that the purpose of the deputation is to demonstrate the readiness of the Sunni Kurds to stand with the Government against the Shiah uprising on the Euphrates. That this deliberate misrepresentation of the facts may lead by way of reaction to a closing of the Shiah ranks is a possibility which the Cabinet have apparently ignored.

I have, &c.  
ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 122.

*Kurdish Petition.*

IMPROVEMENT of the administration of the northern areas and abolishment of the Regulations for Selection of Administrative Officials as regards the north.

2. Enforcement of the Local Languages Law and its amendment as recommended by Amin Zaki Beg.

3. Unification of education in Kurdish areas and the grant of greater authority to the Mudir education in the north and a share of the education budget in proportion to the population.

4. Opening of a secondary school, teachers' training college and a technical school in the northern area.

5. Granting a fair share of educational missions to the Kurds.

6. Allotment of a share of night schools, as in the capital, to Kurds in proportion to their numbers.

7. Reappointment of a Kurdish Assistant Director-General of Interior, who should be a capable Kurd and should be granted wide powers by special regulations.

8. Granting to the Kurds of a share in proportion with their numbers of appointments in headquarters of Ministries, central offices and the Palace.

9. Formation of a liwa from the Kurdish qadhas in the liwa of Mosul with its headquarters at Dohuk.

10. Granting of opportunity to the inhabitants of the northern areas for the election of Deputies who have true connexion with the district and are natives of it.

11. Instructions in Kurdish history in Kurdish schools.

12. Improvement in afforestation, fruit culture and tobacco cultivation by the appointment of specialists and the opening of foreign markets, such arrangements not to be detrimental to merchants nor cultivators.

13. Amendment of the capital works programme to include the following projects:—

- (a) Water project Qarajun and Gobal in the Liwa of Arbil.
- (b) The Zab project in the Liwa of Kirkuk.
- (c) Artesian well projects in the Kirkuk and Arbil Liwas.
- (d) Prolongation of the road from Penjwin to the Persian frontier and arrangements of transit trade thereby.
- (e) Opening of a road between headquarters of Sulaimani Liwa and that of Sharbazher Qadha.
- (f) Completion of the road Surdash-Rania.
- (g) Improvement of the road Arbil-Koi Sanjak and its extension to Rania.
- (h) Opening of a road from Kirkuk to Koi Sanjak via Shuan.
- (j) Opening of a road from Sulaimani to Qara Dag via Qara Dag.
- (k) Opening of a road between Aqra and Barzan and its extension to meet the Arbil-Rowanduz road.

14. Preparation for settlement of the Jaf, Herki and other nomad tribes.

15. Appointment of doctors to headquarters of qadhas and important nahiyas and increase of dispensaries, permanent and mobile.

[E 2308/2/93]

No. 123.

*Air Ministry to Foreign Office.—(Received April 8.)*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*Air Ministry, April 6, 1935.*

I AM commanded by the Air Council to refer to Foreign Office letter of the 13th March, forwarding a copy of Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch No. 19 of the 9th January and to acquaint you, for the information of Secretary Sir John Simon, with their views on the various points raised in the latter part of the despatch.

2. The Air Council fully agree with Sir Francis Humphrys that, owing to the extreme uncertainty surrounding the various factors in the situation, it is practically impossible to determine now what policy it would be most appropriate for His Majesty's Government to adopt in the event of a fresh outbreak of Assyrian disorders in Northern Iraq.

3. The Council also agree that the consequences of any "impulsive intervention" by the personnel of the Royal Air Force Squadron and Armoured Car Section at Mosul would be likely to be disastrous. They have, however, no grounds whatsoever for entertaining any fear that any such intervention would be made, and they had not regarded paragraph 13 of Sir John Simon's despatch No. 842 of 6th December, 1934, to which Sir Francis Humphrys refers in this connexion, as envisaging such a possibility, but rather as indicating the difficulties with which, in certain eventualities, His Majesty's Government might be confronted. The Council are prepared nevertheless to draw the attention of the Air Officer Commanding British forces in Iraq to the views which Sir Francis Humphrys expresses in paragraphs 22 and 23 of his despatch with a view to the issue of suitable instructions when the Air Officer Commanding considers them to be necessary.

4. In regard to authorised action by units of the Royal Air Force, the Council agree that when time permits instructions should be sought from the appropriate quarter. They consider it desirable, however, to contemplate a situation which might render it quite impossible for previous instructions to be obtained from His Majesty's Government. For example, a likely contingency would appear to be that numbers of Assyrian refugees would seek sanctuary within the precincts of the Royal Air Force Station at Mosul. These refugees might be pursued by an Arab and Kurdish mob, which might or might not include unruly elements from the Iraq Army. The Council consider that on humanitarian grounds, and in view of the effect on British prestige which any other course would involve, it would be quite out of the question to refuse sanctuary to these refugees. As a result, such action might conceivably lead to conflict between the mob and the Royal Air Force or Kurdish guards.

5. The Council are of the opinion that it would not be practicable, and, indeed, would be dangerous, to lay down precise instructions as to what action the Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Mosul, is to take in these circumstances. In principle, they consider that he should accord sanctuary to the refugees, and in defending the camp against any mob that might pursue them, he should act in accordance with the usual instructions laid down for action in aid of the civil power; that is to say, he should use no more force than is necessary in the circumstances, and should discontinue the use of force immediately it becomes practicable to do so. He should also keep in close touch with the Mutesarrif of Mosul, who should be induced, as soon as possible, to deal with the rioters, and thereafter to undertake the protection of the refugees until such time as the passions of the mob have abated and a decision has been made by the Iraq Government, advised, it is hoped, by the British Ambassador, as to their disposal.

6. With this object in view the Council are proceeding to appoint a wing commander to the command of the Royal Air Force Station at Mosul. The main duty of this officer will be to become thoroughly conversant with the local situation at Mosul, and to keep in close touch with local civil and military officials and win their confidence, so that in an emergency his local knowledge and his acquaintance with the characters of the personalities concerned will enable him to take action in a manner most suitable to the prevailing circumstances.

I am, &c.

J. M. SPAIGHT.



[E 2453/433/93]

No. 124.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 15.)*

(No. 176.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, April 1, 1935.*

WITH reference to Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch No. 21 of the 9th January, 1935, I have the honour to transmit the following further information concerning Khalil Khoshawi, which I have received from His Majesty's acting consul at Mosul:—

2. In response to the requests of the Iraqi Government for Turkish co-operation, a mixed force of 300 Turkish infantry and gendarmerie arrived on the frontier near Berokh in the second week in March. Soon afterwards they arrested all the chiefs of the Girdi who had been harbouring Khalil and his band, and drove the latter back over the border into Iraq.

3. On the Iraqi side, a mobile striking force of 500 police has been concentrated in the Barzan and Baradost areas. As Khalil is reported to have a following of less than 100 men, the Mosul police should be able to deal successfully with him, provided the Government do not weaken the force to cope with the difficulties that have arisen on the Euphrates.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 2454/1181/93]

No. 125.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 15.)*

(No. 177.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, April 2, 1935.*

IN continuation of paragraph 10 of Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch No. 123 of the 4th March last, I have the honour to furnish the following particulars regarding the capital works programme of the Port of Basra for the financial years 1934-35 and 1935-36, the cost of which will be met from the reserve funds of the port.

2. The programme submitted by the Port Director for the financial year which ends on the 31st March, has several times been revised, and now comprises the following items:—

	Dinars.
(a) Construction of an air port at Maqil ...	23,500
(b) Reconstruction of "Viceroy" pier, with provision for a saluting base ...	8,400
(c) Extension of the supply of electricity from the central power-house to the district of Abul Khasib ...	10,000
	41,900

3. The construction of a large air port for Basra, fully equipped on modern and scientific lines, is understood to have received the approval of the Government in principle, and the work has, to a large extent, already been carried out. The total cost is estimated to be 52,000 dinars, and the balance of 28,500 dinars is earmarked for expenditure during the coming financial year.

4. The work on the reconstruction of the Viceroy pier involves the rebuilding of a jetty originally constructed as a temporary landing place at Ashar by the military authorities for military purposes. It has since been utilised to accommodate native sea-going and river craft, but is now worn out. A saluting base will be built on the new pier.

5. The money to be spent upon the extension of the mains of the central power-house to Abul Khasib represents a further investment of port funds, from which substantial financial benefit should be derived.

6. The above proposals have been under the consideration of the Iraqi Government for more than a year, and according to my information have been

approved in principle. Nevertheless, the sanction of Parliament has not yet been given. Considerable progress has been made towards the completion of the work, and, as there is no possibility of the law being passed during the financial year which has just ended, the Port Director may subsequently find some difficulty with the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

7. In addition to the above he has submitted to the Government a further programme of capital works which he proposes to carry out during 1935-36, some of which will extend into 1936-37. The expenditure involved is estimated as follows:—

	Dinars.
1935-36—	
Continuation works ...	28,500
New proposals ...	81,300
1936-37—	
Continuation works ...	5,200

Full details of the proposals are contained in the attached copy of a letter from the Port Director, addressed to the Ministry of Finance.<sup>(1)</sup> The only item that calls for special comment is the proposal to spend 50,000 dinars upon the installation of a central water supply system for Basra and the adjacent districts, which will absorb the present inadequate town supply. This will be controlled by the Port Directorate on lines similar to those governing the management of the successful central power-house. The port surplus funds will be insufficient to finance the whole of this work, and it is proposed that the Iraqi Treasury should advance a sum of 30,000 dinars as a loan. As the project was conceived by the Government and is being undertaken by the Port Director at their behest, it is unlikely that there will be any undue difficulty over this proposal.

8. The attitude of the Ministry of Finance towards the other items of the programme is not yet known. The expenditure upon the air port is greater than was originally estimated, and if the full programme is sanctioned, the reserve funds of the port will have been wholly spent. The revenue likely to be derived by the port from the air port will not for many years be commensurate with the heavy expenditure incurred, and it is a development which might more appropriately have been financed by the Treasury. On the other hand, the investments in the electricity and water undertakings are directly remunerative. I am advised that there is no reason to apprehend that the expenditure which it is proposed to finance from the reserve funds will affect the ability of the port to continue the annual payment to His Majesty's Government in liquidation of the capital debt. It does not appear desirable that His Majesty's Government should raise any objection to the proposals on the ground that the financial stability of the port will be in any way impaired if the expenditure is approved.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 2455/278/93]

No. 126.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 15.)*

(No. 178.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, April 2, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 171 of the 28th March, and to inform you that, although during the past week no new subversive acts of importance have been committed by the tribes of the Middle Euphrates, there have been disquieting signs that the spirit of defiance continues to spread. I am unable, therefore, to note any positive improvement in the general situation.

2. In spite of the sustained efforts made by Ministers, on the one hand, to persuade the anti-Abdul Wahid sheikhs to abandon their hostility to the present Cabinet, and, on the other, to restrain Abdul Wahid from giving his support to Shiah demands, little real progress has been made. The anti-Abdul Wahid sheikhs remain profoundly mistrustful of Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. I have the



impression, however, that Nuri Pasha, who has had frequent interviews with their representatives in Bagdad, has to some extent succeeded in winning their confidence. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis has, in his turn, worked tirelessly to dispel their suspicions and to convince them of the wisdom of patience and moderation. For the present, they are mainly concerned in watching Abdul Wahid, with whom the next move lies.

3. With Abdul Wahid himself the Cabinet have achieved some success and have so far managed to keep him on their side. The ulema had induced him to visit them at Najaf, but they could not persuade him to sign their manifesto of sectarian demands. On the 1st instant he arrived in Bagdad with a train of thirty motor cars. He was immediately received by the Minister of the Interior, and it is believed in some quarters that he pledged his support to the Cabinet against the combination of the erstwhile pro-Government tribes and the divines of the Holy Cities. In other quarters, however, it is considered that his intention in coming to Bagdad is to get into touch with the Kurdish delegation and with other sheikhs now in the capital, with a view to formulate demands counter to those adopted by the ulema. The main features of these demands are expected to be the dissolution of Parliament, to be followed by a general election, and the maintenance of the present Organic Law as the only safeguard for national unity. He wishes thus to be able to show up his rivals as treacherous enemies of national integrity and himself to pose as the apostle of State unity.

4. Sheikh Muhammad Husain Khashif-al-Ghata, having failed to obtain Abdul Wahid's signature to his Shiah demands, has been talking of issuing a fetva condemning him as an infidel, but Abdul Wahid seems unlikely to be moved by this threat and boasts that he will soon send the alim back to his prayers and his rosary. Meanwhile, without the unanimous support of the Middle Euphrates, Khashif-al-Ghata is hesitating to put forward to the Government his Shiah charter. Indeed, it is doubtful whether those who have already signed would consent to his doing so without the signature of Abdul Wahid.

5. Meanwhile, tribal unrest continues to spread, as will be seen from the enclosed copy of a translation of a pact which has been made between the sheikhs of Suq-al-Shuyukh in the Nasariyah liwa.<sup>(1)</sup> The signatories (about twenty tribal leaders) have telegraphed to Khashif-al-Ghata pledging their support to the people of the Euphrates. The tribes of the inaccessible Hammar Lake are also reported to be restive and disturbed.

6. From many sources I have received reports that the Persian Legation continue closely to interest themselves in current events, and, acting on instructions from Tehran, to do their utmost to increase the difficulties of the Iraqi Government.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran. I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 2526/2/93]

No. 127.

(C.165.M.91.1935.VII.)

*Correspondence respecting the Establishment of Assyrians in Iraq.—*  
(Communicated by League of Nations; Received April 18.)

(1)

*Assyrian Committee to French Government.*

M. le Ministre,

Genève, le 22 mars 1935.

VOUS n'ignorez pas que le comité institué en octobre 1933 par le Conseil de la Société des Nations pour s'occuper de l'établissement, en dehors de l'Irak, des Assyriens qui désireraient quitter ce pays, a étudié récemment, après avoir envisagé sans succès diverses propositions, un projet prévoyant l'établissement des Assyriens dans la région du Rupununi, en Guyane britannique.

Une mission, envoyée par le comité pour examiner les perspectives qu'offrait ce territoire, vient de rentrer, après y avoir passé à peu près trois mois, et a présenté son rapport. Malheureusement, ce rapport révèle l'existence de sérieuses difficultés qui obligeraient—plus particulièrement du fait qu'il s'agit d'un peuple habitué à des conditions d'existence très différentes—à tenter une expérience limitée et très hasardeuse pendant un nombre considérable d'années. La mission a constaté que les possibilités immédiates d'établissement sont extrêmement restreintes, que la région en question ne pourrait jamais assurer la prospérité de tous les Assyriens de l'Irak et qu'il est même problématique qu'une fraction importante d'entre eux puisse s'y établir d'une façon satisfaisante. A son grand regret, le comité a donc été forcé de conclure que l'établissement en Guyane britannique ne saurait être considéré comme une solution du problème urgent au règlement duquel le comité a été appelé à contribuer.

Ce n'est pas sans appréhension que le comité envisage la situation qui découle de cette constatation. Il a toujours reconnu non seulement qu'il était urgent, pour des raisons d'ordre humanitaire, de trouver un lieu approprié d'établissement, en dehors de l'Irak, pour les Assyriens qui croient ne pouvoir y demeurer dans les conditions actuelles, mais encore que des difficultés et des dangers seraient à craindre au cas où il ne serait pas trouvé de lieu d'établissement. Cependant, le comité ne voit guère, à présent, de perspectives permettant de mener ses travaux à bonne fin, à moins que le Gouvernement français ne juge possible de réexaminer favorablement la question d'un nouvel établissement assyrien dans les territoires sous mandat du Levant.

Une partie des Assyriens de l'Irak a déjà trouvé, sous les auspices du Gouvernement français, un asile dans ces territoires. Le comité ne doute pas que l'extension de cet établissement puisse présenter des difficultés considérables, mais il se préoccupe, d'autre part, de la gravité des conséquences que pourrait entraîner l'impossibilité de résoudre le problème assyrien et dont, subsidiairement, les répercussions ne manqueraient guère d'être ressenties dans les territoires sous mandat du Levant.

Pour des raisons à la fois humanitaires et politiques, le comité a décidé d'adresser cet urgent appel au Gouvernement français, afin qu'il accepte comme colons permanents, dans les territoires sous mandat du Levant, non seulement les Assyriens qui y sont aujourd'hui provisoirement établis, mais également ceux qui restent encore dans l'Irak, pour autant qu'ils désireraient quitter ce pays.

Le Gouvernement français n'ignore pas qu'il n'est nullement certain que tous les Assyriens de l'Irak estiment impossible pour eux de rester dans ce pays. Dès le début des travaux du comité, il a été précisé que l'émigration serait purement volontaire. Avant qu'on ait consulté les Assyriens au sujet de leurs désirs—consultation qui serait difficilement réalisable tant qu'un plan détaillé ne pourra leur être présenté—il est impossible de dire quel sera le nombre des personnes pour lesquelles il faudrait prendre des arrangements. Toutefois, d'après les renseignements fournis au comité par le Gouvernement de l'Irak, le nombre des Assyriens qu'il y aurait lieu de consulter serait d'environ 20,000. Le coût de l'établissement des Assyriens est un élément que le Gouvernement français est mieux placé que le comité pour évaluer, étant donné l'expérience acquise en ce qui concerne les Assyriens actuellement établis dans la vallée du Kabbour occidental. Le comité est d'avis qu'aucune obligation financière pour les dépenses de capital qu'entraîneraient les opérations d'établissement envisagées, ou pour l'entretien des colons jusqu'au moment où ils deviendront capables de pourvoir seuls à leur subsistance, ne devrait incomber au Gouvernement français ni aux Gouvernements des territoires sous mandat du Levant.

Le Gouvernement français a déjà montré, à maintes reprises, qu'il était disposé à faciliter, dans toute la mesure du possible, la tâche du comité. Aussi celui-ci est-il certain que ses propositions recevront l'accueil le plus sympathique. Je suis convaincu qu'il suffit, pour ma part, d'insister sur l'urgence d'une décision.

Vous vous rendrez facilement compte qu'une déclaration publique au sujet du plan concernant la Guyane britannique ne saurait être ajournée et que l'annonce de l'impossibilité de retenir ce projet pourrait avoir les conséquences les plus regrettables si elle n'était pas accompagnée d'une déclaration indiquant qu'une autre solution précise et présentant des chances de succès est activement étudiée.



Je vous serais donc reconnaissant de bien vouloir me communiquer, le plus tôt qu'il sera possible, la réponse du Gouvernement français à l'appel que j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser au nom du comité.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Président du Comité pour l'Établissement  
des Assyriens de l'Irak.

LOPEZ OLIVAN.

(2)

*French Government to Assyrian Committee.*

M. le Président,

Paris, le 14 avril 1935.

Par une lettre en date du 22 mars, vous avez bien voulu m'entretenir des inquiétudes éprouvées par le comité du Conseil chargé de l'établissement des Assyriens de l'Irak en présence des conclusions négatives du rapport Browne-Giglioli relatif aux possibilités d'établir les Assyriens en Guyane britannique.

Le comité est préoccupé, tant de mener à bien, en trouvant hors d'Irak un habitat convenant aux Assyriens, la tâche humanitaire à lui confiée, que de prévenir, par l'annonce d'une autre solution favorable, les conséquences possibles de la déception qu'éprouveraient les Assyriens à la nouvelle de l'abandon du plan d'établissement en Guyane britannique.

Pour ces raisons à la fois humanitaires et politiques, le comité, tout en reconnaissant que l'extension de l'établissement assyrien existant en Syrie est de nature à soulever des difficultés considérables, a décidé d'adresser un pressant appel au Gouvernement français et de lui demander d'admettre dans les territoires sous mandat français, en tant que colons permanents, non seulement les Assyriens qui y sont à ce jour établis à titre provisoire, mais encore ceux qui sont demeurés en Irak pour autant qu'ils désireraient quitter ce pays.

Vous voulez bien indiquer que, l'émigration des Assyriens hors d'Irak devant être déterminée par la seule volonté des individus intéressés, il est impossible de préciser, tant qu'il n'aura pas été procédé à une consultation sur place, le nombre des réfugiés qui se prévaudraient des facilités offertes. Le nombre des Assyriens à consulter serait d'environ 20.000.

Je note également que, dans la pensée du comité, il appartient au Gouvernement français d'évaluer les dépenses qu'entraînerait l'établissement des Assyriens en Syrie, et qu'aucune charge financière, soit en ce qui concerne le capital à investir dans les opérations d'installation, soit en ce qui touche l'entretien des colons jusqu'au moment où ils seront en mesure de pourvoir seuls à leur subsistance, ne doit incomber au Gouvernement français ni aux Gouvernements des territoires sous mandat.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Gouvernement français, soucieux de ne point se dérober à l'appel humanitaire qui lui est adressé, a procédé à l'étude la plus attentive de la demande dont le comité du Conseil de la Société des Nations a bien voulu le saisir. Bien que de nombreux éléments de cette étude ne puissent être recueillis que sur place, je crois devoir, pour tenir compte du désir que vous m'avez exprimé de recevoir d'urgence une réponse, vous communiquer dès à présent les conclusions formées à la suite d'un examen nécessairement incomplet.

Il convient tout d'abord de préciser la nature des difficultés auxquelles vous avez bien voulu faire allusion et que l'extension de l'établissement assyrien existant en Syrie est susceptible de soulever.

Les éléments qui constituent la majorité de la population syrienne sont hostiles à l'admission en territoire syrien de minorités étrangères. Par ailleurs, l'acte de mandat, s'il précise les garanties à assurer à tous les autochtones, ne comporte aucune prévision relative à l'accueil de ressortissants étrangers. La Puissance mandataire, si elle agissait de sa propre initiative, se trouverait donc exposée à des critiques auxquelles elle ne pourrait opposer en droit aucun argument. En tout état de cause, l'admission des Assyriens d'Irak est de nature à compliquer sa tâche. Cette mesure peut en outre affecter dans quelque mesure les relations qu'entretiennent entre elles les diverses parties de la population autochtone.

Le Gouvernement français, exerçant en Syrie un mandat dont les termes ont été définis par la Société des Nations et dont il est responsable à l'égard du Conseil, ne peut s'abstenir de signaler au comité les conséquences possibles, sur le plan local, d'une décision que le comité serait appelé à recommander au Conseil, compte tenu des divers éléments du problème.

Si l'on fait abstraction de cet aspect du problème, les possibilités pratiques d'une installation de réfugiés sont fonctions de l'existence de terres disponibles et situées à proximité d'eaux assez abondantes pour permettre l'irrigation.

Trois solutions ont été successivement examinées :

A. Installation des villages aux pieds des monts Ansarieh, en bordure des marais du Gharb, l'assèchement et l'irrigation de ces marais devant fournir aux Assyriens des terrains de culture et les terrains de pâturage étant à trouver sur les pentes des monts Ansarieh.

L'assèchement des marais permettrait la mise en culture d'environ 40.000 hectares, soit une surface plus que suffisante pour donner des terres aux Assyriens et dédommager les propriétaires dont les cultures et les villages se trouveraient submergés par la création, en amont du barrage à construire, d'un lac artificiel.

Mais l'étude du dossier communiqué par le Haut-Commissariat fait ressortir à 122.330.000 fr. l'estimation du coût des travaux. Ces travaux s'échelonnent sur dix à douze ans. Des problèmes délicats se trouveraient en outre posés en raison de la nécessité d'exproprier et d'indemniser, soit en espèces, soit en nature, les propriétaires des terrains inondés. Enfin, l'estimation ne couvre point les frais de construction des villages et de fournitures du cheptel et des instruments aratoires.

Par contre l'entretien des réfugiés pendant la période des travaux se confondrait sans doute dans la plus large mesure avec les dépenses de main-d'œuvre comprises dans cette estimation.

B. Irrigation du Bas-Kabbour avec barrage dans la région de Souar et installation des Assyro-Chaldéens dans cette région.

Le Bas-Kabbour n'étant point habité, la question des expropriations ne paraît pas devoir se poser.

Mais d'après les renseignements succincts fournis par le Haut-Commissariat, l'ordre de grandeur des dépenses serait de 230 millions de francs et la durée des travaux d'environ dix ans.

C. Installation des Assyro-Chaldéens en groupements échelonnés le long du Haut-Kabbour et du Kabbour-Moyen, où subsistent des terres libres et susceptibles d'être irriguées par pompage des eaux du fleuve. Cet établissement serait analogue à celui qui a été réalisé pour les 2.200 Assyro-Chaldéens admis en Syrie à titre provisoire.

Les cinq régions ci-après énumérées paraissent se prêter à l'exécution de ce projet :

(a) Région située entre Safeh et Tell Nasser.

C'est dans cette région que se trouvent installés dès à présent 2.200 réfugiés. Les terres sont très bonnes, irriguées et susceptibles de cultures annuelles. Il est dès à présent possible de prévoir le renforcement de ce groupement jusqu'au chiffre de 6.500 individus.

(b) Région de Tell-Gourane et Hassetché.

Cette région est partiellement occupée par des autochtones. Elle paraît, sous réserve de vérifications, se prêter à l'établissement de 1.500 réfugiés, soit par groupe de 150 à 200 individus, soit en un seul groupe si les autochtones se prêtent aux échanges nécessaires.

(c) Région Tell Taban-Chebadi.

Les terres y sont assez bonnes. Elles appartiennent pour une grande partie à la tribu des Djebours. Sous réserve d'une entente à établir avec cette tribu, cette région semble pouvoir recevoir 4.000 réfugiés.

(d) Plaine Fadghami-Tell Cheik Ahmed, sur la rive gauche du Kabbour.

Les terres sont de moins bonne qualité et d'irrigation plus difficile. Les possibilités d'absorption de cette région ne dépasseraient pas 3.000 personnes.

(e) Pentes sud du Djebel Abdul Aziz.

Les terres de cette région ne sont pas irrigables, mais sont très bonnes et se prêtent à la culture de céréales d'hiver.



Une combinaison peut être étudiée entre cette installation et celle des zones (a) et (b). Une entente préalable serait à réaliser avec la tribu des Beggara du Djebel dont la zone de parcours comprend le Djebel Abdul Aziz. Cette combinaison permettrait l'absorption d'environ 1.500 réfugiés.

Il convient de noter que seule la région (a) est suffisamment connue pour que la prévision qui la concerne puisse dès à présent être considérée comme une certitude. Les autres zones devraient faire l'objet d'une étude approfondie en ce qui touche l'étendue des terrains exploitables, les facilités d'irrigation, les accords à établir avec les occupants autochtones. Ces études ne pourront être terminées avant quatre mois, soit la fin de juillet.

Par voie de conséquence ce n'est qu'à cette même date qu'un devis d'ensemble pourra être établi. Il apparaît dès à présent que les frais d'installation seront beaucoup plus considérables pour les nouveaux arrivants que pour le premier contingent déjà installé. Pour ce premier contingent, en effet, les services intéressés ont été attentifs à choisir un territoire présentant les meilleures conditions. Ces conditions deviennent moins bonnes à mesure que l'on descend le fleuve et que l'on s'éloigne de la zone habitée et du centre de ravitaillement. Le pompage et l'irrigation sont moins aisés à assurer. Enfin, les études préliminaires comportent des travaux tels qu'un levage de plans d'avion, représentant des frais assez élevés.

En l'état actuel du dossier, les prévisions que l'on peut former sur les possibilités offertes par ce projet s'établissent donc comme suit :

L'ensemble des cinq régions ci-dessus énumérées paraît, sous réserve des vérifications techniques auxquelles il sera procédé sur place et des accords à établir avec les occupants autochtones, sédentaires et nomades, se prêter à l'installation d'environ 6.500 réfugiés, le premier contingent établi dans la zone (a) étant compris dans ce chiffre global.

La possibilité de ce groupement de 4.300 nouveaux réfugiés autour des 2.200 Assyriens établis dans la zone (a) peut dès à présent être considérée comme acquise.

Le nombre des individus que permettront d'absorber les quatre autres zones ne pourra être confirmé qu'après l'enquête et les études techniques à poursuivre sur place.

En ce qui concerne le coût de cet établissement, il ne semble pas que les frais à exposer dans la zone (a) doivent dépasser 10 millions de francs. Pour l'ensemble, et à titre de simple indication, le chiffre de 60 millions de francs constitue une approximation vraisemblable.

L'étude des trois projets A, B et C suggère des remarques d'ordre général :

Du point de vue de l'administration locale, le projet A serait préférable aux deux autres. Installés en pleine région habitée, appuyés aux monts Ansariéh peuplés d'Alaouites, les Assyriens constitueraient un groupement facile à contrôler et dont la sécurité serait aisément assurée.

Les projets B et C ont par contre les inconvénients que comporte la position géographique du Sandjak de Haute-Djezireh. Ce sandjak est le plus éloigné de Damas. Sa population comporte une importante proportion de minoritaires. L'établissement des Assyriens renforcera ces éléments, et le risque n'est point exclu de voir se reproduire, à la faveur de ce renforcement, l'état de choses qui rend aujourd'hui opportun l'exode de ces Assyriens hors d'Irak. Dans une telle éventualité l'isolement de la Haute-Djezireh ne faciliterait pas un contrôle attentif par le pouvoir central des réactions de l'autorité administrative locale.

Pour le cas où le projet C retiendrait l'attention du comité, il convient en outre de tenir compte des observations suivantes :

Les zones (a), (b) et (c) sont situées à moins de 50 kilomètres de la frontière turque. Les cinq zones sont proches de la frontière irakienne. Il en résulterait pour le Gouvernement syrien la nécessité de prévoir en ce qui concerne cette région des mesures de police attentivement étudiées.

L'installation le long du Kabbour, dans les conditions prévues au projet C, fournirait aux Assyriens un refuge et la possibilité de pourvoir à leur propre subsistance. Mais il n'en résulterait pas, pour l'économie générale du pays, un bénéfice aussi marqué que celui d'une mise en œuvre de grands travaux compris dans un plan d'équipement général.

Enfin, dans l'hypothèse où une décision serait prise dès maintenant sur le projet C, un intervalle de quatre mois est à prévoir entre l'adoption de ce projet et la confirmation définitive des possibilités d'ensemble qu'il offre.

Au cas où le comité déciderait, compte tenu des considérations ci-dessus exposées, de recommander au Conseil l'installation des Assyro-Chaldéens en Syrie, il conviendrait qu'une provision assez large fût mise dès l'abord à la disposition de l'organisme chargé de réaliser cette installation.

Aucune prévision en effet n'est inscrite aux budgets locaux en ce qui concerne les travaux du Gharb ni de Souar, et il est impossible de prévoir l'époque à laquelle des crédits pourraient être dégagés à ces fins.

Quant au projet C, l'autorité mandataire ne dispose pas d'une trésorerie suffisante pour assurer les avances nécessaires à son financement, et ne pourrait faire supporter ces charges par aucun budget local. Au surplus, un dépassement de crédit de l'ordre de 1 million de francs demeure à combler sur les frais d'établissement du premier contingent.

Au cas où le projet C serait retenu la provision à tenir immédiatement à la disposition de l'autorité mandataire serait de l'ordre de 10 millions de francs.

Quelle que soit donc la solution recommandée par le comité au Conseil, le Gouvernement français ne pourrait pratiquement répondre à l'appel qui lui est adressé que sur assurance officiellement donnée par le Conseil que ni le budget français, ni les budgets locaux n'auraient à supporter aucune charge, du fait de l'installation des Assyriens en Syrie, et sur présentation d'un plan faisant apparaître les moyens à mettre en œuvre pour réunir les sommes nécessaires à cette installation.

Agréé, &c.  
PIERRE LAVAL.

[E 2527/2/93]

No. 128.

Consul, Geneva, to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received April 18.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 42. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Geneva, April 17, 1935.

BERNE telegram No. 3, Saving, of 11th April: Assyrian question.

Following from Secretary of State:—

"French note received last night follows general lines agreed upon in Paris, but contains a final paragraph to the effect that the French Government could not in practice respond to the appeal addressed to them without (a) an official assurance by the Council that no burden would be placed either on the French budget or on the local budget, and (b) a plan showing the steps to be taken to collect the necessary funds.

"It was therefore arranged for Assyrian question to come before Council to-day. The rapporteur, after informing the Council that British Guiana scheme had been found impracticable and that other offers had had to be abandoned, announced Syrian scheme in words given in my immediately following telegram. He then dealt with final paragraph of French note. He stated committee's view that work of settlement could only be undertaken and carried out if sufficient funds were available as and when required, and said that committee would as soon as possible establish a detailed plan on this basis in co-operation with Iraqi and French Governments. Furthermore the committee held that no financial obligation in respect of the capital expenditure involved by the proposed settlement operations, or in respect of the subsistence of the settlers until self-supporting, should be laid either on French Government or on mandated territories. He asked Council to approve attitude of committee.

"Iraqi representative thanked Council Committee and French Government and said that Iraqi Government would do everything to facilitate the mission of M. Oliván.

[12357]

R 2



"I expressed regret that suggested settlement in British Guiana should have come to nothing, but after paying tribute to work of mission of investigation said that in the light of its report it was impossible for His Majesty's Government not to agree with the conclusion of the Council Committee that the region in question, whatever its potentialities of ultimate development, could not be regarded as offering sufficiently assured or sufficiently rapid solution of the exceptional problem which the Assyrian question presented. This problem had not diminished in importance or urgency with the lapse of time and I therefore expressed gratitude to French Government for their readiness to do their utmost to assist the League in its solution in spite of local difficulties. Finally, I wished success to M. Oliván in his mission to Syria and Iraq.

"Turkish representative, who had at first been inclined to demand that there should be no settlement within 100 kilom. of Turkish frontier but had been persuaded to say something less categorical, then stated, after expressing appreciation of Assyrian Committee's efforts, that it would be desirable in the interests of the Assyrians themselves and of the populations of neighbouring countries that settlement should take place at a distance of 100 kilom. from the frontiers of neighbouring countries, the place of final settlement being in any case not less than 50 kilom. from these frontiers.

"French representative referred to 'Bon-Voisinage' treaty with Turkey, which contained provision regarding establishment of political refugees on either side of frontier. French Government desired faithfully to discharge its obligations under that treaty and could not, of course, agree to any settlement plan which would imply any derogation from the treaty except with the approval of Turkey.

"The *rapporteur's* report was then adopted."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 7 (in R). Copy sent to Paris.)

[E 2528/2/93]

No. 129.

Consul, Geneva, to Sir R. Vansittart.—(Received April 18.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 43. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

FOLLOWING from Secretary of State:—

Geneva, April 17, 1935.

"Following is passage from *rapporteur's* report concerning Syria referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"With regard to the possibility of a more extensive settlement of Assyrians from Iraq in Syria, the French Government, as mandatory Power, explained, as soon as the committee was formed in 1933, the difficulties of various kinds which it thought would be involved. Since, however, the committee has not been able to find a place in which to settle the Assyrians anywhere else, and since it is essential that the question should be dealt with urgently, the committee has been obliged to revert to the idea of a settlement in Syria. For reasons both humanitarian and political, therefore, the committee has pressed the French Government to accept, as permanent settlers in the mandated territories of the Levant, not only those Assyrians who are now provisionally settled there, but also those for whom the committee has to find a place of settlement—always on the understanding that they will be in no degree a charge upon the budget of the States of the Levant under French mandate.

"In response to this appeal, the French Government has supplied the committee with a variety of material relating to the question under consideration, and has intimated what material possibilities of settlement have already been recognised, and on what others no final opinion can be formed without further investigation.

"By a letter dated 14th April, the French Government has informed the chairman of the committee that, from the information available, it is now possible to contemplate, subject to arrangements to be made, enlarging the existing settlement of 2,200 persons to 6,500. The investigations now proceeding will doubtless reveal wider possibilities which would be of benefit to such other Assyrians as may express a desire to leave Iraq."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 8 (in R). Copy sent to Paris.)

[E 2561/433/93]

No. 130.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 197.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 11, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 176 of the 1st April, I have the honour to inform you that, according to a report received from His Majesty's acting consul at Mosul, an encounter took place early in April between the mobile police force and Khalil Khoshawi in the country lying north of the Rukuchuk River. Six bandits are said to have been killed and one captured wounded, while the police casualties were one killed. On the Turkish side of the frontier the authorities continue to co-operate, and have handed over to the Iraqi police the families of five of Khalil's followers.

2. The bandits are constantly on the move and frequently change the number and composition of their different groups. It is consequently very difficult to give a reliable description of their disposition. Their total strength is now reported to be well over a hundred, while that of the police operating against them does not now appear to exceed 400.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 2562/1583/93]

No. 131.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 199.)

Sir,

Bagdad, April 11, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 170 of the 28th March, I have the honour to report that a number of persons arrested for their part in the Kadhimain riots of the 23rd March are now on trial before the criminal court of Bagdad.

2. Among them are several well-known men, including a son of Abdul Husain Chalabi, who has so often held the portfolio of the Ministry of Education, and a son of the late Mayor of Kadhimain.

3. The accused are charged under section 80 of the Bagdad Penal Code, and are therefore liable, if found guilty, to be sentenced to death. They are being defended by a group of Shiah lawyers, who are voluntarily giving their services. Public interest in the case is keen, and there is some murmuring against the trial of these men for participation in an affair which, in comparison with what has occurred in the Middle Euphrates, is regarded as trivial, while Abdul Wahid parades the capital in state and is received with every honour by Cabinet Ministers.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.



*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 23.)*

(No. 200.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, April 11, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 178 of the 2nd April, I have the honour to report the following developments in the political situation in Iraq.

2. Abdul Wahid is still in Bagdad with a large number of supporters and is actively engaged in intrigues and negotiations. Several large gatherings have been arranged which have been attended by sheikhs from many different parts of the country. At these gatherings, speeches have been made calling for the defence of national unity and condemning all those who seek to put sectarian interests before the integrity of the kingdom. Both Abdul Wahid and the Kurdish delegations have also issued, through the press, a joint pronouncement of their abhorrence of all that tends to create dissensions among the people and of their determination to stand for national solidarity under King Ghazi.

3. Negotiations with the Government continue, but with no definite results and no agreed form of demands has yet been presented either by Abdul Wahid or the Ulema. Meanwhile, the sheikhs are beginning to fall out amongst themselves and Shalan-al-Atiyah has for the moment broken with Abdul Wahid because the latter will not support his demand for a grant of 25,000 acres of land which he claims was the promised price of his support against Ali Jaudat.

4. On the 8th April small skirmishes took place at Rumaitha and Shinafiyah between armed tribesmen and police patrols. A few men were wounded on both sides, but the police seem to have kept the upper hand. In the Nasiriyah liwa tribal unrest is still evident and now shows a tendency to develop into agrarian agitation against the big landlords. The Government have removed the mutessarif and have replaced him by Majid Beg, a Kurd who has done remarkably well in the north. He is, however, a stranger to the tribes of the Muntafiq confederation.

5. The Mutessarif of Diwaniyah is being transferred to Kut, and his place will be taken by Saiyid Hashim, the present Assistant Director-General of Police.

6. Parliament was dissolved on the 10th April before the expiry of the adjournment of one month, which began on the 12th March. Ali Jaudat and Jamil-al-Madfa'i endeavoured unsuccessfully to dissuade the King from taking this course. If His Majesty had not dissolved Parliament, Yasin Pasha would presumably have resigned, and, as Ali Jaudat and his party could certainly not have formed a Cabinet, the King had no choice but to allow Yasin Pasha to carry on the government of the country on his own terms.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

*C./85th Session (Extr.)/P.V. 4 (1).*

*Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the 85th Session of the League of Nations Council, April 17, 1935.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 23.)*

(Extract.)

**3568. Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.**

M. Shabandar, representative of Iraq, came to the Council table.

M. de Madariaga presented the following report<sup>(1)</sup> :—

"For reasons that will be set out in a detailed report, to be circulated to the Council shortly, the Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq has been forced to realise, much to its regret, that the settlement of the Assyrians in British Guiana, as proposed by the United Kingdom Government, is impracticable.

<sup>(1)</sup> Document C.167.1935.VII.

"The other offers made in response to the repeated appeals of the Council and the committee do not afford all the guarantees of success that the committee regard as indispensable, and have therefore had to be abandoned.

"With regard to the possibility of a more extensive settlement of Assyrians from Iraq in Syria, the French Government, as mandatory Power, explained, as soon as the committee was formed in 1933, the difficulties of various kinds which it thought would be involved. Since, however, the committee has not been able to find a place in which to settle the Assyrians anywhere else, and since it is essential that the question should be dealt with urgently, the committee has been obliged to revert to the idea of a settlement in Syria. For reasons both humanitarian and political, therefore, the committee has pressed the French Government to accept, as permanent settlers in the mandated territories of the Levant, not only those Assyrians who are now provisionally settled there, but also those for whom the committee has to find a place of settlement—always on the understanding that they will be in no degree a charge upon the budget of the States of the Levant under French mandate.

"In response to this appeal, the French Government has supplied the committee with a variety of material relating to the question under consideration, and has intimated what material possibilities of settlement have already been recognised, and on what others no final opinion can be formed without further investigation.

"By a letter dated the 14th April, the French Government has informed the chairman of the committee that, from the information available, it is now possible to contemplate, subject to arrangements to be made, enlarging the existing settlement of 2,200 persons to 6,500. The investigations now proceeding will doubtless reveal wider possibilities which would be of benefit to such other Assyrians as may express a desire to leave Iraq.

"Nevertheless, the French Government, in its above-mentioned letter, said 'that it could not in practice respond to the appeal addressed to it without an official assurance by the Council that no burden would be placed either on the French budget or on the local budgets on account of the settlement of the Assyrians in Syria, and without a plan setting forth the means to be employed to obtain the sums required for this settlement.

"The committee has always considered that the work of settlement could only be undertaken and carried out if sufficient sums were available as and when required. The committee will as soon as possible establish a detailed plan on this basis, in close co-operation with the Iraqi Government and the French Government.

"As regards the wish expressed that 'no burden should be placed either on the French budget or on the local budgets on account of the settlement of the Assyrians in Syria,' the committee has always held that no financial obligation in respect of the capital expenditure involved by the proposed settlement operations or in respect of the subsistence of the settlers until they should be able to provide for themselves should be laid either on the French Government or on the States of the Levant under French mandate.

"In order to meet the wish expressed in the last paragraph of the French Government's letter of the 14th April, 1935, I would request the Council to approve the attitude taken up by the committee in this connexion.

"I also ask the Council to authorise the Secretary-General to draw a further sum not exceeding 40,000 Swiss francs from the Working Capital Fund in accordance with article 33 (2) of the Financial Regulations; the total advances approved by the Council would thus be brought up to 110,000 fr., 20,000 fr. having been voted on the 19th January, 1934, and 50,000 fr. on the 28th September, 1934.

"This credit of 40,000 fr. would serve to cover, among other expenditure preliminary to the carrying out of the plan, the cost of the journey of the chairman of the Council Committee to Iraq and Syria, which it was decided to undertake on the Bagdad Government's invitation and which is regarded by the Iraqi Government and by the Council Committee as likely to facilitate negotiations and contribute effectively to the realisation of the plan of settlement. It is understood that this advance will be refunded to the League of Nations out of the funds which are made available for the financing of the proposed action as a whole."

M. Shabandar (representative of Iraq): I desire on behalf of my Government to thank the committee of the Council for the efforts it has made, from its creation up to the present time, to find a solution for the Assyrian question. I



wish also to thank the French Government for its willingness to allow the Assyrians to settle in Syria.

As regards the visit of the chairman of the committee to Iraq, I feel sure that this will be of very great utility, as my Government will do all in its power to ensure the success of his efforts.

*Sir John Simon:* May I, in the first place, associate myself with the regret which the *rapporteur* has expressed that the suggestion of settlement in British Guiana should have come to nothing? The information available when His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom put the suggestion before the Council Committee encouraged us to take a hopeful view of the prospects in the Rupununi district. It was, however, because that district was largely undeveloped that His Majesty's Government recommended as a first step that a mission of investigation should be sent out by the League. That mission was sent, and I should like to pay a tribute to the thorough and conscientious manner in which it carried out its work. It is, however, impossible for His Majesty's Government, who have had an opportunity of studying the mission's report, not to agree with the conclusion at which the Council Committee has arrived, that whatever potentialities of ultimate development the district in question may possess, it cannot be regarded as offering a sufficiently assured or sufficiently rapid solution of the exceptional problem which the Assyrian question presents.

So much for British Guiana. But it is now eighteen months since the Council decided to assist in seeking a solution of the Assyrian question by means of settlement outside the boundaries of Iraq, if this should be found practicable. My colleagues will agree with me that the Council Committee has been untiring in its efforts, but it has been faced with no easy task. The lapse of time has been unavoidable. Meanwhile, however, neither the importance nor the urgency of the problem has diminished; quite the contrary. We must all, therefore, I feel, be grateful to the French Government for its response to the appeal addressed to it by the committee, and to its readiness, in spite of local difficulties, to do its utmost to assist the League on wider grounds in the solution of this most important problem. We offer our thanks to the French Government.

Finally, I should like to wish success to the distinguished chairman of the Council Committee—a compatriot of the representative of Spain in our Council—M. López Oliván, in the journey to the Near East which he is about to undertake, and which we shall all hope will result in the rapid working out of a satisfactory detailed scheme.

*The President:* As representative of Turkey, I desire to state that my Government is following with interest the question of the establishment of the Assyrians, who, like many others, are simply victims of the world war. We appreciate the efforts that the Council has been making on their behalf, since it has been found indispensable to settle them somewhere outside Iraq.

In the interest of that population itself, however, and in the interest of the populations of the neighbouring countries, it is desirable that any settlement should be at a distance of 100 kilom. from the frontiers of the neighbouring countries, while the place of final settlement should in no case be less than 50 kilom. from those frontiers.

*M. Massigli:* I should like sincerely to thank Sir John Simon for his appreciative remarks concerning the French Government's attempt to make what it hopes may be a decisive contribution towards the very distressing problem of the Assyrians. In acting as it has done, my Government was gratified to realise the interest that the United Kingdom Government has consistently shown in this delicate question.

I wish also to emphasise the great importance that I attach to the declaration just made by the president of the Council in his capacity as representative of Turkey. By agreeing, under the conditions set forth in the report, to the settlement of Assyro-Chaldean refugees on Syrian territory as permanent settlers, the mandatory Power would appear to be taking, in respect of the populations under its mandate, a very serious moral responsibility. It is natural that, on this point, it should desire to have the explicit approval of the Council.

Further, France as mandatory Power has concluded with the Turkish Government a treaty of good neighbourly relations, which embodies special provisions concerning the settlement of refugees on either side of the frontier. The French Government, equally with the Turkish Government, is anxious

faithfully to discharge the obligations ensuing from that treaty. It is thus quite clear—as the Council will certainly realise—that the mandatory Power could not conceive the possibility of the plan for the settlement of the refugees involving any derogation whatsoever from the clauses of the above-mentioned treaty, unless the Turkish Government, as co-signatory to the treaty, explicitly consented to such a derogation.

*M. de Madariaga:* I wish briefly to thank those of my colleagues who have taken part in the discussion, and in particular to say how much I appreciate the laudable effort of the United Kingdom Government to arrange for the settlement of the Assyrians in British Guiana. The detailed report which the committee will submit to the Council will be quite explicit on that point.

As *rapporteur*, I desire to note the observations made by the president of the Council in his capacity as representative of Turkey and the comments on the subjects by the representative of France.

It is my very pleasant duty to thank Sir John Simon for the friendly and, if I may say so, well-deserved reference that he has made to my colleague, M. López Oliván.

The conclusions of the report were adopted.

(M. Shabandar withdrew.)

[E 2610/2/93]

No. 134.

(C.167.1935.VII.)

#### LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

*Report by the Representative of Spain.*—(Received in Foreign Office, April 24.)

Geneva, April 17, 1935.

FOR reasons that will be set out in a detailed report, to be circulated to the Council shortly, the Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq has been forced to realise, much to its regret, that the settlement of the Assyrians in British Guiana, as proposed by the United Kingdom Government, is impracticable.

The other offers made in response to the repeated appeals of the Council and the committee do not afford all the guarantees of success that the committee regard as indispensable, and have, therefore, had to be abandoned.

With regard to the possibility of a more extensive settlement of Assyrians from Iraq in Syria, the French Government, as mandatory Power, explained, as soon as the committee was formed in 1933, the difficulties of various kinds which it thought would be involved. Since, however, the committee has not been able to find a place in which to settle the Assyrians anywhere else, and since it is essential that the question should be dealt with urgently, the committee has been obliged to revert to the idea of a settlement in Syria. For reasons both humanitarian and political, therefore, the committee has pressed the French Government to accept, as permanent settlers in the mandated territories of the Levant, not only those Assyrians who are now provisionally settled there, but also those for whom the committee has to find a place of settlement—always on the understanding that they will be in no degree a charge upon the budget of the States of the Levant under French mandate.

In response to this appeal, the French Government has supplied the committee with a variety of material relating to the question under consideration, and has intimated what material possibilities of settlement have already been recognised, and on what others no final opinion can be formed without further investigation.

By a letter dated the 14th April the French Government has informed the chairman of the committee that, from the information available, it is now possible to contemplate, subject to arrangements to be made, enlarging the existing settlement of 2,200 persons to 6,500. The investigations now proceeding will doubtless reveal wider possibilities which would be of benefit to such other Assyrians as may express a desire to leave Iraq.



Nevertheless, the French Government in its above-mentioned letter said "that it could not in practice respond to the appeal addressed to it without an official assurance by the Council that no burden would be placed either on the French budget or on the local budgets on account of the settlement of the Assyrians in Syria, and without a plan setting forth the means to be employed to obtain the sums required for this settlement."

The committee has always considered that the work of settlement could only be undertaken and carried out if sufficient sums were available as and when required. The committee will as soon as possible establish a detailed plan on this basis, in close co-operation with the Iraqi Government and the French Government.

As regards the wish expressed that "no burden should be placed either on the French budget or on the local budgets on account of the settlement of the Assyrians in Syria," the committee has always held that no financial obligation in respect of the capital expenditure involved by the proposed settlement operations or in respect of the subsistence of the settlers until they should be able to provide for themselves should be laid either on the French Government or on the States of the Levant under French mandate.

In order to meet the wish expressed in the last paragraph of the French Government's letter of the 14th April, 1935, I would request the Council to approve the attitude taken up by the committee in this connexion.

I also ask the Council to authorise the Secretary-General to draw a further sum not exceeding 40,000 Swiss francs from the Working Capital Fund in accordance with article 33 (2) of the Financial Regulations; the total advances approved by the Council would thus be brought up to 110,000 fr.

This credit of 40,000 fr. would serve to cover, among other expenditure preliminary to the carrying out of the plan, the cost of the journey of the chairman of the Council Committee to Iraq and Syria, which it was decided to undertake on the Bagdad Government's invitation and which is regarded by the Iraqi Government and by the Council Committee as likely to facilitate negotiations and contribute effectively to the realisation of the plan of settlement. It is understood that this advance will be refunded to the League of Nations out of the funds which are made available for the financing of the proposed action as a whole.

[E 2686/278/93]

No. 135.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 29.)*

(No. 211.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, April 17, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 200 of the 11th April, I have the honour to report that no important developments have occurred during the past week in the internal situation.

2. The first ten days of Muharram have passed quietly and the police orders prohibiting street processions were obeyed without serious protest.

3. It is said that Sheikh Abdul Wahid is nervous and fears that he is being deceived by his political friends. Those of the tribal leaders opposed to him, who are still in Bagdad, are outwardly most indignant at the action taken against their men at Rumaitha and Shinafivah on the 8th April (see paragraph 4 of my despatch under reference), but the local officials report that these incidents have had a beneficial effect. The new Mutessarif of Nasiriyah is optimistic, and reports that a show of firmness should suffice to restore tranquillity.

4. The dissolution of Parliament is naturally regarded with disfavour by the anti-Abdul Wahid sheikhs, who fear that in the next elections the Diwaniyah seats will be filled with Abdul Wahid's nominees. The Minister of the Interior has, however, done his best to reassure them by promising that the next Parliament shall be truly representative of all elements in the country. In the press the dissolution has been generally approved, the only adverse comment coming from an editor who will most probably lose his seat.

5. One of the effects of the dissolution has been to defer the passing of the budget for the current year until Parliament meets in the autumn. The Minister of Finance told me to-day that, in these circumstances, the terms of last year's budget will apply, and that any urgent additional expenditure will be provided

for by Order in Council ("marsum"), which will be submitted to Parliament for approval. It seems probable that some such action may be taken in respect of a second bridge over the Tigris, which the Prime Minister declares himself to be bent upon building.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran. I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 2890/1583/93]

No. 136.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 9.)*

(No. 131.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, May 8, 1935.*

MY despatch No. 211.

Further disorders have broken out in Middle Euphrates district.

Tribes hostile to the Government have dismantled railway on both sides of Rumaitha, station has been looted and telephone cut.

Prime Minister has confirmed that Rumaitha town is under fire from the north and south and that police posts between Rumaitha and Samawa are being hard pressed.

Government have issued a warning to the tribes and intend to make air demonstration to-morrow. Army is standing by.

[E 2907/1583/93]

No. 137.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 9.)*

(No. 132.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, May 9, 1935.*

MY telegram No. 131.

Report received last night from Diwaniyah, which, unfortunately, appears to be true, states that a R.A.F. aeroplane was forced down in flames while carrying out reconnaissance over affected area. Nothing has since been heard of the two occupants.

It is equally unfortunate that the tribes now in revolt appear to be those who have always been pro-British and pro-Government. The outbreak is most probably due to the ill-advised action of Government in arresting Sheikh Assadullah, a prominent Shia of Rumaitha, on a charge of spreading anti-Government propaganda. The anti-Abdul Wahid tribes, who have always viewed the present Government with disfavour, have thus been given an excuse for a religious uprising.

I am drawing the attention of the Prime Minister, who is also acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the fact that British property has been damaged and British lives lost as a result, and that there seems to be a *prima facie* case for appeasing and not opposing with force the discontented tribesmen. I am also asking him to make it clear that we are not involved in this trouble and have no intention of taking sides in it.

[E 2935/1583/93]

No. 138.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 11.)*

(No. 133.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, May 10, 1935.*

MY telegram No. 132.

Prime Minister has now published at my suggestion a communiqué making it clear that British reconnaissance was unconnected with Government forces.

This is, I consider, as much as can be done for the moment to dispel from the minds of tribesmen any idea that British forces may be associated with measures taken by the Government to restore order.

Assadullah, who proved to be a Persian, is being deported.



[E 2953/2/93]

No. 139.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 13.)*

(No. 239.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, May 2, 1935.*

WITH reference to Geneva telegram No. 44, Saving, of the 18th April, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the English text of a communiqué which the Iraqi Government have caused to be published in the press of the 1st May.

2. It differs only slightly from the text communicated to me in the telegram under reference. The chief alterations which have been made are—

- (a) The omission of the words "as mandatory Power" after "French Government" in the first paragraph.
- (b) The substitution of the wording "to the west of the Khabur" for that of "in the vicinity of the Khabur" in the second paragraph.

3. The reason for (a) is the dislike of the Iraqi Government to referring in an official communiqué to the mandatory status of the French Government in Syria.

4. The purpose of the alteration described under (b) is apparently to suggest that the land chosen for the resettlement scheme is on the far side of the Khabur Basin, and thereby to avoid exciting opposition on the ground that the Assyrians will be too close to the frontier. It is also possible that this amendment betrays the wish of the Iraqi Government to press for the resettlement to be carried out as far as possible from the frontier.

5. From the point of view of its effect on the Assyrians this little deception did not appear to me to be important since, with the arrival of M. Oliván, the full plans of the League Committee will, no doubt, soon be made known to them. I did not, therefore, question the Iraqi Government's reasons for this amendment, all the more because to have done so would have caused undesirable delay in the publication of the communiqué.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 139.

*Translation of Press Communiqué.*

THE committee appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to deal with the resettlement of Assyrians of Iraq who may wish to leave that country is now able to announce that the French Government has consented, in response to an appeal by the committee, to provide certain lands for the permanent settlement of Assyrians in Syria. The matter was laid before the League Council at its session on the 17th April, when the Council approved the action of the committee and the steps which the latter now proposes to take, in co-operation with the Iraqi and French Governments, to prepare a detailed scheme.

In execution of the present scheme for Assyrian settlement, the French Government is ready, in the first place, to accept a section of the Assyrians for settlement in the zone available (for the purpose) to the west of the Khabur River, and will subsequently consider the preparation of additional places of settlement lower down and to the west of the said river.

Time must be allowed for necessary financial arrangements to be negotiated and for details of settlement and expeditious transfer to be elaborated. As a first step the committee has arranged, in order to avoid delay, for negotiations between the Iraqi and French Governments to take place at Bagdad or Beirut.

In the meantime, the committee relies upon the Assyrians to remain calm and to continue patiently their normal life. It is in their own interests that no move should take place such as might delay the completion of the preliminary arrangements for the reception in Syria of Assyrians who may elect to go there, and any premature move may have unfortunate consequences.

Assyrians should not sell away their household goods, crops or flocks until a further communication is made to them by the local committee, and when preparations for transfer and settlement have been completed the operation will be carried out progressively in accordance with instructions which will be issued.

[E 2984/1593/93]

No. 140.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 13.)*

(No. 137.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Bagdad, May 13, 1935.*

MY telegram No. 133.

Prime Minister told me this morning that, following air action by Iraqi Air Force, rebel tribesmen in Rumaitha district are dispersing, and some of their leaders are asking for terms.

Revolt is now, however, spreading to Muntafiq area, and Government headquarters at Suq-al-Shuyukh and Akaika have been heavily attacked by tribesmen to-day.

Movements of troops have been made difficult on account of waterlogged condition of the country after exceedingly heavy fall of rain.

[E 2980/2/93]

No. 141.

*Notes of the 43rd and 44th Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, held in Berne on April 10 and 11, 1935.—(Received May 14.)*

(Confidential.)

A MEETING had been called at the Spanish Legation at Berne for 10.30 A.M. on the 10th April. In a private conversation before the start of the meeting, the French representative gave M. Oliván a message from M. de St. Quentin to the effect that if the French Government failed to obtain satisfaction from the United Kingdom Government in a matter concerning the Egyptian debt, they would feel unable to give satisfaction to the United Kingdom Government by proceeding with the offer regarding the settlement of the Assyrians in Syria. The French representative made it clear that he was not personally in sympathy with this message, but had no choice but to carry out his instructions to deliver it. M. Oliván declared that he could not agree that the French Government could go back upon a firm offer made to the Council Committee and transmitted officially with the agreement of the French Government to the Iraqi Government. The fulfilment of the agreement reached between the French Government and the Council Committee could not be made dependent upon negotiations which did not concern the Council Committee in any way. He must regard the understanding as still in being, and proposed to continue the work of the committee on that basis. The French representative then suggested that M. Oliván should telephone direct to M. de St. Quentin in Paris, and the formal meeting of the committee was adjourned to allow this to be done.

M. Oliván then telephoned to M. de St. Quentin in the presence of the United Kingdom and French representatives and of M. Arocha and expressed his surprise at the message which had been communicated to him. M. de St. Quentin confirmed the message, and denied that any agreement could be said to exist between the French Government and the Council Committee pending the receipt of the French reply to the committee's appeal of the 22nd March. M. Oliván strongly dissented from this view, and said that in his view a binding agreement had been reached in Paris, the confirmatory note being a mere formality. He pointed out that the French Government had communicated to the committee in Paris a memorandum which was to form the basis of the confirmatory note, and M. de St. Quentin had himself agreed that the committee could go ahead on the basis of this memorandum as though the note had been received. Furthermore, M. de St. Quentin had approved in principle the idea of issuing an immediate communiqué to the press, and the issue of such a communiqué had only been



postponed in order to allow M. de Martel to return to his post in Syria and to take certain precautionary measures. Furthermore, with the consent of the French Government, the Iraqi Government had already been informed in confidence of the scheme for settlement in Syria, and the French memorandum on the subject had been communicated to that Government. In these circumstances it was impossible to conceive that the French Government could go back upon their offer. M. de St. Quentin said that he did not mean to imply that the French Government would go back upon it. At the same time he could not agree that any binding agreement yet existed. So far as the French Government were concerned, the matter was connected with other international questions. Also, the French Government had evidence of fresh Turkish objections to Assyrian settlement in the Khabur region. The whole matter therefore needed further careful consideration, and his advice was that M. Oliván should adjourn the meeting of the committee indefinitely.

M. Oliván pointed out that it had been open to the French Government to suggest postponement of the meeting before the committee met. Instead they had sent their representative to attend a meeting, and the other members of the committee had come to Berne at some inconvenience to themselves. As regards Turkish objections, they had been fully taken into account during the Paris conversations, and M. de St. Quentin had then stated that the French Government would proceed even in spite of possible Turkish objections. As to other international questions, M. Oliván repeated what he had already said. He added that if the French Government persisted in the view that no agreement existed, he might have no alternative but to refer the matter to the Council at the forthcoming special session in order to explain his own position and that of the committee. M. de St. Quentin's attitude at this point appeared to change, and, while again stating that he could not agree with M. Oliván's view, he said that he hoped to be in a position to send off the French reply to the committee's appeal of the 22nd March in three days' time.

A formal meeting of the committee was held at 4 P.M. on the 10th April, when M. Oliván, without going into the details of his conversation with M. de St. Quentin, indicated that the situation was not much clearer, but that M. de St. Quentin had foreshadowed the receipt of the French note in three days' time. The arguments which M. de St. Quentin had used had not convinced M. Oliván that the basis of the agreement reached in Paris had changed, and he thought that the committee was justified in continuing its work on that basis.

This was agreed to, and, in view of the presence of Mr. Bieler, of the League Treasury, the committee proceeded forthwith to discuss a draft of regulations for financial control which had been prepared by the League Treasury.

Mr. Bieler explained that the draft had been drawn up on the basis of regulations prepared in connexion with the Saar plebiscite.

The first part of the draft concerned the presentation and approval of estimates.

The United Kingdom Representative took the opportunity of stressing the necessity of reducing as far as possible the estimates which the French Government had so far put forward. He pointed out that the present estimates were in excess of those contained in the scheme for settlement in Brazil, including sea transport. The committee was not, of course, in a position itself to estimate what expenditure would be necessary, but he hoped that the French Government would realise the difficulty of collecting the amounts which they had so far indicated, and would cut down expenditure to essentials. A point which he thought it necessary to establish at an early date was the minimum sum which must be paid down before any settlement could take place.

The President asked whether the 10 million francs which the French Government had mentioned as the probable cost of settling the first 4,300 persons must be paid down before anything could be done.

The French Representative did not think so. M. de Martel was most anxious to avoid any charge on the Syrian budget, and had therefore stipulated that no settlement could take place until the necessary funds were actually available. He did not think, however, that M. de Martel intended it to be understood that the minimum sum must be 10 million francs.

The President said that he thought the committee ought not to be too much hypnotised by the global figure quoted for settlement. His idea was that settlement should be a continuous operation as and when the funds were available. A partial settlement might be better than nothing.

The draft regulations were then considered in detail and a number of suggestions made. Objections were raised in particular to articles 2 and 3. Article 2 stated that the Secretary-General of the League would examine the estimates furnished by the French High Commissioner both for the immediate extension of the existing settlement and for the remainder of the operation when the necessary surveys had been conducted. The Secretary-General would then submit the estimates for approval to the Council Committee. The fear was expressed that this procedure would involve too much delay, and it was agreed that a provision should be inserted allowing the president of the committee, during his forthcoming journey, to approve on the spot if possible, after obtaining the concurrence of the Secretary-General by telegram, the estimates for the first phase of settlement, and to authorise this part of the operation to be put into effect. Article 3 as drafted stated that the settlement funds would be furnished in the first place by the Government of Iraq and by other Governments, and also by contributions from private sources. It was agreed that this article should be worded so as to take into account the fact that no obligation rested upon other Governments, as it did upon the Iraqi Government, and that other Governments and private organisations would only be called upon to furnish the balance which might be required to supplement the contribution of the Iraqi Government.

It was agreed that a modified draft of the regulations should be considered at a later stage. It was also agreed that when the modified draft had received the provisional approval of the committee, it should be sent before its official adoption to the French High Commissioner in Syria through the French Government. It could be intimated to the French High Commissioner that the committee was prepared to take into account any observations which he might wish to make.

The secretary of the committee was then asked to draw up a list of the points of detail which it remained to consider, and the committee adjourned till the following afternoon to give time for the private consideration of some of these points.

The list drawn up by the secretary is annexed. When the committee met to consider it, its first act was formally to approve the action of the president in accepting the invitation of the Iraqi Government to proceed to Bagdad. It was agreed that it would be in the first place advisable for the president to go to Beirut so as to arrive in Bagdad armed with the fullest possible information regarding the views of the French High Commissioner on various points.

The question of the powers of the president was discussed, and on the proposal of the United Kingdom representative it was agreed to give M. Oliván the widest discretion to reach decisions so far as possible on the spot. It was recognised to be impossible for the committee to give anything like definite instructions, and it was agreed that the utmost which it could do was to give the president certain indications of its provisional views on various points for his guidance, in the shape of a memorandum, the terms of which would be considered at the committee's next meeting in Geneva.

The President then explained the procedure which he proposed to adopt *vis-à-vis* of the Iraqi Government regarding its financial contribution. He would, of course, endeavour in Beirut to secure a reduction of the present estimated cost of settlement. Assuming, however, that on his arrival in Bagdad he could still only quote as the estimated cost of the whole operation the 60 million French francs now mentioned by the French Government, he would propose in the first place to ask the Iraqi Government, how much of this hypothetical total they would be prepared to pay. He would recall the undertakings which Iraq had given in this respect, and also her practical interest in seeing that the scheme was rapidly carried out. No doubt Iraq ought to pay the whole cost, but the difficulties were obvious. M. Oliván proposed, however, to press for a contribution of 50 per cent. of the total cost, though he would be prepared to bargain. Having fixed in this manner Iraq's total hypothetical contribution, M. Oliván would then endeavour to obtain from the Iraqi Government, in the form of a lump sum payment, the amount which he might have agreed upon with the French High



Commissioner as necessary for the commencement of the first phase of the settlement operation. The difference between this lump sum payment and the total hypothetical contribution might be expressed in the form of a percentage of the cost of the remainder of the operation, and the Iraqi Government would be asked to promise to pay that percentage of whatever the remainder of the operation might, in practice, cost.

The committee indicated its approval of this general plan of action.

A discussion then took place on the question whether the Assyrians should be asked to contribute to, or to refund eventually, the cost of their settlement. The committee was united in doubting whether it would, in practice, be possible to obtain substantial sums from the Assyrians either as reimbursement or in the form of initial contribution. The president took the view that it was unfair, on account of the special circumstances leading up to their resettlement, to ask those Assyrians who elected to migrate to pay the cost. Furthermore, the Syrian scheme varied from the schemes hitherto examined in that for various reasons it was unlikely that land could be allotted in permanent ownership to individual Assyrians for at least four years.

Doubt was expressed by some members of the committee whether the prospects of reimbursement were in any case sufficiently good to justify the administrative measures which they would involve.

*The Mexican Representative* raised the question whether by waiving reimbursement the committee might not be setting up an undesirable precedent which might lead to trouble with other minorities or refugees.

*The Italian Representative* suggested that a percentage of the taxes collected from the Assyrians might be devoted to reimbursement.

*The President* thought, however, that for some time at least the Assyrians would probably be exempt from taxation.

*The Italian Representative* took the view that to waive a contribution or reimbursement would be unwise when it was uncertain where the funds for settlement were to come from.

*The United Kingdom Representative* expressed the view that the points raised by the Mexican and Italian representatives were of considerable importance and deserved careful examination. The factor of reimbursement might be an important one in the raising of the necessary funds.

After further discussion it was decided to leave the whole question of Assyrian financial participation open for the time being, and to invite the president to study it locally in all its bearings and to make a reasoned recommendation to the committee after obtaining the best available advice.

The composition of the local commission in Iraq was next discussed. *The President* took the view that changed circumstances might necessitate modifications in its composition. Apart from the question whether its present composition was the most suitable for the purpose now in hand, the French Government desired that a representative of the High Commission in Syria should join the committee. Moreover, when the participation of a Nansen representative had been originally contemplated, the Nansen Office had in mind for this office M. Cuénod. M. Cuénod was now available, but was no longer serving the Nansen Office, and the Nansen Office had apparently no suitable substitute. In these circumstances it seemed best, in view of the degree of responsibility which the committee had taken for the Syrian scheme, that M. Cuénod should join the local committee as the direct representative of the Council Committee, rather than of the Nansen Office. *M. Olivier* proposed to attempt to arrange this.

*The French Representative* confirmed that the French Government attached importance to the participation of a French delegate—possibly the French consul at Mosul—in the work of the local committee. The French Government feared that otherwise there might be admitted into Syria a number of Assyrians who were not indigenous to Iraq but had come into the country from Persia for this purpose.

It was agreed to ask the Nansen Office to lend the services of M. Burnier to co-operate with the French High Commission, and a letter to the chairman of the Governing Body of the Nansen Office on this subject was approved.

*M. Arocha* read out a draft communiqué which might be issued upon the arrival of the French reply to the committee's note of the 22nd March. It was agreed to postpone the consideration of this communiqué until the next meeting at Geneva.

## Annex.

### Liste provisoire des Questions à l'Ordre du Jour.

#### 1. Voyage du Président.

##### En Syrie :

Plan financier à discuter avec le Haut-Commissaire. Modalités d'application, préparation des budgets et contrôle des dépenses. Montant des sommes nécessaires pour commencer les travaux. Budget d'installation pour les premiers 4,300 Assyriens.

Remboursement éventuel par les Assyriens des frais de leur établissement.

Droit de propriété à accorder aux Assyriens en Syrie. Sort des femmes et des enfants sans soutien.

Biens que les Assyriens peuvent apporter en Syrie et influence que cela peut avoir sur les estimations d'établissement.

Statut juridique des Assyriens.

##### En Irak :

Montant de la contribution de l'Irak et modalités de paiement.

Commission locale (voir plus loin).

Protection des Assyriens qui restent en Irak.

#### 2. Commission locale.

##### Composition.

Départ de Thomson et de Cuénod.

Règles pour l'établissement de la liste des Assyriens qui voudraient quitter l'Irak.

Ordre dans lequel les différents groupes partiront et importance numérique de ces groupes.

Intervalle entre les départs des groupes.

Liquidation des biens des Assyriens en Irak. Armes se trouvant encore en possession des Assyriens.

#### 3. Collaboration du Représentant de l'Office Nansen en Syrie.

Lettre à adresser au président de l'Office Nansen à ce sujet.

#### 4. Réponse au Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni.

Lettre communiquant les résultats de la mission en Guyane britannique et la décision du comité.

#### 5. Message aux Assyriens.

Ce message est destiné à faire savoir aux Assyriens les décisions du comité et à éviter les désordres qui pourraient se produire si la nouvelle ne leur était pas présentée sous une forme adéquate.

#### 6. Communiqué à la Presse.

Ce communiqué comprendrait la décision du comité au sujet de la Guyane britannique, le projet d'établissement en Syrie, la demande de collaboration de l'Office Nansen (Burnier), le voyage du président.



7. *Demande de Fonds au Conseil extraordinaire du 15 Avril.*

Pour couvrir les frais de voyage du président et d'autres dépenses immédiates, une somme de 30,000 fr. suisses est nécessaire.

8. *Conseil de Mai.*

Rapport éventuel du comité au Conseil.

[E 2981/2/93]

No. 142.

*Record of the 45th Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, held in Geneva on April 16, 1935.—(Received May 14.)*

THE President announced that the French reply to the committee's note of the 22nd March had now been received. The reply would be circulated as soon as possible, but, so far as the President could see from a hasty perusal, it followed the lines of what had been agreed upon in Paris. He asked the French representative to communicate the thanks of the committee to his Government.

The President suggested that the committee should now discuss the draft communiqué which had been read out at the previous meeting.

The French Representative explained that he had sent a copy of the draft to Paris on the previous day, but the Quai d'Orsay had thought it necessary to refer it by telegram to Beirut. The view of the Quai d'Orsay appeared to be that the communiqué was too detailed in its references to Syria, and they would probably suggest a shorter draft. He hoped to have an early definite reply, but must ask in the meantime for the discussion to be postponed.

The United Kingdom Representative then read the draft of a message which the committee might send to the Iraqi Government for communication, if the latter thought fit, to the Assyrians, in order to insure against any premature movement on their part while the details of settlement in Syria were being worked out. As the terms of this message depended to some extent on those of the draft communiqué, it was decided that its consideration must also be postponed.

A redraft of the regulations for financial control, prepared in accordance with the observations made at the meetings of the committee in Berne, was considered.

The United Kingdom Representative drew attention to articles 5 and 6 of the draft, which provided that the advances made by the Secretary-General of the League to the High Commissioner could at any time exceed the funds available for settlement, and that the funds of the League could not be used either for recoverable or irrecoverable expenses. The United Kingdom representative expressed the view that these provisions were too rigid. Circumstances might arise where settlement funds might be perhaps temporarily lacking, whereas the emergency might be one which the League could not well ignore.

M. Bieber strongly opposed any modification of these articles, and no support was forthcoming for the suggestion of the United Kingdom representative.

The President said that he did not think that suggestion should be pressed. The Council could, of course, in case of need, override existing regulations.

The draft was accordingly adopted provisionally, and it was agreed that it should form an annex to the memorandum which was being drawn up for the President's guidance during his visit to Syria and Iraq.

The President then withdrew, and the remainder of the committee proceeded to draw up recommendations to the Secretary-General regarding the financial aspect of the President's journey, with particular reference to the allowances to be paid to the President and to M. Arocha, and to the stenographer who would accompany them.

[E 2982/2/93]

No. 143.

*Record of the 46th Meeting of the Assyrian Committee held in Geneva on April 17, 1935.—(Received May 14.)*

ON the circulation of the French note referred to by the president at the previous meeting, it had been found that in the final paragraph the French Government had stated that they could not in practice respond to the appeal of the Council Committee without an official assurance by the Council that no burden would be placed either upon the French budget or upon the local budgets on account of the settlement of the Assyrians in Syria, and without a plan setting forth the means to be employed to obtain the sums required for this settlement (see Document C 165.M.91.1935.VII). The president of the committee had therefore decided to take advantage of the extraordinary session of the Council to obtain the necessary approval, and at the last meeting of the extraordinary session on the 17th April the Council had approved a report on the subject by its rapporteur (Document C 167.1935.VII). The present meeting of the committee was held immediately after the close of the Council meeting.

The committee agreed that, in view of the publicity given to the Syrian scheme at the Council meeting, there was no longer any need for the issue of a communiqué.

The draft message to the Assyrians was then considered. Certain amendments were suggested, and it was left to the president to approve the precise wording of the message which the United Kingdom representative undertook to prepare. A copy of the message as eventually approved by the president and communicated to the Iraqi permanent delegate is attached as Annex A.

The committee then adopted the following documents: (1) A reply to the French Government's note of the 14th April (Annex B); (2) a note to the United Kingdom Government regarding the results of the investigation into British Guiana project (Annex C); (3) a resolution authorising the president's journey to Syria and Iraq, and covering a memorandum for his guidance (Annex D). To this memorandum were attached the draft regulations for financial control already approved provisionally by the committee at its preceding meeting.

M. Shabandar, the Iraqi delegate, attended a part of the meeting and was acquainted with the terms of the note addressed to the French Government and with the substance of the proposed message to the Assyrians. It was arranged that the message in its final form should be communicated to him as soon as possible, and he was asked to forward it to his Government, making it clear that the committee had, as in previous cases, prepared it solely in order to assist the Iraqi Government, and that it was left to the latter to decide upon the utility of its communication to the Assyrians.

Annex A.

[E 2800/2/93]

(C/Min.Ass./111.)

*Text of a Message adopted by the Committee and transmitted to the Iraqi Government on April 17, 1935, for communication to the Assyrians.*

*Geneva, April 29, 1935.*

The committee appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to deal with the resettlement of the Assyrians of Iraq who may wish to leave that country is now able to announce that the French Government, as mandatory Power in Syria, has consented in response to a pressing appeal by the committee to provide certain lands for the purpose of permanent settlement in Syria. The matter was laid before the Council of the League at its session of the 17th April, when the Council approved the action of the committee and the steps which the latter now



proposes to take in co-operation with the French and Iraq Governments to prepare a detailed scheme.

The French Government is ready in the first place to extend to the limit of its capacity the existing Assyrian settlement in the vicinity of the Khabur River and subsequently to prepare additional places of settlement lower down the Khabur River.

Time must be allowed for the necessary financial arrangements to be negotiated and for the details of settlement and transfer to be elaborated. Every effort will be made to hasten this work, and as a first step the committee has arranged, in order to avoid delay, for negotiations with the Iraq Government and the French High Commissioner to take place in Bagdad and Beirut respectively.

In the meantime the committee relies upon the Assyrians to remain calm and to continue patiently their normal life. It is in their own interests that no movement should take place until all preliminary arrangements have been completed for the reception in Syria of those who may elect to go there, and any premature and unauthorised movement might have unfortunate consequences.

The Assyrians should not dispose of their household goods, crops or flocks until a further communication is made to them by the local committee; and when a scheme of transfer and settlement has been prepared the whole operation should be carried out in an orderly manner in accordance with the instructions which will be issued.

#### Annex B.

[E 2609/2/93]

*President of Assyrian Committee to French Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

M. le Ministre,

*Genève, le 17 avril 1935.*

Le Comité du Conseil pour l'Etablissement des Assyriens de l'Irak a pris connaissance de la lettre, en date du 14 avril 1935, par laquelle le Gouvernement français a bien voulu faire connaître le résultat de l'étude à laquelle il s'est livré, à la suite de l'appel que le comité lui a adressé le 22 mars 1935, en vue d'un établissement éventuel en Syrie des Assyriens de l'Irak.

Pour sérieuses que soient les difficultés dont le Gouvernement français, en sa qualité de Puissance mandataire, a cru devoir faire état dans sa communication —difficultés qui lui avaient paru de nature à écarter *a priori* la prise en considération d'un tel projet—le comité a estimé qu'en raison des graves dangers qu'un nouvel ajournement d'une solution favorable du problème des Assyriens ne manquerait pas d'entraîner, il convenait de se décider en faveur d'un établissement en Syrie.

Après s'être félicité du résultat de la mission qu'il m'avait confiée auprès du Gouvernement français, le comité m'a chargé de lui exprimer ses remerciements pour la précieuse collaboration qu'il lui a apportée et qui doit permettre, dans un avenir prochain, l'heureux aboutissement des travaux du comité.

Le comité s'est trouvé d'accord avec le Gouvernement français pour reconnaître que, des trois projets soumis, le premier présentait des avantages considérables. Toutefois, la durée nécessaire à sa réalisation ainsi que les charges financières qu'il entraîne sont des éléments qui paraissent le rendre difficilement réalisable. Le comité a donc estimé que ses efforts devraient plutôt porter sur le troisième projet, c'est-à-dire sur celui qui prévoit l'installation des Assyriens par groupes échelonnés le long du Haut-Kabbour et du Kabbour-Moyen.

Afin de répondre au désir exprimé par le Gouvernement français dans le dernier paragraphe de sa lettre précitée, le rapporteur du Conseil sur cette question, d'accord avec le comité, a soumis un rapport au Conseil extraordinaire, à sa séance d'aujourd'hui. Vous trouverez, ci-joint, copie de ce rapport ainsi que du procès-verbal de la séance. (\*)

(\*) Not printed.

Le comité ayant pensé que, pour faciliter les négociations et pour contribuer d'une manière efficace à la réalisation du plan d'établissement, il était désirable que je me rende à Beyrouth et à Bagdad, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que je partirai le 25 de ce mois.

Veuillez, &c.

J. LOPEZ OLIVAN,

*Président du Comité pour l'Etablissement des Assyriens de l'Irak.*

#### Annex C.

[E 2539/2/93]

*President of Assyrian Committee to Foreign Office.*

*League of Nations,*

*Geneva, April 18, 1935.*

Sir,

I have the honour to invite a reference to the letter of the 22nd September in which your Excellency was good enough to draw the attention of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq to the prospects of settlement in the Rupununi district of British Guiana.

The committee has recently had under consideration the report submitted by the mission which, in accordance with the suggestion made in the above-mentioned letter, it sent to investigate the area in question. Unfortunately, this report reveals the existence of serious difficulties which render it impracticable to form a reliable opinion as to the number of persons who could eventually be settled satisfactorily in the area in question and which, in the judgment of the mission, would make it necessary, in the case of the Assyrians, accustomed as they are to very different conditions of life, to proceed in the first place, by way of an experiment of very limited scope, over an uncertain number of years. The committee has thus been reluctantly forced to the conclusion that settlement in British Guiana cannot be regarded as offering a solution of the large and urgent problem which it has been asked to assist in solving.

The committee appreciates the spirit in which the offer of settlement in British Guiana was put forward by the United Kingdom Government and it greatly regrets that it should be impossible to proceed further with the matter.

I would ask you to be good enough to communicate its conclusion to the Government of British Guiana, together with an expression of the committee's sincere appreciation of the attitude of that Government and of the Legislature of the Colony towards the project of Assyrian settlement. In particular, the committee desires to record its thanks for the unsparing assistance which was afforded to General Browne and Signor Giglioli in the execution of their difficult task.

I have, &c.

J. LOPEZ OLIVAN,

*President of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.*

#### Annex D.

*Resolution adopted by the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, April 17, 1935.*

The Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq authorises his Excellency M. López Oliván, its president, to proceed at his earliest convenience to Syria and to Iraq for the purpose of making on its behalf, in direct consultation with the High Commissioner for the French mandated territories of the Levant and with the Iraqi Government, all arrangements necessary to facilitate the rapid realisation of a scheme for settling in Syria those Assyrians who may wish to leave Iraq.

[12357]



For the guidance of its president, the committee adopts the attached memorandum as an indication of its views regarding various points with which he may have to deal. It recognises, however, that decisions on these points and on any others which may arise in connexion with the settlement operation contemplated will depend upon a variety of local considerations which the committee is not in a position to weigh in Geneva. While recommending M. López Oliván, therefore, to be guided so far as possible by the attached memorandum, it entrusts him with the fullest discretion to take such decisions as he may consider necessary in the light of local conditions.

*Memorandum regarding the Impending Visit to Syria and Iraq of M. López Oliván, President of the Council Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.*

The Council of the League of Nations by its adoption on the 14th October, 1933, of its *rapporteur's* report on the Assyrian question delegated wide powers to the committee provided for in that report, and directed that, if the committee found it possible in practice to settle outside Iraq those Assyrians who might wish to leave that country, it should take, in consultation with the Iraqi Government, all such steps as it might think fit with a view to the preparation and execution of a detailed scheme of settlement. The main object of the journey which the committee has now asked its president to undertake is to collaborate with the Iraqi Government with a view to the fulfilment of this part of the committee's task.

The Iraqi Government will doubtless expect the president of the committee, on his arrival in Bagdad, to be in a position to furnish full details regarding the projected Assyrian settlement in Syria from both the material and financial stand-points. The committee considers, therefore, that it would be advisable for M. López Oliván to proceed in the first place to Beirut for the purpose of consulting the French High Commissioner on the following points:—

*Mode of Settlement.*

Information is required in the first place regarding the precise situation and extent of the lands which the French authorities are prepared to place at the disposal of the Assyrians. Details concerning the physical characteristics of the lands in question and their agricultural and pastoral potentialities would be valuable, as it will be necessary to place the local committee in Iraq in a position to give full explanations to the Assyrians when the time comes to consult their wishes regarding migration to Syria.

It will be desirable to ascertain also in what manner it is proposed to settle the Assyrians, that is to say whether the various tribes will, so far as possible, be kept together, whether land will in the first place be allotted in common to groups of Assyrians or whether it will be allotted provisionally to each individual family, pending the completion of arrangements regarding permanent ownership, and how much land will be allotted to each group or family.

*Provision of Agricultural Implements, Seed and Stock.*

An important point to be settled with the French authorities is whether arrangements should be made for the Assyrians to bring with them from Iraq, so far as possible, the animals and agricultural implements which they now possess. If so, it will be necessary to consider the means of transporting these possessions and of ensuring their security in transit. In the contrary case, it will be desirable to ascertain what provision the French authorities propose to make for furnishing each Assyrian family with the means of gaining an agricultural or pastoral livelihood.

The committee notes, in passing, that if the Assyrians bring with them from Iraq their own animals and implements, the result should be to decrease considerably the estimated cost of settlement in Syria, though against this saving would have to be set the greater cost of transport.

*Provision for Women and Children without Support.*

There are at present in Iraq a number of women and children whose supporters were killed in the troubles of 1933. So far as the committee is aware, these women and children without support are for the most part, at present, in a camp at Mosul, maintained at the expense of the Iraqi Government. The committee assumes that the segregation of these women and children will not be continued in Syria, and it is for consideration whether it would not be possible, after their transfer to that country, to distribute them among villages allotted to the tribes to which they belong and to make special arrangements for their support by the future inhabitants of those villages.

*Non-Agricultural Employment.*

The majority of the Assyrians are stated to be agricultural or pastoral people who have a traditional love of the land and whose ambition it is to become landowners. A certain number, however, follow other occupations—such as carpenters, blacksmiths, builders and weavers of cloth, and it will be prudent to consider what prospects of a livelihood exist in Syria for such persons. It will be noted that these occupations are for the most part connected with village life and it is to be hoped that arrangements can be made for those who follow them to be usefully employed in connexion with the development of the proposed settlement.

*Medical Services.*

It will be desirable to enquire what arrangements the French authorities propose to make for the care of the health of the Assyrian immigrants.

*Status of the Assyrians in Syria.*

It may not be possible to settle immediately the question of the eventual nationality of the Assyrians after their migration into Syria and perhaps this point will not in any case possess the same importance as it would have done in, for instance, the Brazilian scheme. Nevertheless, a preliminary and non-committal discussion of the question with the French High Commissioner may be valuable. It would be useful to ascertain the position in this respect of other members of minority communities who may have migrated into Syria from adjacent countries.

(NOTE.—The national status of the Assyrians in Iraq appears to be somewhat obscure. While some, and perhaps even the majority, undoubtedly possess Iraqi nationality, others do not appear to have fulfilled the necessary conditions for its automatic acquisition in virtue of the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, or to have taken steps to obtain it since by naturalisation. Technically, therefore, a number of the Assyrians of Iraq may be stateless. On the other hand, the committee understands that in practice all of them are treated by the Iraqi Government as Iraqi nationals, with the exception of those who possess Persian nationality (with whom, it is to be noted in passing, the committee is not concerned, since it is open to them to return to Persia if they desire to leave Iraq). It is desirable, therefore, that if the question is broached at all with the Iraqi Government, it should be broached with great discretion, lest the result may be to lead the Iraqi Government to repudiate all responsibility for the migration of those regarding whose Iraqi nationality any technical doubt may exist.)

*Civil and Religious Rights.*

The existence of the mandate for Syria should be a sufficient assurance to the Assyrians in regard to these rights. This instrument provides for complete religious liberty and gives to each community, subject to general control by the mandatory authorities, the right to manage its religious affairs and to maintain its own schools for the instruction of its members in its own language. No doubt the Assyrians will be treated on an equal footing with Syrian nationals in matters such as access to law courts, public education and taxation, but it may be desirable for purposes of information to clear up the position in this respect and to ascertain in particular how far the Assyrians will be able to employ their



own language in the law courts and for other official purposes; whether they will be allowed to continue to settle personal status matters in accordance with the customs and usage of the community, and whether it is the intention of the French authorities to embody these points in a special law regulating their status.

#### *Organisation of Settlement Operation in Syria.*

It will be desirable to ascertain the intentions of the French authorities regarding the organisation of the whole operation in Syria, *i.e.*, whether they propose to entrust it to M. Burnier alone, working under the direct supervision of the High Commissioner, or whether they propose to establish a committee analogous to that which, in virtue of the committee's resolution of the 31st October, 1933, will make the necessary arrangements for the departure from Iraq of those Assyrians who wish to leave. Whatever the organisation in Syria, it will be necessary to make arrangements for effective liaison with that set up in Iraq.

It would facilitate the consideration with the French authorities of all the above technical details if M. López Oliván could be accompanied by someone with personal knowledge of the present situation of the Assyrians in Iraq. The committee recommends, therefore, that arrangements should be made, if possible, for Major Thomson to be available for this purpose in an advisory capacity.

#### *Finance.*

This will be the most important point to discuss in Syria as it will be in Iraq. Up to now the French Government have given only general indications of the cost both of the first phase of settlement, *i.e.*, the transfer of 4,300 persons, and of the total operation. The committee recommends that M. López Oliván should impress upon the French High Commissioner (a) the vital necessity of scaling down the estimates to the lowest possible limit owing to the evident difficulty of obtaining the necessary funds; (b) the importance of the strictest control over expenditure in order to be able to satisfy on this head those who will be asked to subscribe to the scheme.

In connexion with the first point, it will be necessary to establish the minimum sum which, in the view of the High Commissioner, must be subscribed before any part of the operation can commence, and it is desirable that M. López Oliván, on his arrival in Iraq, should be in a position to place before the Iraqi Government an estimate of this preliminary sum showing in detail the various items which compose it.

In connexion with the second point, the Council committee has, in consultation with the Secretariat of the League, drawn up the attached draft regulations for financial control. A copy of these draft regulations has already been transmitted to the French Government for communication to the High Commissioner, and it is hoped that the latter will be in a position, on the arrival of M. López Oliván at Beirut, to formulate any observations which he may have to make on this subject. The draft has been provisionally approved by the Council committee, but the latter is fully prepared to take into account the observations of the High Commissioner before the final adoption of the regulations. Meanwhile, it draws attention to that part of article 2 of the draft which authorises M. López Oliván, in certain circumstances and after obtaining the prior concurrence of the Secretary-General, to approve forthwith the estimates put forward by the High Commissioner for the first phase of the settlement operation. M. López Oliván will no doubt think it well to obtain, for the information of the Treasury of the League of Nations, details of the manner in which expenditure on Assyrian settlement will be controlled (see articles 9 and 10 of the draft regulations).

The committee leaves it to M. López Oliván to decide whether a visit by him to the area proposed for Assyrian settlement would be advisable before he proceeds to Iraq.

In Iraq the main tasks will be—

- (1) To press the Iraqi Government to make the largest possible financial contribution towards the Assyrian settlement scheme and to arrange the manner in which that contribution is to be paid.

- (2) To arrange, in consultation with the Iraqi Government and the president of the local committee set up by the Council committee's resolution of the 31st October, 1933, the manner in which the scheme for settlement in Syria is to be laid before the Assyrians and the wishes of the latter ascertained as regards migration to Syria.
- (3) To fix in the same way the general principles on which the transfer to Syria of those Assyrians who elect to leave Iraq shall be carried out, including arrangements for the liquidation of that part of their property which is not to be transferred with them to Syria.

#### *Financial Contribution of Iraqi Government.*

The Council's *rapporteur* in his report to the Council of the 19th January, 1934, stated rightly that: "There can, indeed, be no doubt that the Iraqi Government's contribution will be the most important factor in the success of any emigration plan." It is to be anticipated that a great many difficulties will be encountered in obtaining a substantial contribution. Such a contribution will be unpopular with nationalist opinion in Iraq and that the Iraqi Government will be obliged to take this opinion into account. Considerable persuasion will no doubt be necessary, therefore, to induce them to make a reasonable contribution, and it may be that they will be unwilling to commit themselves to any definite sum until the number of Assyrians desirous to migrate has been ascertained, the necessary surveys in Syria completed and the total cost of the whole operation thus definitely established. Again, it is possible that the Iraqi Government may attempt to defer a decision regarding their own contribution until some idea can be obtained of the amounts likely to be forthcoming from other sources.

To take the last point first, it is important to distinguish clearly between the Iraqi contribution and that which may be forthcoming from other sources, since the two are by no means on the same plane. The efforts which the Council committee has made to find a destination for the Assyrians of Iraq have their origin in a request by the Iraqi Government that the League should help them to solve this problem by finding land on which the Assyrians could settle. The task is one which the League was under no obligation to assume, and, in fact, in accepting it, the Council went outside the ordinary sphere of the protection of minorities. No doubt the Council will be glad to take such measures as it properly can to assist in the raising of funds for a work of humanitarian importance. But, again, it must be emphasised that no obligation lies upon it in this respect, whereas the Iraqi Government not only has a moral obligation arising from the circumstances in which the transfer of the Assyrians from Iraq came to be envisaged, but also is definitely committed by promises which its representatives have made in Geneva. Yasin Pasha closed his speech to the Council on the 14th October, 1933, with the following words: "In the interests of all concerned, the happiness of the Assyrians themselves and the reputation of Iraq, it was essential to find a new home elsewhere for the Assyrian immigrants who wished to leave or were unwilling to settle peaceably and to be incorporated finally into the Iraqi State, a home where they could make a fresh start. The Iraqi Government was prepared to make its contribution, as generous a contribution as its resources permitted, to help them on their way. There was one thing it could not do, and that was to find land. That could only be done by the League of Nations, and to it his Government appealed." This promise of a generous contribution has since been reiterated several times by the representatives of Iraq in Geneva.

M. López Oliván will no doubt also think it well to base his representations on the fact that the solution of the problem is, above all, in the interests of Iraq herself. This, again, was recognised by Yasin Pasha in his speech to the Council from which the above quotation was taken.

In any case, it is impossible to give the Iraqi Government any indication at present of the amount which can be raised from other sources. The Council, in its resolution of the 19th January, 1934, appealed to the generosity of Governments and private organisations to consider the possibility, more particularly on humanitarian grounds, of participating in the financing of a settlement scheme. This appeal, however, has necessarily remained in abeyance in the absence of a detailed scheme, and, though it is the intention of the Council committee to



reinforce it at the proper moment, it will, of course, require some little time to collect funds in this way.

It is most desirable, however, that there shall be no avoidable delay in the commencement of the settlement of the first 4,300 Assyrians whom the French Government are prepared to receive as soon as the necessary funds can be obtained. But it is clear that there will inevitably be delay unless the Iraqi Government are prepared to finance this first phase of the operation without assistance from elsewhere.

To sum up, the objects to be aimed at in this part of the negotiation are:—

- (a) To avoid delay in the commencement of the initial phase of settlement;
- (b) To ensure, if possible, that the Iraqi contribution shall not be limited to the cost of this initial phase; and
- (c) To overcome the possible contention of the Iraqi Government that they cannot reach any decision whatever as regards their own financial contribution until the cost of the entire operation and the amount likely to be contributed by other sources are definitely known.

The manner of approach can only be decided by M. López Oliván in the light of conditions as he finds them on arrival in Iraq. The committee suggests, however, that he should, in the first place, ask the Iraqi Government, on the assumption that the whole operation will cost 60 million French francs, to indicate how much of this total they would be prepared to pay.

It will be borne in mind that Iraq is relatively prosperous, having no debts and receiving in addition to ordinary sources of revenue, substantial annual payments from oil companies operating in the country. The committee considers, therefore, that the Iraqi Government could reasonably be asked to bear at least 50 per cent. of the total cost. It recognises, however, that considerable bargaining on this point may be necessary and that it may not be politically practicable to obtain a contribution of this size. At whatever figure the total hypothetical contribution is eventually fixed, however, the committee suggests that M. López Oliván should then endeavour to obtain, from the Iraqi Government, in the form of a lump sum payment, the amount which he may have agreed upon with the French High Commissioner as necessary for the commencement of the first phase of the settlement operation. The difference between this lump sum payment and the hypothetical total amount which the Iraqi Government would be prepared to contribute could be compared with the estimated total cost of the remainder of the operation and expressed in the form of a percentage. The Iraqi Government might then be asked to give a formal promise to pay that percentage of whatever the remainder of the operation might, in practice, cost.

It will be necessary to arrange for the payment of the initial contribution of the Iraqi Government either direct to the League of Nations or into an account to be opened by the League with some bank in Syria. It will also be necessary to reach an understanding as regards the time and manner of the payment of subsequent contributions.

#### *Consultation of the Wishes of the Assyrians and Arrangements for their Transfer.*

As a preliminary to the detailed consideration of these points, it will be necessary to fix the composition of the local committee which is to execute this part of the work. According to the Council committee's resolution of the 31st October, 1933, the local committee was to consist of—

- (1) The Land Settlement Expert (Major Thomson), as president.
- (2) An Administrative Inspector (hitherto Major Wilson).
- (3) A representative of the Nansen Office, appointed by that office in agreement with the president of the Council committee.
- (4) The interested kaimakam or Nahiya mudir.
- (5) The Assyrian village headman concerned.

When the composition of this committee was agreed upon with the Iraqi Government, it was anticipated that once a destination had been found, the work of settlement would be entrusted to the Nansen Office. For various reasons this is not now the most expedient or practicable course, and it is considered desirable that the third member of the committee should, if possible, be the direct representative of the Council committee. The latter would propose to designate for

the position M. Guénod, a technical expert until recently employed by the Nansen Office. It will be necessary, however, in the first place, to obtain the concurrence of the Iraqi Government in this change. It is understood also that the French Government wish to be directly represented on this committee, probably in the person of the French consul in Mosul.

Having agreed upon the revised constitution of the local committee, the first objective will be to agree, in consultation with its president and with the Iraqi authorities, on the manner in which the committee shall consult the wishes of the Assyrians. An important point for decision is whether this consultation must be entirely carried out before any conclusion can be reached as to which of the Assyrians shall first be transferred; or whether the wishes of a certain group can first be consulted, and that group transferred so far as it wishes to leave, while the consultation of the remainder of the Assyrians is simultaneously carried out. It will be remembered that M. Burnier has recommended that, if possible, the first group to be transferred shall belong to those tribes already represented in the provisional settlement now existing in Syria. If this plan is adhered to, it may be that those Assyrians now in the refugee camp at Mosul, or in a semi-destitute condition in the town of Mosul, may be eligible for transfer in the first place, and their immediate transfer might greatly relieve the situation in Iraq.

Once the manner of consultation has been decided, it will be desirable to draw up, again in consultation with the Iraqi authorities and Major Thomson, the terms of a document, explaining the Syrian scheme in detail, which could be placed before the Assyrians by the local committee when consulting their wishes regarding emigration. The Council committee considers it important that, *inter alia*, this document shall make it clear that all the Assyrians of Iraq, other than those of Persian nationality who are thus free to return to Persia should they be dissatisfied with conditions of life in Iraq, are entirely free to choose whether or not to take advantage of the facilities offered by the French Government in Syria. On the other hand, it will equally be necessary to make it clear, as provided in the report adopted by the Council on the 14th October, 1933, that while those Assyrians who elect to remain in Iraq will be regarded as a minority to which the provisions of the Iraqi declaration of the 30th May, 1932, on the protection of minorities will be applicable, they will further be bound to Iraq by the obligations of loyalty to the State recalled by the Assembly in its resolution of the 21st September, 1922. (Copies of this resolution and of the Iraqi declaration of the 30th May, 1932, are annexed.<sup>(1)</sup>)

The committee suggests that M. López Oliván should take the opportunity of his visit to Bagdad to lay down in principle a programme of transfer, *i.e.*, the size of the various groups to be transferred, the order in which they are to leave and the intervals between their departure, taking into account that for climatic reasons emigration is said to be impossible for six weeks in the summer and again after the end of September.

There remains the important question of the liquidation of that part of the property of the Assyrians which it is not practicable to transport into Syria. The committee does not feel able to give any guidance on this point or on the actual details of transfer, as these must naturally depend entirely on local conditions and M. López Oliván will wish to be guided by the advice of the members of the local committee and by that of the Iraqi Government.

The committee notes that a point which will require special consideration is the disposal of the arms which the Assyrians at present possess.

#### *Possibility of a Financial Contribution by the Assyrians.*

In the earlier stages of its work, the Council committee contemplated that part of the funds required for the settlement operation might be obtained from the Assyrians themselves in the form of an eventual reimbursement or even, in the case of the more prosperous members of the community, in that of an initial contribution. The principle of reimbursement, it may be noted, is normally applied by the Nansen Office in settling refugees, and in the committee's resolution of the 31st October, 1933, it was contemplated that one of the tasks of the local committee in Iraq set up by that resolution would be to take measures with a view to the participation by intending emigrants in the cost of their

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



transport and resettlement. In the Council committee's report to the Council in January 1934, the following passage occurred:—

"The committee also agrees with a suggestion made by the representative of Iraq that the Assyrian population itself might provide part of the necessary funds. In any scheme of settlement it is customary to arrange for the expenses to be repaid by the settlers in the more or less near future. Since, however, according to the committee's information, the Assyrians are not all destitute, those of them who own some property could undertake to defray part of the expenses from the outset. The committee proposes to go carefully into this question at its later meetings. It would point out here and now, however, that such participation by the Assyrians themselves cannot be contemplated unless guarantees can be obtained that the Assyrians will be able to dispose of their property in Iraq at reasonable prices. Such an operation will necessarily involve active and generous intervention on the part of the Iraqi Government."

The report from which this extract is taken was adopted by the Council, together with a report by the Council's *rapporteur*, which said that: "Moreover, the Council will certainly agree to authorise the committee to study carefully the question of the payment of part of the expenditure by the Assyrian population itself."

The question of an Assyrian contribution has recently been re-examined by the committee, when it was recognised that it must be considered in the light of certain changes in the situation. In the first place, the Syrian scheme varies from those hitherto explored in that, owing to the need for a detailed survey, it is unlikely that land can be allotted in permanent ownership to individual Assyrians for some four years. In the second place, the upkeep of a section of the Assyrians who have been in a needy condition in Iraq for the past eighteen months has presumably constituted a serious drain on the resources of the more prosperous members of the community. It is perhaps doubtful, therefore, whether initial contributions at all events can reasonably be demanded, and the feeling of the committee is that it is probably not practicable in any case to assess and collect them.

On the question of eventual reimbursement, two currents of opinion have manifested themselves in the committee. Some members incline to the view that it is unfair on account of the special circumstances which have led up to the resettlement of the Assyrians outside Iraq, that those who elect to migrate should be required to pay the cost. Others, on the contrary, feel that such charity amounts to pauperisation, and is not in the best interests of the Assyrians themselves. They feel, also, that it would create an undesirable precedent, which might be the beginning of trouble with other minorities or refugees, not only in Syria but elsewhere.

In the circumstances, the committee has decided to leave the whole question of Assyrian financial participation open for the time being, and to invite M. López Oliván to study it locally in all its bearings, and, after obtaining the best available advice, to make a reasoned recommendation to the committee.

#### *Situation of those Assyrians who may remain in Iraq.*

The report adopted by the Council on the 14th October, 1933, provided that, in addition to arranging the settlement outside Iraq of those Assyrians who wished to leave that country, the committee might examine, in consultation with the Iraqi Government and on the basis of reports furnished by the latter, the measures taken by that Government in order to give full effect to the Council's resolution of the 15th December, 1933, in the case of those Assyrians who might wish to remain in Iraq. Though specific action in this sense may be premature at the present stage, the committee would appreciate any information which M. López Oliván may be able to obtain as to the intentions of the Iraqi Government in regard to this aspect of the Assyrian problem. A copy of the proceedings of the session of the Council at which the resolution of the 15th December, 1932, was adopted, is attached.<sup>(1)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

### *Etablissement des Assyriens de l'Irak en Syrie.—Règlement financier pour le Contrôle des Fonds.*

#### *Préambule.*

Vu la lettre adressée par le Gouvernement français au président du Comité du Conseil pour l'Etablissement des Assyriens de l'Irak, en date du 14 avril 1935;

Vu la décision du Conseil du 17 avril 1935 (Doc. C 167.1935.VII);

Il a été convenu que la gestion des fonds pour l'établissement en Syrie des Assyriens de l'Irak sera régie par les dispositions financières ci-après:

Article 1<sup>er</sup>. Avant le départ de Syrie pour l'Irak, le président du comité spécial constitué par la décision que le Conseil a prise à sa 77<sup>me</sup> session, et désigné ci-après par le terme "le Comité," le Haut-Commissaire de la République française au Levant—désigné ci-après "Haut-Commissaire"—sera invité à lui soumettre, ainsi qu'au Secrétaire général de la Société des Nations—désigné ci-après "Secrétaire général"—une estimation des dépenses pour l'établissement des 4.300 Assyriens dans la région située entre Safeh et Tell Hasseri, ainsi que pour les études préalables à l'établissement des autres Assyriens de l'Irak. Dès que ces études seront terminées, le Haut-Commissaire sera invité à soumettre au Secrétaire général une estimation concernant le solde des frais d'établissement.

Lesdites estimations, qui seront établies en francs français, seront conformes à l'avant-projet ci-annexé; elles comporteront en annexe un barème des traitements et salaires des agents et ouvriers employés par le Haut-Commissaire pour l'établissement des Assyriens de l'Irak en Syrie—désigné ci-après par le terme "établissement."

Art. 2. Le Secrétaire général examinera lesdites estimations dès qu'il les aura reçues; il les soumettra pour approbation, avec ses observations éventuelles, au Comité.

A titre exceptionnel, et après entente avec le Secrétaire général, qui sera consulté par télégramme, le président du Comité est habilité à approuver sur place les estimations pour la première phase de l'établissement et, dans la mesure où les fonds nécessaires auraient été souscrits, à autoriser que soit entreprise cette partie de l'œuvre d'établissement.

Le Secrétaire général sera seul habilité à approuver les virements entre les chapitres des estimations budgétaires une fois qu'elles auront été approuvées par le Comité.

#### *II.—Recettes et Garde des Fonds.*

Art. 3. Les fonds pour l'établissement des Assyriens de l'Irak seront en premier lieu fournis par le Gouvernement de l'Irak conformément à la déclaration faite devant le Conseil à sa 77<sup>me</sup> session et depuis rappelée à différentes reprises, et au surplus par des contributions éventuelles d'autres Gouvernements et d'organisations privées en réponse à l'appel du Conseil en date du 19 janvier 1934.<sup>(1)</sup>

Art. 4. Les fonds ainsi souscrits seront versés au Secrétaire général, qui les maintiendra dans un compte spécial distinct des fonds ordinaires de la Société des Nations, ou éventuellement à un compte en banque dont il pourra seul disposer. Lesdits fonds devront servir exclusivement: (1) au remboursement des avances déjà consenties par la Société des Nations; (2) au remboursement des dépenses déjà effectuées pour l'établissement des 2.200 premiers Assyriens déjà installés en Syrie; (3) au règlement des frais que l'établissement aura entraînés en vertu des décisions du Comité.

Art. 5. Lorsque le Haut-Commissaire présentera au Secrétaire général une demande à cet effet, celui-ci lui fera des avances au moyen des fonds mis à sa disposition, sans que les avances puissent, à aucun moment, dépasser le montant de l'encaisse disponible.

Art. 6. Les fonds propres de la Société des Nations ne seront mis à contribution ni pour des avances recouvrables ni pour des versements à fonds perdus.

Art. 7. Sauf décision ultérieure du Secrétaire général sur demande motivée du Haut-Commissaire, les avances faites ne dépasseront normalement pas les dépenses moyennes d'un mois; elles seront effectuées à la fin de chaque mois pour le mois suivant.

<sup>(1)</sup> Le principe du remboursement d'une partie des frais par les Assyriens n'est pas à écarter *a priori*.



III.—*Affectation des Fonds.*

Art. 8. Lorsque le budget aura été approuvé, le Secrétaire général avisera, à intervalles réguliers, le Haut-Commissaire, de la proportion dudit budget que celui-ci sera autorisé à dépenser ou à engager.

Pour les notifications prévues à l'alinéa précédent, le Secrétaire général tiendra compte de l'encaisse disponible et des engagements souscrits par les Gouvernements.

Art. 9. Le Haut-Commissaire sera responsable de la gestion financière générale des fonds qui lui seront confiés.

Il désignera les fonctionnaires compétents pour engager les dépenses.

Art. 10. Les fonds mis à la disposition du Haut-Commissaire par le Secrétaire général seront gérés conformément aux règles financières applicables au Haut-Commissariat. Sauf décision ultérieure contraire du Secrétaire général, le contrôle et la vérification en seront notamment assurés par les services compétents du Haut-Commissariat.

Art. 11. Sera référée au Secrétaire général toute question financière qui ne serait pas susceptible d'être réglée conformément aux indications données dans le présent règlement.

IV.—*Comptabilité et Vérification des Comptes.*

Art. 12. Le Haut-Commissaire établira et soumettra au Secrétaire général les relevés suivants :

- (a) Un état mensuel des recettes et des dépenses;
- (b) Une fois l'établissement terminé, un compte définitif des recettes et des dépenses, et un compte de caisse.

Art. 13. L'état mensuel des recettes et des dépenses indiquera tous les mouvements de fonds; il sera établi en ce qui concerne les dépenses sur le modèle des estimations budgétaires et indiquera : (a) les crédits budgétaires primitifs; (b) les dépenses du mois auquel se rapporte l'état en question et (c) le total des dépenses effectuées.

Dans un délai d'un mois à dater de sa réception par le Secrétaire général, l'état des recettes et des dépenses sera vérifié par la Trésorerie de la Société des Nations.

Art. 14. Les relevés définitifs seront également établis de manière à indiquer les dépenses par comparaison tant avec les estimations budgétaires primitives qu'avec les estimations modifiées du fait de virements.

Art. 15. Après achèvement de l'œuvre d'établissement, les comptes du Haut-Commissaire seront l'objet d'une vérification d'ensemble conforme au règlement concernant la gestion des finances de la Société des Nations.

## Annexe.

## MODÈLE DE BUDGET.

I.—*Dépenses courantes.*

1. Transports.
2. Ravitaillement.
3. Maisons.
4. Cheptel, semences, &c.
5. Service sanitaire.
6. Traitements, frais de bureau, &c.
7. Divers et imprévus.

II.—*Dépenses de Capital.*

8. Immigration, forage de puits, &c.
9. Matériel permanent.

[E 2998/1583/93]

No. 144.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 15.)*

(No. 141.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, May 14, 1935.

MY telegram No. 137.

I gather from scanty reports that are coming in that situation in Muntafiq has deteriorated since yesterday.

Akaika Serai is reported captured.

Police in Suq-al-Shuyukh are holding out with difficulty and are short of ammunition. Seven Iraqi aeroplanes are immobilised in waterlogged country at Diwaniyah.

This shortage of aircraft may account for an urgent request made to me by the Prime Minister to-day for R.A.F. aeroplanes to carry ammunition to Nasiriyah for use by police who will, he expects, be attacked to-night. At a meeting attended by Cornwallis, the Air Officer Commanding and General Hay the general feeling was that as present situation had been brought about largely by governmental maladministration and by intrigues of present régime, action by R.A.F. would be inadvisable and in any case Air Officer Commanding, in view of intending attack on Nasiriyah, was naturally averse from exposing British machines to any risk.

I accordingly informed the Prime Minister that transport of ammunition by a British machine would amount to departure from principle of non-interference in internal strife (see my telegram No. 133) and that I could not act as instructed [*sic*: ? requested] without consulting you. He was much upset.

If situation further deteriorates, I anticipate that request for assistance of the R.A.F. will be repeated, and I request your instructions.

Subject to your views, I do not consider British interests in railways adequate warrant for departure from attitude I have adopted.

[E 2998/1583/93]

No. 145.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Bagdad).*

(No. 139.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 16, 1935.

YOUR telegram No. 141 of 14th May: Iraqi internal situation.

I approve your action and concur in last paragraph.

If Iraqi Government apply for R.A.F. assistance, you should be guided generally by paragraph 3 (b) of enclosure in Colonial Office secret despatch of 28th July, 1932. Unless, in your opinion and that of your advisers, immediate action is imperative, you should at once report Iraqi request to me with your recommendation in light of then existing situation.

[E 3051/1583/93]

No. 146.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 17.)*

(No. 145.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, May 16, 1935.

MY telegram No. 141 and my telegram No. 143.

Although advance of Government troops has not met with any serious resistance, Prime Minister is clearly very concerned, and possibility of a wide-spread tribal rising must be borne in mind. This would create a situation which, in consideration of position of Royal Air Force in Iraq, has, I gather, not been overlooked, *i.e.*, desirability or otherwise of giving some and material support to an Iraqi Government in order to prevent general tribal anarchy, which might call for action under (c), (d), and (e) of Colonial Office secret despatch of 28th July, 1932.



Following considerations, therefore, occur to me in connexion with Prime Minister's request (which he offered to make in writing):—

(1) My inclination is to support Prime Minister in his effort to restore order because—

- (a) Taking all things into consideration I can at present see no one in Iraq with weight enough to take his place.
- (b) If he fails, whole Administration may collapse, with consequences it is difficult to foresee.
- (c) If he succeeds in quelling revolt, his prestige will be much enhanced, and fact that we have refused him help in his urgent need might render our future relations with him difficult.

(2) I feel, however, that an essential condition of any support whatsoever should be a guarantee that a real effort should be made to redress grievances of tribes in revolt, and that meanwhile every means should be taken to repacify without bloodshed. I am encouraged to hope that use of agents, such as Mr. Ditchburn, might bring this about.

(3) Extended use of British agents, accompanied by demonstration flights by Royal Air Force, would naturally be taken by tribes to mean that we were backing Government, and might have the effect of turning the scale in Prime Minister's favour. But it would have to be made clear to tribes that we were acting purely in the interest of stability, and that we were concerned for their welfare. Participation of Royal Air Force might, however, also mean that in the end we should have to take a more active share in quelling disorder and thus become more heavily involved. It would help me if you would give me some general guidance as to how far His Majesty's Government would be prepared to risk that.

[E 3095/1583/93]

No. 147.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 18.)*

(No. 147.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, May 17, 1935.

MY telegram No. 145.

Situation to-day is much improved.

At meeting yesterday with Muntafiq sheikhs at Nasiriyah, Minister of Defence arranged truce and promised that Government would open negotiations with Kashif-al-Ghata, of whose demands sheikhs declared their unanimous support. Police and officials captured in Suq-al-Shuyukh have been released and allowed to go to Nasiriyah or Basra.

One battalion of infantry arrived at Nasiriyah yesterday. Another should arrive to-day.

Truce does not cover Rumaitha operations, which are proceeding according to plan.

Tribes suffered heavy casualties in action which was fought yesterday, and Khawat and his brother were wounded and captured.

Rumaitha was reoccupied to-day and all tribes in this area have submitted

[E 3087/1583/93]

No. 148.

*Sir John Simon to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Bagdad).*

(No. 143.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 18, 1935.

YOUR telegram No. 145 of 16th May: Iraqi internal situation.

His Majesty's Government are not prepared to sanction demonstration flights, and you should continue to be guided by standing instructions in Colonial Office despatch of 28th July, 1932. If the Iraqi Government are prepared to get into touch with the tribes and to redress their legitimate grievance, His Majesty's

Government suggest for your consideration that full use be made for such purposes of conciliation of qualified British officials in Iraqi service. If British officials are so employed, to visit disaffected area Royal Air Force aircraft must not be used for purpose of transport or escort.

Attitude of His Majesty's Government is neutral, and they are not supporting either party against the other. Their interest on the one hand is that law and order be maintained, and on the other that legitimate grievances of tribesmen be redressed as soon as possible.

[E 3106/2/93]

No. 149.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 20.)*

(No. 249.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 7, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I am in general agreement with the views expressed by the Air Ministry in their letter of the 6th April, 1935, a copy of which was transmitted to me for my observations in your despatch No. 280 of the 11th April last.

2. The Air Officer Commanding the British Forces in Iraq informs me that Wing-Commander Coryton, who has been appointed to command the Royal Air Force station at Mosul, was most carefully selected for his tact and discretion. I am bound to say that he made a good impression on me when I met him yesterday. Provided that he keeps in close touch with the Administrative Inspector, his presence in Mosul should be of considerable value in ensuring that, in the event of a recurrence of Assyrian disturbances in Mosul, full effect will be given to the policy outlined by the Air Ministry in their despatch referred to above.

I have, &amp;c.

(For the Ambassador).

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 3287/1583/93]

No. 150.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 27.)*

(No. 267.)

Sir,

Bagdad, May 15, 1935.

WITH reference to my telegrams No. 131 of the 8th May and No. 137 of the 13th May, I have the honour to furnish you with the following details of the deterioration which has taken place during the past week in the situation in the Middle and Lower Euphrates areas.

2. As I have stated in a number of previous reports, the most pressing of the immediate problems confronting Yasin Pasha's Cabinet was the pacification of the tribal elements of the Middle Euphrates hostile to Abdul Wahid. Yasin Pasha and his colleagues themselves quickly appreciated this essential fact. Since taking office, the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior have tried every means of reassuring these sheikhs. They have also been fully supported by Nuri Pasha, who, as a member of the Ali Jaudat Cabinet, enjoys in a large measure the confidence of the tribes now so bitterly jealous and suspicious of a Government which appears to them to have been put into power by their tribal enemies.

3. Throughout April representative sheikhs of these tribes paid constant visits to Bagdad, and conferred frequently with the principal Ministers and with Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, all of whom persevered in their efforts to convince the sheikhs that the Government would govern justly and would not show preference to Abdul Wahid and his supporters. In order to demonstrate their impartiality,

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the Government published on the 15th May an official communiqué announcing the suspension of the activities of the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the party of National Brotherhood), the political party of which the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior are the leaders. The Prime Minister gave, in addition, private assurances that, in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, the anti-Abdul Wahid sheikhs would be given as many seats as they had had in the last Chamber. Strenuous efforts were also made by intermediaries to reconcile the two tribal factions and to persuade the Ulema of the Holy Cities to stop fishing in troubled waters. Some of those concerned were won over, but others remained obstinately mistrustful, and Kashif-al-Ghata, the turbulent divine of Karbela, clung tenaciously to the sectarian demands to which I referred in my despatch No. 171 of the 28th March. These demands have not yet been formally presented to the King or to the Government, but many of the anti-Abdul Wahid and Muntafiq sheikhs have given binding promises to support the Ulema in their struggle for the Shiah cause.

4. Involved and tortuous negotiations continued throughout April, and by the beginning of May there were signs of improvement, which strengthened hopes of a peaceful settlement. At this juncture, however, the Cabinet took an ill-advised step. They learned that in Rumaitha a certain Shiah priest, named Ahmad Asadullah, a follower of Kashif-al-Ghata, was inciting the local tribes against the Government. He was arrested on the afternoon of the 7th May and removed to Baghdad. That evening the local tribes, the Abu Hassan, the Bani Zuraij and the Dhuwalim, revolted. Under the lead of the Sheikh of the Bani Zuraij, Khawam-al-Abbas, they tore up the railway line on both sides of the town and looted the station and the bazaar. The railway personnel were able to escape and have since found their way to Baghdad. The police successfully held the serai, but, since the evening of the 7th May, no trains have been run south of Diwaniyah or north of Samawah.

5. On the morning of the 8th May, several Royal Air Force machines passed over Rumaitha, and one machine, which flew low over the town, appears to have been hit by rifle fire and forced to land with the loss of two lives. On the following day the Air Officer Commanding sent a special service officer from Air Headquarters to Diwaniyah to endeavour to recover the two bodies. With the help of the mutessarif and a local sayid he succeeded in despatching a letter to Sheikh Khawam-al-Abbas, who at once sent in the bodies decently covered in cloth and reeds. In his letter the sheikh explained that his tribesmen had fired on the aeroplane because they thought it was attacking them with machine guns. The Air Officer Commanding assures me that this was impossible, as the guns of the machine had not been made ready for action when the flight left Hinaidi. The most probable explanation is that the tribesmen mistook the Royal Air Force machines for Iraqi aircraft, many of which have lately been carrying out reconnaissances over the Rumaitha area.

6. On the evening of the 9th May, I visited the Prime Minister, who is Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absence of Nuri Pasha. He expressed great regret at the death of the Royal Air Force officer and gunner and for the loss of the British aeroplane. He agreed with the view that the tribesmen had fired on the Royal Air Force machines because they mistook them for an Iraqi reconnaissance. At my suggestion he undertook to publish a communiqué, making it clear that the flight of British aircraft was unconnected with the operations to restore order, which were being undertaken by the Government. I enclose herein a copy of the communiqué which appeared in the press on the 10th May.<sup>(1)</sup>

7. So soon as Rumaitha was attacked, the Minister of the Interior went to Diwaniyah in order to study the situation, and to make a last effort to arrange a peaceful settlement. On the afternoon of the 9th May, handbills were scattered over the area from Iraqi aeroplanes, warning the tribes that, unless they dispersed to their homes within twenty-four hours and resumed their normal lives, the Government would be forced to take punitive action against them.

8. The tribes made no response, and on the morning of the 11th May, after warnings had been dropped that women and children should be removed from the villages, aerial bombing began and has been continued daily. Simultaneously arrangements were made for the concentration at Diwaniyah of 5 infantry battalions, 1 field battery, 1 mountain battery and 1 company of motor machine

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

guns with auxiliary troops. Three companies of an infantry battalion were also sent from Basra to Samawah, and thence occupied the important railway bridges at Barbuti and Imam Abdullah. General Bakr Sidqi Pasha was put in command of all troops between Hillah and Basra, and martial law was proclaimed in the Rumaitha nahiyah. On the morning of the 12th May, a column comprising the bulk of the troops concentrated at Diwaniyah began a movement southwards towards Rumaitha.

9. The situation on the morning of the 13th May was promising. The moral effect of the air action taken by the Iraqi air force was reported to have been good. Tribal gatherings were dispersing, a number of sheikhs of the Rumaitha area had made their submission and the nephew of Khawam-al-Abbas had made overtures for terms for his uncle. The Prime Minister told me that he was hopeful that the troops would be able to reoccupy the district without serious fighting. Later in the day, however, there was a change for the worse. Telegrams from Nasiriyah reported that the restlessness of the Muntafiq tribes was at last turning into open revolt. The tribes in the neighbourhood of Suq-al-Shiyukh had risen and were attacking the local serais in Suq-al-Shiyukh, Akaika and Qarmah Bani Said. The Mutessarif of Nasiriyah was asking for troops to be despatched urgently to his help.

10. On the 14th May it was reported that the rebels had captured Akaika, and the mutessarif, fearing an attack on Nasiriyah itself, asked urgently for ammunition and reinforcements. A battalion of infantry was sent off from Baghdad in motor cars to try to get through to Nasiriyah via Kut and the Hai, and the Iraqi air force were called upon to take down supplies of ammunition. Unfortunately, all their aircraft were bogged in the waterlogged aerodrome at Diwaniyah, or already engaged either in bombing raids on the Rumaitha front or in transporting ammunition to the beleaguered police at Suq-al-Shiyukh. Fearing that Nasiriyah might be attacked that night, the Prime Minister made a personal appeal to me to help him by sending ammunition to Nasiriyah in a Royal Air Force *Victoria*. For the reasons which I have already explained in my telegram No. 141 of the 14th May, I did not feel able to consent to ask the Air Officer Commanding to comply with the Prime Minister's request.

11. During the night of the 14th-15th May the railway line between Basra and Nasiriyah was cut at Tall-al-Laham and Suq-al-Shiyukh Town was occupied by the rebels. The police, however, continue to hold out in their post.

12. The forces of the Government at Diwaniyah seem adequate to restore order in Rumaitha, but there is little left in reserve to move against the powerful tribes of the Muntafiq Confederation. The one line of communication with the Nasiriyah liwa, which remains open, is down the Hai from Kut. The attitude of the tribes on the Hai is most uncertain, and there is a danger that they will join the revolt. Much will depend on Sheikh Khaiyun-al-Ubaid, the Sheikh of the Abudah tribe at Shatrah. If he joins the insurrection, the Nasiriyah liwa will be cut off from all help, unless the Government forces restore order in Rumaitha and move southwards down the Euphrates into the Muntafiq area. I understand that the column moving south from Diwaniyah is approaching Rumaitha to-day and a decisive action may be fought during the next twenty-four hours.

13. The danger of the revolt spreading is not limited to Diwaniyah and Nasiriyah. The anti-Abdul Wahid and pro-Shiah sheikhs have many powerful sympathisers in the Hillah liwa, between Diwaniyah and Baghdad. If they also rebel, the forces now operating in the Middle Euphrates will be cut off from the capital and their position will then be precarious.

14. It is unnecessary for me to emphasise the dangerous potentialities of the situation. They will be clear enough to you from the above narrative. Events are moving towards a trial of strength between the Government and the Euphrates tribes, and it is by no means certain that the Government will win.

15. In Baghdad the situation is at present quiet and normal, though naturally a variety of changing rumours are in constant circulation. The members of the late Government do not seem to be taking advantage of Yasin Pasha's difficulties, and I am told that they have given no encouragement to their tribal supporters to join in the insurrection. The press unanimously condemns the rebel sheikhs and calls for the sternest repressive measures.

16. The Government endeavoured to deal with Sheikh Asadullah by deporting him to Persia, on the plea that his claim to Iraqi nationality was



invalid. The Persian Government have, however, not yet agreed to accept him. Meanwhile he is in Khanaqin.

17. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 3432/278/93]

No. 151.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 3.)*

(No. 281.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, May 22, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 174 of the 28th March, I have the honour to inform you that most of the Kurdish aghas had left Bagdad by the middle of April.

2. Apparently they did not succeed in obtaining any definite undertakings from the Government concerning the requests which they had put forward on behalf of the Kurds, though soothing assurances in general terms seem to have been given to them by both the Prime Minister and the Minister for the Interior.

3. On returning to their homes, further local discussions and meetings took place among the interested aghas. The reports of the deputation to Bagdad were considered, and it was generally felt that, although these were somewhat intangible, the best course would be to wait and see what effect was given to the oral assurances which had been received from the leading members of the Cabinet. In regard, however, to the question of the nomination of official candidates for the next general election, it was decided that further representations should be made at once. For this purpose a deputation of aghas of the Dauda, Jaf, Dizdai and Talabani tribes came to Bagdad in the first week in May.

4. They were cordially received by the Prime Minister and the Minister for the Interior, to whom they explained the common desire of the Kurds that in the next Chamber they should be represented by local personalities of note, and that outsiders from Bagdad should not be foisted on the Kurdish constituencies. They submitted for the Government's consideration a list of suitable candidates from amongst whom they suggested the Government should choose their nominees. The Ministers promised sympathetically to bear in mind the representations of the aghas, and dismissed them reasonably contented with the results of their visit. While in Bagdad they frequently gathered in Sheikh Mahmud's house. He has told my oriental secretary that he advised them strongly not to think of any form of tribal activity against the Government.

5. From several sources I have received information that, in addition to their intrigues among the Shiah, to which I have several times referred in my despatches on the Euphrates troubles, the Persian Government are working for a pan-Iranian movement among the Kurds. So far their propaganda has made very little progress, but, if serious discontent were to develop among the Kurds of Iraq, the pan-Iranian ideal, if cleverly propagated, might easily win a large measure of support.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador).

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 3433/1583/93]

No. 152.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 3.)*

(No. 283.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, May 22, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 267 of the 15th May last, I have the honour to inform you that the situation on the Middle Euphrates and in the Muntafiq Province has greatly improved during the past week.

2. On the 16th May Jafar Pasha, the Minister of War, accompanied by Mr. Ditchburn, flew to Nasiriyah in an Iraqi Air Force machine to consult with the mutessarif and to speak to a gathering of tribal sheikhs of the Muntafiq Confederation.

3. The situation in the Nasiriyah liwa was then critical. On the previous day 300 police had surrendered with their arms to the insurgents at Suq-al-Shiyukh, and there was good reason to fear that the tribes of the Shatrah, on the Hai, might join the insurrection, and thereby cut the only remaining route by which reinforcements could be sent to the Muntafiq area. The tribes in the vicinity of Nasiriyah were truculent, and it was believed that an attack on the town was imminent.

4. On arrival at Nasiriyah, Jafar Pasha first interviewed the Shatrah sheikhs. His friendly manner quickly put them at their ease, and his speech, in which he emphasised that if disorder prevailed Iraq would be judged unfit to govern herself, made a considerable impression on his audience. The Nasiriyah sheikhs then joined the meeting and, after further conference, Jafar Pasha agreed to a truce. The conditions were that the Government should open negotiations at once with the Alim, Kashif-al-Ghata, regarding the Shiah demands (the text of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 171 of the 28th March), and that, pending the conclusion of these negotiations, there should be no further hostilities in the Nasiriyah liwa. Jafar Pasha further agreed that during the truce no troops, other than the two battalions already en route for Nasiriyah, should be sent to the Muntafiq area. For their part, the sheikhs also undertook to arrange for the release of the police and other officials who had been captured by the tribes in Suq-al-Shiyukh. On the same day the first of the two battalions, which had been despatched from Bagdad in lorries, reached Nasiriyah via Kut and the Hai, and adequate supplies of small-arms ammunition were sent down by aeroplane. A second battalion arrived on the following day. All immediate anxiety for the safety of Nasiriyah town was thus removed, and when Jafar Pasha and Mr. Ditchburn returned to Bagdad on the 17th May the situation was much easier.

5. While the events described above were taking place the troops advancing from Diwaniyah were fighting a successful and decisive engagement with the Rumaitha insurgents. Their machine guns inflicted heavy casualties on the tribesmen and Sheikh Khawwam, the local leader, and his brother were wounded and captured. The following day (the 17th May) the column entered Rumaitha and the insurrection in this area was at an end. The advance was continued the next day, and on the 21st May the column reached Samawa.

6. The complete success of the operation at Rumaitha left the Government free to deal with the situation in the Nasiriyah liwa. Negotiations were opened with Kashif-al-Ghata through Haji Muhsin-al-Shallash, a very wealthy merchant of Najaf, who at one time was Minister for Finance, and the Alim was persuaded to send an exhortation to the Muntafiq tribes to keep the peace and prevent all fighting. How far negotiations on the "demands" themselves have progressed I have not yet heard, but I gather that Yasin Pasha, while generally sympathetic to the idea of greater Shiah participation in the Government and in the public services, is very much opposed to recognising the title of the ulema to represent the Shiah community in political affairs.

7. The tribes of Suq-al-Shiyukh duly released all the captured officials and policemen, but minor skirmishing with police patrols and posts on the railway line continued to occur between the 17th May and the 20th May. In the neighbourhood of Nasiriyah also, in spite of the truce, the local tribes committed



further depredations. The police were attacked, culverts on the railway were destroyed, and telephone and telegraph lines were pulled down or cut. The mutessarif was therefore instructed on the 19th May to warn the sheikhs concerned that the Government regarded these activities as a breach of the truce made at Nasiriyah, and would therefore no longer be bound by its terms.

8. The situation in Nasiriyah caused anxiety in Basra, as the town had been denuded of troops and police to reinforce those engaged in the operations. In these circumstances, His Majesty's consul arranged with the senior naval officer, Persian Gulf, that H.M.S. *Lupin*, which was at Basra at the time, should remain in the port pending an improvement of the situation.

9. The present position is that the Nasiriyah sheikhs are asking for lenient terms; they have promised to restore the culverts and dykes damaged by their tribesmen, and the sheikhs of Suq-al-Shuykh are negotiating their submission through friendly intermediaries. The work of repairing the railway, the damage to which it is impossible to estimate at the moment, is being rapidly pushed forward, and there is hope that within forty-eight hours through trains will again be running between Basra and Bagdad. It would appear, therefore, that the Government now have the situation well in hand.

10. During the critical period the Prime Minister kept in close touch with His Majesty's Embassy. At my suggestion, Mr. Ditchburn, who has expert knowledge of the disturbed areas, was put on special duty at the Ministry of the Interior to collect reports from all sources and to inform this Embassy and Air Headquarters of the daily developments in the situation. I also had frequent interviews with the Prime Minister, at which he spoke to me frankly about the difficulties of the Government. On the evening of the 15th May I met him at a dinner-party given by the Government to M. Oliván. The position was then grave and Yasin Pasha was clearly very anxious. He told me of his plan to send Jafar Pasha and Mr. Ditchburn to Nasiriyah on the following day to interview the Muntafiq sheikhs, and confessed that Mr. Ditchburn, on account of his long service among the Euphrates tribes, had more influence among them than any other official of the Iraqi Government. He asked me to make a special appeal to him to do his utmost to persuade the tribes to be patient and to have confidence in the Government. He also requested me to authorise him to make it known that His Majesty's Government regarded with disfavour the outbreak of lawlessness among the tribes. I agreed generally with the Prime Minister's requests and authorised Mr. Ditchburn to speak to the sheikhs in the sense already reported in my telegram No. 143 of the 16th May. He did not, however, find it necessary to make full use of this authority, but considered it sufficient to inform the sheikhs that in his *private* opinion His Majesty's Government, while desiring the welfare of all the people of Iraq, would not approve of the lawless methods adopted by the tribes to bring their grievances to the attention of the Government.

11. I also asked Mr. Ditchburn to try to ascertain the causes of the outbreak among the Muntafiq. He reported on his return that all the sheikhs were pledged to support the demands put forward by Kashif-al-Ghata and must continue to struggle for their acceptance by the Government unless told by the ulema to desist.

12. On the 16th May, while the result of both the Nasiriyah negotiations and the advance of the column at Rumaitha was uncertain, Yasin Pasha made the request for a demonstration by Royal Air Force machines, which I reported in the telegram to which I have referred in paragraph 10 above. I expressed my sympathy with the Government's difficulties, but explained that I could not authorise demonstration flights without prior reference to you, and I feared that His Majesty's Government would regard such a flight as an undesirable departure from their policy of non-intervention in internal disputes. Yasin Pasha was evidently disappointed, but accepted my decision with good grace. The situation has now so greatly improved that I see no reason to anticipate any further request for the assistance of the Royal Air Force in connexion with the Euphrates disturbances.

13. I would add that, during the course of the operations, the Royal Air Force in Iraq supplied the Iraqi army with a quantity of munitions, including aeroplane bombs, rifles and small-arms ammunition, in accordance with the arrangements made for the supply of such material in time of urgent need.

14. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Government of India (to whom I have also sent a copy of my despatch No. 267 of the 15th May) and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.  
(For the Ambassador),  
C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 3601/1583/93]

No. 153.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 11.)*

(No. 295.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, May 29, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 283 of the 22nd May, I have the honour to report that during the past week the Iraqi Government have continued steadily to restore their authority in the disturbed areas on the Euphrates.

2. Many Muntafiq sheikhs have made their submission and, although tranquillity has not yet been completely restored in the Suq-al-Shuykh district, the recalcitrant elements of the Hachcham tribe are rapidly being deserted by the others and left to their fate.

3. Through trains have been running between Bagdad and Basra since the 23rd May, and the Rumaitha column reached Tall-al-Lahm on the 27th May en route for Suq-al-Shuykh. Two motor-boats armed with two 2-75 guns and six Vickers machine-guns, hastily improvised in the Basra port, overawed the tribes on the Hammar Lake and reinstated the Mudir of Chubaish without firing a shot. The police officer in charge, excited by his success, telegraphed to Bagdad that "the victorious Iraqi fleet, having rehoisted the noble Iraqi flag, was steaming ahead to destroy all rebels and traitors." Thus easily does the Iraqi temperament achieve exaltation.

4. In Basra confidence has been restored and H.M.S. *Lupin* left the port on the 24th May.

5. In Rumaitha all is now quiet, although martial law still remains in force. Khawwam-al-Abbas, the insurgent leader, who was wounded and captured on the 16th May, has been sentenced to death, but it is not certain whether the Government intend to execute him. The sentence may possibly have been passed in order to intimidate others.

6. Some of the Bagdad newspapers betray in their comments something of the exaltation which inspired the police inspector's telegram which I have mentioned. The Government's triumph over the insurgents is heralded as a great victory of national unity over those who sought to disrupt the kingdom in the name of the rights of religion and racial minorities. General Bakr Sidqi Pasha, now in command of the forces operating on the Euphrates, is once again proclaimed a national saviour and hero. Yasin Pasha, too, has received much flattery and praise, and in several journals the possibility of his becoming what is called a constitutional dictator has been favourably canvassed.

7. In view of the possibility that the revolt on the Euphrates will soon be suppressed, public interest is beginning to turn from day-to-day events to the wider possibilities of the future, and I shall shortly address you a despatch in which I shall endeavour to appreciate the potentialities of the situation which has been created by the important events which have occurred since the beginning of the year.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Government of India and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.  
ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.



*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 11.)*

(No. 297.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, May 29, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 265 of the 15th May, I have the honour to inform you that M. Olivan, accompanied by M. Arocha, Major Thomson and M. Cuenod, left Bagdad on the evening of the 16th May for a visit to Mosul, and returned on the morning of the 22nd May.

2. While in Mosul, M. Olivan and his colleagues visited Assyrian villages near the town, in the Dohuk Qadha and in the Amadiyah Valley. They also interviewed the headmen of the principal tribes and groups of the Assyrian people. M. Olivan gained the impression that practically all the ex-Ottoman Assyrians now in Iraq desired to leave and to be resettled in Syria if their emigration could be arranged. His estimate of the number of those who wished to quit was between 20,000 and 23,000 persons of all ages. His detailed figures are set out in the enclosed copy of a note which he handed to me for my information.

3. On his return, I discussed with M. Olivan your two telegrams Nos. 140 and 142 of the 17th and 18th May. He agreed that it was necessary to press for the largest possible contribution from the Iraqi Government, but he was frankly disappointed that I could tell him nothing regarding the amount which His Majesty's Government might themselves be willing to add to the sum collected from Iraq. He expressed some surprise at your adverse comments on the Gharb scheme, and emphasised the many advantages, political and climatic, which the Jabal Ansariyah and the Orontes Valley offered over the Khabur Basin. He pointed out, moreover, that as it was now, to his mind, quite clear that the number of emigrants was likely to surpass the 16,500 given by the French as the maximum which could be accommodated in all the five regions of the Khabur, where settlement has been suggested as practicable, and, as the later estimates for the Gharb scheme given to him in Beirut made it appear probable that it would in the end prove no more costly than settlement on the Khabur, the original advantages of the latter project had been very much discounted.

4. After our conversation M. Olivan was received by the King, and he then called on the Prime Minister. He gave him an account of his visit to Mosul and told him of the impression which he had gained of the numbers of ex-Ottoman Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq. He added that as this number was high, it was his duty to urge the Iraqi Government to increase to £250,000 the contribution which the Prime Minister had suggested at their previous interviews. The Prime Minister gave M. Olivan a sympathetic hearing and promised to put the whole question before the Cabinet immediately and to inform him of their decision two days later. On the 23rd May, before the matter was considered by the Cabinet, I saw the Prime Minister and pressed him to make the most generous possible response to the appeal which M. Olivan was making for a really substantial contribution from the Iraqi Government. That afternoon, the Council of Ministers considered the whole question in detail, and Mr. Hogg, the adviser to the Ministry of Finance, was called to give evidence of Iraq's financial resources. As a result, Mr. Hogg was requested by the Cabinet to put his views in writing that night, and on the following morning the Prime Minister sent my first secretary, at the latter's request, a statement of the financial position of Iraq prepared by Mr. Hogg. A second but less comprehensive memorandum was sent to M. Arocha. Copies of these two notes form the second and third enclosures in this despatch.

5. The offer contained in the note given to M. Arocha seemed to M. Olivan to be inadequate, and he decided to make further efforts to obtain a larger sum. I promised to help him, and I undertook to talk again with the Prime Minister. The next day, as I was ill with fever, I sent my first secretary to see Yasin Pasha to urge him to reconsider the decision contained in his note and to increase the Iraqi Government's offer to at least £200,000.

6. I enclose a copy of Mr. Bateman's minute on the conversation which ensued. Unfortunately, in spite of his cogent arguments, the Prime Minister could not see his way to fall in with the suggestions put to him and, when he

received M. Olivan later on the same morning, he was unable to raise the total contribution above £125,000. It was on this occasion that the Prime Minister informed M. Olivan that Nuri Pasha had telegraphed from Geneva that the sum of £100,000 was all that was expected of Iraq (see my telegram No. 151 of the 25th May).

7. On Sunday, the 25th May, M. Olivan made yet another effort to induce the Prime Minister to reconsider his decision, but without avail. The Prime Minister's last word was a written offer to pay £10 a head for all Assyrians who left the country up to a total of 12,500 persons. In the event of more than 12,500 persons wishing to emigrate, no payment, he stated, could be made on account of those in excess of this number. A first payment of £60,000 would, he explained, be made at the time of the departure of the first contingent of 4,000 to 5,000, and the balance at the time of the movement for the frontier from their villages of each subsequent group.

8. M. Olivan informed Yasin Pasha that he did not consider this offer to be good enough to enable him to accept it as providing money enough with which to begin the work of resettlement in Syria. Nevertheless, he did not wish to imply that the Syria scheme must therefore be abandoned. He would have to report the Iraqi Government's offer to his committee and act in the light of their decision. Yasin Pasha told M. Olivan that the Iraqi Government had constantly been led to believe by my predecessor, and on one occasion by myself, that if they contributed £100,000, His Majesty's Government would pay the balance of the total required. M. Olivan referred this point to me, and I assured him categorically that, although in the past the sum of £100,000 had frequently been mentioned as a sum which the Iraqi Government might be prepared to contribute, I was quite certain that neither Sir Francis Humphrys nor I myself had ever given the Iraqi Government reason to assume that His Majesty's Government would make any contribution other than as part of such help as might be voted by the League as a whole. I added that I would take immediate steps to disabuse Yasin Pasha's mind of this false impression.

9. M. Olivan, M. Arocha and M. Cuenod left Bagdad by *Nairn* transport for Beirut on the 27th May.

10. Although he was not explicit about his future plans, I gathered that M. Olivan now feels convinced that his committee can make no further progress until His Majesty's Government inform him what, if any, contribution they will make towards the cost of one or other of the resettlement schemes. He said repeatedly to me and to members of my staff that it was no longer possible to continue to try to work out the Assyrian equation with the unknown "contributions from other sources." The time had now come to substitute a figure for this formula. It appeared to him that the only course open to him was to visit London to discuss this point with His Majesty's Government, and I am sure that he would appreciate an invitation to do so.

11. The Council Committee clearly cannot embark on a settlement scheme estimated to cost about £700,000 with only £125,000 in hand, and until the term "contributions from other sources" is reduced to figures, it will be exceedingly difficult for them to decide what step to take next. I submit, therefore, that His Majesty's Government should give early consideration to the question of the amount of the contribution which it may be possible for them to make and to the manner in which it is expedient for them to make it. If a decision in this regard is not rapidly reached, I foresee the possibility of the committee's finally abandoning all hope of resettling the Assyrians outside Iraq, an outcome which, it is scarcely necessary for me to say, would in all probability entail most undesirable embarrassments for His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR



## Enclosure 1 in No. 154.

*Assyriens ayant déclaré vouloir quitter l'Irak.*

N.B.—Ces chiffres ne doivent pas être considérés comme définitifs: ils sont le résultat de consultations faites par MM. Oliván et Arocha à Mossoul et environs, à Kirkuk et à Bagdad. Les chefs de tribus et les personnalités les plus marquantes des Assyriens ont eu l'occasion d'exprimer en toute liberté leur point de vue. S'il est vrai que le nombre des Assyriens voulant quitter l'Irak pourrait s'avérer inférieur au chiffre ci-dessous—comme suite à la consultation individuelle que fera la commission locale—il est également vrai, d'après les informations que nous possédons, que le nombre des dissidents (10,000 à 11,000) pourrait aussi être considérablement inférieur.

Notes du			
17 mai 1935.	Camp de Mossoul	...	342
18 mai 1935.	Villages visités (aux alentours de Mossoul):		
	Djarahia	...	115
	Nassiriyeh	...	30
	Makanan (indécis), 70		
	Bedria	...	90
	Ain Hilwa	...	112
	Geripahn	...	30
			377
19 mai 1935.	Consultation des chefs convoqués à Mossoul:		
	1 <sup>er</sup> groupe	...	2,000
	2 <sup>nd</sup> groupe (dissident), 10,800		
	3 <sup>rd</sup> groupe	...	3,500
			200
	4 <sup>th</sup> groupe	...	4,000
	5 <sup>th</sup> et 6 <sup>th</sup> groupes	...	2,472
			12,172
	Villages du Kourdistan, Qadha de Zibar (entre- vue avec M. Arocha au Rest House de Mossoul)	...	2,500
20 mai 1935.	Délégations reçues par M. Arocha au Rest House de Mossoul: 450 + 250	...	700
	Autres villages visités aux alentours de Mossoul	...	1,613
21 mai 1935.	Kirkuk et Suleimanyeh	...	1,240
23 mai 1935.	Bagdad:		
	"Levies"	...	2,500
	Railways	...	600
			3,100
	Autres: Les "autres" consultés sont des anciens sujets persans qui désirent tous partir et qui sont, à Bagdad, quelque 5,000.		
			22,044
	Plus les Assyriens déjà installés dans le Khabour	...	2,200
			24,244

## Enclosure 2 in No. 154.

*Statement by Mr. Hogg.*

WITH reference to the proposal that the Iraq Government should contribute a sum in excess of I.D. 125,000 towards the cost of settling the Assyrians in Syria—

1. There is no provision in the draft budget for 1935-36 for any expenditure under this head.

2. The budget, as presented to the late Parliament, provides for a surplus of I.D. 1,503.

This will be modified by the recent disturbances on the Euphrates, the direct and indirect costs of which may probably exceed I.D. 250,000.

3. The accounts of the financial year from 1930-31 have shown the following results:—

	Surplus, I.D.	Deficit, I.D.
1930-31	...	353,000
1931-32	...	163,000
1932-33	105,000	...
1933-34	...	128,000
1934-35	200,000 (estimated)	...

Net result: Deficit, I.D. 339,000.

The year 1934-35 was an exceptionally good one. The export of grain was double the average.

The requirements of the country are such that normal ordinary expenditure is continually on the up grade; and in an agricultural country like Iraq, which depends for 56 per cent. of its revenue on customs and excise, a bad season has an immediate effect on the revenue.

Apart from the cost of the operations on the Euphrates, the present financial year is bound to be affected by the heavy sandstorms and rains, which have damaged crops severely, and by the severe attacks on the Basra date crop by insect pests.

4. It is true that constant changes of Cabinet during recent years and the consequent inability to decide on any major questions of policy have resulted in a surplus on the capital works budget—the resources of which are derived mainly from oil revenues—such that the apparent net surplus on the ordinary and capital works budget combined stands at the moment at 1,150,000 I.D.

But this figure is misleading. Apart from the fact that an agricultural country like Iraq stands in urgent need of a reserve, the inevitable commitments on capital works during the next three years are more than sufficient to exhaust this surplus.

5. In spite of the continued changes of Cabinet, which have made it impossible to secure decisions in respect of any capital outlay of real importance other than the Kut barrage), and which have undoubtedly hampered administration and therefore expenditure, the current outlay on capital works of the second order has been about I.D. 400,000-450,000 a year.

Quite apart from this, the following major works have to be provided for during the next three years:—

	I.D.
Kut barrage	1,200,000
Military requirements	1,160,000
Bagdad bridges	375,000
Agricultural bank	100,000
	2,835,000

If at least I.D. 1,250,000 is added for normal capital outlay, a total of I.D. 4,085,000 has to be found: in this total nothing is allowed for the following items:—

	I.D.
Habbaniyah scheme	850,000
Cash payment for railways	?
Cost of Hinaidi buildings	?
Ottoman Régie and debt claims	?

Nor does the figure include anything for the cost of settling the Assyrians.



6. Towards meeting this expenditure the Iraq Government can look to—  
I.D.

I.P.C. payments, which, allowing for the continuance of the gold premium, may, in three years, amount to ...	1,710,000
Contributions from the Currency Board, say, ...	75,000
Payments by the B.O.D. on the assumption that they strike oil in paying quantities sufficient to enable them to meet their obligations under the existing concession (a purely hypothetical supposition), say ...	820,000
Total ...	2,605,000
Add existing surplus ...	1,150,000
	3,755,000

7. There is therefore a prospect of a deficit of I.D. 350,000 in three years' time, assuming that the B.O.D. continue to pay and go to production, that the gold premium continues at its present level, that the ordinary budget balances, and that none of the expenditure mentioned at the end of paragraph 5 come or change.

It is quite obvious that the Iraq Government has no surplus which can be earmarked for the purpose of meeting the cost of settling the Assyrians; and that any expenditure so incurred involves postponing other claims.

8. The capital works programme prepared by the late Cabinet provided for an expenditure, during the next seven years, of I.D. 7 million. Whatever changes may be made in individual items, the total contemplated was, if anything, an understatement of the requirements of the country. Equally, the ordinary budget fails to provide for crying needs.

9. No doubt a loan policy is indicated, but, so far, Parliament has shown itself strongly opposed; nor can it be said either that expenditure on settling Assyrians abroad is either an item which could justifiably find a place in expenditure to be covered by loan, or that its inclusion would tend to influence Parliament in favour of such a policy.

E. G. HOGG.

Bagdad, May 24, 1935.

Enclosure 3 in No. 154.

Memorandum handed to Sr. Arocha by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
May 24, 1935.

THE Iraq Government has taken note of the proposal made by the president of the Committee of Six in regard to the provision of the financial contribution to facilitate the settlement of the Assyrians amounting to I.D. 250,000.

The Iraq Government feels that this proposal has been made by the president with the spirit of facilitating the mission entrusted to him and with the hope that the Iraq Government will take into serious consideration the generous step which the outside world expects her to take to facilitate the immigration of those Assyrians who wish to leave Iraq, and the president believes—in view of the preliminary enquiries—that the Assyrians who desire to leave Iraq number 20,000.

The Iraq Government would like to confirm once more her wish to offer what she is able to pay as a maximum to facilitate the mission of the Committee of Six, but the financial circumstances of the Government—resulting from the carrying out of capital works, and in view of the fact that she is compelled to spend large sums of money to preserve peace and order and to compensate for the losses sustained as a result of natural events (calamities) occurring this year—all these reasons made the State in great need for money to carry out its responsibilities.

The "note" prepared by the financial adviser in this connexion left no doubt to the Government that she is unable to offer any help exceeding the calculation based on the principle accepted by the Prime Minister in his conversation with the president of the committee before the latter's departure to Mosul.

The Iraq Government does not wish to go very deep into its undertakings to the League of Nations, nor into what was previously thought as to the contribution which Iraq had intended to give in the respect, the Prime Minister having mentioned, in the way of example, the decision passed in this respect by one of the previous Iraqi Cabinets, but the Iraq Government did not hesitate in accepting that principle, which cost Iraq more than I.D. 110,000 in view of the number contemplated, and this is in addition to the amounts already spent.

The Iraq Government would like the president of the committee to be aware of the reasons which prevented her to meet all his wishes, hoping very sincerely at the same time that he will succeed in his difficult task.

Enclosure 4 in No. 154.

Minute by Mr. Bateman.

Ambassador.

THE Prime Minister received me by appointment at 8.45 this morning. I thanked him for sending me Mr. Hogg's memorandum on the financial state of Iraq, and then told him that both you and Sr. Oliván were extremely anxious about the situation now reached. I said that it was now clear that a contribution of £125,000 by the Iraqi Government would be insufficient and that, unless Sr. Oliván could get another firm promise of another £75,000, he would have to go back to Geneva with his mission virtually a failure. I said that Sr. Oliván's visit was unique of its kind. He had full authority of the League to negotiate a final settlement. For two years the League had been searching the world over for a place where the Assyrians could go and the present scheme was the only one that had turned out to be feasible. If this one failed there would be nothing for it but for the Assyrians to remain in Iraq and, having been worked up to think that they were leaving soon, no one could say what impulsive action they would take if this scheme failed. In any case, if it should fail, the Assyrians would be on the hands of the Iraqi Government for years and the Iraqi Government would have to keep them alive whether they liked it or not. In the circumstances, therefore, it seemed clear that if we could get rid of the Assyrian question for £200,000 from the Iraqi Government it would be cheap at the price.

I then said that I had examined Mr. Hogg's figures very carefully, but that I did not see the expenditure of £200,000 would necessarily alter the position one way or the other. If at the end of three years there was to be a deficit in any case of £300,000 or £400,000, it might just as well be £600,000 for all the difference it would make. Yasin Pasha entirely agreed with me and said that he would not attempt to argue that the difference between £100,000 and £200,000 would make the difference between solvency and bankruptcy. Having got so far, I then suggested to him that the decision which lay with him was purely political. He agreed. He repeated that a decision of the Council of Ministers, which was only four months old, limited the Iraqi Government to an expenditure of not more than £50,000 and it was with the utmost difficulty that he had persuaded people like Rashid Ali and other members of the Cabinet to see the necessity for exceeding that amount. He told me confidentially that he had telegraphed to Nuri Pasha on the whole subject and had received a reply to the effect that not a penny more than £100,000 was really necessary. I asked him whether he thought that Nuri Pasha or Sr. Oliván was the better man to judge what League opinion was. I could tell him, on the strength of Sr. Oliván's two years' experience of this problem, that opinion at Geneva was that Iraq was almost exclusively responsible for the present situation and that their reputation was one of intransigence. If Sr. Oliván were to go back with his mission a failure, this sentiment would be increased. Was it really worth his while, for the sake of a few thousand pounds, to give justification for this false sentiment when a little firmness at the head of government in Iraq might turn the scale in his favour? Sr. Oliván, following upon his visit to Mosul, was clear in his own mind that the feeling at Geneva was all wrong. But it was one thing to be in Mosul and quite another to be in Geneva and see it there and, if he went back with his mission a failure, he would go back with his hands tied and perhaps his tongue as well. There was another way of looking at it. If he could go back with money which he regards as the minimum contribution from Iraq, either in cash



or a firm promise, then he would be able more easily to get money from other sources. This would mean, as soon as non-Iraqi contributions were forthcoming, that the legend of Iraqi responsibility would be dispelled for ever, because others would have shared it. Was it worth risking this for the sake of the Opposition and a few of his colleagues?

As Yasin Pasha kept silence during the last part of my talk, except for a nervous drumming of his fingers on the table, I thought it worth while to tell him again that this was a unique opportunity in more than one sense. Not only was Sr. Oliván vested with extraordinary powers, but so, if I might say so, was Yasin Pasha himself, and I would like to remark that, so far as I knew, there was no one in Iraq more fitted to clinch a deal of this nature by a bold stroke of statesmanship than himself. That was all that was needed at the present moment, and I would only add that, in so far as the problem was one of great difficulty for him personally, my sympathies were all with him, and I was sure that you would do your best in every way to ease his path. The present opportunity might never recur.

In order to leave him in no doubt as to what the present proposal was, I asked him to receive Sr. Oliván as early as possible this morning; to confirm his immediate contribution of £125,000; and to give him a firm promise of another £75,000 next year. I said that I was making an earnest appeal in the best interests of Iraq.

Yasin Pasha seemed a little shaken, but by no means unreasonable, and I can only hope that some of the considerations put forward may have helped him to get together arguments for disposing of those of his colleagues who may oppose the present scheme.

The Prime Minister is seeing Sr. Oliván at 11.30.

C. H. B.

May 25, 1935.

[E 3731/278/93]

No. 155.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon:—(Received June 17.)*

(No. 300. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, May 30, 1935.*

BY means of a series of telegrams and despatches from this Embassy during the past four months or so you have been kept currently informed both of the circumstances which led to the accession to power of the present Iraqi Government under Yasin Pasha Al Hashimi and of the events which have occurred since they took office some nine weeks ago.

2. The time has probably now come to reassemble in a further despatch the factors which contributed to bring this Cabinet into being, to draw in some background to the picture, and to attempt some appreciation of the situation with which Iraq is now faced.

3. For present purposes it may be convenient to go back to the beginning of the year, when Yasin Pasha, Rashid Ali Beg and Hikmat Suleiman Beg set on foot their movement to overthrow the Ali Jaudat Government. As I see it, the situation was then dominated by two relatively new and essential factors. The influence of the palace had disappeared, and the tribes had made their first excursion into politics. Since the death of King Feisal, nearly two years ago, the whole policy of this country had suffered a radical change. By the force of his personal prestige, which he had used with skill and, it must be admitted, without scruple, King Feisal had been able to keep a check upon the powerful riverain tribes which form so large and important an element in the population of Iraq. By playing the one off against the other, he had curbed their lawlessness, kept them at peace, and held them aloof from the political intrigues of the capital. His influence had, indeed, been paramount everywhere. The suddenness of its withdrawal upset the balance. There was nothing to take its place. The palace slid into the background, whence it is unlikely to emerge. Politicians in Bagdad were at a loose end. The tribes not only reverted to the feuds that had troubled their relations in the past, they entered politics also; some under the aegis of Ali Jaudat and the Wihdah party, and others under that of Yasin and

the Ikha-al-Watani. The two groups faced each other as it were with bared teeth.

4. Yasin's task was a fairly simple one. The Government were weak and irresolute. At their head was a man both commonplace and corrupt; and too foolish or too heedless to see that the country was drifting into something not far off civil war. The incompetence and peculation of the Administration had brought government into contempt, and had exacerbated public opinion throughout the country. Nearly everyone had a grievance to nurse. The pride of the sheikhs of the south and the aghas of the north was smarting under the off-hand and often discourteous treatment they received from the instruments of government in the provinces. As great chieftains, they had to submit to the insolences of officials drawn from the effendi classes of the towns, whom they despised both as venal and effete townees and as the product of a shameless nepotism. The Kurds growled, and with justice, that the law by which their language was to be preserved was being flouted. The Shi'ahs, in their turn, were disgusted to see how the greed of the Sunnis for the fruits of office left so little for them. The extreme Nationalists affected to see in Ali Jaudat and those about him nothing but the tools of this Embassy. A host of little "chanteclers" crowed from their village dunghills because they had been excluded from Ali Jaudat's packed Parliament.

5. Upon such ground as this, therefore, it was not hard for Yasin to work. Each one of these elements was led to believe that the overthrow of the Wihdah Cabinet and the coming to power of the Ikha-al-Watani would bring special measures or reforms which would redress all grievances. Rich promises were made and malcontents were everywhere persuaded that the moment had come to right their wrongs. By such means as these the Bagdad cabal, working under the control of Yasin Pasha, set in motion, for the first time in the history of Iraq, what must be called a strong and representative popular movement against the Government in power.

6. The measure of the success which was achieved has been described elsewhere. While a hostile Senate blocked necessary legislation, the turbulent sheikh of the Euphrates, Abdul Wahid, brought his tribesmen out and confined the Government officials of Abu Sukhair to their offices. In other regions, although there were no open demonstrations, tribal sympathy was almost solidly with the opponents of Ali Jaudat, and there is reason to believe that armed diversions had been promised in the event of the Government's attempting to assert their authority on the Euphrates by force. The only element which rallied to the support of the Wihdah party was the group of sheikhs who, for tribal reasons, were habitually antagonistic to Abdul Wahid. These proclaimed their loyalty and offered to fight their tribal rivals. Their weight was, however, not enough to restore the balance. Two Wihdah Cabinets fell in quick succession, and Yasin and his friends came into power.

7. His end achieved, Yasin Pasha found himself in a position that was by no means easy. He had provoked something like a revolution. He had set in motion forces which he might well be unable to control, for he had let the tribes see their real strength. His Government were now confronted with the task of implementing the promises made to their supporters. They set about coaxing the Kurds into patience. To would-be Deputies they gave fresh hope by the dissolution of Parliament, while the extreme Nationalists were quietened by the sight of Yasin Pasha once more at the head of affairs. With the Shi'ahs it was more difficult to settle accounts. The Ulema of Nejaf and Kerbela seized the opportunity to draw up a list of demands which went further than the Government wished to travel along the path to fuller Shi'ah participation in public life. Their claims were rendered more formidable by the support which they won from tribes hostile to Abdul Wahid. This combination was the most difficult of the new Administration's immediate problems, for it had hitherto respected the authority of government and had moved along constitutional lines. But the Government also had to settle with Abdul Wahid, who clearly expected a handsome reward for the decisive part he had played in the overthrow of Ali Jaudat. For some weeks he pranced about Bagdad, where he was acclaimed by the press as a great leader. At the same time representatives of the tribes opposed to him were also present in the capital, hostile and suspicious. The efforts of the Cabinet were directed towards winning the confidence of these without losing the support of Abdul Wahid. As their instruments for this



purpose they used Nuri Pasha and Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, who were known to and trusted by most of these tribes. For a time it looked as if this influence would prevail. Success would have meant the avoidance of bloodshed, and would have rendered the Ulema and their plans innocuous. But unhappily the Prime Minister chose this moment to cast Sir Kinahan Cornwallis aside, and, left alone, Nuri Pasha did not prove equal to the task. Although the sheikhs received the assurances for which they had asked, they seem to have remained unconvinced that the Government were sincerely bent upon the improvement of the administration. The first unhappy evidences of their doubts have been the risings at Rumaitha and Suq-al-Shiyukh.

8. There is, indeed, little upon which any real hopes of progress may be built. The individual members of the present Cabinet have no higher reputation for honesty of purpose or integrity than their predecessors, and in the past they have been just as prone to use public office for private gain. The tactics by which they have come into office have, however, made it clear to a large portion of the most influential elements of the people of the country that the Government, as an institution, are not omnipotent, and that popular opinion, however crudely organised and expressed, can now exert a powerful influence. The Cabinet will in consequence find that they cannot govern in the old irresponsible manner, regardless of public interests and heedless of popular feeling. It may be hoped, therefore, that Yasin Pasha and his colleagues will realise that, after having restored tranquillity, their first duty is to study most carefully the measures necessary to raise the standard of administration in all parts of the country. At present there are no sure indices of the Cabinet's intention in this regard, apart from a flirtation with a plan to strengthen the British element in the administrative inspectorate, when Mr. Edmonds becomes adviser to the Ministry of the Interior.

9. As I have said, in the sphere of politics, the outstanding feature of the present situation is the advent to power of a Government as a result of a popular movement. Until now Cabinets have come and gone almost entirely because of internal dissensions or of fundamental differences with the Palace or the Residency. Now, for the first time, a Cabinet has come into office which does not owe its position to the favour of either the King or the High Commissioner. The causes are not far to seek. The Residency passed away in October 1932, and with the death of King Feisal in September of the following year, the Palace, as has been shown, ceased to exercise its old influence. The way was therefore clear for representative government to begin. The occasion has met with a response which is, I think, not a little surprising in a country which has only so recently achieved national status. Leaders have come forward ready to shoulder responsibility, and the people have gone some way to demonstrate their ability to combine in order to secure the redress of grievances, and here and there with some apparent realisation of the limits beyond which pressure cannot be carried without danger of anarchy. In short, recent events may be read as indicating the beginning of a national consciousness and promise of that inherent ability of the people to manage their own affairs in their own way, upon which His Majesty's Government pinned their faith when they first decided to set Iraq free from mandatory control.

10. Future developments from this situation must depend in a great measure upon Yasin Pasha himself. The circumstances which I have described above place him in a position of power not enjoyed by any previous Prime Minister in Iraq. If he uses this power wisely, his Government may enjoy the stability necessary to enable him to carry out a number of important schemes of development, which have long been delayed on account of the constant changes of Government which have occurred during the past three years. He may be able to overcome the vested interests which obstruct the way to many necessary administrative reforms and to raise the level of efficiency in the civil service. He is also well placed to introduce measures to quicken the national consciousness, which has germinated during the last few months, and to strengthen the sense of unity with which a common grievance and a common purpose has endowed those formerly mutually alien elements which His Majesty's Government have tried to weld together into the Iraqi nation.

11. Although no other better fitted is, at present, in sight, one cannot be sure that Yasin Pasha is the man either to draw up or to carry out so sound a programme as this. But, as I have explained, the strong position in which he

finds himself is without precedent in Iraq, since he owes it purely to a movement of his own creation. It has now been made even stronger by his present successful suppression of an unpopular tribal rising. May he be trusted not to abuse this power? Many of those in close touch with men and affairs in this country warn me that Yasin Pasha is dreaming of dictatorship. Others say that talk of dictatorship has been common in political gossip for years and that not much importance need be attached to it now.

12. The situation is, however, singularly favourable to a radical change in the constitution of the country. The King is a young hypochondriac, without experience, character or influence, and the throne itself is too recent an institution to have deep roots in the affections of the people or in their history or tradition. No profound shock would be caused if it were swept away. Mustafa Kamal and Riza Shah have shown the way, and, strange though it may be, Hitler, as a great Watani or Nationalist, has found much favour in political circles in Iraq. A dictatorship might, therefore, be little opposed in principle.

13. Yasin Pasha is possessed, moreover, of several personal advantages which should help him in any attempt to seize supreme power. His brother is Chief of the General Staff and virtually the head of the army, the Director of Police is completely under his influence and his Cabinet, including at present even Nuri Pasha and Jafar Pasha, are, I should say, well under his thumb. Jafar Pasha could be dropped overboard any day without fear of the consequences, as he has no influence in the country. Nuri Pasha is, however, himself often credited with dreams of absolute power, and, while he is in no sense fitted to assume it now, he would probably be one of the most difficult obstacles in the way of success, if Yasin Pasha were to attempt anything like a *coup d'Etat*.

14. I am far from wishing to suggest by these observations that some sort of revolutionary upheaval is certain to take place in the near future. My purpose is to sketch the features of the situation and to adumbrate possible further developments. One of these, but by no means the only one, is that of a bid for supreme power by Yasin Pasha, and, in the special circumstances which I have described above, this eventuality seems not too remote to warrant an effort to appreciate the effect which it might have upon the relations of His Majesty's Government with Iraq.

15. If Yasin Pasha succeeded, much would depend upon his attitude towards the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and upon his general policy. If he honoured the Treaty of Alliance, showed reasonable signs of observing Iraq's international obligations, and had a sound programme for the internal administration of the country, I do not think that the situation would give rise to any embarrassments to His Majesty's Government. At the same time, although now there is good ground to think that he sets some store by the treaty, from his past record it is reasonable to foresee that Yasin Pasha may work firmly for the earliest possible replacement of the present close alliance between the two countries by some instrument that would bind Iraq less tightly to ourselves. This outcome would probably be a logical development from the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Iraq and would presumably, therefore, not unduly trouble British interests. If, on the other hand, after achieving dictatorship, Yasin Pasha were to repudiate the treaty or were to adopt a policy in internal or external affairs of which His Majesty's Government could not approve, it might be necessary to reconsider the whole question of our relations with Iraq. There might, indeed, be much to be gained, in such circumstances, by the termination of the special responsibilities which His Majesty's Government, at present, bear under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance.

16. It cannot, however, be assumed that an attempt to carry out a *coup d'Etat* would necessarily succeed. The present circumstances have many favourable elements, but there are other factors which would make the risk of failure very grave. Rivalry and jealousy are always close to the surface in public life in Iraq and no one could attempt to seize supreme power without creating a host of bitter enemies. The Ulema can also be relied upon to oppose strongly the concentration of dictatorial power in Sunni hands. Failure might, therefore, quite easily attend any effort to overthrow the present constitution and, in the struggle, very serious disorders might well occur. How far, and in what manner, His Majesty's Government would be affected by such a sequence of events it is impossible to foretell and a policy to meet it could only be evolved as the situation developed.



17. The conclusion to which I incline, after consideration of the many uncertain factors in the situation which I have endeavoured to appreciate, is that, although the future is likely to be full of interesting and probably important developments, the prospect need not cause anxiety. At the same time it is well that His Majesty's Government should be aware that some radical change in their relations with this country may become necessary in the course of the next few years and will, in my opinion, certainly be called for before the expiry of the statutory duration of the Treaty of Alliance of 1930.

18. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 3734/163/93]

No. 156.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 17.)*

(No. 304 E.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 5, 1935.*

WITH reference to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's despatch No. 631 of the 27th October, 1934, I have the honour to submit the following brief report upon the working of the Iraqi railways during the financial year ended the 31st March, 1935.

2. I enclose herewith the following statements of receipts and expenditure for the year under review:—

- (a) The revenue account, which gives details of the receipts and expenditure during the year.<sup>(1)</sup>
- (b) The net revenue account covering sundry receipts and payments not arising directly from the working of the railways. These are accompanied by an appropriation account, a capital account and a general balance-sheet of the entire railway system, showing the position on the 31st March, 1935. All figures are given in Iraqi dinars, which may equally be read as pounds sterling.<sup>(1)</sup>

3. Revenue receipts totalled I.D. 572,107, which exceeded the estimated figure by I.D. 70,107. Earnings in the previous year had been I.D. 524,037. Expenditure stood at I.D. 512,714—an excess of I.D. 11,854 over the estimate of I.D. 500,860.

4. The revenue surplus on the year's operations was I.D. 59,392, against the very modest estimate of I.D. 1,140. This amount is the net surplus after provision for depreciation and renewals has been made.

5. The increase in revenue over the previous year was derived mainly from passenger receipts and freight of the "other goods" class. Third-class passenger receipts were higher than anticipated and stood at I.D. 12,000 more than in the year 1933-34, which, as a result of lower fares, showed a considerable advance on previous results. General imports showed little change, although a retrogression in this section had been expected. Receipts from this source were actually I.D. 40,000 above the estimate. Receipts from the carriage of agricultural produce and petroleum products were higher by some I.D. 20,000. This was due to a relatively good grain season, which, coupled with favourable barley prices, led to a considerable volume of export trade. The movement of oil products was well maintained, and consignments to Northern Persia by the Rowanduz route improved. Owing to the construction of the new Anglo-Persian Oil Company refinery at Kermanshah, the movement of petroleum via Khanaqin is likely to cease during the present year. To some extent, however, this will be offset by the development of the traffic via Rowanduz, but it is as yet impossible to say whether the new outlet will compare with that by the Khanaqin-Kermanshah route.

6. Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's despatch under reference contained the sentence: "As in previous years, the profit made by the railways is attributable to good fortune in obtaining a heavy volume of traffic of a special and temporary nature." In the year 1934-35 this was perhaps less true than in previous years. Imports of material for Dhibban and for the new refinery at Kermanshah did contribute

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

to its profits, but to a less extent than the very large Iraq Petroleum Company importations of previous years. The continued increase in passenger receipts is a genuine improvement, and though agricultural produce is a rather wayward factor, it is a legitimate one on which to count in a predominantly agricultural country. In the future one outlet for the oil-transit traffic will inevitably close, but another, involving a longer haul, may well be developed. In the circumstances, while it would probably be unfair to the railways to consider that the whole of their surplus was fortuitous, the future cannot, in my opinion, be predicted with any certainty.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 3737/2/93]

No. 157.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir John Simon.—(Received June 17.)*

(No. 309.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 5, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 297 of the 29th May, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's acting consul at Mosul reports that the visit of M. Oliván to his consular district aroused great interest among the Assyrians there and gave rise to much speculation as to their future. Some were convinced that their departure to Syria would take place in a few weeks, while others were openly doubtful of any concrete outcome to the efforts of the League Committee to find a new home for them outside Iraq.

2. The Assyrian groups not well disposed towards Mar Shimun submitted a petition to M. Oliván, in which they set out a number of questions regarding the conditions of their resettlement in Syria and expressed doubts whether the scheme was likely to provide a satisfactory solution of their difficulties. I enclose herein a copy of this petition. You will observe that it is signed, among others, by Malik Khoshaba, Bishop Sargis and Bishop Yawallah, all men of influence and importance.

3. During the last days of May, after M. Oliván's departure, I learned from the Ministry of the Interior that deputations from the Assyrians now living in Mosul town had visited Major Thomson and had asked whether M. Oliván, before leaving Iraq, had given any message for the Assyrians concerning their future. Major Thomson explained that M. Oliván had left no message, but would, no doubt, make known his plans after further consultation with his committee at Geneva. This news was received with marked ill-humour and some members of the deputations became openly abusive, upbraiding Major Thomson as the cause of all their recent misfortunes.

4. The incident was of no great importance in itself, but I felt that it was indicative of the disappointment which was being felt owing to the fact that M. Oliván's visit had not been followed by the announcement of a plan for the early removal to Syria of all who wished to leave Iraq. The representatives of the League had at long last come to Iraq, had been told that the Assyrians were all impatient to be up and going, and yet had left without a word as to the future; without even a comforting assurance that all would soon be arranged. This was the attitude of mind which the Assyrians were apparently tending to adopt, and I felt some misgivings lest, through the spread of disappointment, a spirit of desperation might again develop and fresh acts of folly occur.

5. I discussed the situation with the Prime Minister, and he agreed with my view that a reassuring message from M. Oliván and some slight revival of the activities of the local committee might do a great deal to allay the misgivings of the Assyrians. I accordingly telegraphed to M. Oliván on the 3rd June suggesting that, if he thought fit, he should send, through the Iraqi Government, a message to the Assyrians enjoining continued patience until his committee should be able to take further decisions in the light of the information which he had obtained during his visit to Syria and Iraq; and also that he should propose



to the Iraqi Government that the local committee should be reformed to collect statistics and carry out such other preparations as would be required to facilitate their transfer, if the Council Committee succeeded in organising their removal from Iraq. M. Oliván has replied to-day noting my proposals, but reserving his comments until he has seen M. de Martel, who returns to Beirut on the 6th June. I should perhaps mention here that though Major Wilson's contract as an Administrative Inspector has been terminated, his services are being retained for another year to enable him to continue to deal personally with the Assyrian question.

6. I have also persuaded the Prime Minister to study the possibility of finding special employment on public works for the unemployed Assyrians in Mosul town. This would be a further useful palliative if it can be arranged.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 157.

*Petition to M. Oliván.*

Excellency,

May 20, 1935.

OWING to the limited time given to us, during yesterday's interview, in which we were unable to express our views in detail. We therefore, are putting such views, in writing to assure that you are in a position to explain them to those concerned, in deciding the prospects of our future settlement.

Hoping that your Excellency is fully informed as to the Assyrian position during the Great War in connexion with the allied cause, human and material losses suffered by us and been driven from our ancient homes, resulting to our temporary settlement in Iraq, which followed by bringing the case before the League of Nations. After consideration and the 1932 decision as to the Assyrian position in Iraq and the terms of settlement, the execution of which were trusted to Major D. B. Thomson in connexion with the Iraqi Government.

We, the leaders of the loyal faction (who neither shared the Mar Shimun's views and nor joined the hostile element led by Yacu to Syria) are still loyal to the good advices and suitable schemes recommended by the League of Nations.

Our followers, which are now divided into two categories, *i.e.*, (a) those who suffered men, material and moral losses; (b) those who since feel insecure, as a result of the 1933 disturbances, have now adopted different attitudes towards emigration, because they have been assured from unreliable sources, of autonomy in their future settlement.

We (not being enlightened on such points), beg therefore, if possible, the following points to be taken into consideration and the requested answers, communicated to us to enable us to give best possible advice to our followers as to what attitude, should they adopt towards emigration. The points are as follows:—

1. We request, to be informed in detail, the reasons leading to the failure of the settlement schemes in the West (Brazil and British Guiana), and also reasons leading to our resettlement in Asia (Syria)?
2. What is the difference between our probable settlement in Western Mesopotamia (El Jezireh Liwa), and that of the Eastern Mesopotamia (Iraq)? If it be said, that Iraq is no more a mandated territory, but Syria is so, will not that mandate terminate? And if it does, what about the future security of then would be Assyrian colony?
3. What will be the difference between the mandatory Government of Iraq prior to 1932 and that of the present Syria, as regards the future treatment of the Assyrians?
4. We request to be informed, as much as possible as to the settlement system, such as administrative, social and economical affairs?
5. We also wish to be informed, as to the suitability of the climate, produce of soil, water, and financial assistance in the future settlement in Syria?
6. What will be the position and part of the Assyrians in the operation of the settlement scheme?

7. We wish clearly to know, the position of the Mar Shimun in the spiritual and temporal affairs of the Assyrians in the future settlement, in case he is permitted to reside in Syria among the Assyrian community?
8. We request to know, if possible, whether loyalty exercised by us in honouring League of Nations decisions and acting on its recommendations, &c., and our continual obedience and co-operation with the British and Iraqi Governments, has been appreciated by the League, and whether it will be communicated to our future would-be Government, as regards our future treatment by that Government?
9. We strongly request, that our position (which was forwarded through Major D. B. Thomson to the League of Nations in the autumn of 1933, as to settlement of our faction in a separate area, in the would-be Assyrian settlement.
10. If by any chance, the League of Nations not being in a position to guarantee materially, the future security of the Assyrians in the future would-be settlement, we request the League's sympathetic consent and assistance in our independently appealing to all World's Governments, to absorb as many of us into their respective countries, as possible, which we believe would give us permanent security and will relieve the League of Nations from our continual appeals for help, &c.

#### Conclusions.

If our emigration will be carried out in such an obscure state, as regards future, we consider it unjust to blame the Government of Great Britain for having supported Iraq and that of Iraq for having acted improperly, whereas, France and Syria are trusted unconditionally, to act properly under the same terms, as those existing in Iraq. We do not share this opinion, and believe that the consequences shall be the same, there, in future. We further beg to state that we do not want to subject the mandatory and local Syrian authorities to such blame as Great Britain and Iraq were subjected.

We have, &c.

MAR SERGIS, the Bishop of Jelu, Baz and Raikan.

MALIK KHOSHABA M. YOSEPH, Lower Tiari.

MAR YAWAHALLAH, the Bishop of Barwar Bala, Sapna and Nairca.

MALIK ZAIA M. SHEMISDIN, Lower Tiari.

KASHA YOSEPH KELAITA (MAR BISHU).

MALIK KHAMUZ M. YONAN OF BAZ.

KASHA KINA GORIEL OF BAZ.

MALIK NIMRUD GAZEE OF JELU.

SHAMASHA DAVID BENYAMIN, Ashita.

MALIK SHLIMUN MATLUB, Gawar.

MALIK HARUN SHIMUN, Jelu.

RAIS KHIYU ODISHU, Ashita.

RAIS DANIEL PARIS, Jelu.

RABI SHMUEL YELDA, Lower Tiari.

RABI SHAHIN GEVERGIS, Baz.

RAIS MAMU ESHU, Jelu.

RAIS HORMIS NEESAN, Jelu.

Five Signatures.

Five Signatures.

(No names given.)

(No names given.)

[E 3888/1583/93]

No. 158.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received June 24.)*

(No. 316.)

Bagdad, June 11, 1935.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 295 of the 29th May, I have the honour to report that the reoccupation of Suq-al-Shuyukh was completed without opposition on the 2nd June. Since then the troops and police have been engaged in the pacification of the surrounding country, but their movements have been seriously hampered by the high floods of the Euphrates, and tribal resistance has not yet been completely broken. Fines of 50-100 rifles have been imposed on the tribes chiefly responsible for threatening a breach of the peace at Nasiriyah, and punitive measures are still being carried out against the Bani Hachcham for their sacking of Suq-al-Shuyukh.

[12357]

x 2



2. On the 9th June a small column of about one company encountered determined opposition, and lost one man killed and fourteen wounded. Heavier casualties are believed to have been inflicted on the tribal forces. A larger column, supported by machine guns in boats, is to be sent to punish the sheikh responsible for this opposition. His name is Farhud-al-Fandi, and hitherto he has been a conspicuous supporter of the Government and of the local authorities.

3. Three officials of the Suq-al-Shuyukh district have been tried by court-martial and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for inciting the tribesmen to revolt, and four others are awaiting trial. Two ex-soldiers, convicted of using machine guns against the police, were sentenced to death and hanged on the 6th June.

4. I learn privately that Bakr Sidqi Pasha, the Officer Commanding the Forces on the Euphrates and also administering martial law, is pressing the Government to agree to execute a number of sheikhs and to inflict heavy punishments on the tribes guilty of taking up arms against the Government. The Cabinet do not, however, see eye to eye with him: firstly, because they consider his recommendations unnecessarily harsh and vindictive; and, secondly, because Abdul Wahid is exerting his influence to secure a general amnesty for those sentenced by the military courts. He is said to have declared his determination to revolt himself if Sheikh Khawwam-al-Abbas were executed.

5. In my talks with the King and with Yasin Pasha, I have, on several occasions, indicated that clemency towards those implicated in the recent disturbances would be wise, and would in the long run prove a better factor in restoring order and stability than severity.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 3889/1098/93]

No. 159.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received June 24.)*

(No. 317.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 11, 1935.*

YOU are aware, from paragraph 15 of my predecessor's last annual report, that there were seventy-five British officials employed in various departments of the Iraqi Government at the end of 1934, not including the British subjects employed by the Iraqi Railways and under the Directorate of the Port of Basra. The advent to power of Yasin Pasha, coupled with the fact that a large number of contracts were due to expire on the 31st May last, led to the belief that there would be a great exodus of British officials during the present month.

2. This, however, has not yet proved to be the case. Only ten contracts were, in fact, allowed to expire. They concern the following:—

- (1) Sir Kinahan Cornwallis: Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior.
- (2) Colonel Prescott: Inspector-General of Police.
- (3) Mr. Parby: Comptroller and Accountant-General.
- (4) Mr. Sievwright: Inspector-General, Customs and Excise.
- (5) Mr. Monk: Collector of Customs and Excise, Bagdad.
- (6) Dr. Dunlop: Chief Medical Officer, Bagdad.
- (7) Dr. Spencer: Chief Ophthalmic Specialist, Health Service.
- (8) Dr. Woodman: Chief Surgical Specialist, Health Service.
- (9) Dr. MacLeod: Medical Officer of Health, Mosul.
- (10) Mr. Bassett: Chemical Examiner.

Messrs. Sievwright, Monk, Dunlop, Spencer and Woodman were all offered renewals, but declined, either because they felt that they had been in Iraq long enough or because they were not altogether satisfied with the new conditions offered them. Mr. Parby had, long before, made known his desire to return to his parent service in India.

3. In addition to the above, Mr. Creed, president of the Court of First Instance at Mosul, and Mr. Livingstone of the Customs and Excise Department,

resigned their appointments upon being offered more attractive employment elsewhere. Major Wilson, whose appointment as Administrative Inspector in Mosul has expired, will remain for some months to carry out special work in connexion with the settlement of the Assyrians.

4. The Iraqi Government do not propose to leave unfilled or to fill with Iraqi officials all the posts left vacant by the retirement of British officials. It is their present intention to appoint Mr. Edmonds to the post of Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, and they have already applied to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for a suitable official to replace Mr. Edmonds as Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Similarly, the engagement of a new Adviser to the Ministry of Justice, for whom application has also been made to His Majesty's Government, will enable Mr. Creed's post to be filled by Mr. Alexander, whose present post has been offered to Mr. Drower.

5. Mr. Swan, formerly Assistant Adviser to the Ministry of Finance, has already been appointed Inspector-General of Customs and Excise in the place of Mr. Sievwright, and the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has now informed me that Mr. Yeardye, who has previously served in the Customs Department, has been asked to replace Mr. Livingstone. The British personnel in the Department will, therefore, be reduced by one only, and I trust that its well-known and widely recognised efficiency will not be impaired.

6. With regard to the Health Service, a successor to Dr. Woodman has already been found. Dr. Braham, who had previously served under the Iraqi Government as surgical specialist and who has a good reputation in Iraq, consented to give up his practice in England at short notice and to return to the service of the Iraqi Government. He has already arrived in Bagdad. I understand that it is the intention of the Iraqi Government to engage more British doctors. Indeed, advertisements have appeared in the British press, but I understand that intending candidates are unable to obtain much information from the Iraqi Legation in London concerning conditions of service.

7. The Iraqi Government have not yet applied for a successor to Colonel Prescott and, as there are two British officers with long experience of Iraq still remaining in the Directorate-General of Police, it is unlikely that Colonel Prescott's post will be filled. Mr. Parby's post has been given to Naji Beg-al-Suwaidi, who has held several ministerial appointments, including those of Finance and Justice.

8. I understand that a British official—probably a land settlement officer—will succeed Major Wilson as Administrative Inspector at Mosul.

9. An immediate attempt to gauge the effect of the departure of so many British officials would be premature, since much depends on the extent to which the Iraqi Government carry out their present intentions in the matter of their replacement. By my impression is that the present Government recognise the value of the services of British officials and do not desire drastically to cut down their numbers. Many of the officials, whose contracts have not yet been renewed, were receiving very large salaries, and I believe that the unwillingness of the Iraqi Government to renew their contracts was chiefly due to their desire to introduce uniform and more moderate rates of pay for foreign officials.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 3890/2/93]

No. 160.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received June 24.)*

(No. 318.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 11, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, as the result of the action mentioned in paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 309 of the 5th June last, M. Oliván telegraphed to the Prime Minister on the 7th June proposing that, in order to allay the tension which had made itself felt as the result of the indeterminate outcome of his visit, all the inmates of the Mosul camp for destitutes and 1,000 indigents from Mosul town should be transferred to Syria at once. For this purpose he asked the Iraqi Government to establish a credit of £60,000 at Beirut in the name of the League. The Prime Minister replied accepting these



proposals. Copies of these two telegrams and of M. Oliván's valedictory message to the Prime Minister are enclosed herein.

2. In a final telegram to me M. Oliván informed me that he was leaving Beirut on the 8th June and that M. Arocha would follow him on the 15th June, after visiting the Gharb and Khabur to inspect the alternative areas in which it is proposed that the Assyrians should be resettled. M. Cuénod will arrive in Bagdad on the 12th June and will proceed at once to Mosul, where the local committee has been reconstituted, under Major Thomson, in order to arrange the transportation of those who are to leave now for Syria.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure 1 in No. 160.

*Copy of Telegram No. 6, dated June 6, 1935, from His Majesty's Consul-General, Beirut, to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.*

MY telegram No. 5.

Oliván would be grateful for transmission to Prime Minister of following message:—

"If your Excellency is of opinion that immediate transfer to Khabur of Assyrians in Mosul camp and of about 1,000 others whose departure would appear desirable, and who, according to information received here, could be settled before end of June, would contribute to appease agitation to which my attention has been drawn, I should be ready to take decision in this sense whilst awaiting on my return to Geneva that committee decide certain fundamental questions. I request your Excellency to telegraph me if you are in agreement and to place at disposal of Secretary-General of League at Beirut branch of the Banque de Syrie et Grand Liban the £60,000 that Iraqi Government has undertaken by terms of your letter of the 26th May to pay down in cash for departure of first 4,000 to 5,000 Assyrians. A local committee, including Cuénod, could be immediately constituted to carry out transfer and eventually to prepare for further immigration in accordance with committee's ultimate decision. As I am leaving Beirut for Geneva on the 8th June, I would much appreciate very early reply."

Oliván has sent above through me as he has no code with Iraq authorities.

Enclosure 2 in No. 160.

*Copy of Telegram No. 6, dated June 7, 1935, from His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad, to His Majesty's Consul-General, Beirut.*

YOUR telegram No. 6.

Please convey following reply to Oliván from Prime Minister:—

"The Iraqi Government agree to the proposed arrangements for transfer of the 340 Assyrians in the Mosul camp and of 1,000 others from Mosul town. They also agree to place at the disposal of the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in the Beirut branch of the Banque de Syrie et Grand Liban a credit of £60,000 on condition that it is understood that this sum, in accordance with the terms of my letter of the 26th May, is a payment on account of the first convoy of 4,000 to 5,000 persons, and on condition that the balance shall be applied to subsequent convoys at the rate of 10 dinars a head. The Iraqi Government agree to the constitution of a local committee (including Cuénod) as suggested in your telegram."

Enclosure 3 in No. 160.

*Copy of M. Oliván's Reply to the Prime Minister, Bagdad.*

*Beyrouth, le 8 juin 1935.*

PRESIDENT, Conseil des Ministres, Bagdad.

D'accord contenu votre dépêche d'hier. Je prends mesures nécessaires transfert convenu. Je partirai cette après-midi pour Europe. Arocha visitera Haut-Khabour Ghab et restera à Beyrouth jusqu'à samedi prochain. Cuénod partira Bagdad prochain, Nairn mardi 11. Saisis cette occasion renouveler mes remerciements au Gouvernement Irak, à votre Excellence personnellement, pour bienveillant accueil et facilités accordées mission.—OLIVÁN.

[E 3891/150/89]

No. 161.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received June 24.)*

(No. 319.)

*Bagdad, June 11, 1935.*

Sir,  
WITH reference to my despatch No. 275 of the 18th May last concerning the relations between Iraq and Syria, I have the honour to inform you that the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad recently discussed with me in detail his current negotiations with the Iraqi Government on this subject.

2. He informed me that the principal questions engaging his attention were—

- (a) A "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement.
- (b) The creation of machinery (within the framework of (a)) for the settlement of frontier incidents.
- (c) An agreement for the eviction of undesirables.
- (d) A tariff convention.
- (e) A trans-desert traffic agreement.
- (f) The final settlement of the tribal cases dealt with at the Palmyra Conference of October 1934.

His plan, he said, was to conclude a separate agreement on each of these questions by means of an exchange of notes between the French Legation at Bagdad and the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and thereby to overcome the complication created by the Iraqi Government's insistence that they would only conclude a formal treaty if it were signed by a properly empowered Syrian on behalf of Syria.

3. Little progress appears to have been made with the "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement since last year, and M. Lépissier is still negotiating an instrument which does not differ in essentials from the draft forwarded to your predecessor by Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes in his despatch No. 436 of the 24th July, 1934. In the matter of the expulsion of undesirables, he has made more headway, but a number of questions still remain to be settled.

4. Negotiations for the conclusion of a tariff convention are embarrassed by the suspicions of the Iraqi Government that the French are seeking to obtain preferential rates for goods of French or partially French origin imported into Iraq under the guise of local Syrian produce or manufactures. There is also a difficulty about the export of sheep from Iraq, on which the Syrian Government appear to wish to impose restrictions. As regards trans-desert traffic, it is the desire of the Iraqi Government to permit free movement every day instead of only on certain fixed days, as is the rule at present. The French see difficulties in arranging for the safety of the route in such circumstances.

5. My predecessor reported the main facts of the Palmyra Conference in his despatch No. 30 of the 16th January. The developments which he anticipated in the last three paragraphs thereof have now taken place. The French authorities in Syria have refused to accept the Iraqi contention in regard to the Ruwallah Wasaqa case and a deadlock has ensued. M. Lépissier is verging on despair over this tangled affair, but gamely continues, evidently under instructions, to battle for the payment of compensation of 50,000 fr. to Nuri Shalan, the Sheikh of the



Ruwallah. He has, I fear, small prospect of success. This is not, however, a matter in which it is in any way desirable that I should intervene.

6. M. Lépiessier explained to me that his policy had always been one of friendliness towards the Iraqi Government, but he felt that, unless he could soon show concrete results, this policy would be discredited, and those in the Quai d'Orsay and at Beirut, who had constantly advocated a firmer line, would have their way. He also hinted that the French Government, tired of Hashimite plots in Damascus, were thinking of offering the Throne of Syria to one of Ibn Saud's sons—a step which he suggested might cause Iraq considerable embarrassment.

7. Shortly after my talk with M. Lépiessier, I had an opportunity, during an interview with the Prime Minister, to touch on Iraq's relations with Syria and to urge that it was in the best interests of the Iraqi Government to put something into M. Lépiessier's pocket before he went away on leave at the end of June. Yasin Pasha said that he appreciated this and would do his best to give something to M. Lépiessier to take back to Paris. He went on to say that Nuri Pasha had recently paid a visit to Paris for the specific purpose of trying to find common ground with the French about some of the matters in question. The officials at the Quai d'Orsay (and, in particular, M. de Saint-Quentin) had, however, proved to be so uncompromising that Nuri had thought it expedient to discontinue the discussions and to return to London.

8. I then referred to the possibility of a Saudi prince being set on the throne in Damascus. Yasin Pasha was not disturbed by the prospect. He merely laughed, and said that M. Lépiessier had better go and whisper the story at the tomb of King Ali.

9. I shall continue to press Yasin Pasha to be as responsive as possible in his negotiations on these questions, and shall report to you in due course what satisfaction, if any, M. Lépiessier is given.

10. It is perhaps appropriate to mention here that in the Mosul liwa there is an increasing desire to see the terminus of the Syrian railway to Tell Kocheh linked up with the Iraqi railway system. I am disposed to believe that in a few years, if, indeed, not earlier, the force of the economic advantage to be gained from a junction of the Syrian with the Iraqi railway system will overcome the political objections which now stand in the way of railway development in this direction.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

# CHAPTER III.—SYRIA AND GENERAL.

[E 651/53/93]

No. 162.

*Consul-General Havard to Sir John Simon.—(Received January 29.)*

(No. 9.)

Sir,

*Beirut, January 22, 1935.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 97 of the 11th December relative to the ceremonies in certain countries of the Near East on the occasion of the formal inauguration of the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipe-line, I have the honour to inform you that at the close of the ceremony in Damascus on the 17th January Sir John Cadman hurried through to Beirut and was just able to get through by the direct route over the Lebanon through the beginning of a blizzard of snow which effectually blocked the pass for the next forty-eight hours. The main party, which had stayed the night in Damascus, had planned to visit Baalbek on the morning of the 18th January and to arrive in Beirut in the late afternoon. The weather, however, did not permit of this, and they were obliged to travel to Beirut by the circuitous way of Homs and Tripoli. They arrived safely at Beirut at 6 P.M., followed by their personal luggage some two hours later.

2. The ceremonies at Beirut opened on the evening of the 18th with a reception given in honour of the officials of the Iraq Petroleum Company and their guests by the French High Commissioner at his residence. Some 600 people were invited, and the reception, which was cordial and gay, lasted until the small hours of the morning. On the 19th the company had invited some 200 people to witness the formal inauguration of the pipe-line at Tripoli, and from 8 A.M. onwards the road to Tripoli was the scene of much movement. After cocktails in a large marquee tent which had been erected for the reception of the guests, there was a general exodus at 11.30 to the pipe-line terminus, and when the High Commissioner arrived at about noon to perform the ceremony there were some 300 people awaiting him in the enclosure.

3. Two tankers were lying in the bay ready to receive the oil directed through the pipes by the High Commissioner, and at the prearranged signal the crowd—informed of each phase of the operation by a loud speaker—was able to follow the whole manoeuvre, which was carried out without a hitch. The guests subsequently returned to the company's mess, where a sumptuous lunch awaited them, towards the end of which the chairman of the company made a speech, in which he presented souvenirs of the occasion to the High Commissioner and to the President of the Lebanese Republic, and to which the High Commissioner replied congratulating the company on the successful termination of their tremendous task, and saying how happy he was to find himself in the middle of those who had realised a work of such magnitude. With the end of the lunch the official part of the ceremonies ended. The delegates and guests returned to Beirut, and seemed thankful to look forward to a Sunday of comparative rest. The weather, which had been fine for the actual inauguration of the pipe-line at Tripoli, broke during the lunch, but Sunday was a fine day, and, as it had become possible to clear the snow from the pass over the Lebanon, several parties took the opportunity of visiting Baalbek. Lord Stanhope spent Sunday in visiting Jun, near which is the tomb of Lady Hester Stanhope. Early on the morning of the 21st January all left for Haifa, where further ceremonies take place to-day.

4. So far the inauguration has been a great success, and, apart from minor alterations which had been occasioned by the weather, the programme has been carried through smoothly. The fine weather has now again set in, and it may be hoped that it will last another two days, which will suffice to see the end of the ceremonies at Amman.

5. I have sent copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem and His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.



*Consul Mackereth to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 11.)*

(No. 13.)

Sir,

*Damascus, January 18, 1935.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 42 of the 11th December, 1934, I have the honour to inform you that the inauguration ceremonies organised by the Iraq Petroleum Company in Syria passed off as planned.

2. At the banquet held in Damascus on the 17th January, Sir J. Cadman made a speech, summarising his company's activities and achievements. His original draft had been heavily sub-edited by the French High Commissioner, and Sir John read the bowdlerised version with obvious distaste, apologising for his halting delivery by explaining extemporarily in the middle of it that he was unaccustomed to having to speak from notes prepared for him. The initiated allowed themselves a sly smile. The High Commissioner's aim was, apparently, to avoid any remark which might suggest to Syrian hearers or newspaper readers that there were in this enterprise important interests other than French ones, or which might suggest that the Syrian Republic existed except in name. To give point to the last idea, M. de Martel combed the list, which was submitted to him, of guests to the banquet so thoroughly that only six out of the forty-three Syrian notabilities suggested by the company for invitation were passed as fit to be included with the 104 foreigners.

3. In conversation, I derived the impression that the French official visitors had earned the dislike of their British and American companions during the ceremonies in Iraq and Syria by exhibiting a proneness to raise political phantoms in connexion with purely commercial matters. Mr. Bastid was, perhaps, an unhappy choice.

4. Although the inauguration festivities, which are on a lavish scale, are said to be costing about £25,000, it is, indeed, but a very small fraction of the cost of the pipe-line itself. Times, however, seem to have changed since the rich merchant in the East kept a shabby door to his palace.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

*Consul-General Havard to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 12.)*

(No. 17 E.)

Sir,

*Beirut, February 2, 1935.*

ECONOMIC conditions in the Lebanon.

#### *Industry.*

In continuation of my despatch No. 61 E. of the 1st November, I have the honour to report that during the quarter ended the 31st December, 1934, the industrial situation in the Lebanon was stable and normal. Lebanese industries were being carried on at a regular rhythm and there was neither over-production nor a tendency for trade to slacken off, with its resultant concomitant, lack of employment. During this quarter the modernised Naccache soap factory entered into full production and placed on the market brands of high-class soap which are competing successfully with similar brands from France and Great Britain. A new brewery called the Brasserie franco-libano-syrienne also put its products on the market, but, unfortunately, in this case there has been serious rivalry with the other local brewery of Gellad Frères, and the result has been a certain amount of price-cutting which, if no arrangement between the two rivals can be made, may result either in both selling at a loss or in a deterioration of the quality of their products. The factories making biscuits, farinaceous foods, chocolate and jam have continued to progress and are competing successfully with the same articles imported from Europe. The Arida cotton-spinning factory at Tripoli, which during the quarter has received encouragement from the Government by a decree imposing increased import duties on the higher counts of thread, shows promise

of resuming its former importance as a supplier of spun cottons, and is now able to compete with the higher count threads imported from Japan and India. Mr. Arida, who is a British subject, would much like to see the lower counts of thread also protected by increased import duties, and it is possible that this may happen later. Meanwhile, he is seriously planning to put up a cotton-weaving factory and intends to visit the United Kingdom shortly with a view to purchasing machinery. Other local industries, such as matches, cement, hosiery, silk weaving and brush manufacture, have been working normally, and a turn for the better has taken place in the leather-tanning industry, locally-produced leather again finding favour with the public. More modern methods of tanning, coupled with increased customs duties on leather parts and accessories for boots and shoes, are responsible for this. At the beginning of 1934 a permanent exhibition of Lebanese industrial products was opened. During the course of the year some 32,000 people visited this exhibition, which has doubtless contributed useful commercial propaganda in favour of local products. Amongst the Lebanese products which are finding a market in neighbouring countries, notably Palestine and Transjordan, may be mentioned farinaceous foods, matches and chocolates.

#### *Commerce.*

2. The general situation continues to show improvement. This improvement started in the second half of September and lasted until the end of October. There was then a lull, but towards the end of November markets again became active. The causes of this improvement were the excellent harvest results—especially in cereals—which were so abundant that the transport of grain at one time monopolised nearly all the available rolling-stock of the railways. The production of wool, cotton and olives was highly satisfactory and the customs figures show a notable increase in exports. A satisfactory sign is the decrease in bankruptcies and forced liquidation, and during this quarter the number of protested bills fell well below that of the three preceding quarters. A remarkable feature is the complete stoppage in orders of Japanese goods deliverable after the end of March, local merchants fearing that, as soon as Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations becomes operative, Japanese products will come under the maximum tariff. There has been activity in the discounting of bills, the larger banks doing business at 6 per cent., and the smaller ones at from 7½ to 9 per cent.

#### *Economics.*

3. At the end of November, the High Commissioner decided to institute a monopoly of tobacco and tombac, and a commission was set up to study the form and application of the monopoly. The commission submitted its report in January and, although no final decision has yet been made, it appears certain that the monopoly will be given to a society formed locally. The terms proposed by the commission appear at first sight somewhat onerous; amongst other things, they guarantee the State a fixed minimum revenue of 22 million francs.

4. Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Majesty's consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

*Sir F. Humphrys to Sir John Simon.—(Received February 23.)*

(No. 84 E.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, February 11, 1935.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 91 of the 31st January relative to the development of the northern railway system in Syria and Iraq, I have the honour to inform you that on the 3rd February passengers on the Aleppo-Nisibin Railway were conveyed for the first time to the new terminus of the line at Tell Kotchek, which is 50 kilom. beyond the old terminus Tell Ziouane and within a few miles of the Syro-Iraqi frontier.



2. This development at present merely shortens the distance which travellers on this route from Europe to Bagdad have to cover by motor car, since the passengers as before still spend a night at Mosul before proceeding to Kirkuk, and thence by train to Bagdad. As from the 1st May, however, it is proposed that passengers shall be conveyed from Tell Kotehek to Kirkuk without spending a night in Mosul and this will in effect realise a reduction of one day in travelling time by this route. At present the journey by the Simplon-Orient Express and the Taurus Express takes seven days between London and Bagdad.

3. Articles frequently appear in the local press urging the Iraqi Government, on the grounds both of economic advantage and pan-Arab sentiment, to complete the northern section of the Iraq railways and link the new terminus with Mosul and Bagdad along the right bank of the Tigris; in other words, to complete the Bagdad railway as it was originally conceived by the Germans, and make Alexandretta the seaport on the Mediterranean for Iraq. The economic centre of gravity would thus tend to shift from Bagdad to Mosul and, in my opinion, political consequences would follow which would constitute a grave threat to the unity and stability of this country.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

F. H. HUMPHRYS.

[E 2199/2199/89]

No. 166.

*Sir P. Loraine to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 4.)*

(No. 142.)

Sir,

*Angora, March 29, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Comte de Martel, High Commissioner for Syria and the Lebanon, who was on his way from Paris to rejoin his post, recently spent two days in Angora as the guest of the Turkish Government. His Excellency arrived from Constantinople on the morning of the 26th March and was received with military honours at the station, where he was met by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the French Ambassador, and a number of prominent Turkish officials. The Minister for Foreign Affairs gave a dinner in his honour in the evening, and the reception which followed was attended by the Diplomatic Body. The High Commissioner was received on the following day by the President of the Republic, together with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador, and the audience lasted for over an hour. There were also interviews with the Prime Minister and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Justice, National Economy, and Customs and Monopolies.

2. An official communiqué published on the 27th March states that in the conversations between the High Commissioner and the various Cabinet Ministers, the following questions were examined:—

- (1) Frontiers and frontier relations.
- (2) Railway communications.
- (3) Commercial exchanges.
- (4) The agreement regarding Syrian property in Turkey and Turkish property in Syria.
- (5) Questions relating to optants.
- (6) Financial questions.
- (7) Stations under mixed control.

3. The communiqué goes on to say that views were exchanged on the above-mentioned subjects in an atmosphere of perfect collaboration and great cordiality, on account of the friendly relations existing between France and Turkey, and the relations of "bon-voisinage," which Turkey maintains with the States of the Levant under the French mandate. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, the communiqué continues, made mention of the special administrative régime applicable to the district of Alexandretta in regard to the particular status of

the inhabitants of Turkish race, and Comte de Martel gave an assurance that France meant to safeguard the autonomy of the sanjak and to enforce respect for the relevant agreements between the two Governments. The High Commissioner and the Minister for Foreign Affairs found themselves, moreover, in agreement in regard to the intangibility and inviolability of the Turco-Syrian frontier, and it was decided that the Permanent Frontier Commission would open its next session at Damascus on the 17th June, 1935. Among other (unspecified) measures designed to ensure the tranquillity of the frontier zones, it was decided that all persons guilty of crimes committed within these zones, and all persons guilty of crimes committed outside these zones who took refuge therein, should be handed over to their respective authorities without any extradition formalities. The communiqué ends by declaring that complete identity of views was attained in regard to all the questions discussed.

4. The High Commissioner left for Adana and Syria on the morning of the 28th March, and was escorted as far as the frontier by an official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Beirut, Aleppo and Damascus.

I have, &c.

PERCY LORAINÉ.

[E 2568/2568/89]

No. 167.

*Consul Mackereth to Sir John Simon.—(Received April 23.)*

(No. 34.)

Sir,

*Damascus, April 12, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a digest of the budgets of the Syrian Republic for the years 1933, 1934 and 1935, which has been extracted from the *Syrian Official Gazette*.

2. These budgets deal only with the revenue and expenditure controlled, under the French delegate's supervision, by the Syrian Government. To balance the accounts in 1933 and for the budget of 1935 grants in aid from the "Compte de Gestion des Services d'Intérêt commun" of 3 million francs and 1,900,000 francs respectively have been made by the High Commissioner.

3. Taking the population of Syria proper as being just under two millions (latest official estimate), expenditure in 1933 was in the region of £1 2s. 3d. a head, in 1934 18s. 9d. a head, and for 1935 £1 a head. This does not include the disbursements of the High Commissioner from the customs revenues on the common account of the mandated territories. Taken *pro rata*, these amounted in 1933 and 1934 to about 13s. 6d. and 15s. a head respectively, bringing the total administrative expenditure in Syria, including the bulk of the share of the cost of the high commissariat and the dependent delegations, to £1 15s. 6d. a head in 1933, £1 13s. 6d. in 1934; and, according to the estimates, £1 15s. for 1935. On the whole it may be said that the produce of the taxes the Syrian grudgingly bears is frugally administered.

4. It will be noticed that no provision is made in 1935 for payments to the elected members of the Syrian Parliament. This fact probably presages the dissolution of the present Parliament.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives in Aleppo, Beirut and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.



Enclosure in No. 167.  
*Digest of the Budgets of the Syrian Republic Years 1933, 1934 and 1935.*

Chapter.	Receipts.			Expenditure.		
	1933. £ Syr.	1934. £ Syr.	1935. £ Syr.	1933. £ Syr.	1934. £ Syr.	1935. £ Syr.
I.—Direct Taxes	3,107,000	2,953,500	3,170,000	..	..	..
II.—Indirect Taxes and Monopolies	2,140,000	2,222,600	2,014,500	..	..	..
III.—State Lands and Properties	440,300	232,200	175,000	..	..	..
IV.—Government Revenue Departments	345,100	297,000	207,000	..	..	..
V.—Miscellaneous	434,257	394,300	407,200	..	..	..
VI.—Local Government Contributions	109,730	124,500	112,500	..	..	..
VII.—Extraordinary Revenue	1,288,200	708,000	755,000	..	..	..
VIII.—From Revenues and/or Common Fund of Mandated Territories	600,000	Nil	391,365	..	..	..
Totals in £ Syr.	8,464,587	6,932,100	7,282,365	..	..	..
Equals in £	2,137,522	1,800,545	1,954,593	..	..	..
Average rate of exchange to £ sterling	3.96	3.85	3.70	..	..	..
				Chapter.		
				I.—Central Administration		
				II.—Councils and Parliament		
				III.—Public Debt and Subsidies to Provincial Administrations		
				IV.—Finance Department		
				V.—Ministry of Interior		
				VI.—Geographical and Gardes mobiles		
				VII.—Police		
				VIII.—Public Health Aid to Poor		
				IX.—Ministry of Justice		
				X.—Agricultural and Economic Services		
				XI.—State Lands and Properties		
				XII.—Public Works		
				XIII.—Posts and Telegraphs		
				XIV.—Education		
				XV.—Secret Funds		
				XVI.—Unforeseen		
				XVII.—Special Works		
				XVIII.—To meet previous deficits		
				Totals in £ Syr.		
				Equals in £		
				Average rate of exchange to £ sterling		

(1) Nothing for Parliament in 1935

[E 2923/528/65]

No. 168.

*Consul Parr to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 11.)*

(No. 23.)

Sir,

*Aleppo, May 4, 1935.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 8 of the 11th March, I have the honour to report that the Bagdad Railway extension from Tell Ziouane to Tell Kotchek was formally opened by the French High Commissioner on the 2nd May, in the presence of various local authorities and of representatives of Iraq, of Iran and of Turkey.

2. The chairman of the Régie générale des Chemins de Fer et Travaux publics concluded his speech by expressing the hope that arrangements might soon be made for extending the line as far as Mosul. As reported in the local press, however, M. de Martel's allusions to this possibility were extremely vague.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut and to His Majesty's consul at Damascus.

I have, &c.

ROBERT PARR.

[E 3074/528/65]

No. 169.

*Consul-General Havard to Sir John Simon.—(Received May 17.)*

(No. 42 E.)

Sir,

*Beirut, May 8, 1935.*

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Parr's despatch No. 23 of the 4th May relative to the inauguration of the extension of the Aleppo-Nissibin Railway from its former terminus at Tell Ziouane to the new terminus at Tell Kotchek—a prolongation of 70 kilom.—on the Syria-Iraq frontier, I have the honour to state that the French High Commissioner returned to Beirut on the 5th May, having occupied the 3rd and 4th May in visiting various places in North-East Syria and notably the villages in the Valley of the Khabbur River, where the Assyro-Chaldean refugees were settled last year and where further contingents of these refugees may be settled in the near future.

2. Both in official circles and in the local press, much has been made of the extension of the railway to the Iraq frontier and the international aspect given to the inauguration ceremony by the presence of representatives from Turkey, Iraq and Persia. This extension was one of the pet schemes of the present High Commissioner destined to help in restoring Syrian economy. Railhead is now brought within 105 kilom. of Mosul and travellers arriving by the Simplon-Orient express at Tell Kotchek at 10.30 A.M. will be able to reach Kirkuk by car the same day in time to catch the night train and arrive at Bagdad or Khaniqin on the Persian frontier in the early hours of the following morning.

3. Great advantage, it is hoped, will be reaped from regular and rapid connexion with the Iraq frontier. During the rainy season west-bound merchandise from Persia and Northern Iraq was directed to other outlets, since the desert track to Tell Ziouane became frequently impassable; it is hoped that the present railway extension will suffice to attract this merchandise. The region which the railway now expects to tap sends every year to different countries in Europe many hundreds of tons of skins and hides, of camel-hair and goat-hair, of cotton and of eggs. Special trucks will be provided for the transport of cattle and the railway company also expects to obtain a large share of the transport of cereals which the region sends every year to Europe.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem, the Department of Overseas Trade, and His Majesty's consuls at Aleppo and Damascus.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.



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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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## FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

# EASTERN AFFAIRS

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CONFIDENTIAL

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXXVII.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 3883/269/91]

No. 1.

QATAR OIL CONCESSION.

1. *Agreement between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Ruler of Qatar.*

THIS agreement was made on the seventeenth day of May, 1935, corresponding to the fourteenth day of Safar, 1354, between his Excellency Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Qasim-al-Thani, Ruler of Qatar (who is hereinafter called "the Sheikh," and this expression, whenever the contract requires, shall include his successors and assigns), on the one part, and Charles Clark Mylles, on behalf of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) (which will hereinafter be called as the "Company"; and this expression shall, whenever it is required by the contract, include its assigns), on the other part.

Agreement is hereby concluded between the Sheikh and the Company as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The Sheikh grants to the Company, in virtue of this agreement, and under the following conditions, the sole right, throughout the principality of Qatar, to explore, to prospect, to drill for, and to extract and to ship and to export, and the right to refine and sell petroleum and natural gases, ozokerite, asphalt, and everything which is extracted therefrom, which shall hereinafter be called "the Substances." If the Company discovers, in the course of its investigation and general activities, any minerals other than the Substances mentioned in article 1, *e.g.*, gold or iron oxide or any other minerals, it shall not be justified to appropriate the same, but must inform the Sheikh of their discovery; and the Sheikh shall have full right to, and absolute control over, those minerals which have been extracted, and he shall be free in granting concessions for the extracting of those minerals to any company or companies, or to dispose of those minerals in any manner he considers to be consistent to his interests.

ARTICLE 2.

Subject to the conditions of article 7 below, the Company can operate in any part of the State of Qatar as is defined below, but it will not operate on places such as religious lands, cemeteries, lands occupied by religious buildings, or by essential enterprise by their owners as may exist on the date of the signature of this agreement, or any customary extensions of such religious lands, or cemeteries or buildings as may be pointed out by the Sheikh. The State of Qatar means the whole area over which the Sheikh rules, and which is marked on the north of the line drawn on the map attached to this agreement.<sup>(1)</sup>

The period of this agreement shall be 75 years from the date of its signature.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not reproduced.



## ARTICLE 3.

The Company shall explore the State of Qatar minutely by any methods which is best in its opinion to enable it to ascertain the probable existence of the Substances.

And for the purpose of carrying out its work in accordance with this agreement, the Company shall employ all customary and proper means, and shall carry out the examination by methods agreeable to the modern scientific knowledge. The Company shall inform his Excellency the Sheikh of all its operations in this connexion from time to time.

The Company undertakes to keep drawings and maps and accurate records of the wells drilled and such-like data, whether they be topographical, geological or drilling, as it is customary to keep, and such information as these shall be open to inspection by the Sheikh or his authorised representative.

## ARTICLE 4.

In consideration of the rights granted by his Excellency the Sheikh to the Company in accordance with this agreement, the Company shall pay to his Excellency the Sheikh the following payments during the period of this agreement, namely:—

- (a) On signature: 4 lakhs of rupees.
- (b) At the end of each year of the first five years from the date of signature: 1½ lakhs of rupees.
- (c) At the end of the sixth year from the date of signature and at the end of every year which follows it until the end of the concession: 3 lakhs of rupees.
- (d) When the Company wins oil and saves it into storage it shall pay royalty on the Substances, in accordance with the description of article 1 as follows:—
  - (1) On all the substances which it has won and saved into storage, except asphalt, ozokerite and natural gas, per ton (2,240 English pounds), at the rate of 3 rupees.
  - (2) On asphalt and ozokerite won and saved into storage, per ton (2,240 English pounds), at the rate of 1 rupee 8 annas.
  - (3) On natural gas produced and sold per 1,000 cubic feet, at the rate of 2 annas.

But the Company shall not pay royalty on any of the Substances used within the State of Qatar by the Company or its employees.

## ARTICLE 5.

The Company will measure all liquid matters, at the time of their extraction from wells, either by dipping reservoirs or by means of measuring instruments, and measure solid substances by weighing; and it should supply the Sheikh with a copy of the register if his Excellency so demand. Likewise, the Company shall submit to his Excellency the Sheikh an account of the Substances extracted by it for every six months, and the authorised agent of the Sheikh shall have the right of inspection thereof at all reasonable times.

## ARTICLE 6.

The Company may construct, maintain and operate roads and telegraph and telephone installations and their lines, and wireless stations, refineries, and the ordinary ports situated at Dohah for importing its materials, and pipelines and pumping stations, workshops, houses and other things, and works which are useful for it, as required for the purposes of its operations, and also the accommodations required for its employees, but excepting the places occupied by the enterprise of their owners, or those which it will be difficult for their owners to part with; and these are exempted. And the Company has the right to choose the port which may be suitable for exporting its Substances; and it will likewise have the right to use all the means of transport required for its operations in accordance with this agreement, excepting aerial transport, which, on

every occasion arising for it, the Company must obtain the Sheikh's permission and consent thereto. And his Excellency the Sheikh shall have the full right to use those roads, the electric (telegraph) lines, the wireless installations, telephones and railways for his personal business and for governmental purposes, in case of need, free of charge; and the Sheikh shall have the right, also, to use all the ports used and constructed by the Company, and the Company undertakes to afford his Excellency the Sheikh all facilities in this respect.

## ARTICLE 7.

The Sheikh grants to the Company the use and occupation of uncultivated lands belonging to the Sheikh himself and which the Company may require for its operations, free, after an understanding is arrived at between the Sheikh and the Company about them, excepting the lands surrounding Riyan, as will be defined by the Sheikh himself. The Company has no right to acquire lands occupied by the enterprise of the owners thereof and also houses, places and lands which their owners decline to sell or to rent; and excepting these, it does not matter to use (other lands) if occasion arose. And the Company shall inform the Sheikh from time to time of the lands, houses and buildings which it requires to occupy for its enterprise. And the lands, houses and buildings already acquired by the Company and found by it to be unnecessary for it any longer for its business shall be restored by the Company to the Sheikh free. Provided that all the lands, houses and buildings which have been acquired by the Company shall be handed over to the Sheikh free on the termination or prior to that, on the cancellation, free.

## ARTICLE 8.

The Company may take any quantity of water which it may require for its operations, free of charge, on the condition that this will not cause any loss or damage to any of the inhabitants. And subject to the same conditions as have been specified, the Company can explore, drill and impound water to satisfy the requirements of its operations.

In case of need, the Sheikh's army or military expeditions can take, free of charge, any quantity of water available under the Company's control after its requirements are satisfied; and, likewise, the inhabitants can take such surplus water for themselves and their animals, free of charge.

## ARTICLE 9.

The Company can take any earth, mud, gravels, lime, gypsum and stones and other similar substances which it requires for its operations, free of charge, but it will not prevent the people from taking their customary requirements of these materials. The Company, however, must only take what it requires, and shall have no right to export any of these (materials) abroad.

## ARTICLE 10.

In consideration of the sums agreed upon in article 4, the Company shall have the right to import water, petroleum, fuel, machinery, motor cars, lorries, aeroplanes, equipments, instruments, wood, utensils, iron ware, building materials, medicines, office equipments, household furniture, and all other things, equipments and goods required by the Company or by its employees for its operations, but not for sale to others; and it shall have the right to export its substances and their derivatives and things already imported by the Company without customs duty or import duty or export duty or tax or any other duty. The Company shall, however, pay the ordinary duty applicable to British merchants in the State of Qatar on all the personal effects, piece-goods, general merchandise and provisions which it imports for the personal use of its employees. And the Company and its operations, incomes, profits and properties shall be exempt and free, during the period of this agreement, from all the present and future taxes of any kind whatsoever.

## ARTICLE 11.

The Sheikh agrees that he will afford the necessary assistance to carry out this agreement, and that he will use his authority to protect the Company's employees and property as far as possible. But the Company shall also itself



take the necessary steps in this respect, namely, that the Sheikh or his representative will appoint armed guards of his own choice and the Company shall pay the expenses; and the guards should be sufficient in number and equipment. And neither does the Sheikh guarantee to the Company what may be caused by unforeseen circumstances, nor will he be responsible therefor. For instance, should, God forbid, an attack be made by an enemy, or any accident occur in spite of him, through any aggressor, the Sheikh shall, in case of such aggression, use his endeavour to ward off an aggressor of this nature; but he shall not be responsible for any loss or damage thereby caused.

#### ARTICLE 12.

The Company has the right to transfer this agreement to any other commercial company; but it shall have no right to transfer it to any Government whatsoever on the conditions that the said Company shall be able to fulfil the obligations of this agreement and its engagements entirely. The Company shall inform the Sheikh if it transferred this agreement in the manner aforesaid and obtain his assent and acquiescence. And the Company shall have the liberty to form a single company, if it finds it necessary, to carry out this agreement, and that company so formed shall be identical with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), and the aforesaid company shall enjoy all the rights and privileges granted to the Company in virtue of this agreement, and it must bear all the engagements and responsibilities set forth therein.

#### ARTICLE 13.

The Company may terminate this agreement if it finds it disagreeable for it to act upon the same; but it shall have no right to cancel it or to abandon it and to discontinue operating it except after three years with effect from the beginning of operation, by giving six months' previous notice, in writing, to the Sheikh of its intention to do so. And if the said cancellation should take place within thirty-five years from the date of signature of this agreement, all the lands granted by the Sheikh and any lands or buildings purchased by the Company and any houses or buildings constructed by, and any immovable properties belonging to, the Company within the State of Qatar shall be surrendered to the Sheikh free of charge. And the wells actually producing at the time of the said cancellation shall be surrendered in a condition considered to be good and satisfactory, as they were at that time.

And if the said cancellation should take place after thirty-five years from the date of signature of this agreement, all the Company's properties within the State of Qatar shall be surrendered in that case to the Sheikh, free of charge; and the wells actually producing at the time of the said cancellation shall be surrendered in a condition which is reasonably considered good and satisfactory, as they were at that time.

On the termination of this agreement at the conclusion of the seventy-five years, stipulated for in article 2, or the conclusion of any extension or renewal of its period, all the Company's properties existing in the State of Qatar shall be surrendered to the Sheikh free of charge; and the wells actually producing at that time shall be surrendered in a condition which is reasonably considered good and satisfactory, as they used to be at that time.

#### ARTICLE 14.

The Sheikh has the right to cancel this agreement in the two cases mentioned below:—

- (a) If the Company fails to pay the sums mentioned in article 4 within six months from the date they fall due. Provided that if any dispute should be made by the Company in regard to any payment thereof, the Sheikh shall not cancel the agreement until arbitration takes place thereon in accordance with article 16, and unless the Company fails to comply with the award of the arbitrators within three months from the date of the said award.
- (b) If the Company is in default according to the provisions for arbitration set forth in article 16.

#### ARTICLE 15.

The Sheikh shall not hold the Company liable if default should occur on the part of the Company in carrying out or fulfilling the provisions of the agreement by the mere occurrence of *force majeure* delaying operation; but should any difference occur between his Excellency the Sheikh and the Company as to the existence or non-existence of such *force majeure*, the same shall be referred to arbitration, as provided for in article 16. And the Sheikh stipulates that the *force majeure* delaying operation means that which occurs in connexion with the Company's operations in Qatar and that nothing else must be taken into consideration and must not be used by the Company as an argument in this respect. And the Company shall proceed to effect repairs at the time when any damage, of any nature, takes place; and the period of the said delay, together with any period reasonably necessary for repairing the damage, will be added to the period fixed in accordance with this agreement.

#### ARTICLE 16.

Should any dispute occur between the Sheikh and the Company in regard to the interpretation of this agreement, or of any matter arising therefrom, or in regard to the engagements obligatory on either of the parties in accordance therewith, such dispute shall be referred to two arbitrators if no agreement can be arrived at for settling it by any other method, and the Sheikh will appoint one of them and the other will be appointed by the Company. Each of the two parties shall appoint his arbitrator within thirty days after receiving the demand therefor from the other party. The two arbitrators shall thereupon appoint a third arbitrator; but if the two arbitrators or any two arbitrators appointed instead of them are unable to agree upon the third arbitrator within sixty days from the demand for arbitration, the two parties agree that, in that case, the third arbitrator should be appointed by the political resident; and the Sheikh makes it a condition that he should agree to the third arbitrator.

The award of arbitration shall be consistent with the legal principles familiar to civilised nations.

The decision of the majority of arbitrators shall be final; and the place of arbitration shall be Qatar.

On giving any award, the arbitrators shall fix a sufficient time within which the party against whom the award is given should carry out the said award. And that party shall be considered at fault only when he fails to comply with the award before the expiry of the aforesaid period and not otherwise.

#### ARTICLE 17.

The labourers employed by the Company must be from amongst the Sheikh's own subjects or from amongst those approved by the Sheikh, excepting technical employees and the managers and clerks whom the Company may require and whom it cannot find in the country. As the Sheikh prescribes as a condition the dismissal of any employee whose retention is disapproved by the Sheikh, if the Sheikh has observed any irregular conduct on his part. And it naturally follows that the wages which the Company pays to the employees from amongst Qatar people shall be reasonable.

#### ARTICLE 18.

The Sheikh and the Company declare that they base action upon this agreement on the basis of good faith and pure belief and upon the interpretation of this agreement in a manner consistent with reason. And the Company undertakes to acknowledge the Sheikh's authority and his rights in his capacity as the ruler of the State of Qatar principality and to respect them in every manner.

#### ARTICLE 19.

Nothing contained in this agreement shall prevent the Sheikh in any manner whatever from granting concessions to other parties for anything excepting the Substances mentioned in article 1, provided that the said concessions do not interfere with the rights of the Company or its operations in accordance with this agreement.



## ARTICLE 20.

The Company will pay all the sums due to the Sheikh, in accordance with this agreement, into the Sheikh's account in the Eastern Bank (Limited) in Bahrein, and the receipt taken from that bank shall be a full acquittance of the Company's liability for the sum mentioned in the bank's receipt. The Sheikh may from time to time appoint another bank or other banks for the purposes of this article, and this shall be done in writing.

## ARTICLE 21.

This agreement shall be binding upon both parties and their successors and assigns; and it has been written in Arabic and English, and all due care has been taken to make the two texts identical in meaning. And if any difference should arise as to the meaning or the interpretation of any article, at any time, the Arabic version is to be relied upon.

## ARTICLE 22.

The expression year, month and day used in this agreement shall mean what is consistent with the English solar calendar and not any other.

In witness whereof the two parties have hereunto set their hands and seals on the day and in the year mentioned in the preamble.

ABDULLAH-BIN-QASIM-AL-THANI,  
Salih-bin-Sulaiman-al-Mani,  
*Ruler of Qatar.*

For the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited):  
H. H. HILMI.  
C. C. MYLLES, *Representative.*

2. *Anglo-Persian Oil Company's Representative to the Ruler of Qatar.*

Sir,

(1)

In view of your having signed the oil concession for the State of Qatar in favour of this Company, I am authorised by the Company to give you the following undertakings additional to all the undertakings set forth in the concession:—

- (1) The Company will drill two artesian wells free of charge at such place as may be selected by his Excellency the Sheikh.
- (2) The Company will warn all its employees that they should respect and give heed to general laws and religious customs, and that they should not display in public forbidden things, such as intoxicating liquors.
- (3) Consequent on the demand of his Excellency the Sheikh for the employment of informed persons in Qatar, who should represent his Excellency in exercising what may be necessary in regard to his rights in accordance with this concession the Company undertakes to pay the salaries of such informed persons whose number should not be more than two persons only on condition that these salaries shall be reasonable and in keeping with their positions and duties.
- (4) The Company will supply to his Excellency the Sheikh either in cash or in kind at the Company's option annually until oil is won and saved into storage—

Two thousand tins of petrol.  
Three thousand tins of kerosene.

And thereafter—

Five thousand tins of petrol.  
Ten thousand tins of kerosene.

It is requested that you will let me have your acceptance in writing of these undertakings.

For the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited):  
CHAS. MYLLES, *Representative.*

May 17, 1935.

(2)

Sir,

*Dohah, Qatar, May 17, 1935.*

Referring to article 7 in the agreement of the concession, the land which surrounds the castle of the Sheikh in Dohah is exempt from all operations of the Company and its works, and this land will be defined by the Sheikh, as is the case at Rivan.

For the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited):  
CHAS. MYLLES, *Representative.*

(3)

Sir,

*Dohah, Qatar, May 17, 1935.*

I am instructed to inform you that I have signed the agreement of the Oil Concession of Qatar in accordance with my authority from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), on the understanding that it is subject to the approval of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.  
(For the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited)),  
CHAS. MYLLES, *Representative.*

3. *Agreement between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.*

This agreement, dated the fifth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-five, is made between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom (hereinafter called "His Majesty's Government") of the one part, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) (hereinafter called "the Company," which expression shall, where the context so admits, be deemed to include its successors and/or assignees) of the other part.

Whereas, in the event of the Company obtaining a concession from the Sheikh of Qatar (hereinafter called "the Sheikh") certain responsibilities will devolve on His Majesty's Government, the Company has agreed with His Majesty's Government as follows:—

1. Notwithstanding anything contained in article 12 of the agreement between the Company and the Sheikh, that agreement shall not be transferred to any other company without the prior consent in writing of His Majesty's Government, and any other company to which that agreement may be transferred shall be and remain a British company registered in Great Britain, and having its principal place of business in Great Britain, and its chairman shall at all times be a British subject.

2. Notwithstanding anything contained in article 12 of the agreement between the Company and the Sheikh, any subsidiary company shall be and remain a British company registered in Great Britain, and having its principal place of business in Great Britain, and its chairman shall at all times be a British subject.

3. The employees of the Company in Qatar shall at all times be British subjects or subjects of the Sheikh, provided that, with the consent of His Majesty's Government, such persons of other nationality as are required for the efficient carrying on of the undertaking may be employed.

Notwithstanding anything contained in the agreement between the Company and the Sheikh, the importation of foreign native labour shall be subject to the approval of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

4. For the purpose of dealing with the Qatar authorities one of the superior local employees of the Company, who shall be a British subject, shall be designated chief local representative of the Company in Qatar. The approval of His Majesty's Government shall be required for the person so designated. He will be ordinarily resident in Qatar and will be responsible for the Company's local relations with the Qatar authorities, which shall be conducted through the political representative of His Majesty's Government in Qatar if and when such a representative is appointed.



5. Subject to the terms of the agreement between the Company and the Sheikh the Company undertakes at all times to pay due deference to the wishes of the Sheikh and to the advice of the political representative (if any) of His Majesty's Government in Qatar and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

6. Any right given to the Company under its agreement with the Sheikh to utilise means of transportation by air shall be subject to any general regulations for civil aircraft made by the Sheikh on the advice of His Majesty's Government.

7. Notwithstanding anything contained in the agreement between the Company and the Sheikh, the Company shall not have the right to use or occupy, and shall not include in the areas to be acquired or utilised for the purposes of its operations, any sites which may have been selected by or on behalf of the Sheikh or His Majesty's Government for defence purposes, for aerodromes, aeroplane or seaplane bases or for wireless and telegraph installations or in connexion with the development of harbours, provided that with the consent of His Majesty's Government which shall not be unreasonably withheld the Company shall have the right to use for the purposes of its operations such harbours as may be developed by the Sheikh or His Majesty's Government if there is not reasonable harbour accommodation available elsewhere. Subject to the terms of the agreement between the Company and the Sheikh, harbours developed by the Company shall be under its complete and exclusive control.

8. Telegraph, wireless and telephone installations, if any, maintained by the Company shall be for use only in its business and as provided in the concession, and shall be so constructed and operated that their operations shall not interfere with the operations of such wireless, telegraph or telephone installations as may be established by the Sheikh or His Majesty's Government.

9. The Company declare that it is their intention, should they consider that commercial conditions justify it, to erect a refinery in Qatar. If and when the Company is satisfied that commercial production is assured, the Company agrees to examine with His Majesty's Government the question of establishing a refinery in Qatar of suitable type and capacity.

10. In the event of a state of national emergency or war (of the existence of either of which His Majesty's Government shall be the sole judge) His Majesty's Government shall have the right of pre-emption of all the oil produced in Qatar in accordance with the terms of the schedule hereto.

11. In the event of notice of termination of the agreement between the Company and the Sheikh being given on the ground that the Company has failed to observe any of the terms of the present agreement between the Company and His Majesty's Government, the arbitration provisions of the said agreement between the Company and the Sheikh shall apply if the Company considers that notice of termination on such grounds is not justified, and in that event the Sheikh shall not cancel the said agreement until arbitration takes place in accordance with the said provisions, and unless the Company fails to comply with the award of the arbitrators within the reasonable time which shall be fixed by the arbitrators for so doing.

In witness whereof Leonard Day Wakely, C.B., on behalf of His Majesty's Government has hereunto set his hand and seal, and the Company has hereunto caused its common seal to be affixed the day and year first above written.

*The Schedule above referred to.*

*Pre-emption Clause.*

In the event of a state of national emergency or war (of the existence of which His Majesty's Government shall be the sole judge)—

(1) His Majesty's Government shall have the right of pre-emption of all crude oil gotten under the concession granted by the Sheikh to the Company and of all the products thereof, and shall have the right to require the Company, to the extent of any refining capacity it may have in Qatar, to produce oil fuel that shall comply with the Admiralty specifications at the time provided that Qatar oil be of a suitable kind and quality for this purpose.

(2) The Company shall use its utmost endeavours to increase so far as reasonably possible with existing facilities the supply of oil, and/or products thereof for the Government to the extent required by the Government.

(3) The Company shall with every reasonable expedition and so as to avoid demurrage on the vessel or vessels engaged to convey the same, do its utmost to

deliver all oil or products of oil purchased by the Government under their said right of pre-emption in the quantities at the time and in the manner required by the Government at a convenient place of shipment, or at a place of storage in Qatar to be determined by His Majesty's Government. In the event of a vessel employed to carry any such oil or products thereof on behalf of His Majesty being detained on demurrage at the port of loading, the Company shall pay the amount due for demurrage according to the terms of the charter party and/or the rates of loading previously agreed with the Company, unless the delay is due to causes beyond the control of the Company. Any dispute which may arise as to whether the delay is due to causes beyond the control of the Company shall be settled by agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Company, and, in default of such agreement, the question shall be referred to two arbitrators, one to be chosen by His Majesty's Government (or the Political Resident) and the other by the Company, with power to appoint an umpire in case of disagreement, such arbitration to be held in England and to be deemed a reference to arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration Acts 1889 to 1934 (52 and 53 Vict., c. 49; 24 and 25 Geo. V, c. 14) of the Imperial Parliament, or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force.

(4) The price to be paid for all oil or products of the refining or treatment of oil taken in pre-emption by His Majesty's Government shall be either (a) as specified in a separate agreement, or (b) if no such agreement shall have been entered into, a fair price for the time being at the point of delivery as the same shall be settled by agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Company, or in default of such agreement by arbitration in the manner provided by the last preceding sub-clause.

To assist in arriving at a fair price at the point of delivery the Company shall furnish for the confidential information of His Majesty's Government, if so required, particulars of the quantities, descriptions and prices of Qatar oil or products sold to other customers, and of charters or contracts entered into for carriage, and shall exhibit to His Majesty's Government original or authenticated copies of contracts or charter parties entered into for the sale and/or carriage of such oil or products.

(5) His Majesty's Government shall be at liberty to take control of the works, plant and premises of the Company in Qatar, and in such event the Company shall conform to and obey all directions issued by or on behalf of His Majesty's Government. Compensation shall be paid to the Company for any loss or damage that may be proved to have been sustained by the Company by reason of the exercise by His Majesty's Government of the powers conferred by this sub-clause. Any such compensation shall be settled by agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Company, or, in default of agreement, by arbitration in the manner provided by sub-clause (3).

L. D. WAKELY.

Signed, sealed and delivered by the said Leonard Day Wakely, C.B., on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the presence of JOHN CHARLES WALTON, India Office, Civil Servant.

The common seal of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) was hereunto affixed in the presence of W. FRASER (Director), JNO. CLARK (Secretary).

*4. Exchange of Notes between the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Ruler of Qatar.*

(1) *From the Political Resident.*

H.M.S. Bideford, at Dohah,

June 5, 1935.

(After compliments.)

His Majesty's Government have been furnished with a copy of the agreement signed by you on the 17th May, 1935, granting to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company an oil concession in respect of Qatar territory on the understanding that the agreement is subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government.



2. Under instructions from His Majesty's Government I now enclose a copy of an agreement which has been concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in London.

3. It is desirable that there should be a clear understanding as to the position which would arise in certain eventualities in connexion with these two agreements, and I am to inform you that in these circumstances the understanding described below has been reached with the Company:—

- (a) Should any of the terms of the agreement between you and the Company be inconsistent or in conflict with the terms of the agreement between the Company and His Majesty's Government signed in London on the 5th June, 1935, the agreement between you and the Company will to the extent of any such inconsistency or conflict be subordinate to and be controlled by the terms of the agreement between the Company and His Majesty's Government.
- (b) If the Company should fail to observe any of the terms of the agreement between the Company and His Majesty's Government signed in London on the 5th June, 1935, or if the alleged failure having been disputed by the Company the matter has been referred to arbitration under article 16 of the Company's agreement with you (which is made applicable to the case by article 11 of the agreement between the Company and His Majesty's Government) and the Company should not remedy such failure within the reasonable time which shall be fixed by the arbitrators for so doing than in these cases, as in the cases mentioned in article 14 of the Company's agreement with you, but in no other, the Company agrees that you will be entitled to terminate the agreement between the Company and yourself, and that all properties of the Company within the State of Qatar shall become your property, and that they will hand over to you free of cost land granted to the Company by you, and any lands or buildings which the Company may have bought and any houses or buildings constructed by the Company and all other irremovable property of the Company within the State of Qatar, including the producing wells and borings which shall be handed over in reasonably good order and repair.

4. You have intimated, after discussion with me, that you understand the nature of the arrangements as set out above, and that you are prepared to agree to them, and I request that you will be good enough to confirm this in writing.

On receipt of your reply His Majesty's Government will obtain from the Company formal confirmation of their acceptance of the arrangements in question and will communicate such confirmation to you.

(Usual ending.)

T. C. FOWLE, *Lieut.-Colonel,*  
*Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.*

(2) *From the Ruler of Qatar.*

(Translation.)

(After compliments.)

5th Rabi'-al-Awwal, 1354 (June 6, 1935).

With the hand of pleasure we have received your confidential letter, dated the 5th June, 1935, equivalent to the 4th Rabi'-al-Awwal, 1354, and have understood its contents.

We thank His Majesty's Government for the trouble they have taken to bring about with the Company such arrangements as will protect and safeguard our rights.

Further, we beg to say that we agree with and confirm to His Majesty's Government the various arrangements which they have made.

(Usual ending.)

5. *Correspondence between the India Office and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*India Office, June 21, 1935.*

I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose herewith for the information of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company a copy of a letter dated the 5th June, 1935, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Sheikh of Qatar, together with a translation of the latter's reply dated the 6th June, 1935, in regard to certain points which arise in connexion with the Oil Concession granted (subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government) to your Company by the Sheikh of Qatar on the 17th May, 1935, and in connexion with the Political Agreement of the 5th June, 1935, between your Company and His Majesty's Government regarding the said concession.

2. I am to request that in accordance with the unofficial understanding already reached with the Company, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company will now be good enough formally to confirm their acceptance of the arrangements embodied in the Resident's letter of the 5th June as binding on the Company. I am to add that on receipt of a letter from the Company accepting the arrangements mentioned above, the Marquess of Zetland will cause a further letter to be addressed to the Company expressing His Majesty's Government's formal approval of the Oil Concession granted to the Company by the Sheikh of Qatar.

I am, &c.

J. C. WALTON.

*Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited),  
Britannic House, Finsbury Circus,*

Sir,

*London, June 24, 1935.*

We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 21st June, 1935, under reference, relative to a concession recently obtained by us in Qatar.

2. We beg formally to confirm our acceptance, as binding on the Company, of the arrangements embodied in the letter of the 5th June, 1935, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Sheikh of Qatar.

3. We shall be glad to receive His Majesty's Government's formal approval of the concession granted to us by the Sheikh of Qatar on the 17th May, 1935, in order that we may be in a position to afford complete information to our partners in this matter at an early date.

We are, &c.

W. FRASER, *Deputy Chairman.*

Sir,

*India Office, June 27, 1935.*

I am directed by the Marquess of Zetland to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Fraser's letter of the 24th June on the subject of the Qatar Oil Concession, and to express on behalf of His Majesty's Government their formal approval of the concession granted to the Company by the Sheikh of Qatar on the 17th May, 1935.

Copies of this correspondence are being sent to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf with a view to action being taken as indicated in paragraph 4 of Colonel Fowle's letter dated the 5th June to the Sheikh of Qatar.

I am, &c.

J. C. WALTON.



[E 4949/206/25]

No. 2.

CORRESPONDENCE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE DELEGATES OF SAUDI ARABIA AND KOWEIT AT THE CONFERENCE HELD AT KOWEIT BETWEEN JUNE 17 AND 29, 1935, TO DISCUSS A SETTLEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE OF KOWEIT BY KING IBN SAUD.

[E 4518/206/25]

I.—*Translation of a Letter dated the 16th Rabi Auwal, 1354 (June 17, 1935) from Ahmad-al-Humaidhi, Humammad-bin-Thunaiyan-al-Chanim, and Khalid-az-Zaid (Koweit delegates), to Khalid Abul Walid, Hamad-as-Sulaiman, and Abdulla-al-Qusaibi (Saudi delegates).*

(After compliments.)

IN view of what is known to you and to us, and also to every high-born and poor person, of the good and friendly relations which have existed for very many years between the Al Sabah and the Al Saud dynasties, more especially between His Majesty King Abdul Aziz and his Excellency Sheikh Ahmad-al-Jabir, and in consequence of the desire of both countries to further strengthen these relations, by removing the trade blockade of Koweit, we have suggested below the most suitable method, as seemed to us, for the resumption of the export trade (from Koweit) with His Majesty's Kingdom. These are as follows:—

- (1) That customs collecting centres should be established within the frontiers of His Majesty the King. These may consist of one post or more than one, and in such places as His Majesty the King may choose.
- (2) That his Excellency Sheikh Ahmad-al-Jabir shall, for his part, assist to the best of his power in the control and guiding of all exports to the above posts or centres. This will be by means of manifests, which will be issued in triplicate; the first copy to go with the goods, the second to be handed over to His Majesty's local agent, Abdulla-an-Nafisi, and the third one to remain in the customs office of the local Government.

The above is the opinion we hold, and the procedure is one which is recognised between kingdoms and nations that are good neighbours, as well as by others.

(Usual ending.)

II.—*Translation of a Letter dated the 23rd Rabi Auwal, 1354 (June 24, 1935), from the Saudi Delegation to the Koweiti Delegation.*

(After compliments.)

WITH reference to the discussion which we had with you to-day in regard to the resumption of "Musabalah" ("trade") between our country and Koweit, we beg to reiterate in writing, in addition to what we explained verbally, the good intentions of our Government, and the affectionate spirit, friendliness, and good feeling which they have towards the Koweit Government, and to say that they (the Saudi Government) are prepared to continue conversations with a view to arriving at a satisfactory conclusion between both sides, and to discuss measures to remove all misunderstanding for the future. Such conversations, however, must be on the one clear basis, that the Government of Koweit shall give "guarantee" ("dhaman") with regard to goods passing (across frontier) to His Majesty the King's territory (*i.e.*, that nothing is smuggled apart from goods sent under manifests). This, indeed, is what we proposed in the course of our discussions with you.

Should your esteemed delegation agree to negotiate on this basis, we are prepared once more to discuss the subject in order to arrive at the conclusion sought by both sides.

(Usual ending.)

*Note by Political Agent.*—The above letter, as will be seen, is worded somewhat differently from what the Saudi delegate laid down as the only basis for future talks (see my telegram No. 211 of the 25th June), namely, that Koweit must

agree before anything else to guarantee that not even a single smuggler got across the border. They appear to be playing for safety. The Koweit delegates have not missed this point, and in their reply have pinned the Saudi delegates down to what they actually did say.

III.—*Translation of a Letter dated the 24th Rabi Auwal, 1354 (June 25, 1935), from the Koweit Delegation to the Saudi Delegation.*

(After compliments.)

WE have received your esteemed letter dated the 23rd Rabi Auwal, 1354 (June 24, 1935), and have understood what you stated as to your good intentions as well as the good intentions of His Majesty King Ibn Saud's Government, namely, that you are prepared to continue conversations with a view to arriving at a satisfactory conclusion between both sides, and to discuss measures to remove all misunderstanding, but that such conversations must from now onward be on the one basis, that the Government of Koweit shall first give "guarantee" ("dhaman") with regard to goods (smuggled) passing across the frontier. You added that if our delegation would agree to the "guarantee" condition on behalf of the Koweit Government, then you would be prepared to continue the talks.

We wish, therefore, now to make the matter quite clear. The situation is, as we suggested to you in our letter dated the 16th Rabi Auwal, 1354 (June 17, 1935), and as was also discussed with you in yesterday morning's meeting (June 24, 1935). You stated that the "guarantee" system was desired by His Majesty's (Saudiyah) Government, which was that nothing should be smuggled, and only goods exported according to manifests should be allowed to pass into Saudi territory. That should any smuggler be caught, his goods would be confiscated, and the Koweit Government would have to pay the customs duty imposed on same. Also that should this happen more than three times, His Majesty's Saudi Government should have the right to cancel the agreement.

At the same meeting we replied to you that the Koweit Government would give you their word of honour to do all in their power to prevent smuggling. And that should any smuggling be discovered (within her territory) the Koweit Government would inflict the severest of punishments on the evil-doer.

As regards the "guarantee" insisted on by you—with every precaution taken and every goodwill, we say this cannot be realised. Hence it is not reasonable of you to make such a condition. That which the Saudi Government is afraid of (*e.g.*, smuggling), should it occur, will be trifling and very small, because of the measures that will be taken by His Majesty's Saudi Government and the Government of Koweit. It should certainly not affect the goodwill, and the desire for a reciprocal agreement between His Majesty the King and his Excellency Sheikh Ahmad-al-Jabir.

We have every hope, however, that owing to your deep insight you will not allow a doubtful and unreasonable defect to stand in the way of good understanding.

We beg for a reply to this, and express the hope that we shall come to a good understanding.

(Usual ending.)

IV.—*Translation of a Letter dated the 24th Rabi Auwal, 1354 (June 25, 1935), from the Saudi Delegation to the Koweiti Delegation.*

(After compliments.)

WE have with due regard received your esteemed letter dated the 24th Rabi Auwal, 1354 (June 25, 1935), in reply to our letter dated the 23rd Rabi Auwal (June 24, 1935), but have not found in it a clear reply to what we asked your reply for, save an outline of the talks we had with you in our last meeting, while, according to your desire, we asked you in writing to let us know whether or not you agree to the "guarantee" basis, so that we may be able to arrive to a definite conclusion.



Therefore, we request that you will kindly inform us in clear manner as to your final decision, either you should agree to the "guarantee" basis, or decline from it, in this way the situation will be made quite clear, and we can submit a report to our Government.

Awaiting your reply.

(Usual ending.)

V.—*Translation of a Letter dated the 24th Rabi Auwal, 1354 (June 25, 1935), from the Koweiti Delegation to the Saudi Delegation.*

(After compliments.)

WE have received your letter dated the 24th Rabi Auwal, 1354 (June 25, 1935), in reply to our letter of the same date, from which we understand that you consider our reply not to be clearly put, and that you now wish to be informed definitely whether we agree to the "guarantee" basis or not, in order that you may submit a report to your Government.

Contrary to what you say, we believe that we have made the position quite clear, and have not been obscure. We explained to you that the "guarantee" basis, which you demanded in yesterday's meeting, could not possibly be realised, in spite of every good intention and effort on our part; for, as we explained, the first case of smuggling that occurred would not only upset the plan, but would tend to have exactly the opposite result where the good agreement and connexions desired by both His Majesty's Saudi Government and our Government are concerned. Therefore, you should either make propositions different to the above, or submit your present proposal, together with our reply to it, to your Government. We leave that to you.

(Usual ending.)

[E 4949/206/25]

VI.—*Translation of a Letter dated the 27th Rabi Auwal, 1354 (June 28, 1935), from the Koweiti Delegation to the Saudi Delegation.*

(After compliments.)

WITH reference to the information you imparted to us in to-day's meeting, that His Majesty the King would not agree to the resumption of trade between Koweit and the Saudi Arabia save on the "guarantee" basis on the part of the Koweit Government.

As you know, we have written a letter to you, dated the 16th Rabi Auwal, 1354 (June 17, 1935), in which we stated the views we considered good for both countries. On the other hand, in the meeting of the 21st instant (June 22, 1935), you demanded a "guarantee," and we stated in our letter of the 24th instant (June 25, 1935) that that "guarantee" was impossible to give, as it could not practically or theoretically be enforced.

In a second letter, also dated the 24th instant (June 25, 1935), we asked you to submit both your proposition of "guarantee" and our reply to it, to His Majesty the King.

If His Majesty the King, as you informed us definitely and verbally to-day was the case, does not agree to anything but that we give the "guarantee" asked for, then all that is left for us is to make it known that we cannot commit ourselves to any such "guarantee."

Although we recognise that His Majesty the King and his Excellency the Sheikh Ahmad-al-Jabir are as brothers, and that there is no difference between our two countries and the two peoples, nevertheless we regret the failure of negotiations. We do not entirely despair, however, and still hope for agreement. We look to this conference as a first step to the understanding desired. May God destine agreement.

Please acknowledge our letter.

(Usual ending.)

VII.—*Translation of a Letter dated the 27th Rabi Auwal, 1354 (June 28, 1935), from the Saudi Delegation to the Koweiti Delegation.*

(After compliments.)

WE have to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 27th Rabi Auwal, 1354 (June 28, 1935), copy of which is embodied herein below :—

[Letter VI.]

We seize this opportunity to thank you for the welcome and courtesy with which we have always been met during our discussions, and wish with you, from the bottom of our hearts, that the two countries be given the chance to come to an agreement in the near future.

(Usual ending.)

[E 4063/1309/25]

No. 3.

*Proposed Saudi-Iraqi Treaty.*

IN the course of conversation with me this morning Nuri Pasha told me that the Saudi Government had for some time been pressing the Iraqi Government to conclude a new treaty to supplement, if not to replace, the treaties negotiated by Nuri Pasha in Mecca in 1931.

2. The Saudi Government had originally proposed a treaty of alliance. Nuri Pasha had replied that the Iraqi Government were not prepared to go quite as far as this, but that they would conclude a treaty providing for consultation as to the common measures to be taken in the case of war or threat of war, provided it was clear that Iraq would not be called upon in any circumstances to take any measures against any Arab State or any action incompatible with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930.

3. The Saudi had eventually produced a draft treaty which Nuri had not liked, as it was extremely vague and at the same time appeared to go too far. I understood Nuri to say that he had then referred the matter to a committee of the Cabinet in Bagdad and that three alternative draft treaties had been prepared for communication to the Saudi Government. Nuri Pasha had one of these treaties with him and seemed disposed to communicate the Arabic text of it to me (though he had not got it with him), provided we could have it translated confidentially. I told him that we should be very glad to see the text if he liked to communicate it to us, and that we could make suitable arrangements about having it translated, but when Nuri Pasha heard that we had no Arabic scholars in the Foreign Office itself, he took the line that it might be better for him, on his return to Iraq, to communicate the Arabic text to His Majesty's Embassy in Bagdad, who would have expert translators available. I did not press him on this point.

4. Nuri Pasha explained that what was now in contemplation was a treaty of friendship—not of alliance—providing for consultation in certain emergencies, and subject to the provisos he had mentioned, *i.e.*, no obligation to take measures against any Arab State or to take any action incompatible with the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. This short treaty, which would really not amount to very much, would be supplemented later by commercial, extradition and possibly other arrangements.

5. I told Nuri Pasha that we should welcome any development which would further the cause of peace and stability among the Arab States. Both Iraq and Saudi Arabia were good friends of ours and we should like to see them good friends with each other. Of course it would be necessary, as Nuri Pasha himself had said, that any arrangements made between Iraq and Saudi Arabia should be such as not to conflict with the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. There need presumably be no difficulty about this point, the importance of which Nuri himself had emphasised. But it was equally essential that any arrangements contemplated should not conflict with Iraqi's obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations and under the Kellogg Pact. I presumed that Nuri Pasha had considered this point.



6. Nuri Pasha replied that he had not only considered this but that he proposed to urge the Saudi Government to apply for membership of the League of Nations for Saudi Arabia.

7. I replied that His Majesty's Government naturally welcomed anything which would strengthen the League or extend its membership. But had Nuri Pasha considered the question whether Saudi Arabia would, in fact, be able to fulfil the necessary conditions of membership and assume the obligations of a member of the League? What, for instance, would be the position in regard to slavery, which was a legal institution in Saudi Arabia? Nuri Pasha said that this had not been an obstacle in the case of Abyssinia, and asked whether there need be any more difficulty in the present case than there had been on that occasion? He thought that the admission of Afghanistan to membership of the League might also constitute a useful parallel. I said that both these cases were rather outside my sphere and that though I had read a good deal about them I did not feel competent to discuss them. I understood, however, that Abyssinia's membership of the League had not been entirely free from complications.

8. I asked Nuri Pasha whether he had had any political discussions with Fuad Bey and he replied that he had only had one short conversation with him which had not been of great importance. It was possible, however—though not certain—that the Amir Saud and Fuad Bey would pass through Iraq on their return to Arabia after their European tour, in which case he would continue the discussions then.

G. RENDEL.

*Foreign Office, July 1, 1935.*

[E 4126/77/91]

No. 4.

*Record of First Part of Third Meeting with Fuad Bey Hamza at the Foreign Office on July 2, 1935.*

THE following were present at the meeting:—

Mr. Rendel.  
Sir A. Ryan (His Majesty's Minister  
at Jedda).  
Mr. Ward.  
Mr. Malcolm.

Fuad Bey Hamza (Deputy Saudi-  
Arabian Minister for Foreign  
Affairs).  
Sheikh Hafiz Wahba (Saudi-Arabian  
Minister in London).

MR. RENDEL recalled that, at the two previous meetings at the Foreign Office, discussions about the south-eastern frontiers had been confined to the northern portion of the proposed boundary. It would not be possible to proceed with negotiations on this part of the line until each side had had time to consider the arguments put forward by the other. He would like to make it clear, however, that His Majesty's Government could not modify their attitude in regard to the claims of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz in regard to the part of the line at the base of the Qatar Peninsula or in the region of the Khor-al-Odeid. They would, however, give careful consideration to the memorandum which Fuad Bey had promised on the question of the proper attribution of Banaiyan and its district.

FUAD BEY HAMZA replied that he preferred to postpone further detailed discussion of the northern portion of the boundary until His Majesty's Government had studied his memorandum, which he hoped to have ready very shortly. Speaking about the south-eastern frontier problem as a whole, he could hold out little hope that King Abdul Aziz would be able to accept the proposals of His Majesty's Government, since the boundary they had suggested, unlike that proposed in the memorandum communicated by Fuad Bey to Sir A. Ryan on the 3rd April, 1935, was not based upon the existing situation in the desert. King Abdul Aziz would no doubt be ready to give way on specific points if the facts could be shown to be otherwise than he claimed, but he could not break his pledges to those tribes who had placed themselves under his protection. Fuad

Bey hoped that His Majesty's Government would appreciate the difficulties which confronted the King—particularly in view of his position *vis-à-vis* Arab national sentiment—when asked to surrender territory to which he had an established claim.

MR. RENDEL explained that His Majesty's Government fully appreciated the position of King Abdul Aziz. But he could not accept Fuad Bey's contention that the proposals of His Majesty's Government were not based on the existing situation. The line they were offering was based upon facts ascertained after the most careful enquiry.

He then suggested that the meeting should proceed to discuss the southern sector of the line. Since the discussions with Fuad Bey Hamza in London in September 1934, much detailed information had been obtained in regard to the allegiance and distribution of tribes in this area, and the southern sector of the line which His Majesty's Government were now offering (running from the intersection of the Anglo-Turkish "violet" line of 1914, and parallel 18° N. to the intersection of meridian 52° E. and parallel 19° N.) had been drawn up in conformity with this information so as to include within the Aden Protectorate the territory predominantly inhabited by the Hadhrami tribes of the Protectorate. It was true that the proposed frontier was a straight and artificial line; but this was inevitable in the case of a line running through a featureless and practically uninhabited desert, and need present no difficulties, since both parties were trying to fix the ultimate limits of territorial sovereignty and not to establish a frontier in the European sense of the word.

FUAD BEY remarked that the drawing of the boundary in this sector would depend upon what tribes His Majesty's Government claimed for the Hadhramaut. He was understood to say that there were three important tribes in the area between the central desert and the Hadhramaut Valley—the Seiar, Karab and Jinaba—and that great authority was wielded in this region by a certain sheriff, who was in correspondence with all the neighbouring Governments—with the King of the Yemen, with the Saudi Government, and, Fuad Bey supposed, with the authorities in the Aden Protectorate. Fuad Bey explained that King Abdul Aziz did not claim the allegiance of the Seiar and the Karab, although the Imam of the Yemen might do so, but, even so, he considered that the line proposed by His Majesty's Government was placed much further north than could possibly be justified by the facts. Returning to the general question of the frontier as a whole, he enquired whether His Majesty's Government would agree to a map being prepared to illustrate the habitats of the tribes in the desert, and to serve as a basis for the allocation of territory? Fuad Bey adverted to the argument he had produced at the first meeting on the 24th June, namely, that the diras of the tribes were fixed and could be definitely ascertained by experts.

MR. RENDEL pointed out that there was a wide difference between the extreme limits within which a tribe might wander (and which would inevitably overlap with the limits of other tribes) and the actual territory within which a tribe was predominant. His Majesty's Government had always been ready to recognise as belonging to a tribe territory in which it was unquestionably the predominant influence, but it seemed obvious that there would have to be a compromise as between the extreme limits of the various tribal diras.

SIR ANDREW RYAN brought the discussion back to the southern sector of the frontier. He pointed out that in the south-east and south the line proposed by King Abdul Aziz himself (in the memorandum communicated by Fuad Bey on the 3rd April, 1935) was itself artificial, inasmuch as it was a straight line defined by geographical co-ordinates. On the other hand, Fuad Bey had told him that the King only claimed three tribes (the Murra, Beni Hajir and Dimran [Dimnan]) and part of another (the Manasir) in the Ruba-al-Khali. If Fuad Bey wished the allocation of territory to take place on the basis of diras, he suggested that it would be useful if he could produce a map showing the diras of these three and a half tribes to serve as a working basis for the discussions. It was remarkable that a claim to less than four tribes could be held to justify claims (as made in Fuad Bey's memorandum of the 3rd April) covering an enormous portion of South-Eastern Arabia.



FUAD BEY enquired the reasons which led His Majesty's Government to propose a southern boundary sloping north-east from the intersection of the "violet" line and parallel 18. Why was the line not carried due eastwards along parallel 18?

Mr. RENDEL explained that the line followed the direction of the coast and of the natural features of the country, which all ran towards the north-east in this part of Arabia. It was obviously necessary that there should be a continuous belt of territory between the boundary with Saudi Arabia and the coast of the Hadhramaut, since it was known that the territory in the possession of Hadhrami tribes ran back a considerable distance beyond the steppe country on the edge of the desert and into the sands themselves. His Majesty's Government were satisfied that the southern boundary they had proposed was fair and in accordance with facts, but if King Abdul Aziz could show that their data were wrong they would be ready to consider any evidence he could bring forward in support of his contention.

FUAD BEY observed that he could not accept the statements of British experts as to the position in this area as necessarily correct. There were other experts from among the tribes whose evidence could be, and had been, heard, and if—as he thought was the only proper course—it was decided to work on the basis of tribal diras, it would be possible to send out an international commission or some such impartial body to decide questions of fact on the spot.

Mr. RENDEL and SIR ANDREW RYAN pointed out that both sides were aiming at a rational geographical boundary and were agreed as to the necessity for an elucidation of the relevant facts. His Majesty's Government were just as anxious as the Saudi Government to arrive at these facts, and they had now obtained a great mass of material on the subject. The case hardly seemed one in which an international commission could accomplish useful work in the Ruba-al-Khali, where the population was sparse, wild and nomadic, and where it would hardly be practicable to interrogate tribal leaders; moreover, before the tribal situation was accepted as a basis it would be necessary to decide the exact attribution of all the tribes in question. There were, too, other considerations besides that of tribal diras. Fuad Bey had virtually admitted this by defending the Saudi claim to the Khor-al-Odeid at the first meeting on the ground of its commercial importance to Saudi Arabia. Mr. Rendel and Sir Andrew Ryan went on to express the view that the next stage in the negotiations should be the production by Fuad Bey (for consideration by His Majesty's Government) of the fullest possible information in support of his arguments against the southern sector of the line proposed by His Majesty's Government, and of his contention that the line proposed in his memorandum of the 3rd April (a line running on the south from the intersection of meridian 56° E. and parallel 22° N. to the intersection of meridian 52° E. and parallel 17° N., thence due west along parallel 17 until its intersection with the Anglo-Turkish "violet" line) offered the fairest and most suitable boundary. It would be most convenient if this information were to be supported by a map showing the limits of the diras of the specific tribes claimed by the Saudi Government.

FUAD BEY replied that he could supply this information, if necessary, though it would take a long time, as it could only be obtained in Arabia. For his part he preferred the alternative course, namely, that His Majesty's Government should produce a detailed statement of their criticisms of the line which King Abdul Aziz had proposed. This line had been evolved in accordance with the request made by His Majesty's Government in the preceding autumn for a statement of the King's claims. Much trouble had been taken to collect evidence and to explore the tribal position, and he was convinced that the line was both accurate and fair. King Abdul Aziz had not hesitated to make sacrifices on his side where the facts did not warrant his maintaining his claims, and Fuad Bey cited as an instance the abandonment of the Saudi claim to the Manahil, Ahl Kathir and Muhara [Mahra] sub-tribes (branches of the Da'akeih tribe) although when he had written his book about Arabia a couple of years ago he had claimed them for Saudi Arabia. But no sooner had King Abdul Aziz complied with the request of His Majesty's Government and put forward a statement of his claims, than His Majesty's Government, without even replying to this or stating their objections to it, had put forward an alternative, and quite

inadequate, counter-proposal of their own. This suggested that they had never intended to take King Abdul Aziz's proposals seriously, and were merely trying to strike a bargain, instead of getting at the facts. It seemed to him only just and reasonable that His Majesty's Government should now give their views on the line proposed by King Abdul Aziz, instead of pressing their own counter-suggestion and inviting him to offer his criticisms on it.

Mr. RENDEL regretted that he could not share Fuad Bey's opinion as to the next stage. It had been agreed that while negotiations were in progress no emphasis would be laid on the fact that His Majesty's Government regarded the Anglo-Turkish Blue and Violet lines as defining the strict legal position in regard to the frontier; but he felt bound to point out that the Anglo-Turkish lines did, in fact, form the starting-point for the negotiations. His Majesty's Government had, however, made the most thorough enquiry as to the existing facts, and, as a result, they were now offering important concessions in derogation of the strict legal position; if the Saudi Government were not satisfied it seemed clear, therefore, that it was for them to give their reasons. It was not a question of criticising the proposals as a whole. The line could be divided into various sectors. The sector from the Dohat-as-Salwa to Banaiyan had formed the subject of very full discussion at the first meeting, and Mr. Rendel had explained in detail the reasons for which His Majesty's Government could not accept the claims of King Abdul Aziz in this sector. As regards the corner of the line at Banaiyan, he had already undertaken that Fuad Bey's promised memorandum should be carefully studied. They were now discussing the southern part of the frontier, and as Fuad Bey was demurring to the proposals of His Majesty's Government in this sector of the line as well, it was surely for him to give his reasons and elaborate his views. Apart from these considerations, Mr. Rendel felt that the claims put forward in the Saudi memorandum of last April were so extensive on the south and south-east, and included so vast an area which was manifestly outside the dominions of King Abdul Aziz, that little would be gained by criticising it in detail. He could say at once that His Majesty's Government would never be able to agree to concessions on so immense a scale involving the cession of territory belonging to rulers to whom they were bound by ancient treaties. Moreover, the Saudi claims in the south and the south-east were merely defined in the memorandum, and were not supported by any detailed information such as would be essential if they were to be subjected to detailed criticism. Another point was that the tribes claimed by King Abdul Aziz in the Ruba-al-Khali were (on Fuad Bey's own statement to Sir A. Ryan) only three and part of a fourth in number, whereas the tribes of the Hadhramaut were very numerous. It would therefore be much simpler for the Saudi Government to state the limits which they claimed for the diras of their three and a half tribes than for His Majesty's Government to produce a detailed exposition of the rights of the tribes of the Aden Protectorate and of the other rulers concerned.

SIR ANDREW RYAN then joined Mr. RENDEL in urging Fuad Bey to accept the line which His Majesty's Government had now offered—i.e., from the intersection of the "violet" line of 1914 and parallel 18 to the intersection of meridian 52 and parallel 19—as a basis of negotiation, and to obtain and supply a detailed statement of the views of the Saudi Government upon it.

FUAD BEY insisted that the line proposed by the Saudi Government in fact followed as closely as possible the limits of the diras of the tribes he had mentioned to Sir A. Ryan in April as owing allegiance to King Abdul Aziz. He suggested that it was unreasonable to ask for a further statement regarding them, and repeated that King Abdul Aziz would not be able to give way on any part of the line he claimed. But, after a long further discussion, he eventually agreed to meet the request of the Foreign Office representatives and to supply a further statement of the views of his Government on the southern sector of the proposed boundary.

The meeting then proceeded to discuss the future of the Treaty of Jeddah. This part of the discussion is recorded separately.

*Foreign Office, July 3, 1935.*



[E 4127/318/25]

No. 5.

*Record of Second Part of Third Meeting with Fuad Bey Hamza at the Foreign Office on July 2, 1935.*

THE first part of this meeting was devoted to further discussion of the south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia and is recorded separately. The following were present for the second part of the meeting:—

Mr. Rendel.	Fuad Bey Hamza (Deputy Saudi-Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs).
Sir A. Ryan (His Majesty's Minister at Jedda).	Sheikh Hafiz Wahba (Saudi-Arabian Minister in London).
Mr. Ward.	

At the end of the discussion on the frontier question, Mr. RENDEL enquired whether Fuad Bey Hamza desired to raise any particular questions for discussion at future meetings.

FUAD BEY HAMZA replied that he was anxious to discuss the question of the prolongation of the Treaty of Jedda. He thought that the opportunity should be taken to revise the treaty at the same time; for instance, the description of King Abdul Aziz in it as "His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies" required amendment.

Mr. RENDEL explained that Fuad Bey need have no fear that the change in the title of King Abdul Aziz or of the Saudi Kingdom would affect the validity or authority of the treaty: there were numerous cases where the King of England was described by an obsolete title in treaties which were still binding on the United Kingdom.

Turning to the question of the prolongation of the Treaty of Jedda, Mr. Rendel pointed out that under article 8 it would continue in force indefinitely, unless and until denounced by either party. He felt sure that neither His Majesty's Government nor the Saudi Government would wish to terminate the treaty, which constituted the basis of their present friendly relations with each other, unless there were some better and more up-to-date instrument to put in its place. There would therefore be no particular advantage in formally prolonging it—i.e., in the two parties binding themselves not to denounce it (since neither had any intention of doing so)—unless it were for the purpose of taking the opportunity to modify or abrogate some provision of the existing settlement.

He understood that the main desire of the Saudi Government in making their present proposal was to secure the renunciation by His Majesty's Government of their qualified right to manumit slaves, as set out in the relevant exchange of notes effected at the time of the signature of the main treaty.

FUAD BEY did not dissent from this analysis of the position.

SIR ANDREW RYAN remarked that there were three possibilities:—

- (a) The present treaty could be allowed to go on until the outstanding points at issue had been settled.
- (b) The present treaty could be formally prolonged, the opportunity being taken to make any necessary changes in its provisions.
- (c) Negotiations could be begun for a new treaty.

He considered that if the second course was to be discussed it would be best to begin by trying to reach agreement on the question of slavery and the right of manumission.

Mr. RENDEL observed that it was clearly to the common interest of both the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia to maintain their relations upon a firm and durable basis, and it was only a question of the method by which this should be effected. He doubted whether much would be gained by arranging for the specific prolongation of the treaty until the main questions at issue had been amicably settled, when, no doubt, a new treaty covering all the ground and in

closer harmony with the existing position could be negotiated. But if the present treaty were to be formally prolonged and the right of manumission abandoned as part of the arrangement, it would be necessary in first place, as Sir A. Ryan had pointed out, to reach a clear understanding on the question of slavery.

He pointed out that the abandonment of the right of manumission was a very delicate matter on account of the keen interest taken in the question of slavery by large sections of public opinion in Great Britain. His Majesty's Government had, however, undertaken in the relevant exchange of notes to consider the surrender of this right if certain conditions were fulfilled; and if they could show that those conditions were now fulfilled and that a real improvement had been brought about in the general lot of slaves in Arabia, they would be in a position to justify their action before public opinion. Until this state of affairs came into being, there could be no question of His Majesty's Government agreeing to surrender the right of manumission.

The present position was that Fuad Bey had communicated privately to Sir A. Ryan certain draft Saudi regulations designed to prevent trade in slaves and to ameliorate the condition of existing slaves. These regulations would require to be completed and strengthened in certain particulars before they could be regarded by His Majesty's Government as justifying the proposed concession, and he suggested that it would be most useful if Fuad Bey and Sir A. Ryan could now discuss the draft regulations together in detail, with a view to the Saudi Government making definite proposals on the subject.

FUAD BEY agreed to this course and a meeting was accordingly arranged between him and Sir A. Ryan for the morning of the 3rd July.

*Foreign Office, July 3, 1935.*

[E 4111/77/91]

No. 6.

*Fuad Bey Hamza to Mr. Rendel.—(Received July 3.)*

*Saudi Arabian Legation, London,  
July 2, 1935.*

Dear Mr. Rendel,

I AM very sorry that I was unable to prepare the note I promised you in the course of our conversation on the 25th June on the subject of the line of frontiers in Eastern and Southern Arabia before receiving your letter dated the 27th June. This delay was caused by unavoidable reasons of which you are no doubt aware.

2. I would like to explain most emphatically and sincerely that the line of frontiers given in the note which I had the pleasure to present to Sir Andrew Ryan in Jedda on the 3rd April, 1935 (29th Thil Hijja, 1353), was defined after the most careful investigation into the actual situation at the present moment and after the following important factors have been taken into consideration:—

- (1) The fact that both Governments (the British and the Saudi Arabian) have agreed to put aside the legal question so long as it was possible to reach an honourable agreement, as it was preferable to try to draw a new line for the frontiers which would be acceptable to all parties concerned and which would safeguard the permanent common interests.
- (2) The fact that the Government of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz did not adopt the wide principle which was the basis of her relations with the tribes of the desert which had declared their allegiance and submission to His Majesty the King as the tribes of Da-akeih, viz., Al Manahil, Ahl Kathir and Ahl Mahra—and most of the tribes of Al Manasir, Al Daru', Al 'Awamir, Beni Ghafir and others, but were content to mention the natural boundaries which were at the same time generally recognised by the tribes inhabiting the desert as belonging to the tribes on whose members and lands His Majesty's Government has exercised direct influence for a long period, during which their ordinary members and their sheikhs were actually in His Majesty's service and His Majesty's regular army.



- (3) His Majesty's Government's realisation of the extreme difficulties which may arise as a result of an unjust delineation of the frontiers and particularly the great resentment which the tribes may feel if they were abandoned after having rendered loyal allegiance and submission all these long years and after having built their hopes for the future on the continuity of the system of government devised for them and His Majesty's Government's wish to keep its promise and fulfil its obligations and responsibility towards its subjects and its neighbours.

3. Having outlined to you these fundamental points, I would like to point out that the line of the frontiers which I presented to Sir Andrew Ryan does not contain any exaggeration nor does it leave any room for bargaining or discussion. As I have pointed out above, due note was taken in delineating this line, of the tribal considerations which are generally admitted by the Bedouin population and more especially by those of them who are neutral and are therefore not interested in proving somebody's claim or refuting it.

4. You will no doubt remember what I told you in our last two meetings, that His Majesty's Government fully appreciating the position delegated to me the task of checking the official data concerning the frontiers by taking the evidence of certain neutral persons among the experts of the desert. As a result I became convinced that the line referred to above does not exceed the true state of affairs and that the wells of Banaiyan, Sufuq, Battha and Bataihin belong to the Ahl Murra.

5. I would like to explain to you now certain details concerning the places and wells belonging to the tribes which would make it easier to understand.

- (1) Al Aqal wells, *i.e.*, Aqal-an-Nakhla, Aqal-ar-Rimth, &c., are commonly used by Murra and Qatar tribes.
- (2) Duwaihah belongs to the Manasir tribe.
- (3) Mijan and Sabakha Matti are shared in common by both the Murra and the Manasir tribes.
- (4) Banaiyan, Sufuq, Khashm, Turfa, Battha, and Bataihin are wells belonging exclusively to the Murra tribe.
- (5) Arada is the first place belonging to the Manasir in the west between Banaiyan and Qufak-al-Liwa.
- (6) Bainuna is a well belonging to the Manasir tribe, but other Bedouin tribes use it.

6. I hope that these details may be of interest to you and may ultimately help you to form a general idea about the frontier line, which will, in the end, lead to a satisfactory settlement of the issue.

Sincerely yours,  
FUAD HAMZA.

[E 4218/318/25]

No. 7.

*Record of the Fourth Meeting with Fuad Bey Hamza at the Foreign Office on July 5, 1935.*

THE following were present:—

Mr. Rendel.  
Sir A. Ryan.  
Mr. Laithwaite, India Office.  
Mr. Ward.  
Mr. Malcolm.

Fuad Bey Hamza.  
Sheikh Hafiz Wahba.

# I.

The first subject to be discussed was the question of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia.

MR. RENDEL said that no further progress appeared for the moment to be possible, and that it was now for each side to consider the arguments put forward by the other. His Majesty's Government, for their part, would await

the statement which Fuad Bey had promised at the last meeting regarding the *diras* or tribal areas of the three and a half tribes claimed by King Abdul Aziz, with particular reference to the southern sector of the boundary proposed by His Majesty's Government. Mr. Rendel said that it would be particularly useful if Fuad Bey could accompany this statement with a map which could show roughly (in, say, gradations of shading or colour) the areas claimed as exclusively, predominantly or only partially inhabited, or wandered over, by particular tribes.

FUAD BEY HAMZA explained that he would have difficulty in meeting this latter request, but that he hoped shortly to have ready a list of over 150 names of wells, water-holes, &c., showing to which tribes and sections or sub-sections of tribes they were regarded as belonging.

MR. RENDEL expressed the hope that the statement might be available as soon as possible; but he explained that it would, of course, have to be referred to the British authorities in the Gulf and at Aden, so that it might be some weeks before His Majesty's Government could reply to it.

# II.

MR. RENDEL then said that he wished to speak to Fuad Bey about the Saudi blockade of Koweit, or rather, since Fuad Bey did not like that term, about the problem of the economic relations between Saudi Arabia and Koweit. He began by outlining to Fuad Bey the information contained in the latest telegrams from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf regarding the position reached in the local conference which had recently been taking place at Koweit between the delegates of the sheikh and those of King Abdul Aziz. It appeared from these telegrams that, while the King was ready to adopt the Sheikh of Koweit's suggestion of a customs and manifest system, he had instructed the Saudi delegates to insist as a condition that the Sheikh of Koweit should give a guarantee that no single smuggler from Koweit would be allowed to cross the border. In the event of this guarantee failing on more than three occasions to prove effective, the Saudi Government would terminate any agreement reached. This guarantee the Koweit delegates had naturally been unable to give. They had, however, promised to give instead an undertaking on Koweit's honour that Koweit would do her best to stop smuggling. At this stage the Saudi delegates had explained that they had no authority to go beyond the King's orders. They had consequently closed down the negotiations and returned to Nejd.

Mr. Rendel pointed out that there was no legal obligation on a country having low tariffs to prevent smuggling into a country whose tariffs were high. The problem was one of frequent occurrence and, to take an example on a very much larger scale, had occurred between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the days of prohibition in the United States. On that occasion His Majesty's Government, though under no legal obligation to prevent the export of liquor to the United States, had, in the interests of good relations, voluntarily agreed to come to an arrangement under which they co-operated to check liquor smuggling. In a small way the position was analogous in Koweit, where the sheikh had now offered to co-operate for the purpose of checking smuggling into Saudi Arabia. But it was quite impossible for any country, even the most highly organised, to guarantee not to allow a single smuggler through. The Saudi Government's demand could therefore only be described as unreasonable. Mr. Rendel regretted that the conference should have broken down in this unsatisfactory manner when agreement appeared to have been reached on the main problem. He wished to repeat that this question of Koweit-Saudi relations was one to which His Majesty's Government attached particular importance. It was one of the main objects of His Majesty's Government to ensure that Saudi relations with Koweit should now be regularised and set right on the same lines as had been so successfully followed in the case of Saudi relations first with Iraq and then with Transjordan. He hoped, therefore, that Fuad Bey might be able to arrange for the conference to be resumed.

MR. LAITHWAITE also stressed the desire of the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India to see this result achieved and the great importance which they attached to the disposal of the question. As regards the Saudi Government's insistence on a guarantee, Mr. Laithwaite said that it seemed



clear from the history of the last few years that the Saudi Government were in a position to impose an effective blockade on the land frontier of Koweit and to deal with any persons who might be caught smuggling across that land frontier. That being so, a demand on Koweit for a guarantee such as had been suggested would seem, to say the least of it, superfluous. He drew Fuad Bey's attention to the fact that if the Saudi Government's demands were to be made public they could not fail to show King Abdul Aziz in an invidious light, and indeed might well give the impression that he was not really seeking a settlement. Mr. Laithwaite added that the Saudi delegates' difficulties in negotiating, even with the help of the telegraph, were of course understood by His Majesty's Government, but he reminded Fuad Bey that Koweit was ready to promise on her honour to do her best to stop the smuggling, and he made it clear that His Majesty's Government for their part would do all in their power to ensure that this undertaking was observed. He trusted therefore that Fuad Bey would be able to suggest some way in which the Saudi Government could be induced to relax their insistence on an absolute guarantee.

FUAD BEY HAMZA, in reply, explained that, while the Saudi Legation had received some information as to the progress of the negotiations at Koweit, they were not yet in possession of full details as to the points on which those negotiations had broken down. The information now given to him helped to make the position clearer. He now understood that the following proposals had been made:—

- (a) A system of customs posts through which trade would be canalised.
- (b) A system of manifests to be operated in conjunction with the system of customs posts.
- (c) An honourable undertaking by Koweit to do all she could to prevent smuggling across the Saudi border.

This having been confirmed, Fuad Bey undertook to make enquiries by telegraph of his Government and expressed the hope that he would shortly be in a position to make some statement on the matter.

At this point Mr. Laithwaite withdrew.

### III.

The meeting then proceeded to discuss the future of the Treaty of Jedda and the connected question of the suggested abandonment by His Majesty's Government of their right of manumission.

Mr. RENDEL said that he wished first of all to dispose of a misunderstanding to which Fuad Bey had given expression in conversation with Sir L. Oliphant on the previous day. It appeared that Fuad Bey had gained the impression during the conversations which were held in London in September 1934, that His Majesty's Government had declared their willingness to renew the Treaty of Jedda in the manner now proposed by the Saudi Government, but that Fuad Bey had now found, to his surprise and regret, that they had since changed their minds. Mr. Rendel said he was satisfied, and had confirmed from the records of the 1934 conversations, that Fuad Bey was under a misapprehension on this point. His Majesty's Government had never taken any decision about the future of the Treaty of Jedda, and had not gone back on anything that had been said to Fuad Bey on that subject last year. He cited once more the three possibilities which had been discussed in 1934 and which had again been quoted by Sir A. Ryan at the meeting held on the 2nd July. Of these three, the negotiation of an entirely new treaty covering all points at issue and drawn up in accordance with present conditions naturally seemed the most workmanlike. This could, however, only take place when the major questions now outstanding had been settled, and as it now looked as though a settlement of these questions might take longer than had at first been anticipated, the conclusion of such a new comprehensive treaty might in consequence be delayed for a considerable time. This being so he could see no objection in principle to the prolongation of the present treaty in the way suggested by Fuad Bey Hamza, if agreement could be reached in regard to any modifications of the provisions of the Jedda settlement which it was desired at the same time to introduce. Mr. Rendel reminded Fuad Bey that it had been agreed at a previous meeting that the principal topic to be

discussed before the Jedda settlement could be prolonged and amended in this way was the question of slavery in relation to His Majesty's right of manumission. He drew attention once more to the strength of public and parliamentary opinion in this country on the subject of slavery, and of the important influence of the anti-slavery societies. It was therefore essential that His Majesty's Government should be able to justify any decision which they might reach to abandon their right of manumission, on the lines contemplated in the original exchange of notes, by being able to show that a new situation now existed in Arabia which rendered the maintenance of that right inappropriate or unnecessary. He added, speaking personally and unofficially, that the draft anti-slavery regulations which Fuad Bey had communicated privately to Sir A. Ryan seemed to him to provide a hopeful basis for further discussion. It had not yet, however, been possible to submit the details of these proposals to the Secretary of State and it would be necessary, before any undertaking could be given to the Saudi Government, to submit to Sir Samuel Hoare a detailed statement showing the precise scope of the proposed Saudi regulations. It was only thus that Ministers would be able to judge whether the new arrangements would be sufficient to enable them to make an adequate defence in Parliament for the abandonment by His Majesty's Government of this important and well-known right. Mr. Rendel suggested that it would be of great assistance from the point of view of further progress if Fuad Bey Hamza could give a firm undertaking that King Abdul Aziz would, when the time came, be ready to promulgate regulations on the lines of those now under discussion.

SIR ANDREW RYAN then explained the progress which he had been able to make on the previous day in a conversation with Fuad Bey Hamza (see separate record in E 4163/325/25) and gave it as his opinion, subject to one or two difficult points, that a promising position had now been reached as regards slavery. There were, however, other points which needed consideration in connexion with the future of the Treaty of Jedda, some of which had already been raised by the Saudi Government. He mentioned the question of the arms traffic as an example. He pointed out, however, that, if only in view of the close questioning which His Majesty's Government must be prepared to face, the problem of slavery was the most serious.

FUAD BEY HAMZA again pressed for an assurance that His Majesty's Government would in principle be prepared to prolong the Treaty of Jedda.

Mr. RENDEL replied that, while he was not yet authorised to give a formal assurance to this effect, he did not think that His Majesty's Government would be likely to raise any objection in principle to an exchange of notes which would amount to a declaration that neither party would denounce the Treaty of Jedda for a period of years, provided that, as he had said before, agreement could be reached on any modification in the provisions of the settlement which the Saudi Government wished to take this opportunity to secure.

The discussion then reverted to the question of slavery and manumission.

FUAD BEY HAMZA explained that this question could only be pursued on a basis of complete confidence between the two parties. He realised that His Majesty's Government would require to have advance knowledge of the anti-slavery legislation which the Saudi Government intended to promulgate. He doubted, however, whether the Saudi Government would be willing to communicate the exact terms of the proposed legislation to His Majesty's Government. He suggested that His Majesty's Government should be content with an understanding as to what should be covered by the legislation and leave the actual drafting to the Saudi Government. Fuad Bey again emphasised the importance of avoiding any impression that internal Saudi legislation was being carried out at the dictation of His Majesty's Government.

Mr. RENDEL explained that His Majesty's Government fully realised the importance of avoiding this impression. On the other hand, they must be in a position adequately to defend their abandonment of the right of manumission, and this could only be done if the legislation, in consideration of which the right of manumission would, in fact, be abandoned, could be regarded as satisfactory. They could not, therefore, give any undertaking about the eventual abandonment of their right without precise knowledge of the provisions of the contemplated



legislation. It was, however, just as much in the interest of the Saudi Government as of His Majesty's Government that the legislation should be actually enacted before His Majesty's Government abandoned their right of manumission, since if His Majesty's Government could say that new legislation had been voluntarily enacted by King Abdul Aziz and that a new situation had thereby been produced, and actually existed, which justified them in abandoning their right of manumission, it would look far less as though a bargain had been struck than if the right of manumission were abandoned simultaneously with, or in advance of, the promulgation of the legislation in question.

FUAD BEY HAMZA explained that the Saudi Government must have a private guarantee that if the legislation were passed His Majesty's Government would then abandon their right of manumission.

SIR A. RYAN restated the procedure, which he himself had had in mind and which, if adopted, would involve three stages, viz., (1) a private but binding agreement that, if the Saudi Government promulgated legislation on certain lines, His Majesty's Government would renounce the right of manumission; (2) the promulgation of the Saudi legislation; and (3) the public renunciation of the right of manumission as part of the suggested arrangements for prolonging the validity of the Treaty of Jeddah.

MR. RENDEL saw no difficulty in regard to the private guarantee suggested by Fuad Bey provided His Majesty's Government were satisfied as to the nature of the legislation. Indeed, if they were not, the position would be impossible, as they would not then be able to make an adequate defence before Parliament of their abandonment of their right. Although the exchange of notes might not actually need ratification, and Parliament was not technically concerned with ratifications, it would be necessary for any new agreement to be laid before Parliament, and it would never do if parliamentary criticism could not be adequately met. On the other hand, if His Majesty's Government were supplied with full and precise information as to the contemplated legislation, Ministers would then be able to judge whether that legislation would enable them to meet parliamentary criticism and to carry Parliament with them when the right of manumission came to be abandoned. The question whether the modification of a treaty instrument which had been ratified would itself need ratification—i.e., whether the proposed exchange of notes would have to be subject to ratification—was a question somewhat outside his province, on which the necessary technical advice would be obtained.

FUAD BEY HAMZA then said that if His Majesty's Government, rather than prolong the Treaty of Jeddah as proposed, preferred to wait until an entirely new treaty could be negotiated, or for any other reason did not wish to prolong the treaty in the manner now proposed, the Saudi Government would not object. In that event, he suggested that the question of slavery and manumission could be simply dealt with in a separate exchange of notes without bringing in the Treaty of Jeddah at all.

MR. RENDEL pointed out that this was an entirely new suggestion, and doubted whether it would be a satisfactory one. In practice the Jeddah settlement, i.e., the Treaty of Jeddah and notes attached thereto, had always been treated as a whole. There might well be serious objections to any attempt to deal with the settlement piecemeal, and he thought that His Majesty's Government would probably prefer Fuad Bey's original suggestion, that the Treaty of Jeddah should be prolonged and agreed modifications introduced by an exchange of notes covering all the ground.

This led to a further discussion of the prolongation or modification of the exchange of notes (Nos. 5 and 6) regarding purchases of arms by the Saudi Government.

MR. RENDEL suggested, and FUAD BEY agreed, that this was a point of form rather than of substance. There was no question of His Majesty's Government treating the Saudi Government in a less favourable way than any other friendly country in a similar position. The question of arms traffic was not dealt with in his department, and he would have to consult the competent authorities before saying more than this. By the words "in a similar position" he meant

there were certain countries where, in the interests of the Governments concerned, it had been internationally agreed that arms should only be supplied to the Governments themselves or to importers specifically approved by those Governments. The intention of this arrangement had been to prevent arms being used by rebel tribesmen, and he cited the revolt of Ibn Rifada as one where the limitation of the import of arms to approved importers operated to the advantage of King Abdul Aziz. If then there were some such general international limitation applicable to countries in the same position as Saudi Arabia, he did not think any difficulty need be caused by provision being made for it in any arrangements between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government. It would be time enough, however, to decide what were the most suitable arrangements on this point when agreement had been reached on the main question of the prolongation of the Jeddah settlement and of the abandonment of His Majesty's Government's right of manumission.

An allusion was also made to the question of the prevailing language of the treaty.

MR. RENDEL said that this was also mainly a formal and technical point on which the competent authorities would have to be consulted in due course.

At the conclusion of the meeting SIR A. RYAN undertook to produce a single comprehensive statement of the position reached in his discussions on slavery with Fuad Bey, showing the lines on which the Saudi Government might be prepared to legislate. Steps might also be taken, he thought, to consult other departments of the Foreign Office regarding the arms traffic and the technical questions of form that had been mentioned.

[E 4207/1217/25]

No. 8.

*Fuad Bey Hamza to Mr. Rendel.—(Received July 8.)*

*Saudi Arabian Legation,  
London, July 6, 1935.*

My dear Mr. Rendel,

SINCE I received your letter dated the 27th June, 1935, on the subject of aircraft on the Hasa coast, I have been in correspondence with the proper authorities in His Majesty's Government; and now I am in a position to communicate to you my observations on the points raised by you.

2. I consider that it is above all things essential to separate the negotiations regarding permission for the aircraft of the Royal Air Force from those relating to permission for the machines of Imperial Airways. The negotiations relating to permission for the latter must be on the customary lines adopted in the case of other commercial companies. And my Government is prepared at all times to meet the representatives of Imperial Airways and to discuss with them the most satisfactory method of giving effect to their requirements. Our own discussions, however, must be limited to the aircraft belonging to the Royal Air Force.

3. I consider it essential that permission for the aircraft of the Royal Air Force should be in accordance with a clear agreement in the form of a contract or convention for a fixed period, in which should be set forth in detail the matters which may or may not be undertaken. It is, in my opinion, exceedingly difficult, and, indeed, contrary to our interests to grant a general unconditional permission, however simple or easy the services to be rendered may be.

4. And similarly I consider that it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to grant permission in any form whatever for the enjoyment of rights over its territories or waters without consideration. It is essential therefore that provision should be included in the convention for a fixed annual payment.

5. And further I have been informed that His Majesty's Government is unable to agree that the Royal Air Force should undertake operations in the matter of the working out or repairing of landing-grounds or the setting up of a beacon. They regard therefore as essential that all such works should be undertaken by themselves on the basis of plans, in accordance with which the carrying out of such works is required. It is therefore desirable to specify within the terms of the proposed convention both the works to be undertaken and the intervals of time to be prescribed for their inspection and repair.



6 I wish to explain to you that these are the preliminary considerations which have been adopted by my Government and that they are for the safeguarding of the permanent interests of both parties as well as for the avoidance of any possible misunderstanding or misinterpretation in the future.

Yours very sincerely,  
FUAD HAMZA.

[E 4314/77/91]

No. 9.

*Statement of the Wells and Territories of Ahl Murra.—(Communicated by Fuad Bey Hamza, July 8, 1935.)*

THE territories of Ahl Murra begin from the boundaries of Ahl 'Awamir and Bani Ghafr in the neighbourhood of Al Khatin and Al Kidan and extend to Al Dhafra and Al Saih. The last-named is a level plain containing wells and separating the southern and eastern mountain tracts from the heavy sands to the north. The tract of Al Saih belongs to the tribes of Da'kaih, while the sands to its north belong to Ahl Murra, including Bujaih and Al Dimnan.

2. The wells recognised among the tribes as belonging to Ahl Murra in the Rub'-al-Khali and the heavy sands are as follows:—

1. Bir Fadhl.	43. Buraidan.	85. Al Wutaid.	124. Abu 'Adham.
2. Al Qasab.	44. Barzan.	86. Qadha.	125. Abu Khabb.
3. Mubaiha.	45. Al Si'ad.	87. Al Qaliba.	126. Sawad-al-Butan.
4. Maqainama.	46. Majhud.	88. Al Hafair.	127. 'Air.
5. Al Tuwairifa.	47. Al Barida.	89. Bir-al-'Awamir.	128. Farwada.
6. Fadhila.	48. Janha.	90. Bajran.	129. Abu Fulnj.
7. Al 'Ubaila.	49. 'Atiya.	91. Umm-al-'Id.	130. Abu Khash.
8. Ibrahimia.	50. Abu Jawabi.	92. Al Qudairat.	131. Mu'assam.
9. Farja.	51. Abu Sibl.	93. Mubarak.	132. Manjurat-bin-Sa'd.
10. Manjurat Nasir.	52. Tuwairisha.	94. Abu Arzila.	
11. Faris.	53. Khamr-al-Dawni.	95. Busaih.	133. Marfa.
12. Naifa.	54. Al Tuwairifa.	96. Sa'qa.	134. Ma 'Alya.
13. Ain Sala.	55. Jurairan.	97. Khartam.	135. Khamr Afda.
14. Al Pazra.	56. Muballita.	98. Dhahiya.	136. Al Saliba.
15. Dabbaba.	57. Khiran.	99. Al Kharkhir.	137. Sabkhat Kardus.
16. Bir Nifi.	58. Al Sharaya.	100. Ummiyat-al-Ghanam.	138. Bahat-al-Salimi.
17. Zain'aba.	59. 'Alya.	101. Bal Ashus.	139. Qamqaima.
18. Bainha.	60. Al Tuwail.	102. Ma-bin-Fari'a.	140. Khaur.
19. Al Baha.	61. Abu Dabbagh.	103. Mulaibiya.	
20. 'Aqariban.	62. Al 'Ayaina.	104. Bal Afu.	141. Abu Jarada.
21. Bahat-al-Hairan.	63. Sabkhat-al-'Ajaiz.	105. Al Turaid.	142. Al Qarraf.
22. Bahat-al-Qatl.		106. Washna.	143. Abu Aiba.
23. Sabkhat Nura.	64. Sa'ida.	(? Shanna).	144. Ibn 'Tubai'.
24. Abu Shidad.	65. Al Qara.		145. 'Arqab.
25. MuZairiq.	66. Bal Dhiban.	107. Bir Salim (ibn Suwasim?).	146. Khaur-al-'Afu.
26. Al Dakma.	67. Abu Farais.		147. Qarkham.
27. Muqairin.	68. Mab'uth.	108. Ladhani.	148. Al 'Aridh.
28. Al Turaiqa.	69. Manjura.	109. Sabgha.	149. Al Zughain.
29. Al Qarain.	70. Al 'Udaina.	110. Waqawin.	150. Baidhat-al-Hayaya.
30. Al Butain.	71. Qudhaiyan.	111. Al Ka'ami.	
31. Buralka.	72. Al Dhibi.	112. Abu Madain.	151. Jamshan.
32. Sabkhat-al-Dhiba.	73. Bunnaiyan.	113. Mufaitih.	152. Al Taraiz.
	74. Bakbra.	114. Taiyib Ism.	153. Khaur-al-Rabi'.
33. Julaimida.	75. Bir 'Aziz.	115. Al Qu'da.	154. Al Mashyan.
34. Dhabiya.	76. Hidba.	116. Abu Riqa.	155. Ibn-al-Tuhatha.
35. Bahja.	77. 'Ata.	117. Bir Hadi.	156. Al Sharit.
36. Musa'ida.	78. Al Bahth.	118. Al Harsha.	157. Umm-al-Hadid.
37. Fajafaj.	79. Nudqan.	119. Bid' Mubarak.	158. Ziqit.
38. Al 'Usaila.	80. Jarwan.	120. Al Hara.	159. Zuwaira.
39. Al Makbrog.	81. Umm-al-Jira.	121. Al Khashbi.	160. Mamura.
40. Umm Rikh.	82. Khuwaitima.	122. Sabkhat-bin-Rushdan.	161. Turaiwa.
41. Hirra.	83. Wasi'a.		
42. Buraid.	84. Sahban.	123. Abu Hayai.	

*Saudi Arabian Legation, London.*

[E 4243/350/25]

No. 10.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Mr. Calvert (Jedda).*

(No. 191.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 11, 1935.*

WITH reference to Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 148 of the 14th May last, I have to inform you that His Royal Highness the Amir Saud, accompanied by Fuad Bey Hamza (Saudi Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs), Dr. Midhat Sheikh Al Ardth (personal physician), a secretary and two personal attendants (described for the purposes of the visit as aides-de-camp), arrived in England on the 17th June. The Saudi Arabian Minister in London and his first secretary, M. Mahmoud Riyad Zada, were also included in His Royal Highness's suite for the official part of the visit. The date of the Amir's arrival was changed at the suggestion of Sheikh Hafiz Wahba from Saturday, the 15th June (as originally proposed), to the following Monday, the 17th June, in order to avoid beginning the visit at the end of a week.

2. As you are aware, the Amir, with his suite, was the guest of His Majesty's Government for two weeks from the day of his arrival. The period of official hospitality ended at noon on the 1st July, but His Royal Highness is prolonging his stay in a private capacity in this country until towards the end of the present month.

3. The Amir was received on his arrival at Dover Harbour with a Royal salute of twenty-one guns. A military guard of honour was mounted on the pier, and His Royal Highness was formally welcomed by the mayor and corporation of Dover and by the secretary, Government Hospitality, on behalf of His Majesty's Government. The Amir proceeded at once by train to London, where he was received at Victoria Station by the Lord-in-Waiting, representing His Majesty the King, Mr. J. B. Monck, on behalf of myself, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and a considerable number of other persons, including representatives of the Moslem community in the United Kingdom.

4. The Amir Saud was accommodated with his suite at the Hyde Park Hotel, and a full programme of engagements was arranged for his entertainment. Two copies of the official printed programme for the visit are enclosed herein for your information; (1) they have been amended in manuscript so as to show the changes made in the original programme to suit the wishes or convenience of His Royal Highness.

5. The King had originally intended to receive the Amir Saud in formal audience on the 25th June, but owing to His Majesty's indisposition the audience was postponed until the 29th June. The Amir had, however, an opportunity of meeting the Queen and members of the Royal Family on the 20th June when he visited the races at Ascot, where he took luncheon with Her Majesty and the Royal party and subsequently watched the races from the Household Stand. His Royal Highness, accompanied by Fuad Bey Hamza and an aide-de-camp, also attended the Third Court at Buckingham Palace on the 25th June and stood upon the Royal dais in the ballroom.

6. I received the Amir, accompanied by the Saudi Arabian Minister in London and Fuad Bey Hamza, at the Foreign Office on the day after his arrival. No political questions were touched upon at this interview, but advantage is being taken of the presence of the Saudi Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs in this country to discuss outstanding political questions with his Excellency and Sheikh Hafiz Wahba. Copies of the records of the various meetings which have taken place at the Foreign Office for this purpose are being sent to you under separate cover, but I enclose herein two copies of a statement (1) which, with the agreement of Fuad Bey Hamza, was given out to the press in order to correct certain mis-statements which had appeared in regard to the object of His Royal Highness's visit to this country.

7. On the 27th June I entertained the Amir Saud and the principal members of his suite at a dinner at the Foreign Office to which were invited members of His Majesty's Government, senior officers of His Majesty's Services and other prominent persons interested in Arabian affairs. Two copies of the printed table plan for the dinner are enclosed herein to show the actual attendance at the dinner. (1)

(1) Not printed.



8. Some difficulty was experienced in finding a suitable decoration to be conferred on the Amir, in view of the undesirability of giving him a decoration superior in status to the Grand Cross of the Order of the Indian Empire held by his father King Abdul Aziz. It was finally decided that the Order of the British Empire would be most suitable, and the Grand Cross of that Order (Military Division) was bestowed on the Amir Saud on the 1st July. Later in the same day minor decorations of the Order of the British Empire were presented to the following members of the Amir's suite:—

Dr. Midhat Sheikh Al Ardth, O.B.E.

Muhammad Sheykh, M.B.E.

Fahd-bin-Kreydis, M.B.E.

Saleh-al-Ali, M.B.E.

Fuad Bey Hamza being already a Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire (awarded on the occasion of the visit of the Amir Feisal in 1932), it was not practicable to confer another decoration on him on the present occasion. Arrangements have, however, been made for him to receive a piece of plate as a souvenir of the visit.

9. The Amir Saud has throughout his stay in this country created an excellent impression by his pleasant manners and courteous demeanour. Unfortunately, as a result of the previous visits to Italy, France, Holland and Belgium, the Amir was already tired on his arrival in this country, and in order to spare his health a number of engagements and projected visits had to be cancelled. The secretary of the Government Hospitality has, however, undertaken to assist the Saudi Legation as far as possible after the termination of the period of official hospitality, and at the request of Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, who is anxious that the educative side of His Royal Highness's visit shall not be neglected, arrangements have been made for the Amir to visit the Humber motor works at Coventry, a hospital, a London County Council school, and the offices of the *Times* newspaper during the present month. It was originally intended that the Amir should make a short tour in Scotland, but this project has now been abandoned; it is, however, still possible that he will leave London for a few days in order to visit some industrial concerns in northern England or the Midlands.

10. Arrangements have also been made with the co-operation of the Government Hospitality Fund for the Amir to attend as an official guest the Royal Jubilee Reviews of the navy, of the army and of the air force.

I am, &c.

SAMUEL HOARE.

[E 4333/557/25]

No. 11.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 15.)*

(No. 194.)

Sir,

Jedda, July 1, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for June 1935.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 11.

JEDDA REPORT FOR JUNE 1935.

I.—Internal Affairs.

180. The King passed the month in Nejd, where he may be expected to remain for the rest of the year. It is sufficiently unusual to deserve mention that his movements have remained completely unrecorded by the Saudi press during June.

181. For otherwise those of the Amir Saud, whose European journey has been copiously written up and whose progress from banquet to review and on to banquet, through Italy, France, Holland and Belgium to England, where he arrived on the 17th June, has been carefully chronicled.

182. Amir Feisal remained at Taif and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was as much in the hands of the caretaker as at the end of May (see paragraph 139).

183. It was reported that another of the sons of Ibn Saud, the Amir Mansur, recently met with an accident whilst motoring. It was said that he was standing beside a stationary car when a second car, passing too close to the first, ran over his feet. It is not known how serious was the injury, but Ibn Saud's rage was such that the offending driver would, it is stated, have paid for the accident with his life if it had not been for the magnanimous intercession of Amir Mansur himself.

184. The administrative changes foreshadowed in paragraph 140 of the report for last month were announced during June. The post at Jedda of kaimakam, it is true, was not filled and Sheikh Muhammad Id Ar-Rawwaf's position, according to a correction issued in the *Saut-al-Hejaz* of an earlier communiqué, is that of deputy kaimakam only. The changes include:—

Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Muammar, from Amir of Taif to Amir of Al Aflaj in the Wadi Dawasir, and Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Muammar, from Amir of Jedda to Amir of Taif. The Acting Amir of Medina, Sheikh Abdul Aziz-bin-Ibrahim, was reported early in June to have returned there and resumed charge (reference paragraph 141).

185. The *Umm-al-Qura* announced on the 28th June the death of the Amir of Jizan, Sheikh Hamad Ash-Shuwayir. He was carried off by a fever. The same issue contained a high decree sanctioning the appointment of Sheikh Saud Ash-Shuwayir as deputy Amir of that place. Little was known of Sheikh Hamad Ash-Shuwayir, except that he occasionally came to notice in connexion with Asir and the military operations there of last year (see paragraph 189 below).

186. The Saudi Government have decided to establish police posts at Tebuk, Dhaba and Umm Lejj under the following officers: Seyyid Naji, Murad Effendi Al Turjaman and Muhammad Effendi Nijmi respectively. These officers are expected to proceed shortly to their posts from Mecca.

187. Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman, the Minister of Finance, visited Jedda on the 21st June to preside at the official inaugural ceremony of the new Jedda customs building. Local notables and Government officials composed the assemblage and speeches laudatory of Ibn Saud were delivered. No foreign representatives were, as far as is known, invited. The new building is said to be commodious and a great improvement on the former premises.

188. The Minister of Finance, in his other capacity of Deputy Minister of Defence, is said to have been active during the month in effecting the concentration of stocks of ammunition and other Government munitions in Taif. Consignments of ammunition are reported to have arrived from Asir, but these reports are a little difficult to reconcile with recent prevalent rumours of the situation in that province.

189. On or about the 26th June some 300 Saudi soldiers left Jedda by the launch *Riyadh* for Qunfidha and Jizan. In official circles this movement was represented as a normal one of garrison relief in Asir. Rumour, however, was persistent that trouble had recently arisen over the collection of "Zakat" from the tribes and that Saudi tax gatherers, to the number of fifteen, had been killed by the Beni Malik or the Abadil. The same rumourists would have us believe that the late Amir of Jidan, Sheikh Hamad Ash-Shuwayir (*vide* paragraph 185 above) did not die of a fever, but met a violent end at the hands of the Masariha tribe.

190. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 7th June contained particulars of a new project, the "Mashru-al-Qirsh," the piastre project, on the model of a recent Egyptian experiment. The funds collected by this enterprise were to be devoted to objects of national concern. The article was suitably vague and it is doubtful whether the project will ever amount to anything.

191. Mr. Twitchell arrived in Jedda by sea from Yanbu on the 30th June, accompanied by Mr. E. D. McDermott, a director of the syndicate, and a Mr. Shanks, of whom the former is believed to be leaving for England by next



boat. It is credibly reported that a subsidiary company to the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate is about to be formed.

192. A recent feature of considerable economic significance has been the steady appreciation of the Saudi silver riyal over the past few months. The selling rates of exchange for rials per £ gold during the last three months have been as follows:—

	Rials.
April 1	21
May 1	20½
June 1	20
June 30	17, 18

Whether the rise may be attributed to a tendency to hoard silver currency by the inhabitants of this country with the object of taking advantage of a better rate on the approach of the pilgrimage season, an explanation which it is difficult to accept, or to the rise in the price of the metal in the world's silver markets, or to some undetected economic influence, the effect on the cost of living of foreign residents in this country has already become appreciable. (In this connexion, *vide* paragraph 145 of the last report.)

193. Regulations were published on the 21st June and were communicated separately at the same time to the Legation by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs containing a list of the Red Sea ports of Saudi Arabia to which sailing vessels, plying on these coasts, were to be restricted. The measure, which is designed to check smuggling, is virtuous enough though, as far as remoter stretches of coast are concerned, it will probably be impossible of application by the present jejune Saudi preventive administration.

194. Two schools are reported to have been established during the month, a school at Riyadh which, by Royal permission, is to bear the style of the Amir's School, and a primary school at Medina.

195. The narrower austerities of the Wahhabi creed have never flourished in the alien soil of the Hejaz. Observers have recently not been slow to note an increasing latitudinarianism, even beneath the sacred walls of the Holy Haram itself. Committees of Virtue are said to be in process of dismemberment, and the merchant of Mecca and Jedda now devotes himself more sedulously to his commercial than to his religious exercises. Townsfolk smoke freely in the streets of Mecca, and solace their hours of ease in the coffee-houses of their choice with hubble-bubble and a quiet game of "damana." Vocalists are ready at any hour to render such favourite Arab airs as "Dana dana," and gramophones, now that wireless sets have achieved official respectability, are, alas! less muted than before, whilst gramophone records are hawked in the streets. One observer of life in Mecca over many years describes the change over a mere two months as little short of miraculous. In Jedda quarantine officials find it necessary to visit ships in full force, and have been seen to display a healthy, if indiscriminating, taste in beer. Whether this new licence is essentially an expression of release from the toils of a repugnant "Calvinism" no longer for the moment officially enforced, or is due in part to a feeling that better and larger pilgrimages are ahead and the economic depression has now done its worst, one may be permitted to speculate on its permanence. Committees, even of less durable stuff than virtue, die hard.

196. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* of the 25th states that arrangements have been made for a weekly broadcast in the form of a lecture on the subject of Ibn Saud. The newspaper omits to state the station from which the lectures will be broadcast, but private enquiries indicate some station in Java.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

197. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* of the 18th June contained a short article, "received for publication," but from an unspecified source, in which the rumours of Seif-ul-Islam Ahmad of the Yemen's complicity in the attempt on the life of Ibn Saud, in March last, were denied. It was perhaps rather fanciful to feel that the language of the article lacked a little in emphasis. It went on, however, to denounce the mischief-makers responsible for these idle tales and characterised Saudi-Yemen relations as being those of friendship undimmed.

198. The Yemeni found in possession of three bombs (*vide* paragraph 152 of the report for May) is still in the custody of the police and is reported to have been sent on to Riyadh. The man appears to be of a great age, infirm and sick and even hard-boiled police officials are moved to compassion at his senility. There is a disposition to believe his story that he found the bombs, and no great significance is being attached to the matter. It is reported that a strict watch is being kept on all Yemeni residents in this country, and stories are not lacking of high-handedness and brutality by the police authorities. Certain Yemeni suspects are still said to be under lock and key.

199. Another *démenti* appeared in the press when the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 14th June denied a report published in the *Muqattam* that Dhafir tribesmen of Nejd had attacked and looted a number of motor cars in Koweit territory.

200. The Saudi rejoinder to the protest against the armed incursion into Koweit territory, referred to in paragraph 153 of the report for May, was considered by His Majesty's Government, and a reply authorised which whilst firmly maintaining the position taken up in regard to *Zakat* was couched in language calculated to reduce the risk of having to pursue the question further. This reply was addressed to the Saudi Arab Government on the 9th June by Mr. Oppenheim, who was in charge of the Legation during the interval between Sir Andrew Ryan's departure and Mr. Calvert's arrival, and was made simultaneously with action taken with the Saudi authorities in connexion with the Koweit Conference (see paragraph 202 below).

## III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

201. Sir Andrew Ryan left for Cairo by a Royal Air Force Victoria in the early hours of the 7th June, arriving there the same day. The machine had arrived two days earlier, also making the flight in one day. Her officers, Squadron-Leader P. H. Mackworth, D.F.C., F/Lt. J. P. Domville and F/O. M. Sorsbie were given civic receptions at Wejh and Yanbu, but only quarantine and passport officials turned out to greet their arrival in Jedda. On the 6th June the plane was refuelled to the tune of some 300 gallons of petrol, the proceedings being interrupted by a soldier anxious to refuel his cigarette lighter. A cocktail party in honour of the officers was held at the Legation house the evening before departure.

202. After reconsideration of the question of the Koweit Conference (*vide* paragraph 160 of last month's report), His Majesty's Government, desirous that the conference should meet and be able to conclude preliminaries by the 12th June and seeing less serious objection to armed retainers, provided their numbers were restricted, than to "guards," authorised the Legation to inform the Saudi Arab Government that there would be no objection to a party of fifty armed retainers accompanying the Saudi delegation, but that the number was larger than expected and a reduction would be welcome as they were to be the guests of the Sheikh of Koweit. This communication was made to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 9th June, simultaneously with that described in paragraph 200 above.

203. The conference assembled at Koweit on the 16th June, the Saudi delegates being accompanied by no less than eighty odd retainers instead of fifty. The proceedings of the conference soon showed, in spite of a satisfactory beginning, that there was the slenderest hope of success. The Saudi delegation's tone became dictatorial and offensive and the Koweit proposals for a system of customs posts and manifests, referred telegraphically to Ibn Saud, evoked the reply from Riyadh that the only possible condition under which the Saudi Arab Government would adopt the system was for Koweit to give a written guarantee that not a single smuggler from Koweit would cross the border. The inability of Koweit or His Majesty's Government to give so sweeping an undertaking led to little modification of the Saudi terms, and their delegates were expected to leave on the 30th June. Ibn Saud could hardly, it seems, have steered the conference more deliberately on to the rocks.

204. (Reference paragraph 161.) The further supplies of medical stores for the Legation dispensaries arrived early in the month and, upon the refusal of the Jedda customs authorities to allow clearance under diplomatic immunity, customs duty was assessed and paid under protest pending the general settlement of the whole question.



205. (Reference paragraph 126.) The text of the agreement, together with annexures, between the Sudan and Saudi Governments and the two companies, in respect of the cable and wireless services of this country, was published in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 21st June, 1935.

206. On the 12th June the Ministry for Foreign Affairs addressed the Legation stating the desire of the Saudi Arab Government to establish postal communications between Jizan and Kamaran. A thrice-monthly service, by sambuq, was suggested for ordinary and registered letter mail. The question has been referred to His Majesty's Government.

207. (Reference paragraph 93 (d) of the report for March last.) A note was addressed to the Saudi Arab Government on the 25th June in which they were informed that, subject to certain definite reservations, the Saudi nationality law may now be considered applicable to British subjects and British-protected persons, a further extension of six months to allow of submission of proof of foreign nationality having helped to remove the objections previously entertained by His Majesty's Government.

208. The Italian flotilla leader *Pantera* (*vide* paragraph 162) visited Jedda on the 29th June, remaining until the morning of the 1st July. The circumstances surrounding the visit were highly curious. Early in the morning of the 29th she was observed to be lying at anchor in the outer anchorage, an unusual place, where she remained until about 3 p.m., when she entered the inner anchorage, exchanging the customary salutes with the battery on shore. It transpired that early in the morning the captain, accompanied by two stewards, had come ashore in a ship's launch and had landed, the stewards proceeding to the bazaar and the captain enquiring the direction of the Italian Legation. He was, however, prevented from leaving the quarantine quay by the authorities there, as apparently the Saudis had received no official intimation of the ship's visit. The stewards were recalled and after several hours had been spent at the quay, during which time the Italian vice-consul arrived there, it seems that arrangements were made for the ship to come in to the inner anchorage, be subjected to the usual quarantine formalities and exchange a salute of guns. Whatever may be the explanation of this curious episode, and one report accounts for the visit by the alleged interest of the *Pantera* in a Swedish ship in Jedda roads at the same time believed to be carrying munitions of war (later reports state for the Yemen, not for Abyssinia), it is clear that there was a bad Italian blunder somewhere. The Saudi authorities appeared to have acted with great reasonableness.

209. Foreign representation here showed small changes during the month. The Soviet Minister and Mme. Turakoulov left on the 30th June for Asmara on sick leave. It is not yet known who has been left in charge. The new Egyptian consul, Abdul Hamid Monir Bey, arrived after a delay of many months on the 2nd June, and Hasan Abou Alam left for Egypt a few days later.

#### IV.—Miscellaneous.

210. Lady Ryan left Jedda for Aden on the *Jehangir* on the 10th June.

211. Mr. Calvert returned from leave on the 12th, assuming charge from Mr. Oppenheim, who had officiated since the departure of Sir Andrew Ryan on the 7th June.

212. Captain G. S. H. V. de Gaury, M.C. (*vide* paragraphs 132 and 157), left on the 28th for Koweit by car, travelling via Riyadh. The Saudi authorities had acted well up to their promises to facilitate arrangements for his journey.

213. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* published on the 4th June what purported to be the terms of a treaty between the United States of America and the Yemen. It was a short document of five articles providing for recognition of the Yemen, mutual trade and other facilities. It was to remain in force for ten years.

214. The Eastern Telegraph Company's cable ship, *Lady Denison Pender* arrived at Jedda on the 13th to repair a break in the cable to Port Sudan. She left on the 17th.

215. A rumour unusually fantastic but persistent that five Englishmen have recently been murdered in Mecca continues to reach the Legation. It appears to have originated in Vienna, later appearing in the *Echos* of Damascus, the *Wahdat* of Delhi and the *Balagh* of Cairo. It is a fine specimen of the *canard viennois*.

216. (Reference paragraph 135.) The refusal of the Saudi authorities to allow mutawwifs to proceed to the Dutch East Indies has been considerably modified, if not withdrawn, and no similar restrictions have been imposed on mutawwifs proceeding to India, nor is it believed that such are now contemplated. The matter is, however, receiving further attention.

217. The wife and three children of Odello, the Italian merchant mentioned in paragraph 162, arrived on the 30th. This augmentation of the Italian colony makes it a close rival, in point of numbers, of the British colony.

218. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the British Legation was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: Nil.  
Took refuge in June: Nil.  
Manumitted and repatriated: Nil.  
Locally manumitted: Nil.  
Left voluntarily: Nil.  
On hand at the end of the month: Nil.

[E 4421/191/25]

No. 12.

*Record of First Part of Fifth Meeting with Fuad Bey Hamza at the Foreign Office on July 15, 1935.*

THE following were present at the meeting:—

Mr. Rendel.	Fuad Bey Hamza (Deputy Saudi
Sir A. Ryan.	Arabian Minister for Foreign
Mr. Ward.	Affairs).
Mr. Malcolm.	

MR. RENDEL suggested that the meeting should discuss in the first place the situation arising out of the recent conference at Bahrein to consider the question of transit dues on goods imported into the Hasa province of Saudi Arabia through the port or territorial waters of Bahrein. He recalled that the conference had reached a considerable measure of agreement, and that it had subsequently been agreed between Sir A. Ryan and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin at Jedda that its results should be embodied in a formal exchange of notes between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government. As regards the substance of the agreement there appeared to be only two points outstanding, viz.:—

- (1) Whether the Saudi Government were prepared to give an assurance that reciprocal action would be taken by them for the issue of manifests to all vessels leaving their ports for Bahrein.
- (2) What should be the duration of the formal agreement embodying the results attained at the conference.

Mr. Rendel did not think that there would be any difficulty over (1), but (2) was more complicated. The Government of Bahrein felt that they could not bind themselves in perpetuity for a long fixed period not to alter their transit dues, they wished to be able to regain their freedom of action in the event of the economic situation undergoing some unexpected change. In the circumstances His Majesty's Government had suggested that the duration of the agreement might be defined by the following formula:—

"Should economic conditions in Bahrein at any time render necessary a reconsideration of these concessions the Bahrein Government will inform the Saudi Arabian Government and will not withdraw any of these concessions until six months after giving such notice."

This would mean that the agreement would run on indefinitely until six months after notice had been given to terminate its provisions; the Bahrein Government were quite prepared, if the Saudi Government wished it, to amend the formula so as to give the Saudi Government reciprocally a similar right to bring the agreement to an end.

Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had, however, pointed out to Sir A. Ryan that, while the Saudi Government had no objection to the agreement not being of perpetual



duration, they could not agree that any such limitation should apply to the right of vessels calling at Bahrein to take cargo on direct to the Hasa coast. They accordingly desired that the undertaking given by the Bahrein delegates, that the Bahrein Government would not in future repeat the procedure they had adopted in the case of the steamship *Ahmedi*, should be made perpetual, irrespective of the duration of the rest of the agreement.

The insistence of the Saudi Government on this last point had led to a temporary delay in embodying the results of the conference in a general agreement, but Mr. Rendel was now authorised to give Fuad Bey a categorical assurance, on behalf of His Majesty's Government and of the Government of Bahrein, that there would in the future be no penalisation at Bahrein (as in the case of the steamship *Ahmedi*) of vessels carrying cargo direct to the Saudi coast of the mainland. This point could be dealt with, and the above assurance confirmed, in a separate note. The assurance given by the Bahrein delegates on this point would be perpetual in character, and he hoped that this would leave the way clear for the projected exchange of notes.

FUAD BEY HAMZA said that his Government would, of course, have no objection to instituting a system of manifests for vessels sailing between their ports and Bahrein; and he thought that the assurance which the Bahrein Government were ready to give would solve the difficulty arising out of the *Ahmedi* case, to which he knew that King Abdul Aziz attached special importance. But he was not himself familiar with the present state of the question, having left Jedda before the latest discussions, and would therefore have to refer the matter to the King.

Some discussion followed upon the procedure which should be followed in drawing up the formal agreement to embody the results of the conference. It was agreed that the perpetual undertaking with reference to the case of the steamship *Ahmedi* should be contained in a separate note, while the other results of the conference would be embodied in an exchange of notes between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Government, to be exchanged either in London or in Jedda. The Foreign Office would endeavour to produce the necessary drafts for Fuad Bey to see before he left England on the 22nd July. It was, however, explained to Fuad Bey that this might not after all be possible, since the wording of the translation of the Bahreini delegates' letter to the Saudi delegates, recording the position reached in the local conference, appeared to contain some small ambiguities, such as the technical department of the Foreign Office might object to incorporating in an official Anglo-Saudi exchange of notes. The Foreign Office would, however, do their best; but the actual exchange of notes would, in any case, have to be postponed, as Fuad Bey would have to submit the drafts to his Government for their approval.

*Foreign Office, July 18, 1935.*

[E 4422/341/25]

No. 13.

*Record of Second Part of Fifth Meeting with Fuad Bey Hamza at the Foreign Office on July 15, 1935.*

THE first part of this meeting was devoted to a brief discussion of the question of the dues paid on goods imported through Bahrein into Saudi Arabia, and is recorded separately.

The following were present:—

Mr. Rendel.	Fuad Bey Hamza (Deputy Saudi-
Sir A. Ryan.	Arabian Minister for Foreign
Mr. Ward.	Affairs).
Mr. Malcolm.	

*Transjordan-Nejd Frontier.*

MR. RENDEL recalled the protest which the Saudi Government had made, in their note of the 3rd February, 1935, to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, against the use by Transjordan car patrols of the track at a point named

Thaniyya Taraif, and he reminded Fuad Bey that before leaving Jedda Sir A. Ryan had informed the Saudi Government that this question was necessitating exhaustive study owing to defects in the maps, but that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to discuss it with his Excellency Fuad Bey in London. In fulfilment of this promise, Mr. Rendel now wished to explain the situation which had arisen.

Local investigations, which were still proceeding, had shown that many places on the Nejd-Transjordan frontier were not by any means in the positions in which they were shown on the 1918 "International" Asia 1:1,000,000 map, referred to in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement. In fact, that map had now been shown to be very seriously inaccurate. It had been compiled on reports supplied by travellers, but those reports were now being found to have contained progressive errors, which had caused a correspondingly progressive series of inaccuracies in the map. The final result was that many of the features on the 1918 map either were in a totally different position from that shown on the map, or lay in an entirely different relationship towards each other from that shown, or, in some cases, did not exist at all. As a typical example, Mr. Rendel cited the route shown on the map as followed by Carruthers in 1909. This route was shown as passing diagonally from north-west to south-east through an apparent gap between the Jebel Tubeik and a small hill to the east of it called Thaila Maizila, and in this gap it was shown as crossing Captain Shakespeare's route of 1914, so that on the map there was a continuous route round the Jebel Tubeik within Transjordan territory. But it now turned out that there was no such gap, and that the Thaila Maizila was merely a rocky spur of the Jebel Tubeik itself, and an integral part of the Tubeik *massif*.

Mr. Rendel, turning to the map, explained the indications it gave of the main intentions of the negotiators of the Hadda Agreement. It was clear that King Abdul Aziz, on the one hand, had sought to keep the whole of the Wadi Sirhan for Saudi Arabia, and that Sir Gilbert Clayton, on the other hand, had sought to keep for Transjordan the whole of the Jebel Tubeik. This was the only explanation of the general line of the frontier, particularly at its southern end. The natural inference was that Sir G. Clayton, relying on the fact that the map showed Carruthers' and Shakespeare's routes as passing round the eastern end of the Jebel Tubeik, had drawn the southern end of the Transjordan-Nejd frontier, where it is shown on the 1918 map, with the object of leaving the route round the eastern end of the Jebel Tubeik entirely within Transjordan. Now, as Mr. Rendel had said, Carruthers' route had proved an impossibility, since the Jebel Tubeik *massif* and the eminence called Thaila Maizila were all part of the same mountain and there was no practicable gap between them. On the other hand, the British authorities in Transjordan, believing that the Hadda Agreement entitled them to a track round the eastern end of the Jebel Tubeik within Transjordan territory, had naturally made use of the existing track nearest to the mountain. In so far as this track could be plotted at all on the 1918 map, it appeared to go round the eastern end of the bluff known as Thaila Maizila. But this bluff, although shown on the 1918 map as just running over the frontier, apparently lay in a totally different position. Its exact position could not be established without a full and detailed survey of all the other features in the neighbourhood on both sides of the present boundary, and such a survey would certainly have to be carried out before any satisfactory decision could be reached as to where the true frontier really lay.

In order to approach the problem with any hope of success it was necessary to consider the intentions of King Abdul Aziz and Sir G. Clayton; not with a view to changing the frontier, but with a view to securing a true and correct interpretation of the frontier which they were, in fact, trying to establish when they signed the Hadda Agreement. They were both wide-minded and far-seeing men, who would naturally have dealt with the problem on broad and common-sense lines, and who were not likely to be preoccupied with trivial issues; and, in view of the hopeless inaccuracy of the map, particularly in this area, it was only by the criterion of the true intentions of the negotiators that proper effect could be given to the agreement which they had reached. Bearing these considerations in mind, Mr. Rendel thought that there could be no doubt that, just as the projecting edges of the Wadi Sirhan were intended to fall within Saudi Arabia (wherever they might actually lie and however different their true position might be from that shown on the 1918 map), so the track round Thaila Maizila (which



was the nearest approach in fact to the Carruthers and Shakespeare track shown on the 1918 map) should fall within Transjordan.

Mr. RENDEL therefore suggested that the only really effective way of settling this difficult problem would be in the first place to arrange for a full and accurate new survey of the whole area by agreement between both parties. This survey would have to extend over Saudi as well as over Transjordan territory if all the features were to be correctly placed in their true relationship to each other. By this means the true facts would be established. Secondly, it would be necessary to agree as to the main intentions of King Abdul Aziz and Sir G. Clayton, with a view to establishing as nearly as possible exactly what frontier they were trying to lay down. When this had been done, and the facts had been established and a general criterion agreed upon for the interpretation of doubtful points, it would be necessary to appoint a frontier delimitation commission, whose task should be, taking into account these intentions, to mark on the ground and on a full and accurate map, the nearest possible approach to the line which King Abdul Aziz and Sir G. Clayton had tried to lay down.

FUAD BEY asked Mr. Rendel whether he could be furnished with the new data which had led His Majesty's Government to form their present view as to the inaccuracy of the map.

Mr. RENDEL replied that this information was still fragmentary and inconclusive. It had shown quite definitely that the 1918 map was hopelessly wrong. But it had not yet been possible to produce a correct map of the whole area. It was for this purpose that a new survey, extending over both sides of the frontier, would be required.

FUAD BEY observed that, if the intentions of King Abdul Aziz and Sir G. Clayton were to be adopted as a criterion, the Saudi Government would certainly have to press their claim to Hazim. Mr. Rendel had spoken of the projecting edges of the Wadi Sirhan, and this was definitely part of the Wadi Sirhan system. Moreover, King Abdul Aziz had claimed the Jebel Rashrashiya at the head of the Wadi Sirhan, and this had formed the subject of detailed discussion at the time of the negotiations. It had been intended that King Abdul Aziz should have this hill, and Hazim naturally went with it.

Mr. RENDEL pointed out that it was clear from article 1 of the Hadda Agreement that the phrase regarding the projecting edges of the Wadi Sirhan only applied to the part of the frontier which turned eastwards, south of parallel 31° 25', where the frontier began to slope eastwards. This was the first time that he had ever heard of any Saudi claim to the Jebel Rashrashiya, which had never been mentioned in connexion with the Saudi Government's claim to Hazim, and of which he had found no trace in the records of Sir G. Clayton's negotiations which resulted in the Hadda Agreement. These records were, however, very full on the question of the allocation of Qaf, which had for a long time formed the main point in dispute, and when it was eventually agreed that Qaf should go to King Abdul Aziz, the area which went with it had been clearly specified as consisting of its date gardens and salt pans. There had been no suggestion that any larger area should be conceded. If, however, Fuad Bey could produce any evidence to show that it had been the clear intention of the negotiators that the Jebel Rashrashiya should go to Saudi Arabia, any such evidence would, of course, be relevant and would have to be very carefully considered.

FUAD BEY HAMZA said that his statement was supported by the testimony of others who had taken part in the negotiations on the Saudi side.

Mr. RENDEL said that, apart from the merits of the question, this suggestion provided a good example of the difficulties which had arisen, since, if King Abdul Aziz thought he had secured Hazim and the Jebel Rashrashiya (although the line as drawn on the 1918 map patently left Hazim in Transjordan), Sir G. Clayton equally thought that he, for his part, had secured the whole of the Jebel Tubeik *massif* and the route surrounding it for Transjordan. Mr. Rendel added that the map of the northern end of the Transjordan-Nejd frontier appeared to be much more accurate than at the southern end, since the country in question was much better known and far more frequented.

FUAD BEY HAMZA at this point interjected that King Abdul Aziz in any event claimed the Jebel Tubeik under his dormant claim to Aqaba and the Sanjak of Maan.

Mr. RENDEL reminded Fuad Bey that it had been agreed last September that this question should not be raised for the present. He did not, therefore, wish to raise it. But unless Sir G. Clayton had wished to secure the Jebel Tubeik *massif* for Transjordan, the southern end of the Transjordan-Nejd frontier—carried as it was so far to the east and south—would have been meaningless. The Jebel Tubeik fell within Transjordan because the Transjordan-Nejd frontier extended to the east and south of it, and not as forming part of the Aqaba-Maan territory. The Transjordan-Nejd frontier was a valid internationally agreed boundary and could hardly be disputed.

FUAD BEY HAMZA then asked for a full statement of His Majesty's Government's view of the problem, and he suggested that, if Transjordan needed any particular concession of territory for practical purposes, the Saudi Government would no doubt be willing to consider granting it, subject, of course, to their obtaining corresponding concessions of equal value in return.

Mr. RENDEL said that, if Fuad Bey wished, he would let him have a written statement of His Majesty's Government's proposals such as, he hoped, would be of assistance to Fuad Bey in laying these proposals before King Abdul Aziz. He considered, however, that questions of give-and-take did not arise at this stage and might never do so, since what His Majesty's Government were trying to establish was merely the true line of the Hadda Agreement frontier. Mr. Rendel trusted therefore that the Saudi Government would be willing to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in making the necessary survey, in deciding what were the intentions of King Abdul Aziz and Sir G. Clayton, and ultimately in appointing a frontier delimitation commission. All this, however, would necessarily take a long time, and he asked Fuad Bey whether he did not think that, in all the circumstances, and in view of the number of other difficult questions outstanding, it might not be better to carry on for the present with the existing line. The present tacitly accepted boundary, which had long been observed in practice, had not, in fact, led to many difficulties. There had certainly been frontier difficulties, but these were of a different order and were due to raiding or to irregular behaviour on the part of frontier officials. He would, for instance, like to take the opportunity to draw Fuad Bey's serious attention to the unsatisfactory reports which had been received by His Majesty's Government as to the attitude of the Saudi Amir of Qaf. He did not wish to pursue the matter in detail at that moment, though the complaints against the Amir of Qaf had been serious. The point he wished to make was that these difficulties were not, in fact, due to the line followed by the existing boundary, which might, therefore, well be allowed to remain as it stood until other outstanding questions had been disposed of and the whole question could be finally and thoroughly settled.

SIR A. RYAN mentioned the three principal places in regard to which there had been, or were, disputes. They were: Haditha, over which His Majesty's Government had, after careful enquiry, frankly admitted that the Saudi Government's view was correct; Hazim, over which His Majesty's Government considered that the Saudi Government were mistaken; and now Thaniyya Taraif, which involved so many factors as to make it, in His Majesty's Government's view, necessary to re-examine the frontier as a whole. Apart from these, there were, he believed, no points in dispute in connexion with the alignment of the frontier, and he thought, therefore, that the *status quo* might well be maintained in the meantime.

FUAD BEY HAMZA replied that the Saudi Government might agree in general to this suggestion, but that they could not agree as regards Thaniyya Taraif, which was, he asserted, in Saudi territory.

Mr. RENDEL explained again the reasons for which His Majesty's Government were convinced that any such assertion was open to serious question.

FUAD BEY HAMZA then proposed that all the existing physical features shown on the 1918 map as lying to the west of the frontier should be regarded as falling within Transjordan, and all those shown as lying to the east of it should



be regarded as falling within Saudi Arabia, irrespective of where they might actually be on the ground. A new frontier could thus be established without difficulty. If Thaniyya Taraif were shown on the 1918 map as lying to the west of the Hadda line, the Saudi Government would admit that it was in Transjordan, but if it were shown as lying to the east of the line, they could not allow Transjordan to make use of it without special permission and would be obliged to treat any Transjordan forces frequenting the spot as trespassing on Saudi territory, with all the consequences that this might imply.

MR. RENDEL, in reply, made it clear that the *interpretation* of the Hadda Agreement line and the recognition of the physical features was precisely the difficulty with which both sides were faced. It was, in fact, extremely hard to know where that line lay on the ground. He had already explained the difficulty of identifying the physical features. So long as there was any doubt on this point, it was impossible merely to draw a frontier on the basis of the features shown on the 1918 map.

MR. MALCOLM indicated with a sketch the type of difficulty which would seem likely to arise if this criterion were adopted. He drew a diagram showing four imaginary physical features, numbered in order 1, 2, 3 and 4. He assumed that an accurate map might well have the effect of altering the position of these features so that the numbers ran, for example, 1, 3, 4 and 2. It might be possible, in the first case, to draw a line which would place features 1 and 3 to the west and 2 and 4 to the east of a frontier, but the second case would wholly alter the alignment of the dividing line. A frontier based on the position of each feature as shown on the 1918 map might appear reasonable on the 1918 map, but the same principle might produce a hopelessly tortuous and impracticable frontier if the relative positions of the features were shifted.

FUAD BEY HAMZA then proposed as an alternative that the frontier should be fixed purely by the points of latitude and longitude given in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement, irrespective of the physical features. He said that the Saudi Government would willingly agree to this method, and he wished to put it forward as a definite proposal.

MR. RENDEL pointed out that this would not give effect to the Hadda Agreement. Article 1 of that agreement specifically mentioned the 1:1,000,000 "International" map (*i.e.*, the 1918 map) as the relevant map, and for this and other reasons (*e.g.*, the reference to the projecting edges of the Wadi Sirhan) it was clear that the frontier was intended to approximate as closely as possible, in relation to the physical features, to the Hadda Agreement line as plotted on the 1918 map. If the latitude and longitude alone were now followed, an entirely different and wholly artificial frontier would be produced, which might operate just as much to the disadvantage of Saudi Arabia as to that of Transjordan, and which would be completely at variance with the intentions of the Hadda negotiators. It would also deprive Saudi Arabia of Hazim and of the Jebel Rashrashiya, but this would be the case whichever of Fuad Bey's methods were adopted.

FUAD BEY HAMZA said that His Majesty's Government appeared to him to rely on the 1918 map when it suited them and to discard it when it did not. He considered that there must be one criterion for application to the whole line—*i.e.*, either the allocation of the physical features as shown on the 1918 map, or the latitude and longitude. He did not care which of these was adopted, but he could not accept the suggestion that the intentions of the negotiators should be taken into account, unless the Saudi Government were free to press their claim to Hazim and the Jebel Rashrashiya on that ground.

MR. RENDEL demurred to Fuad Bey's criticisms. He repeated that His Majesty's Government were in no way questioning the validity of the Hadda Agreement, but that what they were seeking to do was to secure the adoption as exactly as possible of the line which King Abdul Aziz and Sir G. Clayton intended to lay down by it. So many of the natural features on the 1918 map were, however, either unidentifiable or of doubtful existence, or in completely transposed positions, that a new and detailed survey of the whole area was essential as a first step.

His Majesty's Government were, however, prepared to adopt one of two alternatives—either to carry on with the hitherto accepted existing boundary until a suitable moment should arrive to go thoroughly into the whole question and settle it finally, or to reach an agreement with the Saudi Government on the necessary steps for arriving at such a settlement without further delay. In the latter case agreement would have to be reached (a) on the true facts—*e.g.*, by an early, complete and accurate survey of the whole area; (b) as to the main intentions of the negotiators; and (c) for the appointment of a delimitation commission. The object of the commission would, as he had explained, be to establish on the ground the frontier which King Abdul Aziz and Sir G. Clayton would have drawn had they had a correct and complete map.

It was subsequently agreed that Mr. Rendel should write a letter to Fuad Bey summarising the discussion and recording the various proposals which had been made in the course of it, and that Fuad Bey should submit to King Abdul Aziz the two proposals which Mr. Rendel had put forward on behalf of His Majesty's Government, and seek His Majesty's instructions thereon.

*Foreign Office, July 18, 1935.*

[E 4422/341/25]

No. 14.

*Mr. Rendel to Fuad Bey Hamza.*

My dear Fuad Bey,

*Foreign Office, July 19, 1935.*

I WRITE as arranged to summarise the results of our discussion of the 15th July on the question of the Transjordan frontier.

2. You will remember that I began by referring to the Saudi Government's protest of the 3rd February last against the use by Transjordan car patrols of a track passing through a place known as Thaniyya Taraif which the Saudi Government claimed was not in Transjordan territory. Sir Andrew Ryan had informed your Government before he left Jedda that this question was necessitating exhaustive study, owing to defects in the maps, but that we should be prepared to discuss it with you during your present visit. It was in consequence of this communication that I was raising the matter.

3. I then explained to you that our investigations had shown that the existing maps of this area were very seriously inaccurate. The 1:1,000,000 "International" map of 1918, which had been used in the negotiation of the Hadda Agreement and in the delineation of the frontier laid down in that agreement (and which is, indeed, specifically referred to in article 1), had now been shown to be quite unreliable, and many of the features in it either lay in entirely different positions in relation to each other or were quite unrecognisable. In some cases, indeed, they did not exist at all. These errors appeared to be most serious at the southern end of the line in the neighbourhood of the place referred to in your Government's protest of last February. In particular, the bluff marked on the 1918 map as Thaila Maizila had now been shown not to be an isolated eminence lying well to the east of the Jebel Tubeik, but to be an integral part of that massif, and so closely connected with the main portion of the mountain that there was no practicable route between the two. The Transjordan car patrols were thus obliged to go to the east of this bluff in order to travel round the Jebel Tubeik on their ordinary patrolling duties, and the route round the Jebel, shown on the 1918 map as having been followed by Carruthers and Shakespeare and passing between the Tubeik and Thaila Maizila, had now been shown to be non-existent and impossible.

4. Without a full and detailed survey of the whole area and an agreed decision as to precisely where the Hadda frontier should run in the light of the new information now available, it is difficult to say that any precise point in the particular neighbourhood now in question is definitely in Saudi Arabia or in Transjordan. The uncertainty in regard to the relative position, and even existence, of the various physical features makes it, in our view, impossible to apply the Hadda frontier to the ground without a great deal of further information, and in advance of any general agreement as to the principles which should be



followed in interpreting the Hadda line. On the other hand, it is likely to be a long and complicated business to reach a final settlement of this question, and the boundary at present observed, which has long been tacitly accepted by both sides, has not led to serious practical difficulty.

5. In these circumstances, I suggested two alternative possibilities. The first was that we should agree to let this matter stand over until further progress had been made with regard to the settlement of other outstanding questions, when we might be better able to deal with the present question with the thoroughness which it required. Alternatively, if your Government felt it necessary to try to clear up the whole question without further delay, I suggested that we should review the whole question of the Transjordan-Nejd frontier, as established by the Hadda Agreement, and that, for this purpose, it would be necessary to take the following steps:—

6. In the first place it would be necessary to obtain full and detailed information as to the actual geographical facts, *i.e.*, where the various physical features really lie, and how far those marked on the Hadda map can be identified, and this would involve a new and detailed survey of the whole frontier area on both sides of the frontier, for which, of course, we should need the co-operation of the Saudi Government. Hitherto we had been most careful to avoid crossing into what was recognised as Saudi territory and had, therefore, only carried out a fragmentary and limited survey on the Transjordan side of the frontier which was insufficient to establish all the relevant facts.

7. Secondly, it would be necessary, in our view, to come to some agreement as to the principles which should be followed in interpreting the line laid down by the Hadda Agreement in the light of the new situation revealed by the inaccuracy of the map. For this purpose I suggested that it would be essential to be guided by the known intentions of the negotiators. You will remember that we had some discussion as to these intentions, and that I expressed the view that it was clear that the broad intentions underlying the Hadda settlement were that King Abdul Aziz should retain the whole of the Wadi Sirhan up to and including Qaf, with its date gardens and salt pans, and including its projecting edges, to the south of parallel 31° 25' N.; while it was equally clear that Sir G. Clayton had pressed for and secured a line running as far to the east and south as it did (*i.e.*, to the east of the crossing of the Carruthers and Shakespeare tracks, and well to the south of the Jebel Waila) in order to retain the Jebel Tubeik, and the tracks passing round to the east and south-east of it, within Transjordan territory.

8. I suggested that when we had thus established the facts, and agreed about the broad intentions of the negotiators of the Hadda Agreement, a frontier delimitation commission should be set up to delimit on the ground the nearest possible approach, in the light of the new information available, to the frontier which King Abdul Aziz and Sir G. Clayton were trying to lay down in the Hadda Agreement.

9. You did not welcome either of these proposals. You explained that if it was a question of taking into account the intentions of the negotiators of the Hadda Agreement, you considered that King Abdul Aziz would have a good claim to the whole of the hill known as Rashrashiya to the north-west of Qaf, and thus to the village of Hazim (about which there has already been a good deal of correspondence between our two Governments), since this was part of the Wadi Sirhan, and the King's claim to it had formed the subject of special discussion during the Hadda negotiations. On this point I felt obliged to say that I had not seen any record of any such discussion and that, on the contrary, my recollection was that, when Sir G. Clayton had eventually agreed to the retention of Qaf by King Abdul Aziz, the concession had been specifically limited to the town of Qaf with its surrounding date gardens and salt pans. Moreover, the line drawn on the 1918 map clearly leaves Hazim to Transjordan. You replied to this that the 1918 map equally showed Thaniyya Taraif as in Saudi territory and that, if we were trying to obtain any adjustment of the frontier in its neighbourhood, your Government would be willing to consider any such proposals from us, but would be obliged to claim some equivalent concessions in return. I did not pursue this suggestion because, in our view, what is required is not so much to introduce any modifications into the frontier as to establish as accurately as possible on the ground what that frontier was really intended to be.

10. You then made two proposals. The first was that the frontier should be delimited on the ground purely in the light of the description by geographical co-ordinates, *i.e.*, by latitude and longitude only, as given in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement.

11. Alternatively, you suggested that each recognisable feature in the neighbourhood of the frontier should be allotted to Transjordan or to Saudi Arabia, as the case might be, simply according to whether it appeared on the Transjordan or the Saudi side of the frontier as drawn on the 1918 map, irrespective of its true position.

12. The comments I made at the time on these two proposals were as follows: As regards the first, I explained that, in our view, the specific mention of the map and the specific reference to the projecting edges of the Wadi Sirhan in article 1 of the Hadda Agreement made it clear that the frontier must be determined, not in the light of latitude and longitude, but as far as possible in relation to the physical features as shown on the 1918 map. I added that a frontier plotted solely in the light of geographical co-ordinates would almost certainly be at complete variance with what King Abdul Aziz and Sir G. Clayton were trying to lay down, would be entirely artificial and unnatural, and would probably prove to operate just as much to the disadvantage of Saudi Arabia as to that of Transjordan.

13. As regards your second suggestion, I explained that we were not trying to escape from the Hadda Agreement, but, on the contrary, to give the fullest possible effect to it. We were quite ready to agree to the physical features being allotted to Transjordan or to Saudi Arabia, according to whether they lay on the Transjordan or the Saudi side of the Hadda line as plotted on the Hadda map. The difficulty was that, particularly at the southern end of the frontier, these features were largely unrecognisable and that they lay in an entirely different relationship to each other from that shown on the map. It was therefore necessary to have some principle of interpretation if an entirely fantastic line were to be avoided. You will remember that, at this point, Mr. Malcolm drew a little diagram for you showing how the "shifting" of the physical features might make a frontier which was intended to be straight into a quite impracticable and unnatural series of loops.

14. I hope shortly to send you our record of the discussion, and so I need not record it further in this letter. But my main object in writing now is to record the definite proposals which were made; that is, the two alternative proposals which I put forward on behalf of His Majesty's Government and which I have summarised in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above, and your two alternative proposals as summarised in paragraphs 10 and 11. I have already summarised in paragraphs 12 and 13 the difficulties which we see in the way of the adoption of either of your proposals, and although I will, of course, submit them to the proper authorities, I fear there is little hope of our being able to agree to either of them.

15. Meanwhile, I understand that you will submit our two alternative proposals to King Abdul Aziz, and I hope that, if His Majesty feels unable to agree to the provisional maintenance of the boundary at present observed pending a more favourable opportunity for a final settlement of the whole question as suggested in paragraph 5 above, he will be prepared to consider the alternative summarised in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8.

16. I should add that it is, of course, understood that our discussion was concerned only with the frontier between Transjordan and Nejd, as laid down in the Hadda Agreement on the 2nd November, 1925, and that the question of the frontier between Transjordan and the Hejaz, which is dealt with in notes 1 and 2 signed at the time of the Treaty of Jedda, remains entirely unaffected.

Yours very sincerely,

G. W. RENDEL.



[E 4472/1309/25]

No. 15.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 389.)

Sir,

Bagdad, July 5, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 315 of the 11th June, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text (in translation) of a draft treaty of friendship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia which Yasin Pasha gave me a day or two ago.

2. He explained that, although he had instructed Nuri Pasha not to continue, in London, the negotiations which had been begun in Jedda, Nuri Pasha had been unable to avoid discussions with Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and Fuad Bey Hamza, and had accepted, for transmission to his Government, a third draft of the proposed treaty. Yasin Pasha added that the Cabinet would not examine this draft until after Nuri's Pasha's return, as it would be necessary for them to hear his report on his conversations in London with the Saudi Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3. The draft contains few novelties and is more remarkable for the provision made in several of its articles for mutual co-operation in the cause of the peace and progress in the Arab world, than for any noteworthy obligations assumed by either contracting party towards the other.

4. Article 2 makes the usual provision for the establishment of diplomatic and consular representation between the two countries according to accepted international procedure. No direct reference is made, either in this article or elsewhere in the treaty, to the special position enjoyed in Iraq by His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador under the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Iraq of 1930, but article 9 would appear to afford a sufficient safeguard in this respect.

5. I assume that, if articles 2 and 9 are retained in their present form in the final text, it will be unnecessary for the Iraqi Government, at the time of signature, to exchange notes with the Government of Saudi Arabia similar to those which were appended to the Iraq-Afghanistan Treaty of Friendship concluded in December 1932 (see Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch No. 9 of the 5th January, 1933).

6. You will observe from the wording of article 10 that the treaty is not likely to come into force pending agreement in the texts of the numerous annexures to be attached to it. I shall, however, be glad to learn whether there is any point to which I should draw the attention of the Iraqi Government meanwhile.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 15.

*Draft Treaty of Friendship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.*

(Translation.)

His Majesty . . . . .

His Majesty . . . . .

Sincerely desirous of meeting the wishes of their respective peoples for the promotion and strengthening of the brotherhood which unites them, for mutual co-operation to maintain the safety of their countries, and for bringing about an understanding between them regarding Arab affairs;

Conscious that the time has now come for the strengthening of the relations between the two Kingdoms by a treaty, based on sound and comprehensive bases consistent with the above principles, to replace the former agreements concluded in special circumstances;

Have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of Iraq:

His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia:

Who, after having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

## ARTICLE 1.

Perpetual peace and true friendship shall prevail between the Kingdoms of the two high contracting parties. Their relations shall be based on co-operation, for the safety of their respective Kingdoms, and mutual understanding regarding all that concerns the interests of the Arab countries. Both parties agree to endeavour to strengthen the bonds of brotherly friendship between the Arab countries.

## ARTICLE 2.

Diplomatic and consular relations shall be established between the two Kingdoms according to accepted international procedure.

## ARTICLE 3.

The high contracting parties undertake to employ every means in their power for the settlement by amicable negotiations of any disputes that may occur between them. Should difficulty arise in the settlement of any dispute by this means they shall resort to arbitration and accept the results thereof in accordance with the provisions of the first annexure to this treaty.

## ARTICLE 4.

Each of the high contracting parties undertakes not to conclude any understanding or agreement with any third party or body or individual which may in any way prejudice the interests of the other high contracting party or harm his Kingdom or its interests, or that is likely to expose the safety of his Kingdom or its interests to danger or harm.

## ARTICLE 5.

In the event of a disturbance breaking out within the territory of either of the two high contracting parties, each of them undertakes reciprocally (in so far as the question concerns him):—

1. To adopt effective measures to prevent rebels from making use in any way of his territory against the interests of the second party.
2. To prevent rebels from taking refuge in his territory, and to surrender refugees to the second party if this is demanded, due regard being given to the exemptions admitted by international law.
3. To prevent his subjects from participating in insurrections or assisting or encouraging rebels by any means.
4. To prevent the despatch from his territory of any kind of direct or indirect assistance to rebels.

## ARTICLE 6.

A conference consisting of representatives of the two high contracting parties shall be held from time to time, or at least once a year, in rotation in each of the capitals of the two contracting Kingdoms. The duty of this conference shall be to examine the best means of putting into force of the provisions of this treaty and its annexures, and to exchange views on affairs touching the interests of the Kingdoms of the two high contracting parties.



## ARTICLE 7.

The representatives of one of the high contracting parties may take charge of the interests of the other party (if the other party wishes this to be done) in any foreign country or place where the other party is not represented. This arrangement shall not in any way affect the freedom of that party to appoint his own independent representatives if he should wish to do so. It is to be understood by the two high contracting parties that their representatives in foreign countries shall exert all their efforts to follow a common policy in accordance with the spirit which inspires the provisions of this treaty.

## ARTICLE 8.

The two high contracting parties agree in principle that it is desirable that the Arab countries should participate in the mutual understanding and co-operation on which the provisions of the preceding articles of this treaty are based. Such participation shall be effected after a request in this sense has been made by another State, in a manner to be agreed upon between the two high contracting parties and that State.

## ARTICLE 9.

It is understood by the two high contracting parties that none of the obligations devolving upon either of them, under this treaty, shall in any circumstances prejudice the execution of the obligations which they may have assumed under other treaties or agreements previously concluded.

## ARTICLE 10

The two high contracting parties agree that at the time of the signature of this treaty they shall conclude special agreements, or annexures to this treaty, which shall be considered an integral part thereof, regarding the following matters:—

- (a) The manner of arbitration provided for in article 3 of this treaty, the formation of the board of arbitration, and the procedure to be followed in the settlement of cases and the execution of the resolutions of arbitrators.
- (b) Frontier and "bon-voisinage" questions, tribal affairs, and tribal movements in pursuit of grazing grounds between the two Kingdoms.
- (c) The manner and conditions of the entry of the subjects of each of the two high contracting parties into the territory of the other party, and their passage through, and residence in, that territory.
- (d) The regulation of all questions of the nationality of the subjects of the two high contracting parties, and the settlement of any disputes concerning these questions.
- (e) Economic, commercial, and customs affairs between the two Kingdoms.
- (f) The organisation of the means of transport and communication between the two Kingdoms.

This treaty shall come into force with effect from the date of ratification of all these annexures.

## ARTICLE 11.

This treaty shall remain operative for a period of twenty years from the date of its coming into force.

[E 4486/318/25]

No. 16.

*Record of Sixth Meeting with Fuad Bey Hamza at the Foreign Office on July 18, 1935.*

THE following were present at the meeting:—

Mr. Rendel.  
Sir A. Ryan.  
Mr. Ward.  
Mr. Malcolm.

Fuad Bey Hamza (Deputy Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs).  
Sheikh Hafiz Wahba (Saudi Arabian Minister in London).

This was the final meeting of the series, and the opportunity was taken to review the position reached as a result of the earlier conversations, and to decide on the procedure to be followed in future negotiations.

## I.

MR. RENDEL opened the meeting by recalling the present position in the negotiations about the frontiers of the Saudi Kingdom in Eastern and South-Eastern Arabia. His Majesty's Government were now in possession of the detailed information supplied by Fuad Bey in his letter of the 2nd July, and his memorandum of the 8th July in support of the boundary claimed by King Abdul Aziz. This information had been passed on to the British authorities in the Persian Gulf and in the Aden Protectorate, who would now devote themselves to a thorough examination of the Saudi case. The eventual conclusions of His Majesty's Government would be largely based upon the reports they received from these authorities, but he could assure Fuad Bey that the claims of King Abdul Aziz would receive full and fair consideration.

FUAD BEY HAMZA said that he would like to take this opportunity to mention that the names given in his letter and subsequent memorandum were not only of wells, but also of places and districts. As the names had been obtained from Bedouin tribesmen, it would obviously be impossible to find many of them on the maps. Some of the wells and places mentioned were, however, close to the Qatar peninsula or the coast of the Persian Gulf and were quite well known.

MR. RENDEL then concluded the discussion of the south-eastern frontiers by informing Fuad Bey that the reply of His Majesty's Government to his two communications would be returned to the Saudi Government in due course through His Majesty's Legation at Jedda.

## II.

The discussion then turned to the question of the Bahrein transit dues.

MR. RENDEL said that he feared it would not be possible to prepare draft notes embodying the agreement reached at the local conference in time for them to be shown to Fuad Bey before he left England on the 22nd July. The wording of the letter from the Bahrein delegation detailing the concessions their Government was prepared to make to Saudi Arabia was not entirely clear in some respects, and it would probably be necessary for the draft notes to be referred to the Government of Bahrein for concurrence before they were communicated to the Saudi Government.

At the same time Mr. Rendel wished to repeat the formal assurance he had given Fuad Bey at their previous meeting that the Government of Bahrein would not at any future time again penalise ships (like the s.s. *Ahmedi*) calling at Bahrein and carrying cargo direct to the mainland of Arabia without transshipment in Bahrein waters. His Majesty's Government intended to confirm this perpetual assurance in a separate note to be addressed to the Saudi Government at the time of the main exchange of notes.

FUAD BEY HAMZA explained that he had not received any recent instructions from his Government about this question, and so was not in a position to do more than take note of what Mr. Rendel said. He suggested, however, that it might be useful if he were to see the draft notes before they were formally communicated to the Saudi Government for their concurrence.



After further discussion it was agreed that as soon as the draft notes had been approved by His Majesty's Government and the Government of Bahrein, copies of them should be sent to Sheikh Hafiz Wahba for onward transmission to Fuad Bey Hamza, wherever he might then be in the course of his leave. At the same time the draft notes would be sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda, who would be instructed to communicate them formally to the Saudi Government for their concurrence, as soon as Fuad Bey Hamza had expressed his personal agreement with the terms employed in the drafts.

### III.

MR. RENDEL next referred to the debt due from the Saudi Government to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India. He explained that His Majesty's Government had no desire to embarrass the Saudi Government by raising this matter; but their position, too, was not easy since they were liable to criticism in Parliament and by the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons if steps were not taken with a view to liquidating the debt. His Majesty's Government had learned with much satisfaction of the repayment by the Saudi Government last May of their half share of the cost of the enquiry conducted by Mr. Macdonell in 1931 into the rival claims arising out of tribal raids between Transjordan and the Hejaz and Nejd, and of their payment of 10 per cent. of the capital of the larger debt for £31,437 4s. 6d. due on account of arms and ammunition supplied to King Ibn Saud in 1929. His Majesty's Government would now be grateful to learn the intentions of the Saudi Government in regard to the repayment of the remainder of the arms debt, and he was authorised to inform Fuad Bey that if satisfactory arrangements could be made for the repayment of the outstanding 90 per cent. of the capital of the debt within a reasonable period, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to take a sympathetic view of the question of interest on the debt.

FUAD BEY HAMZA replied that he would look into the matter with a view to producing a statement of the intentions of his Government about the repayment of the remainder of the debt.

### IV.

The next matter to be touched upon was the future of the Treaty of Jedda, and the connected questions of slavery and the traffic in arms.

MR. RENDEL said that he was now authorised to inform Fuad Bey that His Majesty's Government would be prepared in principle to extend the validity of the Treaty of Jedda for a further seven years by means of an exchange of notes, on the lines already suggested by Fuad Bey, provided that a satisfactory settlement were reached on the question of slavery and the other outstanding points of less importance.

SIR A. RYAN pointed out that in his draft exchange of notes Fuad Bey had suggested prolonging the treaty for ten years.

MR. RENDEL replied that he had mentioned seven years because that was the period of validity of the original treaty. He thought that neither His Majesty's Government nor the Saudi Government were ready just yet to conclude a new treaty, and, in the circumstances, he agreed with Fuad Bey that there would be advantage in stabilising relations between their two countries by prolonging the existing treaty for a definite term of years. As a new treaty would probably be a subject for negotiation before very long, he thought seven years might be a sufficient period. At the same time, there would, of course, be no question of the treaty automatically expiring at the end of the seven years, as it would continue to run on indefinitely, as at present, subject to denunciation at six months' notice.

FUAD BEY suggested that the treaty might be prolonged for ten years, unless a new treaty were negotiated in the meanwhile.

MR. RENDEL and SIR A. RYAN thought that this was a useful formula, to which there could be no objection, and agreed to recommend it to His Majesty's Government.

The discussion then turned to the question of slavery and manumission in relation to the prolongation of the treaty.

MR. RENDEL reminded Fuad Bey that the whole question of the renewal of the treaty hinged on a settlement being reached on this issue which would be satisfactory from the point of view of their respective Governments. He understood from Sir A. Ryan that his private discussions with Fuad Bey had shown that there was a good prospect of agreement, although there were still a few points outstanding about which Sir Andrew was not entirely happy, particularly the reluctance of Fuad Bey to agree to make the clause in the regulations, affording redress to persons who could show that they had been illegally enslaved in the past, applicable to persons enslaved prior to the establishment of the present régime in the Hejaz. If Sir A. Ryan felt any doubts about the adequacy of the slavery regulations which the Saudi Government were proposing to issue, Fuad Bey could be sure that they would not satisfy public and parliamentary opinion in this country when it became necessary for His Majesty's Government to justify the surrender of their right of manumission.

FUAD BEY observed that His Majesty's Government were not alone in experiencing difficulties over the slavery question. He had only received very general instructions from King Abdul Aziz to guide him in his negotiations on the subject, and he feared that in his discussions with Sir Andrew Ryan he might already have gone too far and be unable to obtain approval for the concessions he had offered. He begged His Majesty's Government to realise that King Abdul Aziz had himself to reckon with the force of public opinion in regard to slavery, which was an ancient and established institution in Arabia, sanctified by Islamic law and tradition. His Majesty would have to consult his tribal and religious leaders, and they might well, if only from motives of self-interest, refuse to agree to the far-reaching measures that were now proposed. Fuad Bey pointed out that, in introducing reforms on the subject of slavery, King Abdul Aziz would have to contend with a mass of vested interests, as well as with the religious feelings of important sections of the population.

MR. RENDEL and SIR ANDREW RYAN replied that they fully appreciated the difficulties that confronted King Abdul Aziz and the Saudi Government and were most anxious that His Majesty should, if possible, obtain the prior consent of the ulema and the tribal leaders before introducing the proposed reforms.

MR. RENDEL desired, however, to point out that His Majesty's Government were only asking King Abdul Aziz to carry out certain reforms that were, in any case, inevitable before very long, if, as they hoped, Saudi Arabia were to continue to maintain its present rate of progress under the enlightened rule of His Majesty and to take its proper international place in the modern world. The indefinite continuance of slavery as an institution was not possible in the conditions of the present day, and he cited the trouble which Abyssinia was experiencing through the continuance of slavery within her borders.

He begged Fuad Bey to submit to King Abdul Aziz the result of his conversations with Sir Andrew Ryan on the subject of slavery, and to try to obtain from His Majesty some definite and far-reaching proposals which could be laid before Ministers here as a satisfactory counterpart to the surrender of the right of manumission. Once agreement had been reached on the question of slavery, nothing would stand in the way of the Treaty of Jedda being prolonged.

FUAD BEY promised to do his best to produce as soon as possible the final proposals of his Government. It was agreed that when these were available they would be submitted to Ministers without delay, and a communication containing the views of His Majesty's Government would then be made to the Saudi Government through His Majesty's representative at Jedda.

The discussion then turned to the question of the prolongation or modification of the exchange of notes (Nos. 5 and 6) at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Jedda in regard to purchases of arms by the Saudi Government.

SIR ANDREW RYAN reminded Fuad Bey that this matter had been discussed at the fourth meeting on the 5th July, when it had been agreed that



it involved points of form, rather than of substance. He had now been able to go into the question more deeply, in consultation with the competent Department of the Foreign Office. There were two difficulties connected with the note written by Sir G. Clayton at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah. That note referred to the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, and the reference implied certain qualifications of the assurance contained in it. That convention was now, however, dead, and a new agreement was in contemplation, which existed only in draft form. There would be no new regulation, Sir A. Ryan understood, providing for special zones, but, on the other hand, the question of possible restrictions on the supply of arms in abnormal circumstances had attracted increasing attention. It would be necessary to devise a new formula more in accordance with these developments than that embodied in the original note.

Mr. RENDEL explained that the position was that it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government to qualify their assurance on the arms traffic in order to bring it into line with any existing or impending international commitments by which they might be bound, but that any such qualification would be one of purely general application. There would be no question of discrimination against Saudi Arabia as such.

FUAD BEY thanked Sir Andrew Ryan and Mr. Rendel for the explanations they had given. He said that he had, however, been uneasy at hearing Mr. Rendel at the fourth meeting on the 5th July, state that His Majesty's Government did not intend to treat the Saudi Government "in a less favourable way than any other friendly country in a similar position." He thought that the expression "in a similar position" might imply discrimination.

Mr. RENDEL replied that he had been obliged to use the words quoted by Fuad Bey on account of the provisions in the 1925 Arms Traffic Convention establishing "special zones" in different parts of the world, within which the signatory countries bound themselves to sell arms only to Governments or their accredited agents, on account of the risk of any sale of arms to warlike and turbulent tribal elements leading to unrest and possible revolts. He realised that zones of this nature did imply a certain discrimination, but he pointed out that it was essentially in the interests of the Governments of countries within the zones that there should be a prohibition of the private import of arms and ammunition. He understood from Sir Andrew Ryan, who had been in touch with the experts on the subject at the Foreign Office, that it was unlikely that any future Arms Traffic Convention would contain provision for "special zones." Nevertheless, he felt obliged to make a reservation on the point, as it was still possible that some alternative system might eventually be adopted by which certain groups or categories of countries should be subject to special regulations. He repeated, however, that there would be no question of discrimination against Saudi Arabia as such.

FUAD BEY remarked that the Saudi Government were naturally more anxious than anybody else that arms should not be supplied illicitly to private individuals in their country. But they did not like any form of discrimination, and they could only agree to safeguards such as those underlying the idea of "special zones" if they were embodied in general terms applying to the world as a whole.

After further discussion, SIR ANDREW RYAN undertook that as soon as a copy of the new draft Arms Traffic Convention had been obtained, he would try to work out a formula for embodying the original assurance of His Majesty's Government in revised and up-to-date terms.

# V.

Mr. RENDEL concluded the meeting by enquiring, with reference to the discussion at the fourth meeting on the 5th July, whether Fuad Bey was now in a position to make any statement about the recent conference between the delegates of Saudi Arabia and Koweit to discuss the problem of their mutual economic relations.

FUAD BEY replied that he had received a long communication from his Government. Unfortunately, however, its contents were not clear to him in all respects, and he regretted that he was not therefore in a position to make any statement on the subject.

Mr. RENDEL drew Fuad Bey's attention once more to the importance which His Majesty's Government and the Government of India attached to an early settlement of the present economic deadlock between the two countries. He expressed the hope that every effort would be made to reach agreement on the basis of the proposals of the Sheikh of Koweit, and that the Saudi Government would abandon their insistence on a guarantee that no single smuggler would be allowed to cross the border from Koweit into Saudi Arabia.

*Foreign Office, July 22, 1935.*

[E 4431/350/25]

No. 17.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).*

(No. 26. Saving.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 23, 1935.*

CROWN PRINCE of Saudi Arabia who left England 22nd July, accompanied by Fuad Bey Hamza, a doctor, a secretary, and two personal attendants, expects to arrive at Alexandria on 12th August in Egyptian steamship *El Nil*, leaving Genoa 8th August. Party propose to leave next day by train (avoiding Cairo) for Jerusalem and Amman, where His Royal Highness will visit Amir Abdullah, and to leave Jerusalem 20th August for Port Said for connexion on 21st or 22nd August with Khedivial or Italian steamer to Jeddah.

2. Egyptian Minister in London will do all he can to facilitate Amir's passage through Egypt, but in view of absence of official relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Minister in London and Fuad Bey Hamza have asked that I will use my influence in same sense. They point out in particular that Egyptian Court will be in residence at Alexandria, and that it would be awkward and invidious if His Royal Highness were not at least to write his name in palace book on his arrival.

3. In view of delicacy of situation produced by King Fuad's personal attitude towards Saudi Arabia I leave you full discretion, but I hope you may be able to represent to His Majesty the desirability of his showing the Amir suitable attention in the course of his passage through Egypt. His Majesty's Government have always been anxious for establishment of normal relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia (*cf.* Sir P. Loraine's despatch No. 244 of 12th March, 1930), and treatment accorded to Amir Saud in Egypt may prove important factor.

4. Egyptian authorities will no doubt do everything possible to facilitate the Amir's journey, but you may think it desirable to put in a word with Egyptian Government. Please also instruct Mr. Kelly in your absence on leave to meet the Amir on arrival and do anything that he suitably can to assist His Royal Highness on his passage through Egypt.

5. Please report your action by despatch sending copy to Jeddah.  
(Repeated to Jeddah, No. 3, Saving (by bag), of 25th July.)

[E 4433/588/25]

No. 18.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Mr. Calvert (Jeddah).*

(No. 208.)  
Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1935.*

WITH reference to Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 19 of the 27th January, enclosing a copy of a note from the Saudi Government, dated the 18th January, regarding the proposed conference to discuss the reconditioning of the Hejaz Railway, I transmit to you the accompanying copies of correspondence on the subject with His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.<sup>(1)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> One enclosure only printed.



2. You will observe from the enclosure to Sir George Clerk's despatch No. 1028 of the 18th July that the French Government have now informed his Excellency that they concur generally in the terms of the draft note to the Saudi Government, a copy of which was communicated to them in accordance with the instructions in Sir John Simon's despatch No. 1045 of the 28th May to Sir George Clerk. They have, however, suggested, after consultation with the High Commissioner for Syria and the Lebanon, that the conference at Haifa shall assemble on the 10th October next instead of on a date towards the end of September as had been proposed by His Majesty's Government.

3. His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine having signified that he sees no objection to the alteration of date proposed by the French Government, I shall be glad if you will now address the Saudi Government in the terms of the enclosed draft note.<sup>(1)</sup> Your French colleague has already been instructed to reply in identical terms (subject to the concurrence of His Majesty's Government in the revised date proposed for the conference, of which the French Government are being informed) and you should concert with him to present your respective replies to the Saudi Government on the same date.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I am, &c.  
SAMUEL HOARE.

[E 3054/588/25]

Enclosure in No. 18.

*Sir John Simon to Sir G. Clerk.*

(No. 1045.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 28, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 444 of the 27th February, enclosing a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Jedda on the subject of the proposed conference to discuss the reconditioning of the Hejaz Railway, I have to inform your Excellency that I have now considered, in consultation with the other interested Departments of His Majesty's Government, the terms of the reply to be returned to the Saudi Government's note to Sir Andrew Ryan of the 18th January, an identic copy of which was addressed to the French Minister at Jedda.

2. His Majesty's Government are disposed to agree with the view expressed by Sir Andrew Ryan in his despatch No. 19 of the 27th January that there is no advantage in insisting on the acceptance by the Government of Saudi Arabia of the Lausanne declaration as a necessary preliminary to a technical conference. That declaration is important to His Majesty's Government because it embodies the view which they and the French Government hold on the status of the Hejaz Railway. You will, however, be aware from my despatch No. 1761 of the 21st November last that, after consultation with the French Government, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was instructed last November to inform the Saudi Government orally that His Majesty's Government specifically agreed to allow them to make, in the course of the correspondence leading up to the proposed discussions, a reservation regarding the status of the railway. The Saudi Government proceeded to make this reservation in their note of the 18th January (a translation of which formed the sub-enclosure to my despatch under reference). After careful examination of the terms employed by the Saudi Government in their reservation, His Majesty's Government do not consider it necessary to take exception to it in any way and they therefore suggest, subject to the concurrence of the French Government, that it will be sufficient in replying to the Saudi Government's communication to take formal note of their reservation and simply to add the counter-reservations suggested by Sir Andrew Ryan in paragraph 8 of his despatch, without further insisting on a specific acceptance of the Lausanne declaration.

3. As regards the further questions of the date and place of the proposed conference, Sir Andrew Ryan has received an unofficial suggestion from the Saudi Government that the conference should be held at Haifa at the end of September next. This proposal is acceptable to the Government of Palestine

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

and His Majesty's Government will be glad to learn whether it also commends itself to the French Government.

4. The next stage in the procedure agreed upon with the French Government is for His Majesty's Government and the French Government to reply in identic terms to the Saudi note of the 18th January, and I transmit to you herewith the draft of a note which His Majesty's Government suggest might be suitable for this purpose.<sup>(1)</sup> It will be seen that the draft note to the Saudi Government incorporates the suggestions for the exclusive agenda of the proposed conference which were contained in paragraph 6 of the French Government's note of the 14th August, 1934 (a copy of which was enclosed in your despatch No. 1352 of the 15th August), with the addition of an item to cover the inclusion in the discussions of a project for the reorganisation of a train service on the railway, which formed part of the agenda for the abortive conference at Haifa in 1928 in accordance with the suggestion of the French Government themselves in paragraph 4 of their note to His Majesty's Embassy of the 13th June, 1927 (a copy of which was enclosed in Sir Eric Phipps's despatch No. 1310 of the 15th June, 1927).

5. I shall be glad if you will take an early opportunity to enquire whether the French Government agree with the views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in regard to the Lausanne declaration, as set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this despatch, and whether they would be disposed to instruct their representatives at Jedda to reply to the Saudi Government's note of the 18th January in terms identical with those of the enclosed draft.

I am, &c.  
JOHN SIMON.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 4522/350/25]

No. 19.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Mr. Calvert (Jedda).*

(No. 210.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 24, 1935.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 191 of the 11th July, regarding the visit to England of the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, I have to inform you that His Royal Highness the Amir Saud, accompanied by the members of his suite, left this country on the 22nd July on the return journey to Saudi Arabia, and proceeded to Paris.

2. The Amir was seen off at Victoria Station by the Lord in Waiting, representing His Majesty the King, and Mr. J. B. Monck on behalf of myself. His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, officials of the Foreign Office, members of the Diplomatic Corps in London and a considerable number of other persons, including prominent Moslems resident in England, were also present to take leave of His Royal Highness. I enclose herein an extract<sup>(1)</sup> from the *Times* of the 23rd July, containing the text of messages which were addressed by the Amir at the time of his departure to the press and the general public, with a view to expressing his gratitude for the hospitality he had received in this country.

3. You are already aware, from my telegram No. 88 of the 18th July and from other correspondence, of the position reached as a result of the series of political conversations that have taken place with the Deputy Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs during the course of the visit.

4. In addition to the engagements mentioned in the last two paragraphs of my despatch No. 191, the Amir visited, during the last fortnight of his stay, the Bank of England, the Royal Mint and the offices and studio of the British Broadcasting Corporation. His Royal Highness also undertook a short motor tour in the Midlands, in the course of which he spent a night at Stratford-on-Avon and visited the works of the Humber Motor Company.

5. In his despatch No. 148 of the 27th May, recording the departure of the Amir Saud from Jedda at the outset of his journey to Europe, Sir Andrew Ryan referred to the belief that His Royal Highness would return by way of Turkey, Syria and Iraq. This appears, in fact, to have been the original intention, but early in July the decision was taken (for what reason is not known) to abandon

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



the idea of visiting these countries. It was suggested at one moment that the visit to Amman, which had been definitely arranged as a result of telegraphic correspondence between King Ibn Saud and the Amir Abdullah (copies of which were enclosed in Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 159 of the 25th May), should also be given up, and the Amir return by the direct sea route to Jedda. It is understood, however, that King Ibn Saud eventually insisted upon the visit to Transjordan being carried out, in view of the fact that the Amir Abdullah's invitation had already been definitely accepted, and that it would be discourteous to cancel the visit.

6. According to present arrangements the Amir and his suite will spend some time in France and Switzerland (it is understood that a proposal to visit Germany has not been pursued) before embarking on the Egyptian steamship *El Nil* at Genoa on the 7th or 8th August. The ship is expected to arrive at Alexandria on the 12th August, and after spending the night in Alexandria His Royal Highness will proceed the next day by train direct to Jerusalem, where he will arrive on the 14th August and stay at Government House for two nights, before proceeding to Amman on the 16th August. His Royal Highness proposes to return to Jerusalem from Amman on the 19th August, and to leave the following day for Suez, where he will embark on the 21st August or the 22nd August on the Khedivial Mail or the Lloyd Triestino steamer for Jedda.

7. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Angora and Bagdad, and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I am, &c.

SAMUEL HOARE.

[E 4666/4666/25]

No. 20.

*Memorandum respecting the possible Candidature of Saudi Arabia for the League of Nations.*

THE Kingdom of the Hejaz, at that time under the Hashimite King Hussein, was included in the list of original members of the League of Nations attached to the Covenant of the League. King Hussein failed, however, to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and the original membership of the Hejaz in the League accordingly failed to take effect.

2. In 1926 Ibn Saud, already Sultan of Nejd, conquered the Hejaz and became King of "the Hejaz and of Nejd and its dependencies," to quote the Treaty of Jedda concluded with His Majesty's Government in May 1927.

3. The question of the possible admission of the Kingdom of the Hejaz and Nejd into the League of Nations was raised in the first instance privately by the League Secretariat in 1929; it was decided, however, that there were many difficulties in the way and that it would be unsuitable for His Majesty's Government to suggest to King Ibn Saud that he would be well advised to join.

4. In July 1930 a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Jedda reporting that the Deputy Saudi-Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Fuad Bey Hamza, had shown some interest in the possible entry of the Hejaz and Nejd into the League of Nations, furnished an occasion for the matter to be exhaustively reviewed in the Foreign Office. A subsidiary point was first disposed of by the legal advisers showing conclusively that there could be no question of the joint kingdom entering the League on the strength of the Hejaz having been included in the list of original members. Apart from the difficulties inherent in reviving a membership that had never taken effect, they were of the opinion that the Hejaz had lost its national identity and that the joint kingdom, which was a "real" rather than a "personal" union (a fact that was confirmed in 1932 by the application to all King Ibn Saud's dominions of the title "Saudi Arabia"), was a new creation in world politics and would require a formal application for new membership under article 1 (paragraph 2) of the Covenant. The main question of the desirability of encouraging King Ibn Saud to apply for membership was then explored.

5. It was appreciated that there were certain important arguments that could be adduced in favour of the entry of the Hejaz and Nejd into the League. Membership might lead Ibn Saud towards co-operation with other countries in matters of international concern such as international health control and the development of international communications, especially by air (although some

doubt was felt about the advisability from a purely British point of view in laying stress on the international aspect of e.g. the Arabian air route and the sanitary control of the pilgrimage to Mecca). Another argument (which was particularly important in 1930-31 when the Ikhwan raids into Southern Iraq were of recent memory) was the good effect which the entry of King Ibn Saud's territories into the League might have on their relations with Iraq, which was expected to join in 1932; it was felt that the assumption by both countries of the obligations of League membership might facilitate the settlement of future disputes between them.

6. On the other hand there were felt to be serious objections to supporting the candidature of a country so primitively organised as the Saudi kingdom which would find it difficult, if not impossible, to participate in the civilising work of the League. The chief objection was felt to be the widespread existence in Arabia of domestic and industrial slavery and the unlikelihood of the attitude of official toleration towards it being changed, at least to the extent of undertaking the obligations devolving from article 23 of the Covenant. Almost equally important was the difficulty likely to be experienced in fulfilling the condition that a State applying for membership shall have established frontiers; the frontier between Asir and the Yemen was undefined and that between the Hejaz and Transjordan had only been provisionally disposed of by an exchange of notes at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Jedda in 1927. Apart from these general considerations there were objections from the point of view of purely British interests. If His Majesty's Government were to encourage King Ibn Saud to seek admission to the League and difficulties were then to arise at Geneva, he might well hold them responsible for any rebuff that he suffered. Moreover, it would be definitely inconvenient for the question of the frontier between the Hejaz and Transjordan to be discussed at Geneva.

7. The conclusion reached in the consideration of the question was that Sir A. Ryan should be instructed to adopt a neutral and non-committal attitude on the main issues leaving it entirely to King Ibn Saud to decide whether he wished to go any further in the matter or not, and a despatch was drafted in this sense for the guidance of Sir A. Ryan. However, when the matter was submitted to Mr. Henderson, then Secretary of State, he instructed Mr. Dalton to add a final paragraph to the instructions to the effect that all the considerations mentioned above were subordinate to the general principle that His Majesty's Government desired to see membership of the League of Nations as nearly universal as possible, and could not, therefore, consistently do anything to dissuade a State from applying for membership. Consequently if King Ibn Saud expressed a wish to apply for membership Sir A. Ryan was to say that His Majesty's Government welcomed his decision and would support the candidature of his kingdom at Geneva.

8. His Majesty's Minister at Jedda had little opportunity for personal discussion with Fuad Bey Hamza in the summer of 1931. When the question of entry into the League of Nations did finally come up at a meeting on the 15th July Fuad Bey intimated that his Government had not taken any decision and were merely looking into the matter. His Excellency did not make any request that His Majesty's Government should support an application for membership and Sir A. Ryan, therefore, confined himself to explaining (in reply to an earlier enquiry by Fuad Bey) the legal considerations governing any candidature of the Hejaz and Nejd (see paragraph 4 above).

9. In 1932 the Kingdom of the Hejaz and Nejd became known as "Saudi Arabia," but there was no move on the part of the Saudi Government to reopen the question of admission to the League.

10. On the 3rd March, 1933, the Saudi-Arabian Minister in London referred in conversation with Sir L. Oliphant to the prospect of Saudi Arabia entering the League and requested the opinion and advice of His Majesty's Government. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba explained that he was anxious to avoid any risk of an application by Saudi Arabia for membership being rejected at Geneva; he was certain, however, that an application championed by His Majesty's Government would be successful. Sir L. Oliphant drew attention to the difficulties presented by the lack of definition in certain of the frontiers of Saudi Arabia and the continuance of slavery as an institution, but the Minister was inclined to think that they were not insuperable. As regards slavery he cited the example of the admission of Abyssinia and added that he had raised this point with King Ibn

[12750]

E 4

P.O. despatch  
to Jedda No. 137  
of April 8.  
E 584/584/25 of  
1931.

E 4169/584/25  
E 4175/584/25  
of 1931.

E 1210/840/25.

E 4920/4920/91  
of 1929.

E 4310/1400/91  
of 1930.

Minutes on  
E 4310/1400/91  
of 1930.

Minutes on  
E 584/584/25 of  
1931.



Saud, who felt that if his country were a member of the League it might help him to introduce anti-slavery measures.

11. Sir L. Oliphant concluded his interview with Sheikh Hafiz Wahba on the 3rd March by informing him that His Majesty's Government were rarely, if ever, prepared to promise their support in advance for an application for membership of the League. This induced a further visit from the Minister on the 11th May, who stated on this occasion that while the Saudi Government did not wish for a definite promise of support from His Majesty's Government, they would be glad to learn whether an application by Saudi Arabia for membership would be favourably viewed by His Majesty's Government. Sir L. Oliphant replied by referring once more to the difficulties inherent in the matter, and after some discussion Sheikh Hafiz Wahba agreed not to press his enquiry for the time being.

12. The action of the Saudi Minister in reopening the question was the cause of the arguments for and against the admission of Saudi Arabia into the League of Nations being reconsidered in the Foreign Office. It was felt that the objections which had been current when the matter was considered in 1930-31 (see paragraph 6 above) were still applicable and that the admission of Saudi Arabia would be likely to weaken the League rather than to extend its authority. Despite the intentions attributed to King Ibn Saud by his Minister in London (see paragraph 9 above) there seemed no reason to anticipate that any serious effort would be made to put an end to the institution of slavery as part of the social structure of Saudi Arabia. It was not considered safe to invoke the Abyssinian precedent, since the attitude of the Emperor of Abyssinia towards slavery was less unsatisfactory than that of King Ibn Saud; moreover, the favourable political conditions at Geneva which led to the election of Abyssinia in 1923 were no longer present, and it was probable that the League would be much more exacting in regard to slavery, particularly in view of the forthcoming establishment of its Permanent Commission on slavery. Again, a serious disadvantage from the point of view of His Majesty's Government was the probability that the successful candidature of Saudi Arabia would increase the discontent felt in Egypt against her exclusion from the League pending the conclusion of a treaty settlement with this country.

13. On the other hand the lack of definition in some of the frontiers of Saudi Arabia could no longer be considered as an insuperable obstacle, particularly since the undemarcated frontier between Saudi Arabia and Iraq had not been an obstacle to the entry of the latter country into the League in 1932. The uncertainty on the frontier between Asir and the Yemen appeared to have been largely cleared up and it was felt that the position in South-Eastern Arabia might be held to be covered by the Anglo-Turkish protocols of 1913-14. As regards the possible difficulty over the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan it was pointed out that the League had never raised the matter in connexion with the administration of Transjordan by His Majesty's Government under the mandate. In any event it would not be in British interests to lay stress on the lack of definition in the frontiers of Saudi Arabia since it would be highly inconvenient were this to lead to a demand by King Ibn Saud for a definite settlement of the Transjordan-Hejaz frontier (on account of the dispute over the Aqaba-Maan district) and for the demarcation of the Transjordan-Nejd frontier (where serious defects had just been discovered in the maps on which that boundary is based).

14. These considerations were placed before His Majesty's Minister at Jedda in a despatch of the 17th May, 1933, together with fresh instructions on the subject. Sir Andrew Ryan was informed that if the Saudi Government showed signs of wishing to press their application His Majesty's Government would not feel justified in actively discouraging them, particularly as it could not be doubted that Iraq and Persia had strengthened their international position as a result of their membership of the League. Provided the Saudi Government realised the obstacles to their election and did not expect His Majesty's Government to sponsor the candidature there did not seem to be any strong counter-vailing reason for deterring them. In the event of his receiving any further enquiries on the subject Sir Andrew Ryan was to adopt an attitude of complete but sympathetic neutrality, refraining from anything which might be taken as a rebuff but doing nothing to encourage them to proceed hastily in the matter. At the same time he should give the Saudi Government any information they might desire, while not minimising the obstacles in the way of their candidature. In

E 2491/840/25.

Minutes on  
E 2491/840/25  
of 1933.

F.O. despatch  
to Jedda No. 124  
of May 12.  
E 2491/840/25  
of 1933.

the event of the Saudi Government attempting to secure a demarcation of their frontier with Transjordan on the grounds of its necessity as a precondition to entry into the League, Sir Andrew Ryan was to refer to the Secretary of State for further instructions.

15. No more was heard of the matter for over a year, but in the course of a meeting at the Foreign Office on the 24th September, 1934, the Deputy Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned that his Government might be inclined during the course of the prospective negotiations with His Majesty's Government for a general settlement of outstanding questions to raise once more the possible entry of Saudi Arabia into the League of Nations. Fuad Bey thought that the proposed settlement would dispose of the difficulty arising out of Saudi Arabia's lack of fixed frontiers; he hoped, moreover, that some progress would be made in the course of the negotiations on the slavery issue, so that it might be possible for Saudi Arabia to follow the precedent of Abyssinia and apply for admission to the League in advance of the total abolition of slavery. The matter was not pursued further but in an interview which Fuad Bey gave to a journalist at Damascus the following month he stated that the possibility of Saudi Arabia entering the League was under consideration.

16. The question of a Saudi application for membership of the League of Nations did not arise in any form during the recent series of discussions at the Foreign Office with Fuad Bey. In the course of a discussion with Mr. Rendel on the 3rd July, about the proposal for a new treaty between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the Iraqi Foreign Minister stated, however, that he proposed to urge the Saudi Government to apply for membership of the League. Mr. Rendel adopted a non-committal line towards this suggestion, but drew his Excellency's attention to the difficulties inherent in the question. Nuri Pasha seemed, nevertheless, to be confident that the admission of Saudi Arabia could be arranged on the precedents of the entry of Abyssinia and Afghanistan.

17. In view of the interest Nuri Pasha is taking in the matter it seems likely that His Majesty's Government may again be invited before long to support the candidature of Saudi Arabia for the League. Recent developments have scarcely tended to diminish the obstacles and objections to this development. The difficulty over frontiers is now acute, since His Majesty's Government have at the moment reached something like a deadlock with King Ibn Saud over the boundaries of his kingdom in Eastern and South-Eastern Arabia, and a similar state of affairs seems not improbable on the Saudi-Transjordan frontier, where the frontier is in a very confused state owing to the hopeless inaccuracy of the maps on which it is based. It would be highly embarrassing for His Majesty's Government if these questions (which are most important from the point of view of their protégés, the Amirate of Transjordan, the Arab States in the Persian Gulf and the tribes of the Aden Protectorate, apart from the requirements of Imperial strategy) were to be involved in an attempt by Saudi Arabia to enter the League.

18. Even more important is the revelation in the course of the last few months of the grave risk which the League runs in admitting semi-barbarous countries. Although Saudi Arabia is very far from possessing the attractions of the Abyssinian plateau, there are distinct possibilities of it being found to contain important oil and mineral (chiefly gold) resources; there is a considerable possibility of the present strong Government collapsing on the death of King Ibn Saud, and a period of civil war and chaos would then arise that might sorely tempt a predatory and land-hungry Great Power to intervene in Arabian affairs. As against the above considerations may be set the possibility of the entry of Saudi Arabia into the League providing a useful encouragement at a time when the League's future is clouded by the Italo-Abyssinian crisis. Moreover, the slavery difficulty is likely to diminish, since the Saudi Government now appear disposed to make a serious advance towards the eventual suppression of slavery in their country.

19. For convenience of reference the considerations which appear to be valid at the present time (from the point of view of His Majesty's Government) for and against the entry of Saudi Arabia into the League of Nations are summarised in a table attached to this memorandum.

Eastern Department, Foreign Office,  
July 30, 1935.

J. G. WARD.

E 5907/2420/25

E 4003/1300/25  
of 1935.



## Annex.

*Summary of Arguments (from the Point of View of His Majesty's Government)  
For and Against the Entry of Saudi Arabia into the League of Nations.*

(NOTE.—The references are to paragraphs in the preceding Memorandum.)

## FOR.

(a) It might strengthen the prestige of the League as a gesture of confidence in it despite present troubles (paragraph 17).

(b) The settlement of disputes with neighbouring countries might be facilitated by Saudi Arabia assuming the obligations of the Covenant (paragraph 5).

(c) The possible advantages resulting from the participation of Saudi Arabia in the manifold international activities of the League (paragraph 5).

(d) The possibility of King Ibn Saud resenting the failure of His Majesty's Government to support his candidature in the event of his deciding to press it (paragraph 14).

(e) The possibility of Saudi Arabia's entry into the League encouraging King Ibn Saud to proceed more vigorously against slavery (paragraphs 14, 17).

## AGAINST.

(1) The objections and dangers inherent in the admission of semi-barbarous countries to the League (paragraphs 6, 11, 17).

(2) The existence of slavery in Saudi Arabia (paragraphs 6, 11).

(3) The serious difficulties which might be caused to His Majesty's Government by the frontiers between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan, the Arab States in the Persian Gulf and the Aden Protectorate being brought before an international body (paragraphs 12, 16).

(4) The entry of Saudi Arabia would be likely to increase the discontent felt in Egypt against her exclusion from the League pending a treaty settlement with His Majesty's Government (paragraph 11).

(5) The possible inconvenience to British interests of the internationalisation of, e.g., flying across Arabia and the sanitary control of the pilgrimage to Mecca (paragraph 5).

(6) The possibility of the application of Saudi Arabia meeting with a rebuff at Geneva and of King Ibn Saud visiting his displeasure on His Majesty's Government in the event of their encouraging the candidature (paragraph 6).

[E 4693/350/25]

No. 21.

*Sir M. Lampson to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 1.)*

(No. 105. Saving.)

[By Air Mail.]

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

*Cairo, July 29, 1935.*

YOUR telegram No. 26, Saving.

I have mentioned matter both to Aly Maher and to Prime Minister.

2. Former will speak to King Fuad and does not doubt that every civility will be shown to the Prince, including his being met on arrival by someone from the palace. In present state of King Fuad's health he doubted if an audience would be possible. I said I did not press for that, though if King Fuad of his own volition suggested seeing Prince it would be all to the good.

3. Prime Minister was, as usual, receptive, and I suggested that in addition to normal customs, &c., facilities, special car should be provided on train. This, he said, would willingly be done. Prime Minister said he regretted absence of official relations with Saudi Arabia; he could not understand why this state of affairs had been allowed to continue.

4. I observed that I could understand a certain caution when Ibn Saud's future was doubtful, but now that it seemed assured, strained relations with Egypt seemed merely foolish. I know there had been friction over the Holy Carpet, but surely that might be regarded as a matter of the past.

5. Prime Minister was quick to realise that treatment of Prince on his way through Egypt might prove factor in future Egyptian-Saudi relations.  
(Copy sent to Jedda (by bag).)

[E 5011/557/25]

No. 22.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 222. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, August 2, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for July 1935.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 22.

JEDDA REPORT FOR JULY 1935.

I.—Internal Affairs.

219. The month passed almost uneventfully in Jedda. Ibn Saud remained in Nejd, where his activities, whatever they were, again were passed over in complete silence by the Mecca press. The Amir Saud's prolonged visit to England continued to be reported in considerable detail. We were informed that the Amir was now adding to the cares of the State the acquisition of the English tongue—in his spare time. He left London, with his suite, for Germany and Switzerland on the 22nd July.

220. Amir Feisal spent the first half of July at Rukba on a hunting expedition. He was later in the month reported in the *Umm-al-Qura* to be indisposed.

221. From subsequent reports it would appear that Amir Mansur (reference paragraph 183 of last month's report) sustained injuries to a leg. His mother, and, it is said, favourite wife of Ibn Saud, was also reported to be far from well, and was being attended by Dr. Dame, the American mission doctor from the Persian Gulf. She was stated to be suffering from a tubercular abdominal fistula, and that unfortunately the X-ray apparatus at Riyadh had proved useless. The only other available apparatus was one at Mecca, but this, it was ultimately decided, was too small. A large and expensive X-ray machine was stated to have been ordered for Riyadh from Germany, and steps, it is believed, have been taken to expedite its despatch. Meanwhile, it was said that any operation would be postponed until the X-ray apparatus was received. An X-ray plant for Mecca was stated to have been promised by Talaat Pasha Harb, of the Banque Misr, but it had still to arrive.

222. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* of the 23rd July announced the appointment of Abdullah-bin-Feisal as Amir of Burayda. Beyond the information that he is not a son of Amir Feisal, but is a member of the Royal Family, and was married to, and subsequently divorced from, a daughter of Ibn Saud, little is known of him. By one informant the appointment was stated to be a consolation for the divorce, which was none of the Amir's seeking.

223. The same newspaper also reported the appointment of Seyyid Hashim Sultan, for long a confidential agent of Ibn Saud's and employed on missions in various parts of the country from time to time, to be the representative of the Ministry of Finance in Hasa. His task more especially is to co-operate with the officials of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, and to act as go-between in connexion with Saudi and company affairs. As regards the company, Mr. Lenahan, the Jedda representative, left here by sea on the 24th July, intending to make his way to Hasa via Egypt and Syria, where he expected to remain on local leave for three weeks. Mr. West remains in charge at Jedda, and it is believed Mr. Miller, chief geologist, will go on leave on



Mr. Lenahan's arrival in Hasa. Mr. Lenahan is expected to return to Jedda at about the end of the year.

224. It was learnt fairly reliably that the newly-appointed Deputy Amir of Jizan, Sheikh Saud Ash-Shuwayir (see paragraph 185 of last month's report), had been recalled to Mecca, and was unlikely to return, the officer commanding troops there, Ibn Aqil, having been appointed to succeed him. Sheikh Saud's visit to Mecca is said to relate to an alleged misappropriation of 30,000 rials at his previous post.

225. Troops were stated to have been sent south to Jizan from Taif during the early part of the month, and Amir Feisal's absence from Taif was attributed less to motives of sport than to stimulation of local recruiting. More emphatic reports were received that the late Amir of Jizan was killed during tribal disturbances in that neighbourhood (see paragraph 189 of last month's report), but less was heard of these local troubles and troop movements during the latter part of the month.

226. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 19th July announced that the Government had established a wireless station at Al Majma'a in Nejd. The station had been completely installed by the Saudi Posts and Telegraphs Administration. An earlier issue of the same newspaper published an official communiqué forbidding shipping to use their ship's wireless whilst in harbour or in Saudi territorial waters.

227. One Saudi aeroplane was reported to have flown at Taif on the 24th: not a busy month, but the cadets now in Italy are coming along! One, according to the Saudi press, has flown solo and three others have successfully passed their examinations.

228. Both the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 26th July and the *Saut-al-Hejaz* announced the arrival during the month of Sheikh Abdur Rauf-as-Sabhan, accompanied by Sheikh Ahmad-al-Mujallid, at Mecca from Bagdad. They had travelled via Riyadh, where they had been received by Ibn Saud, in whose praise Sheikh Abdur Rauf had delivered himself of a speech. This former Director of Education in Jedda under the Hashimites has a long and active past of anti-Saudi intrigue in Egypt, Transjordan and Iraq, where he was associated with the late ex-King Ali, but has now been pardoned by Ibn Saud, as has his less prominent companion, under the terms of the amnesty declared in January last (see paragraphs 6 (c) and 7 of the report for that month). He came to Jedda on the 28th July, but it is not yet known whether he has left the country or not.

229. (Paragraph 191 of the last report.) Mr. E. D. McDermott, the visiting director of the Saudi Arabia Mining Syndicate, left for the United Kingdom on the 3rd July. Mr. Twitchell and his Australian associate, Mr. Shanks, a few days later set off in one of the company's red trucks to explore a more direct route from Jedda to the "cot of gold" mine than the present circuitous line of approach, which entails a sea trip to Yanbu and from there a wearisome motor journey, avoiding the Medina area, of about 315 miles. The mine appears to be situated well to the south-east of Medina, almost upon the confines of Nejd, and the prospecting trip, although not wholly successful, encouraged the hope that a route could be found. Mr. van de Poll arrived in Jedda on the 20th, having succeeded in getting through from the mine to the coast at Rabigh, this route being about 240 miles. With the intention of shortening this distance by a more direct line, Mr. Shanks and Mr. van de Poll left again by truck towards the end of the month. Mr. Twitchell left on the 24th for the United Kingdom and hoped to return early in October. He saw Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman before his departure. In conversation with Mr. Calvert before he left he said he had been busy estimating the possibilities of the mine based on the essays already made, and expressed himself as gratified with the results. The mining operations near Yanbu-an-Nakhl, where Mr. Shanks was employed, have now been abandoned.

230. The following items of medical interest may be recorded: (a) Work has been started on the construction of a hospital at Medina, towards which the Egyptian lady Qut-al-Qulut-al-Damerdashyya has given a donation, whilst Indian philanthropists are interested in the same or a similar project; (b) 6,500 were reported to have been vaccinated; (c) Mahmud Hamdi Bey, the Director-General of Public Health, who left Jedda on three months' leave on the 31st July, during which period he may attend the Paris meeting of the International Health Office, was stated to intend purchasing medical equipment for Saudi hospitals to the tune of some £2,000.

231. The steady appreciation of the Saudi silver rial, noted in paragraph 192 of the last report, continued, the selling rate of exchange per gold pound touching the high rate of 14½ rials on the 11th July. At the end of the month it had fallen back somewhat to 16 rials 8 piastres. The rate for rials per Egyptian pound varied at the end of the month between 10 rials 8 piastres and 10 rials 1 piastre.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

232. (Paragraph 200 of last report.) The exchanges with the Saudi Government, already recorded, over the armed incursion into Koweit territory were continued by a Saudi reply to the last Legation note. It covered pretty much the same ground as its predecessor in minimising and explaining the affair. It accused Koweit of inaccuracy in its report and of discourtesy towards the Saudis concerned; and denied there was any warrant for the view that Ibn Saud had appeared to attempt to exercise authority in Koweit. The Saudi Government asserted their desire for friendly relations, but hoped for the views of His Majesty's Government as to whether the present frontier practice should continue or a new arrangement be sought. Meanwhile, the note concluded, both sides should prevent their officials and other subjects from crossing the frontier without prior permission of the other side. The question was still under the consideration of His Majesty's Government at the end of the month.

233. On the 14th July an officer of the Transjordan Frontier Force, Captain Chamberlain, left Aqaba in an armed car and crossed into Saudi Arabia. As he failed to return he was followed by a second car, which overtook the first at Haql, some 20 miles south of Aqaba. The first car and its occupants had been arrested, and so was the second party, with the exception of a non-commissioned officer, who was allowed to return to Aqaba to inform the authorities. Lewis guns had been left behind in Transjordan, but both parties were armed with small arms. An urgent note was despatched on the 16th by the Legation to the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing great regret at this singular and apparently wilful transgression, and requesting that urgent instructions be sent to Haql for the release of the cars and the personnel. A reply was received on the 22nd, expressing regret at this violation, not the first of which they had had to complain, and stating that orders had been given for the release of Captain Chamberlain and his men. This rather mild reaction and the speed with which the release was effected may be attributed to the personal intervention of Amir Saud, who telegraphed from London to his father requesting prompt release. The two cars and their personnel arrived back in Transjordan on the 24th July; and, to anticipate a little, the thanks of the High Commissioner for Transjordan for the prompt response to his request were conveyed by the Legation to Ibn Saud on the 1st August.

234. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* reproduced an article which, it stated, had recently appeared in the Yemeni newspaper the *Iman*, denouncing certain elements in the Arabic press which appeared bent on stirring up enmity between the Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and giving the lie to tendentious reports that the Yemeni Government had recently imprisoned certain sheikhs of the Tihama for aiding and abetting the Saudi forces during the late war.

235. The same Mecca newspaper reported that the Government of the Yemen had acquired three telegraph and wireless installations from Europe, which were to be placed in the palaces of the Imam and "the Seif-ul-Islam" (probably meaning Ahmad) and in the house of Seyyid Abdullah-al-Wazir.

## III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

236. Conversations on a number of important subjects, particularly that of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia, took place with Fuad Bey Hamza in London during the month, Sir Andrew Ryan being present.

237. The Koweit Conference (paragraphs 202 and 203 of last report) dispersed at the end of June. Two of the principal Saudi delegates, Hamad-as-Suleiman and Khalid-al-Qarqani, were reported by the *Saut-al-Hejaz* of the 16th July, rather quaintly, as arriving at Riyadh "after passing a period of six months away, during which they had visited most of the Saudi coasts to consider their affairs."



238. The proposal to despatch a non-official mission (paragraph 135 of the report for April last) to various countries in connexion with the revenues of the Haramayn Waqfs was referred to the Governments of Palestine and India, who saw no objection, provided that, among other conditions, the objects of the mission should not include the collection of money, and that the individual members were persons to whose entry into those countries no exception could be taken on political or other grounds. They must expect no official facilities or support in India.

239. In January last the Saudi Government presented the Legation with a bill of approximately £300 sterling in respect of expenditure incurred in connexion with British aircraft on two occasions, (a) when a Royal Air Force Victoria forced-landed on the 17th April, 1934, near Jinnah Island, Persian Gulf (paragraph 81 of the report for April 1934), and (b) when three Moth aeroplanes belonging to the Bombay Flying Club were missing in the neighbourhood of the Saudi-Iraq Neutral Zone (paragraph 251 of the report for October 1934). His Majesty's Government and the Government of India decided to meet the bill, and payment was made by the Legation on the 9th July.

240. There has been much speculation locally as to the probable attitude of the Saudi authorities towards the recruitment of labour for Eritrea. Rumours have been rife of Italian requests to the Saudis to facilitate the enrolment of chauffeurs, but one British Indian chauffeur who presented himself at the Italian Legation was turned away with the information that none was wanted. No other categories of labour are known to have left for Eritrea, and it was stated by a knowledgeable source that the Italian Legation's attitude was to refuse applications. There is otherwise little apparent reaction to the Italo-Abyssinian situation.

241. The return of the Soviet Minister, M. Turakoulov, from Asmara, but without his wife, was the only event during the month of any interest, as far as foreign representatives were concerned. The French Chargé d'Affaires hoped to go on leave about the middle of July, but was delayed by the non-arrival of two batches of official mail. The only reason for mentioning this is that the mail was carried by Italian ships from Suez via Massawa, where, having for some reason been put ashore, it was held up owing to the confusion reigning at that port.

242. Several months ago a large consignment of wheat was shipped to Yanbu by the Egyptian Government for the poor of Medina. The Saudi Ministry of Finance undertook to transport the whole within a period of twenty days, the Egyptian Government agreeing to pay £E. 6,000 to defray cost of transport. The money was paid, in addition to other sums given for charitable purposes in that stricken city, but so far no more than one-sixth of the wheat has reached Medina, it is understood, and the balance lies rapidly deteriorating at Yanbu. The new Egyptian consul is now finding that the Minister of Finance is difficult to bring to an interview.

#### IV.—Miscellaneous.

243. Captain de Gaury, M.C. (paragraph 212 of last report) arrived at Koweit on the 6th July, having been accompanied from Riyadh onwards by six armed guards provided by Ibn Saud.

244. The American Dr. Dame (see paragraph 221 above) was reported to be attracting patients to Hail and Riyadh from this side of Saudi Arabia. He was accompanied to Riyadh by Dr. Harold Storm, M.D., who came on as far as Taif, whence he sent his passport to the Legation for a visa for Aden, by the hand of a third American of the original party to set off from the Persian Gulf, Mr. Robert van Peurson. The latter was a taciturn young man, who left on the 24th July for Egypt and the United Kingdom, probably *en route* for America on leave. Dr. Storm has not yet blown this way.

245. An Italian engineer, named Hario Marinangeli, arrived about the 7th, and was later understood to have entered partnership with the Italian merchant Odello (paragraph 217 of the last report).

246. Further information was received in regard to mutawwifs proceeding abroad (paragraph 216 of last report). Though no official announcement was made on the subject, it was understood that no restrictions would be placed on mutawwifs travelling to India or the Netherlands East Indies provided each mutawwif produced a reputable guarantor to meet any claims established against him in respect of debts contracted in those countries with pilgrims, &c. No

"sabee," however, is to be allowed to go to these two countries, except he be designated to represent a mutawwif who is unable to go himself. Mutawwifs desirous of visiting other "pilgrimage countries" must take care to return to the Hejaz before the month of Ramadan.

247. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the British Legation was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: Nil.

Manumitted and repatriated: Nil.

Took refuge in July: Nil.

Locally manumitted: Nil.

Left voluntarily: Nil.

On hand at the end of the month: Nil.

248. Monthly returns showing certain particulars of individual slaves manumitted are now being rendered for use with the League of Nations Slavery Committee, and a memorandum has been forwarded summarising such particulars from the 1st January, 1930, to the 30th April, 1935.

[E 5154/74/25]

No. 23.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 26.)*

(No. 223. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, August 4, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the usual annual report on the pilgrimage to the Holy Places of the Hejaz in 1935. It has been prepared on the same lines as the report for 1934, enclosed with my despatch No. 254 of the 11th August, 1934.

2. It gives me pleasure to place on record once again my appreciation of the excellent work of the pilgrimage officers of the Legation and of their conscientious and exhaustive reports, from which this general survey has been compiled. The experience and wide knowledge of Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah, the Indian vice-consul, have proved very valuable, whilst Haji Abdul Majid, the Malay pilgrimage officer, Dr. Abdul Hamid, the Indian medical officer and Mr. C. Ousman, pro-consul, whose first year of pilgrimage work this is, have made useful contributions and deserve my thanks. I am indebted to their respective staffs, in particular to Shah Jehan-al-Kabir, principal assistant to the Indian vice-consul, for much laborious work undertaken in typing this report.

3. As in the past two years, copies of this despatch and enclosure are again being sent only to the Government of India (Foreign and Political Department), the Government of India (Department of Education, Health and Lands) and the Government of the Straits Settlements. It will doubtless be circulated in print to other authorities interested in the pilgrimage.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 23.

#### *Report on the Pilgrimage of 1935 (A.H. 1353).*

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(1) *Introductory and General.*

It is agreeable to be able to record in the compass of a few lines that Saudi Arabia, since the last report was rendered, has passed a year relatively untroubled by serious disturbance, internal or external. Within her own borders peace and security have remained unbroken, and with her neighbours her relations have been uniformly correct, and, with Iraq in particular, friendly. The Treaty of Taif spirit of Arab brotherhood with the Yemen was severely tested by the attempted assassination in the Haram at Mecca of Ibn Saud and Amir Saud by a number of Yemenis, to which reference will be made later, but, thanks to the good sense of the King, survived substantially unimpaired.

2. Considerable diplomatic activity marked the course of the year over a large field of questions in which British interests were closely involved and protracted negotiations with the Saudi authorities on a number of delicate subjects, chiefly relating to eastern and south-eastern frontiers, engaged the attention of the Legation. The future of the Treaty of Jeddah, which had become denunciable by either party at six months' notice at any time from the 17th March, 1934, onwards, was also the subject of conversations. These negotiations were to be continued in London in June and July 1935, when Fuad Bey Hamza would be there in attendance on the Amir Saud, who embarked at Jeddah for Italy on the 14th May, on his first visit to Europe.

3. The year was more definitely given over to internal reorganisation, consolidation of recently acquired territory, and to liquidation, as far as possible, of the financial legacy of the Yemen war. In the autumn of 1934, upon the demobilisation of his troops, Ibn Saud disbursed in cash and kind the equivalent, it is estimated, of at least £100,000 gold, in war gratuities. Conjecture as to the provenance of so considerable a sum leaned to the view that the King had dipped heavily into the Royal Treasury, a reservoir of unknown depths, little credence being given to the opinion, strongly held in one quarter, that Ibn Saud, as a condition of peace with the Yemen, had exacted a secret indemnity from the Imam Yahya.

4. Release from his preoccupations as Deputy Minister for Defence enabled Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, in his other capacity of Minister of Finance, to devote his undivided attention to the revenues of the country. Measures were taken, by an intensification of propaganda work in Islamic countries, to stimulate an increased pilgrimage for 1935, and promises, not to be fulfilled, were held out of a "Haj-al-Akbar," with its seven-fold blessings. A propaganda department was established in the Ministry of Finance under the notorious Indian agitator, Muhammad Khan Ghazi Khan.

5. Partly perhaps as a consequence of these efforts, the total of overseas pilgrims in 1935 rose to 33,898, a satisfactory increase over the 25,291 of the previous year and better, in fact, than the figures for any year since 1931.

6. Pilgrimage Day, the 9th Dhu'l Hijja, fell this year on Thursday, the 14th March, a keen disappointment to many who had hoped for a Friday Haj, "Haj-al-Akbar." The congregation on Arafat numbered some 70,000 inclusive of all elements, according to Legation estimates, although the Saudi estimate, higher as usual, put it at about 100,000, Nejd alone being estimated at about 40,000. The increase this year, apart from the general increase from abroad, can be chiefly attributed to the presence of Yemenis, who numbered about 10,000, whilst the Indian vice-consul reports that again this year Hejazis were not represented in full force, owing to the adverse effects of the economic depression.

7. Climatic conditions, if warm, were favourable and general health was good. Saudi medical personnel (*vide* paragraph 58) remained much the same as last year.

8. The outstanding incident of the pilgrimage was the attempt, happily completely frustrated, of a number of Yemenis to assassinate the King and the Heir Apparent. The would-be murderers attacked the King and his son whilst they were circumambulating the Kaaba, but were beaten off and speedily dealt with. The King showed exemplary coolness and his sagacity and statesmanship in giving strict instructions that the persons of the numerous Yemeni "Guests of God" then at Mecca were to be respected averted what might easily have proved to be another St. Bartholomew's Eve.

9. The economic situation was depicted in last year's report (paragraph 9 *et seq.*) in the most sombre colours. During the intervening twelve months,

although some improvement has been discernible, particularly in 1935, the general position has continued to present many of the unsatisfactory features previously noticed. A further payment of £30,000 gold by the California Arabian Standard Oil Company early in the summer of 1934 scarcely availed to lighten the burden of expenditure over the Yemen war. Economy was again practised at the expense of officials, whose salaries, when paid, were invariably considerably in arrear, whilst the most recent step has been to effect an all-round salary reduction of 25 per cent., two-thirds of the balance to be paid in cash and one-third in kind, the cash payment to be reckoned in terms of gold at a highly unfavourable rate. Distress was scarcely less intense and afflicted most classes in the Hejaz, including merchants, motor-car owners and mutawwifs. Trade continued on a restricted scale and goods left over from last year clogged the market, yet a slight improvement in movement and clearances through customs was reported. Up to the end of 1934, few signs of a change for the better were apparent, though, as has been noted, Ibn Saud was able to meet expenditure on war gratuities and the Saudi Government were able on the whole to discharge current liabilities as they fell due. The larger pilgrimage brought a welcome increase to the revenues, and although the poverty of the average pilgrim was no less marked than before, an unusually large number of distinguished personages and well-to-do pilgrims was an appreciable factor. Customs receipts probably improved in consequence, with the result that a serious situation was sensibly eased and a somewhat better tone observed. Certain firms here were understood to have completed a satisfactory year, and Sharqieh Limited concluded the season with a profit, albeit only perhaps a "paper" one. A signal instance of a return to financial rectitude (or perhaps a desire to please) was the payment by the Saudi Government in May 1935 of the whole of one small debt due to His Majesty's Government and 10 per cent. of a larger one due to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.

10. While the California Arabian Standard Oil Company have made some progress in their rather remote operations in Hasa, the schemes referred to in paragraph 11 of last year's report have had a somewhat various history:—

- (a) Mr. Philby was able to secure in 1934 renewal of the motor-vehicle concession to Sharqieh Limited on more favourable terms, and it was understood, subsequent to the pilgrimage, that a substantial profit, on paper, had been realised. Mr. Philby was, however, still dissatisfied with the working arrangements of the new concession, in some respects.
- (b) The Hyderabad textile scheme in Medina continued to confine its sphere of usefulness to the support of the manager and his family, but of no one and nothing else.
- (c) No further developments in respect of Messrs. Ibrahim Jewan Baksh and the Mecca public electricity supply scheme were reported.

11. Further economic projects initiated during the year may be briefly noticed:—

- (a) A concession over a large area of the Hejaz, excluding the holy areas of Mecca and Medina, was granted in the autumn of 1934 to the Saudi Arabia Mining Syndicate for the exploitation of gold. Mr. K. S. Twitchell, the syndicate's representative in this country, started work early in 1935 and was stated to be optimistic, at the end of the period under review. The syndicate certainly has provided work at the site of its present operations south-east of Medina for a fair number of necessitous Bedouin.
- (b) A piastre project, or the collection of piastres from the public for objects of a national character, on the lines of a movement started in Egypt, was inaugurated in May 1935. Its objects are at present nebulous, but, it is thought, will be connected with a scheme to provide Saudi Arabia with an air force. It was not regarded as a vigorous movement at its inception.
- (c) A concession was given in the summer of 1934 to Sheikh Abdurrahman Quseybi to fish for pearls in the Red Sea waters of Saudi Arabia. Venezuelan divers under a Syrian overseer spent several unsuccessful months both north and south of Jeddah, but operations were suspended and have not since been resumed.



12. Medina has undoubtedly suffered greater privation and misery of late years than other centres in the Hejaz, and that much sympathetic interest in her unhappy situation has been evinced throughout the Islamic world the following will bear witness:—

- (a) The Egyptian Government sent 38,000 sacks of wheat and a considerable sum of money for distribution to the poor of Medina. Only about one-sixth of the wheat is reported to have reached its destination, the remainder lying, rapidly deteriorating, at Yanbu. The Egyptian consulate have received little satisfaction in response to their representations to the Minister of Finance, who had undertaken to transport the whole consignment from Yanbu to Medina in twenty days.
- (b) The Nawab of Bahawalpur visited Medina and remained there a month, much to the advantage of the commerce and charitable institutions of the place.
- (c) A movement has been launched in India for the establishment of a charitable dispensary at Medina. One individual donation of 25,000 rupees was reported.

13. In May 1935 the Government imported from India 400,000 rupees in silver stated to be for payments due to be made by Ibn Saud in Nejd. It was understood that this had been necessitated by a general reluctance in Nejd to accept Saudi rials, and dissatisfaction with the hitherto much used Maria Theresa dollar as currency.

14. Greater interest has been evinced in the air and an aerial society was inaugurated during the year. The Government also sent a number of students to Italy to be trained as aviators. The question of pilgrimage by air came to the fore last year owing to the activities of Talaat Pasha Harb and the Banque Misr group. Although they were unable to get permission of the Saudi Government this year for an air service, it was understood there was a fair chance of it being granted in 1936.

15. The general desire of the Saudi Government to promote appeasement was demonstrated by the grant, during the year, of an amnesty to Saudis living abroad who had been engaged in the past in anti-Saudi activities. As a result, a number of exiles returned and made their peace with Ibn Saud.

16. Propaganda (see paragraph 12 of last year's report) did not abate perceptibly and the same leading practitioners were in evidence. Jemal Pasha was less vocal in India, but is alleged to have held out prospects of concessions for an India-Hejaz air service to certain credulous persons, who were gracefully eluded by the pasha, when both he and they came on pilgrimage. Dr. Shafi Ahmed, Ph.D., turned up and was said to have been rewarded for past, and encouraged for future, services. Ismail Ghuznavi arrived on Haj, after two years' absence, and was stated to have had his funds replenished.

17. As has been noted, the Minister of Finance gave himself up largely to the pilgrimage this year and excelled himself in his attentions to distinguished, well-to-do and influential pilgrims. His entertainments were more numerous and more lavish cars were placed at the disposal of those he wished to cultivate and certain Koshan exemptions were granted. This generous ground-baiting for next year's pilgrimage culminated in the circulation amongst returning pilgrims by the Haj Committee of a leaflet announcing the forthcoming reduction of the Pilgrim Tariff for 1936 by 25 per cent., a matter concerning which the Legation await more official confirmation.

18. No official change took place in Saudi-Egyptian relations and there was still no likelihood of the "mahmal" being sent to this country, but there were evidences of greater cordiality in their actual relations. Talaat Pasha Harb, chairman of directors of the Banque Misr, again visited the Hejaz by air several months before the Haj, this time accompanied by Adly Yeghen Pasha, a fellow-director. The number of Egyptian pilgrims further increased from 4,302 last year to 5,361 this, all of whom, many being well-to-do, travelled by the steamship *Zamzam* and steamship *El Kawsar*, acquired by the Banque Misr Navigation Company for this purpose. The company also provided two large barges for the conveyance of pilgrims between ship and shore, but this innovation was not a success. Talaat Pasha performed the opening ceremony of the hotels at Mecca and Jedda, inaugurated under the auspices of the Banque Misr.

19. There were certain signs during the year that Ibn Saud might adopt a more liberal attitude towards the question of non-Moslem foreign representatives visiting Taif. Hopes were encouraged by his spectacular gesture in inviting His Majesty's Minister to visit him there in July 1934, before proceeding on leave. Sir Andrew Ryan's visit lasted from the 12th to the 14th July.

20. The Mecca newspaper the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 21st September, 1934, published an official communiqué "approving" the International Sanitary Convention of 1926, with the exception of the following articles: 7, 55, 75, 127, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 142, 144, 145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 163, 164, 165. It transpired that the Saudi Government's intention was to adopt the convention, to which they were already signatories, with the exception of the articles indicated, for domestic legislative purposes only (*vide* paragraph 53 below). This enactment was one item only in a spate of official legislation or quasi-legislation among which may be mentioned the Infectious Diseases Regulations, Narcotic Drugs Regulations and Regulations in regard to Vaccination.

21. A definite tendency was observed this year for agitators to exploit the pilgrimage as a platform from which to ventilate their political grievances in the dissemination of anti-Jewish and other political literature. This was particularly the case in regard to Palestinian Arabs, and Sir Andrew Ryan took an opportunity of alluding to the matter in conversation with Fuad Bey Hamza soon after the pilgrimage. The conversation related to the proposed despatch of an unofficial Saudi mission to India and Palestine in connexion with the Haramayn Waqfs. A so-called delegation from Syria, consisting of Dr. Jamil Mardam, Fakhri Bey Barudi, and Shafiq Bey Jabri, arrived, via Bagdad and the overland route, from Nejed.

22. Besides the hotels of the Banque Misr, those of the Government (see paragraph 14 of last year's report), which were still maintained, were well patronised and were fully booked. The number of pilgrims who used the Medina Hotel was again insignificant. The Government rest-houses on the roads were seldom used by pilgrims, on account of their excessive charges. The scheme of Sir Nizam Jung to construct caravanserais on the Medina road still remained on paper, and no further developments were noticed in this respect during the year under review. The Government again maintained a service of spare motor lorries, engineers and spare parts, for the assistance of motor traffic on the Medina road, which proved of assistance to pilgrims. A posse of Nejd soldiers was also posted in the more difficult and sandy parts on the Mecca road to assist motor vehicles stuck in the sand. They, however, proved more of a nuisance than a help, as, on occasion, they were wont to beat chauffeurs for no apparent reason, until brought to heel by the authorities as the result of verbal representations of the Indian vice-consul. The Hejaz motor transport companies provided less secure conveyance this year. A number of regrettable accidents occurred; in one case, two Indian women pilgrims died of burns and others were injured on a bus catching fire; in another, an Indian woman pilgrim was run over by a bus, with fatal results. Many vehicles overturned, due to reckless driving and excessive speed, and their occupants were bruised in consequence.

23. Negotiations between the Saudi and Iraqi Governments for the establishment of an overland route between Nejed and Medina were amicably concluded during the year under review. The route was opened to motor traffic between the Hejaz and Iraq and, although many difficulties were experienced, a number of vehicles, carrying 398 pilgrims, arrived in time for the pilgrimage. Details, as also of other overland routes, will be found in the section on transport.

24. The orphanage at Medina (paragraph 15 of 1934 report) maintained its reputation and worked satisfactorily. The Director-General of the Saudi Police Force at Mecca inaugurated a scheme to deal with the increasing nuisance of mendicants within the precincts of the Holy Haram at Mecca. He opened a "poor house," and forcibly removed about 300 beggars from the Haram and accommodated them therein. After the Haj they were freed again. Well-to-do pilgrims contributed towards a fund opened for the purpose. This Legation also helped to reduce this problem by repatriating no less than 1,491 West African destitutes, via Suakin and Massawa.

25. Of the two small steamers of the Arabian Steam Navigation Company mentioned in paragraph 16 of last year's report, one, since her arrival from Hudeyda after the Yemen war, was sent to Egypt for repairs, and has not



reappeared. The other lies at anchor in the Jedda Roads for longish periods, in between bursts of activity.

26. Pilgrimage shipping continued much on the same lines as in previous seasons, except that certain new ships appeared, cutting into the pilgrimage trade. French interests appear to have undergone reorganisation in the formation of a company to run the Fabre Line steamship *Sinaia*. Other newcomers were the French steamship *Arafat*, on the return pilgrimage, and the *Velho* of Messrs. Cowajee Dinshaw.

27. The rial remained fairly steady this year. It fluctuated between 23 rials, and at the height of the Haj, 20 rials to the gold pound, but later appreciated to 15 rials for a variety of reasons, which are not altogether clear.

28. Prices of food-stuffs in rials remained about the same as last year, and the general purchasing power of pilgrims was still very low. The Jedda municipality opened a stall, after the Haj, for the sale of food-stuffs to the public at standard prices.

29. Security on the roads was again maintained at its high standard. Cases of pilferage again occurred at Mecca, Arafat, Mina and Muzdalfa. A remarkable feat of daring was reported of three unarmed Hejazi Bedouin camelmén who killed two armed Nejdí soldiers, on patrol near Taif.

30. The King, as usual, gave his annual pilgrimage dinner on the 11th March. Unlike last year, the Indian vice-consul was invited, but was prevented from leaving Jedda by pressure of work in connexion with incoming pilgrims. The only foreign representative present was the Afghan Minister in Cairo, who also represents his government at the court of Ibn Saud. Among the speakers, the ex-King Amanullah of Afghanistan caused much comment, for having spoken on the importance of Islamic unity, attempted twice to approach some further topic (thought to be slavery), but at the repeated gesture of appeal of Ibn Saud, desisted. The Royal discourse was, as usual, chiefly devoted to the necessity of co-operation among Moslem Powers, and concluded with an appeal for help to the Islamic world.

31. As a result of a private visit to Medina, in the autumn of 1934, the Indian vice-consul resported the desirability of certain reforms in the condition of the pilgrimage, both in the city itself and on the Medina road. No opportunity, however, presented itself of pursuing the matter.

32. The pilgrimage this year was attended by an unprecedented number of highly-placed Indian personages. Among them were—

His Highness the Nawab of Bahawalpur, with a large suite and an elaborate train of motor cars; and her Exalted Highness the Badshah-Begum of Hyderabad, representing the Ruling Princes and Princesses of India; Major-General Nawab Sir Omar Hayat Khan Tiwana, hon. A.D.C. to His Imperial Majesty; Nawab Bahadur Dr. Sir Muzamilullah Khan, K.C.I.E., O.B.E., L.D., of Aligarh; Nawab Wali-un-Dowlah Bahadur of Hyderabad (Deccan), who died at Medina of pneumonia; Nawab Sir Nizam Jung Bahadur of Hyderabad (Deccan); Lady Waqalat-ul-Umra, step-mother of the Nizam; Khan Bahadur Hafiz Hidayet Husseyn, C.I.E., M.L.C., of Cawnpore, and Khan Bahadur Allama Yusuf Ali, C.B.E., I.C.S. (retired).

Besides these there was also a large number of other high Government officials, non-officials, intellectuals and tribal chiefs of the North-West Frontier.

33. In addition, other distinguished pilgrims this year were ex-King Amanullah of Afghanistan, the Glaoui, representative of Moroccan Grand Kaids, who came and went unostentatiously, Sheikh Muhammad-bin-Saqar, brother of the Ruler of Sharjah, and Sheikh Juma'-bin-Makhtum, brother of the Ruler of Dibai, and the chief of the Hadendown tribe of the Sudan, while conspicuous among pilgrims of many nationalities were four Japanese Moslems, who successfully performed the Haj. One English Moslem lady from Egypt, a Miss Wentworth Fitzwilliam, also made the pilgrimage.

34. Apart from Hasrat Mohani (paragraph 26 of 1934 report), Azad Sobhani, Moin Uddin of Ajmere, Abdur Rahim of Peshawar, Mufti Muhammad Nasem of Ludhiana and Ismail Ghuznavi were the only Indian agitators to perform the pilgrimage this year. Muhammad Khan Ghazi Khan, mentioned in paragraph 26 of last year's report, succeeded in getting employment in the Saudi Ministry of Finance, in the capacity of the Superintendent of the Pilgrimage Propaganda Bureau.

35. Arrangements for the dispersal of the pilgrimage worked satisfactorily this year. No compensation was payable by the shipping company to the pilgrims for detention at Jedda, as the ships for return journey were available within the prescribed time.

36. H.M.S. *Penzance* (Commander R. H. Bevan, R.N.) visited Jedda for Haj week. She stayed from the 12th March to the 17th March.

37. A parade of Saudi troops at Mecca was held on the 20th March. The number of the troops reviewed, according to the Saudis, was 30,000.

38. No report of forged rupee notes came to the notice of this Legation during this season. The position in respect of forged rupee notes remains unchanged from that described in paragraph 25 of the 1933 report.

39. This year the Afghan Minister in Egypt was also appointed to represent his government at the court of Ibn Saud, and visited the Hejaz during the pilgrimage. He rented a house this year for the Legation at Jedda, and although it remained practically closed upon the departure of the clerk in charge (the solitary remaining member of the Legation) on leave, its flag continued to fly on Fridays. An Indian doctor in the employment of the Afghan Government also performed the Haj.

40. Considerable anxiety was still felt by foreign residents in this country due to the attitude of the Saudi Arab Government towards them. They were deprived of several concessions in respect of "Koshan," &c., which had been previously enjoyed alike with the Saudi subjects. Laws prohibiting foreigners from holding landed property in the Hejaz were revived, and pressure was brought to bear upon owners of property either to sell or to retain them by adopting Saudi nationality. The Indian chauffeurs were again allowed to work here for the pilgrimage season only. Certain exchanges took place between the Legation and the Saudi Arab Government over the question of Saudi nationality. Eventually an extension of time was granted by the Saudis for claimants to foreign nationality to produce their proofs.

41. As last year, the "Kiswa" or the Holy Cover for the Kaaba was woven locally through the joint efforts of the Hejazis and domiciled Indians, resulting in less expenditure, as last year.

42. No case of enslavement of pilgrims came to the notice of this Legation during this season, as last year.

## (2) Statistics.

43. The following tables give the usual statistical information. The figures given are those prepared by the quarantine authorities, but it should again be pointed out that discrepancies occur between these figures and those supplied from other sources. Besides the particulars of arrivals (by dhow) at Lith (paragraph 34 of last year's report), it has also been possible this year to add a further column in Table (A), showing the number of arrivals (by dhow) at Qunfida. The official figures given below represent, therefore, the total number of pilgrims who landed at Jedda, Yanbu, Lith and Qunfida, during the period the 31st October, 1934, to the 14th March, 1935, viz., 33,898, as against 25,291 for 1934. The increase of 8,607 pilgrims, in the year under review, can be analysed as follows:—

Indians	...	...	...	3,714
Malayans	...	...	...	444
Dutch East Indies	...	...	...	1,165
North Africans	...	...	...	557
Egyptians	...	...	...	1,059
Sudanese	...	...	...	332
West Africans	...	...	...	273
Palestinians	...	...	...	1,047
East Africans	...	...	...	112
Yemenis	...	...	...	214

8,917



A remarkable increase may be noted in respect of Palestinians, whose number in 1935 was 1,432, as against 385 of last year; whilst British Malays were 617, as against 173 in 1934. It would appear from Table (A) that, with the exceptions of Bokharans and Persians, whose numbers decreased to 523 and 1,063 respectively, as against 847 and 1,133 in 1934, the other nationals not mentioned above showed either a negligible increase or decrease.

TABLE (A).

*Number of Pilgrims arriving by Sea and landing at different Ports of the Hejaz, arranged by Nationality.*

Nationality.	1934.	1935.	Landed at—			
			Jedda.	Yanbu.	Qunfida.	Lith.
<b>India and Far East—</b>						
Indian ... ..	7,399	11,113	11,086	27	...	...
Malayan ... ..	173	617	617	...	...	...
Dutch East Indies ... ..	2,827	3,992	3,992	...	...	...
Chinese and other ... ..	256	223	169	54	...	...
Japanese ... ..	...	4	4	...	...	...
<b>Africa—</b>						
North African ... ..	2,323	2,880	2,718	162	...	...
Egyptian ... ..	4,302	5,361	5,322	39	...	...
Sudanese ... ..	584	866	866	...	...	...
West African ... ..	891	1,164	879	...	285*	...
Senegali ... ..	43	30	30	...	...	...
Somali ... ..	52	37	37	...	...	...
Zanzibari and East African ... ..	27	139	139	...	...	...
South African ... ..	98	59	59	...	...	...
Abyssinian ... ..	13	29	29	...	...	...
<b>Arab countries—</b>						
Syria ... ..	725	718	491	227	...	...
Iraqi ... ..	195	170	117	53	...	...
Palestinian ... ..	385	1,432	1,166	266	...	...
Yemeni ... ..	277	491	491	...	...	...
Hadrami and Adenese ... ..	267	284	284	...	...	...
Hejazi ... ..	530	679	645	34	...	...
Persian Gulf (including Muscat and Bahrein) ... ..	79	105	89	...	...	16*
<b>Miscellaneous—</b>						
Afghans ... ..	1,720	1,707	1,696	11	...	...
Bokharans ... ..	847	523	510	13	...	...
Persians ... ..	1,153	1,063	1,050	13	...	...
Russians ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	...
Turkish ... ..	114	156	62	94	...	...
<b>European countries—</b>						
Yugoslavians ... ..	31	43	42	1	...	...
Albanians ... ..	20	11	11	...	...	...
Greeks ... ..	10	...	...	...	...	...
English ... ..	...	2	2	...	...	...
<b>Total</b> ... ..	<b>25,291</b>	<b>33,898</b>	<b>32,603</b>	<b>994</b>	<b>285</b>	<b>16</b>

N.B.—(1) The mark \* indicates that this number arrived by dhow.

(2) In addition to the above total of overseas pilgrims, there were also 1,000 from Koweit who travelled on camels by the overland route and 398 pilgrims who travelled by the overland route in motor vehicles. They returned by the same route. Besides the above, there were also 542 destitute Indian pilgrims, who travelled overland or by dhow, but returned by ships.

TABLE (B).

*Number of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Countries of Embarkation.*

Country of Embarkation.	1934.	1935.
<b>India and Far East—</b>		
India ... ..	10,169	13,441
Malaya ... ..	886	1,013
Dutch East Indies ... ..	2,477	3,802
<b>Africa—</b>		
North Africa ... ..	1,770	2,322
Egypt ... ..	5,759	8,405
Sudan ... ..	1,798	1,831
Eritrea ... ..	105	85
East Africa ... ..	...	...
South Africa ... ..	196	70
<b>Arab countries—</b>		
Syria ... ..	1,618	1,685
Iraq ... ..	3	1
Yemen ... ..	...	...
Aden ... ..	542	651
Hadramaut ... ..	...	199
Asir (Hejaz) ... ..	...	29
<b>Miscellaneous—</b>		
Persia ... ..	...	...
Russia ... ..	2	...
Europe ... ..	16	33
By dhow from different places but landed at Qunfida and Lith ... ..	...	301
<b>Total</b> ... ..	<b>25,291</b>	<b>33,898</b>

TABLE (C).

*Number of Pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz by Sea, arranged by Countries of Embarkation.*

Flag.	1934.		1935.	
	Number of voyages.	Number of pilgrims.	Number of voyages.	Number of pilgrims.
British ... ..	177	15,933	66	20,913
Dutch ... ..	11	2,022	6	3,833
French ... ..	4	2,432	2	2,685
Italian ... ..	73	503	15	256
Soviet ... ..	4	5	...	...
German ... ..	8	8	1	29
Egyptian ... ..	4	4,388	6	5,852
Arabian ... ..	...	...	1	29
By dhow* ... ..	...	...	...	301
<b>Total</b> ... ..	<b>281</b>	<b>25,291</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>33,898</b>

\* (a) This year the Saudi quarantine department was able to show the number of pilgrims who landed at Qunfida and Lith by dhow.

(b) The figures given relate to the actual pilgrimage season and not, as last year, to the whole Arabic year.

### (3) Quarantine.

44. The inauguration this year of the overland motor route for pilgrims between Nejed and Medina, together with the growing use of the alternative motor route from Koweit to Mecca via Riyadh, as well as the possible development of other overland routes, discussed later at paragraphs 97 ff., make the consideration of quarantine measures of special importance. For the reception of



overlanders from Iraq, who had already been inoculated and vaccinated in their countries of origin, a temporary quarantine camp was established, it was reported, some 2 miles from Medina on this route, where quarantine formalities were carried out, and Saudi quarantine dues imposed. No such measures are known to have been taken in respect of pilgrims travelling from Koweit, and no dues, it is understood, were levied.

45. The usual quarantine measures were instituted at Kamaran, Tor and Suakin during the year under review.

#### Kamaran.

46. Compulsory vaccination and inoculation again gave satisfactory results. Kamaran reported health good. Ten deaths (five on British Indian ships) and four births (none on British Indian ships) were reported. The steamship *Akbar*, on the 11th February, brought one case of modified small-pox and one of chicken-pox; the steamship *Rahmani* brought one case of measles, diagnosed at Kamaran as non-infectious; and the *Akbar*, on the 11th March, again brought a case of modified small-pox.

47. Exemption from landing pilgrims was granted to twenty-three ships, and only 268 pilgrims were landed for disinfection, compared with 282 last year, none of these being from British Indian ports.

48. The steamship *Khosrou*, calling at Aden on the 22nd February, took on board a few unvaccinated and uninoculated pilgrims. Fortunately, they readily submitted to vaccination and inoculation, and so the ship was not unduly delayed at Kamaran. Stricter precautions are to be taken at Aden for the future.

49. In view of the declaration of the Saudi medical authorities, verified by the Indian medical officer and the representative of the International Quarantine Board, that the pilgrimage was clean, His Majesty's Minister was able to dispense ships returning to India and Malaya from calling at Kamaran. Similar precautions to last year were observed regarding vaccination and inoculation of returning pilgrims, modified somewhat as regards procedure owing to difficulties made by the local quarantine authorities. Two cases of chicken-pox and one of small-pox were refused embarkation on the steamship *Akbar* on the 28th March; two cases of chicken-pox and one of convalescent small-pox by the *Rahmani* on the 5th April; and on the 10th April the *Akbar* again refused two cases of chicken-pox.

50. In returning ships, the following cases occurred during the voyage:—

Steamship *Islami*, the 26th March, 3 chicken-pox.

Steamship *Rahmani*, the 5th April, 1 chicken-pox.

Steamship *Akbar*, the 28th April, 3 chicken-pox; 1 modified small-pox.

#### Tor.

51. Returning pilgrim ships were subjected to the usual detention of three days. The Alexandria Quarantine Board declared the pilgrimage clean on the 1st April, but subsequent discovery of cholera vibrios in certain pilgrims suffering from diarrhoea led them to impose certain restrictions on pilgrims proceeding via Egypt.

#### Suakin.

52. Pilgrims returning to Africa via the Sudan underwent the usual five days' detention at Suakin. Two cases of chicken-pox and one of leprosy were rejected by Khedivial Mail ships, but proceeded upon recovery.

#### Jedda.

53. No quarantine measures were necessary, or were applied, in respect of pilgrim ships or pilgrims this year, although some anxiety was manifested in India owing to the "adoption" of the International Sanitary Convention of 1926, with many reservations (in respect of article 127 *inter alia*) by the Saudi Government (referred to at paragraph 20 above).

54. The Port Medical Service was maintained by one doctor only, Dr. Ibrahim Adham, until about two weeks before Haj day, when Dr. Yahya (see paragraph 40 of last year's report) returned. Dr. Ibrahim Adham was less obstructive again, except in respect of the vaccination and inoculation of returning pilgrims, where, as has been noted, to spare his susceptibilities and maintain Legation control, a modified procedure was adopted.

55. Dr. Muhammed Saleh came to Jedda as representative of the Alexandria Quarantine Board. He was allowed to visit Mecca for the first time, although he has visited the Hejaz in this capacity on a number of previous occasions. The Saudi authorities, however, accorded no official recognition of his position as representative of the Board.

56. As recorded above at paragraph 24, the Legation repatriated 1,500 destitute West Africans during the cool weather. All were vaccinated and inoculated at the Government of India Dispensary at Jedda, owing to stipulation by the Government of Eritrea (most of the Takrunis were shipped to Massawa) that such precautionary measures, of a quarantine nature, should be taken here.

#### (4) Health.

##### General.

57. The health of pilgrims during the 1935 season was satisfactory and climatic conditions good, though possibly not so favourable as last year.

##### Saudi Medical Service.

58. No attempt was made to recruit the depleted strength of medical personnel (*vide* paragraph 44 of last year's report), in spite of the promise of an increased Haj. There was, however, no demand this year upon the medical service for military purposes as was occasioned in 1934 by the Yemen war. The following is the distribution during the season, based on a list supplied by the Indian medical officer, except for transfers to Mecca for temporary service at the height of the pilgrimage:—

*Mecca*.—Five, including the Director-General of Public Health, a dentist and a newly-engaged analytical chemist. In addition, there is a midwife; and one other doctor, who worked during the pilgrimage, resigned soon after. There appears to be no surgeon.

*Jedda*.—Four, including two quarantine doctors, and two doctors (one, a newly-appointed Turk, is a bacteriologist) at the hospital. There is, in addition, a midwife.

*Medina*.—One doctor.

*Taif*.—One doctor—called to Mecca for the Haj.

*Yanbu*.—One doctor. None at Wejh.

*Riyadh*.—One, the royal physician, who in May 1935 accompanied Amir Saud on his European tour.

*Hasa*.—One doctor recently appointed.

*Najran*.—One Indian Unani doctor recently appointed.

59. This total of 14 (excluding the Unani doctor and the two midwives) comprises 12 Syrians, 1 Turk and 1 Egyptian, all of whom have Syrian medical qualifications, except the director-general and the bacteriologist, who hold Turkish degrees. The increase in Syrians, under the aegis of a Syrian director-general, is interesting. The number of private practitioners fluctuates. A new Italian, Dr. Brunelli, arrived in February, but apparently has no official connexion with the Italian Legation. No change has been reported in regard to pharmacists.

60. Sanction has at last been accorded to Unani doctors to practise in this country, upon individual applications being made. It is believed the King himself overrode the objections of the Director-General of Public Health.

61. Hospitals show little signs of improvement (*vide* paragraph 46 of last year's report).

*Mecca*.—Last year's remarks still apply. There is no X-ray apparatus, but an X-ray specialist has been advertised for. Gabban was used exclusively for isolation. A house has been hired by the Government as an infirmary, where food and first aid are provided for destitutes; it can accommodate about 1,000, but lacked beds.

*Jedda*.—The hospital is undergoing repairs, an interminable process in this country. Nothing was seen of the doctors from Istanbul, save the bacteriologist, who was without accommodation at the end of the year. Distrust of the institution by the local inhabitants appeared to be fairly thorough.



The quarantine authorities opened four centres for the vaccination of the general public, as well as pilgrims leaving by ship. Staff arrangements for this undertaking were stated to be quite inadequate.

*Medina.*—As recorded earlier in this report, a movement is on foot in India to provide Medina with a hospital; a Government hospital is also projected.

*Taif.*—The construction of a hospital was commenced during the year, and is believed to be proceeding.

62. The Indian medical officer is even more emphatic this year than last (*vide* paragraph 47 of last year's report) in his observations regarding defective Saudi medical services. Yet with defective equipment and inadequate personnel the Government indulged in rather ambitious legislative enactments copied from more advanced countries.

63. The following statement of cases treated and deaths in Government hospitals has been prepared by the Indian medical officer from weekly returns published in the local press. Dr. Abdul Hamid points out that the statement is not complete for the year the 1st June, 1934, to the 31st May, 1935, as for a number of weeks, for some unexplained reason, no returns were published:—

Disease.	Number of cases.	Deaths.
Dysentery ...	1,996	31
Small-pox ...	305	222
Consumption ...	193	49
Syphilis ...	1,635	6
Typhoid ...	37	19
Measles ...	109	38
Chicken-pox ...	12	4
Puerperal fever ...	42	33
Leprosy ...	11	2
Mumps ...	4	2
Paratyphoid ...	2	1
Whooping-cough ...	38	6
Dengue ...	73	1
Influenza ...	169	13
Diphtheria ...	2	2
Tetanus ...	1	1
Meningitis ...	1	1

These figures are given for what they are worth and at best can only give a partial idea of the prevalence of disease in a country so poorly provided with hospitals. They indicate that dysentery, small-pox and syphilis would appear to have increased over last year.

#### *Diseases during the Pilgrimage Season.*

64. Pilgrims remained largely unaffected by small-pox and chicken-pox in the Hejaz. Cases refused embarkation for India and cases occurring during the return voyage to India are noted at paragraphs 49 and 52 above.

65. During the actual pilgrimage, influenzal catarrh and influenzal pneumonia were rife, many deaths being due to the latter. Malaria was common and cases of sun-stroke, none fatal, were reported, the days passed at Muna being somewhat hotter. After the Haj, dysentery and diarrhoea were very common, the daily attendance at the Legation dispensary being as many as 60 to 80 for these complaints alone.

66. The general health of the local inhabitants showed much improvement, malaria being the chief scourge.

#### *Mortality.*

67. The death rate this year is estimated by the Indian medical officer at about 0.6 per cent., double that of last year. At Arafat one death only occurred and at Muna thirty-five in the three days, also double last year's figure.

#### *General Sanitary Conditions.*

68. Dr. Abdul Hamid describes these as worse than last year, which would scarcely seem possible. Absence of latrines, lack of arrangements for the disposal of carcasses, prevalence of mosquitoes, infection of water-supply, &c., a truly formidable catalogue. His "Medical Hints to Pilgrims" was again published in the press in India, and was thought to have proved useful.

69. The temperature on Haj day was the same as last year, ranging between 85° and 97° F.

#### *Water Supply.*

70. There was no change in conditions at Mecca this year, whilst at Muna and Arafat water was abundant and much cheaper, at 5 piastres for 4 gallons, than the extortionate prices of last year. The new bacteriologist and the analytical chemist are stated to have reported adversely on Ain Zubeyda water and recommended the use of iron pipes underground.

71. The Jeddah water-supply, described at paragraph 56 in last year's report, remained much the same, except that progress had been made in laying down pipes in the town to various distributing points. The work is not by any means complete, the important distributing point at the quarantine quay not having been commenced. Money is still required, but handsome donations were received during the pilgrimage from the Nawab of Bahawalpur, the Begum of Hyderabad and others.

#### *Government of India Dispensaries.*

72. The Jeddah Dispensary remained open as usual throughout the year. The staff remained unchanged, the retention of the third dispenser and sweeper being sanctioned. The third dispenser, however, left for India after the pilgrimage and is due to be replaced during the summer of 1935. Minor repairs and white-washing were carried out and another room was tiled. Special attendance registers, supplied by the Government of India, were brought into use this year.

73. The Mecca Dispensary opened on the 13th January and closed on the 14th May. As Dr. Hamid Hussin had gone to Medina, Dr. Muhammad Khan (*vide* paragraph 58 of the report for 1933) was appointed sub-assistant surgeon. His work and that of his staff was satisfactory, particularly in view of the increased pilgrimage. Arrangements for Haj week, including attendance at Arafat and Muna were similar to those of previous years. At Muna when the Indian vice-consul and Indian medical officer are always obliged to hire joint accommodation at their own expense, this year on account of greater demand, separate accommodation (the Indian vice-consul in tents) had to suffice.

74. The attitude of the Saudi authorities towards the Government of India dispensaries continued to be one of complete non-recognition. The attitude of the Director-General of Public Health towards the Mecca Dispensary and the Indian medical officer calls for no special comment this year. Conversations on the general position of the dispensaries proceeded throughout the year. In August 1934 the Saudi Government aggravated the situation by issuing a circular to foreign missions asking that the missions should in future furnish separate statements of medical supplies imported for their "private" use and those for other uses in order that customs dues could be collected on the latter. Pending further discussion, the Saudi Government eventually agreed to leave the situation intact, and under this agreement allowed the annual consignment of medical supplies to come in duty free. A supplementary consignment from Egypt was refused admittance, and duty was, in accordance with an arrangement made, paid under protest pending settlement of the whole question. This last consignment was received subsequent to the period under review, but is mentioned here for the sake of completeness.

#### *Cases Treated in the Indian Dispensaries.*

75. The total number of cases treated at the Jeddah Dispensary from the 1st June, 1934, to the 31st May, 1935, was 43,535 as compared with 42,500 last year. Of these, the number of Indian pilgrims treated at Jeddah between the 30th November, 1934, to the 31st May, 1935, was 6,841 as compared with 4,841 for the last year. The number of cases treated at Mecca from the 13th January



to the 15th May was 20,306 as compared with 13,109 last year. At Mecca nearly all patients were pilgrims, very few being Hejazi and other subjects. During three days at Muna 310 cases were treated.

76. Indoor cases this year totalled thirty-six as compared with forty-seven of last year. Dr. Abdul Hamid performed 326 major operations and 3,540 minor operations. Lack of accommodation, &c., for indoor cases does not permit of much increase in indoor work and operations.

77. The observations, as to a comparison in numbers treated in the Indian and Saudi medical institutions, apply this year as before (*vide* paragraph 63 of 1933 report).

78. The total amount collected up to the 31st December, 1934, from patients for medicines supplied amounted to 234 rials. From January 1935 the practice of charging was discontinued, in view of the controversy with the Saudi Government over the general dispensary question.

79. The following table shows the percentage of the various diseases treated in the Indian dispensaries during the year ended the 31st May, 1935:—

Medical—	Percentage.
(1) Malaria and its complications ... ..	32.75
(2) Other fevers and infectious diseases ... ..	0.35
(3) Urinary diseases, including syphilis and gonorrhoea ... ..	12.91
(4) Digestive troubles ... ..	7.34
(5) Circulatory diseases ... ..	0.62
(6) Respiratory diseases ... ..	4.11
(7) Nervous diseases ... ..	1.29
(8) Diseases of the locomotory system ... ..	2.50
(9) Women's diseases ... ..	3.46
(10) Children's diseases ... ..	3.97
(11) Eye, ear, nose and throat diseases ... ..	5.51
(12) Deficiency diseases ... ..	0.43
Surgical—	
(13) Sinuses, &c. ... ..	20.25
(14) Wounds and other contusions ... ..	4.03
(15) Hydrocele and hernia ... ..	0.09
(16) Cystitis, stone, &c. ... ..	0.40
Total ... ..	100.00

80. The practice noted in paragraph 65 of the report for 1933 in respect of a charge of 5 rupees to the cost of transport being made to patients in their own quarters was followed again this year. About eighty-five visits were made free to indigent persons.

81. The difficulty with regard to dispensing outside prescriptions (*vide* paragraph 65 of last year's report) occurred again this year, but to a much less extent.

82. Mahmud Hamdi also instructed all local dispensaries that no outside prescriptions should be dispensed unless given by a doctor licensed to practice by the Director-General of Public Health.

#### Other Foreign Medical Assistance.

83. The Egyptian consulate still maintained its doctor, but medicines and instruments were reported to be still lacking. The Egyptian Government sent the usual medical mission during the pilgrimage season, consisting of two, the consulate doctor acting as the head of the mission. They worked as last year, in Mecca for one month only.

84. The Afghan mission was as elementary as ever. A new doctor, Ahmed Ali Punjabi, retired from the service of the Government of India, was appointed instead of Dr. Saleh, who had come here for three successive years.

85. The Dutch doctor, Abdur Rahman, as last year, worked at Mecca. The Dutch Legation was reported to have no intention of reopening their Jeddah dispensary.

86. A new Italian doctor, as already noted, has recently set up in private practice.

87. The Russian doctor George (*vide* paragraph 68 of last year's report) worked up to the middle of May 1935, when he was removed and sent back to Russia, on account, it was reported, of frequenting certain White Russians here in the Saudi Air Service. The dispensary was closed. The dentist resumed his work upon his return from Hodeida, while the Minister's wife, Mme. Turakoulov, was said to have given up her work. A Russian lady doctor, Amina, was said to be attending the King's family at Riyadh.

#### Medical Arrangements on Pilgrim Ships.

88. The medical arrangements on the new ship, the steamship *Islami*, were a great improvement. A recommendation by the Legation that the crew of every pilgrim ship should be vaccinated and inoculated at least once every pilgrim season was accepted by the Port Haj Committee, Bombay. The same authority also agreed that a strict medical examination of ship's hotel managers and servants should be made periodically, for such diseases as tuberculosis, syphilis and gonorrhoea, as cases had been reported. Various suggestions regarding medical diaries were also accepted. For questions concerning transport from ship to shore, the compulsory food system, &c., see paragraphs 105 and 154 respectively.

#### (5) Internal Transport.

89. The chorus of complaints raised after the 1934 pilgrimage, regarding the hardships and difficulties, due to inefficiency of the motor transport organisation, experienced by all classes of pilgrims able to afford that means of conveyance to the Holy Places, led Ibn Saud to convene a conference at Taif in the early summer of that year, as described in paragraph 73 of last year's report. The following rules were framed:—

- Each motor company to possess a fleet of thirty vehicles (instead of twenty as previously) consisting of twenty-four buses and six cars.
- Of these vehicles 10 per cent. were to be new Fords.
- All vehicles to be ready for inspection by the beginning of Rajab.
- All vehicles of any one company to be presented for inspection together, at one time.
- Inspecting bodies were appointed and a committee to superintend organisation during the year.

90. The rules, however, were not observed, particularly as regards thoroughness of inspection, with the result that motor transport, whose owners had been too impoverished to renew and repair their vehicles, was in a condition which, according to the Indian vice-consul, subjected pilgrims to even greater hardships in 1935 than in the previous year. These are summarised by Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah as follows:—

- Large numbers of pilgrims were delayed on the Mecca-Jedda road, and hundreds refused to continue their journey in the dilapidated vehicles provided. The Naqaba, or motor transport administration, attempted to insist, but the Indian vice-consul was able finally to arrange for the vehicles to be changed.
- Cases occurred of pilgrims spending seven days on the Medina road.
- Complaints were again heard of pilgrims of several nationalities composing one bus load.
- Reckless driving led to loss of luggage.
- Muzawwars were blamed for much avoidable delay on pilgrims leaving Medina.
- There was an unusual number of accidents this year: a bus caught fire on the Medina road, fatally burning two Indian female pilgrims and injuring a number of others; an Indian female pilgrim was run over by a bus and killed; a number of other cases of injury occurred.
- As last year no special arrangements were made for the hotels to run cars for their clients.



- (h) Particular hardship was experienced on the sandy stretch between Mastura and Bir bin Hassan on the Medina road. This led to an appeal to prominent Indian pilgrims by others of their number to consider a proposal to re-construct the Medina road.

91. As already noticed above, Shargieh (Limited) continued this year with a modified concession for the import of Ford motor vehicles for pilgrimage traffic.

92. The proportion of the poorer classes of pilgrim was as great in this year of larger numbers as last, as may be seen from the fact that only about 11,000 pilgrims travelled to Medina by motor this year. Nor were users of motor transport between Jedda and Mecca as numerous as might be expected. The steamship *Islami*, for example, arrived on the 31st December with 835 pilgrims from Indian ports (the majority being non-Indians), of whom forty-five only travelled to Mecca by car, eighty by camel, the rest walked.

93. Difficulty was experienced in meeting a greater demand this year from well-to-do Indian pilgrims for motor transport to Arafat. The charges, unlike last year, were per person, instead of per car or per bus, viz.: £1½ gold travelling by bus and £2½ gold by six- and four-seater cars.

94. Renewed complaints by a stream of deputations to Ibn Saud of the motor transport organisation led him to convene, after the Haj, another conference on the lines of that of last year. This year the King insisted on the amalgamation of all motor-car companies into one single corporation. A committee was formed and companies were called on to surrender their vehicles, against assessment of value. The corporation was to consist of two sections, one comprising vehicles attached to it by the companies and the other of Government vehicles. None but corporation vehicles were to be allowed to ply for hire. It was too early, at the end of the period under review, to judge of the merits of the scheme, but car companies were stated to be surrendering only their most worthless cars, retaining their better ones in the hope of sale for cash either to private individuals or to the corporation at the height of the next pilgrimage.

95. As already stated, the private visit of the Indian vice-consul to Medina led him to suggest various reforms, for recommendation to the Saudi authorities. Although that course was approved, no suitable opportunity occurred, owing to the intrigues, according to Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah, of Muhammad Khan Ghazi Khan and Ismail Ghuznavi. Of the proposals mentioned at paragraph 74 of last year's report, only those at (c) and (d) appear to have been adopted.

96. It is estimated that, as last year, about 60 per cent. of the Indian pilgrimage visited Medina by motor this year.

#### Overland Routes.

97. A new feature in the pilgrimage, anticipated in paragraph 83 of last year's report, resulted from an agreement reached between the Governments of Saudi Arabia and Iraq early in 1935 for the opening of a new motor route between Nejef and Medina, whereby Iraqi transport companies were to carry pilgrims to Medina, whence they would be conveyed to Mecca in Saudi vehicles. It was agreed that the Iraqi Government should allow only five-seater motor cars to operate during the present Haj season. The rather meagre total of 398 pilgrims, including a party of seventy-odd Iraqi boy scouts and twenty-two British Indians, were transported from Nejef to Medina by this overland route. The fare for four- and five-seater cars from Nejef to Medina was £18 gold and £15 gold respectively. Pilgrims had to pay a further £15½ gold per head for their transport from Medina to Mecca and back by bus, including mutawwifs' fees and quarantine dues.

98. A number of vehicles left Ahmedabad, India, again this year, intending to travel overland all the way. After great difficulty, two reached Nejef, where their passengers were obliged to transfer into Iraqi vehicles for Medina. Not all were able to pay the fare and the unfortunate ones had to be left behind. Again, the venture cannot be said to have been a conspicuous success.

99. The motor route from Koweit, via Riyadh, to Mecca, though still believed to be very imperfectly organised, was used by a party of Indian pilgrims this year, who arrived too late for the Haj.

100. The so-called route from Hasa to Mecca, via Riyadh, apparently does not enjoy the official countenance of the Saudi Government, but notices were

posted in the bazaar at Bahrein last autumn that the Saudi authorities would be prepared to carry up to fifty pilgrims to the Hejaz for £10 gold, or £15 gold return. The notice was withdrawn on the representations of the Political Agent. Subsequently, an Indian, named Zafar Mirza, has been working to obtain sanction to open this route in connexion with sailings from Karachi to Bahrein. His pretensions to have secured a concession from the Saudi Government were denied by the Minister of Finance. The Legation maintained its attitude of discouraging the use of all unorganised or semi-organised overland routes.

101. A further overland route engaged the attention of a number of enterprising Syrians, who in two convoys made the journey, after the Haj, from Damascus to Medina, via the Wadi Sirhan and the Hejaz Railway track, with great hardship in seventeen days. They returned in less time and with less difficulty via Mudawwara and Maan.

#### Camels.

102. Those who travelled by camels this year experienced unusual difficulties, both in respect of delay and hardships; and written and verbal complaints were numerous. Under transport regulations, a camelman could get no more than 34 rupees for the journey to Medina and back out of the total of £10 gold or 240 rupees recovered from a pilgrim against this item; the balance passes to the Government Treasury. The poverty of the camelmen, coupled with the local drought in Medina, sent up the price of fodder and camels practically starved, becoming too weak to carry their loads. Pilgrims had often, therefore, to walk long distances.

103.—(a) At paragraph 92 above it has been mentioned that out of 835 pilgrims arriving by the *Islami*, forty-five travelled to Mecca by motor vehicles and eighty by camels, while the rest walked on foot. This news greatly agitated the Saudi Minister of Finance, who ordered an investigation. It transpired that camelmen were evading the regulations by hiring their camels to pedestrian pilgrims for a nominal sum, after having passed through the "Koshan" gate of Jedda. The camels found thus engaged were forfeited to the Government and the camelmen imprisoned; subsequently the latter were released and the camels returned to them, but it served as a warning both to the Wakiils at Jedda and to the camelmen.

(b) About 1,000 souls travelled from Koweit by camel, being exempted from payment of dues. They travelled via Burayda, instead of by the designated route through Jerriya-ilya.

#### Cabs.

104. The same practice as last year was followed in respect of the use of cabs in the town of Mecca.

#### Dhows.

105. (Reference paragraph 78 of last year's report.) As the arrangement was renewed for one year only, the Government of India were again asked to continue the arrangements between Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. and themselves for the conveyance of pilgrims and their luggage between ship and shore and *vice versa* for a further period of one year. It, however, had again certain defects and was a source of complaint and was to receive the attention of the Legation for further recommendation to the Government of India.

#### General.

106. No attempt even was made this year to prevent pilgrims from travelling on foot between Mecca and Jedda, and many of the poorer, especially Afghan and Bokharan, pilgrims did so travel. But the prohibition against footing it to Medina was more strictly enforced. Those willing to walk to Medina had to obtain permission from the Saudi Government. Mutawwifs were then held responsible. Nevertheless, a good number of pilgrims actually travelled on foot to Medina.



107. Motives of economy still led a few hundred pilgrims to postpone their trip to Medina until after the reduction of the "Koshan" (paragraph 80 of last year's report). The Government, with an eye to revenue, fixed the "Koshan" rate for the journey during the non-pilgrimage season, differentiating between foreigners and Saudi subjects. The rates were as follows for the return journey:—

Foreigners: £2 gold and 3½ rials.  
Saudi subjects: £1 gold and 1½ rials.

108. The Minister of Finance promised the Indian vice-consul that, on presentation of a memorial to him by British subjects resident in Medina, he would consider the request for the restoration of the privilege of reduced "Koshan" rates enjoyed by them alike with Saudi subjects (paragraph 81 of last year's report). No action was, however, taken by Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, although the memorial was submitted in good time. As a result, many who could not afford the higher rates were unable to perform the Haj.

109. An Indian pilgrim, who arrived at Jedda by sea, travelled to Mecca on a bicycle. He was held up on the Mecca road until a sum of 64 piastres miri was recovered from his wakil on account of "Koshan." He was then allowed to resume his journey. It is worth mentioning that this is the first instance of a bicycle reaching Mecca; previous cyclists having been less fortunate.

#### (6) Customs.

110. The remarks at paragraph 85 of last year's report regarding smuggling and venality apply with equal force to the year under review.

111. After the pilgrimage season was over a local newspaper announced that the Government had decided to reduce the customs duties on a number of important articles, *e.g.*, petrol, tobacco, artificial silk, perfumes, disinfectants. Unofficial confirmation of this was latter obtained from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Reluctance to make an official announcement may be explained by the fact that the reduction related to tobacco and certain other commodities, viewed by strict Wahhabis with repugnance. Economically the reductions, especially that on petrol, would seem to reveal a confidence in the financial position of the country, inspired by the larger pilgrimage of this year. The abolition of all duties on disinfectants was doubtless inspired by the present movement to show the world how modern Saudi Arabia is in matters concerning public health.

#### (7) Religious Policy.

112. Committees of virtue in the principal towns of the Hejaz continued to exist, but had their powers considerably curtailed by Royal order. After the Haj the force of special constables employed under the committees of virtue was abolished and the local police entrusted with their duties. These developments have been welcomed, and a much greater laxity in public was apparent on all sides. The enjoyment of music, both gramophone and vocal, and of smoking in public places, was latterly quite common.

113. A powerful stimulus to this movement was given when permission, unpublished but official, was accorded in January to import radio sets. This relaxation, which primarily affects the coastal towns, may be expected to have important influences on the life of the country. The immediate result was to render night more hideous than ever before, with the oriental harmonies received over the ether from Cairo largely obliterated by ear-splitting atmospherics. There has been some reaction, it is said, in Wahhabi circles, but no restrictions had been imposed at the end of the period under review. Radios were also said to be in private, but secret, use in the households of notables at Mecca and Taif.

114. Although pilgrims had less reason to complain this year of excessive religious zeal shown by the authorities, the usual restrictions on visits to tombs and shrines were officially maintained, but unofficially circumvented.

115. The greater religious tolerance evident did not prevent the occurrence of isolated incidents, as when in Jedda towards the end of 1934 the beating of a

boy by the police for not attending prayers at the mosque led to a fracas between irate Jeddawis and the police. About eighty local inhabitants were thrown into prison and many flogged in consequence.

116. A grievance of Indians who marry Hejazi girls here is that they are forbidden by fetwa of the Sharia Court to take their wives to India.

#### (8) Mutawwifs.

117. No change of importance affected the mutawwif fraternity during the year under review. The recommendations of the Indian vice-consul, referred to in paragraph 90 of last year's report (*cf.* paragraph 107 (a) of 1933 report), at last materialised in the appointment of a certain Abdul Hye Daud, of Mecca, as the permanent "naqib" of Jedda. This recognised the principle of having the sheikh of the wakils from outside the body of the wakils themselves. The action of the Saudi Government in not selecting a man for this office from Jedda itself should enable its incumbent to remain aloof from the personal affairs and interests of the wakil class.

118. The efforts of the Indian vice-consul to secure a body of wakils exclusively devoted to Indian pilgrims were neutralised to some extent by the wiles of the wealthy and influential ex-naqib, who was able to arrange for his son to be appointed a wakil for Indian mutawwifs independent of the new naqib. The father continued to enjoy his own agency for non-Indian mutawwifs, and presently, jointly with the son, to exercise his old control over such questions as pilgrims' lodgings, &c. Complaints were not slow in being made, even by leading Indians, that Egyptians and other non-Indians, wards of the father, were being given preference in accommodation, &c. Other ex-wakils were beginning to apply to Government for agencies in the names of relatives, and it was said that, money talking so powerfully, certain deserving and respectable wakils had been displaced in this disagreeable intrigue.

119. Other recommendations of the Indian vice-consul were adopted (paragraph 107 (a) of the 1933 report), except one requiring the personal presence of wakils at Jedda to meet incoming pilgrims. If instructions were given, they were apparently ignored by one prominent and wealthy wakil of Mecca.

120. The question of the conduct of pilgrim guides (paragraph 93 of last year's report) whilst in India, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies was the object of further serious consideration by the Saudi Government. Complaints were numerous, and a typical case, occurring in respect of Malaya, is described later at paragraph 188 of this report. Mutawwifs when abroad sometimes took advances from pilgrims in respect of dues, granting in return a letter of credit on their agents in the Hejaz and then remained behind, whilst their agents here were unable to meet the demands of the letters, and the Saudi authorities found great difficulty in collecting dues from the pilgrims. The Minister of Finance, after a short period in which he was inclined to forbid mutawwifs from going to India, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, finally, after consulting the Indian vice-consul, decreed that mutawwifs might proceed to the above countries provided that each produced a reputable guarantor in case claims arose against them later on, and also that each undertook, before a court, to refrain from bargaining with pilgrims or causing similar mischief. "Sabees" were entirely forbidden to go to these countries, except such as were designated by mutawwifs themselves unable to go. As regards mutawwifs for other nationalities than the above, they would be allowed to proceed provided they undertook to return before the commencement of the next pilgrimage.

121. The Saudi Government, in framing these regulations, were perhaps actuated more by financial motives, *viz.*, to prevent spendthrift mutawwifs from throwing their money away in foreign countries, than by any others. It remains to be seen whether there will be any improvement as a result in the conduct of this not very desirable element in Haj propaganda.

122. The Indian vice-consul draws attention to the difficulties he has been confronted with owing to the intrigues against him of the agitators Muhammad Khan Ghazi Khan and Ismail Ghuznavi, though it is not believed these will prove a more serious factor. Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah reports that his relations with mutawwifs and wakils have been perfectly harmonious. The maintenance of the black-list system has again proved its usefulness.



123. No new instances of misconduct by mutawwifs came to notice other than cases similar to those reported in paragraph 95 of last year's report.

124. (Paragraph 96 of last year's report.) The payment of dues in advance at Jedda was again a source of difficulty, in spite of the wide circulation in India of warnings against leaving with less than the prescribed amount of money. A party of thirty Sindhis refused to pay dues on landing on grounds of destitution.

125. There was no change in the "Taqrir" system, although representations were made to Ibn Saud and the Minister of Finance.

126. (Paragraph 99 of last year's report.) No progress with the Minister of Finance was made in connexion with the proposal to have Indians of the Shia faith placed under the care of the Indian Sheikh-ul-Mutawwifin.

127. No improvement was reported in the conduct of the "muzawwars" of Medina. As stated earlier in this report, the Indian vice-consul desired to make certain recommendations, after his private visit to Medina, but for various reasons no suitable opportunity presented itself. The recommendations concerned, *inter alia*, muzawwars and the abolition of the "taqrir" system.

#### (9) Pilgrimage Tariff and Cost of Pilgrimage.

128. There was no change in the pilgrim tariff in 1935, but there was considerable delay in publishing the schedules, so that the Legation were obliged to proceed with the customary notification to the Government of India and other British Governments interested in the pilgrimage, basing themselves upon oral assurances received from the Minister of Finance. The schedule was published on the 5th November, 1934, and duly circulated. Tentative estimates were prepared and forwarded to the Government of India on the 4th October, for inclusion in the *Pilgrim Guide*, to be published for the future by the Port Haj Committee, Bombay.

129. As will be seen from paragraph 17 above, the Saudi authorities are believed to be contemplating for next year a 25 per cent. reduction on all dues and charges payable by the pilgrim. It remains to be seen whether the reduction will actually be introduced; it was promised in a leaflet distributed to returning pilgrims by the Haj Committee here.

130. The adoption of the recommendation mentioned at paragraph 103 of last year's report again proved of great convenience, and many pilgrims availed themselves of the opportunity to await in Mecca the arrival of their ships.

131. The proposals at paragraphs 104, 105 and 106 of last year's report were not pursued this year.

132. Difficulties in respect of payment of dues by poorer pilgrims have already been referred to at paragraph 124 above.

133. Indian pilgrims again failed to realise that Saudi dues are fixed in terms of gold, and that variations in the exchange value of gold would alter the estimates. Tentative estimates were prepared when the rate was 22 rupees per gold pound. At the height of the season the rate moved to 24 rupees.

134. The tariff, once again, did not include charges for motor transport from Mecca to Arafat and back. The rates for this, however, have been given at paragraph 93 above.

135. Transport charges for Medina were the same as those for last year. For postponement of visit until "Koshan" was reduced, see paragraph 107 above.

#### (10) Indian Pilgrimage.

136. (Paragraph 114 of last year's report.) Questions relating to the Indian pilgrimage have continued to be dealt with individually as they arose, and no comprehensive review has been submitted to the Government of India.

137. The Indian pilgrimage began this year with the arrival of the steamship *Alavi* on the 26th November, 1934, and the stream of arrivals ended with the steamship *Akbar* on the 11th March, 1935.

138. The following table shows the number of pilgrims from each province of India and from Ceylon, classified according to ports of embarkation:—

#### British Subjects.

Province.	Total Number of Pilgrims in 1934.	In 1935.			
		Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Bengal and Assam ...	667	624	32	465	1,121
Punjab ...	1,811	88	2,449	...	2,537
Bombay Presidency ...	1,128	1,703	36	...	1,739
United Provinces ...	1,015	1,090	489	...	1,579
Madras Presidency ...	189	312	3	1	316
Sind ...	465	3	867	...	870
Behar and Orissa ...	109	239	10	17	266
Central Provinces ...	511	691	129	...	820
Beluchistan ...	197	10	216	...	226
N.W. Frontier Province ...	294	67	246	...	313
Hyderabad (Deccan) ...	481	736	...	...	736
Delhi ...	175	6	129	...	135
Burma ...	47	23	1	17	41
Nepal ...	1	16	...	...	16
Ceylon ...	3	14	...	...	14
French India ...	...	1	...	...	1
Unknown ...	...	39	2	...	41
	7,093	5,662	4,609	500	10,771

139. The discrepancy between the foregoing total and that given in paragraph 43 above is due to the fact that the figures in that paragraph include Indian pilgrims from embarkation ports other than those in India, and the present statement has been compiled from the lists of pilgrims, whereas those in paragraph 43 have been compiled from information supplied by the quarantine authorities. This table puts the total number of pilgrims from British India, the native States, Ceylon and other foreign possessions in India at 10,730 (excluding 41 unknown), as compared with 7,093 of last year. In order to facilitate comparison between the number of pilgrims this year and last, the figures for 1934 have also been shown in the above table. It would appear that the arrivals from each province of India showed an increase this year.

140. The following list shows the number of non-Indian pilgrims who travelled to the Hejaz via Indian ports:—

	1934.	1935.			
		Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Chinese (Turkestan) ...	648	22	361	...	383
Afghans ...	1,636	54	1,614	...	1,668
South Africans ...	5	3	...	...	3
Russians (Turkestan) ...	27	...	3	...	3
Persians ...	25	1	3	...	4
Hejaz-Nejd subjects ...	241	171	75	26	272
Malayans ...	2	1	...	1	2
Arabs from Persian Gulf ...	75	7	37	...	44 <sup>(1)</sup>
Tibetans ...	...	6	...	...	6
Miscellaneous ...	22	7	...	...	7
	2,681	272	2,093	27	2,392

<sup>(1)</sup> Sixteen from Dibal, twenty-one from Bahrein and seven from Muscat.

141. Any difficulty in reconciling the foregoing figures with those in paragraph 43 above is due to causes similar to those indicated in paragraph 150 below. In order to facilitate comparison between the number of pilgrims this year and last, the figures for 1934 have also been added this year. Arrivals from



Chinese Turkestan showed a decrease over last year, while pilgrims from Persia and other places in the Persian Gulf appear to have deserted the Indian route to the Holy Land.

142. According to information from the Saudi passport officer at Jedda, the numbers of Indian pilgrims who arrived from other than Indian ports, as well as of those who left by other routes, were as follows:—

	Arrivals.	Departures.
Suez ... ..	157	75
Port Sudan ... ..	58	...
Aden ... ..	34	38
South Africa ... ..	13	...
Dutch East Indies and Malaya ... ..	2	...
Zanzibar and East Africa ... ..	...	32
Eritrea ... ..	...	5
Hodeida ... ..	...	1
	264	151

In addition to the above, twenty-two Indian pilgrims arrived by motor vehicle overland from India via Iraq, and returned by the same route; and 542 on foot via Nejd, Yemen, Iraq and Palestine, who were repatriated eventually at the expense of the Government of India.

143. The Mogul Line fleet of Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. was again the only line engaged in the pilgrimage traffic from India this year.

144. The following table shows the movement of return traffic with details of the number of ships available on given dates for repatriation of pilgrims, the number of pilgrims awaiting repatriation and the number actually repatriated:—

Dates.	No. of ships in port.	Pilgrims awaiting embarkation.	Pilgrims despatched.	Pilgrims remaining.	Remarks.
1935—					
March 24 ... ..	5	5,136	926	4,210	<i>Jehangir.</i>
March 25 ... ..	4	4,416	1,697	2,719	<i>Rizwani.</i>
March 26 ... ..	3	2,871	1,614	1,257	<i>Islami.</i>
March 28 ... ..	2	1,574	1,303	181	<i>Akbar.</i>
April 5 ... ..	1	1,798	1,612	186	<i>Rahmani.</i>
April 10 ... ..	1	1,342	1,028	314	<i>Alavi.</i>
April 22 ... ..	1	1,494	1,494	...	<i>Islami.</i>
April 28 ... ..	1	1,334	1,334	...	<i>Akbar.</i>
May 10 ... ..	1	858	858	...	<i>Rahmani.</i>
May 20 ... ..	1	599	599	...	<i>Alavi.</i>
June 10 ... ..	1	205	205	...	<i>Jehangir.</i>
July 12 ... ..	1	302	302	...	<i>Alavi.</i>

145. The following table shows the number of ships run, voyages effected and pilgrims carried by the Mogul Line:—

Outward from India.			Homeward to India.		
No. of ships.	No. of voyages.	No. of pilgrims.	No. of ships.	No. of voyages.	No. of pilgrims.
6	14	13,079 <sup>(*)</sup>	6	12	13,062 <sup>(*)</sup>

(\*) The discrepancy between this figure of pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz and that given in Table (B) of paragraph 43 above is due to the fact that the figures supplied by the shipping company were for the actual season of the Indian pilgrimage, beginning the 26th November, 1934, while the Quarantine Department gives the number of all Indians, including even those who arrived from India during the non-pilgrimage season; in addition, there was also a difference on account of children.

(\*) This figure includes 542 destitutes who came overland, but returned by steamer at the expense of the Government of India. There was also a number of pilgrims who came from India, during the non-pilgrimage season, and returned after the Haj. 443 return tickets are still held in deposit with this Legation.

146. The following table shows the distribution of the totals given in the preceding paragraph by ports of embarkation and destination. In the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 124 of last year's report, it has again been possible this year to give the exact number of pilgrims who returned to Bombay or Karachi:—

Port.	Pilgrims embarked.	Pilgrims returning.
Bombay ... ..	5,852	5,661
Karachi ... ..	6,702	7,401
Calcutta ... ..	525	...
	13,079	13,062

147. The following is a statement of the number of pilgrims who purchased single and return tickets in India, or deposited the amount of return passage:—

Port.	Deposit.	Single.	Return.	Total.
Bombay ... ..	...	215	5,637	5,852
Karachi ... ..	22	91	6,589	6,702
Calcutta ... ..	...	26	499	525
	22	332	12,725	13,079

148. It is to be regretted that the number of pilgrims who deposited the amount of their return passage was only twenty-two this year, of which total Bombay's share is nil. It is, however, more satisfactory to note that the number of single ticket holders was comparatively small, considering that this figure includes mostly pilgrims travelling first or second class. Foreign pilgrims travelling via Indian ports are now accustomed to travel with return tickets, so there would seem no necessity now to analyse single ticket holders under separate columns, "Indian" and "Foreign."

#### Return of Pilgrims to India: General.

149. Although the number of arrivals this year from Indian ports was more by 3,239 than last year, arrangements made by the shipping company for the return journey were satisfactory. In one case, however, on the sailing of steamship *Alavi* on the 10th April, it was found that 314 pilgrims had been left behind, due to the lack of accommodation on board. They proved a source of inconvenience to the Legation, until put on board the steamship *Islami* on the 22nd April. As the period of detention of this batch of pilgrims was between thirteen and fifteen days, no compensation allowance was payable. The shipping company were not called on to pay detention allowance to pilgrims during the year under review.

150. As mentioned in paragraph 131 of last year's report, the Indian vice-consul was again faced with persistent requests by many better-class pilgrims, who travelled with first or second-class return tickets, for the reservation of their passages by telegrams, &c., in advance, in contravention of the established rotation system. His Highness the Nawab of Bahawalpur and Her Exalted Highness the Badsha-Begum of Hyderabad, together with certain minor exalted personages, were exempted from the operation of the rotation system, under a special ruling obtained from His Majesty's Minister.

151. (Paragraph 133 of last year's report.) The new pilgrim ship steamship *Islami*, with her accommodation for 100 first-class passengers, no doubt helped to remove difficulties in respect of accommodation of better-class pilgrims, but the demand still exceeded the supply. On the sailing of steamship *Islami*, on the 22nd April, eight first-class and seventeen second-class pilgrims felt constrained to travel voluntarily as deck passengers. Apart from this instance twenty-one first-class and twenty-seven second-class pilgrims also travelled as deck passengers, while five first-class pilgrims elected to travel second-class, on the homeward journey to India.



152. On one occasion during the season, the local shipping agents informed the Legation that the steamship *Alavi* was to sail on the 25th April. Pilgrims in Medina and Mecca were duly notified, and about 473 of them reached Jeddah before the given date. The ship, however, did not sail until the 28th April, and the pilgrims approached the Legation with a view to obtaining the compensation allowance provided under sections 149 ff. of Pilgrim Ship Rules, 1933. This was, however, ruled out on the grounds of being applicable to ports in British India only and not to Jeddah.

153. Difficulty was experienced this year in connexion with the arrival of the last pilgrim ship, steamship *Akbar*, as late as the 11th March, although the authorities concerned in India had been informed by the Legation that the last pilgrim ship should arrive not later than the morning of the 10th March. Importance is attached to the matter, particularly as the majority of pilgrims, who use camels as means of transport or travel on foot, are left with a narrow margin to get to Mecca in time for the Haj. Apart from usual delays and difficulties in clearing luggage, &c., from the customs, this period of the pilgrimage season is one of congestion and disorganisation in Mecca, where all concerned are occupied in preparation for the pilgrims' departure for Arafat.

#### *Food, Accommodation, &c.*

154. The second year of the operation of certain of the amendments to the Indian Merchant Shipping Act (paragraph 139 of last year's report) was one in which the defects noted last year, in spite of some adjustments, again gave rise to strong criticism and complaint. Pilgrims of much higher standing and in larger numbers are now making the Haj, and greater conveniences, better food and improved service are demanded. Reports by committees of pilgrims and the complaints of individuals were, during the year, unanimous in asking for radical improvement, and very vigorous criticism was directed by almost every committee to such questions as baths and latrines, accommodation and storage of heavy luggage, attendants to be Moslems, and, in great volume, to the imperfections of the present food supply system. Upon all these, and many matters of subsidiary importance, the Legation has made recommendations and suggestions to the Government of India and the Bombay Port Haj Committee.

#### *Committees of Pilgrims.*

155.—(a) The Legation recommended to the Government of India in 1934 the appointment of committees of pilgrims on board pilgrim ships, instead of Amirs-al-Haj. As a result, all the ships transporting pilgrims from India to the Hejaz in the year under review had committees aboard. It was, however, observed that Port Haj committees in Bombay and Karachi appointed separate members on board each pilgrim ship, resulting sometimes in somewhat unwieldy committees composed of eight members or more.

(b) On return voyages, the Legation appointed, as last year, committees consisting of three educated pilgrims travelling by each ship. The Indian vice-consul was approached by some pilgrims to give adequate representation to the different provinces in the selection of the personnel for the committees. It was, however, pointed out that, although consideration was generally given to this point, it could not always be adopted for reasons of numbers, &c.

(c) Members of committees, both on the outward and the homeward voyages, did not confine themselves in their reports to the duties required of them by the terms of their letter of appointment, namely, "... to ensure satisfactory representation of the difficulties and complaints of the pilgrims on board the ship to her master." Their reports were invariably larded with suggestions for improvement which come within the scope of the new pilgrim-ship rules, yet in some respects they were very useful and helped to bring to the notice of the authorities concerned the views and demands of pilgrims.

#### *Pilgrim Passes.*

156. The views expressed in paragraph 141 of last year's report were reinforced by experience gained in the year under review. A suggestion for a modified and more easily handled form of pilgrim pass was referred to the Government of India for their consideration in Jeddah despatch of the 8th July last, wherein was enclosed a specimen form of pass made by the Indian vice-consul. The Indian Section of the Legation issued sixty-four duplicate passes

to pilgrims, who had lost their original pilgrim passes, and a further number of 580 emergency passes to those who travelled overland on foot or who had remained in the Hejaz for more than one year and had lost their pilgrim passes.

#### *Refunds on Deposit-paid Passes.*

157. The system, mentioned in paragraph 142 of last year's report, was again followed and proved very helpful to the pilgrims concerned, who were not required to wait for months as in the past.

#### *Registration.*

158. The Legation arrangements continued to work satisfactorily, and 10,418 Indian pilgrims, of the 11,113 shown in Table (A) of paragraph 43 above as having arrived by sea, registered at the Legation, the deficit being accounted for by the reasons mentioned in paragraph 143 of last year's report.

159. Fifty-nine unclaimed or unused return tickets and deposit-paid passes of 1934 were forwarded to the Commissioner of Police, Bombay. Applications received thereafter for refunds or return to India were dealt with in accordance with standing instructions of the Government of India.

160. Six Indian pilgrims who had not deposited their return tickets at this Legation and fifteen foreign pilgrims reported the loss of their return tickets. Arrangements similar to those described in paragraph 179 of 1932 report were made for all cases, to enable them to obtain passage.

#### *Local Haj Committee.*

161. The local Haj Committee, mentioned in paragraph 148 of 1934 report, was again constituted as usual, under the presidency of the Indian vice-consul, for the purpose of regulating return passages to India. It sat at the house of the Indian vice-consul and did useful work.

162. The arrangements for the Hyderabad Pilgrimage were again satisfactory this year. Although a responsible official of the State Government was appointed as "Kafila Salar," the caravan largely controlled its own affairs, in view of the presence of a large number of high State officials following the visit of Her Exalted Highness the Badsha Begum on pilgrimage.

163. There was one stowaway this year from Calcutta. On the arrival of the ship at Jeddah, the necessary amount was contributed by well-disposed pilgrims to cover his return passage. Thereupon, he was allowed to land and, after the pilgrimage, returned home.

#### *Destitutes.*

164. There was, fortunately, a negligible increase in the number of destitutes this year over 1934, the figures being 562, as against 560. It would again appear that the number of those who came overland was considerable, but less in proportion to the total than last year, being 461 out of 562. The following table gives an analysis of the figures for this year by (a) provinces of origin, and (b) routes of access to the Hejaz:—

##### (a) Provinces of origin—

Bengal	...	...	...	90
Sind	...	...	...	217
Punjab	...	...	...	116
Assam	...	...	...	10
United Provinces	...	...	...	15
North-West Frontier Province	...	...	...	8
Bhopal State	...	...	...	1
Kashmir	...	...	...	1
Burma	...	...	...	4
Kapurthala State	...	...	...	1
Madras	...	...	...	27
Rajputana	...	...	...	3
Kalat	...	...	...	36
Baluchistan	...	...	...	31
Hyderabad (Deccan)	...	...	...	1
Bombay	...	...	...	1
				— 532



## (b) Route—

(1) Overland—			
Via Gwadar-Muscat-Mokalla-Yemen	...	...	153
Via Gwadar-Riyadh	...	...	277
Via Persia-Iraq-Nejd	...	...	22
Via Iraq-Palestine-Syria	...	...	9
			— 461
(2) By sea—			
Bombay (steamer)	...	...	10
Karachi (steamer)	...	...	9
Calcutta (steamer)	...	...	1
			— 20
Bombay-Mokalla-Jedda (dhow)	...	...	2
			— 2
(3) Partly by sea and partly on foot—			
Bombay to Mokalla by dhow; rest on foot, via Yemen, &c.	...	...	78
Karachi to Batna-Dibai by dhow; rest on foot, via Riyadh	...	...	1
			— 79
			562

165. The authorities in India were again able to get a quotation of 40 rupees per head, excluding food and conveyance charges, direct from Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. for the repatriation of destitutes. A sum of 285 rupees was collected from twelve of the individuals repatriated, who seemed able to contribute, in part, to the cost of their return. The actual amount expended on behalf of the Government of India was 26,892·8·0 rupees.

166. The usual precautions were taken to guard against fraud, to provide the authorities in India with lists of the persons repatriated and to take from each an undertaking to repay the money expended.

167. The attention of the Government of India was again drawn to the desirability of the control of pilgrims travelling on foot overland, in view of growing seriousness of this factor in the annual problem of disposing of Indian destitutes.

*Publicity.*

168. The work of publishing and issuing *Guide for Pilgrims to the Hejaz* devolved this year on the Bombay Port Haj Committee, which took the same form as when produced by the Government of India, but styled *Manual of Instructions for Pilgrims to the Hejaz*.

*Banking Facilities.*

169. No change occurred in the position described in paragraph 156 of last year's report. The principal banking concerns in Jedda are still the Netherlands Trading Society, which has branches in India, and Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., whose correspondents there are the National Bank of India. The Legation again deprecates the use of "Hundis."

170. Requests were again made this year by several leading pilgrims to make arrangements to cash drafts and make payments at Mecca and Medina. The amount of cash deposited by pilgrims, in the safe custody of this Legation, amounted to 47,835 rupees this year.

*Indian Staff.*

171. (Paragraph 158 of last year's report.) Staff arrangements remained the same as last year. All worked with the zeal and efficiency now expected of them, Khan Bahadur Ihsanullah speaking highly of the excellent work of his principal lieutenant, Shah Jehan al Kabir, and giving praise to the solid progress made by the second clerk, Iqbal Din. The temporary clerk also performed his duties ably.

(11) *Afghan Pilgrimage.*

172. There was no marked change in the number of Afghan pilgrims, being 1,707, as against 1,720 last year.

173. It is worth noticing that in spite of the increasing use of overland routes, Afghans still seem to prefer the sea route via India. Although there was a fall in their number by thirteen pilgrims over last year, those who travelled from India were a little more numerous, being 1,668 as compared with 1,636 of last year; and almost all were either return-ticket holders or holders of deposit-paid passes. There was a negligible number of destitutes, and not more than eight came to the notice of this Legation, through their endeavours to pass themselves off as British subjects and so be repatriated at Government of India expense. The Afghan representative at Jedda paid no attention to them, and eventually the cost of their passage was borne by local charity.

174. The Afghan Government appointed their Minister in Cairo to represent them also in Saudi Arabia. The Minister presented his credentials on the 1st April, and also attended the Royal banquet. After the pilgrimage, the Minister left for Cairo, leaving behind the Afghan clerk in charge of the Legation. The Afghan Government have now opened a Legation in the Hejaz, and rented a house at Jedda for the purpose. The clerk, the only member of the staff, also left for Afghanistan about two months after the Haj, leaving the Legation in the charge of the doorkeeper, whose chief duty is to clean the premises and hoist the national flag, a newcomer among foreign flags in Jedda, on Fridays.

175. A new doctor, named Ahmed Ali, was deputed this year as medical mission from Afghanistan. By origin a Punjabi, he has been referred to at paragraph 84 above. As usual, he opened the dispensary both at Mecca and Mina for a short period only, and left for India by the steamship *Rahmani* on the 5th April, 1935.

176. The only Afghan notables to attend the pilgrimage this year were ex-King Amanullah, who came accompanied by his mother and brother-in-law. There was a general belief amongst Afghans and Indians that the visit of the ex-King was not unconnected with propaganda work in furtherance of his cause. He delivered a speech at the Royal banquet, reference to which has been made at paragraph 30 above. Reports were received that, in spite of the warnings conveyed by the Afghan representative, a number of Afghan nationals secretly visited the ex-King; and a large number of Indians, especially those from the Frontier Province, are stated to have similarly visited him.

(12) *Malayan Pilgrimage.**Shipping (Outward from Malayan Ports).*

177. The first pilgrim ship from Singapore, steamship *Bellerophon* of the Blue Funnel Line, arrived at Jedda on the 11th November, 1934, and was followed by three other ships of the same line at intervals of about a month each, the last being the steamship *Protesilaus* which reached Jedda on the 11th February. The total number of pilgrims, including Dutch (from the Netherlands East Indies), American (from the Philippine Islands), and Saudi Arabian nationalities, carried by these four ships, was 1,112, as compared to 991 during last season.

*Number of Pilgrims.*

178. The total number of pilgrims from British Malaya registered at the British Legation during the season was 617. This was 257 per cent. more than the last season, when the total was only 173. It is of interest to review the annual figures for the last ten seasons, as follows:—

Season.	Number.	Season.	Number.
1926	3,073	1931	506
1927	12,184	1932	80
1928	4,418	1933	101
1929	1,455	1934	173
1930	2,590	1935	617



The present total of 617 was made up by places of origin, as follows:—

Straits Settlements—				
Singapore	...	...	...	46
Penang and Province Wellesley	...	...	...	45
Malacca	...	...	...	21
Labuan	...	...	...	0
Federated Malay States—				
Perak	...	...	...	89
Selangor	...	...	...	53
Pahang	...	...	...	27
Negri Sembilan	...	...	...	31
Unfederated Malay States—				
Johore	...	...	...	187
Kedah	...	...	...	41
Kelantan	...	...	...	63
Trengganu	...	...	...	14
Total	...	...	...	617

179. This welcome increase in numbers continues the process of gradual improvement observed over the past few years and is the best figure since 1930.

#### *Single Tickets.*

180. Haji Abdul Majid points out that out of the present 617 arrivals, 32 or a little more than 5 per cent. came on single tickets, and remarks that in view of the correspondence between this Legation and the Government of the Straits Settlements with the object of discouraging the practice of issuing single tickets, this can scarcely be regarded as satisfactory. It should be added that all the single tickets were issued at Penang, and that two of these single ticket-holders actually applied for repatriation before the Haj was completed.

#### *Pilgrim Passes.*

181. The rule providing for the issue of a pilgrim pass to each pilgrim, even if a minor, was in some cases disregarded by the districts of (1) Kuala Langat in Selangor and (2) Batu Pahat in Johore; and this caused some difficulty in registering the pilgrims.

#### *Charges and Cost of Pilgrimage.*

182. The general nature and effects of the Saudi pilgrimage tariff are again discussed in a separate section of this report. The approximate rate of exchange this year was 22 to 24 rials = £1 gold = 14.50 = 15.50 Straits dollars on the average.

183. The cost of a return ticket Singapore-Jedda (including quarantine dues, &c.) during the season under review was 181 dollars as compared with 182 dollars during the last season. Haji Abdul Majid estimates that the minimum cost for the pilgrimage for the Malay pilgrim was:—

- (a) To Mecca only, excluding maintenance, about 400 Straits dollars.
- (b) To Medina also, excluding maintenance, about 480 Straits dollars.

184. Reference has already been made to the distribution of pamphlets by the Jedda Haj Committee announcing a reduction of 25 per cent. on all charges in the Hejaz for the coming season. The new schedule of charges had not been received at the close of the period under review.

185. A few pilgrims came with insufficient money to pay their mutawwifs the "Duit Jamu" of £6.40 gold Pts., which included, besides the mutawwifs' fees for their services, &c., the Government tax of £2½ for each person. It is important that pilgrims should not leave their countries of origin with insufficient money in their possession.

#### *Pensioners.*

186. Although some Malay pensioners received their pensions regularly under the improved system through the British Legation at Jedda, it would appear that some authorities in Malaya concerned with the payment of pensions were unaware that the system exists, for several pensioners declared here that they were told they could not be paid their pensions in Jedda.

#### *Hostels for Students in Mecca.*

187. The idea of establishing hostels for the better accommodation and care of students in Mecca suggested by Haji Abdul Majid in 1933 has been taken up by the committee for the newly-started religious school for Jawi (Malay and Javanese) students, the "Darul-'Ulum'uddiniyah," and circular-letters have been issued both in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies for donations to meet the cost of building. Tunku Mokhtar, a young brother of the wealthy Sultan of Langkat, is president of the committee.

#### *Mutawwifs.*

188. The unwisdom of pilgrims making payments in advance to mutawwifs or sheikhs was exemplified this season when five Malay pilgrims, whilst still in Singapore, paid to one Sheikh Abdullah Rawa, a mutawwif of Mecca, the authorised contract charges of £18 gold each and certain sums in addition against drafts on his Mecca agent. Abdullah Rawa did not return to the Hejaz for the Haj and his agent in Mecca was unable to honour the drafts presented by the pilgrims. Although the Saudi Government sent the agent to jail, the pilgrims' plight was not remedied and they missed the Medina visit, which had been included in the contract. Even their luggage containing food-stuffs had to be left in Jedda, although the transport of the luggage was also in the contract. The Government addressed the Legation officially on the subject, and a sum of 300 Straits dollars only was obtained, on referring the matter to the authorities at Singapore. The Saudi Government was still at the end of the period under review pressing for payment of the balance due.

189. It is instances of this nature that led the Saudi Government, as described at paragraph 120 above, to contemplate forbidding mutawwifs from proceeding to India, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, modified later on to insistence on the production of a guarantor, &c., before a mutawwif proceeds to those countries.

#### *General Conditions during the Pilgrimage Season.*

190. The report given by Haji Abdul Majid concerns matters that have already been adequately noticed elsewhere in this report. As last year, security was good, the prices of food-stuffs and water not exorbitant, petty thieving fairly common, and accidents from the greater number of cars used more frequent, but Al-hamdulillah, no Malays were injured.

191. One or two cases where registered letters from Malaya were reported to have been delivered by the postal authorities to other than actual addressees came to notice. Whether this was mere inefficiency or not was not discovered.

#### *Mortality.*

192. The total number of reported deaths among Malay pilgrims during the season ending the 19th April, 1935, was eighteen. This approximated to 3 per cent. of the total number of arrivals against 1 per cent. during the previous season. Despite the increase, it is not considered to be abnormal as in some previous years it went up to as much as 10 per cent. and 15 per cent.

#### *Effects of Deceased Pilgrims.*

193. The British Legation is still in correspondence with the Saudi Arab Government regarding the effects of the two deceased pilgrims from Province Wellesley, referred to in paragraph 179 of last year's report.

#### *Assistance to Pilgrims.*

194. A sum of £100 was approved by the Government of the Straits Settlements this season for purposes of repatriating and giving pecuniary assistance



to destitute pilgrims; and the whole of this amount was expended. The number of persons thus assisted was twelve, six of whom had to be supplied with tickets. Four of the six were pilgrims who had stayed nine or ten years in the Hejaz, but the remaining two were pilgrims who came this season and last season on single tickets, already referred to.

#### *Notabilities from Malaya.*

195. Among the well-known persons who came on pilgrimage from Malaya this season were the following:—

Inche Muhammad-bin-Haji Abdul Rahman, a Justice of the Peace in Malacca; Dr. Ibrahim of Singapore; Inche Muhammad Jaffar, a Kedah Civil Servant; To' Puan Alang Sharipah of Perak (widow of the late Dato' Sri Adika Raja, I.S.O.); Inche Baharuddin, I.S.M.; Inche Muhammad-bin-Dato Muda, I.S.M.

#### *Staff.*

196. Haji Abdul Majid, the Malay Pilgrimage Officer, arrived at Jedda on the 11th November, 1934, and left on the 19th April, 1935. Haji Muhammad Jamil satisfactorily assisted him as clerk for the sixth pilgrimage year.

#### *(13) West African Pilgrimage.*

197. According to returns published by the Saudi authorities, 879 Takrunis (West Africans) of all nationalities entered the country via Red Sea ports. Yet lower down the scale, under the heading of "Pilgrims who arrived via Qunfida," the figure 285 is given. This number obviously includes pilgrims of several nationalities, but the Legation has reason to believe that at least a third of the number consisted of West Africans, British- and French-protected persons. Last year (see paragraph 181 of last year's report) the figure 891 given in the Saudi returns referred only to pilgrims who had entered the country through the port of Jedda; the additional figure of 1,259 was the Saudi estimate of West Africans of all nationalities who entered the country through the smaller Asiri and Hejazi ports south of Jedda. Of the total number of West Africans who entered the country during the period under review, probably not more than 40 per cent. were British or British-protected.

198. The problem of the disposal of some 1,500 British West African destitutes (see paragraph 184 of last year's report) was eventually solved after protracted correspondence between this Legation and the Governments concerned, and a total of 1,491 destitutes was repatriated between the 4th November, 1934, and the 10th February, 1935.

199. Up to the time of writing this report no further applications for assistance to leave the country have been received. This satisfactory state of affairs is not surprising in view of (a) the void created in the local Takruni world as a result of the recent mass repatriation; (b) the greatly improved condition of the local labour market, with the subsequent demand for cheap Takruni labour; and (c) of the reports, if correct, of a large number of Takruni pilgrims who were unable to pay the Saudi quarantine dues at Qunfida, Lith and other ports and were turned back.

200. The present position with regard to the vexed question of dhow traffic from Massawa is somewhat obscure. But in the light of information volunteered by three Takrunis who had recently landed at Qunfida, it would appear that the Italian authorities were making some attempt, though feeble, to control the traffic. So far as could be ascertained, the system of control seems limited to the compulsory purchase of return tickets by all pilgrims proceeding to Hejaz by dhow. A return ticket between Massawa and Qunfida is said to cost 160 P.T.E. The Saudis, however, have maintained the lively interest, evinced for the first time last year, in restricting the traffic. All pilgrims arriving at Qunfida, Lith or other small ports south of Jedda were required to pay quarantine and other dues, amounting to 180 P.T.E. each, for which an official receipt was given, before they disembarked; those who were unable to pay were immediately turned back.

201. Only fifty-eight pilgrims travelled under the Nigerian Pilgrimage Scheme this year, compared with sixty-nine last year, all of whom arrived in this country in time to perform the pilgrimage. By the 6th June all but one had collected their return tickets and the sums due to them, and all but two had left the country by the 10th June, 1935. The scheme, which worked smoothly this year, must be accounted a complete success so far as this Legation is concerned, and it is to be hoped that, when its benefits become more widely appreciated and the increasing difficulties and expense of the Massawa route known, a greater number of pilgrims will be induced to take advantage of its benefits next year.

202. The Amir of Kazaure and party arrived in Jedda *en route* for Mecca on the 27th February. Whilst in Mecca he ran short of funds and was advanced the sum of £20 by the Legation.

#### *(14) Somali Pilgrimage.*

203. According to Saudi returns, thirty-seven Somalis of all nationalities entered this country through the port of Jedda this year, as compared with fifty-two in 1934. Probably not more than fifteen of them were British-protected persons. No figures are available regarding those who came overland via Qunfida and Lith.

204. The only advance made to a Somali this year was to Sheikh Ismail Ishaak, Dolbahanta Muhammad Musa, Sheikh of Salehia Tarika, Suksodi.

206. Repatriation of British Somalis: position on the 30th June, 1935:—

(a) Applications deserving of consideration ...	3
(b) Applicants repatriated ...	None.
(c) Applicants assisted ...	2

#### *(15) Sudanese Pilgrimage.*

206. Official returns published by the Saudi authorities show that 866 Sudanese pilgrims disembarked at Jedda this year, an increase of 332 on last year's figure of 534. They were, as usual, carried to and from the Hejaz by ships of the Khedivial Mail Line. A few pilgrims who satisfactorily proved the loss of their travel papers were issued with emergency certificates, and the local agents of the Khedivial Mail Line were good enough to provide them with free passages to Suakin.

207. During the return season sixty-three pilgrims (selected out of approximately 200 odd applicants) were advanced the total sum of £E. 102. Immediately after the Haj an unruly crowd descended on the Legation demanding an advance of money to enable them to settle debts, chiefly to mutawwifs, contracted during the pilgrimage. The majority of those who applied, if their rather brusque approach may be so described, for an advance were firmly imbued with the belief that they would be handed the cash forthwith, without question, by the Legation. This erroneous impression has apparently been spread abroad in the Sudan by returned pilgrims who, having themselves obtained an advance at Jedda with comparative ease, passed the information on to their relatives and friends. Consequently, a fair number of pilgrims entered this country with insufficient funds to cover the cost of the pilgrimage, confident that the deficiency would be made good on application to the Legation. This impression was strengthened by the attitude of mutawwifs, who showed willingness to wait for their dues until after the Haj.

208. There were numerous complaints again this year regarding the usual shortage of shipping. Noisy deputations trekked to and fro between the local shipping agents' offices and the Legation, clamouring for a ship. But in view of the limited number of ships at the disposal of the Khedivial Mail Line, nothing could be done.

209. Prominent among Sudanese who performed the pilgrimage this year were Sheikh Muhammad Muhammad-el-Amin Tirik, nazir and Chief of the Hadendowa tribe, who arrived in Jedda with a number of followers on the 27th February, and Sheikh Mudassir Ibrahim, a well-known religious notable of Omdurman. They were both in possession of letters of recommendation, and all possible assistance was given them.



210. Repatriation of Sudanese: Position on the 30th June, 1935:—

- (a) Applications considered deserving of examination: 5
- (b) Applicants repatriated: 3
- (c) Applications still under reference: Nil.

(16) Zanzibari and East African Pilgrimages.

211. Returns published by the Saudi authorities show that 139 Zanzibari and East Africans entered the country via the port of Jedda this year, an increase of 112 on last year's figure of twenty-seven.

212. No Zanzibari or East African pilgrim applied for repatriation this year.

(17) South African Pilgrimage.

213. According to Saudi returns, fifty-nine pilgrims arrived in Jedda from South Africa, a decrease of thirty-nine on last year's figure of ninety-eight. The large majority of these pilgrims were, as usual, people of substance, who made their way unostentatiously in and out of the country.

214. A case has been reported of an Italian ship bringing pilgrims from South Africa and Zanzibar in 1934 evading calling at Kamaran for quarantine purposes. The matter is still the subject of enquiry.

215. Repatriation of South Africans:—

- (a) Applications considered deserving of examination: 1.
- (b) Applicants repatriated: 1.
- (c) Applications still under reference: Nil.

(18) Palestinian and Transjordan Pilgrimage.

216. Statistics published by the Saudi authorities show that 1,432 Palestinian and Transjordanian pilgrims entered the country through the ports of Yanbu and Jedda. This figure, incidentally, corresponds with the total number (1,420 Palestinians and twelve Transjordanians) given by the Palestine Government as having registered with the Palestine Health Department as intending pilgrims. The figure probably constitutes a record, and shows a notable increase over last year's figure of 377.

217. In accordance with past procedure (see paragraph 214 of last year's report) the Government of Palestine seconded an official, Suleyman Effendi Dashan, a clerk in the employ of the Department of Health at Gaza, for service with the Legation for a period of six weeks. He arrived in Jedda on the 11th March and proceeded to Mecca on pilgrimage, eventually reporting for duty at the Legation on the morning of the 20th March. He performed his duties conscientiously and efficiently, and was of great assistance to the pilgrims themselves. His services were highly appreciated by the officer under whom he worked. It was found possible to dispense with his services on the 22nd April, when he left Jedda for Palestine.

218. It is worthy of mention that the circular (see paragraph 213 of report for 1933) published and distributed by the Government of Palestine, advising intending pilgrims in their own interests to conform with official regulations, has achieved a fair measure of success in reducing the tendency of poor pilgrims to proceed on pilgrimage overland. Only fourteen members of this fraternity applied to the Legation for assistance. Three of them were natives of Transjordan, who, after an unfruitful wait of four days, decided to return by the overland route. Of the remaining eleven destitutes, five were assisted by mutawwifs, through the good offices of Suleyman Effendi Dashan, and six were repatriated in the usual manner on the 8th May.

219. In spite of the somewhat higher cost of living, according to some reports, during the pilgrimage and later, relatively few applications for refunds were received during the return season. After the usual process of elimination, 196 pilgrims were each advanced the sum of £4.

220. Shipping arrangements worked smoothly this year, and there were no complaints from north-bound pilgrims.

221. A notable who performed the pilgrimage this year was Sheikh Muhammad Abdurrahim Beidas, M.B.E. He was in possession of a letter of recommendation from his Excellency the High Commissioner for Palestine, and was afforded all possible assistance.

(19) Pilgrimages of Adenese and Natives of the Aden Protectorate.

222. According to Saudi returns, 284 Hadhramis and natives of the Aden Protectorate came on pilgrimage by sea this year (port or ports of entry not given; probably refers only to Jedda). This figure does not include those who travelled by dhow and entered the country via the ports of Qunfida and Lith. The figures given in the Saudi returns for these ports are 285 via Qunfida and sixteen via Lith. Both figures come under the vague headings, "Pilgrims who came via Qunfida" and "Pilgrims who came via Lith." It is impossible to submit an accurate estimate of Hadhramis and Adenese included in the above figures, but it seems doubtful whether they would exceed more than one-third of the total. No reliable information is available regarding those who came overland.

223. Shipping facilities to Aden and Mokalla were adequate this year. The two Besse Line steamers made frequent, though irregular, calls throughout the return season.

224. The steady exodus of Hadhramis of the semi-settled class, which commenced in 1932, continues. Between the 21st March, the beginning of the return season, and the 30th June, emergency travel documents were issued to 212 Hadhramis in this category, as compared with 270 last year (see paragraph 209 of last year's report). It is estimated that at least half of those who came on pilgrimage through the port of Jedda this year have already returned.

225. A prominent notable of the Aden Protectorate who performed the pilgrimage this year was Sultan Muhammad Ji'bil, Regent of the 'Audhali Sultan. He was in possession of a letter of recommendation, and all possible assistance was given him.

226. Repatriation of Adenese and natives of the Aden Protectorate: Position on the 30th June, 1935:—

- (a) Applications considered deserving of examination: 33.
- (b) Applicants repatriated: None.
- (c) Applicants assisted: 28.

(20) Muscati, Bahreini and Koweiti Pilgrimages.

227. Statistics published by the Saudi authorities again do not differentiate between pilgrims from the above Sheikhdoms and Sultanate of the Arabian shores of the Persian Gulf, eighty-nine of whom are recorded as having entered the port of Jedda on pilgrimage this year, as compared with seventy-nine last year.

228. Although no figures are available it may be safely assumed that a much larger number travelled overland. According to an extract from the *Koweit Intelligence Summary*, some 1,000 pilgrims left Koweit on the 31st January by camel *en route* for Mecca via Burayda, being exempted, as already noted previously, from Saudi quarantine dues.

229. A notable who performed the pilgrimage this year was Sheikh Juma'-bin-Maktum, brother of the Ruler of Dibai. He and his party of about seventeen followers left for the mainland on the 2nd December, 1934, and travelled via Riyadh to Mecca, where they arrived as Ibn Saud's guests on the 28th January. Ibn Saud is stated to have provided the necessary transport for the party from Riyadh to Mecca.

230. No Muscati, Bahreini or Koweiti pilgrim applied for repatriation this year.

(21) Sarawak Pilgrimage.

231. Sarawak was again unrepresented this year, alas!, among the "Guests of God."



[E 5014/602/25]

No. 24.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 227.)

Sir,

*Jedda, August 6, 1935.*

WITH reference to Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch No. 80 of the 18th March, concerning the concession granted by the Saudi Arab Government to the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited), I have the honour to submit a general report on the activities in the Hejaz of the syndicate since the ratification of the concession by King Abdul Aziz on the 12th February last.

2. It will be recollected that the concession allowed the syndicate three months in which to get to work, a year for general prospecting and another year for further research in selected areas, after which leases were to be granted to subsidiary companies formed to work the individual property. Mr. Twitchell seems at present to be well ahead of this schedule. He set to work, with great energy, immediately after his return to Jedda on the 17th February. The Australian, a Mr. Shanks, mentioned by Sir Andrew Ryan in his despatch No. 56 of the 24th February, arrived with a British clerical assistant on the 27th February, and the whole party set out early in March for Yanbu and the Northern Hejaz.

3. After four months prospecting and assay work Mr. Twitchell seems to have decided to concentrate, for the moment, his attentions on the gold workings at Mahd-adh-Dhahab ("Cot of Gold"), and has withdrawn Mr. Shanks from Yanbu-an-Nakhl where he has been working without successful results.

4. Mahd-adh-Dhahab was visited for three weeks in June by Mr. E. D. McDermott, one of the directors of the syndicate. On his return to England early in July, followed on the 24th July by Mr. Twitchell, who hoped to travel from Egypt by air, it was reliably reported that a subsidiary company had been formed to work the area containing this mine.

5. The Mahd-adh-Dhahab gold mine, which is situated at 24° 15' N. and 41° 10' E. at a height of 3,550 feet above sea level, is said to have been worked by Harun-ar-Rashid and perhaps even earlier in the times of the Jahilfya. The extensive workings and the large area covered by ruined buildings show that a great number of workmen were employed in those times. Mr. Twitchell is now seeking to prove that the workings were not exhausted of their gold, but were abandoned either through the lack of engineering equipment and the knowledge how to mine deeper, or through the failure of the water supply or from political reasons.

6. Mr. Twitchell has been working at this mine himself and says he is very gratified with the results so far obtained in the mining of gold. There are, I believe, also subsidiary metals. He foreshadowed early developments and hoped to start diamond drilling, the machinery for which was on its way. Mr. Twitchell is, however, faced with many problems. I am not competent to judge the scheme from a technical mining point of view, but engineering problems may well be small compared with other factors such as the supply of water and communications with Medina and the coast.

7. Mr. Twitchell confessed to me in conversation that the water supply was indeed a problem and said it might be necessary to sink a well. At present water is found in the surrounding districts at Maden (3 kilom.), Jiraisiya (10 kilom.), and Suwaijiya (50 kilom.), while at the mine itself Mr. Twitchell has discovered a shaft containing water, estimated at about 7,000 gallons, which he intends to reserve for use in connexion with the diamond drilling.

8. With his usual energy and with Mr. van de Poll's local knowledge in support, Mr. Twitchell has set to work to solve the problem of communications. Mahd-adh-Dhahab lies, as the crow flies, some 100 miles from Medina and 240 from Jedda. The original plan was to use Yanbu as a base, being only 200 miles from the mine, but during these four months the road has been found very difficult. Non-Moslems have to leave the beaten track from Yanbu to Medina and circle the forbidden area to the north, making the road distance about 315 miles, and mostly over abominable ground of Harat lava, where in the winter the trucks were once or twice held up by rain floods. This combined with the abandonment of the workings at Yanbu-an-Nakhl have induced the syndicate to consider the possibility of a road from Jedda, which will be a little longer than

the Yanbu road, and which would give the advantages of quicker external communication through the larger port. They are accordingly now occupied in prospecting three alternate routes:—

- (1) Jedda-Asfan-Al Birka-Mahd-adh-Dhahab.
- (2) Jedda-Rabigh-Madh-adh-Dhahab.
- (3) A route between these two.

None of these routes is at all practical at the moment; to quote Mr. van de Poll, who made a preliminary prospecting journey through to the mine on the Rabigh route, he only went forward because he knew he could not go back. It remains to be seen which, if any, of these three routes are chosen.

9. Well sinking, road making and the provision of food and medical treatment in the middle of unknown desert can only be a costly affair; it argues a wealth of optimism in the promoters in the possibilities of the undertaking.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade and to the High Commissioner for Transjordan at Jerusalem.

I have, &amp;c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 5160/350/25]

No. 25.

*Mr. Kelly to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 26.)*

(No. 958.)

Sir,

*Ramleh, August 17, 1935.*

ON the receipt of your telegram No. 26, Saving, of the 23rd July, Sir Miles Lampson approached the Prime Minister and His Majesty's "chef de cabinet" with the request that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia should, on his passage through Egypt, be shown suitable attention and afforded all possible facilities. Subsequently the Prime Minister informed me that every civility would be shown to the Prince, and that a special saloon would be provided for him and his suite on the Egyptian State Railways. Nessim Pasha added that King Fuad had reluctantly consented to the Governor of Alexandria, Hussein Sabry Pasha, meeting the Prince on his arrival; that no one would go from the palace, but the Governor could nevertheless be described as representing the King. Aly Maher Pasha, however, later informed me that the Governor would represent the King, and added that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had at his request telegraphed to the Governor, who was then in Palestine, to ensure his return in time.

2. Incidentally, Nessim Pasha deplored this rancorous attitude of King Fuad, and stated that there was no longer any cause for the continuation of bad relations between Egypt and Arabia.

3. The Prince and his suite arrived at Alexandria on the Egyptian steamship *Nil* at about 4 p.m. on the 12th August, and were met on board by Hussein Sabry Pasha, the Governor, and by myself. A number of officials and notables, including the Saudi Agent in Egypt, the Afghan Minister, the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires, Talaat Harb Pasha, and representatives of Egyptian Arab tribes were also present to receive His Highness. A crowd on the quay cheered the Prince as he descended the gangway, and the people who lined the streets accorded him a friendly welcome. It is perhaps worthy of remark that at a time when a violent anti-Nessim and anti-British campaign is being conducted by almost the entire Arabic press, the crowds on this occasion showed no sign whatever of anti-British sentiment, but, on the contrary, applauded the Residency car on its journey through the streets. The Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires subsequently assured me that the explanation was to be found in the fact that an act of courtesy to a neighbouring Moslem State met with general approval, but the occurrence tends to confirm the Prime Minister's contention that the present press campaign has hitherto been largely artificial, and is being instigated by the political enemies of the present régime. The Prince proceeded immediately on landing to Ras-el-Tin, where he inscribed his name in the palace book. He was received at the palace by the master of ceremonies and by Mohammed Hussein Bey. From the palace he went to the Hotel Cecil, where he spent the night. During his stay in



Alexandria the Prince received visits from a number of Egyptian and Arab notables.

4. As the Saudi Arab Agent in Egypt had given me to understand that a call on the Prince during his stay in Alexandria would be appreciated, I paid a short courtesy call on him at 5-30 p.m. at his hotel. During the interview the conversation was confined to subjects of general interest. With reference to his stay in England, His Royal Highness spoke very earnestly of his gratitude to their Majesties the King and Queen, and said that the event which had most impressed him during his whole tour had been the naval review. The proceedings were enlivened by the Amir's amusement on finding that the aide-de-camp who accompanied me was a brother officer of Captain Chamberlain, who so lately erred and strayed from his ways into Saudi territory. On the following morning Fuad Bey Hamza returned the visit and called on me at the Residency. He volunteered in a formal manner that he was fully aware that Sir Miles Lampson was responsible for the special courtesies extended by the Egyptian Government. On account of King Fuad's obstinate "misunderstanding of past events," he did not anticipate any immediate effect on Egyptian-Saudi official relations, but this did not greatly disturb him, as an improvement could only be a question of time. He had called on Aly Maher Pasha and on the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and conveyed the Prince's thanks to King Fuad and to the Egyptian Government for the hospitality he had received at their hands.

5. The Prince left Alexandria at 3 p.m. on the 13th August by special train for Jerusalem. He was seen off at the station by the Governor, by the acting oriental secretary on my behalf, and by a considerable crowd who again cheered His Highness. Before his departure the Prince issued to the press a short statement expressing his pleasure at his visit to Egypt, stressing the bonds of friendship existing between this country and Arabia, and expressing his hope for the future prosperity of King Fuad and the Egyptian Government and people.

6. His Royal Highness is expected to return from Palestine to Cairo on the 19th August, and he will spend the time until his departure for Suez and Jedda on a Nile steamer placed at his disposal by Talaat Harb Pasha, of Banque Misr. It has not yet been decided whether he leaves Suez by Khedivial Mail steamer on the 21st August or by an Italian steamer on the 22nd August.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda.

I have, &c.

D. V. KELLY,

*Acting High Commissioner.*

[E 4472/1309/25]

No. 26.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Mr. Bateman (Bagdad).*

(No. 598.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 29, 1935.*

I HAVE had under consideration Sir Archibald Clark Kerr's despatch No. 389 of the 5th July, in which was enclosed the translation of a draft treaty of friendship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

2. I note that the draft enclosed in that despatch has now been superseded by a further draft of the proposed treaty, which was communicated to Nuri Pasha in London by the Saudi Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and I accordingly do not propose to comment in detail upon the earlier draft text. I have, however, caused the wording of article 2 of the draft to be examined carefully in the light of the notes exchanged at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Alliance of 1930 between the United Kingdom and Iraq in regard to the precedence of His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

3. There is no actual mention in the draft treaty, unlike the recent treaty between Italy and Iraq, of the grant by the parties to one another of most-favoured-nation treatment in regard to diplomatic representation; but, in the absence of any special arrangement to the contrary, the effect of article 2 (under which diplomatic relations are to be established "according to accepted international practice") would be that if Iraq received an Ambassador from Saudi

Arabia the Saudi Government would be entitled to claim that he should take precedence over a British Ambassador who presented his credentials later. The question therefore arises whether article 9 is sufficient to enable the Iraqi Government to carry out their obligations towards His Majesty's Government in regard to the precedence of His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad. Article 9, as translated in the enclosure to Sir Archibald Clark Kerr's despatch, provides that none of the obligations devolving upon either of the parties under this treaty "shall in any circumstances prejudice the execution of the obligations which they may have assumed under other treaties or agreements previously concluded," but I am advised that as the treaty would doubtless be signed in Arabic only it would depend upon the scope and meaning of the Arabic word translated by "agreements" whether or not the relevant Anglo-Iraqi exchange of notes of the 30th June, 1930, would be included within this reservation.

4. It is true that an obligation rests upon the Iraqi Government to see that any treaty they may conclude is consistent with their engagements towards His Majesty's Government, and I am advised that the exchange of notes at the time of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 undoubtedly constitutes a treaty in the broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, I consider that if article 2 is retained in its present form in the text of an eventual treaty it would be preferable for the Governments of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to exchange notes at the time of the signature of the treaty on the lines of the notes exchanged between the Governments of Iraq and Afghanistan on the 20th December, 1932 (see Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch No. 9 of the 5th January, 1933). This procedure would have the advantage of ensuring that the Saudi Government were fully aware of the position and of putting beyond doubt any question of the treaty between Iraq and Saudi Arabia being interpreted in a manner derogatory to the special position of His Majesty's Ambassador at Bagdad.

5. I accordingly request that you will take an opportunity to draw the attention of the Iraqi Government to the considerations set out in the two preceding paragraphs, and to suggest to them the desirability of their exchanging notes with the Saudi Government at the time of the signature of the proposed treaty on the lines of those exchanged in connexion with the treaty between Iraq and Afghanistan.

6. As mentioned above, I do not consider it necessary to subject the other articles of the draft to detailed examination at this stage. I feel bound, however, to point out that article 9 means that in concluding this treaty Iraq makes all her rights under it subject to any treaty which Saudi Arabia has concluded up to date, and unless the Iraqi Government are acquainted with all these treaties and have studied them they can hardly know what the effect of this article will be. I should not, in a treaty to which the United Kingdom was a party, be ready to accept a provision on these lines, which rendered the effect of the whole treaty subject to so uncertain and possibly complicated a provision. You may, if you see fit, mention this point orally to the Iraqi Prime Minister or Minister for Foreign Affairs; and you are similarly authorised at your discretion to suggest the possible advantage of amending article 10 so as to avoid postponing the entry into force of the main treaty instrument until the conclusion of the numerous projected annexures, the negotiation of which is likely to take much time.

7. You will be aware from my despatch No. 449 of the 4th July that the question of the proposed new treaty between Iraq and Saudi Arabia was discussed in the course of a conversation at the Foreign Office on the 1st July between the Iraqi Foreign Minister and the head of the Eastern Department. Nuri Pasha was informed on that occasion that His Majesty's Government would welcome any development likely to further friendly relations between the two Arab States, provided, of course, that due regard was paid to the obligations of Iraq under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance.

8. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda.

I am, &c.

SAMUEL HOARE.



[E 5403/280/91]

No. 27.

*Gist of a Report by Mr. Salih Jafar Muhammad Salih Jafar, M.B.E., British Political Clerk, Hodeida.—(Enclosure to Aden Despatch No. 257 of August 19, 1935; Communicated by Colonial Office, September 7.)*

SLAVERY in the Yemen is still existing, and will continue to exist as long as the Yemen is ruled by Arabs and there are chances of imports into the country.

2. There is a demand for slaves in the Yemen, whenever they are available, but the Yemeni buyers are not wealthy, and, consequently, the interest displayed is not so great as in the Hejaz and Nejd.

3. There is no special public market for slaves in the Yemen as at Jeizan and Sabya, and slaves are therefore offered secretly to interested buyers, and when sale is not effected they are transferred from place to place until they reach Asir, where they fetch a better price.

4. It may be questioned as to why slaves are imported into the Yemen when there is a better market in Asir. This is done to avoid detection by the sloops patrolling in the Red Sea, as the Yemen ports are closer to the African smuggling ports than those of Asir.

5. There are many slaves owned by native Arabs in the Yemen, but as fresh supplies are rare they are not sold except in an emergency, and therefore command high prices. The King of the Yemen himself and some of his sons are owners of slaves. Some of the old slaves were emancipated by their owners, but are still serving them.

6. Slaves are not usually kept by Yemenis for the purpose of labour. The females serve as concubines, and are sometimes married; and the males are trained to look after the owners' business and house. The chiefs and rulers use certain of their slaves as soldiers.

7. The import of slaves, however, has greatly diminished during the last five years, no doubt owing to the vigilance of the British Red Sea sloops.

8. A further reason for the fall in the imports of slaves in the Yemen may be attributed to the prerogative exercised by Seif-al-Islam Ahmed, the eldest son of the King of the Yemen. Between 1928 and 1930 a large number of slaves were imported into Meidi. The owners and the slaves were ordered to proceed to Hajja, where Seif-al-Islam Ahmed purchased the best heads at very much reduced prices. The owners sustained great losses, and this greatly discouraged further imports, and since then slaves are secretly smuggled in small numbers as crews, servants, &c., the Yemeni officials being bribed when necessary.

[E 5544/269/91]

No. 28.

*Political Resident, Persian Gulf, to India Office.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 16.)*

(No. C/256.)

THE Hon. the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, and has the honour to transmit to him translation of "mulhaq" from Ibn Saud to the Sheikh of Qatar regarding the Qatar boundary.

*Bahrain, August 29, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 28.

*Translation of "Mulhaq," dated August 6, 1935, from His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia to the Ruler of Qatar.*

(After Compliments.)

YOU doubtless know that I consider you to be like myself, and I would therefore like to explain everything to you. In things which concern us and are between us and you, as you know, no change will take place. But in view of the political situation and of our interests, O brother, you should assist us.

There is an important matter which concerns us. You know that the British interfered in the affairs of Oman and of Qatar and they have only two claims. One we have admitted, for the strong reason that the people of those parts have become under them and that they [the British] fight for them. Formerly we informed them [*i.e.*, the British] that they [*i.e.*, Oman and Qatar] were our subjects and the subjects of our fathers and grandfathers [*i.e.*, forefathers]. In view of the fact, however, that the people of those countries have themselves chosen to be in their present state, and whereas the English are our friends, we did not like to make obstacles, and so we left the question of the towns only, but no one has the right to claim anything or property in the desert or among the tribes, nor had their fathers or grandfathers claimed such a right. We do not, however, want to press our brothers and relatives for the reason that they are brothers and relatives to us, and so we do not want to deny any person a thing for which he is responsible and which he can protect. But other things which are beyond his control and in which he has no interests, we cannot allow them to pass to any person.

The second matter is that they claim to have had a treaty with the Turks and that the Turks allowed them some lands. We informed them about three matters: Firstly, that the Turks did not exercise authority in these lands, but that all were beyond their control, and that they did not keep order in Hasa and its vicinity, nor did they have proper control over them. Secondly, that their alleged treaty with the Turks was signed only after I occupied Hasa. Thirdly, that the treaty was not ratified, so that I do not admit nor accept it.

The object and haste are, however, that we have heard that an oil company have applied to you for a concession and that they want to try operations and drilling, which would be of harm to us before the boundaries between us and you are fixed and before a treaty is concluded. Once the boundaries are fixed, you will be at liberty to do yourself what you like. As regards the boundary, we will not go beyond the understanding between us. Your brother [*i.e.*, Ibn Saud] requests you to adopt either of these two ways: that you should keep the matter until the question of the boundary between us and the British is settled, when everything will be easy, or that you should request them [the British] to settle the question of the boundary between us and them by leaving the matter to be settled between us and you without their mediation, or between us and them, whichever way you may select.

I have explained this to you, our brother, in order that you may be aware that, if the company starts any work or drilling before the boundaries are settled, we will be compelled to protest and to stop operations and to prevent anything being done until the matters between us and them are settled. If the drilling were to take place at some other place I would have done all in my power [not quite clear—but appears to mean that Ibn Saud would have taken action himself to stop them], as they have no right to drill before the settlement of the boundary between us and them. We did not want to write anything to them before referring the matter to you, so that you should try and get the boundaries settled, which is our desire and would be better for you and for us, or to postpone the matter until the question is settled in the manner you consider fit.

The reason for this [letter] is to inform you so that you be aware. You know that I am sure that, if it was the question of Qatar and of drilling in Qatar, you would not agree to anything from which harm should happen to us, but if we were to leave the matter it would be used against us as a proof by others. The arrangements between us and you will not be changed by word or a span of land, if God is willing.



[E 5575/557/26]

No. 29.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received September 16.)*

(No. 247. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, September 2, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for August 1935.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the list appended to the report for January, and, in addition, a copy has, for the first time, been sent to his Excellency the Governor of British Somaliland at Sheikh.

I have, &amp;c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 29.

JEDDA REPORT FOR AUGUST 1935.

I.—*Internal Affairs.*

249. Little or nothing has been heard of the movements of Ibn Saud, who presumably passed the month at Riyadh.

250. The Amir Saud returned from his visit to Europe, Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan on the 25th August and, on landing at Jedda, was given what amounted to a popular welcome, a cheerful contrast to the absence of enthusiasm that marked his departure. He travelled from Egypt in an Italian ship, and was greeted on board on arrival by certain chosen individuals, and at the Quarantine Quay by the Amir Feisal and a number of other princes, foreign representatives, members of the foreign community, notables, officials, school-children and a considerable crowd. He was saluted on the arrival of his ship and on coming ashore by two Saudi aeroplanes which had flown specially from Taif for the occasion, and a guard of honour was mounted at the quay. A short reception was held at the quay, when laudatory and congratulatory speeches were delivered and songs were sung by the children. The town itself was gaily beflagged and the route taken by the procession was decorated as far as the Medina Gate with bunting, streamers and at least one triumphal arch. The streets were agog with sightseers most of the day and celebrations continued into the night. The Amir Saud left for Mecca on the evening of the 25th and for Taif a day or so later.

251. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin came from Riyadh to be present at Jedda on the Crown Prince's return. He alone did not return to Mecca and Taif with the Royal party, as he had certain matters to discuss with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, as will be described below, and other foreign representatives. He left for Taif on the 29th August, intending to return to Jedda a few days later to resume the conversations.

252. Fuad Bey Hamza did not return with the Amir Saud. He left the Royal party to spend a period of leave in his native Syria. His brother, Taufiq Hamza, however, joined His Royal Highness's suite and returned to this country with the Amir.

253. The Minister of Finance, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, left for Egypt on the 21st August, ostensibly proceeding to Turkey for reasons of health. He had intended to travel to India, but had postponed his departure until too late in the season, in view of the expected arrival of the first pilgrims in October for the next Hajj. Various reasons are advanced here for the visit to Egypt, *inter alia*, that he proposes to negotiate with Talaat Pasha Harb and the Banque Misr concerning a project to reconstruct the Jedda-Mecca road. He is also said to be interested in the purchase of lighting plant for Mecca and for the Government hotels maintained at Jedda and Mecca.

254. Mr. Alan White arrived here from Hasa on the 4th August to take charge of the Jedda office of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company in the absence of Mr. Lenahan (reference paragraph 223 of last month's report).

He travelled via Egypt. The *Umm-al-Qura* came out on the 30th August with the information that on the 23rd oil had been struck by the company at the borings at Al Habr, in Hasa. This would appear at least premature, as the company's representatives in Jedda know nothing of so important a development.

255. During the absence of Mr. Twitchell, M. van de Poll has been in charge of the operations of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate in this country. He has been back and forth between Jedda and the mine, taking a circuitous route, during August, whilst Mr. Shanks has been busy with a party of some sixty labourers roadmaking along the direct alignment Jedda-Mahd-adh-Dhahab now decided upon. He is making fair progress and it is understood that the surface of the road will ultimately be treated with oil to bind and "seal" the loose top sand. The soil is expected under this treatment to "pack" well, and it is hoped the method will prove as satisfactory as it is stated to be in other parts of the world. It is gathered a pier out to deep water may be constructed by the syndicate some 3 or 4 miles north of Jedda.

256. The two aircraft which flew down from Taif to welcome the Amir Saud returned on the 29th August. It was reported in the press that earlier in the month they had flown at Taif and had taken up certain Government officials. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* stated that the Saudi students in Italy have now completed their training as pilots. Ibn Saud, however, was less optimistic on the subject in conversation with Captain de Gaury (reference paragraph 243 of last month's report) early in July. The King said that his air force was not progressing quickly enough; that two aircraft had already been "written off" by the students in Italy, and that it would probably be necessary to extend their course from one year to eighteen months, until, in fact, they could be made efficient. Ibn Saud spoke of using his two best pilots in a weekly air-mail service he proposed to establish between the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, via Hasa, Riyadh and Taif. American aircraft appear to be favoured at present.

257. Reports have been received over the past two months of an impending reorganisation of the Saudi military forces. Details are lacking, but certain draft regulations have been drawn up and are understood to be under Royal consideration. The wearing of uniform has been prescribed for certain elements in the forces, an unpopular decision with tribesmen.

258. The internal situation has remained undisturbed, except for definite signs of a determination of the authorities in Mecca to infuse new vigour into their Committee of Virtue (reference paragraph 195 of report for June). An active official with considerable powers has been appointed, and the backsliding Meccan, unless he would be scourged, is now condemned once more to the old routine of Islamic piety. Jedda has felt less noticeably the effect of Virtue Resurgent, but the use of the radio may, it is said, be limited to reception of the news. Virtue might well be roused by that nightly violation of the ether which passes here for music.

259. (Reference paragraph 231 of last month's report.) The selling rates for Saudi silver riyals during the month gradually rose from 16.8 to 17.16½ and from 10.1 to 10.11 at the end of the month for gold and Egyptian pounds respectively. Hoarding was more definitely reported, and the manager of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited) here stated confidentially that the firm's London office had recently been approached by the Saudi Arab Legation there regarding freight rates on a consignment of £90,000 worth of riyal, half- and quarter-riyal pieces. This consignment was expected to arrive here shortly and would be followed by others. Local speculators may therefore find their exploitation of the temporary shortages of silver currency cut disastrously short. It is understood from London that the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate were also approached by the Minister of Finance for a loan of 1 million silver riyals, but were unable to comply.

260. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 3rd August contained an announcement by the Ministry of Finance that all private car-owners must submit to the Ministry at the end of each month a statement showing quantities of petrol, oil, grease, spare parts, tyres and accessories used in respect of each car, the statement to be supported by invoices and receipts. Private owners were, furthermore, forbidden to carry any fare-paying passengers, only members of the owner's family to be excepted. This obscurely worded decree is probably designed to check illicit sales of petrol, &c., and to give the monopolistic motor-car company a closer control of passenger traffic. It is not expected to be observed save in the breach.



261. The establishment of a First-Aid Society for this country is contemplated, and regulations are now being promulgated in instalments in the press. A committee has been appointed.

262. According to the *Umm-al-Qura*, two new primary schools were opened at Mecca during the month.

263. Sheikh Muhammad Tawil, the Director of Customs in Hasa, arrived early in August at Taif, where he remained at the end of the month.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

264. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, in the course of a ceremonial call on His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 29th August (see paragraph 267 below), requested that the cordial thanks of Ibn Saud and the Amir Saud be conveyed to the Acting High Commissioner for Palestine and the people of Palestine for the warmth of their welcome to the Amir Saud during his recent visit to that country. The message was duly transmitted.

265. (Reference paragraph 232 of last report.) Under instructions from His Majesty's Government His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires replied to the Saudi Government on the 5th August regarding the incursion of armed retainers of the Amir of Hasa into Koweit territory. The note stressed, but in conciliatory terms, that the conduct of the party themselves was responsible for the impression that their object was to bring pressure to bear on certain tribes to leave Koweit territory in order that "zakat" could be collected from them by the Saudi authorities. The party was treated with courtesy and allowed to return at once to their own country. As to the practice to be followed in regard to movements on the frontier, both His Majesty's Government and the sheikh remained of the opinion, previously expressed, that there was no reason to modify the local practice followed hitherto in regard to persons crossing the frontier for ordinary purposes of intercourse. On the 27th August Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, in the course of a long conversation with Mr. Calvert on the subject of the Koweit blockade (see paragraph 270 below), reverted to the attitude of His Majesty's Government over the armed incursion, and stated that in a note, which would shortly be received by the Legation, Ibn Saud had laid down that, whilst subscribing to the principle of freedom of movement on the frontier in accordance with the age-long practice, he proposed to prohibit Koweitis from entering Saudi Arabia, except upon previous permission being obtained, upon pain of the severest punishment. This was due, stated Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, to the intensification of smuggling from Koweit since the breakdown of the conference and the armed party incident, and was a provisional measure pending the settlement of the blockade question.

266. Reports, as yet unconfirmed, have recently been received from Taif that the situation in Najran is again causing the Saudi authorities some anxiety. It is said that a Saudi collector of the "zakat" tax was recently killed by Najran tribesmen, a number of whom promptly took refuge in the Yemen. Thereupon forty lorries containing soldiers were despatched to the south and the situation restored. The actions of the Imam are, it is averred, being closely watched, and the recent importation of munitions of war into the Yemen (*vide* Aden intelligence summaries) has not passed unnoticed here. A "jihad" tax is being collected at Taif, a further report states, and collection is being enforced ruthlessly by the Amir, Abdul Aziz-bin-Muammar, the erstwhile Amir of Jedda of pleasant manners. That Saudi eyes are again turned on their southern defences may not be unconnected with the present Italo-Ethiopian crisis, for Ibn Saud fears that an Italy victorious in Abyssinia would, with an army on the spot, next turn her attention to the Yemen (see paragraphs 268 and 269 below).

## III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

267. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin paid a ceremonial call on His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 29th August, and conveyed, by command, Ibn Saud's most grateful thanks to His Majesty the King and to His Majesty's Government for the exceptional welcome and hospitality shown to the Amir Saud during his recent visit to England. Sheikh Yusuf added that the Amir Saud desired that his own thanks be conveyed similarly to His Majesty and His Majesty's Government.

Mr. Calvert made suitable acknowledgment of this communication and undertook to convey it at once to its high destination.

268. On the 25th August Sheikh Yusuf Yasin called on His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires charged with a message from Ibn Saud for His Majesty's Government concerning the present Italo-Ethiopian crisis. He spoke at great length and described the delivery of the message as the real reason for his visit to Jedda. Ibn Saud had maintained correct relations with the Italian Government during the Saudi-Yemen war and since, and now, particularly in view of the hospitality shown to the Amir Saud during his visit to Italy, he was anxious to preserve those relations. He had, therefore, decided to suspend, until the present crisis was over, treaty negotiations with Abyssinia which had been going on since the delegation from that country was here in the spring (reference paragraph 128 of the report for April). Ibn Saud wished to avoid creating the impression of taking sides, and for that reason had refused an Italian request for permission to recruit labour here for Eritrea. This request had been preferred by the newly-arrived Italian merchant, Odello (reference paragraph 240 of the report for July, &c.). Odello had thereupon requested permission to purchase and ship to Eritrea 10,000 to 12,000 camels, and asked to be allowed to interview the King at Riyadh. Ibn Saud refused to see Odello and referred him to his Minister of Finance. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman eventually agreed to the export of 200 to 300 camels a month, but so hedged the concession about with conditions as virtually to nullify it. Odello then renewed his request to see the King, and, on this occasion, Ibn Saud consented to receive him. He saw the King twice and Sheikh Yusuf at least once. In the course of conversations with the latter he declared himself to be no merchant, but an Italian military officer sent specially to this country to purchase supplies for Eritrea. Sheikh Yusuf further professed that Odello conveyed to him veiled threats of Italian retaliation soon or late should the Saudis fail to show compliance. He offered good prices for camels, was prepared to pay £10,000 cash down in advance, and offered, moreover, to supply the Saudi Government with arms and ammunition. Sheikh Yusuf declared that Ibn Saud maintained the attitude that as a government they were unable to enter into any arrangement of the sort with Odello, but placed him in touch with certain private individuals, who would assist as go-betweens in the purchase of camels. Sheikh Yusuf concluded by putting certain specific questions, on behalf of Ibn Saud, as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government to the Italo-Abyssinian situation, and as to what would be their attitude if Saudi Arabia found herself menaced from "the south." He was remaining in Jedda in order that the reply, when received, might be communicated to him. Mr. Calvert, in undertaking to convey the message, pointed out that certain of the questions put to His Majesty's Government were hypothetical, and observed, speaking personally, that His Majesty's Government's constant aim was the maintenance of peace.

269. Certain further reactions to the present Italo-Ethiopian situation (paragraph 240 of last report) have been observed locally during the month. Early in August, preparations were made by Messrs. Haji Abdullah Alireza and Co. to export a consignment of cattle, sheep, fruit, vegetables and similar local produce to Eritrea. The shipment was forbidden by the Saudi Government, but a week later they revoked their previous decision and allowed a consignment of sheep and produce to be shipped to Massawa, where prices are said to rule high, taking care to levy an export tax. It is not known whether further consignments have been sent. In any case, public sentiment is opposed both on the grounds that supplies in this country are none too plentiful and prices here are likely to rise if stocks are reduced by export to Eritrea, and on grounds of pro-Ethiopian feeling. This sentiment finds religious sanction in the well-known tradition that kindness and support were afforded by Abyssinia to Moslems in the early days of Islam. Signor Odello's activities, in conjunction with Messrs. Lazzarini, in search of camels had become public property, owing to the large amount in gold being bought by the Italians, before Sheikh Yusuf Yasin saw Mr. Calvert. Odello visited Riyadh, accompanied by a member of the firm of Lazzarini and the half-caste dragoman of the Italian Legation, about the 17th and returned to Jedda about the 28th August.

270. Upon the breakdown of the Koweit Conference (paragraphs 202, 203 and 237 of reports for June and July) His Majesty's Government decided, in view of the unreasonableness of the Saudi attitude, to maintain pressure on the



Saudi Government. Acting under instructions, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs enquiring whether the Saudi Government were in a position to state their view in the light of further conversations which had taken place in London with Fuad Bey Hamza, who agreed to refer the question again to his Government for their renewed consideration. On the 27th August Sheikh Yusuf Yasin broached the subject orally with Mr. Calvert in a lengthy statement, in which he asserted that Koweitis had no real desire to terminate the present situation of a brisk and lucrative smuggling trade and alleged that dues were officially levied at the gates of Koweit on goods it was common knowledge were to be smuggled into Saudi Arabia. He outlined the measures to prevent Koweiti smugglers from entering this country (see paragraph 265 above), which would be contained in the Saudi note now on its way to the Legation. After Mr. Calvert had emphatically restated the views already expressed in writing, Sheikh Yusuf stated that he was authorised to discuss the question further in a personal exchange of views. Mr. Calvert replied that he had no instructions to discuss the question and suggested that it would be best to await the Saudi note. He could give Sheikh Yusuf no encouragement that an early reply could be expected.

271. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin at the meeting of the 27th August referred to the question of the proposed conference on the reconditioning of the Hejaz Railway (reference paragraph 59 of the report for February). On the 15th August, the Legation and the French consulate had addressed identic notes to the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs in which they notified their Governments' acceptance of the Saudi proposal for a technical conference on this question; took note of Saudi reservations and restated their own; proposed an agenda; and suggested that the proposed conference should assemble at Haifa on the 10th October next, under the presidency of the chief Palestinian delegate. Sheikh Yusuf, after some discussion of the agenda, informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that the Saudi Government were prepared to agree to the proposals contained in the identic note. A Saudi note to this effect would shortly be received.

272. (Reference paragraph 204.) The question of the Government of India dispensaries also came up for discussion in the conversations with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin of the 25th and 27th August. He was, of course, aware that the matter had been discussed in London by Sir Andrew Ryan with Fuad Bey Hamza, but was firmly of the impression that draft Saudi regulations, intended for early promulgation, were to be further considered by himself and His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, whereas Mr. Calvert was equally firmly of the impression that Fuad Bey, in London, had been strongly urged to defer promulgation until after Sir Andrew had had an opportunity of further discussion of the issues involved during his forthcoming visit to Riyadh—and that the matter had been left at that. The apparent misunderstanding has been reported to His Majesty's Government, but Sheikh Yusuf strongly represented the question as one for the unfettered decision of the Saudi Government and declared that the promulgation of the regulations could no longer be delayed.

273. To complete the tale of the burden of affairs brought from Riyadh to Jedda by this attorney-minded counsellor of Ibn Saud, the questions of slavery, the Bahrein Conference Agreement and Sir Andrew Ryan's visit to Riyadh were mentioned, but more briefly and quite uncontentiously.

274. (Paragraph 238 of last report.) The names of the members of the unofficial mission to various countries in connexion with the Haramayn Waqfs were communicated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 14th August. They are the following four individuals:—

Sheikh Abdullah-ash-Shaibi,  
Seyyid Muhammad Shata,  
Sheikh Bakr Daghestani,  
Seyyid Ubeyd Medani,

while Sheikh Yusuf Zeynal will accompany them as adviser. No exception can be taken to any of these persons, all of whom are of highly respected families. They have not yet left this country, but further information as to the date of departure and programme has been promised. On the 25th August, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires drew Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's attention orally to the possibility that the arrival of this mission in India might be expected to arouse some anti-Saudi agitation in Moslem circles in that country.

#### IV.—Miscellaneous.

275. The Saudi pilgrimage tariff for the 1936 Hajj was published, in its Arabic and Malay versions, during the month. The various British Governments interested are being informed of the charges that have this year been introduced. Upon the dispersal of the 1935 pilgrimage the local Hajj Committee distributed leaflets in which a reduction of 25 per cent. on all Saudi dues and transport charges was promised. As far as transport charges in the Hejaz are concerned the promise has been carried out, but a number of other items have now been consolidated in one item, the charge levied slightly exceeding the aggregate of the individual items now merged.

276. The customary press propaganda for the next Hajj is now in full spate. A newspaper the *Hajj* is reported to have been founded at Delhi by Sheikh Omar-al-Bastawi. Entirely misleading accounts of the medical organisation in this country are often circulated in this propaganda, the truth being that hospitals here are ludicrous caricatures of the normal institutions elsewhere, and medical personnel and equipment are inadequate and inefficient to a degree.

277. The sloop H.M.S. *Penzance* (Commander E. C. Longsdon, R.N.), visited Jedda in the morning of the 29th August, in response to an urgent call to convey to hospital in Port Sudan the second translator of the Legation, who was critically ill. She remained here about two hours.

278. Signor Odello, of whom much has been related in earlier paragraphs, was joined towards the end of the month by a compatriot, Caro Caglieri, who is to represent his chief in a business enterprise at Berbera, concerning which the Governor of British Somaliland has raised no objections. This gentleman is Signor Odello's second associate, the first, Ilario Marinangeli, having already been noticed at paragraph 245 of the last report.

279. The Italian Dr. Brunelli and his wife (paragraph 162 of the report for May) left Jedda during the month after a disagreement with their Legation over the terms of service on which the doctor conceived he had come to this country. He was given short notice by the Chargé d'Affaires to clear out and went.

280. Dr. W. H. Storm of the American Mission at Bahrein arrived in Jedda about the 22nd from Taif, where he had been for some weeks after crossing Arabia via Riyadh.

281. Other travellers during the month have been M. Paul Klein (French), and M. Georges Robert Naly (Swiss), who passed through Jedda at the end of the month, proceeding via Port Sudan to Jibuti. A M. Julius B. Vago (Hungarian) floated along from Addis Ababa, with a letter testifying to his good character from the Seventh Day Adventist Mission at that place, which he hoped might help him into a job with Mr. Twitchell's Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate. He is still about somewhere.

282. No report on this month of grace August 1935 would be complete without a reference to the weather. Heat and humidity have remained at unusually high levels; heavy clouds have lent oppressiveness to day and night; for two days the world was enveloped in a mist which reduced visibility to half a mile or less; a ship of the Ben Line vainly searched for Jedda for the whole of a day and pilots from shore were equally unable to find the ship; two other days were enlivened by sudden and severe sandstorms which left quantities of desert on desks and in dossiers. One cannot altogether agree, whether politically or climatically, with a member of the French consulate who described this month as "la saison du calme."

283. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the British Legation was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: Nil.  
Manumitted and repatriated: Nil.  
Took refuge in August: Nil.  
Locally manumitted: Nil.  
Left voluntarily: Nil.  
On hand at the end of the month: Nil.

One female took refuge in the Legation for a few days, but, it becoming quickly apparent that she was not a slave, she left voluntarily with her husband.



[E 5577/588/25]

No. 30.

*Correspondence between Mr. Calvert and the Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs.—(Received in Foreign Office, September 16.)*

(1)

*To Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Royal Highness,  
(After Compliments.)

*Jedda, August 15, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Royal Highness, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have given careful and sympathetic consideration to your Royal Highness's note of the 18th January last, in which the Government of Saudi Arabia proposed that a technical conference should be held to consider the repair of the damaged sections of the Hejaz Railway and the resumption of traffic over the whole length of the line.

2. His Majesty's Government fully share the desire of the Saudi Arab Government for the reopening of the southern section of the Hejaz Railway, and they are also confident that if this object were achieved great benefit would be conferred upon all the territories through which the railway runs.

3. His Majesty's Government, therefore, accept the proposal of the Saudi Arab Government that discussion of the technical matters connected with the reconditioning of the damaged section of the railway and the resumption of traffic thereon should again be undertaken.

4. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have taken note of the reservations made by the Government of Saudi Arabia in regard to the ownership and status of the Hejaz Railway. They consider it necessary, however, for their part also to place on record that their own position with regard to these matters remains unchanged and is based upon the declaration made at Lausanne on the 27th January, 1923.

5. It will, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be of advantage to all parties to agree in advance on the precise and complete agenda for discussion at the proposed conference, and they accordingly propose, for the consideration of the Saudi Arab Government, that the following agenda be adopted:—

- (i) Examination of the degree of reconditioning which the railway requires.
- (ii) Preparation of an estimate of the cost of the necessary work.
- (iii) Establishment of the manner in which the necessary expense is to be met.
- (iv) Consideration of a project for the organisation of a train service along the whole length of the railway.
- (v) Consideration of a project for the eventual distribution of rolling-stock among the different sections of the line.

6. If this agenda is acceptable to the Saudi Arab Government I have the honour to suggest, on behalf of my Government, that the proposed conference shall assemble at Haifa, in Palestine, on the 10th October next, and that the chief Palestinian delegate shall preside over the discussions.

7. I have the honour to request that your Royal Highness will inform me as soon as possible whether these proposals meet with the approval of the Saudi Arab Government, in order that the necessary arrangements may be made for the holding of the conference.

With highest respects,

A. S. CALVERT

(2)

*From Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

The Honourable Chargé d'Affaires,

*Taif, August 31, 1935.*

WITH reference to your note, dated the 15th instant, I take this opportunity to inform you that His Majesty's Government have taken note of what has been written and they thank His Britannic Majesty's Government for their interest in the running of the Hejaz Railway, the use of which will be of great benefit to all the countries through which it will pass.

The Government of His Majesty agree to what has been said in paragraph 5 of your note—that the conference should be held at Haifa on the 10th October, 1935—and agree to the agenda for discussion at the conference and also that the conference should be held on the said date in Haifa. The Government will, God willing, inform you of the names of the delegates in the near future.

With highest respects,

FEISAL.

[E 5875/269/91]

No. 31.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received September 30.)*

(No. 254.)

Sir,

*Jedda, September 10, 1935.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 163 of the 8th September, relative to the question of the attitude of Saudi Arabia to Qatar, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the translation of the personal letter received from Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, in which he states the view taken by the Saudi Arab Government of the grant of an oil concession in Qatar by the Sheikh of Qatar. The letter covers the main points mentioned by Sheikh Yusuf in his conversation with me on the 6th September, reported in my telegram No. 161 of the 7th September, except that no mention of the word "protest" is contained in the letter. In conversation, moreover, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin made some attempt to define the territories of the Sheikdom of Qatar as having originally consisted of an enclave comprising Doha itself and a limited surrounding area known as Saffat. I refrained from following Sheikh Yusuf in an excursion into a subject on which I felt he was not expertly informed.

2. Copies of this despatch and enclosure are being sent to the Government of India, Bushire and Bahrein.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 31.

*Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to Mr. Calvert.*

(Translation.)

*Jedda, Jumad-ath-Thani 9, 1354.*

My dear Mr. Calvert,

*(September 7, 1935.)*

I DESIRE to confirm the verbal discussion between us when I spoke to you on the evening of the 8th Jumad-ath-Thani, 1354.

You are aware that the frontiers between this Kingdom and the Amirate of Qatar and the coast of Oman have never been actually delimited between those countries, and our Government is ready to delimit this frontier at any time. It has come to the knowledge of our Government that the Amir of Qatar has granted or will grant a concession for the exploitation of oil in Qatar, but as the frontier has not been drawn between us and that Amirate therefore our Government beg that such a concession be not granted, and that no work be carried out in that zone before the frontier is definitely drawn. It is not possible for our Government to recognise or agree to any work referred to being undertaken, and boring



and production in the places which they (Saudi Arab Government) occupy and which is under their influence at the present time.

I desire to explain to you that our Government, although they have granted a concession for the production of oil in the zone which includes the lands neighbouring on the Amirate of Qatar, but our Government, up to this date, have not allowed the company to operate any work of drilling in that zone, pending the definite delimitation of the frontier.

With highest respects,

YUSUF YASIN.

[E 5865/350/25]

No. 32.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 30.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, September 28, 1935.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of two despatches from the Officer Administering the Government of Palestine (with enclosures), dated the 5th September, on the subject of the visit of the Amir Saud to Palestine and Transjordan.

I am, &c.

J. L. MAFFEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

*Officer Administering the Government of Palestine to Mr. Malcolm MacDonald.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*September 5, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to your confidential despatch (Transjordan) of the 29th June, 1935, regarding the visit of His Royal Highness the Amir Saud to the United Kingdom and subsequently to Transjordan, and to inform you that His Royal Highness spent the period from the 14th to the 19th August in Palestine and Transjordan.

2. When the intention of the Amir Saud to visit this country became generally known, allegations were made in *Al Jami'a-al-Arabiya*, the organ of the Supreme Moslem Council, that the Government, in entertaining him as an official guest and in drawing up a programme for his movements, intended to prevent free contact between the Arabs of Palestine and the visitor. The High Commissioner, accordingly, directed that the Arab population should be given the fullest opportunity possible of greeting and entertaining His Royal Highness, and reception committees, in which representatives of all Arab political parties were invited to participate, were formed under arrangements made by the President of the Supreme Moslem Council. The suggested programme for the period the Amir was to be in Palestine was drawn up in consultation with Haj Amin, who communicated to the local committees the details provisionally decided upon.

3. The Amir Saud and his suite arrived at Kantara, from Alexandria, on the evening of the 13th August, and were there met by my Arab private secretary, who laid before His Royal Highness the programme suggested for his movements in Palestine, and by a senior Moslem police officer who was detailed to remain in attendance on His Royal Highness so long as he was in Palestine.

Arrangements had been made in advance that the coaches in which the royal party travelled from Alexandria should be conveyed across the Suez Canal, so that they were able to continue their journey to Jerusalem undisturbed. The coaches were attached to the ordinary passenger train leaving Kantara for Palestine shortly after midnight, but they were detached at Khan Yunis in the early hours of the morning of the 14th August, and from that station to Jerusalem were run as a special train. This was arranged principally to meet the desire of the Arab inhabitants of the towns and districts through which the railway

passes to demonstrate to His Royal Highness their pleasure at his visit. The train was stopped accordingly for a few minutes at each station.

4. An official reception was arranged at the Jerusalem station. I welcomed the Amir on behalf of the Palestine Government, and presented to him the senior officers of Government, a representative of each foreign consulate, and a number of notables among whom the only non-Moslem was Yasub Eff. Farraj, Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem and acting President of the Arab Executive. A guard of honour was mounted outside the station by the 2nd Battalion the Royal Berkshire Regiment, and His Royal Highness inspected the guard before entering the car which I had placed at his disposal. He was enthusiastically applauded by large crowds which had gathered to witness his arrival.

5. From the station the Amir proceeded to the Haram-esh-Sherif to perform his religious duty of taking the first opportunity to salute this Holy Place. His car was accompanied as far as St. Stephen's Gate by a trotting escort of Palestine police. In the Haram area, as at the railway station, large crowds had gathered to welcome him. After praying at the Aqsa Mosque the Amir and his suite drove to Government House, where they were to be my guests. The suite comprised Fuad Bey Hamza, his secretary (and brother) Taufiq Hamza, Kheir-el-Din Zerkali, adviser to the Saudi Agency at Cairo, Fahed-bin-Kreidif and Saleh-al-Ali, respectively, secretary and aide-de-camp to His Royal Highness, and a servant. Also travelling with the Royal party, but lodged at the King David Hotel, were Dr. Hamdi, Director of Health in the Hejaz, Sheikh Naser, Saudi Agent at Damascus, and Abdel Rauf Sabban, described as Hejaz Deputy Minister of Finance.

6. After lunch, to which I invited a few Arab notables including the mayors of Jaffa, Haifa, Nablus and Hebron, and one or two Government officers, His Royal Highness and suite drove to Hebron, where they visited the mosque. Returning thence they proceeded direct to a reception at the Rawdat-al-Maaref School, arranged in their honour by the Jerusalem reception committee.

7. In the evening I gave a dinner party to which I invited the members of the Executive Council and a number of Moslem notables and Moslem Government officers.

8. On the 15th August the period from 9 A.M. to 10 A.M. was set aside for the Amir to receive visits at Government House. He then drove to Jaffa, where he was the guest of the local reception committee at a lunch arranged in the house of a certain Yusuf Ashhour. On the way His Royal Highness made a stop at Ramleh, where the population demonstrated their welcome. In the afternoon the party drove from Jaffa to Nablus, where they were entertained to tea by the Nablus reception committee. Halts were made *en route* at Qalqiliya and Tulkarm, where also His Royal Highness was enthusiastically greeted by the population.

9. From Nablus His Royal Highness and suite drove directly to Government House, where I gave a second dinner party at which the guests included the principal Royal Air Force and military officers, the heads of Government departments, the Anglican bishop, Mr. Shertok of the Jewish Agency, foreign consuls-general, and the consul of Czechoslovakia, who is filling the post of a consul-general, and is, moreover, accredited to Saudi Arabia.

10. On the morning of the 16th the Amir Saud and his suite motored to Amman. As far as the Allenby Bridge they were accompanied by my Arab private secretary and an escort of Palestine police. At the bridge they were met by the Amir Talal on behalf of the Amir Abdullah, the chief of his Highness's divan, and the Chief Minister's secretary. An escort of two cars of the Desert Patrol of the Arab Legion was provided. The Amir Saud was greeted at Es Salt by the Mutessarif of the Belqa District, and a guard of honour, and from the entrance to the town of Amman to the palace a cavalry escort of the Arab Legion accompanied the cars.

11. His Highness the Amir Abdullah, the Acting British Resident, the Chief Minister and the officer at present commanding the Arab Legion (Major Glubb) received the Amir Saud at the door of the palace and subsequently the members of the Executive and Advisory Councils, heads of departments and officers of the Arab Legion were presented.

12. An official banquet was given at the palace in the evening to which were invited the Acting British Resident, the members of the Executive Council, the financial adviser, the officer at present in command of the Arab Legion, and certain senior officers of the Royal Air Force and the Transjordan Frontier Force.



His Highness the Amir made a speech of welcome, of which I attach a translation, and presented a jewelled sword to the Amir Saud. The latter replied in suitable terms.

13. The morning of the 17th was devoted to visiting Madeba and the excavations of Siagha. Lunch was taken at the palace and was attended by heads of departments of the Transjordan Government and officers of the Arab Legion.

In the afternoon, a parade of the Arab Legion was followed by a gathering of tribesmen and a Bedouin dinner of rice, roast camel and sheep which was eaten at a camp erected for the purpose on the hills west of the palace. In order to avoid raising questions of precedence, His Highness the Amir Abdullah did not attend the parade but was represented there by his eldest son, the Amir Talal.

14. On Sunday, the Amir Saud and suite were the guests of the municipality of Amman at an *al fresco* lunch in the orchards of Ain Hummar. An informal dinner was given at the palace, after which His Highness the Amir bestowed decorations on the Amir Saud and members of his suite. In return, the Amir Saud gave presents of Arab cloaks to the palace officials.

15. His Royal Highness and suite left Amman by car at an early hour on the morning of the 19th August and drove to the Allenby Bridge, where they bade farewell to the Amir Talal and were received by my Arab private secretary. Thence they drove directly to the Jerusalem station, where the ceremonial observed on His Royal Highness's arrival was reversed.

The coaches in which the Royal party were travelling were hauled to Lydda as a special train, and there attached to the ordinary passenger train proceeding to Kantara.

16. Prior to leaving, His Royal Highness handed me a message, a translation of which is enclosed, for publication.

17. Throughout the whole of his stay in Palestine and Transjordan, His Royal Highness impressed all who came into contact with him by his dignified bearing and charm of manner. He was careful, even at purely Arab functions arranged in his honour, to avoid anything of a political or controversial nature, and his visit was unmarred by any untoward incident.

You will have observed that, in the Arab press, the visit of the Amir Saud to Palestine and Transjordan was welcomed as reflecting the re-establishment of friendship between the Saudi and Hashimite families; and particularly as affording first an occasion for drawing attention to the alleged wrongs under which the Arabs of this country were suffering and, in the second place but less immediately, some grounds for the hope that in due time Arab Palestine might be delivered from its present subjugation by an Arab Prince who could now rightly be looked upon as the exemplar and champion of Arab independence.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Jeddah.

I have, &c.  
J. HATHORN HALL,  
*Officer Administering the Government  
of Palestine and Acting High  
Commissioner for Transjordan.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 32.

*Speech of Welcome.*

(Translation.)

Your Royal Highnesses the Amirs,  
Your Excellencies and Gentlemen,

I HAVE been looking forward to this night, which gives me an opportunity of meeting His Royal Highness the Amir Saud, and I find it my duty to thank His Majesty, his noble father, for accepting my invitation and permitting him to come here.

There is no doubt that this visit is the augury of a happy era for the nation, which desires at all times that good understanding and harmony should be its guide.

I and my country are most delighted to be able to greet the eldest son of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz here, and I wish both His Majesty and his Highness "good health" and success.

It gives me pleasure to offer to his Highness a souvenir of this auspicious visit—this sword, which, God willing, he will carry for many years as a token of loyalty and brotherhood.

Amman, *Jamada Awal* 17, 1354  
(August 16, 1935).

Enclosure 3 in No. 32.

*The following Message has been handed by His Royal Highness the Amir Saud to His Excellency the Officer Administering the Government for Publication.*

THE two days which I spent in this country, which is full of energy and life, have delighted me and created in me a feeling such as, to say to the least, can only be expressed by thanks to the noble Government and people alike for the great hospitality and generosity with which they have received me.

In particular, I am grateful for the kind attention which has been extended to me by his Excellency the Officer Administering the Government, his alert officers and the zealous members of the police.

As regards the Arab people, who received me during my visit as an affectionate father would receive his sons and a kind brother would receive his brothers, to this living people who are mine and whose I am, I confess my inability to appreciate adequately their feelings towards me and to express my thanks for all they had shown to me during my journeys in their towns and villages and visits to their institutions.

I can only pray to the Almighty God to bestow His blessings upon this people and to direct their steps in the right path.

I wish also to thank the Syrian delegates who took the trouble to come here to take part in my reception and to make me feel that I am amongst my family and clan.

I shall not forget the way I was received by the press and by all journalists. May God reward them on my behalf and on behalf of the nation of whom they are the spokesmen and whose feeling they express.

Enclosure 4 in No. 32.

*Officer Administering the Government of Palestine to Mr. Malcolm MacDonald.*

(Secret.)

Sir,

September 5, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my confidential despatch of to-day's date regarding the visit of His Royal Highness the Amir Saud to Palestine and Transjordan, and to submit the following further observations on certain political aspects of the occasion:—

2. Although the composition of the Arab reception committees as published in the press purported to embrace all parties, in fact none of the leading members of the Opposition (National Defence party) participated, and complete control over the arrangements was thus exercised by the Mufti and his adherents. The reason for the abstention of the Opposition was that they resented the fact that Haj Amin, and not they, had taken the initiative in the matter, thereby securing a political advantage and an enhancement of prestige. They also objected, and with some reason, to the inclusion in the local committees of persons of little standing, including in the case of the Jaffa Reception Committee, as I subsequently learnt, a man who had served a sentence of three years' imprisonment for forgery. Both in Jaffa and Nablus, the district commissioners were obliged to bring pressure to bear in order to overcome the reluctance of the mayors to attend the receptions arranged in their towns. They were offended at not having



been invited to preside over the local reception committees, a dignity to which they felt themselves entitled as the elected representatives of the population.

3. Throughout the period during which the Amir Saud was in Palestine Haj Amin took every possible opportunity of thrusting himself to the fore and of assuming charge of the Royal guest. So much so, indeed, that on the afternoon of the 14th August, on the occasion of the visit to Hebron, he contrived to seat himself beside the Amir, thereby forcing Fuad Bey Hamza to occupy the small folding seat in front. Fuad Bey Hamza was not unnaturally annoyed, and I thought it well to speak to Haj Amin on the subject, with the result that this particular manoeuvre was not repeated on the following day. As was to be anticipated, however, he took to himself the most prominent part in the receptions at Jaffa and Nablus and the intermediate towns, thereby greatly annoying the Opposition faction, whose newspapers have devoted several articles to the subject.

4. I enclose herein a copy of a report of the 20th August, submitted by the Acting British Resident on some of the political aspects of the Amir Saud's visit to Transjordan. Abdel Rauf Sabban is identical with the man of that name referred to in the High Commissioner's telegram No. 9 of the 13th January, 1933, and connected correspondence.

I also enclose translations of telegrams received by the Amir Abdullah and the Amir Saud from King Ibn Saud, in reply to telegrams announcing the safe arrival of the Amir Saud at Amman, and of telegrams exchanged between the Amir Saud and the Amir Abdullah after the former had left Transjordan.<sup>(1)</sup>

5. It is of interest to record that on the morning of the 14th August, when the invited guests were assembling at the Jerusalem railway station to await the arrival of His Royal Highness, the waiting Arab crowds gave an ovation to the Abyssinian consul.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, Jedda.

I have, &c.

J. HATHORN HALL,  
Officer Administering the Government of  
Palestine and Acting High Commis-  
sioner for Transjordan.

Enclosure 5 in No. 32.

*Acting British Resident, Amman, to Officer Administering the Government  
of Palestine.*

(Secret.)

Your Excellency,

*Office of the British Resident, Transjordan,  
Amman, August 20, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to my letter of even number, dated the 19th August, 1935, on the subject of the visit to Transjordan of the Amir Saud.

2. The Amir Saud made a favourable impression upon all those whom he met, and his attitude as regards political matters was most correct.

He ignored pointedly any political allusions made to him in the course of conversation and confined himself to uttering polite expressions of thanks for the kind reception he had been accorded and to saying how delightful it was to feel that all Arabs were brothers.

He was most cordial to His Highness the Amir and the Amirs Talal and Naif.

3. As regards the suite, it was unfortunate that two of the members who came to Amman should be individuals who had shown open enmity at one time or other to the Hashimite house. Kheir Eddin Zerqali had to fly from Transjordan soon after the inception of the present régime in order to escape the consequences of writing poetry in which his Highness was the subject of abuse, and Khaled-el-Hakim was an opponent of the late King Feisal at Damascus during 1919 and 1920. His Highness the Amir also resented the fact that Abder Raouf Sabban, who was expelled from his Highness's employ and from Transjordan as the result of representations made by Ibn Saud, should have been included in the party in Palestine.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

Fuad Bey Hamza was to have stayed at the palace, but, at his own request, was lodged at the Philadelphia Hotel. He held a number of private meetings with persons in opposition to the present Government in Transjordan, including Adel-el-Azmeh, Tahir-el-Jokka and Abdullah Nimr. He was also in touch with the Druse refugees of the Atrash family, and Mohamed Izzeddin-el-Halabi, who came to Amman from Nebk in order to meet the Amir Saud.

4. His Highness the Amir was a most courteous host and was at pains to prevent the occasion being exploited for political purposes by the nationalistic politicians in Syria and Palestine. It was for this reason that he declined to accept the visit of Haj Amin-el-Husseini and Ragheb Bey Nashashibi from Palestine and Mohamed Nahas and Shukri Kowatli from Damascus. His Highness also requested me to instruct the British consul at Damascus to refuse visas for Transjordan to a party of eleven Syrian politicians who desired to come to Amman in order to call on the Amir Saud. The exclusion of this party was the subject of adverse comment in the Syrian press.

A number of Arab newspaper correspondents both from Palestine and Syria were present, and his Highness received them at the palace on Saturday, the 17th instant. He warned them that the visit of the guest, which was made for the purpose of renewing an old friendship between the Hashimite and Saudi families, was not to be made the occasion for political manoeuvres.

5. The Amir Saud showed considerable interest in Major J. B. Glubb, and after subjecting Samir Bey Rifai, the secretary to the Chief Minister, to a long cross-examination on the subject of Major Glubb's personality and activities, expressed the opinion that he was a much pleasanter person than reports had indicated.

I have, &c.

A. S. KIRKBRIDE,  
Acting British Resident.

[E 6148/269/91]

No. 33.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 14.)*

(No. 266.)

Sir,

*Jedda, September 28, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to your telegram No. 112 of the 20th September, regarding the attitude adopted by Ibn Saud in respect of the grant of the Qatar Oil Concession, and to transmit to you herewith a copy of the letter I addressed to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 26th September in accordance with your instructions and upon being informed by the Government of India and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf of their concurrence in the terms of the communication.

2. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin is still in Jedda and would appear likely to remain here some little time. He is now virtually in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for Amir Feisal left for Riyadh on a short visit on the 23rd September.

3. I should like to take this opportunity to explain that the purpose of my telegram No. 169 of the 15th September was to enquire in what respects my communication to the Saudi Arab Government should be modified in regard to its form by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin's oral statement and confirmatory letter of the 6th and 8th September respectively, and how far the Saudi *démarche* should be taken into account. In making this enquiry, I need hardly point out that there was no suggestion to moderate the terms of our communication to the Saudi Arab Government, much less to "condone" direct relations between Ibn Saud and the Sheikh of Qatar. The Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, in their telegram of the 17th September to the Secretary of State for India, apparently misinterpreted my telegram No. 169.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, Bushire and Bahrein.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.



Enclosure in No. 33.

*Mr. Calvert to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin.*

My dear Sheikh Yusuf Yasin,

Jedda, September 26, 1935.

WITH reference to your Excellency's letter of the 9th Jumad-ath-Thani (7th September), relative to the question of Qatar, I beg to inform your Excellency as follows: When His Majesty's Government were informed by me of your letter, they were about to address the Saudi Government in regard to their action in corresponding direct with his Excellency the Sheikh of Qatar on a subject which, since His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are responsible for the foreign relations of the sheikh, falls within the sphere of my Government. His Majesty's Government have learned with surprise that the Saudi Government addressed a letter to the Sheikh of Qatar on a matter which affects his foreign relations, as these, as the Saudi Government are aware, are conducted by His Majesty's Government by virtue of their special treaty relations with him. My Government trust that in future the Saudi Government will address them, and not the sheikh, if they have occasion to raise questions concerning Qatar. In this connexion I beg to refer your Excellency to the statement made by Sir Andrew Ryan to his Excellency Fuad Bey Hamza on the 20th February last.

2. I am glad to take this opportunity of explaining to your Excellency that, after long negotiations, in which His Majesty's Government participated and which they saw no reason to delay, the Sheikh of Qatar on the 17th May last granted to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, with the full approval of His Majesty's Government, a concession for the exploitation of oil, &c., in his territory.

3. I would also like to recall to your Excellency that, as the Saudi Government have already been informed, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are prepared in derogation of their strict legal rights to offer to the Saudi Government important concessions at the northern end of the frontier line and to admit Saudi sovereignty up to the so-called "green line," which, as has already been indicated to the Saudi Government, is a line running from the head of Dohat-as-Salwa to a point 5 miles north-east of Sakak, thence to a point 5 miles west of Banaiyan. But, as was pointed out to his Excellency Fuad Bey Hamza in London last June, this line represents the utmost concession which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are able to offer in this area compatibly with their obligations to other rulers concerned. I may add that the reasons why His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are unable to contemplate concessions in this sector were fully explained to his Excellency Fuad Bey.

4. The southern limit of the oil concession granted to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by the Sheikh of Qatar does not extend beyond this "green line," but lies to a considerable distance to the north of it. The concession does not, therefore, extend to any territory under discussion with the Saudi Government.

5. Moreover, I should inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have formally assured the Sheikh of Qatar of their protection against any interference with his territorial rights, more particularly over the area covered by the oil concession. In view of the language contained in the letter of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz to his Excellency the Sheikh of Qatar, His Majesty's Government feel they must make this point clear and draw the attention of the Saudi Arab Government to the terms of article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda. By this article His Majesty King Abdul Aziz undertook, among other things, to maintain friendly relations with the Sheikh of Qatar, whose special treaty relations with His Majesty's Government he explicitly recognises.

6. In these circumstances, your Excellency will appreciate that the frontier question cannot be affected by the grant or exploitation of this concession. I am happy, in conclusion, to assure your Excellency that His Majesty's Government appreciate and reciprocate the Saudi Government's desire to reach an early agreement on the frontier question, and that they hope that discussions on this subject may profitably be resumed on Sir Andrew Ryan's return to Arabia.

Yours sincerely,

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6149/6149/25]

No. 34.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 14.)*

(No. 267.)

Sir,

Jedda, September 28, 1935.

THE tendency of the Saudi Arab Government to introduce into this country certain features of an administrative nature borrowed from more highly organised States, particularly in regard to public health, sanitation and the like, has been previously reported on more than one occasion. This ambition would appear to have prompted the formation of what is officially designated as "The National Humane First-Aid Society of the Saudi Arab Kingdom," the regulations concerning which have recently appeared in the Mecca newspaper the *Umm-al-Qura*. I do not consider that these regulations are of sufficient interest to forward to you—they concern, briefly, the objects for which the society was founded, i.e., to render aid to victims of accidents, to sick persons and to assist the medical services in the event of the outbreak of epidemics; its organisation; its revenues, which are to be derived principally from donations and subscriptions, and from the sale of special issues of postage stamps; its flag, which is to be green and red; and its membership. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 18th September announced that a committee had been formed and a chairman elected. There seems to be no doubt that this organisation, though unofficial, will work under fairly close governmental control.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Government of India, Department of Education, Health and Lands.

I have, &amp;c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6152/557/25]

No. 35.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 14.)*

(No. 270. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, October 1, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for September 1935.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the case of the report for August 1935.

I have, &amp;c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 35.

JEDDA REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1935.

## I.—Internal Affairs.

284. The King welcomed the Amir Saud upon his arrival at Riyadh, where the Crown Prince was given a warm reception, on the 1st September, after an absence of more than three months on his European journey. Subsequently, little was heard of the royal movements, and, indeed, reports reached Jedda from Taif that Ibn Saud, for a period, had been indisposed. The Amir Feisal left Taif for Riyadh on the 23rd, after twice postponing his departure. The hardy rumour that he is going there to be married again cropped up, whilst other sources stated that a family conference, similar to one held before the Saudi-Yemen war, had been convened to consider the position of this country *vis-à-vis* the Italo-Ethiopian crisis.

285. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, apart from two short visits to Taif, remained at Jedda the whole of the month. He had numerous meetings with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, to which more detailed reference will be made later in this report, and was seen in both the more and the less engaging moods of his Syrian soul. He appeared to occupy the position of Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in the continued absence of Fuad Bey Hamza in Syria.

[12750]



286. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, during the month, moved on from Egypt to Syria. A report in the *Saut-al-Hejaz* lent some confirmation to reports of his interest in the construction of pilgrim hotels and metalled roads in this country, mentioned in paragraph 253 of the last report. His brother Hamad Suleiman continued to act in his absence as Minister of Finance.

287. The internal situation remained generally tranquil. No further reports of trouble in Najran were received, so that the position there would appear to have been effectively stabilised. Troops, however, were moved south into the Asir Tihama, a mixed force, with supplies, leaving Jedda by the Saudi vessel *Al Fath* on the 13th for Jizan, or according to one report, for Qunfidha. The Saudi soldiers spent several days in Jedda before their departure, and their new khaki uniforms, of an unfortunate shade of green, attracted some attention. No further contingents are known to have followed, and undue significance is not at present attached to this movement of Saudi forces.

288. The appointments were announced during the month of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Haya as Amir of Turaba in the room of Ibrahim-an-Neshmi, the veteran Saudi soldier, who was appointed Amir of Najran, and left shortly after for his new post. Tahsin Bey, formerly commandant of police in Jedda, was appointed head of the administration of the Ministry of Defence.

289. Mr. Allen White (reference paragraph 254 of last report) left for Hasa by way of Egypt and Syria on the 25th September, ten days after the arrival from London of Mr. R. Lebkicher, a geologist of the Standard Oil Company, who, it is understood, will remain in charge of the office of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company here for several months. The Mecca press contained further references to reports that the company had struck oil in Hasa.

290. The selling rates for Saudi silver rials (paragraph 259 of last month's report), remained fairly steady during September at 18½ and 10½-11½ for gold and Egyptian pounds respectively. The manager of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited), at the end of the month, had heard nothing further regarding the consignment from London of £90,000 worth of silver rial pieces. A further importation of rupees from India (reference paragraph 145 of the report for May), amounting to 112,000 rupees, arrived on the 10th from India by the steamship *Jehangir*.

291. Sheikh Muhammad Tawil, Director-General of Customs, Hasa, remained at Taif on leave. He made a clean sweep of most of his subordinate officials, the new appointments, of no individual interest, being announced in the press during the month.

292. The Waziriya water supply has been a source of some anxiety during the past three or four months. The present supply is barely sufficient for a once daily distribution, and plans for its increase are at present under consideration.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

293. The recent developments in the Yemen, in connexion with the reported appointment of the Saif-ul-Islam Ahmad as Regent and the proposed reorganisation of the Yemeni army on modern lines, has been given some publicity by the Mecca press. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* offered its congratulations to the Yemeni Crown Prince.

294. Various questions concerning foreign relations in Arabia arose during the month, but as British interests were primarily concerned, they will be treated under the next section.

## III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

295. (Paragraph 267 of last report.) By command of His Majesty the King, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires called on Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 4th September to express His Majesty's appreciation at the message of thanks from Ibn Saud and the Amir Saud for the hospitable welcome given to the latter during his recent visit to England.

296. (Reference paragraphs 265 and 270 of last report.) The Saudi note foreshadowed by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin in conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 27th August, in regard to the Koweit blockade, was received on the 1st September. It was found largely to cover the ground traversed by Sheikh Yusuf orally, and declared that, pending a settlement of the question

along the lines suggested by the Saudi delegates to the recent conference, a drastic intensification of blockade measures against both goods and unauthorised persons attempting to enter Saudi Arabia from Koweit would be enforced. It repeated the allegation that a large increase in smuggling from Koweit had taken place subsequent to the episode of the armed incursion into Koweit and to the breakdown of the conference. Acting upon instructions, Mr. Calvert addressed on the 15th September a further official communication to the Saudi Government stating that His Majesty's Government now regarded the incident of the armed incursion as closed, and expressing surprise at the alleged increase of smuggling from Koweit and the intention of the Saudi Arab Government to restrict intercourse with Koweit still further. His Majesty's Government regretted that no consideration had apparently been given to the Legation's previous note, and warned the Saudi Arab Government that they must assume sole responsibility for the continuance of the present unsatisfactory situation if they maintained their insistence on impossible conditions. No further exchange had taken place on this matter at the end of the month.

297. On the 6th September Sheikh Yusuf Yasin informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that information had reached Ibn Saud that the Sheikh of Qatar had granted, or was about to grant, an oil concession in Qatar. As no agreement had yet been reached as to the boundaries between Saudi Arabia and that sheikdom, Ibn Saud requested that no further action be taken in the matter pending delimitation of the frontier. Sheikh Yusuf added that although the concession granted by Ibn Saud to the California Arabian Standard Oil Company extended to territory adjoining Qatar, the Saudi Government had expressly prevented the company from operating in that area in advance of the settlement of the boundary. This statement Sheikh Yusuf subsequently embodied in a personal letter. Acting under instructions, Mr. Calvert replied on the 26th September to the effect that His Majesty's Government had become aware that Ibn Saud had recently corresponded direct with the Sheikh of Qatar, and that they had therefore been on the point of addressing the Saudi Arab Government to express their surprise at a procedure at variance with the explicit undertaking of Ibn Saud under the Treaty of Jedda. The letter informed Sheikh Yusuf that an oil concession had, in fact, been granted on the 11th May last by the Sheikh of Qatar to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, with the full approval of His Majesty's Government; that the area of the concession lay well to the north of the boundary line His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider as their utmost possible concession to Saudi Arabia; and that the grant of the oil concession could not therefore be affected by the boundary question, upon which His Majesty's Government shared the Saudi Government's desire to reach an early settlement.

298. (Reference paragraph 272.) After a number of further exchanges on the subject of the draft regulations regarding foreign dispensaries, doctors, dispensers, &c., which the Saudi Arab Government desired to promulgate at an early date, His Majesty's Government agreed that His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires should discuss these regulations with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, with a view to securing amendments to eliminate provisions of a possibly vexatious and undesirable nature. Discussions took place on the 15th and 17th September, and a number of amendments put forward were conceded.

299. During September two incidents involving the violation of Saudi territory by aircraft of the Royal Air Force were reported. The first was the alleged infraction of the Saudi-Transjordan frontier on the 16th August at Alqan, which was brought to the notice of the Legation by the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs in studiously polite language. The matter was referred to the Transjordan authorities, whose reply was awaited at the end of the month. The second instance took place off the Hasa Coast, when a flying-boat of the Royal Air Force was forced by engine trouble to alight on the sea some 10 miles from the shore and subsequently to shelter in the lee of Ras Tanura. In this case the Legation was able first to inform the Saudi authorities and to express regret, to which a polite reply was received, coupled with an assurance that they were always ready to render assistance to aircraft forced to land in unavoidable circumstances. Mindful, perhaps, of the recent payment by His Majesty's Government of the bill for expenditure incurred by the Saudi Government in rescuing distressed British aircraft (see paragraph 239 of the report for July), the Saudis seem to have realised that to be a Samaritan sometimes pays.



300. (Reference paragraph 271.) The promised Saudi note expressing agreement with the proposals of the Anglo-French identic note regarding the proposed Hejaz Railway Conference at Haifa on the 10th October was received on the 1st September. Further conversations took place during the month with reference to the possibility of the Saudis conducting a preliminary inspection of the line in their territory in order to be able to place the conference in possession of as full information as possible as to the degree of reconditioning necessary. An inspector (according to the *Saut-al-Hejaz*, one Sherif Rashid-al-Ghazi) left Medina on the 21st September and is expected to arrive at Mudawwara on the 6th October, whence he will, it is hoped, be able to proceed to Haifa to lay his report before the Saudi delegate. The latter, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin informed Mr. Calvert at the end of the month, is to be Fuad Bey Hamza, at present in Syria.

301. (Reference paragraphs 268 and 269.) The preoccupation of Ibn Saud over the Italo-Ethiopian crisis continued to manifest itself during the month under review. On the 3rd September Mr. Calvert replied orally to the enquiries made by Ibn Saud regarding the attitude of His Majesty's Government in this emergency. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin emphasised Ibn Saud's desire for close and friendly collaboration with His Majesty's Government in peace and war, and stated that the King's policy would be to align himself with the British Government. Until the situation clarified itself, the Saudis would, however, treat the Italians with customary courtesy, but if hostilities were unfortunately to break out they would follow His Majesty's Government. The sheikh stressed the financial importance to this country in these times of economic depression of a deal in camels with the Italians, who were also ready to promise them, in addition to money and arms, guns and aeroplanes. Subsequent to the statement of His Majesty's Government's views, he had given permission for the sale of a number of camels to the Italians. He might impose limitations on their numbers later on. Sheikh Yusuf's statements led to a further oral communication on the 16th September by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires regarding the views of His Majesty's Government, and another conversation on the subject took place on the 19th, when the sheikh discussing the general situation personally enquired what would happen to shipping, postal services, &c., in the Red Sea if the Suez Canal were closed, an event he appeared to expect. He felt sure that His Majesty's Government would not wish, as a great Moslem Power, to see harm or loss befall the Hejaz, but would act as in the Great War, when His Majesty's Government helped to alleviate the hardships suffered by that country.

302. It was understood from Sheikh Yusuf Yasin that Odello, the Italian self-styled merchant, had paid a lump sum in advance for the purchase of camels, and that a broker had been despatched to collect the animals. No invasion of Jedda by camels for Eritrea had taken place up to the end of the month. No further shipments of live-stock, fruit or vegetables to Massawa took place in September, the reason given being that, owing to the disorganisation in that port and consequent delay in unloading, the fruit and vegetables perished and had to be thrown overboard, and the animals suffered severely. As Saudi merchants were to be paid for their goods "landed Massawa," they suffered in some cases total loss in consequence. The experiment is therefore not likely to be repeated. Generally, the Italo-Ethiopian situation is followed with the closest interest, facilitated by the rapid increase in the number of wireless sets being imported. Rumours during September were responsible for some panic and a rise in the local prices of food-stuffs in the "sûq," but the municipality took certain measures, and the receipt of further news of a more reassuring nature helped to restore confidence.

303. (Paragraph 274 of last report.) The unofficial Haramayn Waqfs mission had not left for abroad at the end of September. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 27th reported the resignation of one of the delegates, Sheikh Abdullah-ash-Shaibi, on account of pressure of other duties, and the appointment in his stead of Sherif Ridha. Other reports were not lacking that the mission would not leave at all, for, it is said, as regarded Egypt, Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman had done all that could be done; from Palestine, certain monies had been received from the Grand Mufti; and India was definitely unfavourably disposed towards the mission.

304. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 19th that some 244 destitute Indians had arrived in Hasa and had been prevented

from proceeding further into the interior. He suggested that they should be returned to India and drew attention to the undesirability of destitutes using the overland routes to Mecca. These unfortunates had arrived in Hasa via Muscat, Oman and Qatar. The matter was under consideration at the end of the month.

305. The Italian and Turkish Chargés d'Affaires returned from leave during the month on the 1st and 22nd respectively, and the Soviet Legation's dentist, M. Miron Merson, accompanied by his wife, left for Europe via Port Sudan on the 8th. Signor Persico expressed to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires his dissatisfaction with the junior official, Signor Ardizzone, left in charge of the Italian Legation during the summer, for not only had he bungled the arrangements for the visit of the Italian flotilla-leader *Pantera* (see paragraph 208), but he had been guilty of the "gaffe" of missing the Amir Saud on his return to Jedda. As the Crown Prince arrived in an Italian ship, Signor Ardizzone took launch to go aboard to welcome His Royal Highness before he landed, but, unfortunately, the Italian representative arrived too late, the Amir had left the ship, and when the unfortunate Ardizzone returned to shore the reception at the quay was over. Celâl Bay, it is expected, will be preoccupied with the effects on Turkish interests in this country of the Saudi Law on Immovable Property (reference paragraph 241 of the report for October 1934).

#### IV.—Miscellaneous.

306. (Paragraph 246 of the report for July.) It was stated that all restrictions on mutawwifs proceeding to India, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies have been withdrawn. The embargo remains as regards "sabees."

307. The American missionary, Dr. Storm (paragraph 280), after a visit to Yanbu, left for Jizan *en route* for Aden on the 13th.

308. Captain H. A. Symons, the representative of a British firm dealing in military equipment, arrived from Port Sudan on the 4th September and left for the same place on the 8th, intending to make for the Yemen.

309. Signor Caro Caglieri left Jedda for Berbera (paragraph 278), it is believed, early in September.

310. Rains fell during the month at Taif and at other places in the interior.

311. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the British Legation was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: Nil.  
Manumitted and repatriated: Nil.  
Took refuge in September: 1 male, 1 female and infant.  
Locally manumitted: 1 female and infant.  
Left voluntarily: Nil.  
On hand at the end of the month: 1 male.

[E 6153/5599/25]

No. 36.

Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 271. Confidential.)

Sir,

Jedda, October 1, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 237, Confidential, of the 20th August last relative to the reactions in this country to the present Italo-Ethiopian crisis, I have the honour to submit a brief account of the general attitude and public feeling, in the somewhat limited area with which I am in touch, towards this dispute and the parties involved in it, in order to supplement the information I have ventured to telegraph at some length regarding the attitude of the Saudi Arab Government as communicated to me by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin.

2. It may, I consider, be confidently stated that the general sympathies in this part of Saudi Arabia are undoubtedly with Abyssinia, and are perhaps as strong or even stronger than they were when I addressed to you the despatch under reference. It has been even said that some criticism has been expressed locally of the Saudi Arab Government for not having adopted an attitude more



definitely friendly to the Abyssinians. The recent growth in the number of wireless sets now privately owned and successfully operated in Jedda has helped to foster an intense interest in the day-to-day fortunes of this situation. In the latter part of September, both at Mecca and Jedda, the sensitiveness of the local inhabitants to the gravity of reported developments at Geneva led to a wide-spread movement to buy up food-stuffs and other goods to hoard against the day when supplies by sea, upon which the urban population of the Hejaz so largely depend, should be interrupted, if not cut off. The impulse to hoard was short-lived, and the efforts of the local authorities and the effect of more hopeful news contributed to restore confidence and to allow prices, which had risen appreciably, to return to normal.

3. I have as yet observed no sign of anti-British propaganda of Italian inspiration. Indeed, the feeling here at present is that the only hope of the avoidance of hostilities lies in the firm attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government, and while feeling towards Great Britain may be considered friendly, it is believed that pro-Italian sympathy, even in limited circles, scarcely exists.

4. Signor Odello, as I have reported by telegram, has now received permission from the Saudi Government to purchase camels. He has paid a lump sum in advance, and his broker left some days ago to arrange to collect the animals. They have not appeared in Jedda yet. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin informed me that he had imposed no limits either in respect of the number of camels bought or the time taken in acquiring them, although he did not exclude the possibility of placing restrictions on the operations of Signor Odello later. No further consignments of other live-stock and such commodities as fresh fruit, vegetables, fodder, &c., have been shipped to Massawa, as the first experiment turned out unfortunately for the Saudi merchants engaged. It is reported that the vegetables, fruit, &c., perished owing to the lengthy delay which occurred at Massawa before the goods could be unloaded, and they had to be thrown overboard, the loss falling on the shoulders of the Jeddawi merchants, who were to receive payment upon the consignment landing safely at Eritrea.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, Addis Ababa, Aden and the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.  
A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6087/77/91]

No. 37.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir A. Ryan (on leave).*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, October 23, 1935.*

HIS Majesty's Government are anxious to take advantage of your forthcoming visit to King Abdul Aziz at Riyadh to resume, and if possible to advance, the negotiations which have been proceeding for a settlement of the eastern and south-eastern boundaries of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, it is probable that King Abdul Aziz himself will raise this question with you at an early stage, as I understand that it is one on which he feels strongly; and it is in fact the most important major question at issue between this country and Saudi Arabia at the present time.

2. You will recollect that after His Majesty's Government had decided not to take their stand, so long as negotiations were proceeding, on a rigid adherence to the legal basis provided by the frontier laid down in this region by the Anglo-Turkish agreements of 1913-14, you were instructed, in November 1934, to open negotiations with the Saudi Government for an agreed settlement of this question by endeavouring in the first place to obtain an exact statement of King Abdul Aziz's territorial claims. The Saudi Government's response to your enquiry was delayed for several months, but they eventually furnished you, on the 3rd April last, with a memorandum putting forward a claim to a vast area in South-Eastern Arabia, which was asserted to correspond to the areas frequented by certain tribes owing allegiance to King Abdul Aziz. You were already aware from the previous consideration which His Majesty's Government had given to the matter that they were unable to entertain such extensive demands, and you

therefore proceeded immediately to the next stage contemplated in your instructions and offered to Saudi Arabia a small strip of territory—the so-called "green line" concession—immediately to the east of the 1913-14 boundary. The subsequent departure of the Deputy Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs from Jedda rendered an immediate continuance of negotiations impossible, but the discussions were resumed with Fuad Bey Hamza himself during his visit to London last summer.

3. Despite the offer which was then made by His Majesty's Government of a further territorial concession (bounded by the so-called "brown line"), it unfortunately proved impossible to reconcile the divergency between the point of view of His Majesty's Government (as then agreed upon between all the various departments of His Majesty's Government concerned) and that of King Abdul Aziz; and, on Fuad Bey's departure towards the end of July, the discussions closed in what appeared to be a complete deadlock.

4. It was explained to the Saudi Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs during the course of these discussions that His Majesty's Government were prepared, with a view to reaching an amicable settlement, to make limited concessions, to the east of the 1913-14 boundary, of territory which, like that comprised in the areas already offered to the King, could be shown to be predominantly utilised by tribes or settlements recognising his sovereignty. His Majesty's Government considered, however, that no satisfactory or durable frontier could be constructed on a purely tribal basis, in view of the shifting allegiance of the nomad tribes and of their wide and overlapping migrations. Tribal considerations were valuable where it could be shown that an area was predominantly or exclusively frequented by a certain tribe with an exclusive political allegiance, but historical, geographical and strategic considerations would also have to be taken into account. The object of His Majesty's Government was not to establish a rigid frontier in the European sense, but to work out a boundary as equitable as could be attained from all points of view, which would remove sources of uncertainty and friction by defining the territorial limits within which Saudi Arabia and the other Arab States concerned would respectively be free to exercise full sovereignty. Fuad Bey Hamza replied that his Government considered that the only basis for a settlement was to establish and allocate the grazing grounds in accordance with the political allegiance of the desert tribes concerned. He maintained that the statement of King Abdul Aziz's demands was drawn up on the basis of the grazing grounds of four tribal groups, in particular of the widespread Ahl Murra tribe, who acknowledged Saudi sovereignty; and, in support of the line claimed by King Abdul Aziz, he communicated the names of 161 wells said to be owned by that tribe. Fuad Bey criticised the concessions offered by His Majesty's Government as being purely arbitrary and not in accordance with the material facts of the situation in the desert. The Saudi Government had, he said, worked out, after the most searching investigation and enquiry, a carefully plotted and rational boundary which took account of the political and tribal situation, and they were prepared to provide detailed evidence in support of their proposal; he insisted therefore that the next move lay with His Majesty's Government, and that, if they did not agree with Saudi claims, it was for them to produce a detailed statement of their criticisms. Hitherto, he asserted, His Majesty's Government had merely replied to the Saudi proposals by the simple counter-offer of an arbitrarily limited narrow area which failed to take account of the material facts.

5. His Majesty's Government are reluctant to acquiesce in a continuance of the deadlock reached in the conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza last summer, without making any further attempt to reach an agreed settlement. As you yourself have advised, so long as this frontier question remains in its present indefinite state it stands in the way of the general and lasting settlement of Anglo-Saudi differences which His Majesty's Government are anxious to bring about. Moreover, the rapid development of oil exploitation on the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf renders it very desirable that a definite limit should be drawn between territories which would be recognised as being under the sovereignty of King Abdul Aziz on the one hand, and as being under that of the rulers of Qatar, of the Trucial Coast States and of Muscat on the other. You will recollect that only in September last His Majesty endeavoured to stop the grant of an oil concession by the Sheikh of Qatar to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, on the ground that part of the concession area was included in his territorial claims.



If the frontier is not settled there is a risk that similar difficulties may arise from the exploitation of the oil deposits in the Trucial Sheikdoms if oil concessions should be granted therein.

6. It is clear, therefore, that every effort should be made, especially at the present critical juncture in world affairs, to reach an agreed settlement of the dispute, to put an end to an uncertain and unsatisfactory situation, and to remove a source of friction which has already had an unfortunate effect upon the general course of Anglo-Saudi relations. With this object in view His Majesty's Government, after obtaining fresh information from the British authorities of the Persian Gulf and of the Aden Protectorate, have reconsidered the whole question, and they are prepared to go to the extreme limit of concession in the endeavour to formulate new proposals to meet the claims of King Abdul Aziz in the greatest possible measure. They have accordingly decided to authorise you to seek a favourable opportunity during the course of your forthcoming visit to Riyadh to resume negotiations in the matter, if possible with King Abdul Aziz himself, but otherwise with his Ministers, and to furnish you with the following instructions for your guidance.

7. You will begin by informing King Abdul Aziz that, as a result of the conversations with Fuad Bey Hamza last summer in London, the whole question of the frontiers in South-Eastern Arabia has been fully reconsidered by His Majesty's Government, after consultation with the local British authorities in Arabia. In particular His Majesty's Government have re-examined the boundary claimed by King Abdul Aziz, as described in the memorandum communicated to you on the 3rd April last, in the light of the detailed evidence supplied by Fuad Bey Hamza, of the arguments advanced by him in the course of discussion, and of the further information collected by the British authorities in the areas concerned. You will then express in general terms the earnest desire of His Majesty's Government to go as far as possible to meet the wishes of King Abdul Aziz in an amicable settlement of the question, laying stress at the same time on the long-standing treaty obligations of His Majesty's Government towards the independent rulers of the Arab States in South-Eastern Arabia. You should emphasise the importance which His Majesty's Government attach to their historic position in the Persian Gulf, and the impossibility of their agreeing to any solution which might in any way prejudice or impair that position or injure the interests of the Arab States with whom they are in special treaty relations.

8. At this stage you may at your discretion decide to inform King Abdul Aziz that you are in possession of new proposals by His Majesty's Government. Before describing these proposals you desire, however, to make it clear why His Majesty's Government, after full and sympathetic enquiry into the material facts of the situation, have not felt able to accept the boundary which the King had himself suggested. You should then proceed to explain in detail the reasons which prevent His Majesty's Government from accepting the boundary proposed in the Saudi memorandum of the 3rd April last, developing for this purpose the relevant arguments used in discussion with Fuad Bey Hamza last summer as set out in the records of the meetings.

9. Beginning at the northern end of the proposed Saudi line you should point out the importance which His Majesty's Government attach to establishing a frontier in accordance with geographical, as well as political and tribal, considerations. The Qatar peninsula forms a clearly defined and separate geographical unit, and it is only reasonable that the frontier between the Sheikdom and its neighbours should follow the natural division between the peninsula and the mainland. His Majesty's Government have already expressed readiness to depart from their strict legal position by recognising King Abdul Aziz's sovereignty as extending over the western shore of the gulf known as the Dohat-as-Salwa and over the Ikhwan settlements at the head of the Gulf; but they could never consent to attribute to Saudi Arabia features, such, for example, as the Jebel Naksh, which form an integral part of the physical structure of the Qatar Peninsula itself and have always, in fact, been an equally integral part of the Sheikdom. An additional factor in regard to the frontier of Qatar is the grant by the Sheikh to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, with the full approval of His Majesty's Government, of an oil concession over the Sheikdom of Qatar. This concession, which was granted on the 11th May last, while not extending beyond the limits of the State of Qatar as claimed by

the Sheikh of Qatar and recognised as his territory by His Majesty's Government, does actually extend to the south of the line claimed by King Abdul Aziz (*cf.* paragraph 5 above); but the position in this respect will be already known to His Majesty through the communication which I instructed Mr. Calvert to make by my telegram No. 112 of the 20th September. Should you decide to advert to this development, you should take the opportunity to recall the fact that His Majesty's Government have formally assured the Sheikh of Qatar of their protection against any interference with his territorial rights.

10. Turning to the problem of the Khor-al-Odeid (to which Fuad Bey Hamza attached special importance), you will explain to King Abdul Aziz that, as Fuad Bey was informed in London, His Majesty's Government have long recognised officially the validity of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi's claim to the whole of this inlet, and have regarded his territory as extending round both the Khor-al-Dhuwain and the Khor-al-Odeid up to a line, running westwards from the northern side of the mouth of the Khor-al-Odeid, which forms the boundary between the territory of Abu Dhabi and that of Qatar. His Majesty's Government naturally cannot violate or disregard their obligations to these Arab rulers with whom, as the King has recognised by article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda, they have long-standing and special treaty relations. Should you consider it wise or desirable to do so, you are authorised to develop frankly to the King a further argument which was used with Fuad Bey Hamza in London; namely, that His Majesty's Government have had for many years a particularly strong interest in the chain of Arab States on the coast between Qatar and Muscat; that the maintenance of this position is an important principle of British policy in the Persian Gulf; and that it would be at complete variance with this policy for them to agree that a powerful State such as Saudi Arabia should acquire a new outlet to the sea on this section of the coast, to which neither political nor geographical considerations entitle it.

11. Pursuing your reply to the claims put forward in the Saudi memorandum of the 3rd April, you should explain that a thorough reinvestigation of the situation has now been made by the British authorities in the Persian Gulf in order to ascertain the precise limits of the territory of the Sheikdom of Abu Dhabi in the hinterland of the coastal strip. As a result it has been established that the district known as Al Aqal, the Sabkhat Matti salt marshes, and the districts shown on the maps as Bainunah, Dhafrah and Qufat-al-Liwa, all of which lie outside the area predominantly covered by the Ahl Murra tribe, are within the historic possessions of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. His Majesty's Government are accordingly unable to agree to the eastward prolongation of the proposed boundary being carried as near to the sea coast as suggested in the Saudi memorandum of the 3rd April, since this would, in their opinion, be incompatible with their obligation to protect the rights of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. Similarly, they can find no justification for the extension of the claims of King Abdul Aziz as far east as meridian 56°, since this would result in the inclusion in Saudi territory of the steppe country beyond the Great Sands, and of the grazing grounds of tribes owing allegiance either to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi or to the Sultan of Muscat.

12. You will then inform King Abdul Aziz that the tribal position on the southern fringe of the Ruba-al-Khali desert and in the northern part of the Hadhramaut has also been the subject of detailed reinvestigation since the statement of his boundary claim was received last April. As a result His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the tribes depending on the Aden Protectorate—and in particular the Al Saiar, Al Manahil, Ahl Kathir and Ahl Mahra—normally range not only to the edge of the Great Sands between parallels 17° and 19° North, but for some little distance into the sands themselves. You should explain that His Majesty's Government were informed by Fuad Bey Hamza, during the course of the conversations in London last summer, that King Abdul Aziz did not claim the allegiance of these tribes, and their enquiries have now definitely shown that the southern and south-eastern limits of the district predominantly frequented by the Ahl Murra (which they understand to form the basis of the Saudi claims in this area) do not extend to the edge of the sands, but lie a considerable distance to the north and north-west of the line claimed in the Saudi memorandum of the 3rd April.

13. You should then proceed formally to put forward the new offer which His Majesty's Government, in the light of the foregoing considerations, have now



resolved to make, emphasising once more that it is made with every desire to meet the wishes of King Abdul Aziz to the furthest possible extent, but adding in no ambiguous terms that it represents a final concession which His Majesty's Government will not be able to increase. I trust that you will thus dispel as far as possible any impression in the King's mind that, in now putting forward proposals much more favourable to him than the two territorial concessions already offered, His Majesty's Government would be likely to yield still further in response to continued bargaining on his part. As you are aware, this is a point to which the India Office attach much importance. You should explain that the new boundary which you are about to offer has been carefully worked out, and that, while the geographical, historical and political considerations mentioned in the preceding paragraphs have naturally been taken into full consideration, the new proposals also take account of the full and detailed information which His Majesty's Government have now received from their local authorities in Arabia regarding the wanderings and habitats of the Ahl Murra tribe. In the light of this information His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree in principle to recognise King Abdul Aziz's claim to the allegiance of the Ahl Murra tribe, and they have endeavoured to align their proposed boundary so as to include as far as possible within Saudi Arabia the grazing grounds ("dara") exclusively or predominantly utilised by the various nomadic sections of this tribe.

14. As you are aware, the Political Agent at Koweit has recently reported that the Murra "dara" appears to be bounded on the north, east and south by a line running from a point south of Hofuf parallel to but inland from the neck of the Qatar Peninsula; continuing in a south-easterly direction along the southern edge of the Sabkhat Matti marsh; turning south-south-east at the south-eastern corner of the Sabkhat Matti; running thence straight across the Eastern Rub' al-Khali as far as the Sabkhat Mijora (approximately at the intersection of meridian 54° E. and parallel 20° N.); and thence sweeping westwards, within the southern limit of the Great Sands, so as just to include the important group of wells at Shanna: I enclose herein a copy of a valuable sketch map prepared by Colonel Dickson to illustrate the result of his recent enquiries.<sup>(1)</sup>

15. You are authorised to make such use as you think best of this information; but you should be careful not to give the impression that His Majesty's Government have in any way abandoned their objections, as explained to Fuad Bey Hamza in London, to basing the frontier solely on tribal considerations. To do so might only encourage the belief that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to modify their offer in the light of further statements regarding tribal settlements or "diras," and might lead the Saudi Government to embark on a lengthy, and inevitably fruitless, argument as to the precise areas covered by tribal migrations. At the same time, you should make the best possible use of the fact that, in their new proposals, His Majesty's Government are offering to recognise the sovereignty of King Abdul Aziz over practically the whole "dara" of the Ahl Murra tribe, even as defined by the information communicated by Fuad Bey Hamza at the time of the conversations in London.

16. After these preliminary observations you should, subject to confirmation by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf of the exact location of key-points A and B mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) below, and to further telegraphic instructions in regard to the eastern sector of the frontier dealt with in sub-paragraph (c) below, make a formal offer of the following line as the boundary between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the one hand and the Sheikdoms of Qatar and Abu Dhabi (in special relations with His Majesty's Government), the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, and the Aden Protectorate, on the other:—

- (a) A line starting from a point on the eastern shore of the gulf known as the Dohat-as-Salwa about 4 miles to the north-east of the settlement of Qasr-as-Salwa, running thence in a straight line to a point, which may for convenience of reference be called "Key-point A," which will probably lie at the western extremity of the salt lake known as Sabkhat-al-Amra.
- (b) From this point the line will run roughly due south to a point to be known as "Key-point B." This point, when fixed, will be situated approximately on the northern boundary of the Murra "dara" as drawn in

<sup>(1)</sup> Not reproduced.

the light of the latest information in the possession of His Majesty's Government (i.e., on Colonel Dickson's map (see paragraph 14 above)). It is proposed to fix this key-point B at some well on the southern edge of the district known as Al Aqal (i.e., a short distance east of the intersection of meridian 51° E. with parallel 24° N.) to which a positive claim can be advanced on behalf of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. The Political Resident is still making enquiries as to the precise points at which these two key-points A and B could reasonably and properly be fixed, and further instructions will be sent to you as soon as his reports have been received and a decision has been reached by His Majesty's Government thereon.

- (c) From key-point B it is proposed that the boundary should proceed, generally speaking, in a straight line, but so as to leave the whole of the Sabkhat Matti to Abu Dhabi to the intersection of parallel 22° N. with meridian 54° or 55° E. and thence down whichever of those meridians is decided on to its intersection with parallel 20° N. The Political Resident is being consulted on the question of substituting meridian 55° E. for meridian 54° E., as originally proposed, for this sector of the line, and further instructions will be sent to you on this point as soon as possible.
- (d) Thence the boundary will run in an approximately straight line, but so as to leave the Sabkhat Mijora in Saudi Arabia and the Ramlat Mugshin in Muscat and Oman, to the intersection of meridian 52° E. and parallel 19° N. (namely the south-eastern corner of the area—the so-called "brown line" concession—offered to Fuad Bey Hamza in London last July), and thence in a straight line to the intersection of parallel 18° N. with the "violet line" of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914.

17. Your detailed comments on the proposed line, which you may make at whatever stage seems to you most appropriate, should be based on the following considerations: You should make what capital you can out of the small further concession which the new line offers at its northern end, in that it lies considerably east of the so-called "green line" which you were instructed to offer to the Saudi Government last April. You should emphasise that, as a result of their further thorough study of the matter, His Majesty's Government are now prepared fully to admit the Saudi claim to the wells at Banaiyan, to which Fuad Bey attached such particular importance last summer. You should also lay stress on the fact that the sector of the line defined in sub-paragraph (b) of the preceding paragraph represents a genuine attempt to meet the Saudi claim while respecting the territory of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. You will then do your best to make it clear, while not letting it be thought that the line is drawn on a purely tribal basis, that the line now proposed leaves within Saudi Arabia the whole of the Murra "dara" according to the latest information in the possession of His Majesty's Government (see paragraph 14 above). Moreover, in carrying the boundary as far east as they are now doing, His Majesty's Government will be recognising the authority of King Abdul Aziz as extending beyond the "dara" of the Murra tribe into the southern part of that of the Manasir, who are a tribe predominantly based on territory under the sovereignty of Abu Dhabi. You may then point out that the southern section of the proposed line, described in sub-paragraph (d) of the preceding paragraph, leaves not only the whole of the Murra "dara" in this region within Saudi territory, but also the important wells at Shanna, although these are used by tribes from the Aden Protectorate almost as much as by the Ahl Murra. In conclusion, it will be well for you to explain that, although the proposed boundary, like that proposed by King Abdul Aziz himself, is in its eastern and southern sections necessarily artificial, and based mainly on geographical co-ordinates, His Majesty's Government are satisfied that it represents a fair and reasonable division between the various suzerainties concerned.

18. Lastly, you should make every endeavour to ensure that in any settlement eventually reached all tribes are left free to use their normal wells and grazing grounds on whichever side of the line they may be situated.

19. Basing yourself on the broad lines of the instructions contained in the preceding paragraphs, I request that you will make every effort to secure the



acceptance *in principle* by King Abdul Aziz of the new boundary proposed by His Majesty's Government. In the event of agreement being reached, they are still inclined to favour the procedure suggested in paragraph 8 of Sir J. Simon's telegram No. 70 of the 1st May, namely, the incorporation of the new line in a single comprehensive instrument in which the frontier would be defined as being between Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Muscat and the Aden Protectorate on the other. This point is, however, premature at the present time, as is also the question of the possible final demarcation of the frontier in the vicinity of the Qatar peninsula.

I am, &c.

SAMUEL HOARE.

[E 6120/325/25]

No. 38.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir Andrew Ryan (on leave).*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, October 24, 1935.*

ON your departure from England to return to your post, I think it desirable that you shall proceed to Jedda by way of Riyadh in the hope that you may, by personal discussion with His Majesty King Abdul Aziz, be able to pave the way for the settlement of various questions outstanding between His Majesty's Government and Saudi Arabia. Separate instructions are being issued to you as to the attitude which you will adopt and the policy which you will follow in regard to the various questions which are likely to arise. In this despatch I propose to deal with the question of slavery in Saudi Arabia, with particular reference to the proposal that His Majesty's Government should abandon, in return for adequate anti-slavery regulation by King Abdul Aziz, the right of manumission which they at present exercise at His Majesty's Legation at Jedda, in accordance with the practice confirmed by letters Nos. 3 and 4 exchanged at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Jedda of 1927.

2. Sir John Simon in his despatch No. 452 of the 13th December, 1934 (a copy of which is annexed<sup>(1)</sup>), authorised you to discuss this subject with the Saudi Government, provided they were prepared to offer in return effective legislation which would be at least as satisfactory as the present system in securing the actual reduction of slavery and alleviation of its evils.

3. Since then you have held numerous discussions with the Saudi Government in Jedda, and with the Deputy Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs in London during his visit here last summer. As the result of these discussions, Fuad Bey Hamza communicated to you a draft of the proposed Saudi "regulation" on slavery, which he was prepared to recommend King Abdul Aziz to promulgate as a necessary preliminary to the abandonment by His Majesty's Government of their existing right of manumission. A translation of this draft regulation forms an enclosure in this despatch.

4. This draft regulation has now been examined in consultation with you and with Sir George Maxwell, the United Kingdom representative on the League of Nations Expert Slavery Committee, and, generally speaking, it appears to me sufficiently satisfactory to justify the negotiation of a settlement on the lines proposed in my predecessor's despatch.

5. The Saudi Government having represented that it would not be possible for King Abdul Aziz to promulgate legislation on the lines of the enclosed draft in any way which might suggest that it was the result of foreign pressure, an essential feature of the procedure now contemplated is that the promulgation of this legislation shall appear to be spontaneous. On the other hand, the Saudi Government are, not unnaturally, loath to take the first step by promulgating this legislation unless they have some guarantee that its promulgation will be followed by the abandonment by His Majesty's Government of their existing right of manumission. It has therefore been suggested that you should address to the Saudi Government a confidential but official communication formally undertaking that, if and when the proposed regulation has been promulgated, His Majesty's Government will in due course abandon their right. Provided that there is a definite understanding as to the nature of the legislation in question,

<sup>(1)</sup> December 13, 1934, Section 1.

and that your note to the Saudi Government is so worded as to make it clear that it will not be applicable if the legislation does not take the form previously agreed upon, I have no objection to this procedure; and, if you can reach an agreement with King Abdul Aziz as to the terms of the legislation, you are authorised at your discretion either to address to His Majesty during your stay at Riyadh, or to the Saudi Government after your return to Jedda, a formal and confidential note in the above sense.

6. The draft regulation itself appears to me to be of a sufficiently satisfactory character to justify the abandonment by His Majesty's Government of their right of manumission. It contains, however, certain points which could be much improved; and I desire that you will discuss them with the proper authorities before you formally agree to the present draft.

7. I understand that you are satisfied that the prohibition against the import of slaves into Saudi Arabia by sea, contained in sub-head 1 of article 1, is clearly intended to be of universal application, notwithstanding the reference in the preamble of the article to so-called "treaty States." In this case, no further amendment to this sub-head is essential; though this point would be placed beyond any possible doubt if the words "from any country" were added at the end of the sub-head.

8. A point of greater importance is in sub-head 2 of article 1, where I agree with you that an amendment should be inserted to make it clear that the exception would not cover persons recently enslaved in the Yemen, and that the "document" provided for should mean an official document of such a nature as would establish the fact that the person to whom it refers was already a slave before the inauguration of the present régime in the Hejaz. Such an amendment would not alter the purport of the sub-head, and should therefore not be difficult to obtain. You will therefore make every effort to persuade the Saudi authorities to introduce it.

9. Article 4 of the draft regulation has formed the subject of much discussion between you and Fuad Bey, and I share your objection to agreeing to the time limit established in it, which would deprive of any remedy persons "unlawfully" enslaved before the inauguration of the Saudi régime in the Hejaz, *i.e.*, before 1925, whereas such persons have at present some chance of regaining their liberty by taking refuge at His Majesty's Legation at Jedda. You should endeavour, therefore, to secure an amendment of it in a form which would extend the period to an earlier date or, better still, impose no time limit at all. Failing this, I should be satisfied with a formula which would provide for redress in really hard cases dating from before the Saudi régime; *e.g.*, cases in which the applicant or his relatives could show a clear recollection of the circumstances of the enslavement. On the other hand, ten years have now elapsed since the institution of the Saudi régime in the Hejaz, and the number of persons enslaved before that time who are still likely to seek manumission at His Majesty's Legation at Jedda is steadily decreasing. While therefore the proposed article might involve hardship in a limited number of cases of persons enslaved before the institution of the Saudi régime in the Hejaz who may still be hoping to regain their liberty by seeking manumission from His Majesty's Legation, the fact that these persons have taken no such action for so long a period renders the matter one rather of theoretical than of practical importance, and the objections to the proposed article are in practice likely to become less and less cogent. It thus seems questionable whether His Majesty's Government would be justified in risking on this point alone the loss of the other important advantages of potential future value presented by the draft regulation. You may therefore in the last resort, if unable to overcome the strong objections of the Saudi Government to any amendment of this article, accept the article in its present form.

10. A further point on which I request that you will make every effort to secure an amendment of the draft regulation is the final proviso of article 5, which appears to give a slave-owner the power to reserve to himself at the time of a marriage between his slaves the right eventually to separate the husband and wife. I recognise that this proviso is based on ancient and still existing practice in Arabia where, moreover, marriage relations are generally of a looser character than in non-Moslem countries. None the less, it is particularly repugnant to western ideas and may well cause considerable criticism when the regulations become known in this country and have to be invoked publicly in



justification of the action of His Majesty's Government in abandoning their right of manumission. While, therefore, it is most desirable on the one hand that article 5 of the draft regulation be amended in this respect, I am, on the other hand, well aware that there are limits beyond which King Abdul Aziz cannot go in opposing practices which have the approval of the overwhelming majority of his subjects in general, and of the Ulema in particular. You may thus find that His Majesty will oppose any such suggestions by pleading the force of opinion in Saudi Arabia, and to this argument His Majesty's Government can, in the last resort, only reply by emphasising the force of public opinion in this country. While therefore you will press very strongly for the omission or modification of this passage, I see no alternative but to authorise you to accept it as it stands if, in your judgment, the success of an otherwise promising negotiation would be jeopardised by further opposition on this point.

11. Sir John Simon, in paragraph 4 of his despatch No. 452 of the 13th December, 1934, referred to a suggestion by Sir George Maxwell that action might be taken to bring Saudi Arabia into the orbit of the efforts being made by the League of Nations to end slavery, at least to the extent of securing her accession to article 2 (a) of the International Slavery Convention, 1926. After taking into full consideration the general indifference of the Saudi Government, as reported by you from time to time since the issue of Sir John Simon's instructions on this point, to the League of Nations and its activities, I am of opinion that it will be preferable, at any rate for the present, that His Majesty's Government, who at least have something with which to bargain in the proposed abandonment of their right of manumission, shall continue to deal with the matter as an Anglo-Saudi question, and that the idea of securing the accession of Saudi Arabia to article 2 (a) of the International Slavery Convention of 1926 shall not be pursued at the present time, though it may be possible to revert to it, independently of the present negotiations, at some future date. In any case it may be hoped that other influences, such as the force of public opinion in Europe generally and among enlightened Moslems in other countries, may gradually induce the Saudi Government to make effective any regulations which they adopt on this subject.

12. The question whether, if you are able to reach an agreement with King Abdul Aziz in regard to the draft Saudi regulation, the eventual abandonment by His Majesty's Government of their right of manumission shall be made independently, or as part of an arrangement for the prolongation of the Treaty of Jedda, is distinct from that of the main issue dealt with in this despatch. Generally speaking, however, and subject to such views as you may derive from your conversations with King Abdul Aziz, the best method will be to adopt the suggestion originally made by you, that, when certain matters, of which this question of slavery is the most important, have been satisfactorily settled, the Treaty of Jedda shall be formally prolonged by an exchange of notes. Both parties would undertake therein not to exercise for a period of, say, seven years, their right under article 8 of the treaty to denounce it on six months' notice, while His Majesty's Government would, in the same exchange of notes, record their renunciation of the right of manumission which they have maintained under the letters exchanged between the late Sir Gilbert Clayton and King Abdul Aziz at the time of the original conclusion of the treaty.

13. On the other hand, should your negotiations with King Abdul Aziz on such subjects as that of the south-eastern frontiers make sufficient progress to justify you in recommending the conclusion of an entirely new treaty to replace the Treaty of Jedda of 1927, it would still be possible to fall back on the first of the two courses of action suggested in paragraph 12.

14. Alternatively, so little progress may be made with the settlement of the other questions in dispute that it may be impossible or undesirable either to renew the Treaty of Jedda in the manner proposed, or to conclude a fresh treaty. In that event I shall be prepared, on your recommendation, to consider the conclusion of the proposed arrangement for the abandonment by His Majesty's Government of their right of manumission in return for the promulgation of the proposed legislation; and, in that case, the arrangement would have to be incorporated in a separate exchange of notes dealing with that subject only.

15. It may be that during your visit to Riyadh no suitable opportunity will present itself for you to discuss this question with the King in person. In that case, the question will arise whether you will take any initiative in raising it on

your return to Jedda, if the Saudi Government do not themselves raise it. On the whole, I incline to the view that the balance of argument is in favour of proceeding with the matter, even if the Saudi Government do not themselves revive the question. I am, however, prepared to leave it to your discretion, in the light of the circumstances existing at the time, whether to take any such initiative or not. If you are in any doubt on the point, you may seek my further instructions by telegram or despatch according to the circumstances. If the Saudi Government take the initiative in discussing the matter, or if you decide, in the exercise of your discretion, that it is desirable for you to raise it yourself, you will naturally still be guided by the present instructions, copies of which are being sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda for his information.

I am, &c.

SAMUEL HOARE.

[E 5238/325/25]

Enclosure in No. 38.

(Confidential.)

#### DRAFT SAUDI REGULATION ON SLAVERY.

(Communicated by Fuad Bey Hamza to Sir Andrew Ryan on July 19, 1935.)

(Translation amended in accordance with Sir A. Ryan's Minute on E 5780/325/25.)

(Part 1.)

Article 1. Whereas the provisions of the law entail that the subjects of treaty States<sup>(\*)</sup> shall not be enslaved or sold, it is absolutely prohibited—

- (1) To import slaves into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by sea.
- (2) To import slaves into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by land routes unless the importer produces a document confirming that the person imported is a slave and recognised as such in the country from which he is imported.
- (3) To enslave free persons in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- (4) To buy or obtain possession of any slave who has been imported or enslaved in any manner contravening the foregoing paragraphs after the promulgation of this regulation.

In the event of any contravention of the articles set forth in the preceding paragraphs, any person committing such contravention shall be liable to the following penalty:—

- (1) The slave concerned shall be considered free and set at liberty.
- (2) The customs regulations against smugglers shall be enforced.
- (3) Rigorous imprisonment shall be imposed for a period not exceeding one year.

(Part 2.)

Art. 2. The slave shall have the following rights of his owner or possessor:—

- (1) The right to be fed, clothed and housed.
- (2) The right to be well treated, and to be employed with kindness and consideration and without harshness.
- (3) The right to medical attention, with payment of the cost of treatment.
- (4) In general, all the rights enjoyed by the members of a man's household or dependents as established in the provisions of the law.

Art. 3. In the event of a slave complaining of bad treatment on the part of his owner or possessor, the competent authority shall summon both complainant and the person against whom the complaint is lodged, and if it is satisfied that the complaint is just it shall caution the owner or possessor in the first instance,

(\*) The words "treaty States" are the nearest rendering in modern language of the conventional expression used in the Arabic; the use of that expression in Islamic parlance would, it is understood, include any State with which Saudi Arabia was in relations, even though the relations were not on a treaty basis, e.g., it would include Abyssinia.



and shall grant him respite for a period not exceeding two months in order to examine again the condition of the complainant, and if it is satisfied in the second instance that the grounds for complaint still exist it shall compel the owner or possessor to divest himself of the ownership or possession of the complainant either by sale or otherwise. If the owner or possessor fails to bring the complainant before the competent authority within the period fixed by it, he shall be subject in the first instance to a fine not exceeding £1, and if the contravention is repeated a fine double that amount shall be imposed and he may be sentenced to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one week.

Art. 4. Any slave who can prove that he was born free and that he was enslaved in a manner contravening the law during the period which has elapsed since the foundation of His Majesty's Government in the year 1344 shall have the right to petition for his release from slavery, and it is the duty of the competent authority to consent to examine the case and to give an equitable decision concerning it.

Art. 5. The owner or possessor shall not separate any two slaves who have been duly bound by marriage, and he shall not separate husband and wife by sale or in any other way, unless he has reserved to himself the right to do this at the time when the marriage contract was effected.

Art. 6. The owner or possessor shall not separate children from their mother so long as they are minors.

Art. 7. The slave shall have the right to apply to his owner or possessor for "Mukataba" (i.e., an agreement enabling the slave to purchase his freedom), and it shall be the duty of the owner or possessor to accede to this demand, and in the event of any dispute arising between owner or possessor and slave as to the amount of the sum to be paid that sum shall be assessed by the competent authorities, and they shall appoint dates for its discharge. The exercise of the "Mukataba" shall not be held to set aside the application of the provisions of article 3 above.

Art. 8. Any slave who was born outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall have the right to choose the place where he shall reside when he has been freed in accordance with the provisions of this regulation or in accordance with any other form recognised by the law.

Art. 9. All slaves must be enrolled in a special register to be kept by the competent authorities, and every slave shall be given a certificate of identity containing his description and in the case of males his photograph and certificates of identity shall be in triplicate, one to be kept by the competent authorities, and one by the owner or master, and one by the slave. There shall be listed on the certificate of identity all the transactions relating to the slave, and the owners or masters of the slave shall be required to complete the transactions of the registration within one year from the date of the promulgation of this regulation.

Art. 10. Any slave who has not been registered by his owner in the manner set forth in the preceding article shall have the right to present himself before the competent authority and to demand to be given a certificate of his freedom.

Art. 11. When slaves are passed from the possession of one person to another they must be presented before one of the doctors of the Department of Public Health in order to obtain a certificate of being in a healthy condition.

(Part 3.)

Art. 12. It is not permitted to be engaged in traffic in slaves as an agent or a broker except in accordance with an official licence granted by the competent authority.

Art. 13. A special official shall be appointed to deal with matters relating to slaves and to be called Inspector of Slave Affairs, and he shall have, in case of necessity, a travelling assistant.

Art. 14. The local competent authorities shall be required to present a six-monthly report on the administration of this regulation, containing a summary of the transactions which have been concluded, and the six-monthly reports shall be forwarded, together with the observations of the Supervisor of Slave Affairs, to the Minister of the Interior within two months from the end of the six-monthly period reported on.

Art. 15. The competent authorities referred to in this regulation are the Ministry of the Interior in the capital and the Imarates in the dependencies, and

when cases are under consideration in accordance with the provisions of this regulation the competent authority shall form a committee to examine and give judgment concerning the matter, this committee to be composed of a representative of the authority, a representative of the Police Department, and a representative of the Administrative Council.

Art. 16. This regulation shall have effect from the date of its promulgation.

[E 6396/173/25]

No. 39.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 28.)*

(No. 276.)

Sir,

Jedda, October 8, 1935.

WITH reference to the Eastern Department's communication of the 25th August last, transmitting a copy, in print, of the text of the Oil Agreement between the Standard Oil Company of California and Ibn Saud, enclosed with the Political Resident's express letter of the 5th June last to the Secretary of State for India, I have the honour to report that, as has been recorded in recent Jedda reports, during the past few weeks there have been several references in the Mecca press to the actual discovery of oil in Hasa by the Californian Arabian Standard Oil Company (Limited).

2. One of the first of these reports appeared in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 30th August, where it was stated that oil in large quantities had been struck at the well at Al Habr. As the staff of the company here declared at the time that this was the first news they had heard of the matter, I contented myself with reporting the press statement briefly in the Jedda report for August last.

3. Later reports in the newspapers were more circumstantial, one statement giving the depth to which drilling had reached as 1,959 feet, and adding that it was intended to go to a depth of 2,100 feet. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* of the 1st October contained the brief announcement that quantities of oil extracted were now increasing, and the daily output was estimated at 115 barrels. The head office of the company, it stated, had agreed to commence another well.

4. I gather that, although the Americans in the Jedda office of the company recently admitted that oil had been struck in Hasa, they stated that it had not yet been met with in anything like commercial quantities. The depth to which the company had drilled was, however, far less than the depths reached in Bahrein, and therefore it was presumed that a richer layer of oil-bearing rock lay below.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, Bushire and Bahrein.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6397/602/25]

No. 40.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 28.)*

(No. 277.)

Sir,

Jedda, October 8, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 227 of the 6th August last, relative to the activities of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited), I have the honour to report that Mr. K. S. Twitchell returned to Jedda on the 6th October, after his visit to England, during which he paid a flying visit to New York. He was accompanied by two Englishmen, Messrs. T. P. Larken and D. L. Gibbs, and six Swedes, the latter having engaged as expert diamond drillers. He informed me, shortly after his arrival, that he expects two Americans to join him within the next few days, and hoped that his machinery would not be long in arriving.

2. Mr. Twitchell and his party have taken up their quarters in a house in the "Legation quarter" of the town, which he leased just before leaving here last July. He intends to make the premises his head office in this country.

3. He stated that he would be leaving for the "Cot of Gold" in about two or three weeks, and expressed his satisfaction at the preliminary work already accomplished. One of their chief difficulties, he added, would be the question of water supply, and he anticipated that he might have to go some distance to obtain adequate supplies.

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4. During Mr. Twitchell's absence, M. Van de Poll, who has been in general charge, and Mr. Shanks, the Australian, with other members of the personnel, have been active. Mr. Shanks, in particular, has been in charge of road-making operations, along the alignment Jedda-Asfân-Al Birka-Mahd-Adh Dhahab, to which a reference was made in my despatch under reference at paragraph 8, and in regard to which it is believed considerable progress has been made.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade and to Transjordan.

I have, &c.  
A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6401/1638/25]

No. 41.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 28.)*

(No. 281.)

Sir,

*Jedda, October 9, 1935.*

THE interest evinced in the Hejaz by the Banque Misr, particularly in regard to the promotion and development of Egyptian interests in the annual pilgrimage, have been the subject of report by the Legation from time to time. The relations established with the Saudi authorities by Talaat Harb Pasha on his visits to this country in the latter end of both 1933 and 1934 have been maintained, and Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman in spending some time recently in Egypt, on his way to Syria and possibly Turkey, recorded in Jedda reports for August and September, paragraphs 253 and 286 respectively, is with good reason believed to have been animated by a desire to cultivate those relations still further.

2. That the Minister of Finance has been to some extent successful would appear from the arrival at Jedda on the 1st October by one of the small vessels of the Société Misr de Navigation maritime, now plying in the Red Sea, of a consignment of fifty-four barrels of Shell asphalt for the purpose of laying down an experimental stretch of road on the main Jedda-Mecca highway. A Greek engineer and an Egyptian, said to represent Talaat Pasha Harb, arrived by the same ship, and several days earlier, by a Khedivial Mail vessel, a mixing machine for use in road construction was also landed here on behalf of the Banque Misr.

3. The two representatives of the Egyptian concern have, since their arrival, lost no time in getting to work, and operations have already commenced outside the Medina Gate of Jedda. It is credibly stated that a kilometre of asphalted road will be laid down at the expense of Banque Misr, except for the labour which is being supplied by the Saudi authorities. I am confidentially informed by the manager of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited) that it is estimated that the cost of laying down the whole Mecca-Jedda road under asphalt would be in the neighbourhood of £45,000, or £1,000 a mile. Mr. Courtenay, who as the representative of the Shell Company here is much interested in this project, also informed me that Signor Odallo, the *soi-disant* Italian merchant, made an effort to induce the Greek engineer to use Italian asphalt instead of the Shell product, but without success.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade, the Government of India and Egypt.

I have, &c.  
A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6419/206/25]

No. 42.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir A. Ryan (on leave).*

(No. 317.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, October 31, 1935.*

YOU will shortly be the guest of King Abdul Aziz at Riyadh. While there, you will be engaged in further negotiations on the subject of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia, and on the subject of slavery, on both of which matters you have already received full instructions.

2. Though it is to be expected that these topics will occupy a great part of the time available for political discussion at Riyadh, nevertheless I request that you will not fail at the same time to use every endeavour to secure an

adequate settlement from King Abdul Aziz on the subject of his blockade of Koweit. As you are aware, this blockade has now been maintained for more than ten years, and as long ago as 1929 His Majesty's Government promised the Sheikh of Koweit, in return for his co-operation which was loyally given in the interests of Ibn Saud during the Ikhwan rebellion, that they would do their best to secure an honourable settlement of the question. During his visit to London this year the sheikh received assurances, to which he attaches the highest value, of the interest of His Majesty's Government in his affairs. I enclose a copy of a telegram from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf (No. 892 of the 25th October, 1935), which emphasises how unfortunate would be the reactions in Koweit and in the Persian Gulf generally of any failure to secure a settlement of the blockade question in the course of the Anglo-Saudi negotiations now in progress. On account of the political and strategic importance of Koweit (both actual and potential) His Majesty's Government are anxious to strengthen their friendly relations with its ruler. For this and for other reasons they are bound in pursuance of their promises to him to make every effort to secure a satisfactory settlement and to defend his legitimate interests *vis-à-vis* his powerful neighbour.

3. You will recollect that the conference between Saudi and Koweiti delegates, held at Koweit in the early part of the summer, dispersed without achieving a settlement. From the series of letters exchanged by the delegations, of which I enclose copies for your convenience, you are aware that King Abdul Aziz was ready to agree to the proposed method of controlling Saudi-Koweiti trade, namely, that trade should be directed to one or more customs posts on the Saudi side of the frontier and that all exports should be provided with manifests issued by the Sheikh of Koweit. You will recall, however, that His Majesty attached to his acceptance the condition that this arrangement should be automatically terminated if, after its institution, a single Koweiti was detected smuggling. This demand the sheikh could not, of course, accept; but he offered, as an alternative, a guarantee on his honour that he would do all in his power to stop smuggling and would severely punish offenders. King Abdul Aziz then declared this offer to be inadequate and instructed his delegates to break off the negotiations.

4. The matter was then taken up in London during the conversations last summer with Fuad Bey Hamza, the Saudi Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, at which you yourself were present. It was explained to him that the Saudi Government's demand was most unreasonable, since no State, not even the most highly organised, was in a position to give a guarantee that not a single case would occur of its regulations being evaded, and he was informed that if King Abdul Aziz would accept the sheikh's alternative offer of an honourable undertaking His Majesty's Government for their part would do all in their power to ensure its observance. Fuad Bey, before leaving London, promised to look into the matter.

5. After some time had elapsed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda, acting on my instructions, invited the Saudi Government to give him their views on the matter in the light of the consideration which it had doubtless received in consequence of the conversation with Fuad Bey Hamza in London. Mr. Calvert drew the Saudi Government's attention once more to the importance which His Majesty's Government and the Government of India attach to a solution of this problem and reiterated the willingness of His Majesty's Government to do all in their power to ensure that the honourable undertaking offered by the sheikh should, if accepted, be observed.

6. Of this communication, which was dated the 12th August, no mention was made when the Saudi Government informed Mr. Calvert in a note dated the 1st September that in view of the increase in smuggling which the Saudi Government alleged had taken place since the breakdown of the Koweit conference (but which was denied from Koweiti sources) they intended to enforce an even closer blockade and virtually to prohibit all movement across the Saudi-Koweiti frontier. The Saudi Government were, therefore, reminded on the 16th September that a reply to Mr. Calvert's previous representations was still outstanding and they were warned that if they insisted on demanding impossible conditions from Koweit they would assume the sole responsibility for the present unsatisfactory situation. Copies of these two notes are enclosed.

7. On the 15th October the Saudi Government addressed to Mr. Calvert a note in reply to the above-mentioned communications. From the summary



telegraphed by Mr. Calvert, the Saudi Government appear to have asserted that they had not sought to interfere in the affairs of Koweit and that responsibility for the present situation and for the loss which had been caused to Saudi Arabia thereby thus rested with Koweit and (as it would appear from oral explanations furnished by the Acting Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs) with His Majesty's Government. They maintained, moreover, that the demands made by the Saudi delegation at the Koweit Conference might justifiably have been severer but that they were none the less reasonable in that they would have entailed loss to Saudi commerce and represented the utmost sacrifice which could be made. The Saudi Government expressed regret that such sacrifices should have been characterised as unreasonable, and their note concluded by asserting that agreement on the matter would only be possible if Koweit were to give the required guarantee absolutely to prevent all smuggling.

8. Such arguments are unacceptable to His Majesty's Government, who can only regard this note as evidence of an unsatisfactory and indeed obstructive attitude on the part of the Saudi Government. In particular, insistence on a literal acceptance of the condition which King Abdul Aziz seeks to attach to an agreement is manifestly unreasonable. I shall accordingly be glad if you will draw the serious attention of King Abdul Aziz to the matter at Riyadh.

9. You should begin, as on previous occasions, by reminding the King of the unremitting efforts which His Majesty's Government made to improve and consolidate relations, first between Saudi Arabia and Iraq and then between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan. These efforts proved successful, and have led to settlements which have been to the great advantage of all the parties concerned. His Majesty's Government are now most earnestly desirous of bringing about a similar improvement in the case of relations between Saudi Arabia and Koweit. Aware of the many bonds which have linked those two Arab States in the past, His Majesty's Government are sincerely anxious to see relations between Saudi Arabia and Koweit placed once more on a normal and friendly footing. His Majesty's Government cannot but feel that, with this object achieved, their friendship for both parties will have been most strikingly demonstrated.

10. You should then briefly remind King Abdul Aziz of the recent conference and of the subsequent action of His Majesty's Government, and repeat with as much emphasis as you deem prudent the views of His Majesty's Government on the guarantee demanded of the sheikh by the Saudi delegation, and now still insisted on in the Saudi Government's note summarised in paragraph 7 above. You are authorised to point out to His Majesty, if you think fit, that he stands to gain nothing by insisting on an absolute guarantee, since, even if the sheikh were to give it, his Excellency could not, with the utmost goodwill, achieve more than would be his duty under the honourable undertaking which he has offered as an alternative, and which His Majesty's Government are prepared to endorse. King Abdul Aziz will appreciate the fact that the sheikh, like any other ruler or Government, could but use his utmost endeavours in either event.

11. You will then inform the King that, in the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government, the sheikh's offer of an honourable undertaking to do so, coupled with their own good offices, would give him all the assurance which is either necessary or obtainable. I trust that these arguments will not fail of their effect, but if they do, you may use your discretion to inform King Abdul Aziz that His Majesty's Government regard this matter as a test of his desire to establish Anglo-Saudi relations on an even more cordial basis than at present, and that it will increase the beneficial effects of your visit to His Majesty if it results in a happy solution of this long-standing and dangerous dispute.

12. There is one further argument of which you may find it possible to make some general use in conversation with King Abdul Aziz or with his Ministers. In his despatch No. 256 of the 10th September, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires mentioned that Sheikh Muhammad Tawil, the Saudi Director of Customs in Hasa, had expressed himself to a member of His Majesty's Legation as being in favour of a radical reduction of Saudi customs dues, a policy which he professed to have recommended to King Abdul Aziz. There appears to be little doubt that such a policy, if applied, would remove the cause of much of the smuggling which is now carried on into Saudi Arabia from Koweit, by reducing the disparity between the Saudi and the Koweit customs dues. This policy would also encourage importers to land their goods on the Saudi coast rather than at Koweit, and would thus tend to promote one at least of the objects for which it is understood the

present Saudi blockade of Koweit was instituted. I fear that it would be too much to expect that King Abdul Aziz can be easily induced to see the unwisdom of maintaining his customs duties at an almost prohibitive level, but I consider that, subject to your views, there may be advantage in explaining this aspect of the matter to him.

I am, &c.

SAMUEL HOARE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 42.

(Secret.)

*Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Secretary of State for India.*

(No. 892.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Risher, October 25, 1935.*

ADDRESSED to Secretary of State for India and repeated to Government of India, Jedda. Copy by mail, Koweit.

Jedda telegram No. 192 to the Foreign Office: Koweit blockade. Attitude of Saudi Government, which is apparently still that by which they deliberately torpedoed Koweit Conference, is most disappointing.

2. Sheikh, on my return through Koweit, again appealed to me most earnestly on question of blockade. As result of his conversations in England he has evidently high hope that His Majesty's Government mean to implement their assurance on the subject of blockade, and failure to do so now on our part, even though circumstances may be difficult, will mean that his trust in our good intentions towards him will receive a severe and most undesirable shock, which will have repercussions in other Arab States of the Gulf.

3. I quite realise the importance of treating Ibn Saud liberally, but I have always felt (see, for instance, my telegram of the 8th June, T-112) that Koweit blockade should be made the acid test of desire of Saudi Government for our friendship. I venture to suggest, therefore, whether, in view of persistent unfriendly attitude of the Saudi Government over this point, it would not be [? equitable] for [? Ryan] on his coming visit to Riyadh to intimate to Ibn Saud that any new offer from His Majesty's Government regarding the blue line [? to-day] is dependent on Ibn Saud adopting a reasonable attitude towards the eminently practicable suggestion of the sheikh regarding [? manifests] *et cetera* (vide paragraph No. 3 of sub-enclosure to my printed letter of 28th June).

[E 4949/206/25]

Enclosure 2 in No. 42.

CORRESPONDENCE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE DELEGATES OF SAUDI ARABIA AND KOWEIT AT THE CONFERENCE HELD AT KOWEIT BETWEEN JUNE 17 AND 29, 1935, TO DISCUSS A SETTLEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE OF KOWEIT BY KING IBN SAUD.

[See No. 2, page 12.]

[E 5157/206/25]

Enclosure 3 in No. 42.

*Mr. Calvert to Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(After compliments.)

Your Royal Highness,

*Jedda, August 12, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to the communications which have passed between the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs and this Legation regarding the Koweit Conference, ending with the telephone message from Asad Bey Al Faqih of the 7th July last, informing me that the Saudi delegates had returned to Riyadh upon the breakdown of the conference.

2. Your Royal Highness is, of course, aware that this question was recently the subject of further conversations in London between the departments of His



Majesty's Government concerned and his Excellency Fuad Bey Hamza, who, as a result, undertook to refer the matter again to the Saudi Government for their consideration. I am now instructed to enquire whether your Royal Highness's Government are in a position to place me in possession of their views on this question, in the light of the renewed consideration they have doubtless given to it consequent upon the London conversations.

3. I feel impelled once more to draw the attention of your Royal Highness to the importance which my Government and the Government of India attach to the settlement of this question, and I would strongly urge the Saudi Government to agree to the proposals put forward by the delegation of his Excellency the Sheikh of Koweit at the recent conference. For their part, I assure your Royal Highness, as his Excellency Fuad Bey Hamza was similarly assured in London, my Government would do all they could to ensure the fulfilment of the honourable undertaking offered by his Excellency the Sheikh, which in their view is all that can reasonably be demanded.

With highest respects, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 5871/206/25]

Enclosure 4 in No. 42.

*Mr. Calvert to Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(After compliments.)

Your Royal Highness,

Jedda, September 15, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Royal Highness's note of the 2nd Jumad-ath-Thani, relative to the present position with regard to Koweit, a summary of which was duly communicated by telegraph to His Majesty's Government. I am now instructed to state in reply that my Government have nothing to add to the views expressed in my note of the 5th August last concerning the incident of the armed party which entered Koweit territory, which question they now regard as closed.

2. In regard to the question of the blockade, His Majesty's Government are surprised to learn of the alleged increase of smuggling from Koweit and of the intention of the Saudi Arab Government to restrict intercourse with Koweit still further. As his Excellency Fuad Bey Hamza was informed in London, my Government consider that the demand of the Saudi Arab Government that a guarantee be given by Koweit that no smugglers shall cross the frontier is unreasonable, and they regret to observe that no consideration has apparently been given to my note of the 12th August.

3. My Government, therefore, desire to draw the attention of the Saudi Arab Government once again to the importance they attach to the settlement of this question and to the proposals contained in my note of the 12th August. If the Saudi Arab Government insist on impossible conditions they will assume the sole responsibility for the continuance of the present unsatisfactory situation.

With highest respect,

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6441/1217/25]

No. 43.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir A. Ryan (on leave).*

(No. 319.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 31, 1935.

YOU will recollect that an opportunity was taken during the course of the conversations with the Saudi Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in London last summer to raise again the question of certain facilities for the aircraft of the Royal Air Force, and of regular British commercial air services flying along the air route on the south-western shore of the Persian Gulf between Koweit and Bahrein.

2. The desiderata of the Air Ministry were explained to Fuad Bey Hamza at the second meeting at the Foreign Office on the 25th June, and they were confirmed in a letter addressed to Fuad Bey by Mr. Rendel on the 27th June. A

print copy of the record of the meeting and of Mr. Rendel's letter is enclosed.<sup>(1)</sup> For convenience of reference, the Air Ministry desiderata may be summarised as follows, in the order in which they were mentioned to Fuad Bey :—

- (1) General permission for the British aircraft concerned to fly within Saudi territorial waters, off the Hasa coast, within gliding distance of the land.
- (2) General permission for the Royal Air Force authorities to send the necessary minimum of assistance in an emergency at their discretion, by air, land or sea, to stranded aircraft within the Hasa Province.
- (3) Authority for the Royal Air Force to put in order (if necessary) and to maintain the emergency landing grounds already believed to exist on Jinnah Island, at Qatif and Res-as-Safaniyah, and to use them in emergency only.
- (4) Permission for the Air Ministry to establish and maintain an airway automatic light beacon on Jinnah Island for the guidance of aircraft flying down the Hasa coast by night.
- (5) The eventual co-operation of the Saudi authorities with the proposed central weather forecasting station at Basra.

3. At the meeting on the 24th June, Fuad Bey Hamza did not exclude in principle any of the desiderata put to him, but insisted on the necessity for scrupulous respect of Saudi territorial sovereignty and the avoidance of any impression of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Saudi Arabia. He also mentioned other more concrete considerations, which, after consulting his Government, he subsequently defined as follows, in a letter of the 6th July to Mr. Rendel (a print copy of which is enclosed)<sup>(2)</sup> :—

- (a) Facilities for Imperial Airways (Limited) would have to be negotiated separately between the Saudi Government and the company, whereas those concerning the Royal Air Force would be negotiated through the diplomatic channel.
- (b) Facilities for the Royal Air Force would have to be in accordance with a clear agreement in the form of a "contract or convention" for a fixed period, "in which should be set forth in detail the matters which may or may not be undertaken." A "general unconditional permission" would be contrary to Saudi interests, however simple the facilities in question.
- (c) The Saudi Government would expect a fixed annual payment for any facilities granted.
- (d) The Saudi Government could not agree to the necessary constructional and maintenance work involved by facilities (3) and (4) in the preceding paragraph being carried out by Royal Air Force personnel. Such work would have to be executed by the Saudi authorities in accordance with an agreed specification which might be set out in the formal agreement.

4. The whole question has now been re-examined by the competent departments of His Majesty's Government in the light of the discussions and correspondence with Fuad Bey Hamza. His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that, in view of the Saudi attitude, there would be little advantage in pressing their request for air facilities at present, since this might easily convey an impression of anxiety which would tend to stiffen the conditions attached by the Saudi Government to the grant of the facilities and increase their demands for financial compensation. Moreover, the Air Ministry do not regard the present position as altogether unsatisfactory, since there has been no case of a forced landing on the Hasa coast during the past year, and the risk of such a mishap is steadily diminishing as the reliability of engines and the range of aircraft increase and the meteorological organisation in the Persian Gulf improves.

5. At the same time, the desired facilities would undoubtedly facilitate the passage of British aircraft down the Persian Gulf, and put an end to the danger of an awkward political incident arising out of a forced landing in Saudi territory. His Majesty's Government have therefore decided to furnish you with

<sup>(1)</sup> No. 74, Part XXXVI.

<sup>(2)</sup> No. 8.



the following instructions, so that you may be able to pursue the question of air facilities with the Saudi authorities on your return to Arabia. They appreciate that a favourable opportunity for this purpose is unlikely to arise during the course of your forthcoming visit to Riyadh—although, if one should present itself you are, of course, authorised to take advantage of it—and they are content to leave entirely to your discretion the choice of the moment for approaching the Saudi Government again in the matter.

6. His Majesty's Government consider that, with one exception, the conditions formulated by Fuad Bey Hamza in his letter of the 6th July need not necessarily preclude in practice the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement with the Saudi Government. The exception is the insistence of Fuad Bey on separate negotiations being conducted with Imperial Airways (Limited) in respect of facilities desired for the company's aircraft. This manoeuvre is apparently inspired by the hope of extracting two distinct annual payments for the same facilities and is unacceptable. You should, therefore, make it clear to the Saudi Government that His Majesty's Government can see no reason for two sets of negotiations on the same subject, since, as was pointed out to Fuad Bey in London, no distinction is made between the Royal Air Force and Imperial Airways in matters connected with the organisation of the air route in the Persian Gulf. It is true that Imperial Airways have previously negotiated agreements with foreign Governments direct—*e.g.*, in Egypt and Iraq—but there is no real analogy, since in those cases the company were running a regular service through the countries concerned, thus necessitating the settlement of a large number of points of detail; whereas, in the case of Saudi Arabia, they only require permission to fly over or land in Saudi territory in case of emergency, a permission, moreover, which is identical with that desired for the Royal Air Force. Again, any payment made by Imperial Airways would, in practice, emanate from His Majesty's Government, since it would involve increasing the amount of the official subsidy to the company. You should explain the foregoing considerations to the Saudi Government, and should impress upon them that in the present case there can be no question of the position of Imperial Airways being dealt with in direct negotiations with the company otherwise than through the normal diplomatic channel.

7. Should the Saudi Government maintain their insistence on separate negotiations with Imperial Airways, or should they make difficulties over the other conditions mentioned by Fuad Bey, it will clearly be impossible to obtain all the facilities which were requested last summer. His Majesty's Government consider that, in that event, it will be best for you simply to concentrate on obtaining as much as the Saudi Government can be induced to grant for the use of the Royal Air Force and to omit any mention of Imperial Airways. The facilities in question are actually less necessary for Imperial Airways, whose multi-engined aircraft are less likely than those of the Royal Air Force to be obliged to make forced landings. Moreover, the company would, of course, automatically profit by the provision (even if primarily established for the Royal Air Force) of an airway beacon on Jinnah Island, or by Saudi co-operation in meteorological services.

8. For your information and guidance, His Majesty's Government are now disposed to rank the facilities described and numbered in paragraph 2 above in the following order of importance:—

(4), (1), (2), (3), (5).

As you will see from the enclosed print, the reasons why His Majesty's Government desire these facilities were fully explained to Fuad Bey in the course of the second meeting in London last summer, and were repeated in Mr. Rendel's letter of the 27th June to him. In resuming negotiations on the subject, it will, however, be necessary for you to meet as far as possible the conditions put forward by the Saudi Government in Fuad Bey's letter of the 6th July, and you should, accordingly, also be guided by the following supplementary instructions in regard to the individual facilities.

9. The insistence of the Saudi Government, that all constructional and maintenance work shall be carried out entirely by their own personnel, is impracticable in the case of the proposed airway beacon (facility No. (4)). It would be necessary for one or possibly two experts from the firm providing the beacon to supervise its actual erection and the construction of the necessary

concrete and metal work for the base and mounting of the light. Little is yet known about these automatic beacons, and this work could not be executed simply by following plans, although Saudi labour could, no doubt, carry out the actual work. At the same time, with a view to meeting the susceptibilities of the Saudi Government as far as possible, you may suggest to them that the matter could be arranged to general satisfaction if the experts were to be joined by Saudi officials, and to proceed to Jinnah Island together by a launch or steamer flying the Saudi flag, in order to indicate clearly the fact of Saudi sovereignty over the island. Similarly, the necessary periodical visits for refuelling the beacon (every two or three months) could be performed by Royal Air Force personnel in the company of Saudi officials, who could be met by arrangement at some place on the coast, such as Uqair. The Royal Air Force would be responsible for all transport and other arrangements.

10. The prospects of the Saudi Government according facility No. (1)—permission to fly within gliding distance of the Hasa coast—clearly depends upon the interpretation laid by the Saudi Government of Fuad Bey's reservation summarised at (b) in paragraph 3 above. Aircraft are now continually flying on passage between Koweit and Bahrein, and it would be quite impossible to seek prior permission on each occasion when it was desired to fly over Saudi territorial waters, or even to notify such action in advance. A general authorisation covering all Royal Air Force machines (and, if possible, those of Imperial Airways as well) will alone suffice to make this facility of any value. At the same time you may mention the readiness of His Majesty's Government to include in any agreement with the Saudi Government a specific undertaking that every effort would be made to avoid flying over the land, and that aircraft would, in any case, only avail themselves of the permission to fly over Saudi territorial waters in case of danger through bad weather or the risk of engine failure.

11. There seems to be little likelihood of the Saudi Government agreeing to accord general permission for the Royal Air Force to enter and fly over Saudi territory without previous notification in order to rescue stranded aircraft (facility No. (2)). It may, however, help you in the presentation of your case on this point to insist on the fact that such action—which would, of course, be subject to immediate notification to the Saudi Government—would only be taken in cases where there was manifest danger to human life, *e.g.*, in the case of a flying boat forced down in rough water or a machine stranded in an uninhabited and waterless desert.

12. If the Saudi Government can be induced to allow the use in emergency of one or all of the landing grounds required under facility No. (3), the arrangements for construction and maintenance should present less difficulty than in the case of the airway beacon. All that is required at each landing ground, apart, possibly, from a certain amount of levelling, is a white circle in the centre and four white L-shaped marks at the corners, and these can be easily constructed in concrete and maintained with whitewash. It would clearly be preferable if the landing grounds could be inspected in the first place by a Royal Air Force official; but if the Saudi Government prefer not to avail themselves of Royal Air Force assistance, they could doubtless themselves execute the necessary work, with the co-operation of the pilots in their own air force, on the basis of plans furnished to them. Alternatively, the Royal Air Force could carry out the work in conjunction with the Saudi authorities, as suggested in the case of the airway beacon in paragraph 9 above.

13. The readiness of the Saudi Government to grant any of the desired facilities will doubtless turn largely on the amount of financial inducement they receive. His Majesty's Government are prepared, in the particular circumstances prevailing in Saudi Arabia, to agree that payment should be made for any facilities accorded, although these are of a nature which other countries would normally provide without charge. At the same time, in view of the very limited use to which the facilities—apart from the airway beacon—would be put, they consider that the amount of compensation should be kept on a modest plane, and below the figure of £3,000 a year previously proposed as a maximum offer. For your own information, the question is, moreover, complicated by the possibility of payment being made by means of a remission of the Saudi debt due to His Majesty's Government; and, before this possibility can be explored, it will be necessary to learn the intentions of the Saudi Government in regard to the repayment of the outstanding balance of that debt. It will, therefore, be



preferable for you to avoid any discussion of the financial aspect at the present stage and until you receive further instructions. If questioned on the subject you may indicate the readiness of His Majesty's Government to make a small annual payment, but you should explain that they will require to know how many of the desired facilities the Saudi Government will be prepared to grant before they can make any concrete offer.

14. In the event of your negotiations being successful, you may propose to the Saudi Government that the agreement should be recorded in an exchange of notes to be operative for five years and terminable thereafter at six months' notice.

I am, &c.

SAMUEL HOARE.

[E 4241/318/25]

No. 44.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir A. Ryan (c/o Political Agent, Bahrain).*

(No. 321.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, November 6, 1935.*

AMONG the subordinate questions which will require settlement as a preliminary to the proposed formal prolongation of the Treaty of Jedda is that of the assurance given in the note of the 19th May, 1927, from Sir Gilbert Clayton to King Abdul Aziz in regard to the export of arms and ammunition from the United Kingdom to Saudi Arabia. For convenience of reference I enclose copies of that document and of King Abdul Aziz's reply thereto which are numbered (5) and (6) in the series of notes exchanged at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Jedda.

2. In your despatch No. 113 of the 11th April last, regarding the proposal of the Saudi Government for the specific prolongation of the Treaty of Jedda, you reported that the Deputy Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs was anxious to maintain the position created by these two notes, in regard to the question of the export of arms from this country to Saudi Arabia. To this end Fuad Bey had inserted the following paragraph in the draft note to prolong the Treaty of Jedda, which, he suggested, should be addressed to you by the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

"(2) The two letters exchanged between His Majesty the King and General Clayton, dated the 17th Dhu'l Qada, 1345 (the 19th May, 1927), in respect of the trade in arms, shall continue in force as long as the treaty itself remains in force."

You stated that you had taken the opportunity in the course of your discussion with Fuad Bey to point out that His Majesty's Government would have to consider his proposal on this point, since the situation in regard to the trade in arms had changed since 1927, and since, in particular, much attention had recently been given to the purchase of arms abroad by belligerent countries.

3. The question of the assurance of His Majesty's Government in regard to the export of arms to Saudi Arabia was subsequently raised during the conversations with the Deputy Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs in London last summer. Fuad Bey was informed at the final meeting on the 18th July that His Majesty's Government would be prepared in principle to extend the validity of the Treaty of Jedda by means of an exchange of notes, provided that a satisfactory settlement were reached on the question of slavery and the other outstanding points of less importance. Among these was the question of the supply of arms, and it was explained that it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government to qualify their assurance on this point in order to bring it into line with any existing or impending international commitments in regard to arms traffic by which they were or might be bound. Any such qualification would, however, be one of purely general application, involving no discrimination against Saudi Arabia as such. In reply Fuad Bey expressed once more the objections of his Government to any form of discrimination, and said that they could only agree to safeguards, such as those involved in the "special zones" of the 1925 Arms Traffic Convention, if they were embodied in general terms applying to the world as a whole. The discussions on this subject closed on the understanding that a new formula would be drafted to embody the original assurance of His Majesty's Government in revised and up-to-date terms.

4. As a result of further examination of this matter I am advised that, despite the doubt which prevails as to the exact legal connexion between the Treaty of Jedda and the subsidiary notes exchanged at the same time, the undertaking given to King Abdul Aziz in Sir Gilbert Clayton's note of the 19th May, 1927, is actually co-terminous with the main treaty. It follows that the note would automatically continue to be valid if the Treaty of Jedda itself were to be prolonged, and it accordingly becomes necessary to consider as a preliminary to the formal extension of the treaty what modifications should be introduced in the wording of the original undertaking.

5. The original assurance given by Sir Gilbert Clayton was qualified by a reference to the conditions of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 as prescribing the procedure which should be followed in connexion with orders for the export of arms from the United Kingdom to Saudi Arabia. This convention has never come into force. Nevertheless, I am advised that it must still be considered to represent the international standard for the control of the traffic in arms; it has actually been ratified conditionally by the United Kingdom since 1927, and it is clearly impossible to replace it for the purposes of the assurance to the Saudi Government by a reference to the draft convention which was prepared at Geneva in April 1935 by the Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in and Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War, and which has only received a first reading. The convention of 1925 may, in fact, be considered to have acquired more authority since the exchange of notes with King Abdul Aziz in 1927, and it is noteworthy that its provisions are utilised as a standard of control in the Four-Power Treaty of August 1930 regulating the importation of arms and ammunition into Abyssinia. In the circumstances I consider that the reference to the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 should be maintained in any new version of the assurance.

6. I am advised that the actual effect of the reference to the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925 is to qualify the original assurance of His Majesty's Government by making it subject to all the conditions specified in the convention, including those concerning licences and the machinery to ensure that arms are destined solely for the Government of the country ordering them. At the same time articles 33 and 34 of the convention of 1925 introduce safeguards and qualifications in regard to time of war and the obligations arising out of the Covenant of the League of Nations and other treaty instruments. Nevertheless, I remain of the opinion that these safeguards are not sufficient in present international conditions, since it is desirable that His Majesty's Government should make provision for embargoes which they might be compelled to impose, not merely in fulfilment of actual obligations under the Covenant of the League, but also in accordance with any recommendations of the Council under article 11 of the Covenant; or even for the purpose of taking unilateral action to safeguard peace.

7. In order to enable His Majesty's Government to fulfil their obligations and to exercise an unfettered influence for the preservation of peace I consider, therefore, that Sir Gilbert Clayton's note of the 19th May, 1927, should not be renewed, but should be replaced, as soon as practicable, by a new assurance to be given to King Abdul Aziz on the lines of the following formula:—

"I am empowered by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to inform you that, subject to the conditions laid down in the Geneva Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, His Majesty's Government will not, so long as the treaty signed at Jedda on the 20th May, 1927, remains in force, prevent the export from the United Kingdom of arms, &c., purchased by the Saudi Arabian Government for their own use from manufacturers in the United Kingdom, in normal circumstances. Nevertheless, having regard to developments in the matter of the control of the exports of arms since 1927, His Majesty's Government must reserve the right to suspend temporarily the operation of this assurance in circumstances in which the international obligations of His Majesty's Government or any circumstances connected with any war or threat of war should render it necessary."

8. At your own request I have furnished you, without delay, with the explanations in the preceding paragraphs in order that you may be in possession of my considered views for your guidance if it prove necessary to discuss the subject with King Abdul Aziz or his Ministers. At the same time the question



of the supply of arms remains a subsidiary point connected with the renewal of the Treaty of Jedda, which is in its turn dependent on a satisfactory settlement of the important question of slavery. It would thus be premature for you to take the initiative in discussing this particular question until agreement has been reached on the slavery issue, and the question of the prolongation of the treaty has become more immediate. In the event, however, of King Abdul Aziz or his Ministers raising the matter, either at Riyadh or after your return to your post, you are authorised at your discretion to propose the formula set out in the preceding paragraph to replace the undertaking given in Sir Gilbert Clayton's above-mentioned note.

I am, &c.  
SAMUEL HOARE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 44.

*Sir G. Clayton to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies.*

Your Majesty,

WITH reference to the proposal put forward by your Majesty for the inclusion in the treaty of an article providing that His Britannic Majesty's Government should take no measures to prevent the purchase and importation of whatever arms, war material, ammunition, machines or implements which the Government of the Hejaz and Nejd may require for their own use, I have the honour to inform your Majesty that His Britannic Majesty's Government are of the opinion that this is a question which need not be dealt with in the body of the main treaty.

I am, however, empowered by His Britannic Majesty's Government to inform your Majesty that the embargo on the export of war materials to Arabia has been removed, and that, if your Majesty should see fit to place orders for arms, ammunition and war material with British manufacturers, in accordance with the conditions set forth in the Arms Traffic Convention, 1925, for the use of the Government of the Hejaz and Nejd, His Britannic Majesty's Government will not prevent the export thereof or place any obstacle to their importation into your Majesty's territories.

I shall endeavour, in answer to your Majesty's desire, to present your Majesty with a copy of the convention referred to above as soon as may be.

Respects,

GILBERT CLAYTON,  
Commissioner and Plenipotentiary.

Jedda, May 19, 1927 (Zul Qada 18, 1345).

Enclosure 2 in No. 44.

*Abdul-Aziz-bin-Abdul-Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud to His Britannic Majesty's Commissioner and Plenipotentiary.*

(Translation.)

IN reply to your letter, dated the 18th Zul Qa'da, 1345 (the 19th May, 1927), relating to arms, I wish to thank you for your statement which makes it clear that the importation of arms into Arabia is not prohibited.

Respects,

(Sealed) ABDUL-AZIZ-BIN-ABDUL-  
RAHMAN-AL-SAUD.

Zul Qa'da 19, 1345 (May 21, 1927).

[E 6400/160/25]

No. 44A.

*Translation from the Umm-al-Qura of October 4, 1935.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 28, 1935.)*

*Regulation in respect of Doctors, Dispensers and other Sanitary Employees and Dispensaries and Medicines of the Foreign Governments whether attached to Diplomatic or Consular Missions or those which may come Temporarily during Pilgrimage Seasons.*

ROYAL decree has been issued approving the following regulation for action accordingly:—

#### Chapter I.

#### ARTICLE 1.

Written notification is required upon the appointment of a doctor or dispenser, and to transmit with the communication a copy of the diploma of the doctor permitting him to practise the profession of medicine, and a copy of the diploma of the dispenser and [for] a copy of permission (certificate) which the dispenser has obtained by experience of the profession of dispensing in his country. At the same time, the issue of an official permission should be made from the Public Health (Administration) to authorise the holder to practise the profession of doctor or dispenser in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia according to local regulations.

#### ARTICLE 2.

The written communication provided for in the preceding article No. 1 should include the duties to be performed by the employee on whose behalf the licence may be asked for, viz.:—

- (a) Whether his work will be confined to the members of the diplomatic or consular mission.
- (b) Whether his services besides what is mentioned in the preceding paragraph will be extended to treatment of persons other than the members of the diplomatic or the consular mission, whether they may be subjects of the local Government or foreigners.
- (c) Whether his duties will be confined to the matters mentioned in the two paragraphs, or in one of them, or whether he will be entrusted with medical attendance on pilgrims as a medical mission in Mecca, Mina or Arafat.

#### ARTICLE 3.

The authority issuing the licence for the practice of the profession of doctor or dispenser as is mentioned in the above articles should show therein the duties to be performed by the one on whose behalf the licence is given in accordance with the particulars mentioned in article 2 above.

#### ARTICLE 4.

Communication by the Administration of Public Health with the one who has been granted a licence to practise the profession of doctor or dispenser within the scope of paragraph (a) of article 2, shall be effected through the diplomatic channel except in the event of the occurrence of contagious diseases or extraordinary cases when they will be made direct.

#### ARTICLE 5.

Those who may be granted licences to practise the profession of doctors or dispensers within the scope of paragraph (b) of article 2, shall have without other intermediary connexions with the Administration of Public Health. They shall have to comply with all the stipulations imposed in respect of practising the profession of doctor or dispenser in the Saudi Arab Kingdom under the regulations in force.



## ARTICLE 6.

Doctors and dispensers who will be appointed to treat the pilgrims, within the scope of paragraph (c) of article 2, whether they come from abroad temporarily and in company of the pilgrims themselves, or whether they reside in the country to practise as indicated in paragraphs (a) and (b) of article 2, or whether appointed for temporary service during the pilgrimage season from doctors and dispensers residing in the Hejaz, whose principal task is the care of the health of the pilgrims of their Governments they shall devote their energies to the treatment of pilgrims; and their relations with the Administration of Public Health shall be without intermediary; firstly to make themselves known to the administration, and secondly to consult the administration in all matters that may turn to the advantage of the health of their pilgrims; to make known to the administration the houses of the doctors themselves, to inform the administration concerning the situation of the health stations and the houses of the pilgrims, provided these doctors are concerned with the lodging of their pilgrims; and the above-mentioned doctors should inform the Health Administration of the number of patients treated by them and of their diseases, of deaths and cases of contagious diseases which come under their treatment.

## ARTICLE 7.

Doctors and dispensers or other sanitary employees who are subjects of foreign Governments whether they are attached to the diplomatic or consular missions of those Governments or come temporarily to accompany the pilgrims in the pilgrimage season shall have no immunity, distinction, exemption or privilege except what are stipulated in this regulation.

## ARTICLE 8.

Licences for the practice of the profession of doctors and dispensers of foreign Governments will be issued by the Administration of Public Health according to the Health Regulations and will be delivered through the diplomatic channel in response to the application made by the same means. The Administration of Public Health or other Government departments shall not collect any fees whatsoever in respect of these licences. The licence is to be given once and shall continue to be valid so long as the doctor or the dispenser for whom it has been issued is carrying on his work. As regards licences which are issued to doctors and dispensers who accompany the pilgrims temporarily, or who are appointed temporarily for the Haj season, they shall be for the season and their validity will expire directly the doctor or the dispenser leaves the country. Should the doctor or the dispenser return, appointed by his Government in other seasons or for a fixed period in the diplomatic or consular mission, a note on the licence made to renew its validity will be sufficient.

## ARTICLE 9.

Any doctor or dispenser or others of the employees of foreign Governments may be exempted from the entrance or Koshan dues or any other fees or taxes on an official request being made through the diplomatic channel by the Government to which the employee, for whom exemption is requested, belongs.

Chapter II.—*Dispensaries.*

## ARTICLE 10.

The opening of dispensaries of foreign Governments should be in accordance with a licence to be issued by the authority concerned in the Government, on a written request being submitted through the diplomatic channel.

## ARTICLE 11.

The existence of a dispensary known to the Government as being under a foreign Government on the day of issuing this regulation shall be counted as a legal licence for the continuation of its opening. Consequently the authority concerned shall issue a certificate to be considered as a licence for the dispensary which will be sent through the diplomatic channel.

## ARTICLE 12.

The dispensaries of foreign Governments shall have no distinction, immunity or privilege except those stipulated in this regulation or any other issued by the Government.

## ARTICLE 13.

The dispensaries of foreign Governments shall be subject to the same sanitary provisions as may be imposed on other dispensaries.

## ARTICLE 14.

The said dispensaries should submit to the Administration of Public Health a yearly report showing their services and the number of persons treated by them and of the different diseases under the prescribed rules. It is also their duty to report any case of contagious diseases without delay.

## ARTICLE 15.

The permanent and temporary dispensaries are subject to the same conditions.

Chapter III.—*Medicines and Medical Stores.*

## ARTICLE 16.

Medicines imported by doctors or dispensers or the dispensaries of foreign Governments may be exempted from dues on an official application being submitted through the diplomatic channel, subject to the following conditions:—

- (a) If they are for the use of the members of the diplomatic or consular mission.
- (b) If they are for free distribution among the poor patients.

A detailed list of the medicines and their quantities should be attached to the special application submitted for obtaining the order for their exemption.

## ARTICLE 17.

The medicines and medical stores, which will be imported for the purpose of sale, cannot be exempted from dues in any circumstances.

Chapter IV.—*Application of this Regulation.*

## ARTICLE 18.

This regulation will come into force from month from the date of its promulgation in the newspaper the *Umm-al-Qura*.

## ARTICLE 19.

Each of the officials of the (Saudi) Government whom the articles of this regulation concern, should carry them out as far as he is specially concerned.



[E 6475/206/25]

No. 45.

Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir A. Ryan (c/o Political Agent, Bahrain).

(No. 324.)

Foreign Office, November 7, 1935.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 317 of the 31st October, regarding the Saudi blockade of Koweit, I transmit to you herewith the accompanying copy of telegram No. 2974 of the 30th October, from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, which was received too late to be considered in connexion with my instructions to you, for your guidance in discussing this question during your visit to Riyadh.<sup>(1)</sup>

2. You will observe that the Government of India, with a view to bringing home to King Abdul Aziz the serious view which His Majesty's Government take of his unfriendly attitude towards Koweit, advocate—

- (a) That you should pursue the suggestion made by Mr. Calvert in his telegram No. 165 of the 8th September (a copy of which is enclosed herein for reference<sup>(1)</sup>) and contrast the very warm assurances of King Abdul Aziz's friendship for His Majesty's Government as the basis for his foreign policy, which were expressed by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin in discussing the Italo-Abyssinian controversy with Mr. Calvert early in September last, with the attitude of the Saudi Government over their blockade of Koweit.
- (b) That you should reinforce this argument by also pointing out the analogy between the Saudi attitude towards the action of the Government of Bahrain in the so-called *Ahmedi* incident and the point of view of Koweit in regard to the Saudi blockade.
- (c) That, if this representation still failed to influence the King's attitude, you should act in accordance with a suggestion made by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf in his telegram No. 892 of the 25th October (a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 317 of the 31st October), and make the new offer of His Majesty's Government for a settlement of the Saudi frontier in eastern and south-eastern Arabia dependent on the Saudi Government adopting a reasonable attitude on the Koweit blockade question.

3. On grounds of principle I do not feel myself able to accept the proposals of the Government of India summarised at (b) and (c) above. As regards (b), there can be no doubt that the policy of the Bahrain Government in trying to penalise the steamship *Ahmedi* for carrying goods direct to the Hasa coast was at variance with all international usage and was quite indefensible. There is clearly no true analogy between such a policy and the action of the Saudi Government in preventing commercial intercourse between their country and Koweit, which, however unfriendly towards His Majesty's Government and the sheikh, is not inconsistent with international law or practice. It would therefore, in my opinion, be most unwise to attempt to link up the two matters in any way, nor, having regard to the known feelings of the Saudi Government in regard to the *Ahmedi* case, does it appear that any result could be looked for other than a further embitterment of Saudi-Koweit relations. Similarly, for reasons which will be familiar to you, I see strong objection to the suggestion of the Government of India summarised at (c) above.

4. At the same time I agree that there is now considerable force in the main suggestion of the Government of India, summarised at (a) in paragraph 2 above. When Mr. Calvert suggested early in September that attention might be drawn to the contrast between King Abdul Aziz's protestations of friendship and his policy towards Koweit, His Majesty's Government were particularly anxious to avoid any action that might have discouraged the King from consulting them in regard to his policy in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute and driven him towards seeking an understanding with Italy. They accordingly felt obliged to postpone consideration of Mr. Calvert's suggestion until a more propitious moment. Moreover, at that time the Saudi Government's latest note on the subject of the Koweit blockade had not yet been received.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



5. In the weeks which have since elapsed it has become increasingly evident that the Saudi Government are not likely in present circumstances to come to any political agreement with the Italian Government. At the same time it has become even more important that every effort should be made to put relations between Saudi Arabia and Koweit on a normal basis, and that no argument should be neglected which might influence King Abdul Aziz to modify his present unfriendly and obstructive attitude in maintaining a rigid blockade of a sheikhdom in such close and special relations with His Majesty's Government.

6. I accordingly authorise you in carrying out the instructions contained in my despatch of the 31st October to speak at your discretion to King Abdul Aziz, or to his Ministers, on the lines of sub-paragraph (a) in paragraph 2 of this despatch.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah.

I am, &c.  
SAMUEL HOARE.

[E 6546/5599/25]

No. 46.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 8.)*

(No. 290. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, October 15, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 271, Confidential, of the 1st October, relative to the reactions in this country to the present Italo-Ethiopian situation, I have the honour to report further upon certain more general features of the situation, and to add some details, of minor importance, supplementary to the telegraphic reports submitted since the date of my despatch under reference.

2. I am informed by a fairly reliable source that the consignment of arms and munitions landed here on the 5th October from the Italian steamship *Tripolitania*, nominally from a firm in Italy to the Italian self-styled merchant Signor Odello, but in reality from the Italian Government to the Saudi Government, reported in my telegrams Nos. 184 and 185, still remains in the Customs Department here. The nine Italian mechanics, or instructors, who arrived from Massawa by the same boat are therefore believed to have at present very little to do. They still live in the Government-owned hotel here.

3. I am reliably informed that the consignment of 150 packages consists of 22 barrels, 1 large case and 127 cases of different sizes. This informant has more recently stated the belief that the large case contains a car, probably an armoured car, but that twenty-two of the smaller packages contain medical stores for the Italian Legation. He added (on the 12th October) that it was reported that a large travelling car, of some well-known Italian make, luxuriously fitted with dining and sleeping accommodation, with a wireless set, &c., was shortly to arrive here as a present from the Italian Government to Ibn Saud, whilst to-day he reports that an Italian ship, the *Ernani*, of the Industria Navali Soc. Anon. Linia, is expected to arrive here to-day or to-morrow and to discharge a large truck with trailer, weighing about 10 tons. This, he considers, might be the caravan *de luxe* for Ibn Saud. Two experts are said to be accompanying the vehicle for the purpose of assembling it on arrival and instructing the eventual driver.

4. Since my despatch No. 232 of the 13th August, when I last referred to the Saudi press and drew attention to the complete silence of the *Umm-al-Qura* and the *Saut-al-Hejaz* on the subject of the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, there has been some change. Both organs have appeared with articles on the situation and with copious reproductions of telegraphic reports from various sources on the situation. The articles so far have not been in any way objectionable, and generally, I consider, may be attributed to the authorship or inspiration of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. In some instances the news items have contained reports of a probably erroneous and tendentious nature, usually emanating from Egypt, and quite possibly of original Italian inspiration. For example, the report of the presence of sixteen Italian submarines in the Red Sea was given some prominence, and statements regarding the exodus of residents in Egypt to safer quarters in Palestine and Syria in fear of the menace of Italian aircraft from

Cyrenaica were reproduced. As reported in my telegram No. 185, I took an opportunity on the 6th October of alluding, in conversation with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, to the prevalence of misleading reports, and suggested that the Mecca newspapers would do well to take care to avoid sensational news. The *Umm-al-Qura*, a newspaper which appears on Friday of each week, now announces that it will publish a daily news-sheet (except Fridays), containing telegraphic reports of current events.

5. No further information has been received regarding the purchase of camels by the Italians. It would appear probable that more information will be available in this respect shortly. Purchases would appear to have been made almost entirely in Nejd, for not only are reports of purchases in the Hejaz completely lacking, but complaints have been heard locally that Nejd, and not the Hejaz, is reaping the benefits accruing from this deal. The distance to be traversed by the camels in coming from Nejd partly explains the delay in their arrival. My Indian vice-consul also reports that it is believed locally that camels purchased from the northern districts of Nejd will be shipped from Rabigh and Wejh, and those from the southern districts from ports in Asir such as Jizan and Qunfidha. This may well be the case in order that the movement should be kept as unobtrusive as possible. It may, indeed, be wondered whether the camel of Arabia is likely to be a success in the highlands of Abyssinia, under the rigours of a winter campaign.

6. The sympathies of the local populace remain as strongly favourable to Abyssinia as before. I am informed that a few days after hostilities had commenced in Ethiopia a crowd collected in Jedda to listen to news broadcast from a wireless set belonging to a certain inhabitant of the town, and that items of news favourable to Ethiopia provoked cheers and cries of "Down with the Italians!" from those assembled. It is even asserted that the Italian Chargé d'Affaires protested to the Minister for Foreign Affairs against this hostile demonstration as being inconsistent with the friendly relations subsisting between the two countries, Saudi Arabia and Italy. In consequence, it is said, the headmen of the various quarters of the town have received instructions to prevent such demonstrations in future.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, Addis Ababa, Aden, the Department of Overseas Trade and the senior naval officer, Red Sea Sloops.

I have, &c.  
A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6548/269/91]

No. 47.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 16.)*

(No. 292.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a letter from Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, dated the 15th October, respecting the Qatar Oil Concession.

*Jedda, October 16, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 47.

*Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to Mr. Calvert.*

My dear Mr. Calvert,

*Mecca, Rajab 17, 1354 (October 15, 1935).*

I HAVE received your letter dated the 26th September, 1935 (the 28th Jumad ath-Thani, 1354), and in reply I have the honour to state the following:—

2. It was strange to our Government that the British Government disapproved of the correspondence which has taken and is taking place direct between His Majesty the King and the Sheikh of Qatar, in respect of a matter concerning the affairs of Qatar, and that you relied on your disapproval upon



article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda, and stated that "His Majesty King Abdul Aziz undertook, among other things, to maintain friendly relations with his Excellency the Sheikh of Qatar, between whom and His Britannic Majesty's Government . . . &c., and whereas your statement and the interpretation of article 6 differ in text, meaning and significance from the contents of article 6, I therefore write to you herein the copy of article 6 literally, and which begins: "His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies undertakes to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the territories of Koweit and Bahrein and with the Sheikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast, who are in special treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty's Government." The undertaking of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies is confined to friendly and peaceful relations with the Amirs of those territories (literally: directions), and it does not contain any reference to any undertaking by His Majesty that he should not correspond with them or that they should not correspond with him, and therefore nothing has been changed since the Treaty of Jedda in the relations which had existed between His Majesty and those Amirs, but friendly and peaceful relations remained complete and perfect, and correspondence is exchanged between His Majesty and them in respect of various affairs, because this assures the friendly and peaceful relations which His Majesty undertook to maintain. The treaties referred to in article 6, concluded between the British Government and those Amirs, are the concern of the Amirs, and they (His Majesty's Government) may bind them with them, but they (His Majesty's Government) cannot bind our Government with them.

3. As regards your reference to (the fact) that the British Government, in accordance with their (willingness) to deprive themselves of their strict legal rights, and offer a part of those rights to the Saudi Arab Government, &c. (literally: to the end of your statement on the subject). I am glad to draw your attention in this respect to the true facts that our Government always desire that their relations with the Amirs of those territories (literally: directions) should be lasting relations of affection and friendship, and do not desire to restrict (literally: press upon) them and their affairs, and they (Saudi Arab Government) showed their readiness to grant them areas (territories) to the utmost extent which can be granted, on the understanding that the whole of those domains were previously subject to the fathers and forefathers of His Majesty the King Abdul Aziz. As regards the legal rights to which you refer and to which the British Government pretend, our Government cannot recognise and accept them and cannot consider them as basis for any discussion in connexion with those frontiers. In respect of the above, our Government therefore preserve their fullest rights in the territories and places which they cannot agree to renounce in favour of the Amirs of those territories, and our Government cannot recognise or agree to any privileges or rights which may be granted at those reserved places, and record their reservation in their regard.

4. This is on the one hand, and on the other I am pleased to inform you that our Government are fully prepared at any time to discuss the settlement of the question of the frontiers in a spirit of affection and friendship to those neighbouring Amirs whenever discussion may be resumed on this subject.

With highest regards,  
YUSUF YASIN.

[E 6649/588/25]

47A.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 11.)*

(No. 297. Confidential.)

Sir,

WITH reference to correspondence ending with my telegram No. 190 of the 10th October, regarding the Hejaz Railway Conference at Haifa, I have the honour to inform you that at a meeting on the 12th October Sheikh Yusuf Yasin informed me that Sherif Rashid-al-Ghazi, the individual selected by the Saudi Government to inspect that portion of the Hejaz Railway between Medina and the Transjordan frontier, had arrived at Haifa in time for the opening of the conference, and expressed his thanks for the assistance afforded the inspector by

*Jedda, October 22, 1935.*

the authorities of Transjordan. Sheikh Yusuf had, at that time, little further information, except that Fuad Bey Hamza had reported that he was finding the British delegate most helpful and that he had been received by the Acting High Commissioner, who, Sheikh Yusuf declared with appreciation, had promised sympathetic co-operation. He regretted that the attitude of the French representative was much less understanding, and Sheikh Yusuf expressed the belief that the authorities in Syria were by no means anxious to see the railway actually reopened.

2. On the 19th October, at a further meeting, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin reverted to this subject. He had heard from Fuad Bey Hamza that the conference had come to an end, but he was unable to determine from Fuad Bey's communication whether it had been adjourned or whether it had broken down. He went on to describe the proceedings at Haifa in regard to two questions forming part of the agenda, namely, the allocation of rolling-stock and the manner in which the necessary expenditure should be met. I do not propose to give more than an outline of his remarks, as being of interest only as a Saudi view on the proceedings of the conference.

3. Sheikh Yusuf stated that the Saudi proposal in regard to the allocation of rolling-stock was that it should be assigned to the countries concerned in proportion to the length of line within each country. This proposal had been strongly contested by the French delegate, whilst the British delegate had not expressed a definite view.

4. As to the manner in which expenditure was to be met, I understood Sheikh Yusuf to say that the French proposal that each country should be responsible for the expenditure necessary on that part of the line within its borders had proved quite unacceptable to the Saudi delegate, who took the view that the line could not be thus partitioned, as it was essentially one, and should be so considered. The French delegate had thereupon stated that there were no funds available, from the present operation of the railway, for the purpose of reconditioning the line generally. As the question of the character of the railway as an indivisible whole was a political rather than a technical one, Fuad Bey Hamza had requested Sheikh Yusuf to bring this difficulty to my notice. Fuad Bey would himself speak to M. Maigret, now at Haifa, in the same sense.

5. I have as yet received no information regarding the progress made at the conference, and consequently was able merely to note the remarks of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on this subject.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Jerusalem and Beirut.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6654/269/91]

No. 48.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 11.)*

(No. 303.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of his note to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, dated the 26th October, respecting the Qatar and the south-eastern frontier of Saudi Arabia.

*Jedda, October 26, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 48.

*Mr. Calvert to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin.*

My dear Sheikh Yusuf Yasin,

*October 26, 1935.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's letter of the 17th Rajab (15th October) relative to the question of Qatar and of the south-eastern frontier of Saudi Arabia generally, I have the honour to inform you that Sir Andrew Ryan, who, as your Excellency is aware, is shortly arriving in Riyadh, will bring

[12750]

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with him new proposals in regard to the frontier question. His Majesty's Government hope that these proposals will lead to a settlement and, as all matters affecting the position between Saudi Arabia and Qatar are bound up with a settlement of the frontier question, they prefer to reserve any further discussion of the points raised in the correspondence which has passed between your Excellency and myself until Sir Andrew Ryan's return to Jedda.

Yours sincerely,

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6656/5599/25]

No. 49.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 11.)*

(No. 306. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, October 29, 1935.*

WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 299 of the 22nd October, relative to the reactions in Saudi Arabia to the Italo-Ethiopian war, I have the honour to inform you, as already briefly reported in my telegram No. 197 of the 27th October, that on the 26th October the arms consignment was removed from the Jedda Customs, and loaded on to the large Italian motor-truck and trailer (a Diesel-engined vehicle of Fiat make) and, it is said, on to three other motor lorries. The latter were reported to have left early the next morning, but the truck and trailer remained in front of the Italian Legation until about 10 A.M., when, escorted by a saloon car, it took its departure, the Italian mechanic-instructors, dressed as for a long journey and accompanied by suit-cases and attaché-cases, travelling with it. The arms, it would seem, are being taken to Riyadh, but reports which have reached me suggest that the Italian personnel may only go as far as Ashaira, where the arms are to be handed over to Saudi officers and a demonstration of their uses staged for the benefit of the recipients. Another report, however, states that Signor Odello, with some of his companions, has received an invitation to visit Ibn Saud at Riyadh. This source, which may generally be considered to be well-informed, avers that the Italian Government are prepared to make the Saudi Arab Government a loan, but the latter are at present unable to decide whether to accept, being embarrassed by the question of their indebtedness to His Majesty's Government and, indeed, preoccupied on the subject of their relations with His Majesty's Government generally. My informant inclines to the belief that the loan will be made, and states that the form of the loan, whether financial or in the form of munitions, or both, is being studied by the Saudi authorities in the meantime.

2. That the policy of the Saudi Government was undecided during the period of three weeks the consignment of arms remained here in the Customs Department appears fairly clear, and it may be not without significance that clearance was eventually effected after the return to this country from abroad of the Minister of Finance, who recently proceeded to Riyadh to see the King. It may well be that the uncertainty arises from the reluctance of Ibn Saud to commit himself to the Italians, whom, in the past, he has had good reason to mistrust. As I have already reported it may, with some confidence, be surmised that the influence of his Syrian advisers, perhaps now reinforced by that of Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman, is being exerted in favour of an understanding with the Italians, but my Indian vice-consul has recently heard from a Meccan source that members of the Royal Family, and Nejdīs generally, are strongly opposed to any deal with the Italians, whether over camels or anything else. This corresponds with the general feeling in the Hejaz, where the firm attitude adopted by the King of the Yemen, if reports are to be believed, is favourably contrasted with that of the Saudi Government towards the two parties to the war.

3. As regards the delivery of the camels to the Italians, while no signs have yet been apparent in Jedda, large droves of these animals have been observed recently near Shariya, and the latest reports indicate that a shipment of 1,000 is to be made from Yanbu to-day, an Italian assistant of Signor Odello having left by car yesterday for that port. Also since my despatch under reference, it has been more frequently reported that the Saudi authorities have agreed to sell a number of sheep to the Italians.

4. The short-lived rise in the local prices of food-stuffs, reported in my despatch No. 271 of the 1st October, was followed by another rise later in the month which called forth the intervention of the authorities upon the command of the King. A Royal decree was communicated to the local authorities in the various townships of the Hejaz, but not published in the press, setting up local committees invested with powers to control prices, fix rates of profit, examine the books of commercial concerns, and with judicial powers to inflict punishment, with no apparent provision for appeal. In Jedda merchants were summoned by the Deputy Kaimakam to a meeting, when the decree was announced, and a long discussion ensued, as a result of which a decision was taken by the merchants to appeal for cancellation of the decree and a telegram to that effect was addressed to the King. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 18th October announced that prices had commenced to return to normal, and local merchants were informed that the operations of the committees would be temporarily suspended. It is stated, however, that as a result of the decree merchants have cancelled orders for cereals, &c., placed in India.

5. I have in my telegram No. 197 described how my Turkish colleague informed me that he had recently expressed himself in conversation with prominent Saudi personages in touch with the King, as convinced that Saudi Arabia should at this critical juncture observe an attitude of strict neutrality, and, above all, should do nothing to hazard the friendship of a Power like Great Britain, with whom this country had so many mutual interests. This was a testing-time of Saudi friendship for Great Britain. He went on to describe the recent arrivals of both Italian munitions (which he erroneously described as consisting of two tanks), personnel and motor-vehicles from Massawa as being obviously military in all respects. The men were soldiers, and to the eye of Celal Arat, himself a Turkish veteran, the distinction between officers and other ranks was apparent. He considered this move of the Italians, coming at this juncture, was almost foolish in its lack of discretion as Great Britain would be far from blind to its implications, and expressed the view that the munitions now supplied were only in the nature of ground-bait to facilitate an increase in their political influence in Arabia, and, ultimately, in the whole of this part of the Near East.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, Addis Ababa, Aden, the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, and the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6793/557/25]

No. 50.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 18.)*

(No. 310. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, November 2, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for October 1935.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the case of the report for August 1935.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 50.

JEDDA REPORT FOR OCTOBER 1935.

I.—Internal Affairs.

312. The movements of Ibn Saud have again not been written up in the press, but, according to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, the King has spent a considerable part of the month hunting. Little has been heard of the Amir Saud, except that he is said to be taking lessons in English, and delights to air his few words of that language in conversation with his friends; and Amir Feisal had not returned to Mecca from Riyadh at the end of October.

313. To anticipate the report for next month, on the 1st November the Legation received a telegram from the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs

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L 4



announcing with regret the death of Abdullah-bin-Jiluwi, the Amir of Hasa and cousin of Ibn Saud. The passing of this trusted kinsman and comrade-in-arms of his early days robs the King of one of the most powerful of his leaders, and one whose legend has been perhaps second only to that of Ibn Saud himself. Upon Hasa and further afield along the Persian Gulf the effect of the withdrawal of this stern and dreaded personality will certainly be far-reaching.

314. Sheikh Abdullah-al-Fadhil was appointed, by Royal decree, to act, during the absence of Amir Feisal, as President of the Council of Ministers, a post he has held on previous occasions. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin continued in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and divided his time between Jedda and Mecca. Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman returned from his visit to Egypt and Syria (paragraph 286) on the 20th October, and was accorded a very flattering welcome, especially in Mecca. With the return of his principal assistant, Sheikh Muhammad Surur-as-Saban, a few weeks earlier, the Ministry of Finance is once more at full strength. Sheikh Muhammad Surur was also given a most cordial reception—such is the magic of the Treasury in this little world.

315. Fuad Bey Hamza (paragraph 300) attended the Hejaz Railway Conference at Haifa (see paragraph 338 below), from the 10th–19th October, as Saudi delegate, and was expected by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to return to Jedda early in November.

316. Internally, the situation has remained untroubled. A further shipload of stores left for Jizan by the *Al Fath* towards the end of the month, but the only movement of troops to come to notice was the arrival of 130 soldiers, in ten motor-lorries, from Medina on the 5th, and their departure for Mecca the following day. There has, however, been much marching, counter-marching, early morning tactical exercises and what not, by the small uniformed force forming the Jedda garrison.

317. A well-known Hejazi personage, in conversation here recently immediately upon his return from Riyadh, where he had been the guest of the King, gave an interesting glimpse of Ibn Saud's views on the development of a military organisation in this country. The account, which is given for what it is worth, showed the King in a braggart mood, in which he boasted of his power to summon to his court the remotest and most powerful chieftains in his realm by a slave bearing a simple message. He extolled the ease and speed with which he could mobilise and demobilise, and asked whether anywhere else in the world could an army be assembled so quickly and at so little cost to the State. Why, therefore, should he concern himself to organise his forces on modern lines, as many had urged upon him, and spend millions of rials to little purpose!

318. If there has been any aerial activity, it has been confined to the skies of Taif. One of the White Russian pilots recently went to Egypt and has now returned, having, it is thought, tried to buy spare parts for the Wapitis, but with little success. A wrecked plane whose identity is at present doubtful (save that it is apparently not a Wapiti) was brought in to Jedda by lorry from the direction of Rabigh towards the end of the month. It may be an old De Havilland. The Saudi student pilots are still in Italy, the first batch now having graduated as "aviators." The Italian Chargé d'Affaires admitted in conversation that he had been criticised in Italy for sending them, as apparently the Italians are not impressed. Signor Persico, himself, was rather crushing, for, he said: "Il faut du courage pour voler." One only had shown any real aptitude. The student pilots, too, were at odds amongst themselves, and had indulged some time ago in an unseemly *fracas*.

319. Local prices of food-stuffs (paragraph 302 of last report) again rose both in Mecca and Jedda, due to uneasiness at the situation between Italy and Ethiopia. The authorities once more intervened, and a Royal decree was issued, but not published, setting up in each centre a local committee invested with powers to control prices, fix rates of profit, and with judicial powers to inflict punishment. Jedda merchants appealed to Ibn Saud for the cancellation of the decree, and were informed in reply that the operations of the committees would be suspended. In the meantime, the *Umm-al-Qura* had announced that prices were returning to normal. As a result of the issue of the decree, however, local merchants, it is stated, have cancelled orders for cereals, &c., placed in India.

320. Commencing with the 14th October, the *Umm-al-Qura* has issued daily, except Fridays, a bulletin, at one-half Saudi piastre a time, containing telegraphic news of the situation created by the Italo-Ethiopian conflict.

321. (Paragraph 255 of report for August.) The operations of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited) made considerable strides during October. On the 8th Mr. Twitchell returned to Jedda accompanied by two Englishmen, Messrs. T. P. Larken and D. L. Gibbs, and six Swedes, the latter having been engaged as expert diamond-drillers. Later, the personnel of the syndicate received further reinforcement on the arrival of two more British employees, Messrs. Dunckley and McDermott, and two Americans. Mr. Larken is understood to be the manager at the mine and Mr. Dunckley to be in charge of the Jedda office, while Mr. McDermott, who is the son of the director of that name (paragraph 229 of the report for July), is a surveyor. Mr. C. L. W. Bindloss, the engineer on the Jedda staff of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited), has also been given a post under the syndicate. M. van de Poll went on leave on the 9th, and Mr. Bishop, who has been at the mine during the summer, left Jedda on the 23rd on termination of his engagement. A considerable quantity of vehicles, machinery and stores arrived during the month, and great activity has been displayed in transporting much of this material to the mine. Mr. Twitchell has taken a house in Jedda as the permanent headquarters of the concern. Progress has also been made in road-making operations on the alignment Jedda–Asfan-al-Birka–Mahd-adh-Dhahab, but a difficult section beyond Asfan remains to be dealt with. Houses are being built at the mine of local stone. The position of the mine, according to revised estimates, is now thought to be roughly 23 degrees 30 minutes North by 41 degrees East. A company is stated to have been formed and to have been granted an area of one square mile by the syndicate to prospect.

322. Further references have appeared in the Mecca press that oil has been struck in Hasa. On the 1st October the *Saut-al-Hejaz* announced that the daily output was estimated at 116 barrels, and that the company had agreed to commence boring a second well. The same newspaper on the 22nd stated that the well (the first) had reached a depth of 2,000 feet and that it only remained to bore a further 40 feet. The local staff of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company recently were understood to consider that the oil so far obtained was not in commercial quantities.

323. (Paragraph 290 of last report.) A consignment of twenty-five cases of silver coins (rupees), estimated to be about 100,000 rupees, was discharged here by the steamship *Islami* from India on the 8th. There has been a certain return movement of specie from time to time, but in very small amounts.

324. The Saudi Government have decided to have a condenser plant installed at Jizan, a project which has been under consideration, it is believed, since the late Saudi-Yemen War. Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. have tendered for the supply of the plant, but the manager recently appeared to think that the practical difficulties of handling and landing the bulky machinery, including a large boiler, at Jizan would prove a problem.

325. (Paragraph 286 of last report.) On the 1st October one of the small vessels of the Société Misr de Navigation maritime landed a consignment of fifty-four barrels of Shell asphalt, intended for an experimental stretch of road-way in the vicinity of Jedda. A Greek engineer and an Egyptian, said to represent Talaat Harb Pasha, arrived by the same boat, and a Khedivial Mail vessel also landed, on behalf of the Banque Misr, a mixing-machine for use in road-construction. This development would appear to be the first-fruits of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman's recent activities in Egypt. The two representatives of the Egyptian concern lost no time in getting to work and quickly laid down, immediately outside the Medina Gate of Jedda, a length of about 100 yards of asphalt, without any special preparation of the foundation as far as could be observed. The Greek engineer left again for Egypt a week or ten days later.

326. A proposal has been approved by the King for the collection by a committee of local merchants of one-half piastre miri on each package of merchandise imported through Jedda. The proceeds of this tax are to be devoted to the support of the "Al Falah" schools of Jedda and Mecca, hitherto maintained by the Ali Ridha family, having been founded, with the help of donations from India and elsewhere, by Hajji Muhammad Ali Ridha, former Kaimakam of Jedda.

327. The Saudi Institution in Mecca intends to include the teaching of English in its syllabus, and the press contained a notice inviting teachers with a knowledge of the language to apply for the post.



328. (Paragraph 291 of last report.) Sheikh Muhammad Tawil returned to Hasa at the beginning of the month, taking with him the newly-appointed personnel recruited in the Hejaz.

329. According to the *Saut-al-Hejaz* of the 5th October, a Royal commission, including Khalid-el-Qarqani, has been appointed to carry out a thorough investigation of the Posts and Telegraphs Administration. They are stated to have embarked upon their labours.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

330. (Paragraph 233 of report for July.) The incident of the transgression of the Saudi-Transjordan frontier in July by an officer of the Transjordan Frontier Force, Captain Chamberlain, was closed during the month when His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, in accordance with a promise originally given to the Saudi authorities, informed the Saudi Arab Government of the disciplinary action taken by the authorities in Transjordan. A reply expressing appreciation was received in acknowledgment.

331. The alleged infraction of the Saudi-Transjordan frontier at Alqân by aircraft of the Royal Air Force (paragraph 299) was the subject of further exchanges. The Transjordan authorities, after investigation, replied that no Royal Air Force machine had flown south of Ma'an on the 15th, 16th or 17th August, but the Saudi authorities, not satisfied with this explanation, stated that an aeroplane, although perhaps not Royal Air Force, actually crossed the frontier and requested further enquiries. The question was, therefore, again referred to Transjordan.

332. About the 9th October, Ibn Saud despatched a caravan of motor-cars via Qarayāt-al-Melh to Damascus for the purpose of escorting to Riyadh two ladies of the family of Nuri Shaalan. Colonel Mackereth reports that they are the daughters of the late Nawwaf Shaalan and so grand-daughters of Nuri, and adds that the younger is to wed the Amir Feisal (see paragraph 312 above) and the elder, whose uncle is Sheikh Mithkal-al-Faiz of Transjordan, is to marry Ibn Saud. Reports here mention the Amir Saud rather than the Amir Feisal as the prospective bridegroom of the younger girl. The alliance, entered into with a view to cementing relations with this powerful Ruwalla family, has considerable political significance.

333. Relations with the Yemen call for little comment. The Saudi press, however, continued to reproduce reports regarding the attitude of the Yemen to the Italo-Ethiopian war, and the defensive measures the Yemeni Government are reported to be taking in fortifying certain points on their coast.

## III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

334. Sir Andrew Ryan left England on the 25th October. He is returning to Jedda by way of Riyadh, where he will remain as the guest of the King from about the 22nd-26th November, and will travel from Egypt via Bagdad, Koweit and Bahrein by air. He will be accompanied from Bagdad by Captain de Gaury, and will be met at Riyadh by a party from the Legation consisting of Mr. Oppenheim and Mr. Ousman. Sir Andrew will have a number of questions of importance to discuss with Ibn Saud, further to the conversations which took place in London during the summer with Fuad Bey Hamza.

335. The note to the Saudi Government on the subject of the Koweit blockade, outlined in paragraph 296 of last month's report, evoked a reply as rigidly unyielding as before. Whilst they agreed to the closure of the incident of the armed incursion, they rejected the attempt to fasten upon them responsibility for the present situation. That responsibility must fall on the Koweit Government, for the Saudi Government had in no way sought to interfere in the internal affairs of Koweit. On the contrary, Saudi interests were suffering from the action taken by Koweit. The Saudi note maintained that their demands at the conference were reasonable, and involved sacrifices which the Saudi Government were prepared to face in the interests of a settlement. But no settlement could be contemplated that did not afford an absolute guarantee by Koweit of the entire cessation of smuggling from her territory. The terms of this communication were being studied by the authorities concerned at the end of the month.

336. (Paragraph 297 of last report.) Sheikh Yusuf Yasin replied on the 15th October to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires' letter regarding the questions of the Qatar oil concession and of the frontier with Saudi Arabia. He was unable to admit that Ibn Saud was bound under the Treaty of Jedda to refrain from direct correspondence with the sheikhs of the Persian Gulf, and his Government could not recognise the legal rights to which His Majesty's Government now laid claim. The Saudi Government therefore reserved their rights completely, but were prepared to discuss a settlement of the frontiers question in a friendly spirit. To this Mr. Calvert replied suggesting that the matter be reserved for discussion with Sir Andrew Ryan, who was returning from leave shortly with new proposals, a suggestion to which Sheikh Yusuf Yasin agreed.

337. The draft regulations regarding foreign dispensaries, &c., referred to at paragraph 298 of last month's report, were promulgated on the 4th October, and were to come into force one month after that date.

338. The Hejaz Railway Conference at Haifa (paragraph 300 of last month's report) opened on the 10th October, with Fuad Bey Hamza as the Saudi delegate. The inspector arrived at Haifa in time for the conference, through the co-operation of the Transjordan authorities, and other Saudis present included Muhammad Kenan, Jedda municipal engineer, and (from newspaper accounts, it would appear) Khalid Bey Al Hakim. Little news reached Jedda of the fate of the conference, but Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, who informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that it had come to an end on the 19th, was pessimistic. He attributed failure to the intransigence of the French authorities and spoke appreciatively of the assistance afforded Fuad Bey Hamza by the authorities in Palestine. M. Maigret left Jedda suddenly on the 5th October in response to an urgent summons to be present at Haifa during the proceedings.

339. (Paragraph 303 of last report.) The Saudi authorities still preserve a complete silence over the unofficial Haramayn Waqfs mission. The two members representing Medina who some time ago went to Taif, preparatory it may be supposed to leaving for abroad, returned to Medina early in the month. It does not, therefore, appear likely that the mission will be leaving just yet.

340. The number of destitute Indians in Hasa (paragraph 304 of last report) grew during the month to about 500. The Government of India agreed to their repatriation *via* Bahrein, and at the end of the month measures were being concerted direct between the Political Agent at Bahrein and the Saudi authorities in Hasa for their shipment to India.

341. (Paragraph 158 of the report for May.) The form to which the results of the Bahrein Conference were to be reduced was discussed with Fuad Bey Hamza in London, and subsequently draft notes were drawn up in the Foreign Office. These were submitted to Fuad Bey, at his own request, after he had left England, for his personal concurrence, but this eventually he felt unable to give. After this unlooked-for delay, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires was instructed to submit the draft notes formally to the Saudi Government, which was done on the 14th October. On the 19th, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin orally raised one or two points in the draft notes, and at the end of the month further instructions had reached Mr. Calvert in regard to these.

342. (Reference paragraphs 301 and 302.) The month witnessed some piquant developments in the local reactions to the Italo-Ethiopian crisis. On the 3rd October, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, under instructions, informed Sheikh Yusuf Yasin that His Majesty's Government could not be expected to answer hypothetical questions regarding the effects of closing the Suez Canal, an event which there was no reason to suppose would come to pass, nor was it anticipated that shipping and particularly pilgrim ships would be interfered with in the Red Sea or in the Canal. On the 6th, the sheikh visited Mr. Calvert to inform him that a consignment of munitions had actually arrived the day before by Italian ship from Italy via Massawa. He represented their arrival as a complete surprise to the Saudi authorities who had been filled with consternation on being informed on the 4th by the Italian Legation of the imminent arrival of the consignment. It was true, said Sheikh Yusuf, that during the Amir Saud's visit to Italy the subject of a supply of arms had been discussed and that the Saudi Government had agreed to see some samples. But the moment was obviously unpropitious and the Saudis had allowed the matter to drop, until they were so abruptly reminded of the subject by the Italians. The consignment was, after urgent reference to Ibn Saud, allowed to be landed, but



was to remain in the Jedda Customs, and a party of nine Italians accompanying the consignment was also permitted to come ashore. The arms, which were consigned by an Italian firm (believed to be Fiat) to Signor Odello, would be regarded as being imported as part of a purely commercial transaction. The sheikh pitched this yarn with something less than his customary self-assurance. Indeed, as the projected arrival of the party of Italians had been rumoured in Jedda several days before they appeared, and as accommodation for them was said to have been reserved in advance in the Government-owned hotel here, and as a number of sambuqs had also been standing by twenty-four hours before the Italian Legation sprang their surprise on the unwitting sheikh, the story did not entirely carry conviction. On the 16th, a large motor-truck and trailer (of Fiat make) arrived by Italian ship from Massawa with, it was reported, two attendant mechanics, and this monstrous vehicle, of a bilious yellow colour, was soon seen and heard in the streets of Jedda. On the 26th, three weeks after being landed, the consignment of munitions was removed from the Customs Department and loaded upon the truck and trailer, and sundry other vehicles, which on the following day took their departure, together with the Italian mechanic-instructors, for a destination which report variously gave as Riyadh and Taif. The truck and trailer, which had some difficulty owing to bad going, returned to Jedda on the 31st, but the personnel, it is believed, remained either at Taif or went on further towards Riyadh.

343. There seems some ground for the conjecture that Ibn Saud was at first unwilling to permit the Italian munitions to be landed, and that he finally yielded to the persuasions of some of his advisers. Opinion in Nejd is stated to be opposed to a policy of traffic with the Italians, as it is in the Hejaz, and members of the Royal family are said to be strongly averse from permitting the sale of camels. Be this as it may, no camels have as yet been seen in Jedda, but large droves have been reported up-country in the neighbourhood of Shariya, and rumours of the embarkation of about 1,000 at Yanbu on the 29th are current. It is of interest to note, however, that one fairly good source, as this report is being penned, states that orders have been issued cancelling this shipment of camels. Whether true or not, it would seem fairly certain that Saudi official circles are at present the prey of very divided counsels. Meanwhile, the Saudi Government have caused to appear in the Egyptian news-sheet, the *Ahram*, a positive statement of this country's strict neutrality, attributed to an anonymous but well informed source in Mecca. Sheikh Yusuf foreshadowed a declaration of this nature in conversation with Mr. Calvert on the 6th October, and may be presumed to be the father of this declaration.

344. Popular sympathy locally with Abyssinia is stated to have become vocal on occasion, notably when a crowd listening to a wireless amplification of news of the course of hostilities in Abyssinia could not forbear to cheer the reports of Abyssinian successes. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires was thereupon moved to protest to the Saudi Government against this demonstration as contrary to the friendly relations subsisting between the two countries, Saudi Arabia and Italy, with the result that the headmen of quarters received orders to prevent any similar occurrence in future. Official frowns, moreover, have been directed at some of the younger boys of Jedda who, having discovered an exciting new game involving desperate encounters between Abyssinians and Italians, had turned the streets of Jedda into an Ethiopian battlefield. All might have been well if the principal rule of the game had not been that the Abyssinians always won, but this was too much, it was stated, for the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, who again appealed to the authorities and sanctions were applied.

345. In view of the statement of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin on the 25th August, recorded at paragraph 268 of the report for that month, that the treaty negotiations with Abyssinia were being suspended, it was surprising to learn on the 30th October of the arrival of an Abyssinian mission in Jedda. The mission, headed by Blata Ayeule Guebre, has been in the Yemen for the exchange of ratifications of the recently negotiated Yemen-Ethiopian Treaty and has come overland to Taif. Their presence was reported by the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 31st October. They are being accommodated for the time being at the Kandara Palace, as the guests of the Government.

346. The proposal of the Saudi Government, recorded at paragraph 306 of the report for June, for a postal service between Jizan and Kamaran, has met with the approval of the Posts and Telegraphs Department of the Government

of India, and on the 31st October His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires addressed the Saudi Government putting forward certain conditions on which such a service might be established.

347. As already described M. Maigret left on the 5th October to attend the Hejaz Railway Conference at Haifa, and was still away at the end of the month. The official stationery of the French mission here now bears the device "Légation de France," although no official announcement of the change of status has yet appeared. The Netherlands Chargé returned from leave on the 27th October. The Turkish Legation has now taken to flying the Turkish national flag on Sundays instead of on Fridays as heretofore, and the Chargé has taken unto himself a surname *nouveau style*.

348. The Egyptian consul has now completed the distribution of Egyptian charity (reference paragraph 242) to the poor of Medina, who have each received a quantity of wheat and a small sum in cash.

#### IV.—Miscellaneous.

349. The first pilgrim ship of the season, to anticipate the report for next month, arrived on the morning of the 1st November. She was the *Teiresias* from the Netherlands East Indies and the Straits Settlements, with 558 pilgrims on board.

350. A new Italian doctor Mario Fea arrived in Jedda about the 10th October.

351. (Reference paragraph 309). It has now been learnt that Signor Caro Caglieri has left the country.

352. Government administrations during the month have packed up and returned from Taif to Mecca. Rains are reported from both Taif and Medina.

353. The Amir Saud was reported to have commenced laying out a race-course at Riyadh, upon the most approved European lines.

354. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the British Legation was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: 1 male.  
Took refuge in October: 1 male, 2 females.  
Manumitted and repatriated: 1 male.  
Locally manumitted: 2 females.  
Left voluntarily: Nil.  
On hand at the end of the month: 1 male.

355. The Legation has had the satisfaction of manumitting and repatriating a youth, enslaved years ago, whose mother has for some years come regularly from the Sudan on pilgrimage with the object of finding her son. Hearing of this the boy managed to escape to the Legation and, the woman having been traced, the boy has been returned to her.

[E 6798/6489/25]

No. 51.

Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 316.)

Sir,

Jedda, November 5, 1935.

WITH reference to telegraphic correspondence ending with my telegram No. 206 of the 4th November, relative to the death of the Amir of Hasa, Abdullah-bin-Jiluwi, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the telegram<sup>(1)</sup> I addressed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs conveying an expression of the sympathy of His Majesty's Government and of the reply of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, which I briefly communicated to you in my telegram under reference<sup>(1)</sup>. In addition, I enclose copies of a similar telegram<sup>(1)</sup> I have to-day addressed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Government of India and their reply<sup>(1)</sup> and also of a letter to Fuad Bey Hamza unofficially conveying the sympathy of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Political Agents at Koweit and Bahrein.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



2. As I had arranged a meeting with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin for the morning of the 2nd November, in connexion with the Bahrein transit dues draft notes, I took that early opportunity of informing him that I had communicated the news at once to you, Sir, and of expressing my personal regret and offering my condolences. Sheikh Yusuf expressed his thanks and undertook to convey them to the King.

3. Sheikh Yusuf referred to Abdullah-bin-Jiluwi as the most trusted of Ibn Saud's leaders, and related in particular the part he played in the historic recapture of Riyadh by the "Arba'in" ("The Forty"). Ibn Jiluwi died of diabetes, but had reached an advanced age (Sheikh Yusuf hazarded 75 to 80 years of age), and some eight or nine months ago the American Mission doctor, Dr. Dame, had informed him, Sheikh Yusuf, that the Amir of Hasa had not long to live.

4. Happily, added Sheikh Yusuf, Ibn Jiluwi leaves behind a son (aged, I gathered, about 35 to 40) who possesses all the character of his father, and he appeared to think that upon the son would fall Ibn Saud's choice for the vacant post of Amir of Hasa.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to the Government of India, Bushire, Koweit and Bahrein.

I have, &c.  
A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6799/5599/25]

No. 52.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 18.)*

(No. 317. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, November 5, 1935.*

WITH reference to my confidential despatch No. 306 of the 29th October, relative to the reactions in Saudi Arabia to the Italo-Ethiopian war, I have the honour to inform you that the Fiat truck and trailer, which left with the consignment of munitions on the 27th October, returned to Jedda, together with the Italian personnel, on the 31st. It is reported that this ponderous vehicle had considerable difficulty in negotiating the difficult roads and did not impress the Saudis very favourably. A much happier impression is stated to have been created by the munitions, which one is led to believe included a fast light tank, apt over any sort of rough going, a four-barrelled anti-aircraft gun, light field guns, machine guns and rifles. The report mentioned in my despatch under reference that a demonstration was to be given at Ashaira appears well founded, as from a later source I hear that demonstrations of the capacities of the tank and others of the munitions of war were satisfactorily held at Ashaira before Saudi officers and Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman, the Minister of Finance, who is at the same time, it will be remembered, Deputy Minister of Defence.

2. The subsequent history of the arms consignment has not yet come definitely to light. It may have been taken on by the Saudi authorities themselves to Riyadh, but other reports have suggested that Taif was their destination. Against this is the fact that Ashaira is on the Riyadh, and not on the Taif, road. Signor Odello has not been to Riyadh, but is at present in Jedda.

3. The nine mechanics who first accompanied the arms consignment on its arrival here left by Italian ship for Massawa on the 4th November. It can therefore hardly be supposed that they were instructors, and incidentally it may be wondered how Saudi soldiery, with little mechanical knowledge, will cope with so complicated a piece of Western mechanism as a fast light tank. The two mechanics attendant on the truck and trailer are believed to be still here.

4. The delivery of camels to the Italians, which was to commence, according to a report quoted in my despatch under reference, with an initial shipment of 1,000 from Yanbu on the 29th October, is believed to have been further delayed. One source speaks of a cancellation of the deal by Ibn Saud, and professes to have confirmation of this. Another source states that 1,000 camels are lying at a village about one and a half hours' journey from Yanbu, whence they were due to be shipped on the 2nd or 3rd November.

5. I am reporting separately on the arrival in Jedda of an official Ethiopian mission, which arrived here on the 31st October from Sana by land via Hodayda, Jisan, Abha and Taif. They are the guests of the Saudi Government and are accommodated in the Kandara Palace, some 2 or 3 miles from the town. I have not as yet heard that their presence has aroused any special and outward signs of public interest.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, Addis Ababa, Aden, the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.  
A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6800/6800/25]

No. 53.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 18.)*

(No. 318.)

Sir,

*Jedda, November 6, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Mecca newspaper *Saut-al-Hejaz*, published on the 29th October a short notice that the leading merchants of Jedda had petitioned the King to sanction a tax of a half piastre miri, about 1d., on every package imported from abroad into the Hejaz, the proceeds to be in aid of the Falah schools of Jedda and Mecca, which include, besides a boys' school in each town, the girls' school of Jedda. The notice announced that the King's approval had been granted.

2. The Falah schools were founded in 1904 by Haji Muhammad Ali Zainal Ali Ridha (Alireza), at his own expense, except for about 80,000 rupees subscribed in India for the construction of the school building in Jedda. Until 1931 Hajji Muhammad Ali continued to defray all expenses. Both religious and secular teaching is given in these schools, English being on the syllabus. In Mecca, the teaching staff consists of thirty-four, and in Jedda, at the boys' school, of twenty-four. Pupils in Mecca number some 800, and in Jedda, boys only, about 700. Since 1931 the schools have been supported by subscriptions from several local firms and by other charity. It will be remembered that an effort was made during the visit of Talaat Pasha Harb in 1934 to interest him in the girls' school, but with little success.

3. Owing to the lack of good management and control and also to insufficient funds, the condition of the schools has become so bad, it is said, that the local merchants made an effort to raise a special fund, which amounted to 4,000 rials (about £400), a quarter of which was subscribed once more by the family of Ali Ridha. This sum being insufficient, the merchants petitioned the King as mentioned above.

4. The tax, which will be collected by the shipping agencies and handed over to a special committee of merchants, has already been enforced for some weeks in Jedda, and orders are expected to be sent soon to Yanbu and Rabegh. This method of collection, independent of the Government, is so alien to this country that, in my opinion, it may soon undergo a change.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India and the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.  
A. S. CALVERT.

[E 6769/6769/93]

No. 54.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 18.)*

(No. 589.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, November 6, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to report that ten officers of the Yamani army recently arrived in Bagdad for training with the Iraqi army.

2. Five are young men who have entered the military cadet college, and five have been attached to the signal unit for a course of special technical training.



3. I learn that five other vacancies are being reserved in the military college for cadets from Saudi Arabia. It is not yet certain, however, whether these will be filled.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda and to the Political Resident at Aden.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 6548/269/91]

No. 55.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Mr. Calvert (Jedda).*

(No. 334.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, November 19, 1935.*

AS a result of the recent correspondence between Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and yourself, arising out of the action of King Abdul Aziz in addressing the Sheikh of Qatar about the southern boundary of his State, it appears that the Saudi Government are not prepared to admit that they are under any obligation to refrain from direct correspondence on political matters with the rulers of the Arab States in the Persian Gulf who are in special relations with His Majesty's Government.

2. You will recall that, in accordance with my instructions, you informed Sheikh Yusuf Yasin in your letter of the 26th September that His Majesty's Government had learnt with surprise that the Saudi Government (*i.e.*, King Abdul Aziz) had sent a letter to the Sheikh of Qatar on matters affecting his foreign relations, which, as the Saudi Government knew, were conducted by His Majesty's Government in virtue of their special treaty relations with the sheikh. In a later paragraph of the same letter you pointed out that the language of King Abdul Aziz's letter to the sheikh (which was threatening in tone) obliged His Majesty's Government to draw the attention of the Saudi Government to the obligation which His Majesty had assumed in article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the Arab States in the Persian Gulf.

3. In his reply to this letter on the 15th October, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin expressed the surprise of his Government that His Majesty's Government should disapprove of direct correspondence between King Abdul Aziz and the Sheikh of Qatar. He admitted that article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda obliged King Abdul Aziz to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the Arab rulers in question, but affirmed that it did not in any way preclude His Majesty from corresponding with them direct; in fact, he added that such correspondence "assures the friendly and peaceful relations which His Majesty undertook to maintain." The sheikh concluded by asserting that the provisions of the treaties between His Majesty's Government and the Arab rulers, which are mentioned in article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda, were not binding in any way as between those rulers and King Abdul Aziz.

4. As Sir Andrew Ryan was about to proceed to Riyadh to visit King Abdul Aziz himself, and there was no advantage in pursuing this controversy further with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin at Jedda meanwhile, I decided to instruct you simply to inform the Saudi Government that Sir Andrew Ryan would shortly arrive in Arabia with authority to make new proposals for a settlement of the broader question of the frontiers in eastern and south-eastern Arabia, and not to pursue the subsidiary question of the interpretation of article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda. At the same time I caused the question of the obligation on the Saudi Government to avoid direct correspondence with the Arab rulers to be examined from the legal point of view, with special reference to the terms of article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda.

5. As a result of this examination, I am advised that the obligations incumbent on King Abdul Aziz in his relations with the Arab rulers in the Persian Gulf derive not only from the terms of article 6, but also from the existence of the treaties between those rulers and His Majesty's Government, which were communicated to the King at his own request in 1927 at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Jedda. You will recollect that you made this point in your letter of the 20th September to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin; the latter, however, whether deliberately or owing to a misunderstanding, took the line in

his reply of the 15th October that His Majesty's Government were basing their argument solely on the Treaty of Jedda. It will, therefore, be convenient to consider in the first place the obligations which devolve on King Ibn Saud quite apart from the existence of article 6.

6. The existence of special treaties between His Majesty's Government and the Arab rulers by which the latter undertake not to enter into direct relations with any other foreign Government does not impose any treaty obligation on Saudi Arabia or any other State not to enter into direct relations with the rulers. On the other hand, if Saudi Arabia, knowing of the existence of these treaties (since they have been officially communicated to her Government), were, nevertheless, to persist in trying to enter into such direct relations, her action would amount to endeavouring to persuade the rulers concerned to violate their treaty obligations towards His Majesty's Government. Saudi Arabia would therefore be committing an unfriendly act towards His Majesty's Government, and one such as would normally provoke a strong reaction.

7. The question next arises of the change (if any) introduced by article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda into the general position as described above. It cannot be denied that at first sight the undertaking given by King Abdul Aziz in article 6 "to maintain friendly and peaceful relations . . ." might be read (as Sheikh Yusuf Yasin has, in fact, tried to read it) as meaning that both parties accepted the position that the King was to be in direct relations with the rulers of the Arab States in question. This impression is enhanced in the case of Qatar by the reference in the article to "relations with the territories of Koweit and Bahrein and the Sheikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast," which gives some support to the Saudi argument that in the case of the Sheikh of Qatar direct relations were actually intended between King Abdul Aziz and the sheikh.

8. I am advised, however, that on consideration being given to all the relevant circumstances, this interpretation could hardly be maintained. The special treaty relations between the Arab rulers and His Majesty's Government are specifically mentioned in article 6 itself, and, as their most important feature is the control which His Majesty's Government are given over the foreign relations of these rulers, it would be expected that if article 6 intended to make a departure from this principle, it would say so in unambiguous words. Consequently, article 6 should not be read as intended to sanction a departure from these treaties, unless there is no other meaning which can be attributed to its terms. It is, however, perfectly possible to give full effect to every word in article 6 without involving any departure from the treaties, because, when King Abdul Aziz undertook, towards His Majesty's Government by article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda, to maintain friendly relations with the Arab rulers, this did not mean that in his dealings with them he was to ignore the ordinary diplomatic channels. Under their treaties with His Majesty's Government relations between the Arab rulers and the outside world are to be conducted through His Majesty's Government and, consequently, the latter are the proper diplomatic channel for relations between the Sheikh of Qatar, or any of the other Arab rulers, and King Abdul Aziz.

9. Another cogent and important argument as against the thesis developed by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin is that it is precisely because of these special treaty relations and of the position which they create for His Majesty's Government that it was necessary to insert the provisions of article 6 in a treaty between King Abdul Aziz and His Majesty's Government, and that the King's undertaking to maintain friendly relations with the Arab rulers was not included instead in a treaty between himself and those rulers.

10. Sir Andrew Ryan, on his return to his post, should be guided by the considerations set out in this despatch in any discussions or correspondence he may have with the Saudi Government in regard to the question of direct correspondence with the Arab States on the Persian Gulf. At the same time he should, of course, be careful to avoid giving the impression that the terms of article 6 are in any way ambiguous, or that they could, on any interpretation, be read as giving King Abdul Aziz a right to correspond on political matters with the rulers of the Arab States of Koweit, Bahrein, Qatar and the Trucial Coast direct.

I am, &c.

SAMUEL HOARE.



[E 7005/1638/25]

No. 56.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 2.)*

(No. 325.)

Sir,

Jedda, November 12, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 281 of the 9th October, concerning the activities of the Banque Misr in this country, and more especially their interest in road making, I have the honour to report that the kilometre of asphalt road which it was expected the Banque Misr engineers would lay down as a sample, dwindled in fact to a short stretch of some hundred yards. This was very quickly completed and the Greek engineer left again for Egypt some ten days later. Nothing more having been heard of the Egyptian engineer, it is probable that he also has returned home.

2. The hundred yards of road lies outside the Medina gate of Jedda on ground which, owing to its firmness, one might mistrust as a reliable test for a road which, if and when constructed, will have to pass on its way to Mecca, over hills, wadi beds and shifting sands. No special preparation, as far as could be seen, was given to the foundation, the land merely being levelled and the asphalt laid. As for cost, it is now said that the estimate for laying the whole Mecca-Jedda road is less than the £45,000 quoted in my despatch under reference, but the exact figure is not known.

3. Talaat Pasha Harb is reported to intend visiting the Hejaz after Ramadan, which ends with the end of December, so the roadway project may then be re-examined and a decision taken whether or not to proceed with the construction of the Mecca road.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Department of Overseas Trade, his Excellency the Viceroy of India and to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &amp;c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 7143/191/25]

No. 57.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 9.)*

(No. 323.)

Sir,

Jedda, November 19, 1935.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 211 of the 18th November, relative to the Bahrein transit dues and the notes exchanged with the Saudi Arab Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the two notes addressed by me to the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 16th November, and translations of the replies, signed by Fuad Bey Hamza, and dated the 17th November, which reached me from Mecca on the 18th November.

2. Upon the receipt of Bahrein's telegram No. 164 of the 15th November, I got into touch early on the 16th November with Fuad Bey Hamza by telephone, as he had left Jedda for Mecca, preparatory to leaving for Riyadh, on the previous evening. I explained the suggested alterations in respect of both points in your telegram No. 151 of the 13th November. He at once accepted the substitution suggested in the second paragraph of your telegram and a satisfactory Arabic translation was agreed between us.

3. Fuad Bey raised no objection to the use in the English text of the word "off" in the phrase "anchoring off Bahrein," but as it would be difficult to render this sense exactly in Arabic, without a cumbersome and possibly dangerous circumlocution, I share the view that no change in the Arabic texts could well be introduced. The Arabic, which my senior interpreter translates as "at," is literally "in Bahrein," and I pointed out to Fuad Bey that the use of the word "in" in English would be unsuitable and inexact. Fuad Bey also accepted the suggestion to insert the phrase in parenthesis "(that is, loaded and unloaded direct from ships into dhows and dhows into ships anchoring off Bahrein)" between "trans-shipped" and "without being landed" at the end of paragraph 2 of the main note. He raised no objection to this interpolation being omitted from paragraphs 4 and 6 of the English text, but demurred to its omission

from those paragraphs of the Arabic text, on account of the alleged lack of a satisfactory rendering of the word "trans-shipped" in Arabic. As you were of the opinion that the paraphrase, though clumsy, was not objectionable, I did not make any difficulty, but caused our Arabic text to conform. In regard to the *Ahmedi* note, I omitted the interpolation in both English and Arabic and the Saudi text follows suit.

4. With regard to paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 131, Fuad readily undertook to modify the form of the Saudi draft note, as, indeed, I had suggested on the 11th November (my despatch No. 323 of the 12th November, paragraph 7 (a)).

5. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to Government of India, Bushire and Bahrein, and to the two latter posts I am forwarding copies of the Arabic text of the Saudi notes in addition.

I have, &amp;c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 57.

*Mr. Calvert to the Amir Feisal, Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*Your Royal Highness,  
(After Compliments.)

Jedda, November 16, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Royal Highness, in accordance with instructions addressed to me by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have taken cognisance of the proceedings at the conference held in March and April of this year between delegates of the Governments of Saudi Arabia and of Bahrein, and that they are prepared to enter into an agreement, on behalf of and with the consent of the Government of Bahrein, regarding the treatment of goods destined for or exported from ports in Saudi Arabia, and carried in ships calling at Bahrein, on the following basis:—

1. Duty at the rate of 2 per cent. *ad valorem* shall continue to be levied on goods consigned to ports in Saudi Arabia, or exported from ports in Saudi Arabia, which are landed at Bahrein in order to be re-exported.

2. Duty at the rate of 1½ per cent. *ad valorem* shall be levied on goods consigned to ports in Saudi Arabia, or exported from ports in Saudi Arabia, which are trans-shipped (that is, loaded and unloaded direct from ships into dhows and dhows into ships anchoring off Bahrein) without being landed.

3. In consideration of the reduction in the ordinary rate of 2 per cent., which is provided for in the preceding paragraph, the Saudi Government will not make any request for exemption from the above-mentioned duties in the case of goods consigned to His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia or to his Government.

4. Customs duty at the rate of not more than 5 per cent. *ad valorem* shall be levied on dates imported into Bahrein from the ports of Saudi Arabia, but the rate provided for in paragraph 2 above shall be levied on dates trans-shipped without being landed. The above-mentioned duties shall be calculated on the basis of the wholesale price of dates of similar quality in Bahrein market on the day on which the consignment in question is cleared from the Customs.

5. The Bahrein Government shall issue manifests to all vessels leaving Bahrein for ports in Saudi Arabia on the understanding that the Government of Saudi Arabia shall similarly issue manifests to all vessels leaving ports in Saudi Arabia for Bahrein.

6. The minimum number of packages which may be trans-shipped without being landed shall in future be 100 packages.

7. The present agreement shall come into force from the date of this exchange of notes. Should economic conditions at any time render it necessary, in the opinion of the Government of Saudi Arabia or the Government of Bahrein, to reconsider the arrangements set forth in the foregoing paragraphs, the Government desiring to modify them shall inform the other Government through

[12750]

M 2



the diplomatic channel. Should the two Governments be unable to reach agreement in regard to such amendment, it shall be open to either Government to terminate the present agreement on giving six months' notice of their intention to do so.

I am instructed to suggest that, if the arrangements set forth above are agreeable to the Government of Saudi Arabia, your Royal Highness will inform me accordingly and that this note and your reply thereto shall be held to constitute a binding agreement between the parties.

With highest respects,  
A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure 2 in No. 57.

*Mr. Calvert to the Amir Feisal, Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Your Royal Highness,  
(After Compliments.)

*Jedda, November 16, 1935.*

WITH reference to the note which we have exchanged to-day regarding the future treatment of goods imported into or exported from Saudi Arabia by way of Bahrein, I am instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to refer to the discussion which took place at the conference in Bahrein in March and April of this year regarding the procedure followed by the authorities at Bahrein in the case of the steamship *Ahmedi*, when she called at Bahrein in November 1932. I am authorised to assure your Royal Highness, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Bahrein, that the authorities in Bahrein will not at any future time claim any duties whatsoever on goods shipped to or from ports in Saudi Arabia in ships calling at Bahrein when the goods in question are intended to be taken direct to their destination in the ships carrying them and not to be landed at Bahrein for re-export or trans-shipped without being landed. The permanent validity of this assurance will not be affected by any notification which may be made in accordance with the paragraph numbered 7 in my note of to-day.

With highest respects,  
A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure 3 in No. 57.

*Fuad Bey Hamza to Mr. Calvert.*

(Translation.)

Honourable Chargé d'Affaires,

*Mecca, November 17, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of the 19th Shaban, 1354 (the 16th November, 1935), relative to the agreement concerning goods exported from territories of the Saudi Arab Kingdom and imported into their ports in ships anchoring off Bahrein, about which discussions were exchanged last spring between the representatives of my Government and of the Government of Bahrein.

It provides for the following points:—

1. Duty at the rate of 2 per cent. *ad valorem* shall continue to be levied on goods consigned to ports in Saudi Arabia, or exported from ports in Saudi Arabia, which are landed at Bahrein in order to be re-exported.

2. Duty at the rate of 1½ per cent. *ad valorem* shall be levied on goods consigned to ports in Saudi Arabia, or exported from ports in Saudi Arabia, which are trans-shipped (that is, loaded and unloaded direct from ships into dhows and dhows into ships anchoring off Bahrein) without being landed.

3. In consideration of the reduction in the ordinary rate of 2 per cent., which is provided for in the preceding paragraph, the Saudi Government will not make any request for exemption from the above-mentioned duties in the case of goods consigned to His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia or to his Government.

4. Customs duty at the rate of not more than 5 per cent. *ad valorem* shall be levied on dates imported into Bahrein from the ports of Saudi Arabia, but the rate provided for in paragraph 2 above shall be levied on dates trans-shipped (that is, loaded and unloaded direct from ships into dhows and dhows into ships anchoring off Bahrein) without being landed. The above-mentioned duties shall be calculated on the basis of the wholesale price of dates of similar quality in Bahrein market on the day on which the consignment in question is cleared from the Customs.

5. The Bahrein Government shall issue manifests to all vessels leaving Bahrein for ports in Saudi Arabia on the understanding that the Government of Saudi Arabia shall similarly issue manifests to all vessels leaving ports in Saudi Arabia for Bahrein.

6. The minimum number of packages which may be trans-shipped (that is, loaded and unloaded direct from ships into dhows and dhows into ships anchoring off Bahrein) without being landed shall in future be 100 packages.

7. The present agreement shall come into force from the date of this exchange of notes. Should economic conditions at any time render it necessary, in the opinion of the Government of Saudi Arabia or the Government of Bahrein, to reconsider the arrangements set forth in the foregoing paragraphs, the Government desiring to modify them shall inform the other Government through the diplomatic channel. Should the two Governments be unable to reach agreement in regard to such amendment, it shall be open to either Government to terminate the present agreement on giving six months' notice of their intention to do so.

The Government of His Majesty the King agree to the above-mentioned arrangements and consider your note under reference and this note of mine a document effecting agreement, and each of them is complementary to the other.

With highest respects,  
FUAD HAMZA.

Enclosure 4 in No. 57.

*Fuad Bey Hamza to Mr. Calvert.*

(Translation.)

Honourable Chargé d'Affaires,

*Mecca, November 17, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of the 16th November, 1935 (the 19th Shaban, 1354), of which the text is as follows:—

“With reference to the note which we have exchanged to-day regarding the future treatment of goods imported into or exported from Saudi Arabia by way of Bahrein, I am instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to refer to the discussion which took place at the conference in Bahrein in March and April of this year regarding the procedure followed by the authorities at Bahrein in the case of the steamship *Ahmedi*, when she called at Bahrein in November 1932. I am authorised to assure your Royal Highness, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Bahrein, that the authorities in Bahrein will not at any future time claim any duties whatsoever on goods shipped to or from ports in Saudi Arabia in ships calling at Bahrein when the goods in question are intended to be taken direct to their destination in the ships carrying them and not to be landed at Bahrein for re-export or trans-shipped without being landed. The permanent validity of this assurance will not be affected by any notification which may be made in accordance with the paragraph numbered 7 in my note of to-day.”

I am glad to inform you that my Government have taken note of the above-mentioned undertaking of the British Government, for which I thank you.

With highest respects,  
FUAD HAMZA.



[E 7145/5599/25]

No. 58.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 9.)*

(No. 330. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, November 19, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 317, Confidential, of the 5th November, relative to the reactions in Saudi Arabia to the Italo-Ethiopian war, I have the honour to inform you that little of special interest appears to have occurred during the past two weeks, but certain matters of detail or of unconfirmed report are perhaps deserving of notice.

2. I have reported in my telegram No. 210 of the 11th November that Fuad Bey Hamza, on his return from abroad, informed me that the Saudi Arab Government had received a communication from the Co-ordination Committee of the League of Nations, but had been unable to reply. He confessed that he was very perplexed and described the situation as one of great uncertainty. The strong protest addressed by Italy to Egypt appeared to have impressed him, and he expressed doubt as to whether the Ethiopian mission, at present in this country, would receive much satisfaction from the Saudi Arab Government. A few days later, Blata Ayeule Guebre, the head of the mission, called on me again, and I gathered from him that, although he had seen Fuad Bey Hamza at least twice already, he had not yet completed his negotiations and was awaiting Fuad Bey's return from Riyadh (whither he has now gone to be present during Sir Andrew Ryan's visit to Ibn Saud) after some two or three weeks.

3. The export of the 1,000 camels from Yanbu would appear, from reliable reports, to be now proceeding. An Italian ship, the steamship *Mouni* of Genoa, arrived on the 15th November for the purpose, but it is not yet known how many camels she was able to take. Signor Marinangeli, the assistant or partner of Signor Odello, has been some time in Yanbu, and is stated to have had considerable difficulties with the local authorities there, who proposed to levy an export duty, a quarantine duty, as well as a daily charge for feeding per camel. It is reported that these difficulties have now been composed. The same source states that there have recently been exports from Jedda to Massawa of consignments of "Saman," or clarified butter.

4. As regards Italian personnel here, it is believed that eight only of the nine mechanics left for Massawa, reported in my despatch under reference, paragraph 3, as the senior mechanic is thought to have remained here with Signor Odello. The Fiat truck and trailer have been active during the past few days, and it is stated that they have been sold to the Municipality of Mecca as a refuse vehicle. Signor Odello, indeed, has, it would seem, been energetically prosecuting his business interests here, as he is reported to have secured several small contracts for work of a constructional nature from the local authorities, notably the reroofing of the buildings at the quarantine quay.

5. I have received a curious report from a local source, which may reasonably be expected to be well informed, that Signor Odello has recently sent an urgent telegram to Asmara pointing out that the British Government would shortly be approaching the Saudi Government over the "agreement" (presumably the Treaty of Jedda), and that the question of Saudi debts to His Majesty's Government would doubtless be brought up. Signor Odello urged that the Italian Government should offer to advance to the Saudi Government a sum sufficient to enable them to liquidate their debt to His Majesty's Government, and thereby, at a stroke, enable his Government to supplant His Majesty's Government in the rôle of chief friend and supporter of Ibn Saud. This same source has previously alluded to the possibilities of an Italian loan to the Saudi Government.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, Addis Ababa, Aden, the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &amp;c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 7262/452/91]

No. 59.

*Formation of Petroleum Concessions (Limited) to acquire Concessions in Certain Areas in the Persian Gulf.*(1) *Petroleum Concessions (Limited) to India Office.**City-Gate House, Finsbury Square,  
London, October 24, 1935.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to my conversation yesterday with Mr. J. C. Walton, at which I indicated that, subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, my company, Petroleum Concessions (Limited), proposes to seek for oil concessions in the territory known as the Neutral Zone, the unallotted part of Bahrein Island, the Trucial Coast, and possibly along the Pirate Coast to Muscat.

Petroleum Concessions (Limited) was registered as a private British company on the 14th instant. The whole of its shares will be held by the same interests and in the same proportions as obtain in the Iraq Petroleum Company, and the board will be of similar composition, excepting the appointment of an Iraqi Government director.

The concession recently obtained by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Limited) from the Ruler of Qatar will, at an appropriate time, be transferred to Petroleum Concessions (Limited), together with the agreements relative thereto concluded with His Majesty's Government; the provisions of these agreements are generally acceptable to Petroleum Concessions (Limited) in their application to oil concessions obtained over the above-named territories wherein my company recognises, and will respect, the existence of a special sphere of influence of His Majesty's Government.

There will also be transferred to Petroleum Concessions (Limited) options for oil concessions recently obtained by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Limited) from the Rulers of Ras-el-Khaimah, Sharjah, Dubai, and any other options obtained by that company on our behalf in the Trucial Coast. The negotiations for the actual concessions will be undertaken by Petroleum Concessions (Limited), and in that connexion it is proposed to employ Major Frank Holmes, who is acquainted with Persian Gulf matters, and who, to the best of my belief, can be entrusted to conduct such negotiations with proper observance of the customs of those countries.

The terms to be offered will be based on the terms of the Qatar concession, with suitable adjustment of the cash payments in relation to the respective approximate areas of the concessions. The actual boundaries will be defined at a later stage, as and when they are demarcated.

The wishes of His Majesty's Government in regard to the employment of British subjects in these areas will be observed, but I foresee possibly applying for special permission for the company's Chief Geologist, Mr. N. E. Baker, an American citizen, to visit these areas to compile a report on their oil potentialities. The company will comply with any instructions issued by the Resident or his representatives in regard to the movements, and for the protection, of geological reconnaissance parties.

I shall be glad to hear whether these proposals are agreeable to His Majesty's Government, and whether I may have permission to proceed on the above lines with the co-operation of the Resident in the Persian Gulf, who will be kept informed of the negotiations.

I have, &amp;c.

(For Petroleum Concessions (Limited)).

J. SKLIROS, Director.



(2) Mr. J. C. Walton to Mr. Rendel.

My dear Rendel,

India Office, November 4, 1935.

I ENCLOSE copy of a letter from Mr. J. Skliros, managing director of the Iraq Petroleum Company, regarding a proposed procedure for acquiring options, and, subsequently possible concessions, for oil in certain areas in the Persian Gulf. Certain points in this letter were more fully explained at an interview which I had with Mr. Skliros and Mr. Lefroy of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company on the 23rd October.

2. The reason for forming a company—Petroleum Concessions (Limited)—separate from the Iraq Petroleum Company is, I understood, merely that the latter company has an Iraqi Government director, and it is not considered necessary or desirable that he should participate in undertakings solely concerned with the acquisition of concessions in countries outside Iraq.

3. As regards the Koweit neutral zone, Petroleum Concessions (Limited) are aware of the position of deadlock resulting from Ibn Saud's commitment to the Standard Oil of California, but they think that by the offer of an arrangement to facilitate the marketing of the Bahrein Petroleum Company's production they may obtain the necessary leverage to induce the California Company to relinquish their stranglehold on Ibn Saud's part-interest in the Koweit neutral zone.

4. With reference to the unallotted area of Bahrein, Mr. Lefroy did not think that this would be of value to anyone, but Mr. Skliros was inclined to think that it might be worth while to obtain an option with a view to its examination. So far as I know, we have not entered into commitments with anyone regarding this area, so that it is presumably open to any company which desires to do so to apply to the sheikh for a concession (subject, of course, to His Majesty's Government's approval).

5. On the Trucial Coast the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (or the D'Arcy Exploration Company) have, as you know, already obtained two-year options, subject to His Majesty's Government's approval, at Ras-al-Khaimah and Sharjah. Mr. Lefroy stated that they have just obtained a similar option at Debai. They are also in the field for options at Abu Dhabi, Ajman and Umm-al-Qaiwain. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would go forward with their pending negotiations, but any concessions for which they have acquired or may acquire options on the Trucial Coast would be negotiated and taken by Petroleum Concessions (Limited).

6. The reference to the Pirate Coast is a geographical misunderstanding. Petroleum Concessions (Limited) might interest itself in the possibilities of Muscat, where we have not committed ourselves to anyone, and the field is consequently open.

7. I stated that certain preliminary conditions to the approval of options on the Trucial Coast (which had been discussed with Fowle during his deputation) would be required by His Majesty's Government, viz.:—

*Vis-à-vis the Company—*

(a) That any geologist or employee who visits any of the Trucial sheikhdoms for the purpose of exploring or surveying the area of the option should be of British nationality;

(b) That the exploring party in their travels would be definitely guided by the views of the Resident as to where they should go.

*Vis-à-vis the sheikh—*

(c) That the sheikh concerned should give a definite guarantee in writing that he would be responsible for the safety of the exploring or surveying party.

I added that another condition to the approval of an option would be that further approval by His Majesty's Government would be necessary before negotiations for an actual concession were entered into with the sheikh concerned.

8. The question of our future policy on the Trucial Coast, which was discussed by the Middle East Committee on the 24th September, has, of course, a certain relevance to the question whether in this backward and uncivilised area the acquisition of oil concerns by any company, of whatever nationality, ought to be encouraged or permitted. The result of the meeting in regard to general policy was somewhat inconclusive, but there is, I think, nothing in the conclusions, such as they were, to suggest that we ought to arrive at a definite

decision to sterilise the Trucial Coast so far as oil is concerned. Indeed, the trend of the discussion was rather in the opposite direction, and Fowle himself, though he is averse from any new pronouncement of general policy, has always taken the view that in regard to oil we can hardly impose an absolute veto on concessions which the sheikhs may wish to grant, though specially careful conditions to safeguard the interests of His Majesty's Government and limit our commitments would be necessary. In any case, by stipulating that the actual commencement of negotiations for a concession, apart from the conditions on which it should be granted, will be subject to His Majesty's Government's approval, we shall, so far as is now practicable, ensure that each case is kept open for decision by His Majesty's Government, when the time comes, in the light of considerations of general policy and of the degree of commitment which the grant of any concession would involve.

9. On the question of nationality, it will be seen that the national complexion of Petroleum Concessions (Limited) is identical with that of the Iraq Petroleum Company. It was explained to me that Petroleum Concessions (Limited) would probably beget separate companies to exploit the several areas in which they might be successful in obtaining concessions, but that such are the national jealousies on the part of the non-British elements in the Iraq Petroleum Company that there is no chance of such companies being formed on a basis of a larger proportion of British ownership than that in the Iraq Petroleum Company itself. As, however, the areas mentioned (apart, possibly, from the Koweit neutral zone) are within the "Red Line" Agreement, it seems necessary to be content with the Iraq Petroleum Company's proportion of British shareholding, since no British company outside the Iraq Petroleum Company has shown a serious interest in these areas. Holmes has, indeed, been angling during the last few months for the interest of an all-British group (which, however, had no experience of oil concessions), but I have now heard from him that his negotiations have definitely broken down.

10. If the Foreign Office and the other departments concerned and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf agree, we would propose to inform Petroleum Concessions (Limited) as follows:—

(a) On the Trucial Coast, subject to the conditions stated above, His Majesty's Government approve the options already granted by the Sheikhs of Ras-al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Debai, and any options that may be granted by other sheikhs. If it is desired during the currency of an option to enter into negotiations with the sheikh concerned for a concession, the prior approval of His Majesty's Government will be required before such negotiations are opened. In the event of such approval to the commencement of negotiations being given, the conditions to safeguard Government interests which would have to be attached to any concession obtained would be considered and would have to be accepted by the company before an actual concession was approved.

(b) In Bahrein and Muscat there is no objection to Petroleum Concessions (Limited) applying to the rulers concerned, on the understanding that any concession granted would be subject to the conditions considered necessary to safeguard Government interests.

(c) As regards the Koweit neutral zone, application may be made to the Sheikh of Koweit for an option for his part-interest in the zone, on the understanding that, if it should later become possible for the company to seek a concession from him and Ibn Saud jointly, the prior approval of His Majesty's Government would have to be sought before the company entered into negotiations with those rulers, and any actual concession eventually granted would be subject to such conditions (which might be of a special character, in view of the peculiar juridical position of the zone) as were considered necessary to safeguard British political interests.

11. It will be observed that the company propose to employ Holmes for the negotiations of actual concessions. Mr. Skliros explained that this proposal was made *faute de mieux*. It is, of course, primarily the business of the company whom they employ and, subject to Fowle's views, we do not think that we need make any objection.



12. If Petroleum Concessions (Limited) should make the application, of which the possibility is foreseen in the penultimate paragraph of Mr. Skliros's letter, for special permission for Mr. Baker to visit areas on the Trucial Coast, we could consider in consultation with Fowle the question of making an exception in that particular case from the general rule suggested in paragraph 7 (a) above.

13. I am sending a similar letter to Starling and Seal, and a letter, of which a copy is enclosed, to Air Vice-Marshal Courtney. We should be grateful if you could let us have an early reply as we should like to let Petroleum Concessions (Limited) have a reply to their enquiry as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

J. C. WALTON.

[E 6564/452/91]

(3) *Mr. Rendel to Mr. J. C. Walton (India Office).*

My dear Walton,

*Foreign Office, November 13, 1935.*

MANY thanks for your letter of the 4th November, about the formation of Petroleum Concessions (Limited) and their proposed activities in the Persian Gulf.

2. We entirely agree with the general view expressed in paragraph 8 of your letter and with your interpretation of the feeling of the Middle Eastern Sub-Committee, when the question of oil development on the Trucial Coast came up at the meeting on the 24th September. We are also in agreement with the conditions which you have formulated as a necessary preliminary to the consent of His Majesty's Government being given to any options or actual concessions obtained by the company, and with the lines on which you propose to reply to Mr. Skliros's letter, as indicated in paragraph 10 of your letter.

3. As you know, we have always regretted that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have their hands tied by the "Red Line" Agreement and are unable to compete for concessions in the Persian Gulf as a purely British company. However, as matters stand, there does not seem to be much possibility of any purely British company entering the field as a competitor, and we are certainly no worse off with Petroleum Concessions (Limited) than we should be with the Iraq Petroleum Company themselves.

4. We had at one moment hoped that the Burmah Oil Company might now be induced to enter the field in the Persian Gulf area (please see my letter to Mr. Laithwaite of the 12th April), but I gather that there is little or no prospect of their doing so. Apart from the fact that there is no indication that the Burmah are prepared to consider a change in their traditional policy of not undertaking any commitments in this part of the world, I understand that their close connexion with the board of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Shell might make the position very complicated. But this aspect of the matter falls within Mr. Starling's province rather than mine, and if you want to pursue it you will no doubt take it up with him direct. I am sending him a copy of this letter.

5. I am also sending copies of this letter to Air Vice-Marshal Courtney and Mr. Seal.

Yours sincerely,

G. W. RENDEL.

(4) *Mr. Seal to Mr. J. C. Walton.*

(Confidential.)

My dear Walton,

*Admiralty, November 29, 1935.*

IN reply to your letter dated the 4th November, 1935, enclosing a copy of a letter from Mr. Skliros about the proposed procedure for dealing with oil concessions in certain areas in the Persian Gulf, I write to say that the Admiralty are mainly concerned in the matter of safeguards. This question, although not at present urgent, is bound sooner or later to arise if oil is discovered. We note that Mr. Skliros stated in his letter of the 24th October that the provisions of the Qatar Government Agreement would be generally acceptable to the new company.

As you know, this agreement (like that for Koweit) deals with the question of a refinery in a somewhat unsatisfactory manner, by a mere declaration of intention on the part of the company to erect a refinery if commercial conditions justify it, and to examine the matter with His Majesty's Government when commercial production is assured.

Every new concession granted in countries bordering the Persian Gulf accentuates the importance of the refinery question, and it would be most unfortunate if the greater part of the territory were developed without any binding obligation on the part of the company to build at least one refinery. We do not think that the relaxation of our requirements in this respect in the Qatar and Koweit concessions, in each case after long discussion with the companies, is a good reason for accepting the same position without further discussion in any future concessions. We feel, therefore, that new draft concessions should contain the approved standard refinery clause, and that any relaxation should be agreed to only when good reasons are forthcoming.

We do not suggest that there is any necessity to raise the matter in this form with the company at the present stage, but, in view of Mr. Skliros's reference to the Qatar Agreement, we think it desirable that the company should be reminded that the erection of a refinery or refineries in territory under British influence in the Persian Gulf is one of the prime desiderata of His Majesty's Government. Perhaps, therefore, you would be good enough to include such a reference in your reply.

Apart from the foregoing, we have no comments to offer on your proposed action.

Copies of this letter are being sent to Air Vice-Marshal Courtney, Mr. Rendel and Mr. Starling.

Yours sincerely,

E. A. SEAL.

(5) *Mr. F. C. Starling to Mr. J. C. Walton.*

My dear Walton,

*Petroleum Department, December 7, 1935.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 4th November, E 6564, enclosing copy of a letter from the managing director of the Iraq Petroleum Company, concerning the formation of a new company known as Petroleum Concessions (Limited), as a subsidiary company of the Iraq Petroleum Company, to acquire oil concessions in the Persian Gulf area, I had, just before I received your letter, been informed by Mr. Skliros of this new development, on much the same lines as in his letter to you.

2. We had rather hoped at one period, in view of our special interests in the Persian Gulf, that an arrangement might have been come to within the Iraq Petroleum Company by which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Shell Group might have been allowed to take up some of these concessions. The formation of the new company makes it clear that the French and American groups have not been willing to agree to this.

3. While we may from some points of view regret this decision, the new development has the advantage that we can, I think, now be sure that a company with very substantial British interests will be available to counter the quite serious threat of further penetration in this area by purely American concerns, such as the Standard Oil Company of California, and as I know of no substantial purely British company which is prepared to go into this area this is all to the good.

4. You refer in the third paragraph of your letter to the possibility of an arrangement between the Iraq Petroleum Company and the Standard of California in the marketing of Bahrain oil removing the deadlock in the Koweit neutral zone. But recent efforts to come to an arrangement have broken down. This, I think, may have the result of stimulating the action of the new company in these Persian Gulf areas. I am interested to see that Mr. Skliros is inclined to take up an option for the remainder of Bahrain. There may not be much left that is very valuable on the main island, but perhaps the shallow waters and other islands may be worth investigating. Subject to necessary safeguards such as you refer to in paragraph 7 of your letter, I think we should encourage the company to go ahead with their plans.



5. As regards paragraph 8, I was not present at the meeting of the Middle East Sub-Committee when the policy in regard to the Trucial Coast was discussed, but I have since seen the record of the meeting, and I think that here again, provided proper arrangements such as you suggest are made, we ought not to bar this territory from investigation.

I have already dealt above with the point you raise in paragraph 9.

I agree with paragraphs 10 and 12 of your letter.

In regard to paragraph 11, we do not much like the selection of Major Holmes as the company's representative for the negotiation of concessions. It will, however, have the advantage of putting an end to his activities on behalf of less substantial and speculative concerns. This was an aspect of the situation which, no doubt, weighed with the company in appointing him, but from that point of view we shall also benefit. And he is undoubtedly experienced in conducting negotiations with the sheikhs and rulers of the territories concerned.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Rendel, Mr. Seal and Air Vice-Marshal Courtney.

Yours sincerely,  
F. C. STARLING.

(6) *India Office to Petroleum Concessions (Limited).*

Sir,

*India Office, December 12, 1935.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to refer to your call at the India Office on the 23rd October, and your letter of the 24th October, 1935, regarding the proposals of Petroleum Concessions (Limited), subject to the approval of His Majesty's Government, to seek for oil concessions in the Koweit neutral zone, the unallotted part of Bahrein, the sheikdoms of the Trucial Coast, and possibly Muscat. The questions raised have been under consideration in consultation with the other departments of His Majesty's Government concerned and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and I am now to inform you that the proposals are approved on the following conditions and understandings:—

2. *Bahrein*.—There is no objection to your company applying to the Sheikh of Bahrein for a concession, on the understanding that any concession granted would be subject to the conditions considered necessary to safeguard Government interests; these conditions would be embodied in a separate agreement between the company and His Majesty's Government.

3. *Muscat*.—There would be no objection to the company applying to the Sultan of Muscat for a concession on a similar understanding.

4. *Koweit Neutral Zone*.—Application may be made to the Sheikh of Koweit for an option over his part-interest in the zone, on the understanding that, if it should later become possible for the company to seek a concession from him and King Abdul Aziz jointly, the prior approval of His Majesty's Government would be sought before the company entered into negotiations with those rulers, and that any actual concession eventually granted would be subject to such conditions, embodied in an agreement with His Majesty's Government (which might be of a special character, in view of the peculiar juridical position of the zone), as were considered necessary to safeguard British political interests.

5. *Sheikdoms of the Trucial Coast*.—The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company are being informed that His Majesty's Government approve the options already granted to them by the Sheikhs of Ras-al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Debai on the following conditions, and on the same conditions there is no objection to the transfer of those options, and of any others that may be obtained on the Trucial Coast and approved by His Majesty's Government, to your company:—

- (a) That any geologist or employee who visits any of the Trucial sheikdoms for the purpose of exploring or surveying the area of the option should be of British nationality. If, however, your company should make the application of which the possibility is foreseen in the penultimate paragraph of your letter for special permission for Mr. N. E. Baker, an American citizen, to visit areas on the

Trucial Coast, the question of making an exception in his particular case would be considered in consultation with the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

- (b) That any exploring or surveying party in their travels would be definitely guided by the views of the Resident as to where they should go.
- (c) That the sheikh concerned should give a definite guarantee in writing (as to which he would be approached by the British political authorities) that he would be responsible for the safety of the exploring or surveying party.
- (d) That, if it is desired during the currency of an option to enter into negotiations with the sheikh concerned for a concession, the prior approval of His Majesty's Government to the opening of negotiations would be sought and, in the event of its being given, the conditions to be attached to any concession obtained, in order to safeguard Government interests, would be considered and the approval of any actual concession would be subject to acceptance by the company of these conditions.

6. The conditions to be embodied in any agreements relative to concessions would be considered in consultation with your company when the time came, and might vary somewhat according to the locality in which the concession was sought. I am to add that, as you are aware, the erection of a refinery or refineries in territory under British influence in the Persian Gulf is one of the prime desiderata of His Majesty's Government.

7. It is noted that your company will keep the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf informed of any negotiations with the Sheikhs of Bahrein and Koweit, the Sultan of Muscat, or other rulers.

I am, &c.  
J. C. WALTON.

[E 7263/132/91]

No. 60.

*Papers communicated by the Colonial Office, December 14, 1935.*

(1)

*Sir B. Reilly to Sir C. Parkinson.*

My dear Parkinson,

*Aden, October 23, 1935.*

THE following information may be of interest to you in connexion with the present situation here:—

Seager (who is at the moment acting as Political Secretary) was visited a few days ago by a Yemeni from Taiz, named Sheikh Saleh Hurub—a close confidant of the Officer Commanding, Taiz, Seyid Ali-bin-el-Wazir—who told him that he had been asked to call on the Italian consul. He asked Seager's advice as to whether he should avail himself of this invitation. Seager replied that, though it was no business of his, he thought Sheikh Saleh might get a line on the Italian consul, and that this might be of interest to the Yemeni Government.

Two days later Saleh Hurub visited Seager in his house and passed on the gist of his conversation with Cavaliere Pasqualucci. This conversation, it appears, was in the form of a cross-examination, and the following questions, amongst others, were put, and the answers taken down by the consul's clerk:—

- (a) Has the Yemeni Government asked the British Government for help, either verbally or in writing?
- (b) Was the British Government paying out any gold to the Yemenis?
- (c) Was the British Government paying out increased sums of money to the Protectorate tribesmen on the Anglo-Yemeni frontier?
- (d) Were there any British officers or soldiers in Sheikh Said?
- (e) Was it the British Government which had requested the fortifying of Sheikh Said?
- (f) Was the British Government supplying any war material?



After replies had been given to these questions, my informant was told, *inter alia*—

- (i) That the Italians attached great importance to Sheikh Said.
- (ii) That the British Government would never dare to interfere, and, moreover, could not, if the Italians had any designs on the Yemen.

I pass this information to you as an illustration of the Italian consul's activities, and of the interest taken by the Italian Government in Sheikh Said, which overlooks the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and Perim from the Arabian side. As you know, Sheikh Said and the immediately adjacent area formed the "Yellow Patch" referred to in article 2 of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914. No reference to it was made in the Treaty of Sana of last year, but presumably our policy with regard to it remains the same as it was in Turkish days, namely, that we do not seek to acquire it for ourselves, but we do not wish it to come into the possession of any other European Power, and for this reason we wish the Yemen to retain it, as in former days we wished Turkey to do so. The Italians, on the other hand, evidently believe that we have designs on this strategic point, and they would probably be very glad to acquire it themselves. Their suspicion of Anglo-Yemeni co-operation in this area is interesting, and is indicative of the growing change in the relations of the Yemen with the British and the Italians. Until recently the Imam was inclined to rely on Italian help to protect him against the supposedly aggressive objects of the British. He has now far more confidence in us, and the Italians' aggression against Ethiopia has gone far to transferring his suspicions to them. These developments may tend to accelerate the process of strengthening our ties with the Yemen, and of so bringing it into a British rather than an Italian orbit.

I am not disposed to press forward the Anglo-Yemeni rapprochement too rapidly, and at present we at Aden are limiting ourselves to giving the Yemenis good advice when asked for (as, for example, recently about the defences of Sheikh Said), and to cultivating the good neighbourly relations that have existed since the signing of the treaty. On the other hand, if the alarm that now exists in the Yemen with regard to Italian designs against Sheikh Said and the adjacent Yemen coast, including Mocha, continues, it is possible that the King of the Yemen will make further and more direct overtures for British help in fortifying and protecting his coastal districts against Italian intrusion. Should this happen, I shall, of course, report to you officially, and shall not commit myself in any way without instructions. I mention the possibility now, as I should be glad to know your general views with regard to the attitude that we should adopt in the event of Yemeni suggestions for closer co-operation with us, and especially of requests for our help in obtaining armaments.

Yours, &c.  
B. R. REILLY.

(2)

*Mr. Courtney to Sir C. Parkinson.*

Dear Parkinson,

*Air Ministry, Kingsway,  
November 14, 1935.*

THE following is an extract from a letter we have received from Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, subsequent to the visit which he paid to Aden towards the end of October:—

"There is a certain amount of excitement about the Yemen at Aden. As you doubtless know, the Italians have asked the Imam to allow them to send sick and wounded to Mocha. The Imam has so far refused, but he has indicated to Reilly that he would like to know what would be the attitude of Great Britain if the Italians use force. Reilly expects to have a very definite question on this subject sent to him by the Imam in the near future. I don't know what the answer is. We certainly don't want the Italians there, and it would be very awkward if they occupied Sheikh Said, which is the peninsula at the extreme southern end of the Red Sea on the Arabian side.

Guns mounted here and at the corner of Eritrea could make exit from the Red Sea very uncomfortable. I feel very definitely that we cannot allow them to occupy the southern end of the Yemen at all events."

I am sending a similar letter to Rendel and O'Malley.

Yours, &c.

C. L. COURTNEY.

[E 6305/15/91]

(3)

*Extract from Aden Secret Political Intelligence Summary No. 454 for the Week ending October 2, 1935.*

3522. It is reported from Am Nabia that on or about the 15th September last Seiyid Ali-bin-al-Wazir, the Officer Commanding Taiz, accompanied by the Amils of Taiz and Mocha, arrived at Sheikh Said escorted by fifty soldiers. It is said that the bakeries at the Sheikh Said fort are being rebuilt, while consignments of flour, rice, and cement are being landed. The arrival of more soldiers is imminently expected.

The Yemeni authorities are said to have organised a military post at Dubah, north of Sheikh Said, and manned it with fifteen soldiers.

[E 6481/15/91]

*Extract from Aden Secret Political Intelligence Summary No. 455 for the Week ending October 9, 1935.*

3542. A letter has been received by the Resident from the Officer Commanding Taiz, who is at present in Sheikh Said, asking for his assistance in the matter of the supply of guns for the Sheikh Said fort, which is at present being rebuilt. The letter concludes by saying that the Yemeni Government considers the British Government to be its greatest friend and entertains the hope that the desired assistance will be forthcoming.

A reply has been sent to the effect that Captain Seager will proceed by air to Am Nabia on the 11th October next to discuss certain points in the letter which require elucidation. The King of the Yemen has been asked at the same time whether he has any objection to the proposed meeting. Captain Seager will take this opportunity to discuss some other ordinary matters with the Officer Commanding Taiz, and he has been instructed not to commit His Majesty's Government in any way to an agreement with the Yemeni request.

[E 6608/15/91]

*Extract from Aden Secret Political Intelligence Summary No. 456 for the Week ending October 16, 1935.*

3549. Captain Seager proceeded to Am Nabia by air on the 11th October and returned to Aden the same day after discussing matters with the Officer Commanding Taiz, who was in a most amiable mood. Matters of local interest were brought up, while opportunity was found to point out to Seiyid Ali, and he agreed, that it was probable Sheikh Said could be well defended by machine-gun posts and barbed-wire entanglements where guns of a suitable type would be very expensive, difficult to install and eventually require expert handling.



(4)

*Mr. J. H. Thomas to Resident at Aden.*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*Downing Street, December 12, 1935.*

I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government have had under consideration the attitude which they should adopt (a) in the event of the Italians occupying any point in Yemeni territory, and in particular the territory adjacent to Sheikh Said, either by agreement with the King of the Yemen or by actual aggression; and (b) in reply to any requests for advice or material assistance from the King of the Yemen arising out of an Italian aggression against his territory or the threat thereof.

2. Any attempt by the Italian Government to occupy any point in Yemeni territory, whether by agreement with the King of the Yemen or by actual aggression, would clearly conflict with the undertaking contained in point 4 of the conclusions in the agreed record of the Anglo-Italian conversations at Rome in 1927, in which it is laid down that "His Britannic Majesty's Government regard it as a vital imperial interest that no European Power should establish itself on the Arabian shore of the Red Sea. . . . That, on the other hand, it is in the interest of Italy, in view of her possessions on the western coast of the Red Sea, that no European Power should establish itself on the Arabian shore of the Red Sea. . . . If Italy were to occupy Sheikh Said or any other part of the Yemeni coast, whether by arrangement with the King of the Yemen or by force of arms, she would therefore have committed a breach of an agreement entered into with His Majesty's Government. The effect of this would be to create not a merely local problem but a major Anglo-Italian issue, which would have to be dealt with in the light of the general international situation.

3. His Majesty's Government have no information which leads them to suppose that Italy, in fact, contemplates any occupation of Yemeni territory. Such evidence as they possess of the views of the Italian Government tends on the contrary to show that they continue to attach particular importance to the preservation of the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.

4. At the same time rumours have recently been current that His Majesty's Government themselves contemplate the occupation of Sheikh Said. These rumours are, of course, entirely without foundation, but their existence obliges me to furnish you with certain explanations in regard to the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards this piece of territory, which, as you are aware, was the subject of special mention in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914. Any occupation of Sheikh Said by His Majesty's Government would be a breach not only of the engagement which they contracted in 1927 *vis-à-vis* the Italian Government, but also of the treaty which they concluded with the King of the Yemen in 1934, which provides that the frontier between the Aden Protectorate and the Yemen shall follow for the first part of its course after leaving the sea the boundary line laid down by the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914. If doubts are expressed in any quarter as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government, a reference to the 1934 treaty, with the necessary elucidation of the terms of its third article, should be a sufficient answer. Should, however, the King of the Yemen's fear of an Italian aggression on the Yemeni coast lead him to enquire urgently of you what attitude His Majesty's Government would advise him to adopt in such circumstances, you are authorised to inform him that as a result of an agreement concluded between them some years ago the Italian Government and His Majesty's Government are under a mutual obligation not to establish themselves on the Arabian shore of the Red Sea.

5. It is understood that requests have been made by the Italian authorities in Eritrea to the King of the Yemen for permission to send sick and wounded soldiers from the Italian forces in Eritrea to the Yemeni coast to recuperate. The King of the Yemen has so far refused permission, but the question may arise again at any moment, and in these circumstances His Majesty's Government consider that it will be well for you to inform the King of the Yemen, should he seek advice in the matter, what is the position in international law. Under international law there is no rule forbidding a neutral Power to allow the entry of the wounded or sick of a belligerent Power into its territory. A neutral Power may grant or refuse such permission, and, in fact, in the past, such permission

has in practice been refused more often than granted. If permission is granted, the wounded and sick must remain on the neutral territory and must there be guarded by the neutral Government, and after they have recovered they must be prevented from returning to their home State or rejoining their corps so that they can again take part in the operations of war. While, therefore, the King of the Yemen would be at liberty, under the general principles of international law, to allow wounded and sick from the Italian forces in Eritrea to be brought to the Yemen for recovery, he would be under an obligation to secure that all such wounded and sick remain in the Yemen until the war between Italy and Ethiopia is over. (The view stated above is in accordance with the rules set out in article 59 of Hague Convention No. IV of 1899 and reproduced in identical terms in article 14 of Hague Convention No. V of 1907. The article deals with (a) the transit through, and (b) the maintenance in neutral territory of wounded and wounded prisoners.)

6. Consideration has also been given to the attitude which should be adopted in the event of an application from the King of the Yemen for the supply of arms or of a request from him for assistance in connexion with the fortification of Sheikh Said. The present position is that the King of the Yemen is at liberty to purchase arms from private firms in this country, and there is no objection in existing circumstances to his continuing to do so. In the event of a request from him for the supply of armaments by His Majesty's Government, you should inform him that it will be necessary to consult His Majesty's Government before an answer is given. On learning from you of any such request, His Majesty's Government will consider the matter in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. While there might be no objection to the supply of armaments to the King of the Yemen which would enable him to strengthen his defences, provided that surplus stocks were available, you will appreciate that the situation would be entirely different if Italy were to commit an act of unprovoked aggression against Sheikh Said or other parts of the Yemeni coast. The supply to the Yemeni Government of arms which would be immediately used against Italian troops would raise issues of major importance to Anglo-Italian relations, and obviously the most careful consideration in the light of all the circumstances prevailing at the time would be necessary before any decision could be reached.

7. In the event of a request by the King of the Yemen for advice as to the best method of fortifying the Yemeni coast, His Majesty's Government see no objection to giving further advice such as has already been given by Captain Seager to the local Yemeni authorities if they ask for it. They consider it important, however, that nothing should be said to the King or the Yemeni authorities which would in any way give the impression that His Majesty's Government were accepting any responsibility for the defences of the Yemen or that they were anxious to see those defences strengthened.

I have, &amp;c.

J. H. THOMAS.

[E 7320/135/25]

No. 61.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 16.)*

(No. 337.)

Sir,

*Jedda, November 26, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 240 of the 30th July, 1934, in which I transmitted a translation of the Treaty of Taif concluded between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, I have the honour to forward herewith the translation of an announcement, in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 22nd November, that in accordance with article 4 of the treaty, arrangements have now been made for the delimitation of the Saudi-Yemen frontier. Two committees or commissions, it will be seen, have been appointed by the Saudi Arab Government and will work jointly with similar bodies appointed by the King of the Yemen. It would also appear that one of these committees has already left for the scene of its labours.

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2. No names have as yet been published here of the numbers of the commissions, and no information on this subject has, so far, otherwise come to my notice, but I am instituting enquiries locally.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department and to Aden.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 61.

*Extract from the Umm-al-Qura of November 22, 1935.*

*Committees for the Delimitation of the Frontiers between the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen.*

(Translation.)

IN accordance with article 4 of the Taif Treaty, in which the frontiers between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen have been fixed, and the provision in the last paragraph of the said article that the delimitation of the frontiers shall be effected on the ground by a committee formed by the two Governments, communications have recently passed between His Majesty the King Abdul Aziz and His Majesty the King Yahya for the appointment of a joint committee from the two parties for the delimitation of the frontier. Two committees have, in fact, been appointed, one of which joint committees will undertake to fix the frontiers in the Tihama, and the other to fix the frontiers in the mountains. The first committee met at Jizan, and left for Musim on Wednesday, and will start with the delimitation and determination of the frontier on the basis of the terms of article 4. The second committee will meet at Dhahan (or Dhihan) for the delimitation of the frontiers in the mountains. The proceedings of the two committees will be carried out for the settlement of the matter in the spirit of friendship existing between the two kingdoms. Praise be to God!

[E 7322/602/25]

No. 62.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 16.)*

(No. 339.)

Sir,

*Jedda, November 26, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 277 of the 8th October, relative to the activities of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate (Limited), I have the honour to inform you that the operations of this concern appear to be making steady progress. Mr. Twitchell recently informed me that diamond-drilling, carried out by six Swedish employees of the syndicate, was now proceeding night and day, and that a depth of some 80 feet had been attained.

2. Since my despatch under reference the personnel of the syndicate has been further increased by the arrival of two British employees, Messrs. Dunckley and McDermott, the former as manager of the Jedda office and the latter, a son of a director of the syndicate, as a surveyor; of two Americans, one Dutchman, one German and one Greek. Mr. C. L. W. Bindloss, the engineer on the Jedda staff of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited), also has now taken up a similar post under the syndicate.

3. A large quantity of stores, vehicles and machinery, including the diamond drills, have arrived since my despatch under reference, and a great proportion has been successfully transported to the mine, in spite of difficulties over one stretch of the road Jedda-Asfan-al-Birka-Mahd-adh-Dhahab, on which work is still proceeding.

4. Work is also going on in the construction of houses, built of local stone, at the mine, whilst at Jedda it is reliably stated that the syndicate have acquired an area of some 300 or 400 yards square, about 1 mile north of the town close to the shore, where it is proposed to erect houses for the staff, workshops, store-rooms and garages, and it is also projected in due course to construct a pier out to deep water to facilitate the loading and unloading of their materials.

5. According to revised estimates, I should now be disposed to place the mine at roughly 23° 30' N. by 41° E. An unconfirmed statement has reached me that an area of 1 square mile has been granted by the syndicate to a company, perhaps a subsidiary company, formed to prospect and exploit that area.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Transjordan and the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 7475/1012/25]

No. 63.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 23.)*

(No. 344. Confidential.)

*Jedda, November 30, 1935.*

Sir,

IN my despatch No. 370 of the 11th December, 1934, I had the honour to submit a brief review of the general financial and economic situation in Saudi Arabia. I now propose, after an interval of almost twelve months, to attempt a similar appreciation, necessarily as brief and perhaps as fragmentary as in previous years, in view of the absence of reliable statistics and the lack of authoritative sources of information.

2. Whilst during the previous twelve months Saudi finances were heavily engaged in meeting and satisfying the demands of the Saudi-Yemen War and its settlement, the period under review may be held to have witnessed the liquidation of the immediate legacies of the conflict and a renewal of the activities of the Minister of Finance, now less preoccupied with the duties of his second office of Deputy Minister of Defence, to find fresh sources of revenue to repair the seriously depleted financial resources of the State.

3. Some relief was afforded early in the year by a further increase in the number of foreign pilgrims performing the Hajj in 1935. Not only did this figure increase from 25,291 in 1934 to 33,898, but an exceptional number of distinguished personages and well-to-do pilgrims visited the Hejaz this year, a matter of some point when the general level of wealth amongst incoming pilgrims has fallen so markedly in these lean years. The beneficial effects of the increase brought comfort to all classes in the Hejaz, but complaints were not wanting that the Government had appropriated to themselves the lion's share of the pilgrimage harvest, and distress, even amongst merchants, motor-car proprietors and pilgrim guides, all of whom might have been expected to have benefited most by a larger pilgrimage, was only partially alleviated. Certain foreign companies in Jedda, however, had a more satisfactory year, upon completing their accounts after the Hajj, both Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited) and Messrs. Sharqieh (Limited) being able to record some improvement, the latter having achieved a reasonably good profit, albeit, according to Mr. Philby, a "paper" one.

4. Customs receipts form the other main item of Saudi revenue, and during the twelve months under review these, although no official figures are available, may be expected to have risen in sympathy with the increase in the numbers of pilgrims. Other sources of revenue are of subordinate importance; concessions have not yet commenced to yield steady revenue, for operations by the California Arabian Standard Oil Company for the production of oil in Hasa, though promising, have not yet been completely successful, and gold-mining operations by the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, upon which I have reported separately, have not yet reached the production stage, though here also there are believed to be grounds for optimism. As statistics of any description are, in the absence of official figures, of some interest, I give—for what they are worth—estimates, given in the Egyptian newspaper the *Muqattam* and reproduced in the *Oriente Moderno* of May 1935, of the revenues of the Hejaz for "this year" (presumably a period ending after the 1935 pilgrimage):—

	£ Gold.
From pilgrimage ... ..	300,000
From customs receipts ... ..	200,000
From other sources ... ..	100,000
Total ... ..	600,000



5. General trading conditions may be said to have shown some improvement during the period under review. Chiefly owing to the larger pilgrimage, there have been increased clearances through customs and a somewhat better tone in the market. This, unfortunately, does not mean that conditions can be described as satisfactory, but the tendency is encouraging. Protests were again evoked during the year by the practice of the Government of importing goods, particularly rice, through one importing firm, Messrs. Haji Abdullah Alireza and Co., to the detriment of others, with the result that some small redistribution of favours was effected to soothe the malcontents. The system adopted by the Saudi Arab Government of settling their local indebtedness by allowing rebates of customs dues on goods imported was maintained through the year, although in its early months the Government appeared disposed to abandon it. Adverse comment, and perhaps a realisation of the convenience of the system to the authorities themselves, led to a continuance of this practice. From one source it is gathered that the total number of packages to enter through the port of Jedda during the past twelve months was 620,000, of which some 120,000 were for the Saudi Arab Government or foreign diplomatic missions, and hence duty free.

6. Exports continued to be negligible (they were estimated in March last, for the previous twelve months, at about £8,000 gold), but may be expected during recent days to have received a fillip from the reported purchase of camels from this country by the Italians for purposes connected with the war in Abyssinia, a subject on which separate reports have been submitted. About 1,000 camels are said to have been shipped from Yanbu, though confirmation is still awaited, and the price paid is generally believed to be in the neighbourhood of £15 gold per camel.

7. The visible adverse balance of trade is therefore heavy and has been estimated locally by a confidential, but well-informed, source as about £1,261,000 gold for the year 1351 A.H. and £981,000 gold for 1352 A.H.

8. Economy has again been rigidly practised, except perhaps in certain items of Royal expenditure, and once more at the expense of Government officials, whose salaries, when paid, were invariably in arrear, whilst in the early summer steps were taken to effect an all-round salary reduction of 25 per cent., two-thirds of the now reduced salary to be paid in cash and one-third in kind, the cash payment to be reckoned in gold at a rate highly unfavourable to the official.

9. Apart from the system of customs drafts, described above, the Saudi Government are believed to have been able to meet current liabilities. One signal instance, either of a recognition of the advantages to be derived from a settlement of debts or of a desire to please, may be recorded when, in May 1935, they repaid the whole of one small debt due to His Majesty's Government and 10 per cent. of a larger one due to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.

10. Little or no additional taxation has been imposed during the past twelve months, except in the case of certain minor matters, such as the imposition of an annual tax of £2 gold on wireless receiving sets, permission to import and use which, restricted to certain towns of the Hejaz, was one of the notable concessions to Western influences of the year.

11. The history of the period under review as regards currency has been more eventful than in past years. A shortage of silver rials, probably in some measure due to hoarding, made itself felt during the summer, when rates per £ gold showed the following sharp movements:—

April 1 ...	21
June 1 ...	20
July 1 ...	17-18
July 11 ...	14½
July 31 ...	16-8
August ...	17-6
September ...	18½

A further unusual feature was the importation through Jedda from India by Messrs. Haji Abdullah Alireza, for the account of the Saudi Arab Government, between May and November inclusive, of 1,630,000 rupees; and a further consignment of 400,000 rupees is shortly expected. The reason advanced is that the rupee is a more convenient coin for use in Nejd than the Maria Theresa dollar, and a more popular one with the tribes than the Saudi rial.

12. Generally, therefore, it may be said that the tendency to improvement was maintained throughout the year. Prices of food-stuffs have fluctuated, in the autumn, under the influences of the uncertainty created by the Italo-Abyssinian situation, but the Government took certain steps to restore the position, and it is claimed, though with doubtful accuracy, that prices have on the whole returned to normal. Distress is still, unfortunately, all too prevalent, especially in the city of Medina, but has again been mitigated by charity from a variety of foreign sources.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade and his Excellency the Viceroy of India, Foreign and Political Department.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

[E 7476/557/25]

No. 64.

*Mr. Calvert to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 23.)*

(No. 346. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jedda, December 1, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Jedda report for November 1935.

2. Copies have been distributed as in the case of the report for August 1935.

I have, &c.

A. S. CALVERT.

Enclosure in No. 64.

JEDDA REPORT, NOVEMBER 1935.

I.—Internal Affairs.

356. Riyadh has been the setting for the most interesting event of the month. Ibn Saud, who had been hunting early in November at Rumah, Mawahiya and the Dahna, received as his guest on the 23rd November Sir Andrew Ryan, who remained in the Nejd capital until the 28th. His Majesty's Minister, whose movements are recorded in greater detail below (paragraph 367), conveyed to Riyadh and presented to Ibn Saud the robes and insignia of the G.C.B., conferred by His Majesty King George.

357. Amir Feisal remained in Riyadh during the month in order to be present during the visit of Sir Andrew Ryan. Fuad Bey Hamza, who returned from abroad on the 4th November by Italian ship, left Mecca for Riyadh on the 17th November, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, accompanied by Tewfik Hamza (who was to meet His Majesty's Minister on his arrival at Uqair in Hasa) having preceded him by a week or more.

358. During the absence of virtually the entire staff of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Riyadh, the Minister of Finance, Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, who himself had visited Riyadh early in the month, was left in charge in Mecca.

359. The death of Ibn Jiluwi, the Amir of Hasa (paragraph 313), evoked numerous expressions of sympathy. Condolences were expressed by the Legation on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the Government of India, Sir Andrew Ryan, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Political Agents at Kuwait and Bahrein. No announcement has yet been made as to Ibn Jiluwi's successor, although rumour designates either one of the King's sons or a son of the late Amir. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, in conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires early in the month, mentioned the latter possibility.

360. The internal situation calls for little comment. Four new police posts were established at (a) the junction of the roads between Ru-al-Kuhl and Al Jahum; (b) Qoaz-al-Makasa on the Lith road; (c) Zima; and (d) Kar, for the purpose of frontier control and the control of illicit arms traffic. No untoward incidents have been reported during the month. The prices of food-stuffs, which

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recently rose considerably as a result of disturbing news of the Italo-Abyssinian situation, have now returned to normal, it is somewhat prematurely claimed in the Mecca press, owing to the action taken by the Saudi authorities.

361. (Paragraph 228 of the report for July.) Sheikh Abdur Rauf-as-Sabban is believed to have returned for a while to Iraq. Meanwhile, an even more notorious anti-Saudi intriguer, Seyyid Muhammad Tahir-ad-Dabbagh, is reported in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 22nd November to have made his peace with Ibn Saud, under the amnesty to political offenders of last January. Seyyid Muhammad Tahir recently visited the King at Riyadh and was said to have been received with kindness and hospitality.

362. The development of the operations of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, recorded last month at paragraph 321, continues apace. Mr. Twitchell's British, American and Swedish confrères have been joined by a Dutchman, a Greek with a certain Russian background, and a German, accompanied by his dachshund. The Swedish diamond-drillers are now working night and day; further work on the road is in progress; a site of some 300 yards by 150 yards has been secured by the syndicate about a mile north of Jedda, where work on the construction of a walled compound to contain dwelling-houses, store-houses, garages, &c., has already commenced. A pier, not far removed from this site, running out to deep water, has also been planned.

363. Further changes have taken place in the local representation of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company during the month. Mr. W. J. Lenahan returned from Hasa on the 24th November via Egypt, and Mr. R. Lebkicker left on the 28th by the same route for a few weeks' visit to Hasa before returning to London early next year. Mr. Lenahan stated that the prospects of winning oil in Hasa in commercial quantities appear favourable, as at the present stage of boring 100 barrels a day are being obtained, whereas when at the same depth of boring in the adjacent successful wells in Bahrein only a smear of oil was obtained.

364. A further consignment of 30,000 rupees (*vide* paragraph 323 of the last report) arrived from Bombay on the 13th November, making a total of 1,630,000 rupees imported through Jedda since May last. A further consignment of 400,000 rupees is expected shortly.

365. The following items of legislation have been published in the press during the month: (a) Regulations concerning the prohibition of the import, sale, carrying and possession of arms, other than sporting guns; (b) regulations concerning the practice of medicine in Saudi Arabia; (c) regulations concerning dispensers.

## II.—Frontier Questions and Foreign Relations in Arabia.

366. The *Umm-al-Qura* of the 22nd November contained an announcement that, in accordance with the provisions of article 4 of the Treaty of Taif, arrangements had now been made for the delimitation of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier. Two commissions had been appointed by the Saudi Arab Government, and would work jointly with similar bodies appointed by the King of the Yemen. One of the commissions had already left for the frontier area. No names of the members of these commissions have as yet been made public.

## III.—Relations with Powers outside Arabia.

367. Sir Andrew Ryan, after travelling by air from Egypt via Bagdad, Koweit and Bahrein, as stated in paragraph 334 of the last report, arrived at Riyadh, by way of Uqair, where he was met by Tewfik Hamza, brother of Fuad Bey Hamza, on the 23rd November. He left Riyadh, where he was joined by the Legation party from Jedda, which had arrived on the 20th, on the 28th, and is expected to reach Jedda on the 3rd December. During his stay of five days as Ibn Saud's guest, His Majesty's Minister was to engage in conversations on some of the more important questions outstanding between His Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arab Government.

368. As already recorded above, Fuad Bey Hamza, Saudi delegate to the Hejaz Railway Conference (paragraph 338), returned to Jedda at the beginning of the month. His technical advisers returned several days later. So far no official account has been received here of the proceedings of the conference.

369. (Reference paragraph 340.) On the 4th November the Political Resident at Bushire reported that 409 destitute Indian pilgrims had arrived at Bahrein from Hasa, and were to be evacuated to Karachi on the 11th. As nothing further has since been received on this subject, this has presumably been successfully carried out.

370. Conversations regarding the draft notes embodying the results of the Bahrein Conference (paragraph 341 of the last report) were continued during the month with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, and, upon his return from abroad, with Fuad Bey Hamza, regarding certain minor questions of interpretation. After a further reference to His Majesty's Government for instructions, the exchange of notes took place, by Legation and Saudi notes, dated the 16th and 17th November respectively.

371. The more sinister hypotheses that were built, in the local imagination, on the developments in regard to the Italian consignment of munitions of war, described at paragraph 342 of the last report, were not realised, for the Italian mechanics returned to Jedda within a day or two and left for Massawa on the 4th. It would appear that a demonstration of the capabilities of the munitions was staged at Ashaira for the benefit of Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman and Saudi officers, who, it is stated, were well pleased with the performance of a fast light tank, apt over any sort of rough going, a four-barrelled anti-aircraft gun, light field guns, and smaller arms. A less happy impression was created by the huge Fiat truck and trailer, which spoiled the Roman triumph by experiencing considerable difficulty over the rough going of the Saudi desert, and which, incidentally, is now employed in Jedda busily carting stones, after rumours had been current that it had been acquired by the Mecca Municipality as a refuse vehicle. The report of the imminent shipment of 1,000 camels from Yanbu, referred to in last month's report, was premature. They were, indeed, assembled, but remained, like Kipling's camel, "scruciating idle" for nearly three weeks, until finally shipped by the steamship *Mouna* on the 20th November. It is stated to be strongly rumoured at Yanbu that no further shipments of camels will be permitted.

372. Fuad Bey Hamza informed Mr. Calvert on the 11th November that a communication had been received from the Co-ordination Committee of the League of Nations by the Saudi Government, who had so far found themselves unable to reply. Fuad Bey confessed himself greatly perplexed by the situation, which he described as one of great uncertainty. He expressed doubts as to whether the Ethiopian mission, at present in this country (paragraph 345), would receive much satisfaction from the Saudi Arab Government, and appeared impressed by the strong protest recently addressed by Italy to Egypt. The Ethiopian mission, indeed, in spite of the desire of Blata Ayeule Guebre to conclude his affairs expeditiously and return to his own country, was still here at the end of the month, awaiting Fuad Bey Hamza's return from Riyadh. The latter had seen Blata Ayeule Guebre twice before leaving for Riyadh, and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had given an official dinner-party in honour of the mission shortly after its arrival here. The junior member of the mission, described as secretary, is Seyyid Muhammad Mehdi, a young French-university-trained Moslem.

373. The *Saut-al-Hejaz* of the 26th November contained a communiqué, received from the Italian Legation, announcing the withdrawal of lira bank-notes for 1,000 and 500 lire.

374. The Italian Legation flew its national flag at half-mast on the 19th, 20th and 21st November, presumably as an expression of Italian feeling at the imposition of sanctions.

375. The chancellor of the Italian Legation, Dottore Mario Ardizzone (paragraph 305 of report for September), left Jedda on the 29th November. His successor was expected to arrive on the 1st December from Bagdad.

376. Other diplomatic moves during the month included the arrival of the Afghan Minister, Muhammad Sadiq-el-Mujadadi Khan, and two secretaries, one named Abdel Rahman Raoufi, from Egypt. It would seem that the Afghan Legation here is to be a more permanent institution (the Minister brought a large quantity of luggage with him), and that he has ceased to be accredited to Egypt as well as Saudi Arabia, the Afghan Legation in Cairo having been temporarily closed. M. Ismailoff, secretary in the Soviet Legation, returned from five months' leave about the 20th.



## IV.—Miscellaneous.

377. Mr. H. M. Eyres returned from leave on the 13th November.

378. Pilgrim ships have arrived fairly regularly during the month, chiefly from Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. Numbers of pilgrims are so far satisfactory, the total number of Malay pilgrims registered in the Legation at the end of November being 679, or 62 in excess of the total number from Malaya last year. There are reports that this year Banque Misr contemplate sending an aeroplane of Misr Airwork to Jedda, for the purpose of conveying pilgrims Jedda-Medina and back.

379. It is reported that Seyyid Othman-bin-Muhammad-al-Amudi, the president of the Irshad party of Surabaya, arrived here early in November.

380. Signor D. Odello was stated to have secured a number of minor contracts for works of construction locally, and the Fiat truck was most probably engaged in work in connexion with these schemes.

381. It is stated that the decision has been taken by the Saudi authorities to run a second telephone line between Taif and Jedda. This should be useful next summer, as this year the excessive frailty of the single wire has been exasperating, and called forth mild expostulations from His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to members of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

382. Mr. G. T. Twemlow, of the Shell Company, visited Jedda from the 27th November to the 1st December, staying with Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co. (Sudan) (Limited), Shell agents here.

383. The position as regards the manumission of slaves by the British Legation was as follows:—

On hand at the beginning of the month: 1 male.

Took refuge in November: Nil.

Manumitted and repatriated: Nil.

Locally manumitted: 1 male.

On hand at the end of the month: Nil.

[E 7573/3300/25]

No. 65.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 30.)*

(No. 349.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 9, 1935.

SINCE I informed you by my telegram No. 212 of the 3rd December of my return to Jedda, I have addressed to you a series of telegrams regarding my proceedings at Riyadh. I now have the honour to submit a summary account of my journey which may be useful for future reference.<sup>(1)</sup>

2. I enclose a list<sup>(1)</sup> of the stages of my journey, from which you will see that I adhered fairly closely to my original programme, but took one day longer than I had expected to get from Hufuf to Riyadh, and spent one extra night in the latter place. Captain de Gaury, who accompanied me all the way from Cairo, is preparing a further paper on the route across Arabia.

3. We were favoured most of the way by ideal weather conditions, i.e., sunshine following on recent rain, which had bound the soft ground in the sandy areas. Even so the road was somewhat trying, especially between Hufuf and Riyadh, between Ashaira and Sail, and most of the way from Sharay'a to Hadda, where non-Moslems have to follow a detour, now known as the Christians' Road, to avoid Mecca. It is not too much to say that there is no such thing as a road at all in the European sense, but a practicable track and a track practicable only for the most intrepid drivers. The jolting was such that the wireless set, which I had brought as a present for Ibn Saud, arrived with so many parts broken as to be unusable. One bump more terrific than the rest, when we were crossing an ill-famed tract known as Umm Siqyan on the 21st November, damaged the muscles of my back so severely that I have not yet recovered the free use of them.

4. Our principal stopping places in the interior were Hufuf and Riyadh. All the arrangements in Hasa had been put in the hands of Sheikh Muhammad-at-

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

Tawil, who carried them out with the utmost efficiency and courtesy. We were received on the evening of our arrival at Hufuf by the Amir Saud-bin-Abdullah-bin-Jiluwi, who is acting in the place of his late father and who is to be confirmed in the appointment, when the King goes to Hasa in the near future. The Amir is a man of 35 or so, repulsive in appearance owing to a super-squint. Whether from inexperience or of deliberate intention, he received me with a singular lack of ordinary Arab politeness and left on me a most unfavourable general impression.

5. I cannot praise too highly the courtesy which was extended to me on every other occasion, and the efforts made to provide for the comfort of myself and my party, including Mr. Oppenheim and Mr. Ousman, who met Captain de Gaury and myself some little way out from Riyadh. The Saudi Government chartered a launch to convey me from Bahrein to Uqair, where I was met by Taufiq Bey Hamza, the brother of Fuad Bey. He had been brought from Mecca for the purpose, and he saw us through to Jedda. The King received me daily at Riyadh and entertained us at dinner on the 25th November, after a race meeting and riding display, attended by His Majesty, a large number of his sons, and various princes of the Araif and the Bani Rashid. The heir apparent gave us dinner the next evening and was most affable, speaking much of his experiences in England. The King's brothers did not appear on any occasion.

6. I can indeed say that, with the solitary exception of the boorish young man of Hufuf (whose manner was strangely aloof), every Saudi personage or subordinate with whom I came in contact used every endeavour to do honour to me as a British representative. As I have stated elsewhere, my party were treated throughout with the distinction appropriate to a special mission. We were everywhere received with military honours, and a guard was attached to our own quarters in the new guest-house near the Badi's Palace outside Riyadh, where we were accommodated, being the first visitors to use it.

7. Fuad Bey consulted me twice in Riyadh regarding publicity. We agreed on the terms of a statement, not in the form of a communiqué, to be published in the *Umm-al-Qura* of the 29th November. I enclose a translation<sup>(1)</sup> of this document, omitting my speech at the G.C.B. audience, which was rendered with sufficient accuracy, although one or two unimportant liberties had been taken by the translator.

8. The Saudi Minister of Finance, who is in temporary charge of Fuad Bey's post at Mecca, came out to Sharay'a to greet me on the evening of the 2nd December. We were met at Hadda by all the remainder of my staff and numerous members of the British, Dutch and American communities in Jedda.

9. I find it difficult to do justice in few words to the kindness which was shown me on my journey to Uqair. Apart from the hospitality extended to me by my colleagues in the foreign service in Egypt and Bagdad, I was most excellently entertained by the Political Agents at Koweit and Bahrein and their wives. In all these places I was given opportunities of making a very large number of agreeable and useful contacts, including meetings with Nuri Pasha As Said in Bagdad and the rulers of Koweit and Bahrein. I am also greatly indebted to the Honourable the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, who came specially from Bushire to meet me at Bahrein and with whom I had a useful exchange of views, following on informative conversations with Colonel Dickson and Colonel Loch. Last, but not least, I have to thank the Royal Air Force for transporting me from Cairo to Bahrein. The arrangements made for this transport were admirable in every way. I would ask that, if you see no objection, official acknowledgments should be addressed to the India Office and the Air Ministry.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to the Government of India (Foreign and Political Department), Bagdad, Bushire, Bahrein and Koweit and Aden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



*Sir A. Ryan to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 30.)*

(No. 351.)

Sir,

*Jedda, December 10, 1935.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 215 of the 8th December, I have the honour to forward herewith copies of the note, based on your telegram No. 132 of the 18th November, by which I informed Fuad Bey on the 25th November of the proposals of His Majesty's Government regarding the eastern and south-eastern boundaries of Saudi Arabia, together with a record of my conversations on the subject in Riyadh and an annexed note by Captain de Gaury of what Fuad Bey told me about the Araiq area. I have thought it desirable to make the record of conversations as full as possible.

2. When I went to Riyadh I was in some doubt as to whether Ibn Saud was really keen on a settlement of the question or would prefer to maintain his claims of the 3rd April intact rather than agree to any compromise. The impression I got during the discussions was that the King, though out for a bargain, and a hard one, was genuinely desirous of an agreement. It became more and more apparent to me as we went on that the most crucial issue, though by no means the only one, was the Jebel Nakhsh.

3. The form taken by the conversations in Riyadh made it difficult for me to adhere strictly to the order of the arguments set forth in your despatch No. 309 of the 23rd October, but the record will show that I made full use of them all with the King or with Fuad Bey Hamza, or with both.

4. I had in mind throughout the first two sentences of paragraph 13 of the despatch just quoted regarding the finality of the new British offer. I was all the more anxious to emphasise the views of His Majesty's Government regarding their position *vis-à-vis* the Sheikh of Qatar and the other Persian Gulf rulers, and more particularly to let the King understand that any active interference in the south of the Qatar Peninsula would involve him in a dangerous clash with His Majesty's Government. The possibility of such interference is to my mind the chief disadvantage that might result from leaving the whole question unsettled, now that His Majesty's Government have made an offer handsome enough to deprive Ibn Saud of any reasonable ground for his former grievance that His Majesty's Government were trying to deny his ancestral claims and to "come the Turk over him."

5. You will notice that, although the King made a reference, which I preferred to ignore, to his relations with his Arab neighbours, Fuad Bey did not openly on this occasion contest my arguments as to the effect of our treaties with the Persian Gulf rulers and article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda. In dealing with this subject I anticipated to a large extent the instructions in your despatch No. 334 of the 19th November, which reached me on the 8th December. Fuad Bey has a far better legal brain than Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, and, instead of sustaining the Sheikh's thesis, he developed a more ingenious argument of his own, namely, that as the Anglo-Qatar Treaty was not concluded until 1916, His Majesty's Government must respect an alleged earlier agreement, by which the Sheikh of Qatar recognised Ibn Saud's right to the Jebel Nakhsh. You will doubtless instruct me as to how I should reinforce my *extempore* counter-argument, especially if enquiries on the Persian Gulf side disclose any reason for accepting Fuad Bey's suggestion that the sheikh had before 1916 recognised Ibn Saud's right to the Jebel Nakhsh.

6. I find that, owing to my lack of preparedness for Fuad Bey's argument, I overlooked one point, which I think had escaped him also, namely, that a former Sheikh of Qatar entered into special relations with His Majesty's Government by a formal agreement, dated the 12th September, 1868. You may think it possible to make use of this fact, even though the agreement of 1868 did not give His Majesty's Government control of the foreign relations of Qatar.

7. If His Majesty's Government adhere strictly to the terms of the first two sentences of paragraph 13 of your despatch No. 309 of the 23rd October, there must, I think, be a prolonged deadlock. That may be no bad thing in all the circumstances. I cannot personally think, though I write with great deference to other views that it would really matter much if His Majesty's Government were to agree to a compromise in the southern area, but I am conscious of the great difficulty of giving up the Jebel Nakhsh. In this connexion

it would be useful for me to have for my own use a sketch, showing the limits of the oil concession area and of the protection area in the south of Qatar. I was shown a sketch of this kind in London, but my files here do not seem to contain definite information regarding the two areas.

8. I would draw attention to two other matters which I did not consider it necessary to mention in my telegram under reference. The first is what Fuad Bey said, as set forth in paragraph 20 of the enclosed record, about the position *vis-à-vis* the Yemeni Government. I trust that you will approve of the general line which I took in regard to this unexpected subject. The other matter has to do with the proceedings of Colonel Pelly in and about 1865 (see paragraphs 12 and 13 of the record). This is only important as a matter of convincing Ibn Saud of the good faith of His Majesty's Government.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosures to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, Bushire, Bahrein and Aden.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 66.

*Note handed to Fuad Bey Hamza at Riyadh on November 25, 1935, by Sir A. Ryan.*

FRONTIER line proposed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, subject to the assent of His Highness the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, so far as his interests are affected:—

1. A straight line starting from a point on the coast of the Dohat-as-Salwa 4 miles to the north-east of the point on the sea coast closest to Qasr-as-Salwa and running due south-east for 10 miles. (The terminal of this line is indicated as key-point A.)

2. A line from key-point A to a point (key-point B) midway between Haluwain and Nakhala, to be drawn as straight as possible, but so as to leave to Abu Dhabi the following places, namely, Nakhala, Aqlat-al-Manasir, Farhud, Rimth, Khafus and the route from Doha to Abu Dhabi, which passes west of Sabkhat-al-Amra, and to leave to Saudi Arabia the following places, namely, Haluwain, Bil Deirish and Raghawan.

3. A straight line from key-point B to the intersection of meridian 52° E. with parallel 23° N. (key-point C).

4. A straight line from key-point C to the intersection of meridian 55° E. and parallel 22° 30' N. (key-point J).

5. A straight line from key-point J to the intersection of the same meridian, 55° E., with parallel 20° N. (key-point G).

6. A line from key-point G to the intersection of meridian 52° E. with parallel 19° N. (key-point H), drawn approximately straight, but so as to leave Sabkhat Mijora to Saudi Arabia and the Ramlat Mughsin to Muscat and Oman.

7. A straight line from key-point H to the intersection of parallel 18° N. with the line known as the "Violet Line."

*Riyadh, November 25, 1935.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 66.

*Note by Sir A. Ryan.*

I ARRIVED in Riyadh late in the afternoon of the 23rd November. Ibn Saud received myself and my staff next morning, but the audience was one of courtesy only. That day, the 24th November, after luncheon, Fuad Bey expressed a wish to have a general talk about the business side of my visit. It had already been made pretty clear that the Saudis fully expected official matters to be discussed during my stay, and Fuad Bey started our conversation on the 24th November by asking me what I had in view. I explained that I had come



equipped with instructions on various subjects and that, as on previous occasions, I should welcome an opportunity of stating to the King in person the views of His Majesty's Government, although His Majesty would probably wish me to discuss the details with his advisers. I reviewed the questions which had been discussed with Fuad Bey in London in July. I had new instructions regarding the question of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of Saudi Arabia. This, I said, was the most important outstanding question. I would put second the question of Saudi-Koweit economic relations, and third that of the prolongation of the validity of the Treaty of Jedda, with the three connected questions of slavery, arms traffic and the language of the treaty. I had instructions on all these matters. I had instructions on the question of air facilities also, but I thought it might be better to leave that until after my return to Jedda. As for the Transjordan question, the position was that we were expecting a reply to the letter which Mr. Rendel had written to Fuad Bey on the 19th July.

2. This record deals only with the question of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers. In our conversation on the 24th November I explained to Fuad Bey the general nature of my new instructions. I emphasised the position of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Arab States on the Persian Gulf. Fuad Bey might, I said, dislike the pretensions of a non-Arab State to concern itself with Arabian affairs, but they were founded on an historic evolution. We could not contemplate a break in the line of States with which we were in special relations. On the other hand, we were sincerely desirous of a settlement of the frontier question, and the new proposals I had brought took the fullest possible account of the desiderata which the Saudi Government had put forward. I stressed the fact that the new proposals were not merely an advance on the offers which His Majesty's Government had previously made, but were based on a new method of approach to the question, that of readiness to meet Saudi views handsomely when we could do so, *e.g.*, in regard to the country of the Murra tribe, the *dira* of which proved, in fact, to be much more extensive than we had supposed; but we must at the same time safeguard other essential interests. I pointed out that, in applying this new method, we had gone so far that further concessions could not be expected. I also said that they were subject to the assent of the Sultan of Muscat, whom we had wished to consult, but who was out of reach, when the matter had got to this stage.

3. Fuad Bey preserved the rôle of an attentive listener. He did not demur to my proposal to give general explanations to the King in person, but was clearly anxious to have our proposals as soon as possible. I thought it politic to promise to let him have on the 25th November a note of our proposals and to show him a map to illustrate their effect.

4. Fuad Bey called on the 25th November shortly before the time fixed for my audience with the King to present the insignia of the G.C.B. We had a short general conversation, which I need not record in detail. Its only interest lay in the fact that Fuad Bey got on to the old familiar theme that His Majesty's Government never considered Ibn Saud sufficiently, and had always returned evasive answers to his professions of friendship and a desire for close collaboration with them. He spoke of the King's grievances. I riposted, as usual, by saying how greatly His Majesty's Government valued the King's friendship, but insisting that we had always believed the best way to consolidate mutual friendship was to clear up outstanding questions. (I will revert to this part of the conversation when recording separately my conversations regarding the Koweit blockade.) Before we parted, I gave Fuad Bey my note of His Majesty's Government's new proposals regarding the eastern and south-eastern frontiers and lent him a copy of the latest edition of Hunter's 1 in. = 32 miles Map of Arabia, showing the line now proposed and that which the Saudi Government had asked for on the 3rd April, so far as it could be drawn in from the indications in the Saudi memorandum of that date in the absence of all the geographical information necessary to identify certain of the places named therein. There was no time for discussion, but Fuad Bey manifested disappointment at the exclusion of Sufuk from Saudi territory. I told him that that place was much closer to the Sabkhat-al-Matti than as shown in Hunter's map and was marginal to the Sabkhat.

5. After the formal G.C.B. audience, I remained with the King to talk business. As he apparently wished the conversation to be private, I asked Mr. Oppenheim and Mr. Ousman to withdraw. Fuad Bey remained in attendance.

So did Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and the King's four eldest sons, but they all sat discreetly at the other end of the room. Captain de Gaury acted as interpreter.

6. I reminded the King of our conversations at Taif in July 1934. Since then I said Fuad Bey had been twice in London, and there had been much discussion of outstanding questions. I indicated to the King, as I had already done to Fuad Bey, the three subjects which I particularly wished to pursue in Riyadh. As regards the frontier question, I recalled the Saudi memorandum of the 3rd April and the counter-offer which I had then made. Fuad Bey had said during his subsequent visit to London that the Saudi claims rested on a considered appreciation of tribal considerations, whereas the counter-offer rested on nothing at all (Fuad Bey grinned). I could not accept this view of our counter-offer, but I admitted that it was very limited. After Fuad Bey had left London His Majesty's Government had studied very carefully the information he had supplied and had collected information from other sources. All this information led up to the new proposals which I had given to Fuad Bey just before the audience. I wished to indicate the bases on which they rested. They were twofold.

7. On the one hand, His Majesty's Government were responsible for the foreign affairs of Qatar and the Trucial Sheikhdoms. They had responsibilities towards these States. They could not agree to deprive the Sheikh of Qatar of any portion of the main block of that peninsula by ceding the Jebel Nakhsh or to isolate the sheikhdom by agreeing to a line drawn right across the base of the peninsula. As regards the Khor-al-Odeid, they had consistently recognised that it belonged to the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. I would not take the King through all the objections to the line his Government had proposed, but I would mention two other points. His Majesty's Government were not in charge of the foreign affairs of the Sultan of Muscat, but he was bound to them by many ties and they must consider his interests very carefully. Their information regarding the Hadhramaut tribes showed that their range extended a good deal further north than the Saudi Government had supposed.

8. I had indicated, I said, the objections to the Saudi proposals of last April. I now turned to our second basis, which was more favourable to the Saudi Government. We had gone deeply into the question of the distribution of tribes. We did not think that an allocation of tribes as such could provide a frontier, having regard to the other historical, political and geographical factors, but we did think that great account should be taken of tribal considerations. We had done this in preparing our new proposal, and especially as regards the Murra. We had found that the *dira* of that tribe was, as Fuad Bey had told us, much more extensive than we had supposed. I would give two instances in which we had modified our views. We were relinquishing Banaiyan, which we had at first honestly believed to lie in the domain of Abu Dhabi. In the south we were willing to concede Shanna. Fuad Bey had given us a list of, I thought, 162 wells claimed for the Murra. We had not been able to identify them all, but I believed that, when the King studied our proposal, he would find most of them included in our offer.

9. I intimated to the King that the further we had gone to meet his views the more difficult it would be to increase our offer in any way. I ended by commending it earnestly to his acceptance, saying that it would be very unfortunate if, through failure to reach a settlement now, we were thrown back on irreconcilable positions, we on our original legal theory, he on his claims of the 3rd April.

10. The King thanked me for my statement and expressed gratification at the general nature of our new proposals. He used language suggesting fairly clearly, though not precisely, that we had now the basis of a settlement, for which he appeared to be eager. He said that he wished to make two points at the outset. He wished for the best relations with His Majesty's Government. He also wished for the best relations with the neighbour States. He would not pursue the discussion further at this stage, but he wished to emphasise these two points.

11. I said that I quite understood the King's inability to reply in detail on this occasion to a proposal which I had only just communicated to Fuad Bey. I took note with satisfaction of what he had said as regards his desire for good relations with His Majesty's Government. I thought it politic to say nothing at this stage about his second point. As I had been with him by this time for about an hour and a half and it was time for the midday prayer, I took leave.



12. On the evening of the same day, when sitting with the King before dinner, I mentioned Sir L. Pelly's journey, in connexion with the route followed by Captain de Gaury and myself. This led the King into a positive statement that Sir L. Pelly had reached a definite agreement with his grandfather. He said that the document had been in the possession of the family in Riyadh but had disappeared. Fuad Bey joining in the conversation, I assured them most definitely that there was no trace in any British archives of any agreement other than the Ibn Mana letter, which had been published. One fact I said was quite certain, namely, that Sir L. Pelly, unlike myself, had come to Riyadh without any instructions. The King said that the Pelly mission and the despatch of Ibn Mana were entirely independent. He put the date of Pelly's visit some four years before the death of his grandfather, the Amir Feisal. (The King is clearly wrong in his dates as well as in his facts, but there can be no doubt that he sincerely believes that Sir L. Pelly did conclude an agreement on the occasion of his stay in Riyadh.)

13. When Fuad Bey again called next morning, the 26th November, I referred to the conversation of the previous evening about Sir L. Pelly's visit. I offered to give him a note of the transactions at that time, being anxious, I explained, to dissipate any idea that His Majesty's Government were holding back some agreement entered into by Pelly, because it was favourable to the Saudi Government. Fuad Bey brushed aside this offer, and I did not encourage him in a suggestion of his own that it might be possible to give him copies of the actual correspondence. We then resumed the discussion of the frontier question, with Captain de Gaury in attendance. It would be difficult and useless to reproduce the whole of what passed, but the following paragraphs represent adequately the main course of the conversation.

14. Fuad Bey said he had come to inform me of the King's reaction to our proposal. He suggested that, although it was based, as I had explained, on new principles, their application was very limited. As regards the Jebel Nakhsh area, he referred to past correspondence between the Sheikh of Qatar and the King, through Ibn Jiluwi, in which the sheikh had asked, more as a favour than as a right, that the King should not claim Jebel Dukhan and the tract known as Araq. The King had agreed, and, that being so, the King would now be prepared to abandon any claim to Araq, although he, Fuad, had claimed it in earlier discussions. (This apparently refers to the "Araq" mentioned in the Saudi memorandum of the 3rd April.) On the other hand, he pressed insistently the Saudi claim to Jebel Nakhsh, and urged that a frontier between the two Jebels would be a rational one based on physical features. As regards the Khor-al-Odeid, he began by saying that my arguments were sound, but presently he went back on the implications of this statement by reaffirming the claim to the Khor, though not, I think, as confidently as that to the Jebel Nakhsh. He tried to make out that our desire to maintain the continuity of the chain of States on the Gulf, however much it might rest on a historical basis, need not now prevent us from letting Ibn Saud have the Khor, which Fuad Bey described as economically necessary to Saudi Arabia, and which at one moment in the subsequent conversation he even described as the "port of the Murra." We had feared, he suggested, the intervention of extra-Arabian Powers. We need not fear Saudi Arabia.

15. Fuad Bey's invocation of an agreement between the Sheikh of Qatar and the King gave me an opportunity of asserting our attitude in regard to direct relations between the rulers in special relations with us and Ibn Saud. I reminded him of my statement of the previous day, that we were responsible for their foreign affairs and had responsibilities towards them. The question of our responsibilities to the Sheikh of Qatar had recently come into prominence owing to the grant of the oil concession (which Fuad Bey had mentioned). We had promised the Sheikh protection, and we must be in a position to carry out that promise in any and every contingency, however little we might fear having to do so. I suggested that this was a very real reason for objecting to direct correspondence between the Sheikh and Ibn Saud on important matters. If we promised protection we must have the means of protection, and we must be the judges of what was necessary to provide us with the means. I adverted to the letter which Ibn Saud had addressed to the Sheikh of Qatar some months ago regarding the oil concession and to the subsequent correspondence to which it had given rise. That letter, I said, was in the nature of an ultimatum, backed by a threat, and we had protested as politely as possible. The Saudi Government

had taken exception to our protest, and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin had relied on the wording of article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda as defeating it. That article did not, however, stand alone. It had been led up to and it had been followed by the communication to Ibn Saud of our treaties with the rulers mentioned in it, a communication made by agreement, in order that he might have knowledge of the nature of the special relations of which he had taken cognisance in article 6.

16. Fuad Bey said that the communication to which I referred did not include our treaty with Qatar. I questioned this, and said that it had certainly been intended to include it. It was a published document, and if he had not got it, I could let him have it at any time. Fuad Bey admitted that the question whether it had, in fact, been communicated was of no essential importance, but asked what the position would be if the direct agreement between the Sheikh of Qatar and Ibn Saud, which he had invoked, were antecedent to the Anglo-Qatar Treaty. I said I thought it would make no difference, as, although that treaty had not been concluded until 1916, Qatar had long formed part of the system of States in special relations with His Majesty's Government. I reminded him, speaking from memory, that, in the note communicating the agreements with the rulers named in article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda, we had expressly said that our position did not rest only on treaty texts, but on a whole series of past transactions. I also reminded him, again speaking from memory only, that Qatar was so much a concern of ours before the Anglo-Qatar Treaty of 1916 that it had, I thought, been the subject of a special chapter in one of the pre-war Anglo-Turkish conventions. The Anglo-Qatar Treaty of 1916 had merely reduced to written form pre-existing arrangements. Fuad Bey suggested that before the treaty of 1916 was concluded the Sheikh of Qatar was free to negotiate direct with Ibn Saud. Later in the discussion I asked whether the direct agreement about the Jebel Dukhan and the Araq was, in fact, antecedent to the Anglo-Qatar Treaty. Fuad Bey said it was.

17. I refused to entertain Fuad Bey's claim to the Khor-al-Odeid. I maintained that, even if it were a means of maritime access to the neighbouring part of Saudi Arabia, no territorial claim could be founded on this any more than Ibn Saud could claim Koweit because it was, or ought to be, a port feeding the Saudi area inland. If the Saudi Government wanted an arrangement about trade through the Khor that was another matter. Fuad Bey enlarged the issue at this stage by saying that, if we reached an agreement about the frontier, it would be necessary to have some sort of frontier arrangements for administrative and suchlike purposes. He quoted the parallel of the arrangements in the treaties with Iraq and Transjordan.

18. I outlined the procedure which His Majesty's Government had in view. My present object, I said, was to seek an agreement in principle regarding the frontier line. If this were arrived at, it would be necessary to embody it in a treaty, to which His Majesty's Government would be parties, for themselves and the Sheikhs of Qatar and Abu Dhabi, and to which the Sultan of Muscat and Oman would also be a party. His Majesty's Government had in view one matter, which came within the scope of what Fuad Bey had just said, but which I had not yet mentioned. I read paragraph 18 of Foreign Office despatch No. 309 of the 23rd October regarding the freedom of tribes to use their normal wells and grazing grounds on whichever side of the frontier they might be situated. Fuad Bey contemplated more general frontier arrangements. I doubted whether the conditions on the frontier now in question were similar to those on the Iraq and Transjordan frontiers, but, subject to the fact that I had no instructions other than those I had read, I agreed that arrangements appropriate to the local conditions might well be embodied in an eventual treaty.

19. I find that in the foregoing record of the earlier part of the discussion, I have omitted three points of some little importance as follows:—

- (a) At one moment Fuad Bey gave a definite hint that a bargain might be struck.
- (b) I reinforced my arguments regarding the special position of our Persian Gulf clients by saying that Ibn Saud was the most powerful ruler in Arabia, and that those other States had only such strength as they derived from their special relations with His Majesty's Government. Had it been otherwise, I said, Ibn Saud would have before now absorbed Koweit and Qatar. Fuad smilingly asked whether this would harm our interests. I replied emphatically that it would.



- (c) Fuad Bey threw a question at me about oil possibilities in the Jebel Nakhsh. I told him that I thought there might be oil there, but that we had also reason to believe that there might be oil in the area south-west of the Dohat-as-Salwa, and that we had not allowed the discovery of this possibility to deter us from making the Green Line offer at an earlier stage in the discussions. Fuad Bey tried to make out later that in claiming the Jebel Nakhsh so insistently, the Saudi Government were influenced only by considerations connected with the protection of Salwa in the event of raiding, &c.

20. The second part of the conversation related to the south-eastern portion of the proposed frontier. Before we had got far, Fuad Bey raised the point that the Saudi Government must respect the position of the King of the Yemen. They were themselves ready to waive any claim to tribes in the Hadhramaut hinterland, but they could not prejudice any claim which the Imam might have. I adverted to the fact that the Saudi-Yemen Treaty of 1934 did not deal with the Saudi-Yemen frontier east of Najran. I understood that that was because the Imam had refused to let it be defined lest his pretensions in the Hadhramaut should be prejudiced. After some little general discussion on this subject, I said that it would be hopeless to bring the King of the Yemen into the negotiation of a treaty regarding the frontiers now under discussion, but that the Saudi Government might possibly overcome their difficulty by attaching some sort of declaration to the effect that they did not wish to prejudice Yemen interests. I qualified this by adding that, if such a declaration were made, it should not mention the Hadhramaut as such. We should hold on to the Hadhramaut until all was blue. I added an intimation, speaking quite personally, that His Majesty's Government on their side might have some scruples about possible Yemeni interests in the area between the Violet Line and Najran. Fuad Bey said that no difficulty could arise here, because, while the Saudi-Yemen boundary east of Najran had not been defined, the Saudi and Yemeni Governments had an understanding based on the attribution of tribes in the area.

21. Fuad Bey intimated that our proposed line G-H-Violet Line was unacceptable. He put a general question as to whether I could offer any improvement on our proposals as a whole. I said that I was not authorised to offer any further concessions in regard to the line south of Qatar, on which my instructions were quite categorical; or indeed in regard to any part of our proposals. I said guardedly, however, that as regards one portion, viz., the line J-G, I deduced from the correspondence, though not from the text of my instructions, that His Majesty's Government might be prepared to put the frontier in that part rather further to the east, if it would lead to an agreement, but that in this case it would be more than ever necessary to consult the interests of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. I made it clear that I was speaking only of the area between points J and G and had no sort of authority to go further than our proposal regarding G-H-Violet Line.

22. Fuad Bey suggested that there would be no difficulty with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. He would agree to any frontier, because of the trouble he had in his hinterland with two important personages, Al Khurusi and Al Khalili. Fuad Bey caught on to what I had said generally about a possible modification of the line J-G. He suggested that, if that line could be transferred to meridian 56° E., it might be possible to devise a line further on intermediate between our proposed line G-H-Violet Line and that proposed in the Saudi memorandum of the 3rd April. He thought it would be preferable if this intermediate line could be defined with reference to places rather than to co-ordinates. He was extremely non-committal and explained that he was only throwing out an "idea" of his own. Subject to this, he indicated a possible line from say the intersection of meridian 56° E. and parallel 20° N. to run midway through the Ramlat-al-Mughsin and thence to points approximately at the intersections of meridian 52° E. and parallel 18° N. and of meridian 50° E. and parallel 17° N.

23. On a review of the whole discussion, Fuad Bey and I had to agree that we had not found the basis of an agreement in principle. I said that all I could do was to renew to him and to the King the appeal I had made on the previous day. Fuad Bey said that he had had to overcome great difficulties in his own high quarters in connexion with his own proposals. I explained that very great

difficulties had had to be overcome on the side of His Majesty's Government. Their proposal represented an honest effort to reconcile all the interests involved and I must again commend it earnestly to the acceptance of Ibn Saud.

24. My further conversation with Fuad Bey on the 26th November related to the Koweit blockade, but later that afternoon the King again received me and the audience was devoted entirely to the frontier question. Fuad Bey and Captain de Gaury were present. Only the general lines of what passed can be recorded as the King merely skirmished round the outskirts of a position on which he had clearly made up his mind not to give ground at present. He spoke at times with great vivacity, but with none of that bitterness which characterised his utterances to me at Taif last year.

25. I referred to my conversation with Fuad Bey in the morning and expressed regret that the King had found it impossible to accept a proposal which His Majesty's Government had put forward after an honest endeavour to reconcile all the interests which they had to consider. My only remaining duty, I said, was to renew my appeal that he should entertain it favourably. If this appeal failed I must return to Jedda and report to His Majesty's Government. What mattered was not that I was returning without having reached an agreement of principle, but that His Majesty's Government would have great difficulty in going further than they had done.

26. The King echoed my regret that a settlement had not proved possible. He proffered the usual assurances that, whether this question were settled or no his friendship with Great Britain was unaltered and unalterable. He referred to the many sacrifices he had made in the past, and had made only for the sake of that friendship. He suggested that it mattered little if officials took a couple of years to settle questions. I find it difficult to recall all that His Majesty said in this connexion, but Captain de Gaury's recollection is that he intimated that any differences were a matter for arrangement to be arrived at by modifications of view on both sides on an equitable basis. If I was not in a position to modify my proposals, that was my affair, and any delay in the negotiations could not be attributed to unwillingness on his part to reach a settlement. In the course of his remarks, he referred to the advantages of a method of question and answer, but he appeared to intend to leave the application of this to Fuad Bey and himself threw out only one question, of a somewhat rhetorical nature, as to what the fundamental causes of difference were. He made play also with the fact that in the treaty made with him in 1915 His Majesty's Government had undertaken to recognise his ancestral claims. At one moment he suggested lightly that, after all, the whole area in dispute was desert and that His Majesty's Government could easily give him a bit more.

27. After the King had expounded his views on these lines for some time, I observed that, if I remembered rightly, the treaty of 1915 referred to his ancestral claims in named areas. I should be prepared to answer any questions and would now answer the only one he had put so far. The fundamental difficulty was that, though he was the greatest ruler in Arabia, he was not the only one who had ancestral claims. His position was simple, as he had only to assert his own claims. That of His Majesty's Government was difficult as they were in special relations with some of the rulers and in friendly relations, as between independent States, with Saudi Arabia. They had to accommodate conflicting claims and they had done their best to do so reasonably. They did not exaggerate the ancestral claims of their clients, e.g., they did not claim Hasa for Bahrein, merely because it was shown in old maps as belonging to the latter principality.

28. This evoked a lively sally from the King who denied that Hasa had ever belonged to Bahrein though Bahrein might have belonged to Hasa. I replied that I was dealing only in examples.

29. The King asseverated that he and his brothers in religion, i.e., the coastal rulers had not wanted frontiers between them. He emphasised his friendship with them all and especially the Sheikh of Qatar, who would not be where he was had not he, Ibn Saud, helped him against his relatives.

30. I said that modern conditions had made frontiers necessary. New factors had arisen. How, for instance, had the present discussion started? The King had given an oil concession in Hasa. (The King interposed that it was not he who had given it, but an English company, i.e., by letting the concession go to the Americans. He was poor, he said, and must live somehow.) The United



States Government had then enquired what we considered to be the limits of Saudi Arabia. We had given the only reply we could, and had informed the Saudi Government of what had passed. I added that I did not wish to be misunderstood. Oil was not the only factor. Other factors had made frontiers necessary, e.g., with Iraq and Transjordan. The point was that in modern conditions frontiers must be drawn, if causes of quarrel were to be avoided.

31. The King recognised the necessity for frontiers. He made some obscure reference in this connexion to the circumstances of the Great War.

32. All the King's statements were interspersed with assurances of friendship. Towards the end he became almost fatherly and begged me not to worry overmuch as all would come right in time. I said that the King was in his own country and I hoped he would live for many years. I was a stranger and should be leaving next year. I should have liked to see this question settled before I went, not to gratify my vanity, but because I should not wish to leave behind me a possible cause of future strife. This sob-stuff elicited further amiabilities from the King, but otherwise left him unmoved.

33. When Fuad called on the morning of the 27th to discuss other business, I arranged to leave with him the map mentioned in paragraph 4 above, after having a copy made of the lines drawn in it. I also asked him for further information about the Arai area (see paragraph 16 above). I attach a note made by Captain de Gaury from the explanations given by Fuad Bey.

34. On the 28th November Fuad Bey engaged me in a long private conversation. Before passing to its principal subject, that of the relations of Saudi Arabia with Great Britain and Italy, he begged me to make a further effort to promote a settlement of the frontier question on a basis of compromise. He said, quite personally and non-committally, that if we could give way over the Jebel Nakhsh, he "thought he could induce the King" to give way over the Khor-al-Odeid.

35. Most of this record was written as the conversations proceeded in Riyadh, but I have corrected it somewhat and completed it in Jedda.

ANDREW RYAN.

Jedda, December 7, 1935.

Enclosure 3 in No. 66.

*Description of the Arai Area given by Fuad Bey Hamza.*

ARAIQ, literally "The small veins," i.e., of Sand.

EAST of and within sight of Qasr Salwa are the water holes (Hissu) of Mishabiya. Between Qasr Salwa and Mishabiya is the palm grove of Umm-as-Samra, and this is surrounded by salty low-lying ground (Sabkha), usually called Sabkhat-as-Salwa. Further east again is a sandy plain dotted with bushes called the Arai. Its northern end reaches to near Jebel Nakhsh, and its southern end terminates in the Salama dunes south-east of Sikak.

In the Arai are many water holes, notably—

- (1) Abu Ghath.
- (2) Sai (i.e., in the courier road).
- (3) Ud Abu Samra (the largest group).
- (4) Jabanin.

South of the Arai is the Mishash-bin-Shafi, and east of the Arai begins the Qalail area, the Qalail being a series of small hills which begin north-east of Jebel Nakhsh. Between Nakhsh and Qalail passes the Hasa-Doha road.

(The Mishash water points include the following:—

Mishash-as-Samra,  
Mishash-al-Mifsal,  
Mishash-al-Maqdar,  
Mishash-al-Taz,  
Mishash Umm-as-Samra, and  
Mishash-bin-Shafi.)

[E 7570/206/25]

No. 67.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 30.)*

(No. 352.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 10, 1935.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 216 of the 8th December, I have the honour to forward a record, which I made before leaving Riyadh, of my conversations there regarding the Koweit blockade.

2. I may mention that on the occasion of my first visit to the Sheikh of Koweit, in presence naturally of the Political Agent, I gave his Excellency renewed assurances of the strong desire of His Majesty's Government to remove his grievance against Ibn Saud in respect of the blockade and told him that I was taking to Riyadh new instructions on the subject.

3. In order to impress on Ibn Saud the importance of this question in the eyes of His Majesty's Government, I put it second only to the eastern frontier question, when informing Fuad Bey and later the King himself, of the subject I wished to discuss during my visit.

4. You will observe that my conversation with Fuad Bey on the 26th November was generally unsatisfactory. I think that he has already seen for himself that the not-a-single-case-of-smuggling condition was absurd, but was mortally afraid of his master. By the next day, he had evidently persuaded the King to be more reasonable.

5. I consider that Fuad Bey's suggestions regarding the control of persons carrying goods require very careful scrutiny. I did not press him to define more precisely what he had in mind, because, while anxious to appear sympathetic once I had gained the main point, I thought it better to wait and see how the suggestion, as stated in general terms by Fuad Bey, would strike the authorities in Koweit from the point of view of practicality.

6. I need hardly say that, if it should be at all possible to meet the views of the Saudi Government as now modified, I hope that the Koweit authorities will do so and suggest practical arrangements. I think it would be best to continue the negotiations through this Legation, rather than suggest a resumption of the local conference. The great thing, in my opinion, is now to advance as soon as possible to an exchange of notes, in the hope that Ibn Saud may then relax his blockade measures, and to see over a period of six months or a year how the new arrangements work. I think that Ibn Saud was greatly impressed by the argument that his attitude hitherto has been inconsistent with his professions of friendship for His Majesty's Government.

7. I ventured to discuss with Colonel Fowle and the Political Agents, quite privately and without in any way pre-judging your views, a suggestion of my own that it would strengthen the position *vis-à-vis* Ibn Saud in discussions affecting Koweit (and Bahrein), if means could be found to confer upon the Sheikh (and on the Sheikh of Bahrein, for similar reasons) the title of "His Highness." As I explained to the Political Resident, I am well aware that this suggestion may present difficulty from other points of view, but I have long felt that, in correspondence with the Saudi Government, in which I have so often to impress on them the importance attached by His Majesty's Government to the position of the Sheikh of Koweit (and that of the Sheikh of Bahrein) as an independent ruler, I should have to use the title of "His Excellency," which, however respectable, is normally borne by subjects and which, moreover, has nowhere been so belittled by indiscriminate use as in the Near and Middle East.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Government of India, Bushire and Koweit.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.



*Koweit Blockade: Discussions at Riyadh.*

IN my preliminary business conversation with Fuad Bey on the 24th November, the day after my arrival, I put this second among the questions which I particularly wished to discuss during my visit. I outlined the views of His Majesty's Government referring to their strong desire to get this question settled, as the Iraq and Transjordan questions had been settled; to the impossible character of the "guarantee" which Ibn Saud had demanded and to the Sheikh's counter-proposal that he should give his word of honour to do all in his power to prevent smuggling; to the readiness of His Majesty's Government to back this; and to their difficulty in reconciling the King's attitude with his repeated professions of friendship towards themselves.

2. I mentioned the subject to the King at the outset of my first business audience on the 25th November, but had no opportunity of pursuing it then or at my second business audience next day, as the only subject discussed in detail was that of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers. In the event, as will be seen, I found it better tactics not to tackle His Majesty at all about Koweit but to apply pressure through Fuad Bey.

3. Fuad Bey broached the subject at luncheon on the 26th November and stressed the importance of manifests. After luncheon I proved to him that this was provided for in the letter from the Koweiti delegation to the Saudi delegates at Koweit of the 17th June, 1935. I gave him the translations of that and the ensuing papers in the Foreign Office print enclosed in Foreign Office despatch No. 317 of the 31st October to Jedda. Fuad Bey then developed the argument that Koweit could not do without smuggling. I demurred to this on the ground that the main advantage which such a place derived from being an entrepôt was that its merchants handled trade. I denied that smuggling was essential to the prosperity of Koweit as he had suggested, though I admitted that the temptation to indulge in it was great in cases such as the present when there was so enormous a disparity between the Koweiti and Saudi customs duties. (I had already tried to draw him on the question whether the Saudi Government intended to reduce their duties—see paragraph 12 of the Foreign Office despatch already quoted—but he professed complete ignorance on this subject.)

4. Fuad Bey, who was not, I think, very conversant with what had passed during his absence from this country, tried to make out that the "guarantee" demanded by the Saudi delegates at Koweit was not, in fact, a guarantee that not a single case of smuggling should take place. I demolished this suggestion, whereupon Fuad Bey, making no attempt to defend the guarantee, which had been asked for, suggested that other guarantees would be necessary. He outlined a system of passports or identity certificates for persons carrying goods. I said that something might be done on those lines but I rejected a proposal of Fuad Bey's that I should forthwith draft a note embodying not only the two formulæ in the Koweiti delegates' letter of the 17th June but a system of further precautions against smuggling. I pointed out that I could not draft anything except in consultation with the authorities concerned and that, if the Saudi Government wished for further guarantees, it was for them to say what they wanted. Replying to a complaint of his that the Koweiti delegates had made no counter-proposals regarding guarantees, I said that they had had no opportunity of doing so, as the Saudi delegates had taken them by the throat and had made acceptance of the form of guarantee demanded by them a condition *sine qua non* of continuing negotiations.

5. In defending his suggestion that I should draft a note, Fuad Bey let fall the incautious remark that he had no interest in the matter and that it was I who was pressing for a settlement. I told him that he certainly ought to be interested. Koweit was the natural source of supply for the adjoining parts of Saudi Arabia and it could not be to the advantage of the Saudi Government to maintain *vis-à-vis* of their own subjects a system to enforce which smuggling had been made a capital offence. Fuad Bey rejoined that the Saudi Government were the best judges of how to treat their subjects. I invoked general principles of sound administration and then said that, in any case, his Government had one very strong interest in a settlement. His Majesty's Government, I said, attached the utmost importance to the question. Ibn Saud assured them at every

turn of his friendship. But, in this particular case, his attitude was inconsistent with his professions of friendship for His Majesty's Government, who were bound to uphold the interests of the Sheikh of Koweit.

6. In the end I again pressed Fuad Bey to tell me definitely what the Saudi Government wanted. Fuad Bey replied that he had no authority to make any suggestions and we left the subject.

7. When Fuad Bey called again on the 26th November, I had re-read my papers and was better prepared for him. I attacked him all along the line, pointing out that the Koweit delegates had in fact offered an alternative guarantee to that demanded by the Saudi delegates. They had offered a pledge by the Sheikh to use all his endeavours to prevent smuggling. His Majesty's Government had since offered to back those endeavours by their own. Fuad Bey asked what form the action of His Majesty's Government would take. Would the Political Agent be responsible? I said that, if His Majesty's Government gave a pledge it would be for them to judge of the means of giving effect to it, but that doubtless any action that they took would be taken through the Political Agent.

8. Fuad Bey drew me out as to what I considered would meet the case. I said that in my view all that was necessary was an exchange of notes incorporating heads (1) and (2) in the Koweit delegates' letter of the 17th June plus the Sheikh's pledge and the assurance that His Majesty's Government would do all they could to ensure its fulfilment. I added that, while I had no instructions about a time-limit and did not know how my Government would view the suggestion, I should be prepared to recommend a provision in the exchange of notes, similar to that in the recent Bahrein transit notes, enabling either party to terminate the arrangement by an agreed short notice. This would give the Saudi Government a remedy, if smuggling became in fact serious.

9. During this first part of the conversation, I told Fuad Bey that he had shocked me by two of his statements the day before, when he had said that he had no interest in the settlement of the question and later that he had no authority to make suggestions. As regards the first, I repeated what I had said previously. As regards the second, if the effective Minister for Foreign Affairs of the country told me he had no authority, I could only lay the matter before the person who possessed it, *i.e.*, the King.

10. Fuad Bey resorted to one of his favourite devices and begged me to be practical. He then came into the open, having evidently got the King's consent to a partial surrender. He said that four points had already been put forward, *viz.* :—

- (1) Manifests.
- (2) The Sheikh's pledge.
- (3) His Majesty's Government's assurance.
- (4) My personal suggestion regarding time-limit.

He said that the King had now decided to abandon the condition proposed by the Saudi delegates at Koweit but considered that, in addition to the above safeguards, means should be found to control persons engaged in trade with reference to whether they were—

- (a) Subjects of Saudi Arabia coming from Nejd.
- (b) Subjects of Saudi Arabia resident in Koweit.
- (c) Koweiti subjects.
- (d) Subjects of third Powers, like Iraq, Iran, &c.

11. I agreed to submit this proposal for consideration, making it clear that in my opinion it would be necessary to define clearly what persons should be covered. I pointed out that different classes of persons crossed the frontier for different purposes, regular traders, persons wishing to supply their own needs and others, *e.g.*, sportsmen. I did not exclude the possibility of control on the lines suggested of persons engaged in trade, but I understood it was in accordance with local customs that movements generally across the frontier should be as little restricted as possible. I had been told in Koweit that movement for the purpose of hawking, for instance, was considered quite a special thing, which should be free.

12. Fuad Bey reverted to the questions of manifests. Could they be given in all cases? And what would happen, if a man took out goods, professing to be bound, say, for Iraq when his real intention was to import them into Saudi



Arabia? He thought that the Koweit authorities themselves might find it embarrassing to have to supply the Saudi agent, An-Nafisi, with all manifests. He considered that there should be stringent penalties for false representations as to destination.

13. Fuad Bey added two further suggestions. Fixed routes, should, he said, be specified. The provision for them implied in the word "guiding" in the Koweit delegates' letter of the 17th June was not in his view sufficient. Secondly, the manifest system should extend to dhows, as goods might be embarked in dhows for the Saudi coast.

14. Fuad Bey assured me that the King was animated by no spirit of hostility. I thanked him for his assurance and said that I was quite willing to have all his suggestions examined. I said that in view of what he had told me I no longer considered it necessary to trouble the King personally.

ANDREW RYAN.

Riyadh, November 29, 1935.

[E 7575/318/25]

No. 68.

*Sir A. Ryan to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 30.)*

(No. 353.)

Sir,

Jedda, December 10, 1935.

IN my telegram No. 217 of the 8th December, I had the honour to report the results of the action taken by me in Riyadh on your despatch No. 311 of the 24th October regarding the question of slavery in Saudi Arabia. I have nothing to add to what I stated in that telegram, except that I satisfied myself that it would be useless to press Fuad Bey further on the three points which I was unable to settle with him. I understood him to say that, if we agreed to the Saudi slavery regulations as drafted, with the slight further modifications now agreed on, Ibn Saud would be prepared to promulgate them in return for a promise by His Majesty's Government to renounce their right of manumission after a short interval.

2. I dealt with the question of slavery, as in earlier discussions, as the most important of the matters connected with the proposed prolongation of the validity of the Treaty of Jedda. In this connexion I would offer the following observations on paragraphs 12 to 14 of your despatch No. 311 of the 24th October. Fuad Bey made no reference at Riyadh to the possibility of a new general treaty between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia. The conditions foreshadowed in paragraph 13 of your despatch, as those in which the conclusion of such a treaty might be possible, have certainly not arisen. On the other hand, I see no reason why the alternative course of prolonging the validity of the present treaty should not still be pursued, despite the failure which has attended my efforts to secure a settlement of the question of the eastern and south-eastern frontiers and the uncertain future of other questions not discussed at Riyadh, notably that of air facilities, which I preferred to postpone, and that of the Transjordan frontier, one in which it is for the Saudi Government to make the next move. I have throughout been averse from the alternative discussed in paragraph 14 of your despatch, if it can be avoided. In these circumstances I should prefer, subject to your approval, to proceed still on the lines of the second sentence of paragraph 12 of your despatch, that is to say to dispose of the question of slavery, if this is possible, and then to proceed with the prolongation of the Treaty of Jedda by an exchange of notes, dealing only with the right of manumission, Arms Traffic and the language of the treaty.

3. As I am not yet in a position to report any further discussion of importance regarding the last two subjects that I have mentioned, I can most conveniently record the position in regard to them in this despatch:—

(a) In the course of the conversations at Riyadh I gave Fuad Bey the text of the Arms Traffic formula proposed in paragraph 7 of your despatch No. 321 of the 6th November. Fuad Bey did not seem to like it very much, but we did not discuss it systematically and I propose, in accordance with paragraph 8 of that despatch, to postpone such discussion, if possible, until we have got further with slavery.

(b) As regards the language of the treaty, I told Fuad Bey in the course of our general conversations that I thought His Majesty's Government would be prepared to give the Saudi Government satisfaction on this point, but that it was so subsidiary to the other issues that I had ascertained the general views of His Majesty's Government on the subject only just before leaving England and had not had formal instructions.

If you approve of the general proposals in this despatch, and if I can dispose successfully of the questions of slavery and Arms Traffic, I propose to act on the assumption which I expressed in a minute in the Foreign Office file just before I left, and to express definite readiness to agree on a formula satisfactory to the Saudi Government regarding the language question.

4. I made it clear to Fuad Bey that, if we got to the point of drafting an exchange of notes providing for the prolongation of the Treaty of Jedda, the draft notes would have to be submitted for your approval.

5. I would draw attention to one other point. In paragraph 12 of your despatch No. 311 you speak of a prolongation "for a period of, say, seven years." You will remember that at the sixth meeting with Fuad Bey in London<sup>(1)</sup> Fuad Bey suggested an alternative, viz., prolongation of ten years unless a new treaty should be negotiated in the meanwhile. I should myself prefer, on the whole, a prolongation for seven years, but I should be glad to know whether, if Fuad Bey renews his alternative suggestion in due course, I may accept it.

I have, &c.

ANDREW RYAN.

<sup>(1)</sup> See bottom of page 48 (No. 16), *supra*.



## CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 4051/2/93]

No. 69.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 1.)*

(No. 334.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 18, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 326 of the 12th June, I have the honour to inform you that M. Cuénod went to Mosul on the 14th June. On his arrival the local committee for Assyrians was reformed, and made all the necessary arrangements for the transfer to Syria of the inmates of the camp for destitutes and 1,000 indigents from Mosul town.

2. M. Arocha and M. Burnier were meanwhile touring the Khabur and the Orontes valleys.

3. On returning to Beirut on the 14th June, M. Arocha telegraphed to Yasin Pasha that everything was ready for the immediate reception of the inmates of the camp, and that the others could be despatched during July and August.

4. The Iraqi Government, on the advice of Major Thomson, have replied recommending that, if possible, the whole 1,300 should be sent over before the end of June, as they fear the heat of July and August.

5. On the 17th June the Iraqi Government placed a credit of £60,000 at the disposal of the Secretary-General of the League of Nations with the Banque de Syrie et Grand-Liban at Beirut.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 4052/436/93]

No. 70.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 1.)*

(No. 338.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 19, 1935.*

WITH reference to Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes's despatch No. 529 of the 6th September, 1934, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of a Royal Iradah bringing into force, with effect from the 12th June last, the National Defence Law enacted in February 1934.

2. Regulations for calling conscripts to the colours were published in the *Official Gazette* of the 30th April. A translation of these regulations will be sent to you under cover of a separate despatch.

3. I have not yet had an opportunity to discuss with Yasin Pasha the immediate plans of the Iraqi Government, but I gather that they intend to proceed slowly, and that the first quota (article 14) is not likely to exceed 1,000 or 1,500 men. These will be drawn mainly from the urban population.

4. For some years the cavalry, air force and mechanised units are likely to be maintained on the present voluntary basis.

5. The Arabic press has given a warm welcome to the Royal Iradah bringing national service into operation and Yasin Pasha and his colleagues are praised for having at last realised one of the "dearest aspirations of the Iraqi nation."

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 70.

*Royal Iradah.*

(Translation.)

WE have issued this, our Royal Iradah,

In pursuance of article 40 of the National Defence Law No. 9 of 1934;

At the proposal of the Minister of Defence and with the approval of the Council of Ministers;

For the enforcement of the National Defence Law No. 9 of 1934.

The Minister of Defence is charged with the execution of this Iradah.

Done at Bagdad this 11th day of Rabi'-al-Awwal, 1354, and the 12th day of June, 1935.

GHAZI.

JAFAR-AL-ASKARI,  
*Minister of Defence.*YASIN-AL-HASHIMI,  
*Prime Minister.*

[E 4054/1583/93]

No. 71.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 1.)*

(No. 340.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 19, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 316 of the 11th June, I have the honour to report that during the past week the work of pacifying the district of Suq-al-Shuyukh has proceeded smoothly. Farhud-al-Fandi and two other chieftains of the Hachcham tribe have left the neighbourhood, and since their departure no further opposition has been offered to the Government troops. A collective fine of 200 rifles has been imposed upon the tribe and several section leaders are being held as hostages until this fine is paid. Eleven chieftains of the Bani Khaikan, who also took part in the revolt, are to be tried by court-martial. Six Lewis guns and 196 rifles taken from the police in Suq-al-Shuyukh have been recovered from the tribes.

2. In Nasiriyah the situation is quiet. Rifle fines are being collected from the tribes, and the Military Court continues to try those charged with offences against law and order. Six townsmen have been sentenced to five years' imprisonment, two mullahs have been given life sentences, and a number of bigger schoolboys have been flogged for breaches of the peace.

3. On the Gharraf (Hai) the disturbed situation has led to an outbreak of agrarian disorders. A land dispute between sections of the Bani Said tribe resulted in a sharp skirmish about the 10th June, in which some twenty men were killed and three wounded. The Kaïmakam of Shatrah tried unsuccessfully, with the help of tribal intermediaries, to establish a truce, and, as the rival leaders ignored an order to report to the authorities, they were bombed on the 15th June.

4. Further south the Albu Alyan section of the Abudah tribe have attacked and driven out the cultivators of an unpopular non-tribal landlord. Fighting has been stopped by the police and the kaïmakam has summoned the principals to his headquarters in order to settle the dispute.

5. These disorders have their chief cause in land quarrels and are not directly connected with the political issues which gave rise to the recent insurgent movements in Nasiriyah and Suq-al-Shuyukh. It is, nevertheless, significant that the unpopular landlord, whose men have been evicted by the Abudah, is a staunch supporter of the present Prime Minister.

6. I am informed by the Prime Minister that the death sentence passed on Sheikh Khawwam-al-Abbas, the leader of the revolt in Rumaitha, has been commuted to one of imprisonment for life.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.



*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 1.)*

(No. 341.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 19, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 300 of the 30th May, I have the honour to report that the Ministry of the Interior issued orders on the 9th June to all mutessarifs for the machinery of the general elections to be set in motion. I have not seen a copy of these orders, but I understand that nothing will be done in the areas where martial law has been declared until civil authority is restored.

2. Parliament was adjourned on the 9th April and, under the terms of article 40 of the Organic Law, it must reassemble in extraordinary session within four months from that date. There remain, therefore, only two months in which to carry out the elections.

3. The Government are not certain whether, in present circumstances, this can be done and are somewhat anxious lest the elections should give rise to new disorders. They have consulted Mr. Drower (one of the framers of the Organic Law), but I gather that he has been unable to suggest any way of avoiding the provisions of article 40.

4. Press comments on the opening of the elections have given prominence to the pros and cons of dictatorship and democratic government. I enclose herein some specimens of current views.<sup>(1)</sup>

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 8.)*

(No. 358.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 24, 1935.*

THE Iraqi Government have recently issued new regulations governing the organisations of the Ministries of the Interior and Finance, and I have the honour to enclose herein a schedule showing the departments and sections of which these two Ministries will in future be composed. The full texts of the regulations will be forwarded to you when they are published in the English edition of the *Official Gazette*.

2. The changes which have been made in the Ministry of the Interior are intended to be a first step towards the improvement of the Administration of the country, of whose defects so much has recently been heard.

3. The Directorate-General of Municipalities has been revived and will, I understand, be charged with the primary duty of ensuring a good supply of drinking-water to every town in the country. A new Department of Tribal Affairs has been created, which will be entrusted with the administration of the Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulation, with the preparation of schemes for the gradual settlement on the land of nomadic tribes and with the administrative settlement of tribal disputes concerning land and water rights.

4. The Department of Propaganda and Publicity is also a new creation. Its duties will be to administer the Press Law, to control foreign publications entering Iraq and to arrange for the dissemination abroad of suitable information concerning the economic and political life of the country.

5. The new regulations for the Ministry of Finance raise the status of the State Properties and Trade sections to that of departments under a Director-General, but otherwise make no noteworthy change.

6. The duties of the advisers in both Ministries remain substantially the same as under the previous regulations.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure 1 in No. 73.

*The Composition of the Ministry of the Interior under the Regulation of June 1935.*

Minister Adviser	The Director-General of Administration	The Judicial Secretary.
		The Accounts Section.
		The Personnel Section.
		The Correspondence Section.
		The Translation Section.
	The Director-General of Municipalities	The Archives Section.
		The Frontiers Section.
		The Interior Section.
		The Technical Section.
		The Administration and Accounts Section.
	The Director-General of Tribal Affairs	The Labour Section.
		The Tribal Disputes Section.
		The Tribal Settlement Section.
	The Director-General of Police, The Director-General of Prisons, The Director-General of Census, The Director-General of Propaganda and Publicity, The Director-General of Public Health.	The Land Disputes Section.

Enclosure 2 in No. 73.

*The Organisation of the Ministry of Finance under the Regulation of June 1935.*

Minister Adviser	The Director-General of Finance	The Budget Section.
		The Pension Section.
		The Civil Service Section.
		The Government Press Section.
		The Correspondence Section.
	The Director-General of Revenue	The Land Revenue Section.
		The Property and Animal Tax Section.
		The Income Tax Section.
		The Audit Section.
		The Correspondence Section.
	The Director-General of Accounts	The Treasury.
		The Personnel Section.
		The Foreign Transactions Section.
		The Audit and Inspections Section.
		The Correspondence Section.
	The Director-General of State Properties	The Property Section.
		The Rights Section.
		The Land Settlement Section.
	The Director-General of Trade	The Correspondence Section.
		The Trade Section.
		The Statistics Section.
Affiliated Departments :		The Registration Section.
		The Directorate-General of Customs.
		The Directorate-General of the Port of Basra.



[E 4201/436/93]

No. 74.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 8.)*(No. 362.)  
Sir,*Bagdad, June 26, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 338 of the 19th June, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the regulations which have now been published for the conscription of proportional quotas of recruits in areas where census operations have not yet been completed.<sup>(1)</sup> This system of recruitment was provided for in article 38 of the National Defence Law of 1934 and the regulations now published lay down in detail how it shall be brought into effect.

2. As Sir Francis Humphrys reported in the fifth paragraph of his despatch No. 19 of the 10th January, 1934, it is chiefly in the tribal areas that the census has not yet been completed, and the purpose of the provisions of article 38 of the National Defence Law is to facilitate the application of conscription to the tribes. Under the arrangements which have been made for the recruitment of a proportional quota, it will not be necessary to go through the elaborate procedure of calling up the yearly class and of casting lots for the annual quota of men required for colour service. Instead, the special local committee will fix the quotas on the basis of the estimated population and the local sheikhs will then produce the number of men required. For some years the annual quotas called to the colours are likely to be relatively small and it is not anticipated that there will be any serious difficulty in obtaining the necessary men from the tribal areas in the manner which has now been prescribed.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 4202/1583/93]

No. 75.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 8.)*(No. 363.)  
Sir,*Bagdad, June 26, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 340 of the 19th June, I have the honour to report that, as a result of the action carried out by the Royal Iraqi Air Force and police, the agrarian disturbances which broke out on the Hai have been suppressed and all the tribal leaders concerned have now obeyed the orders of the civil authorities to come to the local administrative headquarters at Shatrah for the settlement of their quarrels.

2. In the Suq-al-Shuyukh district new police posts have been established at strategic points, and the provincial authorities are gradually recovering control over the marsh areas. Up to the 22nd June, 206 rifles and 8 Lewis guns, which had been captured from the police, had been recovered. Fines amounting to 888 rifles and 638 dinars have been imposed on the tribes of this district. Of these, 231 rifles and 588 dinars have already been collected.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 4203/1583/93]

No. 76.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 8.)*(No. 364.)  
Sir,*Bagdad, June 26, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 199 of the 11th April, I have the honour to report that the trial of those charged with complicity in the Kadhimain riots of last March came to an end in the Bagdad Court of Sessions on the 22nd June.

2. Sixteen persons were tried. Of these seven were found guilty and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. The other nine were acquitted and released. Sadiq Effendi Istrabadi, a former Mayor of Kadhimain and a well-known personality in Bagdad, was among those convicted, but Abdul Hadi Chalabi, the son of Abdul Husain Chalabi who has so often been Minister for Education, was acquitted.

3. During the course of the trial fifteen witnesses were sentenced to one year's imprisonment for perjury and several others received small punishments for contempt of court.

4. Great efforts are being made by the friends of those convicted to obtain a mitigation of their sentence. The best lawyers are being briefed for an appeal, and every conceivable wire is being pulled to obtain intervention from the highest quarters.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 4289/2/93]

No. 77.

[C./Min.Ass./116.]

*Geneva, July 8, 1935.*

## LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

*Memorandum submitted at Beirut to the Chairman of the Committee of the Council by the Office of the High Commissioner of the French Republic for the Mandated Territories in the Levant.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 12.)*

*Settlement of the Assyro-Chaldeans on the Banks of the Khabur.*

IT has already been stated that to increase the numbers of the present settlement from 2,200 to 6,500 by the building of new villages to the south would involve expenditure averaging 1,800 fr. per head, and that further consideration would be required if the numbers were to be increased beyond the total of 6,500.

A first summary survey of the question has now been made, from which it appears that—

I.—*Settlement of Refugees and their Subsistence until such time as they can support themselves.*

	Fr.
(a) Transport	80,000
(b) Subsistence: 1st year, 6,570,000 at the rate of 1.20 per head per day; 2nd year, 3,285,000 at the rate of 0.60 per head per day	9,855,000
(c) Equipment (dwellings and various installations, &c.)	1,000,000
(d) Farm implements, buildings and live-stock	2,500,000
(e) Cost of bringing the land under cultivation	2,000,000
(f) Health service	145,000
	15,580,000
Overhead charges and unforeseen expenditure	1,420,000
	17,000,000

This sum might be reduced according to the material situation of the refugees, and the number of head of live-stock they bring with them.



## II.—Plant required to allow of the Irrigation of the Land to be put under Cultivation.

The land readily admitting of irrigation on the bank of the Khabur to the south of the present settlement is in great part already occupied by natives. The cost of erecting new pumping stations will accordingly be higher than was the case with the two pumping stations already established, owing to the distance of the land to be irrigated from the river and its height above sea-level. As a first approximate estimate, it may be computed that the average cost involved will be 1,200 fr. per hectare—which will mean a total of 18 million francs for an area of 15,000 hectares.

It should also be noted that the cost of cultivation will itself be considerably increased by the cost of operation of the plant. It may be put at some 100 fr. per hectare per annum. Assuming an area of 10,000 hectares for irrigation, an annual payment of 1 million francs will be required, representing 5 per cent interest on a capital of 20 million francs.

[E 4290/2/93]

No. 78.

[C/Min. Ass./117.]

Geneva, July 8, 1935.

### LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Memorandum submitted at Beirut to the Chairman of the Committee of the Council by the Office of the French High Commissioner for the Mandated Territories in the Levant.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 12, 1935.)

#### Settlement of the Assyro-Chaldeans in the Plain of the Ghab.

##### NOTE.

(Translation).

Number of refugees ...	15,000
Area required ...	15,000 hectares

This area can be obtained out of the public domain land situated on the left bank of the Orontes in Alawite territory.

The preparation of the plain of the Ghab for purposes of settlement necessitates works extending over a period of four years.

During that period the refugees will be settled partly in the area already prepared on the Khabur, partly in Alawite territory, and the remainder on land leased on the right bank of the Orontes in the region of Sedjar.

The cost of the provisional settlement of the refugees, their subsistence during the period of the preparatory works in the plain of the Ghab and their transport between the Iraqi frontier and the place of provisional settlement is estimated as follows:—

	Francs.
(a) Transport ...	180,000
(1st year: 6,570,000—1.20 fr. per person per day)	
(2nd year: 3,285,000—0.60 fr. per person per day)	
(b) Subsistence ...	11,497,500
(3rd year: 1,095,000—0.20 fr. per person per day)	
(4th year: 547,500—0.10 fr. per person per day)	
(c) Equipment (dwellings and various installations) ...	1,000,000
(d) Farm implements and buildings and livestock ...	2,500,000
(e) Leasing of lands in the region of Sedjaz ...	450,000
(f) Cost of bringing the land leased under cultivation ...	2,000,000
(g) Health service ...	670,000
	18,297,500
(h) Overhead charges and unforeseen expenditure ...	1,702,500
Total ...	20,000,000

This sum might be considerably reduced, according to the material situation of the refugees and the number of head of livestock that they bring with them.

Further, contractors engaged in the preparatory work in the plain of the Ghab will probably find among the Assyro-Chaldeans, workers who can supply a large part of their labour requirements. Specialised workers and labourers employed in this way will have to be paid fair rates in order to enable them to provide for their families. Thus, the estimated expenditure on subsistence can be appreciably reduced. The employment of 1,000 workmen for the period of the works represents wages to the total amount of close upon 5 million francs.

In the absence of any information as to the situation of the refugees, it is hardly feasible to estimate the reduction that it will be possible to make in the sum of 20 million mentioned above.

The works required and the probable cost in connexion with the preparation of the plain of the Ghab are as follows:—

	Millions.
(a) Acharné reservoir ...	7
(b) Karkor regulating works and evacuation works ...	4
(c) Dredging of the Orontes between the village of Rassif and Karkor ...	18
(d) Principal drainage canal ...	4
(e) Secondary drainage canals ...	2
(f) Principal irrigation canal ...	20
(g) Secondary irrigation canals ...	7
Total ...	62

The settlement of 15,000 Assyro-Chaldeans in the plain of the Ghab thus necessitates a total expenditure of:—

$$20 + 62 = 82 \text{ millions.}$$

This expenditure is to be spread over the years 1935 to 1939 inclusive, as shown in the following table:—

Nature of Expenditure.	Amount of Expenditure (in millions of francs) for—					
	1935.	1936.	1937.	1938.	1939.	Total.
Transport and provisional settlement of refugees, subsistence and miscellaneous expenditure ...	6	8	4	1	1	20
Preparation of the plain of the Ghab...	1	9	20	19	13	62
Total ...	7	17	24	20	14	82

Supposing that the number of refugees were 25,000, it would be possible, in order to reduce expenditure to the strict minimum, to retain the area of 15,000 hectares mentioned above. This would correspond to about two inhabitants per hectare and would still be sufficient.

It would simply be necessary to provide for increased expenditure on provisional settlement, subsistence and miscellaneous items.



[E 4291/2/93]

No. 79.

[C/Min.Ass./118.]

Geneva, July 8, 1935.

## LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

*Letter from Yasin Pasha, President of the Council and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, containing the Iraqi Government's offer to contribute towards the Settlement of the Assyrians in Syria.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 12, 1935.)*

Dear M. Oliván,

Bagdad, May 26, 1935.

REFERENCE our conversation of this morning.

I confirm that the Iraqi Government is prepared to offer a total contribution amounting to 125,000 Iraqi dinars calculated on the basis of 10 Iraqi dinars for each person of the Assyrians who wish to leave Iraq up to a total of 12,500 persons.

If the number of those who wish to leave Iraq exceeds 12,500, the Government regret that it will be unable to pay for the excess; the Government, however, is prepared to pay 60,000 Iraqi dinars in cash at the time of the departure of the first party of between 4,000 and 5,000, the remainder will be paid at the time of the departure of each party from their place towards the frontier.

If the custom in the past was that transport expenses within Iraq were not deducted, the Government is prepared not to deduct anything on that account from the total contribution.

Please accept, &amp;c.

Y. EL-HASHIMI,

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 4304/2/93]

No. 80.

*M. Oliván to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 15.)*

Sir,

Geneva, July 13, 1935.

THE Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq feels that the stage has now been reached in its work where no further progress is possible until it has some more definite assurance than at present that sufficient funds for carrying out the settlement will in fact be available.

You will have already received from the Secretary-General an appeal for funds for this purpose which the committee has addressed to all members of the League, reinforcing that issued by the Council on the 19th January, 1934. The members of the committee other than the United Kingdom representative have thought it necessary to address in addition to the United Kingdom Government this separate letter expressing views with which the United Kingdom representative is naturally unable to associate himself.

The Secretary-General's letter will have informed you of the present position. The committee has decided to work for a scheme of settlement in the Gharb area in Syria; the cost of settling 15,000 persons in that area (without making allowance for eventual repayment by the settlers, the principle of which has since been accepted by the committee) was estimated by the French authorities during the recent visit to Syria of the president of the committee at not less than £800,000. Against this sum, the committee has no more than a promise of £125,000 from the Iraqi Government, of which £60,000 has already been paid. The committee has been informed by the French representative that some reduction in the above-quoted estimate may be expected, owing to changed circumstances since the original calculations relating to the development work in the area were made some years ago. Furthermore, reductions in the cost of settlement, as opposed to that of development, may naturally be anticipated in the course of detailed discussions, when various elements which cannot at present be properly appreciated are taken into account. Similarly, the United Kingdom Government will have observed that the committee is urging the Iraqi Government

to augment the sum which it has already promised. But even taking into account the possibility both of reductions in the total sum required and of a larger Iraqi contribution, it is clear that there will in any case be a considerable balance to meet; and it appears from the president's visit to Iraq that a greater number than 15,000 Assyrians may have to be transferred, which would counterbalance to some extent the anticipated reductions referred to above.

Apart from the promise of the Iraqi Government, the only offer received has been that from the United Kingdom Government at an early stage of the committee's proceedings, to the effect that it was willing to pay its share of a League contribution, though it could only contemplate payment as part of a League scheme.

We fully appreciate the reasons why the United Kingdom Government was not prepared at that stage to make a separate contribution, and our present appeal is based on purely practical grounds. The committee finds itself in an *impasse*. Although we cannot prejudge the decision that the Assembly might take if it were seized of the question of a possible League contribution for this purpose, we cannot refrain from expressing our personal view that the practical difficulties in the way of such a contribution would be insuperable. At the request of the United Kingdom representative, we have considered the possibility of arranging a loan under League auspices and we have been convinced that no such course is practicable. In the circumstances, we have been obliged to fall back upon the expedient of renewing the Council's general appeal to all members of the League for individual State contributions, although lack of response to the Council's previous appeal does not encourage us to hope for important results.

We see no prospect in fact of finding a satisfactory solution of the problem with which the committee is faced, unless the United Kingdom is prepared to reconsider its previously declared attitude and to make an independent and substantial contribution in response to this fresh appeal. We feel, indeed, that without a substantial contribution from the United Kingdom Government no adequate solution of our problem is possible and we consider ourselves justified in appealing to the United Kingdom Government in the conviction that it is anxious to see the problem solved and cannot remain indifferent to the consequences of the failure of our endeavours.

We appreciate that, without the more precise details which the committee is taking steps to obtain by further discussions at Beirut, it may be difficult for the United Kingdom Government to decide upon a definite sum. We trust, however, that the absence at this stage of a scheme complete in all its details will not prevent the United Kingdom Government, in the event of its deciding to respond favourably to our appeal, from giving an indication of the amount which it is prepared to contribute.

It will be realised that no final scheme can be established until the Assyrians have been individually consulted as to their desire to leave Iraq and the committee cannot take the responsibility of authorising that consultation without being sure that a substantial proportion of the final expense will be forthcoming.

I have, &amp;c.

J. LÓPEZ OLIVÁN,

*President, for the Committee of  
the Council for the Settlement  
of the Assyrians of Iraq.*

[E 4363/759/93]

No. 81.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 373.)

Sir,

Bagdad, June 28, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Department of Civil Aviation has been transferred from the control of the Ministry of Economics and Communications to that of the Ministry of Defence. I understand that the purpose of the change is to enable the technical experience and knowledge of the Royal Air Force officers serving with the military mission to be made available for the control of civil aviation and the improvement of the existing arrangements for commercial flying.

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2. I have discussed the matter with General Hay, who hopes to be able to arrange feeder lines from Bagdad to Haifa, Basra and Mosul, in co-operation with Mr. Muntz, who, for the past two years, has been endeavouring to enlist the support of the Iraqi Government for the establishment of ancillary air services in Iraq. General Hay also has in view several schemes for improving the Bagdad airport and for the more efficient control of amateur flying over Iraq.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 4369/1583/93]

No. 82.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 16.)*

(No. 382.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 3, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 363 of the 26th June, I have the honour to report that, up to the end of June, fines amounting to nearly 600 rifles and 1,000 dinars had been collected from the tribes of the eastern side of the Hammar lake. Of the 300 rifles captured from the police in Suq-al-Shuyukh, 288 have now been recovered, together with nine Lewis guns.

2. The fact that the Government have been able to collect rifles and money from the strong and well-armed tribes of the almost impenetrable Hammar marshes is an indication that their authority is being steadily restored.

3. The withdrawal of troops from the Muntafiq area began during the first week of July. Two battalions and one battery still remain at Suq-al-Shuyukh; and one battalion is at Diwaniyah, but the protection of Nasiriyah has been taken over by the police. The main body of troops is now located at Rumaitha, where the military court is dealing with the offences committed there during the first phase of the disturbances.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 4418/2/93]

No. 83.

*Record of the 47th Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, held in Geneva, July 10, 1935, at 10.30 A.M.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 18.)*

The President explained that he had not so far followed the usual procedure of presenting a written report on his mission to Iraq and Syria because, in view of the importance which the report might have, he wished it to be written in the light of the observations of the committee. He therefore proposed, in the first place, to make an oral statement.

On its arrival in Beirut the mission had met the High Commissioner, the officials of the French administration and Nuri Pasha, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, who happened at that time to be in Beirut.

The High Commissioner had wished at the outset to clear up two points. In the first place, he wished to know whether the Turkish Government would not make difficulties regarding the settlement of the Assyrians in the Khabur region. He recalled the reservation on this subject made by the Turkish representative at the January session of the Council. M. Oliván had replied that he had himself been present at that session and had then discussed the question with the Turkish representative. His impression was that the Turkish Government would be prepared to close their eyes if the number of Assyrians established near the Turkish frontier was not too great. The High Commissioner had suggested that the President might perhaps on his return to Angora mention this question to the Turkish authorities, but M. Oliván had not encouraged this suggestion, thinking it wiser not to enter into conversations with the Turkish Government in which the latter might stipulate fresh conditions. The second question which the High Commissioner had raised was that of the number of Assyrians who

would be transferred to Syria. M. de Martel had pointed out that there was a considerable difference between the estimates of the committee and of Nuri Pasha. The latter believed that only 4,000-5,000 Assyrians would wish to leave Iraq. M. Oliván had asked Nuri Pasha on what he based this figure. Nuri Pasha replied that the information of the Iraqi Government was to the effect that not more than 5,000 would elect to leave Iraq. This solution would give satisfaction to the Iraqi Government, who were reluctant to see all the Assyrians leave, particularly those from the north, who constituted a useful makeweight to the Kurds. M. Oliván had retained the impression that Nuri Pasha's estimate was based on nothing more than the hopes of the Iraqi Government. In discussions with the High Commissioner, Nuri Pasha, while maintaining that the number of immigrants would not, in fact, be greater than 5,000, had accepted a maximum of 20,000 as a basis of discussion.

As regards the area in which the Assyrians were to be established, the President recalled that the French Government, in the first place, had put forward various suggestions, some of which had to be set aside on account of expense. The French authorities had then come to the conclusion that establishment in the Khabur region offered the best prospects, but they could only contemplate an immediate settlement of 4,300 persons, further settlement being dependent upon closer investigation of the area in question.

The mandatory authorities, however, had since been conducting further investigations into the possibilities of settlement in the Gharb area. The development of this area included the construction of a barrage and the irrigation of a large tract of country. This work would take three or four years and raised the question of what was to be done with the Assyrians during that time. It had been suggested that a part of them might be employed in the execution of the development scheme which was contemplated, and that those who possessed cattle might be provisionally settled on the slopes above the Gharb valley. The most difficult problem was that of providing provisional dwellings, for the construction of permanent buildings could not be contemplated if the Assyrians had to change their residence in four years. M. Oliván had derived the impression that the French Commissioner was strongly in favour of the Gharb solution. His reasons were that, in the first place, settlement would be of a more permanent character. In the second, it would be politically advantageous, for the Assyrians would be amongst Christian minorities and would be sufficiently distant from the frontiers of Iraq and Turkey. The Gharb scheme had undeniable practical advantages. The Assyrians would be settled in fairly homogeneous groups and would become the proprietors of land which in the future would be of considerable value. Once irrigated, these lands would assuredly give abundant crops. Therefore, the recovery of the expenses of settlement would be facilitated.

As regards these expenses, the President had indications which led him to believe that they had been rather over-estimated. He had wondered whether he should enter into a detailed discussion of the estimates with the High Commissioner, but had decided not to do so. In the first place, the estimates presented were of a very general nature, and M. Oliván had taken into account that the French Government, in agreeing to receive the Assyrians in Syria, had rendered a considerable service, and that it was therefore hardly fitting to insist too much upon questions of detail. Moreover, the High Commissioner had adopted a "take it or leave it" attitude, and let it be understood that he was not in a mood to consider conditions. For these reasons, and because no funds were actually available, the President had thought it best not to enter upon a detailed discussion. He had contented himself with saying that the figures appeared to him to be on the high side. Another question discussed in Syria had been the financial regulations for the control of funds. These regulations had been examined by the High Commission, and as the result of discussion, certain slight modifications had been introduced, which had since been approved by the Secretary-General of the League. The question of the eventual status of the Assyrian immigrants into Syria had also been discussed. The High Commissioner had declared that he was ready to apply to the Assyrians the provisions of the mandate and to assure them of equal treatment with other minorities in Syria.

The President had been left with the impression that the French authorities were not willing to receive the Mar Shimun. M. Oliván had mentioned this matter to M. de Martel, who had preferred to postpone an answer. When this



answer came it was negative. The President had pressed the point, and the High Commissioner had promised to refer it afresh to the Quai d'Orsay, while declaring that for the moment it seemed politically inopportune to agree to the settlement of the Mar Shimun in Syria.

There were also a certain number of problems dealing with points which the local commission in Iraq would eventually have to put before the Assyrians, but the President had thought it wiser not to touch upon these questions at that stage of his mission and had departed for Iraq.

The President paid a tribute to the manner in which he had been received in Bagdad by the Iraqi Government and also by the British authorities. His first step had been to take up with Yasin Pasha the question of the Iraqi contribution. In the course of a first general conversation, Yasin Pasha had expressed himself in the same sense as Nuri Pasha, namely, that the Iraqi Government had no great interest in seeing the Assyrians leave. The President had replied that, if the solution of the problem interested the Iraqi Government so little, it was perhaps preferable not to negotiate, whereupon Yasin Pasha had made certain observations on the attitude of the Assyrians towards the Iraqi Government. He had said that the Government of Iraq had only to show a wish that the Assyrians should go for the latter to decide to stay. If, on the other hand, the Iraqi Government appeared to wish to retain them in Iraq, that was sufficient for them to elect to go.

On the question of the probable number of Assyrians who would emigrate, Yasin Pasha had gone a little further than Nuri Pasha and had spoken of 6,000-8,000 persons. On this basis, he had offered to pay £5 sterling for every Assyrian settled in Syria. He had added that, if this number was not exceeded, the Iraqi Government would be prepared to double its offer and to pay £10 a head. He was evidently prepared to contemplate a payment of about £60,000. M. Oliván had been given to understand in various quarters that a sum of £100,000 had been set aside by the Government for Assyrian settlement. As the expenses hitherto in Iraq amounted to about £40,000, there remained a sum of £60,000, which precisely corresponded with Yasin Pasha's offer.

Without entering into details, M. Oliván had informed Yasin Pasha that this offer seemed to him quite insufficient, and that there would be no hope of settlement if the Iraqi Government did not show itself more generous. As the discussion centred on the number of Assyrians who might wish to leave, the President had thought it well to go to Mosul to see the Assyrians in their own surroundings and to make as exact an estimate as possible, after consulting not each individual Assyrian, which would have required much too long a time, but the chiefs and the notables.

The mission then went to Mosul and there visited the Assyrian camp, which happily now existed no longer. As the inmates had now gone to Syria, it was perhaps unnecessary to say more about the camp. The impression which their visit had produced upon the mission was neither good nor bad. It seemed probable that the visit had been "arranged."

With the help of two experts, the mission had made two tours, one in the neighbourhood of Mosul to those villages which had suffered most in the massacres, and the second to the northern region, more particularly round Dohuk in those Assyrian villages which had not suffered in the massacres.

The impression produced by the first tour was that the Assyrians were living in wretched conditions. The villages were stripped of everything. Naturally, it was necessary, in forming a judgment, to take into account the general condition of the country, and not, for example, to compare the situation of the Assyrians with that of Swiss or Danish peasants, and M. Oliván did not think that the position of the Assyrians in the whole area was any worse than that of the rest of the rural population of Iraq. But this situation could not be regarded as satisfactory.

The mission had proceeded to consult the Assyrians in a purposely vague manner in order to avoid future commitments. The members of the mission had said that they had come to inform themselves of the situation and of the wishes of the Assyrians, that the French Government had agreed to offer a home in Syria, but neither the place nor the conditions of settlement were yet fixed. The Assyrians had been asked to say whether they would be prepared to go in the event of a plan of emigration being drawn up. The mission had added that the question of the Mar Shimun had been touched upon with the French authorities,

and that the latter were not prepared to agree that the Mar Shimun should be allowed into Syria.

In the villages round Mosul, the replies had been all of the same sort. With the exception of one individual, who had declared himself bound in writing towards the Iraqi Government not to leave the country, everyone had expressed his wish to go. As regards the Mar Shimun, the Assyrians were sorry that he could not go to Syria, but had nevertheless declared that they were ready to go, even without the Mar Shimun. In their own words, they had said that they wanted to go "wherever their nation should be settled." In the Dohuk region, where the Assyrians are mountaineers and owners of cattle in a pastoral region, the experts who accompanied the mission had expected that the people, who were relatively prosperous, would give either a negative or an indecisive answer. Almost all the Assyrians, however, had declared themselves ready to go without asking for detailed explanations. They were ready to go anywhere in any fashion.

In the course of two days' consultation in Mosul, the mission had interviewed representatives of the Assyrians from other parts of Iraq, who had come in groups of four or five persons. Clearly it was impossible to say to what extent they spoke in the name of the people whom they claimed to represent. It was only possible to form a general impression, which was that practically all showed a desire to leave. Mention of the Mar Shimun had led to certain recriminations, but the Assyrians had nevertheless declared that they would go without the Mar Shimun. One group only, that of Mar Yohannan, was more difficult and truculent. They began by declaring that they could not say how many persons they represented. M. Oliván had replied that he would be obliged, in the circumstances, to consider that they only represented themselves. They were unwilling to give further details, and in answer to a question put by the mission, they had refused to give a definite reply, saying that they must first know the actual conditions of settlement and the consequences that settlement might have, more particularly in the case of the termination of the French mandate in Syria. The President had avoided these questions, and the conversation terminated. But on their departure, the group had declared that they represented some 8,000-10,000 persons. Later they had written a letter complaining that no time had been given to them to explain their views, and giving reasons why they had not replied to the questions put to them.

According to the calculations made on the basis of these consultations, the number of Assyrians who might elect to leave Iraq could be put at about 24,000. This number was not, of course, definite, and it was composed of various groups: (1) A fairly considerable group, who were ready to go anywhere and in any fashion; (2) a number who were ready to go, but might change their minds, particularly if they were assured of better conditions where they were; (3) a number, which might be about 10,000, who were only ready to go if conditions in Syria were better than those which they at present enjoyed.

It was impossible to understand why the Assyrians of the north were so determined to emigrate. Their villages seemed well organised, their cattle plentiful. A schoolmaster, who was at the same time the village priest, had agreed that the majority of the Assyrians would go, but had added that he did not know why, since they were perfectly happy where they were.

On its return the mission stopped at Kirkuk, where they consulted Assyrians engaged in trade, and working in the employment of the oil company or of the railways. These Assyrians had expressed a desire to leave, although they were living in conditions which were relatively satisfactory and drawing fairly high wages.

Before going to Mosul, the mission had been invited by the British military authorities to consult the Assyrian Levies, who numbered some 800 men. The President had thought it best not to carry out this consultation until after the return of the mission from Mosul, but they had ultimately received at the British Embassy three officers of the Assyrian Levies, who had expressed a positive desire to leave the country. The British military authorities confirmed this fact, while regretting the departure of the Assyrians on account of their valuable services. The consultation of the Levies had been completed by a visit to the camp, where the mission had much admired the bearing and the *moral* of the men. They had been astonished that, in spite of the very satisfactory conditions under which they lived, these men desired to leave at any cost.



At Bagdad, the President had resumed negotiations with Yasin Pasha on the basis of the number of Assyrians who had expressed their desire to leave. As the President had reached the conclusion that settlement in the Gharb area would be the best solution, he had told Yasin Pasha that the Iraqi contribution ought not to be less than £250,000. Yasin Pasha had taken note of this figure, which did not seem to surprise him, and promised to consult his colleagues as well as the Financial Adviser to the Government. The President said that it must be remembered that at that moment the Iraqi Government was face to face with fairly serious troubles in the south, which had occasioned exceptional and considerable expenses. The answer of the Iraqi Government was negative the President thought it necessary to insist, but had taken upon himself the responsibility of reducing the sum fixed to £200,000, adding that this was his last word. Yasin Pasha had promised to examine the question afresh, but after consultation with the Financial Adviser, who had prepared a note on the subject, Yasin Pasha had declared that it was absolutely impossible for the Iraqi Government to pay more than £125,000. Yasin Pasha had added that he had received from Geneva a telegram in which Nuri Pasha had stated that the Secretariat considered that £100,000 would be sufficient. While denying this news, the President had thought it necessary to clear it up, and had learned subsequently that Nuri Pasha had been expressing his personal opinion and not that of the Secretariat.

To force the Iraqi Government into a decision the President felt it necessary to fix a date for his departure. On the occasion of his farewell visit to Yasin Pasha, he said that he was going without taking a decision, because the offer made by the Iraqi Government was insufficient. The discussion began afresh. The President felt it impossible to accept the offer because he still hoped to obtain more. On the other hand, he had not wished to cut the discussion short for fear of jeopardising the offer of £125,000, and of the risk of obtaining nothing. He had declared that he had from the Council Committee sufficiently wide powers to take certain measures if a sufficient offer was made by the Iraqi Government, but that as this offer was insufficient, he felt obliged to leave Bagdad without taking a decision, in order to submit the whole question to the Council Committee.

The Iraqi Government's offer had been confirmed by a letter, of which the text had been circulated to the committee.

On arrival at Beirut, the President received a telegram from the French High Commissioner (then in Paris), asking him either to arrange a meeting at Istanbul, or to await the return of M. de Martel at Beirut. The President had chosen the latter course, and while waiting for the High Commissioner, he had received a letter from Major Thomson and a telegram from the British Ambassador reporting a certain uneasiness in the region of Mosul following the visit of the mission. There was apprehension because the mission had gone away without saying anything. In order to turn this to advantage, and to render a service to the Iraqi Government, the President had sent a telegram to Yasin Pasha, saying that, if it would contribute to allaying anxiety, he was ready, on payment by the Iraqi Government of an advance of £60,000, to decide upon the immediate transfer to Syria of the Assyrians from the Mosul camp, and of 1,000 others chosen from those in the greatest need.

This operation had now been completed. When the mission left Syria, the Iraqi Government had not yet deposited the sum of £60,000, but this sum had been deposited on the 15th June, and the transfer of 1,400 Assyrians was now an accomplished fact. There remained out of the £60,000 a balance at the disposal of the Secretary-General.

Although he considered his own mission terminated, the President, on leaving Syria, had asked M. Arocha to obtain additional information by visiting the Khabur and the Gharb areas.

At the request of the President, M. Arocha gave a brief survey of his visit to these areas, basing himself upon a diary which he had kept of the whole journey. His general impression had been that the Gharb area was in every way superior to the Khabur region.

It was agreed to postpone comment on the statements of the President and M. Arocha until a later meeting.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

[E 4419/2/93]

No. 84.

*Record of the Forty-eighth Meeting of the Assyrian Committee held at Geneva, July 10, 1935, at 4.30 P.M.—(Received in Foreign Office July 18.)*

THIS meeting, like the previous one, was not attended by the French representative, owing to his non-receipt of the notice of convocation. It was decided nevertheless to proceed with the discussion of the President's report on the understanding that definite decisions should be postponed until the French representative should arrive.

The President said that the main questions which the committee had to decide were (1) whether the place of settlement should be the Gharb or the Khabur, (2) whether the Iraqi financial offer was adequate, (3) how the wishes of the Assyrians were to be ascertained, (4) how the necessary funds over and above the Iraqi contribution were to be raised, (5) what reply was to be sent to the questionnaire put forward by the local committee (see document C./Min./Ass. 115).

On the first point, the President said that in the Khabur region there were political difficulties. The place of settlement was very near the Turkish and Iraqi frontiers. In the Gharb, on the other hand, it was possible to settle the Assyrians in a more or less homogeneous group among Christians. From the point of view of rapidity of settlement, the Gharb also offered the better prospects. In the Khabur region the only certainty was that 4,300 persons could be settled. The rest depended upon further surveys, upon public works, the eviction of existing inhabitants, &c. From the technical point of view, the Khabur was a desert which required development. Already difficulties had arisen between the existing Assyrian villages there regarding the pumping of water. The land was also not so good as in the Gharb. If it had been possible to make more progress while the mission was on the spot, the President said that he would not have hesitated to take the responsibility of choosing the Gharb area. An important consideration, however, was finance. The total cost was estimated at 82 million francs, of which the mandated territories were ready to pay 22 million francs.

If the Gharb area was chosen, it would of course be necessary to secure much more precise details. One point which the President had not mentioned in his oral report at the previous meeting was the question of ownership of land. It seemed to him that it was necessary for some juridical person to be set up to whom the land would be transferred, and by whom the land would eventually be parcelled out to the Assyrians against payment by them of certain fixed sums.

M. Arocha added that, during the discussions in Paris, it had been thought that the Khabur would accommodate all the Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq. This was now very doubtful, and there was a risk that a good deal of money might be spent on the Khabur scheme, only to find in the long run that the scheme was inadequate.

On the other hand, the Gharb area was only suitable provided that the number of Assyrians reached or exceeded 15,000. The expenses were of two kinds: (a) the fixed expenses of capital development; (b) the variable expenses of settlement proper. The fixed expenses would be the same whether the number of Assyrians transferred was 3,000 or 15,000.

The United Kingdom Representative observed that the scheme submitted by the French authorities was only for 15,000 persons. M. Oliván was now apparently convinced, however, that more than 20,000 Assyrians would wish to go. It was important to know how much extra cost this would involve. We had hitherto been going on the assumption that £800,000 was the maximum which would have to be found, but it now appeared that this was not the case.

The President agreed, but said that he was sure that a very substantial reduction was possible, once the committee had a certain amount of money at its disposal. Account had also to be taken of the material wealth now possessed by the Assyrians.



*The United Kingdom Representative* recalled that the objections raised to the Gharb scheme, in the first place, had been (a) that it cost too much, and (b) that it would take too long. As regards cost, there was perhaps not a very substantial difference between the two schemes. He understood, moreover, that the time necessary for the fulfilment of the Gharb scheme had been reduced to four years, and that it was possible before that time to settle all the Assyrians provisionally in the area. He would like to know, however, precisely where it was proposed to put the Assyrians provisionally.

*M. Oliván* replied that the French were ready to take all the Assyrians at once in the Gharb area. He and *M. Arocha* explained, with the aid of a map, what the scheme involved, and the areas in which it was proposed to put the Assyrians.

*The United Kingdom Representative* then observed that he saw in the French scheme no provision for the cost of the land. Was it clear that it was to be given free of charge by the French authorities?

*M. Oliván* said that this was the case. In consideration of the fact that the committee would be paying for the development of the land, the French authorities were willing to give the land itself without cost. He thought that it should be vested in some sort of trust, which would eventually distribute it to the Assyrians.

This led to a short discussion on the question of reimbursement by the Assyrians of the original capital expenditure.

*M. Oliván* and *M. Arocha* said that they were now both convinced that some scheme of reimbursement was essential, in view of the psychology of the Assyrians and also because of the serious consequences which the setting of a precedent to the contrary might have. They thought that it would be possible to recover in this way at least 50 per cent. of the original outlay.

*The President* said that if the committee decided on the Gharb, it would be possible to open detailed discussions with the French and to make various stipulations which would result in a reduction of cost. Syria was passing through an economic crisis, and the moment was favourable for a bargain.

*The United Kingdom Representative* recalled that in the case of previous schemes, the committee had had to envisage the possibility of two separate Assyrian settlements, one for the pro-Mar Shimun party, the other for the anti-Mar Shimun party. Was this still the case?

*M. Oliván* said that he thought that this question no longer arose. It had not come to their notice during the visit.

*M. Arocha* said that allegiance to the Mar Shimun appeared to be no longer of any great importance. *M. Oliván* and he had been impressed by the strength of national feeling among the Assyrians.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that supposing only 8,000 Assyrians decided to go, would the President still recommend the adoption of the Gharb area?

*The President* said that he thought that for this number the Gharb area would be unduly expensive, and he thought that the committee, in adopting it, ought to make a reservation that, if less than a certain number of Assyrians chose to go, the other scheme would have to be adopted.

*The United Kingdom Representative* pointed out that this raised a practical difficulty. If the committee decided on the Gharb scheme, the Gharb scheme would have to be put before the Assyrians. It seemed difficult, if only 8,000 Assyrians accepted it, then to go back and say that, after all, they would have to go to the Khabur.

There was general agreement that for this reason, if the Gharb scheme was thought to be the better one, it would have to be adopted regardless of the number of Assyrians who might go.

*The Mexican Representative* suggested that perhaps the Iraqi Government might be willing to take over the land in the Gharb area themselves and operate the whole settlement by means of a loan.

*The President* expressed the view that the Iraqi Government would never wish to act in this manner, and that the French authorities would not be prepared in any case to allow a foreign Government to own and operate the area.

*The United Kingdom Representative* strongly urged the necessity for the preparation of a precise plan as the next step. The present details appeared to be of a very vague nature, and if there was to be any hope of raising money, he thought that the committee ought to be able to place a simple but comprehensive plan before those who were likely to contribute, containing a carefully-worked-out scheme of payments, taking into account what might be expected to be recovered from the Assyrians.

*M. Arocha* suggested that the French Government should be asked to prepare a detailed plan in co-operation with technical experts representing the Council Committee.

As regards the Iraqi offer, *The President* said that he had all along thought this insufficient. He had impressed upon Yasin Pasha the responsibility of the Iraqi Government arising not only from the massacre in 1933, but also from the Iraqi promises to the Council. Yasin Pasha had at first attempted to interpret these promises in a narrow sense, claiming that the Iraqi Government had only offered a contribution "to help the Assyrians on their way," or, in other words, simply to pay the expenses of transport. *M. Oliván* was against accepting the Iraqi Government's offer. He thought that a reply should be sent, expressing appreciation of the effort which had been made, but pointing out that the committee wanted more money for the Gharb scheme and asking for double what the Iraqis had already offered.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that the Iraqi offer must be considered in relation to the number of the Assyrians who would wish to go. If only 5,000 went, for instance, the money which the Iraqis had offered would be a very large proportion of the cost. Even if the number were limited to 12,500, which was the figure quoted in Yasin Pasha's letter of the 26th May, the Iraqi contribution might still be regarded as not unreasonable. If, however, some 20,000 Assyrians chose to go, it was clearly quite out of the question, and offered no basis for progress.

The tactics to be adopted needed careful consideration. *Prima facie* the United Kingdom representative thought that little progress could be made until the number of Assyrians wishing to leave had been established. He would prefer to see a detailed plan of settlement drawn up in the first place, to be followed immediately by a consultation of the wishes of the Assyrians, so as to have all the necessary elements ready by the time the Council met in September. He thought it was only when the necessary material was complete that effective pressure could be put upon the Iraqi Government. If the committee merely wrote at this stage and said that they thought the Iraqi contribution ought to be £250,000, there was a danger that the Iraqi Government would merely reply that this was impossible, and the committee would be left in a difficult position.

*The President* asked what means of pressure upon the Iraqi Government existed. Personally he saw none.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that the only effective form of pressure was to say to the Iraqi Government that unless they paid £250,000, the whole scheme would have to be abandoned.

*The President* replied that he was prepared to say this at once.

*The United Kingdom Representative* pointed out that the committee was not yet in a position to say so. Individually, the members of the committee might think that unless the Iraqi contribution was doubled, the whole plan was unrealisable. They could not, however, say this publicly until they had exhausted every means of finding the necessary money. The gap between the present Iraqi contribution and the French estimates was extremely large. It might be impossible to fill it by means of an appeal to individual Governments and private



organisations, as contemplated by the Council of the League in January 1934. The committee had not yet, however, put to the test the question of a League contribution nor had it considered whether it was possible to proceed by way of a loan.

*The Danish Representative* was of the opinion that at this stage it was only possible to approach the Iraqi Government on the basis of the promise made by that Government. A note could be addressed to the Iraqi Government saying that the present offer did not correspond to the promise of a generous contribution made by Yasin Pasha to the Council. The committee could ask the Iraqi Government to reconsider the matter and give something which would correspond to that promise. At the same time, the committee could give in its reply an explanation of the elements which made it necessary to ask for a larger contribution, e.g., the desirability of the Gharb scheme.

*The President* felt strongly that although it was logical to get further details, and to consult the Assyrians before pressing the Iraqis further, it was necessary in the present stage to omit these preliminaries. In any case, he did not think the committee could take the responsibility of authorising the consultation of the wishes of the Assyrians when it was so completely uncertain as to whence the money to finance the scheme was coming. He thought that the committee should now concentrate on attempting to extract more money from Iraq, and appealing to "other sources" to provide the balance. He said that if in this way sufficient money was not forthcoming, he, as President, would see no alternative in September but to put the whole question to the Council, to propose the dissolution of the Assyrian Committee, and to send in his own resignation as its president.

It was agreed to suspend the discussion at this point until the following day.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

[E 4407/2/93]

No. 85.

(C./Min.Ass./125.)

#### LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

*Geneva, July 16, 1935.*

*Letter, dated July 13, 1935, from the President of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq to the Government of Iraq, concerning its contribution towards the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in Syria.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 18.)*

Sir,

*Geneva, July 13, 1935.*

ON my return to this country I duly convened a meeting of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, and rendered to it an account of my recent mission to Iraq and to Syria.

The committee has asked me, in the first place, to express its great appreciation of the manner in which the mission was received in Iraq, and to convey its sincere thanks to the Iraqi Government for the facilities which it so freely gave for the accomplishment of the mission's task. The local experience thus gained cannot fail to be of considerable value, and it is the hope of the committee that it will contribute materially to an ultimate solution of the Assyrian problem satisfactory to all concerned.

I have reported more particularly to the committee the discussions which I had the honour of conducting with his Excellency Yasin Pasha regarding the financial contribution of the Iraqi Government towards the accomplishment of a scheme of settlement in Syria, and the committee has had under consideration the letter which Yasin Pasha addressed to me on this subject on the 26th May.

The committee desires to express its thanks for that letter, from which it takes note that it can count upon a contribution from the Iraqi Government of 125,000 Iraqi dinars (£125,000), calculated on the basis of 10 dinars for every Assyrian who desires to leave Iraq up to a maximum of 12,500 persons. The

committee is happy to learn that of this sum the Iraqi Government have already paid into the Banque de Syrie et du Grand-Liban at Beirut £60,000, representing an advance to facilitate the transfer of the first 4,000-5,000 Assyrians, and that this advance has already enabled a preliminary transfer of about 1,400 persons to take place with the prior agreement of the Iraqi Government.

The Iraqi Government will readily understand that the committee, while recognising that the contribution of £125,000 represents in itself a not inconsiderable effort on the part of Iraq, is, nevertheless, bound to examine it in relation to the magnitude of the problem to be solved, to the undertakings given by the Iraqi Government, and to the resources which that Government commands.

After considering my report, the committee is convinced that of the various possibilities of settlement in Syria offered by the French Government, the Gharb scheme, in the modified form which has resulted from my discussions with the French High Commissioner at Beirut, alone offers real hope of a definitive solution of the Assyrian problem; and it has accordingly reached the conclusion that it is desirable to aim at the realisation of the Gharb scheme rather than to pursue the idea of permanent settlement in the region of the Khabur.

The committee is now taking steps to work out a plan in all its details in collaboration with the French authorities in Syria. The precise cost of the modified Gharb scheme must depend on the result of this work, and also upon the number of Assyrians who may have to be transferred from Iraq.

In the estimates provided by the French authorities during my recent visit to Syria, the settlement of 15,000 persons in the Gharb area (including the necessary outlay for the draining and irrigation of the land) was put at £800,000; this figure did not, of course, make allowance for eventual repayment by the settlers, the principle of which has since been accepted by the committee. It is true, also, that there is reason to hope that some reduction in the estimate may be eventually effected in the course of detailed negotiations. On the other hand, any reduction may be counterbalanced to some extent by the prospect, which my preliminary consultation with the Assyrians has led me to believe a real one, that more than 15,000 Assyrians will eventually elect to leave Iraq. It is evident, therefore, that a very considerable financial effort will be required if the Assyrian question is to receive more than a partial and temporary solution.

The committee desires me to recall, also, the speech made by Yasin Pasha to the Council of the League on the 14th October, 1933. Yasin Pasha then said: "In the interests of all concerned, the happiness of the Assyrians themselves, and the reputation of Iraq, it was essential to find a new home elsewhere for the Assyrian immigrants who wished to leave or were unwilling to settle peaceably, and to be incorporated finally into the Iraqi State, a home where they could make a fresh start. The Iraqi Government was prepared to make its contribution, as generous a contribution as its resources permitted, to help them on their way. There was one thing it could not do, and that was to find land."

The committee appeals to the Iraqi Government to reconsider the matter in the liberal spirit of Yasin Pasha's declaration. It feels that the contribution already promised is, in the first place, out of proportion to the total sum required. It notes, moreover, that the sum already promised is a contribution towards the emigration of 12,500 persons only. The committee cannot help feeling that the unwillingness of the Iraqi Government to contemplate any payment except in relation to this limited number is difficult to reconcile with the declaration of Yasin Pasha, which I have quoted above.

The committee is anxious to continue to do everything possible to assist the Iraqi Government in accordance with the latter's request to the Council of the League, to work out a solution of a problem which, if left unsolved or only partially solved, is bound to give rise to untold difficulties. It lies with the Iraqi Government, however, to make it practicable for League co-operation to be exercised with fruitful results.

In order to do everything possible to help in finding a solution, the committee has unanimously decided to renew forthwith the appeal made by the Council in its resolution of the 19th January, 1934, "to the generosity of Governments and private organisations to consider participating in the financing of a settlement scheme, having regard, more especially, to its humanitarian aspect." I have, in addition, addressed a special appeal to the United Kingdom Government. The committee has, however, grave doubts whether a contribution from the Iraqi Government of less than a sum of £250,000, which I had the honour to suggest



to you in Bagdad as a reasonable amount, will be sufficient to attract contributions from other sources, and it fears that, short of the augmentation to that amount of the sum at present promised by the Iraqi Government, there is a serious risk that a comprehensive solution of the Assyrian problem by the settlement outside Iraq of all those who desire to leave the country, may prove unattainable.

I have, &c.

LOPEZ OLIVAN,  
*President of the Committee of the Council for  
the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.*

[E 4408/2/93]

No. 86.

(C./Min.Ass./124.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

*Geneva, July 17, 1935.*

*Letter to the French Government, dated July 13, 1935, concerning the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in the Gharb District.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 18.)*

M. le Ministre,

*Geneva, July 13, 1935.*

IN a letter dated the 22nd March last I had the honour, as chairman of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, to address an urgent appeal to your Government to accept as permanent colonists in the mandated territories of the Levant not only the Assyrians, who have already settled there provisionally, but also such of those still remaining in Iraq who desire to leave that country.

The French Government, while pointing out the difficulties which, as Mandatory Power, it would encounter in the settlement of the Assyrians, was good enough, in its letter of the 14th April, to give a favourable reply to this appeal and to submit proposals to the committee relating to three different districts.

In agreement with the French Government the committee considered at the time that it should endeavour to promote the third scheme referred to in your above-mentioned letter, which provided for the settlement of the Assyrians in groups spread over the Upper Khabur and the Middle Khabur. However, it also agreed with you that the first of the three schemes submitted, providing for settlement on the edge of the Gharb marshes presented considerable advantages over the other two.

It was essential to determine the districts in which the Assyrians were to be settled in order to be able to fix the number who could be established there and the cost of the operation. A first study was prepared by the competent services of the High Commissariat (docs. 116 and 117), which, by restricting the scope of the original plan, made it possible to save a considerable amount of time and expense.

In the course of the conversations at Beirut between the High Commissioner and the competent services of the Grand Seraglio and the mission over which I have the honour to preside, the superiority of the Gharb scheme was again demonstrated, and this was confirmed by the visit of inspection made to the Khabur and Gharb districts.

The committee of the Council, after hearing the report of my visit to Syria and Iraq, and bearing in mind the considerable advantages of the Gharb over the Khabur scheme and the problems to which the adoption of the latter might give rise in future, and also the fact that, according to the preliminary consultation carried out by our mission in Iraq, the number of Assyrians desirous of leaving that country exceeded the number who could be settled in the available districts of the Khabur, decided to turn its attention to the Gharb district and to take immediate measures with a view to settling the Assyrians in that region.

Among those measures the committee unanimously agreed that the most urgent was to obtain, if possible, before the 15th August next, a detailed and complete study of the scheme for the settlement of the Assyrians in the Gharb.

This study should contain such technical and financial data and recommendations as States, which might offer contributions, will doubtless desire to possess regarding the application of the scheme. It should also enable the local committee in Iraq to reply to the numerous questions raised by the Assyrians who are anxious to leave the country. In particular this study should examine the possibility of cutting down the budget submitted by the Grand Seraglio (docs. 116 and 117) in view of the following considerations:—

1. The fact that to a large extent the Assyrians will be employed as labourers;
2. The material situation of the refugees; and
3. The subsequent repayment of the expenditure by the Assyrians.

In order to save time and to avoid the necessity for consultations by correspondence, the committee considers it advisable for this document to be prepared on the spot by the competent services of the High Commissariat in consultation with two representatives of the Council Committee—M. Cuénod, who is at present in Iraq as the committee's representative and has had exceptional experience of the transfer of populations, and a financial expert whose name will be communicated to you very shortly.

I have, &c.

LOPEZ OLIVAN,  
*Chairman of the Committee for the Settlement  
of the Assyrians of Iraq.*

[E 4409/2/93]

No. 87.

(C.L.118.1935.VII.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

*Appeal by the Committee of the Council.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 18, 1935.)*

AT the request of the Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, the Secretary-General has the honour to address to the Governments of the members of the League the following communication, in which the committee, referring to the Council's resolution of the 19th January, 1934, makes an appeal for funds for the financing of the proposed settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in the French-mandated territories of the Levant:—

It will be remembered that the Council of the League, at its meeting of the 17th April, 1935, approved the attitude of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in relation to the possibilities of settlement in Syria, and authorised the journey of the chairman of the committee to Syria and Iraq, which, it was felt, would be likely to facilitate negotiations and to contribute effectively to the realisation of a plan of settlement.

The chairman of the committee and the secretary of the committee duly proceeded to Beirut, where they had preliminary discussions with the High Commissioner of the French Republic for the Mandated Territories of the Levant. They then went to Bagdad, and, after establishing contact there with the Prime Minister of Iraq, they had the opportunity of visiting Mosul and many Assyrian villages in the north of Iraq. Further discussions with the Iraqi Government followed in Bagdad, as a result of which the Iraqi Government offered a contribution of £125,000 towards the realisation of a scheme of settlement in Syria. This contribution was calculated on the basis of £10 for every Assyrian who might elect to leave Iraq up to a maximum of 12,500 persons.

Subsequently, when the mission had returned to Beirut, it was arranged with the Iraqi Government that the latter should make an advance of £60,000, and that part of this sum should be utilised for the immediate transfer to the Khabur region of Syria, where a provisional settlement of over 2,000 Iraqi Assyrians is already in being, of some 1,400 of the more necessitous of the Assyrians in the Mosul area. This preliminary operation has since been completed. The persons transferred included the inmates of the Mosul refugee camp, which has thus now ceased to exist.



From the report which the chairman has now presented to the committee and which will be circulated to all the members of the League, two important conclusions appear. On the one hand, the mission is convinced by its conversations with Assyrian spokesmen that a greater number of Assyrians may wish to leave Iraq than can be accommodated in the Khabur area; on the other hand, a visit to the two areas in question has confirmed the mission in the belief that the Gharb area possesses in any case important political and economic advantages. The discussions which the mission conducted in Beirut have resulted in important modifications of the Gharb scheme as originally put forward by the French Government, and, as these modifications go far to remove the difficulties which had originally appeared to preclude the adoption of the scheme, the committee has now decided to direct its efforts henceforth towards settlement in the Gharb, rather than in the Khabur, area. It has informed the French Government accordingly and proposed the immediate elaboration of a detailed plan by means of discussions in Beirut between the services of the French High Commission and technical representatives of the committee.

It is, of course, impossible to produce a final plan without consulting the Assyrians individually regarding their desire to go to Syria, but the committee feels that it cannot take the responsibility of authorising such a consultation at the present stage. The committee has, in fact, reached the conclusion that no further material progress can be made until it has some more definite assurance than at present that sufficient funds for carrying out a settlement scheme will be available.

According to estimates provided by the French authorities during the visit of the mission to Syria, the settlement of 15,000 persons in the Gharb area (including the necessary outlay for the draining and irrigation of the land) may cost as much as £800,000. This figure does not make allowance for ultimate repayment by the settlers, the principle of which has since been accepted by the committee. It is true, also, that the French representative on the committee has informed it that the above estimate was based in part on calculations made some years ago, and that closer estimates at the present date may be expected to result in a fairly considerable reduction. On the other hand, any reduction may be counterbalanced by the fact that a greater number of Assyrians may elect to leave Iraq than was contemplated when the figure of £800,000 was quoted, so that the committee thinks it prudent still to regard this figure as the sum which may be necessary to finance the operation. Against this it has so far only the promise of £125,000 from the Iraqi Government, of which, as stated above, £60,000 has actually been paid.

Faced with this serious problem, the committee has decided in the first place to urge the Iraqi Government substantially to increase its contribution, and a reasoned note to this end has been addressed to the Iraqi Government.

It is clear, however, that, even taking into account the possibility of reductions in the existing estimates and of an increased Iraqi contribution, a considerable balance will remain to be found.

In its resolution of the 19th January, 1934, the Council of the League, foreseeing such a situation, issued a general appeal "to the generosity of Governments and private organisations to consider participating in the financing of a settlement scheme, having regard more especially to its humanitarian aspect."

The failure of the project for settling in Syria those Assyrians who may wish to leave Iraq would be attended by serious risks which it is in the interests of all members of the League to avoid. The committee feels bound, therefore, to recall to each individual Government the above-quoted appeal by the Council and to request that Government to inform the Secretary-General as soon as possible whether and to what extent it is prepared to contribute to this work of appeasement and humanity.

The committee trusts that each Government will also take steps to bring this appeal to the notice of any private organisations within its territory which might be in a position to assist financially in the solution of the question.

Geneva, July 16, 1935.

[E 4443/2/93]

No. 88.

*Record of the 49th Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, held in Geneva, July 11, 1935, at 11.30 A.M.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 20.)*

THIS was a full meeting of the committee, the French representative having arrived earlier in the morning. The President had already explained to him what had passed on the previous day.

*The President* said that the first question for the committee to decide was whether to pursue the Gharb scheme or the Khabur scheme. He would ask each member to indicate his opinion in the light of the previous day's discussion.

*The Mexican Representative* said that from both the political and economic points of view the Gharb seemed to him to be the better, and he was in favour of working for it.

*The Danish, French and Italian Representatives* and the *President* himself agreed with the Mexican representative.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he agreed that from the political and economic points of view the Gharb appeared to be the better proposition. He felt, however, that the committee should fully realise the financial implications of adopting it in preference to the Khabur. The French memorandum on the Gharb scheme was of a purely preliminary and general nature and contemplated the expenditure of £800,000. This was merely for 15,000 Assyrians. If a greater number chose to leave Iraq, the expense would be greater. It was also necessary to bear in mind that a certain expense had already been incurred in the Khabur and would continue there. This expenditure had been added to the French estimates of the Gharb scheme. The total sum involved was thus very considerable, and he thought that, while the committee might agree in principle to work for the Gharb scheme, it must recognise that it might not be possible to raise the necessary sums. The scheme might not, therefore, be practicable, and the committee might have to be content with something less ambitious.

*The President*, observing that this risk was present to some extent in connexion with both schemes, said that if, with the reservation indicated by the United Kingdom representative, the committee now decided to work for the Gharb scheme, the next step should be to inform the French Government accordingly. He agreed with the United Kingdom representative that the details should be gone into forthwith and as precise a plan as possible drawn up. He thought that the committee should ask the French Government to draw up such a plan, and to suggest that M. Cuénod, and perhaps a financial expert also, might collaborate on behalf of the Council Committee. It was clearly right that the Governments who might be asked to contribute should have full details.

*The United Kingdom Representative* observed that it was necessary to have these details not merely for the purpose of an appeal to Governments, but also in preparation for the general canvass of the Assyrians. The local committee had submitted a *questionnaire*, and the answers to most of the items in this document could be worked out by M. Cuénod and the other representative in collaboration with the French authorities and embodied in a kind of prospectus of the whole scheme.

It was agreed that a draft letter to the French Government should be prepared on the lines suggested.

*The President* said that the next question for the committee to decide was whether the Iraqi offer was sufficient, and, if not, whether the committee should ask the Iraqi Government to augment it. There was general agreement that the offer was insufficient, and that some kind of note to the Iraqi Government making this clear was necessary.

*The Mexican Representative* suggested that the note should represent the great difficulties which the Iraqi Government would place in the way of the committee's work if they did not augment their offer.



*The Danish Representative* repeated his suggestion of the previous day that the Iraqi Government should be reminded of their undertaking to the League and pressed to provide a contribution which would be in accordance with it.

It was agreed that care must be taken to avoid giving any pretext to the Iraqi Government for withdrawing the offer already made.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that it would not be particularly difficult to draft the greater part of a letter to the Iraqi Government combining the various suggestions which had been made by individual members of the committee. As to the risk of giving the Iraqi Government a pretext for withdrawing the offer which they had made, he thought this could be got over by saying that the committee had taken note of the fact that it could count upon a contribution from the Iraqi Government of £125,000 before proceeding to demonstrate that, in relation to the magnitude of the task in hand, this sum could not be regarded as sufficient. The most difficult part, however, would be the end of the draft. It remained for decision whether the committee should press immediately for a contribution of £250,000, or whether it should leave the question to some extent in suspense for the moment.

This point was left over for reconsideration in the light of the decision which the committee might reach regarding an appeal to other Governments and regarding the consultation of the wishes of Assyrians.

*The President* said that the next question was the most difficult of all, namely, the contribution from sources other than the Iraqi Government. On this point the President thought the time had come to speak frankly; otherwise the committee's work might go on indefinitely. He felt that the committee should renew the Council's appeal, but in what he was about to say he wished to make it clear that he was acting on a practical basis, and not on the basis of responsibility for the Assyrian question. The committee's audience was the world at large, but, in fact, the only State from whom any substantial response might be expected was Great Britain. From the rest of the countries to whom the appeal might be addressed the committee must clearly expect negative replies. He thought, therefore, that the committee should face the facts and address itself to the United Kingdom Government. It should appeal to that Government to make an independent contribution, and ask what sum it would be prepared to pay and under what conditions.

*The United Kingdom Representative* welcomed a frank discussion of this suggestion, which he felt had remained unspoken in the minds of some of his colleagues for a long time past.

He recalled that on the previous day the President had proposed an appeal to the Iraqi Government and to other sources, and had said that if in this way sufficient money was not forthcoming by September, he would feel bound to propose the dissolution of the Assyrian Committee and to send in his own resignation as president. The United Kingdom representative sincerely hoped that as long as the committee remained in being, M. Oliván would remain its president. As to the dissolution of the committee, there was not, he supposed, a single member who would not welcome it. Discussions had now been going on for nearly two years, and it was natural that everyone should wish to come to a speedy conclusion. On the other hand, most of the time had been taken up with the discussion of schemes which had unfortunately fallen through. The present scheme had actually only been under consideration some two or three months, and he thought the committee ought to be careful not to allow the length of its previous unfruitful discussions to influence it to take hasty action in regard to the Syrian scheme. The committee's task was to elucidate all the details and it must be careful not to try to throw its responsibility upon others until it had properly fulfilled its own task. This remark applied not only to the President's desire to set a time limit to the committee's proceedings but also to the question of issuing an appeal for funds at the present moment. He personally felt that this appeal would be premature, and for that very reason might fail. To deal with the proposal of the President that a special appeal should be addressed to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom representative was bound to express the strongest objection to His Majesty's Government being singled out in this way, and to an attempt being made to saddle them with

sole responsibility. He did not wish to enter into a detailed discussion on the question of responsibility because he felt that no useful purpose would be served. At the same time he felt bound to explain in outline once more the attitude of His Majesty's Government so that there should be no misapprehension. He recalled, in the first place, the public declaration which His Majesty's Government had made towards the end of 1933 that they were prepared to pay their share of a League contribution, but could not contemplate an independent contribution. He pointed out in passing that His Majesty's Government were the only Government, apart from the Iraqi Government, which had hitherto shown any disposition to contribute financially towards the settlement of the Assyrian question. But the repudiation of separate responsibility was fundamental. It had often been alleged that His Majesty's Government were under an obligation to the Assyrians and had given them certain promises. This was entirely false. The United Kingdom representative could say with a clear conscience that His Majesty's Government had given no promises to the Assyrians, and were under no obligation towards them. The position was that they had saved the Assyrians from annihilation during the war, had brought them into Iraq and had there spent a vast quantity of money upon them and made every effort to get them properly settled. The most important of these efforts was the attempt made first by negotiation with the Turkish Government and subsequently by appeal to the Council of the League to secure that the old homelands of the Assyrians in the Hakkari country should be included within the boundaries of Iraq, so that the Assyrians could be settled in a homogeneous group as they themselves desired. The League Council had been fairly warned by His Majesty's Government that unless this was done the Assyrian problem could not be solved in the manner in which the Assyrians themselves wished. The League Council, in full knowledge of this warning, had decided that the Hakkari country must remain in Turkey, and the League Council must accept responsibility for that decision. His Majesty's Government were, of course, far from attributing all responsibility to the League Council; they felt that the major responsibility lay with the Iraqi Government because of the massacres in 1933, but for which the problem of resettlement in its present form would never have arisen. But, so far as contributory liability was concerned, this, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, lay with the League. This was the theory underlying the offer of the United Kingdom to participate financially in a League scheme, but only as part of a League contribution. He did not think there was the slightest chance of a withdrawal from this attitude, and any insistence on the responsibility of His Majesty's Government could only lead to failure. Having said so much, the United Kingdom representative said that he would treat the question on a purely practical basis, as the President had suggested. The position was that the committee was faced with an estimated expenditure of a minimum of £800,000, and had no offer other than the Iraqi offer of £125,000. Did the committee really think that any one State even if it could be induced to make an independent contribution at all would be prepared to fill this gap? It was out of the question. It would be absurd for the committee even to suggest it unless it could be shown that no other means of solving the problem existed. It would be necessary to show that everything had been done to reduce the cost, and that the Iraqis had paid the maximum possible contribution. It would be necessary also to show that a League contribution was impossible, and that the balance of the money could not be found by other means than direct payments from individual Governments. The practicability or otherwise of a League contribution could not be put to the test until the Assembly met in September next. The committee could, of course, not commit the Assembly in any way, and he did not suggest that it was necessary to hold up any appeal for funds until the matter had been put to a practical test. One thing, however, that he felt the committee ought to do was seriously to consider the possibility of raising the money by means of a loan under League auspices. He suggested that the committee ought at once to obtain advice on this point from the Financial Section of the League Secretariat.

The United Kingdom representative repeated that he thought it was altogether premature on available information to launch an appeal, whether to Governments in general or to an individual Government. Speaking in regard to his own country, if the United Kingdom Government were to decide to make a contribution whether independently or otherwise the matter would have to go



before Parliament, and the details of the scheme would be very closely scrutinised. There was reason to anticipate the bitterest opposition from various sections of opinion who would feel that charity ought to begin at home, and he thought personally that, even if His Majesty's Government were prepared to consider an independent contribution, it was out of the question to obtain parliamentary approval for a sufficiently substantial sum. The least the committee could do, however, to facilitate the matter was to provide the most complete material. He feared that to put before a Government the very general and meagre information at present available would produce the worst impression of the workings of the League. After all, in private life, if one received an appeal from some charitable object, one did make certain enquiries into the scheme. All the more was this necessary in the case of a Government which was the guardian of the State's finances. He urged that, before considering any appeal, the committee should await the production of a detailed sliding-scale plan by further local investigation, which need not take more than about a month. The result would probably be the production of a convincing prospectus. He thought also that the next step was to take the risk of consulting the Assyrians and finding out how many really wished to go. The President was convinced, from his talks with Assyrian leaders, that as many as 25,000 persons might wish to leave Iraq. But, according to figures supplied by the Iraqi Government at an early stage of the committee's proceedings, this was the total number of Assyrians in Iraq, including those of Persian origin, whereas M. Oliván had estimated that over and above the 25,000 there were 8,000-10,000 who would wish to stay in Iraq. The United Kingdom representative did not suggest that M. Oliván's estimate was wrong. Population figures were notoriously difficult to obtain with accuracy in Eastern countries, and the Iraqi figures might well be wide of the mark. On the other hand, M. Oliván's estimate was based on statements by leaders who might have an interest in exaggerating their own importance. But all the United Kingdom representative wished to do was to draw attention to a wide discrepancy and to the need of removing a doubt, which had an immediate bearing on the question of cost, by means of a carefully organised individual canvass of the Assyrians. It was only when the committee had obtained all the details which lay in its power that any Government could be expected to pronounce on the question of a definite contribution.

The President said that he would reply at once to some of the points which the United Kingdom representative had made. As regards the reference to his threat of resignation on the previous day, he explained that he had, of course, only contemplated such a step at a moment when he should be convinced that the continuation of the committee's work was useless. What the United Kingdom representative had said had an appearance of realism, but it was, in fact, only theoretical realism. The President certainly did not wish to attack the attitude which His Majesty's Government had taken up, but unless the question of a contribution by His Majesty's Government were squarely faced, the committee's work would continue indefinitely. The United Kingdom representative had implied that the committee was being hasty. The President did not think, however, that, after all the work which the committee had put in, it could be accused of going too fast if it decided to ask individual Governments what they were prepared to pay. As regards a League contribution, this was a question outside the competence of the committee. The President could only express his personal opinion that there was no hope whatever of such a contribution. As to the idea of a loan, he was quite ready to explore it, and he asked the secretary to arrange for an expert to attend a meeting of the committee on the same afternoon to discuss the possibilities of a loan, or the difficulties in the way of a loan. On the question of responsibility, he proposed to say no more, as he did not think that argument would lead anywhere. The United Kingdom representative had spoken of opposition in England to the idea of an independent contribution, but he had implied that this opposition would be based on grounds of principle, and the President could not see that the production of the details for which the United Kingdom representative had pressed could be of any value in overcoming opposition of principle. In his view, the contribution required was of a political character. It differed entirely from a commercial enterprise. There was no question of gain attached to it. As regards what the United Kingdom representative had said about the attitude of individuals towards charitable appeals, it was, of course, the case that everyone had the right to enquire how the charitable fund

in question was going to be controlled. The intending subscriber would satisfy himself of the honesty of the organisation, but he did not think that his enquiries would go beyond that. As regards consulting the Assyrians, the consultation which the president and M. Arocha had already conducted locally was of a purely provisional nature and might admittedly be of little value. If a new consultation were contemplated, it must have a more positive basis. At present, the local committee was not in a position to do more than M. Oliván had already done. What value, in the circumstances, would a fresh consultation have? In the President's view, such a consultation ought not to take place until the moment when the operation of settlement was ready to begin. If it took place before financial success was assured, there was a very serious risk. The Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq had seen the recent transfer of some 1,400 of their number. If a fresh consultation took place before the local committee was in a position to say definitely that those who elected to leave would actually be transferred, he thought the result of consultation would be serious trouble. If there was some indication that the financing of the scheme was possible, it might not be necessary to wait until all the money was available, but, failing some assurance about finance, to embark upon consultation might only raise false hopes. Consequently, the President was firmly against further consultation at the present time, and was in favour of an immediate appeal to the United Kingdom Government.

The discussion was suspended, to be resumed later in the day.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

[E 4442/2/93]

No. 89.

*Record of the 50th Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, held at Geneva, July 11, 1935, at 3-30 P.M.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 20.)*

MAJOR THOMSON having arrived in Geneva, *en route* from Iraq to the United Kingdom, the committee decided to hear a report by him on developments since the termination of the President's mission to Iraq and Syria.

Major Thomson said that following M. Oliván's visit to Mosul, the Assyrians in that town had been in a rather disturbed state. The local committee had interviewed the leaders, and had been bound to tell them that there was no immediate prospect of a move. This had caused great disappointment, and the following day the leaders had returned in a somewhat truculent mood. They declared that they had no more money, and that Major Thomson must find them work. Major Thomson had got into touch with the Iraqi Prime Minister, who had agreed to do his best to find employment on public works. Work for fifty men had been found on road-making outside Mosul, and for another 200 on a hospital building. The wage offered was the usual daily wage of 1s. a day. The Assyrians, however, had for the most part refused to work for this, and only thirty of them had eventually worked at road-making.

Later M. Oliván had authorised a partial transfer to Syria, and the local committee had decided to send away with the inmates of the Mosul camp about 1,000 destitutes from Mosul town. Major Thomson had sent for the Metropolitan, Mar Yusuf, the Mar Shimun's uncle, and had entrusted him with the task of forming a local Assyrian committee to select 1,000 destitute Assyrians for Syria. Mar Yusuf had very quickly produced a list. Each head of family on this list was then asked by the local committee if he wished to proceed to Syria and, if so, was required to sign a form to that effect.

Meanwhile, a telegram from M. Burnier in Syria had arrived, stating that he would be prepared to take some of the Assyrians before the 10th July, and the remainder during the rest of July and in August. Major Thomson had arranged a meeting on the frontier with M. Burnier, Major Wilson and M. Cuénod. M. Burnier had then said that he would be prepared to take the whole 1,400 without delay in convoys of 350 persons at a time. The inmates of the camp were sent over to Syria on the 26th and 29th June, and the other Assyrians went in convoys on the 6th, 8th and 10th July.



Major Thomson said that the decision to make this partial transfer had had good results. The Assyrians were now quieter, and were looking forward to a further move in September.

Major Thomson observed that the thousand people from Mosul who had been sent over had been selected as destitutes, and had been certified as such by the Assyrian committee which selected them. But Major Thomson and his colleagues soon began to wonder whether this was true. A local engineer had told him that twelve Assyrians who had been working with him for some time at double the ordinary wage had left suddenly as destitutes. The women in the camp had between them drawn out about £200 from local banks before leaving. Major Thomson understood also that certain Assyrians who had gone over had deposit accounts in Mosul of from £40 to £80 each. The period of these deposit accounts had not expired, and the Assyrians had made arrangements to have the money transferred to a bank in Syria. There was no doubt that the Assyrians had the refugee complex. It was very difficult to find out what their means were. The only way to extract money from them was to give some preferential treatment to those who paid.

Major Thomson then handed to the secretary a document signed by certain representatives of the Baz tribe (anti-Mar Shimun). This document repudiated responsibility for any Baz women who had gone over to Syria.

Major Thomson expressed willingness to answer any questions which might be put to him.

*The United Kingdom Representative* asked whether further transfer was physically impossible until September, and for how long after September transfer operations could go on this year.

Major Thomson replied that the committee would not take the responsibility of further transfer between now and September owing to the great heat. M. Burnier was apparently only willing to take further Assyrians in the month of September, and during that time he was not anxious to take more than 2,000 persons. Major Thomson suggested to the committee that if so large a transfer were not practicable by September, the possibility should at least be considered of sending over 150 men from the levies in Bagdad. They could prepare the way for their women and children, who could be sent over when everything was ready. This would mean a transfer of some 600 persons in all. After September settlement on any large scale, unless prepared beforehand, was climatically impossible until March.

*The United Kingdom Representative* asked whether Major Thomson could give an estimate of the time which would be necessary to conduct the general consultation of the Assyrians.

Major Thomson said that he thought two months would be required, and that this would mean a fairly strenuous effort on the part of the local committee. In answer to a further question from the United Kingdom representative as to whether consultation would be physically possible, say, in the latter half of August, Major Thomson said that, of course, conditions would be far from pleasant and that it would be putting a strain upon the local committee, who would have to travel round the villages. At the same time, it could be done, if necessary.

Major Thomson added, in reply to a further question, that in his view it would not be necessary to complete the whole consultation before any general transfer began. The two operations could be carried on simultaneously.

*The President* observed that Major Thomson was aware of the results of the consultation which the mission had carried out locally. Did he think there was any reason to suppose that a fresh consultation now would produce any different result?

Major Thomson said that two factors would affect the decision of the Assyrians; one was whether they were to refund eventually any of the money, the other was whether the place of settlement was the Gharb or the Khabur. If the Gharb was chosen, he felt sure that more Assyrians would go. As regards the numbers of Assyrians who were now prepared to go, he was of course aware

of the conclusion to which the President had come. He did not think it was possible for him to comment upon that conclusion, as the question of numbers was obviously a matter of opinion.

*The President* asked whether Major Thomson thought a fresh consultation now would give more precise results.

Major Thomson thought not, if the committee made an announcement without full details, but in answer to a question by the United Kingdom representative, he said that if further details were obtained, the result would certainly be different.

*The Danish Representative* expressed interest in what Major Thomson had said about the means possessed by alleged destitutes. Was it possible to find out in future what means intending emigrants possessed?

Major Thomson said this would only be possible by offering preferential treatment.

Major Thomson mentioned that the Iraqis had offered to pay on the basis of £10 a person. He suggested that the committee ought to consider what constituted a person for this purpose. Were children to be included in the calculation? He also referred to the heavy transport costs owing to the amount of material which the Assyrians were taking away with them. Of those recently removed, a great many had bought a considerable amount of material, e.g., sacks of rice, bales of piece-goods, which they had bought just before leaving Iraq, and all this made the question of transport more difficult.

*The United Kingdom Representative* asked whether the local committee had made any plans for the liquidation of immovable property.

Major Thomson replied that the committee had been considering this for some time, and in some cases had induced landlords to give partial compensation for immovable property. A large proportion of debts owing to the Assyrians had also been repaid. These debts were for the most part money-lending debts.

*The President* thanked Major Thomson for his explanations, and asked him to stay in Geneva until the end of the present session in case his assistance was further required.

Mr. Felkin, of the Financial Section of the League, then came in. At the request of the President, the *United Kingdom Representative* explained the situation in which the committee desired to explore the possibility of a loan under League auspices.

Mr. Felkin said that he understood the question to fall into two aspects: (a) what had been done in this way in the past, and what mechanism had been employed; (b) what was possible in the present case. There was no precedent for the League itself raising a loan or being a borrower. The League had no assets but its buildings, and no resources to offer as security. He pointed out that for the League to accept a liability of this sort would require the unanimous consent of all the members of the League. In the past, loans under League auspices had always been required to meet a political or economic necessity on the part of some Government which had asked for the moral assistance of the League. In such cases the Council had first decided whether it was one which it could support. Sometimes, the matter had been referred to a special committee of the Council, and ultimately to the League's technical advisers, namely, the Financial Committee of the League. The principle generally adopted was that there must be a good *prima facie* case that the proposed loan was urgently required on grounds which could be squared with the preamble of the League Covenant and that the loan proposal was economically watertight. It was to make certain of these points that reference was made to the Finance Committee. This committee had usually made exhaustive enquiries on the spot. The points to which they had specially directed themselves were: (1) Was the sum asked for sufficient or excessive? (2) what assets were offered as security? and (3) were the conditions for the control of the operation and for the maintenance of the security such as to justify the Council in giving its consent? These enquiries had usually taken a considerable time, from four or five months to a year. The matter had then been put before the Council, and the League's association with the scheme had



been confined to (a) the publication of the expert's report as to whether the project was feasible or not, and one with which the League should be associated; (b) the appointment of persons to act under the loan contract as trustees; (c) the institution of mechanism under the responsibility of the Council for controlling the money applied to the service of the loan. This procedure had been followed in all cases, with the exception of Austria, where, owing to the complication of political disturbances, it had been considered impossible to float a loan without the joint and several guarantees of individual Governments in addition to that of the Austrian Government. Mr. Felkin explained that a several guarantee would not be sufficient for the loan market, which would only be disposed to grant money on the strength of a joint and several guarantee.

As to what was possible in the present case, Mr. Felkin's own opinion was that the possibility of the Assembly agreeing to the League itself raising a loan was excluded. He would not like to say that it was impossible for the League to raise a loan on any terms with or without a Government guarantee, but the question was at what rate such a loan could be floated, and at what rate the League's financial advisers would be justified in recommending its flotation. The present moment was certainly not a fortunate one, since, except for the Austrian and Estonian loans, all League loans issued during the past ten years were heavily in default. The closest analogies to the present case were the Greek and Bulgarian settlement loans. These had been backed by the value of the land set aside for settlement and by repayment by the settlers, but also by a first charge on specified revenues of the Greek and Bulgarian Governments. Yet these loans were now in default. Any attempt to float a loan on the credit of the League itself without Government guarantees could only be successful on terms so onerous that the League's advisers would be unlikely to recommend it. As regards loans floated with specific Government guarantees, it was a matter of great practical difficulty to obtain joint and several guarantees from financially powerful Governments. At best it was a cumbersome and long proceeding.

*The United Kingdom Representative* explained that in the present case the only security which could be offered was the land which the French Government were prepared to give without cost to the League Committee, and the sums which might be reimbursed by Assyrian settlers.

Mr. Felkin said that he did not think that bankers would be much attracted by these securities.

*The United Kingdom Representative* asked whether, although it had never been done before, it was conceivably possible for the Assembly to set aside certain revenues to cover a League guarantee.

Mr. Felkin said that he saw no chance of such a decision in practice, though he could not say that it was theoretically impossible. He pointed out, however, that one Assembly had no power to bind successive Assemblies.

Mr. Felkin expressed the personal view that the best means of proceeding would be by a loan raised on the guarantee of individual members of the League. If a scheme were put forward for some kind of loan to be raised by the League itself, the financial advisers would, of course, go into it very closely, but he thought they would almost certainly reach a negative conclusion unless powerful Governments were prepared to back the loan.

*The United Kingdom Representative* observed that Mr. Felkin had said that one of the measures taken by the League in connexion with past loans related to the establishment of a trust. He recalled that the President on the previous day had put forward the suggestion that a kind of trust should be set up in which the property of the land set aside in Syria could be vested. Perhaps Mr. Felkin could give some advice on this point.

Mr. Felkin pointed out that the kind of trust which he had previously referred to was a trust which looked after the interests of bondholders. The kind of trust now proposed in Syria was apparently an altogether different organisation. He had himself, however, been connected with a refugee settlement scheme in Greece, and he thought that this settlement scheme provided a useful analogy, as a trustee had been set up in the form of a settlement commission consisting of four persons, two Greek and two appointed by the League. One of the League representatives had been president, with a casting vote. The Greek

Government had passed the necessary legislation to convey to the commission as its absolute property the land on which settlement was to take place. The commission had then established bonds in respect of what the refugees owed, and these bonds were signed by the immigrants and deposited with the commission as guarantees for the ultimate payment of the sums advanced to them. These sums amounted in all to some £90 a person. The refugee gradually paid off this debt and then received his bond, whereupon the land on which he was settled became his property. Mr. Felkin suggested that it would be worth while to look up the Greek and Bulgarian precedents.

*The President* thanked Mr. Felkin for the clear and valuable advice that he had given, and asked the secretary to obtain further information about the Greek and Bulgarian precedents.

Mr. Felkin then withdrew, and the general discussion, which had been suspended in the morning, was resumed.

*The Danish Representative* said that it was clear from what Mr. Felkin said that it would be impractical to expect the League Assembly to agree to a loan. A League loan for the settlement of the Assyrians might also constitute a dangerous precedent in connexion with other refugee questions. He confessed that he had had more hope of a loan before hearing Mr. Felkin. He thought now, however, that the committee's only hope was to try to secure cash payments. He was therefore more inclined, than he had been previously, to follow the recommendations of the President, with the reservation that he could not agree to any implied threat that if the money was not forthcoming within a certain time the committee should dissolve.

*The Mexican Representative* expressed appreciation of the frankness with which the United Kingdom representative had explained the position of his Government. He thought, however, that in practice there was no alternative but for the committee to appeal to the United Kingdom Government. It was impossible to consult the Assyrians until the committee knew more certainly what financial support could be expected, and this involved, in his view, the necessity of knowing how much the United Kingdom Government were prepared to pay.

*The French Representative* suggested that the United Kingdom Government should be asked to pay a definite percentage, and that the committee should say that, apart from the Iraqi Government's contribution, they saw no hope of any money.

*The Italian Representative* indicated agreement.

*The President* said that his views were already known. He would prefer, however, not to ask the United Kingdom for a definite percentage. As all his colleagues were agreed, with the exception of the United Kingdom representative, he asked the secretary to prepare a letter to the United Kingdom Government in co-operation with the Danish representative.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that of course he could not participate in an appeal to his own Government to change their publicly declared attitude, and he must again object to the United Kingdom Government being singled out in this way in a manner which seemed to imply a special responsibility on their part. He had already explained the question of responsibility, and it was unnecessary to go into it further. He thought, however, that, if an appeal were made to His Majesty's Government by his colleagues—and he could not of course, prevent them from taking such action if they wished—there ought to be at the same time a renewal of the general appeal to individual Governments and private organisations. But he still felt strongly that the time had not yet come for such a general appeal. He did not feel that the material at present available was such that any Government could fairly be expected to decide to pay a definite sum. The President had taken the line that as the opposition in the United Kingdom was likely to be on grounds of principle, the practical details of the scheme would be unlikely to affect the decision. The United Kingdom representative said that in his view this was entirely erroneous. No doubt if the United Kingdom Government acceded to the appeal of the committee, and had to take the matter to Parliament, they would present the matter in such



a way as to take into account the opposition in principle which they might expect, but the United Kingdom Government, on the doubtful assumption they were prepared to make an independent contribution, would naturally desire their contribution to be the minimum compatible with the attainment of the object. The Government themselves were, therefore, very interested in the actual details, and, apart from any other opposition, would have to take into account the fact that any proposal put before Parliament would be very closely scrutinised by opponents whose main preoccupation would be economy. He felt strongly, therefore, that in launching the appeal at this moment the committee was running a serious risk of a check, and that it was incurring a heavy responsibility in not first exhausting every means of preparing a cut and dried scheme. Mr. Felkin's *exposé* strengthened him in this conviction. It appeared that when political and humanitarian schemes were placed before the League, the League subjected them to the most minute scrutiny before accepting any responsibility. He thought that any Government would have the right, and would be obliged, to act in the same way.

The President accepted the idea that the proposed appeal to His Majesty's Government should be supplementary to a general appeal. He felt, however, that the general appeal must be launched without delay. If the committee had some general reassurance on the question of finance, he would be ready to go ahead with the consultation of the Assyrians at once, but it was impossible to carry out the consultation unless the Assyrians could be told definitely whether those who elected to go could go or not.

The President and all the representatives of the committee, except the United Kingdom representative, agreed that a letter to the United Kingdom Government expressing the views of the majority of the committee should be sent off without further delay.

The United Kingdom Representative said that in view of this decision he had no alternative but to withdraw his opposition to the simultaneous issue of a general appeal in order that such an appeal might be made in the name of the whole committee.

The committee then considered the *questionnaire* submitted by the local committee. It was agreed that the majority of the questions were questions which M. Cuénod must be asked to clear up in the course of his impending discussions with the French authorities in Syria. Certain other questions were clearly for the Council Committee to decide, but it was felt that it was unprofitable to go into them in detail at the present stage.

Agreement was, however, reached in principle that the Assyrians should be required to reimburse in some measure the money expended on their settlement.

It was agreed that the following day should be devoted to the drafting of documents to give effect to the committee's decisions at the present session and that a further meeting should be held on the 13th July to approve these documents.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

[E 4446/2/93]

No. 90.

*Record of the 51st Meeting of the Assyrian Committee held in Geneva, July 13, at 11.30 A.M.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 20.)*

The United Kingdom Representative informed the committee that the French representative, who had had to leave for Paris, had stated before his departure that he had just learned that the French authorities in Syria now took the view that the estimates for the Gharb scheme, submitted to M. Oliván at Beirut, were too high, as they had been based in part on calculations made several years ago. The French representative, while unable to give any indication of the precise difference which this development would make, said that he was authorised to state that closer estimates under present day conditions would involve fairly considerable reductions. The French representative had agreed that his statement should be regarded as official.

The United Kingdom representative said that there was another point which he would like to put before his colleagues for them to think over. The committee had now approved in principle the idea of reimbursement by the Assyrians. This fact might also be utilised to reduce the capital sum which the committee would have to find. The committee had now of course decided whether the Assyrians were to be asked to reimburse in full, but assuming for the sake of argument that only 50 per cent. could be expected to be recovered over a period of years, it seemed possible to come to some arrangement with the French authorities whereby those authorities would either waive the payment of certain expenses or increase their contribution to the scheme on the understanding that corresponding repayments eventually received from the Assyrian settlers should be paid directly into the exchequer of the mandated territories. In this way, it might be that the total sum which the committee would have to find to finance the operation might not be more than £400,000 or £500,000. If the Iraqi Government could be induced to raise their present offer to £250,000, it did not seem an impossible feat for the balance to be collected.

The President said that this was a suggestion which the committee would do well to discuss when a detailed scheme had been prepared in the course of the forthcoming discussions at Beirut.

It was agreed to leave the choice of the financial expert who should co-operate with M. Cuénod in these discussions to the decision of the President in consultation with the League Secretariat. It was decided in principle, however, that the financial expert might well be a member of the League Secretariat, and that there was no need to seek the services of some independent financial authority of international reputation.

The following documents were then discussed, and the texts as approved are annexed: (1) Letter to the French Government (Annex A)(<sup>1</sup>); (2) letter to the Iraqi Government (Annex B)(<sup>1</sup>); (3) general appeal to all States members of the League (Annex C)(<sup>1</sup>).

The President and the members of the committee, other than the United Kingdom representative, approved the text of a letter to the United Kingdom Government (Annex D)(<sup>1</sup>).

The Iraqi representative then entered the meeting, and the President explained to him the present position.

The Iraqi Representative made a statement, of which a copy is attached (Annex E).

The President expressed appreciation of the fact that the Iraqi representative had come from Rome to attend the meeting of the committee. The statement which he had made required and would receive careful consideration, and the President would not do more at this stage than make one reservation. The statement implied that the Iraqi Government's offer of £125,000 had been accepted by the President in Bagdad, and that the Iraqi Government were surprised in the circumstances that there should be any question of demanding more from the Iraqi Government. The President said that the Iraqi offer, although much appreciated, had never been considered by the mission to be sufficient, and the mission had merely said that it would report the offer to the committee on its return.

The committee had now discussed the matter and was agreed that unless a larger contribution was forthcoming from the Iraqi Government, there was an insufficient basis for a complete plan of settlement. The committee had therefore decided to appeal to the Iraqi Government to augment its contribution, and had justified its appeal in a note, of which the President handed a copy to the Iraqi representative.

The Iraqi representative then withdrew.

A member of the Press Section of the Secretariat then joined the meeting, and the general lines of a communiqué to the press were communicated to him.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

(<sup>1</sup>) Not printed.



[Annexes A, B, C and D not printed.]

# Annex E.

## Statement made by Iraqi Delegate.

FIRST of all I should like to thank his Excellency the President and the committee for the establishment of the Assyrians of Iraq for the kind reception they have accorded me and, in particular, for enabling me to attend the meeting of the Committee, for which I arrived especially from Rome.

Special thanks are also due to his Excellency the President and those who accompanied and helped him in his mission to the East. He exposed himself to climatical and other inconveniences, and sacrificed his comfort for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the question of the establishment of the Assyrians of Iraq. Though the visit of his Excellency to Iraq caused an increase of 25 per cent. of my country's heavy contribution, my Government, nevertheless, were happy to welcome him and his friends and did all that was in their power to facilitate his mission.

Before I make any comments on the scheme and the contribution required from Iraq, I should like to say one or two words on the status of the Assyrians so far as Iraq is concerned.

As all the members of the committee are aware, the Assyrians entered Iraq from Turkey during and immediately after the war as refugees. Iraq met them with exceptional generosity and did all that was in its power to alleviate their hardship. They were given lands, money and other facilities. Iraq did its utmost to convince them to incorporate themselves into that country and to become good and loyal citizens of it. Unfortunately all Iraq's efforts were responded with ingratitude and with acts injurious and harmful to the interests of the country. The Assyrians insisted upon remaining refugees, and they are leaving Iraq as such. In spite of this unpleasing attitude, the Government of Iraq is contributing a heavy amount to the extent of more than its resources permit to help them on their way out of Iraq.

The reason for my alluding to these facts is to demonstrate to the committee the past and present generosity of the Iraqi State towards these ungrateful refugees. I can state without exaggeration that no country can claim equal generosity in such a particular case.

Now I come to the scheme and to the contribution to it. Iraq is not concerned with schemes to be developed in a foreign country. Consequently it is not to be expected that Iraq will be called upon to negotiate on such schemes and figures of the amounts required for their development. Iraq has agreed to contribute a limited amount to help the Assyrians on their way out of Iraq.

The only matter with which Iraq is concerned is the place of the settlement of the Assyrians. In order to avoid troubles in future, and to save the League of Nations from difficulties and problems, Iraq strongly objected to the settlement of the Assyrians near the frontier. But as the committee now finally decided in favour of the Ladkia (Ghab) scheme, I have nothing to say for the present on the subject.

With regard to the contribution of the Iraqi Government, I refer the committee to the declaration made by the Iraqi representative to the Council of the League of Nations at its session of the 14th October, 1933. The following sentence was the only one concerning the Iraqi undertaking of contribution:—

"The Iraqi Government is prepared to make its contribution as generous as its resources permit it to help the Assyrians on their way."

At the time this declaration was made, it was understood that the contribution of Iraq would not exceed £100,000.

Since then Iraq spent between £40,000–£50,000 on the Assyrians, and in addition has agreed to pay a heavy contribution of £125,000 and also to bear the transfer expenses to the frontier.

I beg to say that the Iraqi Government have not only stood by their declaration, but doubled their generosity beyond their resources.

While in Iraq, his Excellency the President endeavoured very strongly to persuade the Government to raise the amount of their contribution to the sum of £200,000. He is well aware of the extreme difficulties which compelled the Iraqi Government to refuse their response to his wishes.

I am sure that his Excellency the President has detailed all this to the committee. For this reason the Iraqi Government expect not to hear more of any request to increase the already very heavy contribution which the Iraqi Government has agreed to make.

Now I understand that the committee is going to address Iraq again on the subject and ask my Government to agree to double their contribution. I must be allowed to venture and say with respects that this attitude of the committee is a little unexpected in view of all the discussions between his Excellency the President and the Iraqi Government on the letters and telegrams exchanged on the subject.

The committee is of course at liberty to do what it likes, but I find it my duty to warn it not to entertain false hopes in this regard. The sum of £125,000 is more than the extreme limit beyond which it is not only impossible but also dangerous for any Iraqi Government to go beyond.

I must say that the committee's present request is bound to receive the same answer which the Iraqi Government was compelled to give with regret on various occasions to his Excellency the President.

With regard to the idea of making contribution amounts as a loan to be redeemed under certain terms, I see now that the scheme is falling through on account of technical difficulties.

If these difficulties should be eventually overcome, I request that Iraq's contribution should be treated in the same way as those of other Powers.

[E 4473/278/93]

No. 91.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 390.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 5, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 358 of the 24th June last, I have the honour to report that, in pursuance of their policy of improving the administration of the country, the Government have now issued new regulations for the organisation of the Ministry of Economics and Communications.

2. I enclose herein a plan showing the different departments of the Ministry as it will be constituted in future. The chief effect of the new regulations is to restore to independent existence the Departments of Irrigation, Public Works and Surveys. These were amalgamated by Arshad Beg Al Umari, who was Minister for Economics and Communications in Ali Jaudat Beg's last Cabinet, but the scheme has proved unsatisfactory and the return to the old organisation will, I think, be generally welcomed. The separation of the Agricultural and Veterinary Departments is also a reversion to a previous arrangement and marks the special interest which the present Government are taking in improving and increasing the live-stock of the country. A sheep-dipping campaign is one of the Prime Minister's projects in this sphere.

3. The Department of Industrial Research is an innovation. The regulations stipulate that the most important function of this department is to carry out research work into the best means of exploiting the mineral resources of the country, and to study the ways and means of developing national industries of all kinds.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.



## Enclosure in No. 91.

*Plan of the Organisation of the Ministry of Economics and Communications under the Regulations issued in June 1935.*

The Minister The Adviser	The Director General of Economics	Financial Secretary.
		Accounts Section.
		Contracts and Concession Sec- tion.
		Personnel Section.
		Correspondence Section.
	The Director of Oil Affairs	Archives Section.
		The Oil Measurement Section.
	The Director of Indus- trial Research	Industrial Research Section.
		Geological Section.
		The Analyst.
	The Director of Surveys.	
	The Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs.	
	The Director-General of Irrigation.	
The Director of Works.		
The Director of Agriculture.		
The Director of the Veterinary Service.		
Affiliated department : The Railways.		

[E 4476/278/93]

No. 92.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 22.)*

(No. 395.)

Sir,

Bagdad, July 11, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 341 of the 19th June, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the programme of Yasin Pasha's Cabinet, as published in the *Iraq Times* of the 5th July.

2. The first item is especially interesting in view of the propaganda which has recently been conducted in several newspapers in favour of the setting up of some form of dictatorship. The second item possibly indicates an intention to restrict the franchise and thereby to make free elections more practicable than they are under the present electoral law. The remaining items comprise an ambitious and comprehensive plan of economic and social legislation which it is most unlikely that the Government will be able to carry out in full. The intention, however, seems to be sound and, as many of the proposed reforms have already been studied by previous Cabinets, there is a fair prospect that, if Yasin Pasha's Government can remain in office for two or three years, much useful work will be done.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

Enclosure in No. 92.

*Extract from the Iraq Times of July 5, 1935.*

## IRAQ CABINET'S POLICY.

THE Iraq Cabinet's statement of policy, which has been eagerly awaited by the public, was issued yesterday evening. The programme announced will provide the basis on which the forthcoming elections will be fought.

The statement is prefaced by a short résumé of the situation at the time the Cabinet took office, which accounted for the delay in the announcement of its programme. The difficulties then encountered having been satisfactorily disposed of, the Government is now in a position to make its declaration of policy.

The aims of the Government are:—

1. The maintenance of the Constitution and the defence of the present form of government against any forces which may tend to change this system.

2. To amend the Electoral Law in order to make the Majlis more representative of the various classes of the people.

3. To foster a spirit of brotherhood among the people and combat with all the forces at the Government's command subversive feeling or movements likely to stir up dissension.

4. To safeguard public morality and eliminate any factors having a detrimental influence thereon; to encourage sports and sports institutions, and to support them both morally and financially.

5. To amend the articles of the Officials Disciplinary Law in a manner which will enable the Government to dispense with the services of incompetent officials.

6. To develop the feeling of responsibility among officials and make the heads of Departments directly responsible to their respective Ministers for the fulfilment of the regulations.

7. To ensure co-operation between the Government and the people in the construction of model dwelling-houses throughout the country.

8. To improve labour conditions and institute the necessary legislation for this purpose.

9. To take measures for the settlement of the tribes and to ameliorate their conditions of life by removing all causes of distress and dissatisfaction, and by instituting a higher standard of health and education among them.

10. To improve municipal conditions and facilities, and to provide financial assistance for the construction of houses for the poorer classes at low annual rentals.

11. To drain the marshes throughout the country in the interests of public health, and to take measures against the spread of diseases in accordance with medical plans which have been drawn up with this object.

12. To increase the army strength to a point sufficient to ensure the defence of the country against aggression; to increase the air force and encourage societies formed for this purpose; to open factories for supplying the army with its requirements, and, in general, to develop the resources of the country.

13. To prepare measures for the establishment of an Agricultural Bank, a National Bank and a Mortgage Bank; to inaugurate the savings bank movement and the employers' liability system; to stimulate the export of goods and produce; and to reduce the taxes on lands and live-stock.

14. To ensure governmental control over certain industries which are essential to the development of the country, such as the construction of an oil refinery and the effecting of improvements in the date industry, either by Government borrowing, or by the formation of companies in which the Government will have an interest as shareholders; and finally, to improve transport conditions.

15. To take steps to develop the mineral resources of the country; to construct roads, bridges and irrigation canals.

16. To improve the quality of seeds and live-stock, and to take measures to eradicate diseases and insects affecting agricultural produce.

17. To effect improvements in the educational system, and to ensure the necessary number of specialists in various subjects by increasing the number of students sent abroad to complete their studies; to reopen the engineering and agricultural schools; and to bring qualified professors of medicine and law from abroad to raise the standard of knowledge in the schools.

18. To amend a number of important laws to meet the needs of the country, such as the Commercial Law, Civil Law, and various laws of procedure.



## LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

Geneva, July 18, 1935.

*Report by the Chairman of the Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, on his mission to Syria and Iraq.—(Received in Foreign Office, July 22, 1935.)*

BY telegram dated the 28th March, 1935, the Government of Iraq was good enough to send to the chairman of the Committee of the Council for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, an invitation to proceed to Iraq. This journey was intended to bring about closer relations between the Government and the committee and to facilitate the progress of the negotiations.

At its meeting on the 17th April, 1935, the Committee of the Council unanimously adopted a resolution authorising its chairman to accept the Government of Iraq's invitation, and to proceed to Syria and to Iraq as soon as he could do so, in order to take on the spot, and in direct consultation with the High Commissioner of the mandated territories of the Levant and with the Government of Iraq, all the measures necessary to facilitate the rapid execution of the scheme to establish in the Levant the Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq. The committee also adopted the text of an aide-mémoire intended to serve as a guide to the chairman in his negotiations, but at the same time granted him full liberty to take such decisions as he might think desirable in the circumstances.

The committee also decided that its secretary and a secretary-stenographer should accompany the chairman on this mission.

At its meeting on the 17th April, 1935, the Council approved the decisions taken by the committee, adopting its *rapporteur's* conclusions (document C.167.1935.VII).

*Work of the Mission to Beirut (First Visit).*

The mission arrived at Beirut on the 6th May, 1935. Its conversations related principally to (1) the general consideration of a plan for the settlement of the Assyrians in the mandated territories of the Levant; (2) the financial regulations for the control of the funds; and (3) the conditions on which the Assyrians would be allowed to settle in the Levant (see document C./Min.Ass./122). It will be remembered that as a result of the negotiations at Paris, the Government of the French Republic sent a letter, dated the 14th April, 1935, submitting to the committee three different schemes of settlement. On the 17th April the committee informed the French Government that it agreed that the first of the three schemes submitted, namely, settlement in the Gharb region, offered great advantages, but that in view of the time required for carrying it out and the financial outlay it would involve, the committee considered that it should turn its attention rather to the third scheme, which provided for the settlement of the Assyrians in groups spread along the Upper Khabur and the Middle Khabur.

In the very first conversations the mandatory authorities informed the mission that they had for some time been reconsidering one of the three proposals submitted during the meeting at Paris, namely, the Gharb scheme, and that they had reached the conclusion that if all the work contemplated in the original plan were not carried out, but only that necessary for the settlement of the Assyrians, the mandatory authorities would be able to submit greatly reduced estimates as regards both the time and the funds required to carry out the scheme. In the opinion of those authorities the Gharb scheme offered great advantages over the Khabur scheme, as *inter alia* the Assyrians would have Christian minorities as their neighbours, the frontier was remote and the economic future of the region was full of promise. Moreover, the Gharb region would accommodate all the Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq.

At the time when these conversations took place the mission possessed no details either of the financial resources at the committee's disposal or of the number of Assyrians who were prepared to leave Iraq, and accordingly would have found it difficult to give an opinion on the schemes or even to enter into a detailed discussion of the estimates. The mission, therefore, merely promised the

High Commissioner that on its travels in Iraq it would try to obtain, by the most suitable means, particulars of the number of future emigrants. These particulars would show whether the Gharb scheme could be entertained, as the experts considered that if the number of settlers were less than 10,000, the cost of the scheme would be so high as to preclude its adoption. The High Commissioner, for his part, promised to continue his study of the question, and to submit to the mission a more detailed draft on its return from Bagdad (document C./Min.Ass./117).

The draft financial regulations for the control of the funds, which was prepared by the competent services of the League of Nations Secretariat at the request of the Committee of the Council, was accepted by the High Commissariat with certain unimportant amendments which I myself had no difficulty in accepting. The Secretary-General of the League, on being consulted by telegram, also signified his agreement. This document, therefore, is now officially adopted (document C./Min.Ass./119).

As regards the conditions imposed by the mandatory authorities in Syria on the Assyrians who would settle there, it was clearly understood that they would be the same as those granted to the other minorities already settled in the mandated States of the Levant, and would be based on the terms of the mandate and the traditions of those countries (document C./Min.Ass./122).

*Work of the Mission in Iraq.*

The mission reached Bagdad on Saturday, the 11th May. The Iraqi Government welcomed it and gave it every facility to perform its work. Negotiations were at once opened with the Prime Minister, his Excellency Yasin Pasha, who was temporarily acting as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I explained to the Prime Minister the results of the committee's work, and informed him of the conversations that had lately taken place at Beirut. I also pointed out that the committee could not make any progress until it knew exactly how much his Government was prepared to contribute in accordance with the repeated promises made by its representative, both to the committee and to the Council. The Prime Minister informed me of certain difficulties with which his Government was confronted in paying the contribution, and added that it would be prepared to pay £5 for every Assyrian settled in Syria. If there were not more than 5,000 or 6,000 of them, the Government would be willing to pay as much as £10 a head. I said that, from information received, there was reason to believe that a larger number of Assyrians would wish to leave Iraq, but that in any case the offer seemed inadequate to enable any of the settlement plans under consideration to be carried out.

It was agreed that it would be desirable for the mission to go to Mosul and the neighbourhood, as it would then be able to make a preliminary enquiry before continuing the negotiations.

*Visit to Mosul and Villages in Northern Iraq.*

The mission arrived at Mosul on the 17th May. Its first visit was to the refugee camp. As the camp has lately been broken up in consequence of the steps I took before leaving Beirut, I do not think there is any need to describe the impressions we gained. The main object of the journey was, as I have said, to ascertain by enquiry the number of Assyrians who wished to leave Iraq. Owing to the conditions under which the mission had to work, no attempt at an individual consultation was possible. After consulting the settlement experts, who have been dealing with this question for some time, we decided that the enquiry might take the form of interviewing the chiefs representing tribes or sections of the Assyrian population. At the same time, on the advice of the experts, the mission decided to pay a visit to the villages in the neighbourhood of Mosul, which had suffered most severely through the events of 1933, and to other villages in the mountains where a large number of Assyrians were living.

The result of the enquiry must be regarded as provisional, in view of the method employed. It is briefly as follows:—

The great majority of the Assyrians wish to leave the country, even those who have property and do not complain of conditions. They expressed their views without asking for any details of their future settlement. According to the statements of the tribal chiefs, the number of these Assyrians is probably



24,000. On the other hand, a group of six chiefs claiming to speak for 8,000 Assyrians said that they could not state their views until they knew what would be their economic and legal position in their new home.

Further enquiries were made at Kirkuk and Bagdad. These confirmed in every respect the results obtained at Mosul. At Bagdad, the levies and the employees of the railways and other important concerns—men holding permanent situations—said that they wished to leave, whatever the conditions might be. I should mention that there are in Bagdad a considerable number of Assyrians who lived in Persia and were regarded as Persian subjects until 1918. Some of the representatives of these groups approached the mission to explain their legal status and ask for their future to be considered.

The enquiry being concluded, the mission returned to Bagdad on the 22nd May. On receiving the results, I felt justified in telling the Prime Minister that, since some 24,000 Assyrians were ready to leave Iraq, I thought a contribution of £250,000 from his Government would be reasonable.

After consulting the Cabinet, the Prime Minister made, on behalf of his Government, an offer of £125,000, calculated on a basis of £10 for every Assyrian leaving Iraq up to 12,500 persons, on the understanding that, if they numbered more than 12,500, the Iraqi Government would not be required to make any additional payment. As to the method of payment, the Government undertook to pay £60,000 on the departure of the first 4,000 or 5,000 Assyrians, and the remaining £65,000 proportionately on the departure of subsequent parties.

In response to my first demand, the Prime Minister, after again consulting the Cabinet, maintained his offer of £125,000, whereupon I explained that personally I regretted that I could not regard that offer as an adequate basis for carrying out a suitable plan. I added that it was unfortunate that no agreement had been reached, because, that being so, I could not take steps to begin moving the Assyrians forthwith, as the committee had empowered me to do. Finally, I said that when I returned to Geneva I would consult the committee and lay his offer before it.

#### *Second Visit to Beirut.*

Returning to Beirut on the 28th May, the mission resumed its conversations with the High Commissariat on the details of the settlement plans. Two provisional schemes, one for settlement on the banks of the Khabur and the other for settlement in the plains of the Gharb (see documents C./Min.Ass./116 and 117), were submitted to the mission.

The plan for settlement in the plains of the Gharb gave rise to a general discussion. It was proposed that, should the plan prove feasible, the authorities of the mandated territories of the Levant should hand over to the committee, or to corporate bodies that might be created, an area of 15,000 hectares, which might, if necessary, be increased even to 18,000 hectares, for distribution among the Assyrians. The committee might fix the terms on which the emigrants would acquire ownership of this land, and the amounts to be repaid before the title-deeds would be surrendered.

I should state that the total cost of putting this land into condition would be 82 million, of which the mandated States of the Levant would defray 22 million.

I promised the High Commissioner to lay his new proposals before the committee.

Information having reached me while at Beirut that there were signs of uneasiness at Mosul since the departure of the mission, I thought it advisable to propose to the Iraqi Government that the Assyrian refugees in the Mosul camp and about 1,000 others should be transferred under the conditions set out in a telegram to the president of the Council (see document C./Min.Ass./121).

The Iraqi Government agreed to the proposal and to the conditions it involved, and it was thus possible to decide upon the transfer of 1,386 Assyrians. This was completed on the 10th July.

After I left Beirut for Europe, the secretary of the committee remained there a few days longer to visit the Khabur and Gharb areas, and make the final arrangements for the contemplated transfer.

The foregoing outline of the mission's work, together with the documents annexed to the present report and the supplementary information with which I shall be able to furnish the committee, will, I hope, enable the latter to form a clear idea of the situation as it is to-day. Without wishing to prejudice or in any

way influence the decisions that the committee will have to take during the present session, I venture to conclude this report with an expression of my own opinion on certain important points that arise in connexion with the enquiries made by the mission on the spot:—

(a) My conversations with the Iraqi authorities and with a large number of Assyrians lead me to think that, should it not be possible to settle the Assyrians elsewhere than in Iraq, their establishment in that country would meet with the most serious difficulties. The majority of the Assyrian population are convinced that they are there only provisionally, and, even in the event of the Iraqi Government being prepared to establish them finally and on favourable conditions within the country, I am sure that this conviction would persist, and might give rise to a permanent problem that would become increasingly acute.

(b) Subject to the more thorough study that should be made regarding the plan for settlement in the Gharb, I consider that this offers much greater advantages than would settlement in the Khabur. These advantages have been made clear by the services of the High Commissariat. They were confirmed both by my personal observation and by the results of the visit of the secretary of the committee to these two districts.

Not only the political advantages, but also the economic advantages should be considered. Settlement in the Khabur would make possible in the future the recovery of only a very small amount, paid chiefly in order to comply with the precedents laid down in similar cases, whereas, with settlement in the Gharb district, it would be possible to recover a large part of the sums expended. Account must also be taken of the normal increase of this fairly prolific population. The settlement of a considerable number of Assyrians, calculated solely on the basis of the present number of emigrants, provides no solution for the problem that will arise as the result of the normal increase of the population.

(c) The calculation of the number of Assyrians desirous of leaving Iraq cannot be considered as final until an individual consultation has been carried out, or until the committee responsible for the matter is in a position to inform each Assyrian that a final decision has been reached regarding the place of settlement, the conditions under which it will take place and the way in which the operation is to be financed. The results of any consultation carried out in the absence of such information cannot be other than entirely provisional and subject to change.

[E 4608/432/93]

No. 94.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 404 E.)

*Bagdad, July 17, 1935.*

Sir,

WITH reference to Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch No. 253 of the 8th May, 1934, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith statements<sup>(1)</sup> of the actual revenue and expenditure of the Iraq Government for the financial year ended the 31st March, 1935. These statements are taken from the official gazette of the 9th June last and are accompanied for purposes of reference by similar statistics for the year ended the 31st March, 1934.

2. The statements for 1934-35 placed revenue at I.D. 3,818,107 and allowed for a small surplus of I.D. 5,600. The actual results show some divergence from these figures. With ordinary receipts amounting to I.D. 4,000,940 and expenditure to I.D. 3,735,374, there was a substantial surplus at the end of the financial year of I.D. 265,566. This was brought about by an increase in the estimated revenue of I.D. 182,133, and a decrease in the estimated expenditure of I.D. 77,823.

3. As compared with the previous financial year there were increases in the receipts from the tax on agricultural and natural produce and animals, from customs and excise duty and from "other Government services." As no changes of importance were introduced in the scale of taxation on the customs tariff, these figures may be taken as reflecting a certain improvement in the agricultural and commercial conditions of the country as compared with the preceding year.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[12750]

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4. It will be observed that receipts from oil royalties during the year amounted to approximately 1 million dinars and were, as previously, credited to a separate "Capital Works" account, from which a sum of I.D. 429,031 was expended. It is not entirely satisfactory that almost one-half of this expenditure was devoted to "Buildings and Equipment" while the amounts spent on roads and irrigation were in both cases under 100,000 dinars. No major capital works scheme was initiated during the year under review.

5. As reported in paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 211 of the 17th April, the passing of the budget for the current year has been postponed until Parliament meets in the autumn.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 4609/278/93]

No. 95.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 29.)*

(No. 406.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 17, 1935.*

IN my despatches Nos. 358 of the 24th June and 390 of the 5th July, I had the honour to bring to your notice a number of measures elaborated by the Iraqi Government in order to improve the organisation of certain departments, including the Ministry of the Interior. New instructions have now been issued governing the work of the administrative inspectorate. These provide for the division of the provinces into five groups, each group being placed under a board of inspection consisting of two administrative and one finance inspector.

2. The five provincial groups will be—

- (1) The liwas of Mosul and Arbil.
- (2) The liwas of Kirkuk, Sulaimani and Diyala.
- (3) The liwas of Bagdad, Kut and Dulaim.
- (4) The liwas of Karbala, Hillah and the Southern Desert area.
- (5) The liwas of Basra, Amarah and the Muntafiq.

The instructions give full powers to the inspectors to enquire into and report on every branch of administrative work, including that of the municipalities.

3. There is at the moment only one British administrative inspector. His headquarters have hitherto been in Kirkuk and his responsibilities have been limited to the two liwas of Sulaimani and Kirkuk. I gather that on his return from leave he will be retained on the inspectorate board of the second group of liwas. Later on, it is intended to appoint another British administrative inspector to group (1). One of the officers now working in the Land Settlement Department (all of whom have had previous experience of provincial administration) will probably be chosen for this post.

4. The Administrative Inspectorate Law of 1933 fixed the headquarters of all administrative inspectors in Bagdad, but it has been found that this has not given satisfactory results. Inspectors have seldom visited their liwas and their inspections have produced colourless reports, showing no real understanding of the local situation. This defect has been realised by the Government, and under the new scheme it is hoped to bring about a closer and more helpful supervision of the provincial administration. The Government intend to amend the law of 1933 by establishing the headquarters of the five inspectorate boards at Mosul, Kirkuk, Bagdad, Diwaniyah and Basra.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 4855/1583/93]

No. 96.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 417.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 29, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 382 of the 3rd July, I have the honour to inform you that the military operations undertaken to restore order in the Middle and Lower Euphrates areas came to an end on the 26th July with a review of the troops by King Ghazi at Diwaniyah. Eight battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, twenty aeroplanes, and detachments of artillery, armoured cars, and auxiliary troops took part in the parade.

2. Diwaniyah was chosen for this ceremony because of the well-known lawlessness of the tribes in the neighbourhood. Fines of rifles and money had been collected from many of their sheikhs for the part they played in the Rumaitha insurrection, but it was considered that a demonstration of military strength would also have a good moral effect on the district.

3. On the evening of the 25th July martial law was brought to an end in the provinces of Diwaniyah and the Muntafiq, and the troops which were concentrated in these areas for the recent operations are returning to their normal stations.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 4858/150/89]

No. 97.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 12.)*

(No. 420.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, July 30, 1935.*

WITH reference to Sir A. Clark Kerr's despatch No. 319 of the 11th June, I have the honour to inform you that the French Chargé d'Affaires was able, prior to his departure on leave earlier in the month, to make some headway towards the settlement of the questions outstanding between Iraq and Syria.

2. Complete agreement has at last been reached regarding the procedure to be followed for the settlement of frontier incidents, and notes have been exchanged making arrangements similar to those reported in Sir Francis Humphrys's despatch No. 219 of the 6th April, 1933.

3. In regard to the "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement, the Iraqi Government, while accepting a number of the articles of the French draft, have given M. Lépassier a counter-draft of four of the five chapters which it comprises. The amendments deal in the main with the migration and pasturage of the bedouin tribes and aim at simplifying the cumbersome arrangements proposed by the French for the control of these matters.

4. On the subject of the eviction of undesirables, full agreement has not yet been reached, but I understand that a working arrangement is actually in force and the matter is not, therefore, urgent.

5. Little progress has been made in the negotiation of a tariff convention, but I gather that the Ministry of Finance are being urged to furnish the counter-proposals which the Iraqi Government wish to put forward.

6. Two draft agreements, one for the regulation of passenger transport and the second for the transport of merchandise across the desert by the Damascus-Bagdad route, have been discussed. These drafts presented little difficulty as they were largely based on the procedure already established administratively. Some minor amendments were suggested by the Iraqi Government of which M. Lépassier took note. The next move now appears to lie with Syria.

7. The problem of the Ruwallah *wasaga* remains, I fear, unsolved, and the findings of the Palmyra Conference have in consequence not been confirmed by the Syrian Government. Nevertheless, M. Lépassier called on Sir Archibald



Clark Kerr, before departing from Bagdad, and thanked him profusely for the assistance which he had received from His Majesty's Embassy in the negotiations to which I have referred above.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda and to His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 4963/2/93]

No. 98.

(C./Min.Ass./136.)

Geneva, August 13, 1935.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

*Letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the Government of Iraq, dated Bagdad, August 8, 1935, in reply to the Letter from the President of the Committee of the Council, dated July 13, 1935, relating to the Contribution by the Government of Iraq.*—(Received in Foreign Office, August 16.)

To the Secretary-General,

Bagdad, August 8, 1935.

IN my telegram No. C/1689 of the 17th July, 1935, I informed you that the telegraphic reports received of the decisions taken on the 10th July by the Committee of Six for the Settlement of the Assyrians had caused my Government some misgiving, but that I would reserve further comment pending the receipt of full details.

I have since received the letter of the president of the committee, dated the 13th July, 1935, and a copy of circular letter C.L.118.1935.VII, but no copy of the president's report, nor any account of the discussions which led up to the definite reversal of the previous decision of the committee, recorded by the president in his letter of the 17th April, 1935, to the French Government (C./Min.Ass./109), in the following words:—

"The committee agreed with the French Government that of the three schemes submitted the first offered considerable advantages. Nevertheless, the time required for its execution and the financial burdens which it involves are factors which appear to make its adoption difficult. The committee, therefore, thought that its efforts should rather be concentrated on the third scheme, i.e., that providing for the establishment of the Assyrians in groups spread along the Upper Khabbur and the Middle Khabbur."

In his speech at Geneva on the 14th October, 1933, his Excellency Yasin Pasha stated that the Iraqi Government was prepared to make its contribution, as generous a contribution as its resources permitted, to help the Assyrians on their way to a new home, which the League of Nations was asked to find them. This promise never contemplated that the Iraqi Government should be called upon to pay, even in part, the cost of extensive capital works to create land for the settlement, or even the whole of the expenses of initial establishment on already available land; neither the spirit nor the letter of the promise admit of such an interpretation.

When the resolution of the Council, ultimately adopted on the 19th January, 1934, was in course of being drafted, the Permanent Delegate of Iraq expressed to the President of the Committee his misgivings at the undue emphasis that appeared to have been laid on the relative importance of the Iraqi contribution as a factor in the success of any scheme, and pointed out that the possible sum was limited; its relative importance must depend on the magnitude or magnificence of the scheme adopted.

As regards expenditure on the Assyrians since October 1933, the position to date is as follows: Up to the end of April 1935 the Iraqi Government had already expended about £40,000 (including a payment of £10,000 to the High Commissioner in Syria). Following the visit of the President of the Committee

(1) See document C./Min.Ass./125.

to Bagdad, a further payment of £60,000 was actually made, together with promises to pay a further sum of £65,000, and also the expenses of transferring the migrating Assyrians as far as the Syrian boundary. The Iraqi Government has thus already incurred, or committed itself to incur, expenditure to a total of about £175,000, whereas, as far as the Government is aware, not a single penny has yet been made available for the resettlement from any other source. That, again, is a situation which nobody can have contemplated at the time of the meeting of the Council in October 1933. It is perhaps desirable to recall, what is frequently forgotten, that the Assyrians are not an autochthonous element of the population of Iraq; they entered the country as refugees from neighbouring States during and after the world war. They therefore represent not a domestic Iraq, but an international problem.

It should be observed, also, that investigations by the local committee into the standard of prosperity of the emigrants who left Iraq recently, revealed that they are by no means destitute. In this connexion it is useful to quote the following extracts from the committee's findings:—

"(1) The women in the refugee camp drew out I.D. 200 from a private bank in Mosul prior to their departure.

"(2) Men proceeding in the last three convoys arranged for the transfer of at least I.D. 600, at present on fixed deposit in a bank in Mosul, to Syria when the periods of deposit expire.

"(3) An emigrant approached the committee asking for transport for his billiard table to Syria, and asked for instructions regarding the disposal of his 12-bore shot-gun!

"(4) The emigrants took with them very great quantities of baggage, including many iron bedsteads, large sacks of rice and sugar, cases of tea, bales of cloth, tobacco, &c.

"(5) A number of Assyrians due to emigrate are in possession of motor cars which they wish to take to Syria."

As regards the manner of payment, it was, of course, the duty of the Government towards its taxpayers to provide that, within the maximum contribution of £125,000, the sum actually disbursed should bear some relation to the number of Assyrians that might ultimately elect to leave the country. The letter of his Excellency Yasin Pasha, dated the 26th May, 1935, thus constitutes a simple formula to ensure some such relation, and provides that the maximum contribution shall become available, even if the number emigrating reaches only 12,500. This formula should, therefore, not be interpreted as "unwillingness of the Iraqi Government to contemplate any payment except in relation to this limited number."

I have, &c.

KAMEL GAILANI,

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 5005/1181/93]

No. 99.

Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 427 E.)

Sir,

Bagdad, August 1, 1935.

I HAVE received from Colonel Ward an advance typewritten copy of the Administration Report of the Port of Basra, including a report on the Fao Bar dredging scheme for the financial year 1934-35. Printed copies of the report will be transmitted to you when they are available.

2. The main financial details of the year's workings are summarised in this and subsequent paragraphs.

Port of Basra—	I.D.
Revenue	297,743
Operating expenditure	197,664
Depreciation of new assets charged against revenue	5,805
Twelfth instalment of capital debt and interest charges	35,156
Revenue surplus	34,480
Profit on power house	2,247

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3. The actual revenue surplus of ID. 34,480 was considerably in excess of the estimated surplus of ID. 2,310. The difference was due in part to the difficulty in arriving at an estimate in view of the reductions in port dues and the uncertainty as to the maintenance of traffic on the completion of the Iraq Petroleum Company pipe-line shipments. In the event, tonnages proved to be higher than in the previous year, and the rise in exports was particularly encouraging to the port authorities. The amount of tanker shipping entering the limits of the port was well maintained.

4. The reserves, which together total ID. 358,384, consist largely of new capital works which account for ID. 220,049. Nevertheless, the financial position of the port continues to be very strong, and there is every reason to believe that the long chain of substantial revenue surpluses will continue unbroken for some years to come.

5. The following summary of the reserve account as it stood on the 31st March, 1934, and the 31st March, 1935, illustrates clearly the financial position of the port:—

	1934. ID.	1935. ID.
General reserve ... ..	225,000	225,000
Surplus revenue reserve ... ..	99,004	131,037
Central power station surplus revenue reserve ... ..	...	2,347
Total reserves ... ..	324,004	358,384
Cash—		
On deposit ... ..	61,250	61,250
On hand ... ..	28,102	41,702
Net amount due to port on current accounts ... ..	13,336	14,640
Stores ... ..	17,089	20,743
Expended on capital works ... ..	204,227	220,049
Total ... ..	324,004	358,384

The nature of the capital works at present in hand, for which, in the absence of budgetary provision, formal sanction was recently given by Royal decree, was explained in Sir Archibald Clark Kerr's despatch No. 177 of the 2nd April. The central power house has already proved itself to be revenue-producing; and while the air port at Magil is less certain to give an immediate return on the invested capital, there can be little doubt that it will eventually prove to be a paying proposition.

6. A separate section of the report is devoted to the Fao Bar dredging scheme. The debt due to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company having been liquidated in the previous year, a reduction of 25 per cent. in the dredging dues was made as from the 1st April, 1934. The revenue from this source amounted to ID. 237,517, which was ID. 65,607 less than in the previous year, but considerably in excess of the estimates. Eight hundred and forty steamers paid dredging dues during the year as against 804 in 1933-34. A new dredger was purchased at a cost of ID. 115,000. Total revenue amounted to ID. 240,138 and expenditure, including the cost of the new dredger, to ID. 242,377. If the cost of the dredger is charged against the reserve fund of ID. 145,331, the year's operations show a substantial surplus thus:—

	ID.
Surplus revenue ... ..	112,361
Reserve fund ... ..	30,331

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.  
C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 5008/278/93]

No. 100.

Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 430.)

Bagdad, August 7, 1935.

Sir,

WITH reference to Sir A. Clark Kerr's despatch No. 341 of the 19th June last, I have the honour to inform you that the general elections came to an end on the 3rd August with the polling of the secondary electors' votes. The results were published the same day, and show that there has been an increase of twenty in the total number of seats in the Majlis, 108 Deputies having been elected as compared with eighty-eight in former Parliaments. The press finds the reason for this in the augmented number of primary electors disclosed by the recent census, and, I am told, by those in daily touch with the situation, that a genuine effort has, in fact, been made to make this Parliament more broadly representative than its predecessors. Mr. Edmonds was shown the list of candidates for the northern liwas and was satisfied that, except in one instance, it could hardly have been improved upon. To this extent, therefore, the lessons of the recent upheaval appear to have been learned.

2. With few exceptions, the vernacular organs of the press jubilantly moralise on the Government's tolerance in allowing these elections to be free from undue influence, and justify their arguments by pointing to the complete tranquillity in which they were carried out. My own impression is that this unruffled calm may be traced to the apathy induced by the extreme summer heat of Bagdad. Several of the newly-elected members have, however, assured me that they were not pressed at these elections to pledge their allegiance in writing to any given leader or party.

3. An analysis of the results shows that sixty-eight of those now elected have had previous parliamentary experience, while some forty are new-comers. Amongst these latter is Rauf Beg Bahrani, the Minister of Finance. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice—Muhammad Zaki—were returned unopposed, and Amin Zaki, the Minister of Economics and Communications, was re-elected. The remainder of the Cabinet are Senators.

4. Amongst the prominent former Deputies who disappear from the scene are Hikmat Sulaiman, Arshad-al-Umari, Ali Jaudat and Jalal Baban. The first mentioned will be remembered as one of the instigators of the revolt in the spring of Abdul Wahid, who himself now reappears as one of the Deputies for Diwaniyah. It was generally thought that Hikmat Sulaiman would be found a place as President of the new Chamber, but he is said to be disgruntled and I do not know whether he consented to stand for election. Arshad-al-Umari held a ministerial post in the last Government, but his hustling methods, indiscriminate energy, and private peccadilloes made him many enemies. His disappearance from the scene caused no surprise. Ali Jaudat's incompetence and corruption were mainly responsible for the troubles of last spring, and he is to be kept at a safe distance, for a time at least, as Iraqi Minister in London.

5. It can reasonably be anticipated that, so long as the present Government hold together, they will enjoy the confidence of at least two-thirds of the Chamber.

6. There are, of course, the usual rumours abroad of rifts in the Government lute, the main line of cleavage being between Yasin Pasha and his party on the one hand, and Nuri Pasha and his supporters on the other, with Rashid Ali, the Minister of the Interior, more or less holding the scales. I cannot, however, see any outward signs of discord at present, except that Jafar Pasha, who was not satisfied as to the impartiality of the sentences imposed on the Euphrates insurgents, has been allowed to find solace for his injured feelings (and incidentally, relief from the Bagdad heat) in the purges of Carlsbad and the flesh-pots of London on a generous daily subsistence allowance.

7. During the elections there were signs that some of Yasin's supporters, who anticipated relegation to the wilderness, were ready to remind him of his former opposition to the treaty of 1930. Their tilts at him, however, seem to have been in the nature of Parthian arrows, and there is nothing at present to show that Yasin Pasha's position is in any way endangered.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.  
C. H. BATEMAN.



[E 5111/2/93]

No. 101.

(C./Min.Ass./139.)

Geneva, August 21, 1935.

## LEAGUE OF NATIONS: SETTLEMENT OF THE ASSYRIANS OF IRAQ.

*Letter from the French Government dated Paris, July 30, 1935, in reply to the letter from the Chairman of the Council Committee dated Geneva, July 13, 1935 (doc. C./Min.Ass./124) with regard to the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in the Gharb District.—(Received August 23.)*

(Translation.)

*M. Laval to the Chairman of the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq.*

Sir,

Paris, July 30, 1935.

IN a letter dated the 13th July last, you were good enough to inform me that as a consequence of the mission which you performed at Beirut, the Council Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq had decided to turn its attention to the Gharb district and to take immediate measures for this purpose.

With this end in view, the committee expressed the desire to obtain, if possible before the 15th August next, a detailed and complete study of the Gharb settlement scheme.

In communicating to me this wish, you expressed the desire that this study should be prepared on the spot by the services of the High Commissariat in consultation with two experts appointed by the committee.

I have the honour to inform you that I have duly communicated to the High Commissariat the suggestions submitted by the committee. I take this opportunity of confirming that the High Commissariat will willingly avail itself of the assistance of the experts which the committee is sending to Beirut.

Lastly, I would add that following upon the exchange of views which has taken place at Paris between the High Commissioner of the Republic at Beirut and M. Arocha and Mr. Hill, detailed supplementary instructions have been sent to the High Commissariat.

The task assigned to M. Cuénod, expert on transfers of populations, and to Mr. Hill, the financial expert, who will be specially responsible for seeing that the estimate is submitted in a form answering to the committee's requirements, has been indicated. It has been made clear that M. Cuénod will submit the list of questions raised by the Assyrians of Iraq to which he has to furnish replies.

Special directions have been given for the estimates contained in the schedule to be prepared with due attention to the savings which can be made, as compared with the previous estimates, in respect of the cost of material, the employment of the Assyrians themselves as labour, and the material situation of the refugees.

The High Commissariat is also requested to deduct from the estimates of aggregate expenditure the aggregate estimates of the repayments to be made by the Assyro-Chaldeans. For this purpose a plan must be drawn up on the basis of past experience, indicating the time-limits within which refunds should be made, and the intervals between the individual payments.

The High Commissariat has been notified of the fact that Mr. Hill is authorised to examine with the services of the High Commissariat the possibilities of mobilising the sums to be expected from these repayments.

Lastly, mention is made of the wish expressed by the committee to receive periodically a report on the utilisation of funds, and to entrust this task to M. Cuénod as the committee's local representative during the period of installation.

I have, &amp;c.

PIERRE LAVAL.

[E 5096/2/93]

No. 102.

*Note from French Embassy.—(Received August 23.)*

A LA suite du voyage effectué en Syrie et en Irak par M. López Oliván, président du Comité pour l'Installation des Assyriens, le comité a estimé que le projet primitif d'établissement dans la vallée du Khabour devait être abandonné, le nombre d'Assyriens qui ont manifesté le désir de quitter l'Irak étant trop élevé par rapport à la superficie des terres cultivables dans cette région. Le comité a alors porté son choix sur la région du Gharb.

Ce dernier projet pose, toutefois, un problème financier beaucoup plus difficile à résoudre que le précédent, puisqu'il suppose des travaux d'assèchement considérables dans la vallée marécageuse du Gharb. Le coût de l'installation de 15,000 Assyriens dans cette région a été évalué par notre Haut-Commissariat à Beyrouth à environ £800,000. Bien que le Gouvernement irakien n'ait jusqu'à présent promis son appui que jusqu'à concurrence d'une somme de £125,000, le comité n'en a pas moins cru devoir mettre tout en œuvre pour assurer l'exécution de son projet. Il a décidé en particulier de faire appel à tous les Etats membres de la Société des Nations afin d'obtenir leur participation financière. Le Foreign Office doit être en possession du document en question.

Le Gouvernement français, qui, à la demande de la Société des Nations, prend la responsabilité d'accepter la venue sur le territoire syrien d'un nouveau groupe minoritaire, est disposé, en vue de répondre d'une manière positive à l'appel du comité, à prier le Comité Nansen d'affecter à l'installation des Assyriens les sommes récupérées sur le crédit de 3 millions mis en 1929 à la disposition de ce comité en faveur des réfugiés arméniens. D'autre part, les Etats de Syrie sous mandat français accepteront de participer aux frais des travaux d'assèchement du Gharb.

Le président du Comité pour l'Installation des Assyriens a cru devoir adresser, au nom de celui-ci, un appel spécial au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté. Le Gouvernement français serait heureux de connaître la suite que le Gouvernement britannique se propose de réserver à l'appel de M. López Oliván et a prié le Chargé d'Affaires de France de s'enquérir auprès du Foreign Office à cet effet. M. Roger Cambou serait très heureux à Sir Samuel Hoare de bien vouloir le mettre en mesure de répondre à la question qui lui a été posée par son Gouvernement.

Le Chargé d'Affaires de France saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 22 août 1935.*

[E 5061/163/93]

No. 103.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Mr. Bateman (Bagdad).*

(No. 209. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, August 24, 1935.*

HIS Majesty's Government have reconsidered proposals for new settlement of question of Iraqi railways, and you are now authorised to approach Iraqi Government on lines proposed in my immediately following telegram. Matter should, in the first instance, be discussed informally with competent Ministers, and proposals only put in writing if you have reason to believe that Iraqi Government will not take serious exception to any of the proposed terms.

Our primary objective is that effective management should remain in British hands, and for this reason it is most desirable that there should be a joint Anglo-Iraqi Board of Management. His Majesty's Government are, however, prepared to agree that British as well as Iraqi members should be appointed by the Iraqi Government in view of the proposed transfer to them of absolute ownership.

(For your information.)

His Majesty's Government might also, in the last resort, agree to British members being in a minority.



A British general manager is, in any case, essential. This is not to be taken to mean, however, that His Majesty's Government will insist on the retention of the present British manager beyond the term of his existing contract, and if you think that acceptance of condition would be facilitated thereby, you may drop a hint to this effect.

Provided sufficient key posts remain in British hands to ensure essential control and efficiency, His Majesty's Government would raise no objection to an overhaul of posts now occupied by non-Iraqis, with a view to a reduction of their total number or to an increase in the numbers of Iraqis in "officer" grades. This suggestion may appeal to the Iraqis and you are at liberty to make it. It seems, however, preferable to postpone specifying the requirements of His Majesty's Government in regard to key posts until the preliminary reaction of the Iraqi Government is known. If it is not definitely hostile, I shall be glad to receive your suggestions.

As regards material, proposal to see *formal* undertaking that the Iraqi Government should purchase only British materials for railways has been dropped, partly because it seems impossible to bind Iraqi Government to purchase material in what may not prove most economical market, but also because wording of article 11 of Iraq's declaration of guarantees seems to make it difficult, if not impossible, to draft an undertaking which would not lead to strong protest from other Powers. The utmost importance is still attached to maintaining the purchase of durable British material (*e.g.*, locomotives, rolling-stock, rails and bridge material). In the course of negotiations you should endeavour to secure from the Iraqi Government an informal promise that whenever possible preference will be given to British materials; but the fact that the promise, even if obtained, would be informal makes it all the more important that British management should be maintained.

Strategic considerations constitute an effective justification which the two parties can use for insisting on and accepting requirements regarding management and materials, but you should be careful to avoid any language that could be construed as increasing or defining our strategic obligations (see Colonel Adam's remarks on p. 5 of enclosure in my despatch No. 419 of 18th June).

Finance is regarded as a secondary consideration, and if the other desiderata can be obtained by any abatement of price, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to go to very considerable lengths. As regards the figure of £650,000, you can point out that His Majesty's Government's present rights are to preference stock as laid down in 1930 agreement, and that they are prepared to surrender these rights for a relatively small cash equivalent.

In December 1928 Iraqis offered to purchase our interest for 77,95,000 rupees representing the present value, taking interest at 6 per cent. of 250 lakhs of rupees in twenty years' time, on the understanding that we would meet any liability to Bagdad Railway Company and would waive debt of 28 lakhs in respect of stores. This offer was not acceptable. We were unable to waive the debt for stores, and it was on this account that the amount of preferred stock assigned to His Majesty's Government in the financial agreement was raised to 275 lakhs of rupees. £650,000 represents approximately the present value, taking interest at 6 per cent., of the latter amount in twenty years' time (the exact figure being £643,000). In present circumstances the adoption of so high a rate of interest as 6 per cent. is extremely generous to Iraq. It could be defended against criticism here by analogy with the rate of interest laid down for the preferred stock, but it can be pointed out to Iraqis that any lower figure involves assuming a higher rate of interest than 6 per cent., and it is not clear on what ground such a rate could be defended. In present monetary conditions the appropriate rate would really be 3 per cent., but this would result in a figure of over £1 million, which we recognise to be beyond what Iraq can in practice be expected to pay.

As regards the Bagdad Railway Company's claim, it can be pointed out that the prospect of this claim maturing is so slight that we do not think that any abatement of the price on that account by itself would be justified; but if the Iraqis seek to make much of the claim, you may offer to meet such proportion of any irrecoverable disbursement made in discharge of it as the purchase price to be agreed upon will bear to the nominal amount of preferred stock allotted to His Majesty's Government. Such an arrangement would follow logically that laid down in paragraph 4 (g) of the financial agreement.

You may accept on your own responsibility any cash offer not below £500,000 as part of a settlement satisfactory in other respects. Any smaller offer or offer to spread payments over a period of years should be referred to me for instructions. The negotiations must not be allowed to break down on financial issues provided that other desiderata can be obtained, but nothing should be said at this stage to suggest that less than £500,000 down would be acceptable.

[E 5061/163/93]

No. 104.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Mr. Bateman (Bagdad).*

(No. 210.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, August 24, 1935.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 24th August: Iraqi railways.

In the first place, Iraqi Government should be reminded that the provisions regarding railways contained in financial agreement attached to 1930 agreement remain binding on both parties. His Majesty's Government do not accept Iraqi Government's contention that arrangements for future of railways provided for therein are impracticable and unworkable, and are still prepared to proceed with them. In view, however, of the Iraqi Government's objections and of the mutual obligations and interests of the two Governments, which of themselves render desirable a settlement of the future of the railways without further delay, His Majesty's Government, in furtherance of their desire to assist the Iraqi Government to the utmost extent consistent with their own obligations and interests, are prepared to agree to the following alternative arrangement, which they now propose to the Iraqi Government. The latter will appreciate that, if this alternative arrangement is not acceptable, at any rate in principle, the arrangements agreed to in 1930 will necessarily stand until they are superseded.

Alternative arrangement which His Majesty's Government propose it that, on its entry into force, Iraqi Government should be placed in absolute possession of existing railways as a going concern, *i.e.*, including all railway land, reserve and renewal funds, debts and credits of whatever nature, and that, in return, Iraqi Government should (1) undertake in writing, *e.g.*, in an exchange of notes, that for a period of twenty years the railway shall be managed by a mixed Anglo-Iraqi board appointed by Iraqi Government, and that the general managership and a limited number of key posts requiring technical knowledge and experience will be reserved for British subjects, and also that such other non-Iraqi personnel as may be required for the railways will, as is provided in the third exchange of notes attached to the 1930 treaty, be recruited from among British subjects, provided suitable candidates are available; (2) make to His Majesty's Government an immediate cash payment of £650,000; and (3) assume responsibility for any liabilities connected with the railways which have arisen or which may arise in future.

Every effort should be made in the course of the discussions with the Iraqi Government to reach an understanding that preference will, so far as possible, be given to British materials.

[E 5132/278/93]

No. 105.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 26.)*

(No. 437.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 14, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 430 of the 7th August last, I have the honour to inform you that Parliament was opened by His Majesty King Ghazi on the 8th August last.

2. The Speech from the Throne, a translation of which is enclosed herein,<sup>(1)</sup> opened with an unctuous reference to the Euphrates disorders of last spring, but contained a welcome intimation that the Government have a general amnesty law under consideration. A pious hope was also expressed for the success of the direct negotiations now taking place in Tehran for the settlement of the frontier dispute between Iraq and Iran.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



3. In dealing with the question of national defence, His Majesty referred to the satisfaction with which the Iraqi people had received the announcement concerning the application of the new conscription law. This can hardly be taken at its face value, since it is a matter of common knowledge that the demonstrations which took place in Bagdad and Basra in favour of the law were by no means spontaneous or popular, but were deliberately staged and paid for by certain *mukhtars*, who were anxious to get kudos from the new Government for the "enthusiasm" which they had managed to instil into the youth of their districts.

4. For the rest, the speech merely epitomises the programme of the Government which was reported in Sir Archibald Clark Kerr's despatch No. 395 of the 11th July last.

5. At the meeting of the Chamber which followed the formal opening, the present Minister of Justice—Muhammad Zaki Beg, a staunch supporter of the Prime Minister—was elected to the presidency of the Chamber by an overwhelming majority. Two vice-presidents, also friends of Yasin Pasha, were appointed. It is thought, in some quarters, that Muhammad Zaki's new appointment will make it possible for Hikmat Beg Sulaiman to enter the Government as Minister of Justice.

6. It is anticipated that this session of Parliament will be very short, and that it will not be possible for the budget to be considered until the autumn session.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 5164/2/93]

No. 106.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to M. Corbin.*

(Confidential.)

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, August 29, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of the memorandum communicated to me by M. Cambon on the 22nd August, in which he was good enough to inform me of the action which the French Government propose to take in response to the appeal addressed by the Assyrian Committee of the Council of the League to all States members of the League, with a view to obtaining their financial participation in the proposed scheme for Assyrian settlement in Syria. I feel sure that the proposed action will be widely appreciated.

2. In that memorandum he enquired what reply His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposed to return to the special appeal addressed to them by the president of the Assyrian Committee on the 13th July.

3. Your Excellency is no doubt aware that His Majesty's Government have hitherto maintained that the financing of any Assyrian settlement scheme, apart from the contributions of the Iraqi Government and of the Assyrians themselves, should be a collective responsibility on the part of the League as a whole, and that while His Majesty's Government were prepared to pay their share of a League contribution, they could not contemplate any independent financial participation. His Majesty's Government still adhere to their view regarding the collective responsibility of the League, but I am happy to be able to tell you, for the strictly confidential information of the French Government at this stage, that they are now prepared, on purely practical grounds, to reconsider in certain circumstances their attitude towards an independent contribution. They still consider that the League should itself make as large a contribution as possible, but they are disposed in principle to recommend Parliament to authorise a limited independent contribution, subject to the elaboration of a satisfactory scheme of settlement, and to there being a reasonable prospect that funds will be forthcoming from other sources, including the League, which, when added to the contribution of this country, will be sufficient to ensure the success of the scheme.

4. It is difficult to speak of precise figures at a time when the number of Assyrians to be transferred from Iraq is yet unknown, and then the details of

the settlement scheme are still being worked out. It would, however, in the view of His Majesty's Government, be impossible in any event to obtain the necessary parliamentary sanction for a greater independent contribution by this country than that which might be made by Iraq.

5. His Majesty's Government take the view that the Iraqi Government should make a considerably increased contribution, and they are about to approach that Government with this end in view. But the gap to be bridged between any contribution likely to be offered by the Iraqi Government and the total estimated cost of the Gharb scheme is unfortunately so wide that it seems unlikely that any sum which His Majesty's Government might be in a position to offer on the above basis would be sufficient to ensure success. Before further material progress can be made, therefore, it seems essential to work out a financial plan which, by taking into account all the factors involved, will reduce the problem to practicable proportions. His Majesty's Government sincerely trust that the conversations which have just taken place at Beirut may have assisted in this direction, but such information as they possess regarding those conversations leads them to doubt whether a sufficient degree of progress has, in fact, been achieved on this point, valuable as the conversations have certainly been in many ways.

6. His Majesty's Government believe that the success of the proposed scheme of settlement is of great mutual importance to Great Britain and to France, in view of the fact that the consequences of further Assyrian troubles might be serious for both countries. They desire, therefore, to suggest that in the light of the discussions at Beirut the position should be frankly explored at a very early date in informal discussions between representatives of the two countries, with the object of discovering some mutually satisfactory *modus operandi* which might be proposed, either to the Assyrian Committee, or to the League Council. The most convenient place and opportunity for such discussions appears to be Geneva in the early stages of the coming session of the Council. These discussions might well be conducted in the first place between the United Kingdom and French representatives on the Assyrian Committee, and as the questions at issue would be largely of a technical and financial nature, His Majesty's Government, on their side, would be prepared to depute a Treasury expert to collaborate with the United Kingdom representative.

7. I should be grateful if you would be good enough to inform me as soon as possible whether the French Government are willing to agree to this procedure.

I have, &c.

SAMUEL HOARE.

[E 5287/163/93]

No. 107.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 31.)*

(No. 215.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, August 31, 1935*

PRIME MINISTER informed me to-day, through Edmonds, that the Iraqi Government accept principles of railway settlement outlined in your telegram No. 210. He has asked me to put your proposals in writing.

I consider best form will be a private letter, in which I can more easily allude to your desire that preference shall be given to British material whatever possible.

As it was clear from my talk with Prime Minister and Nuri on 28th August that main discussion in future will centre on figure of required cash payment, and as both concurred in a remark I made as to strategic value of railways to Iraqi Government, I do not think it will be necessary at this stage to make any further mention of this side of the question (see paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 209).



[E 5422/432/93]

No. 108.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received September 9.)*

(No. 453 E.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, August 22, 1935.*

THERE are several indications that the economic policy of the Iraqi Government has become more clearly defined during the summer months.

2. In my telegram No. 203 of the 12th August, I had the honour to inform you that the Government were seriously considering the floating of a loan of £1,500,000 in the United Kingdom, for the purpose of purchasing and extending the existing railway system. This, in itself, is most significant in that it shows that the progressive members of the Cabinet have succeeded in persuading their more conservative colleagues to abandon the parish pump and to look beyond the walls of Bagdad.

3. For the past three years at least opinion has been divided as to the means of financing the capital works and development schemes of which the country stands so much in need if it is to be rescued from the poverty that threatened to overwhelm it before oil came to its rescue. On the one hand, there were those who held that it was essential to their newly-won independence to wipe out all foreign indebtedness so far as possible, and to start and continue the new life of freedom with a clean slate. Their view was not so much that loan oft loses both itself and friend—a reflection which would probably have left them quite cold—but rather that it placed the debtor under an undue and intolerable obligation to the lender, who was apt to exploit his advantage. These were the people who may be held responsible for paying off the residue of the Ottoman Debt and for pursuing the conservative financial policy inculcated by the British advisers. To them belongs some of the kudos for balanced budgets, the accumulated surplus from the oil royalties and dead rent, and the fact that Iraq emerged scatheless from the financial blizzard of 1930-33.

4. It is, of course, possible and even probable that their heads were turned by the sudden accretion of wealth which the Iraq Petroleum Company—and to a minor and more doubtful extent the British Oil Development Company—brought them. They felt secure in advocating that development schemes could well be made to wait until there were funds, either actually in the bank or in sight, sufficient to enable their execution to be carried out in slow time. They were all for financing the capital works programme out of revenue, forgetful of the fact that economic conditions, like peace in the modern world, are not static but dynamic. So far they had won the day, with the result that the only major scheme of any importance yet attempted has been the Kut barrage.

5. On the other hand, there was always a minority who were anxious to speed up the tempo, to raise the standard of living and to increase the productive capacity of the country. These people sometimes had the temerity to suggest that the oil royalties could most advantageously be used as security for a development loan contracted abroad. But until recently they remained nothing more than a minority whose voice was seldom heard.

6. It was, therefore, with no little surprise that I learned from the Prime Minister last week that he had come round to their view. Hitherto he had been counted amongst those who mistrusted the would-be foreign lender, and I am still somewhat at a loss to account for his sudden conversion. Several considerations may have contributed to it, but in all probability he has come to see that a large part of the current revenue must be devoted in the near future to increasing the strength of the army and air force. The Euphrates disorders of last spring came as a bad shock to him, and the present bellicose behaviour of Italy has impressed him deeply.

7. Whatever the truth may be, the oil royalties furnish him with sufficient security for a loan of far greater dimensions than he at present contemplates. Inasmuch as the loan will be utilised partly to finance new railway construction, it should be possible in present conditions to secure that some of the proceeds are spent on the purchase of material in the United Kingdom. I think, therefore, the Prime Minister should be encouraged to continue in the course on which he has now apparently embarked.

8. In the speech delivered by His Majesty King Ghazi at the opening of Parliament, mention was made of the Government's intention to establish a

national bank. I gathered from a recent conversation with Yasin Pasha that this scheme was at present only in the embryonic stage, but that the Government were of opinion that the time had come for Iraq to have a central bank of its own, similar to those established in other countries since the war and continuously advocated by the financial experts of the League of Nations. The bank would take over the note issue, and this would, of course, mean that the present currency board in London would eventually cease to exist. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that, when the time came, the three British banks operating in Iraq and some of the joint stock banks in London, would be found ready to collaborate in furnishing the necessary capital. He assured me that it was not the intention of the Iraqi Government to curtail in any way the activities of the British banks in Iraq but rather to enlist their active co-operation in developing more rapidly than at present the resources of the country.

9. In my despatch No. 447 E. of the 19th August last, I had the honour to inform you of an amendment recently introduced into the Customs Tariff Law of 1933. This amendment is designed to enable the Government to take active measures to redress the balance of trade with those countries, such as Japan, where hitherto it has been on the wrong side. If and when the Government take action under the new law, British firms should be ready to seize the opportunity offered to regain those markets in which they were formerly supreme, but into which Japan has made inroads during the past few years.

10. The three developments mentioned above seem to offer an encouraging prospect for increased British enterprise in Iraq, and I trust that British interests will not be slow to avail themselves of the opportunities when they occur.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &amp;c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 5451/2/93]

No. 109.

*United Kingdom Delegate, Geneva, to Foreign Office.—(Received September 10.)*

(No. 76.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments and has the honour to transmit a memorandum by Mr. Sterndale Bennett on the present position of the Assyrian question.

*Geneva, September 8, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 109.

*Present Position of the Assyrian Question.**Attitude of His Majesty's Government.*

THE present attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding financial participation in the Assyrian settlement scheme is as follows: While continuing to insist on the collective responsibility of the League for the provision of such funds for Assyrian settlement as are not contributed by the Iraqi Government or by the Assyrians themselves, His Majesty's Government are now prepared, on purely practical grounds and without prejudice to any question of responsibility, to contemplate an independent financial contribution to a League fund in addition to the normal share of the United Kingdom in the contribution which they feel that the League itself ought to make to that fund. There are too many uncertain factors at the moment to fix a figure for the independent contribution (though we cannot exceed £250,000), and we have so far merely informed the French and Iraqi Governments in confidence of our attitude in principle.

2. The possibility of an independent British contribution will, it is hoped, serve to persuade (a) the French to reduce the cost of the scheme to something practicable; (b) the Iraqi Government to increase, and, if possible, to double, the



contribution which they have already offered (£125,000); and (c) the League and private organisations to make the maximum possible contributions.

3. The offer of His Majesty's Government is subject to four conditions:—

- (1) That the settlement scheme shall be satisfactory from the point of view of the Assyrians and from that of financial control.
- (2) That there is a reasonable assurance that the funds forthcoming from other sources, when combined with the independent contribution from the United Kingdom, will be sufficient to ensure the success of such a scheme.
- (3) That the primary responsibility for providing funds remains with Iraq.
- (4) That the responsibility of finding any balance which may remain, after the contributions of ourselves and the Iraqi Government, and after possible contributions by the Assyrians have been taken into account, shall be a League responsibility.

#### *Estimated Cost of Gharb Scheme and Possibilities of Reduction.*

4. When the decision to make this offer was reached it was believed that the total funds to be provided by the Assyrian Committee would be about £800,000 (60 million francs). (According to the preliminary French estimates the drainage and irrigation of the Gharb area before final settlement could take place there, would cost 62 million francs, of which the State of Lattakia was prepared to pay 22 million, leaving 40 million for the Assyrian Committee to find, in addition to the expenses of settlement proper (*i.e.*, construction and equipment of villages, provision of seeds, implements, &c., and maintenance of the settlers until they become self-supporting) estimated by the French at about 20 million francs.)

5. His Majesty's Government have always felt that it would be difficult for the Assyrian Committee to raise more than £500,000, and it has been their hope that the sum of £800,000 might in some way or other be reduced to this figure. There has, however, never been any solid ground for more than a mere hope that this reduction might be possible.

6. Discussions have recently taken place in Beirut between Mr. Hill and M. Cuénod (financial and technical experts respectively) on behalf of the League, and the French authorities in the mandated territory. The object of these discussions was to produce a detailed scheme and to examine thoroughly the estimates in the hope of achieving a substantial reduction. Useful as the discussions have been in many ways, the hoped-for reductions has not been achieved. Certain items have been reduced, but this has been more than balanced by the discovery of other items which would have to be included and the result is that although reductions may prove possible in practice when the work begins, the estimates are now considerably higher than was at first indicated. The French have found it impossible to make any reduction in the costs of the preliminary drainage and irrigation scheme. They claim, in fact, that the estimates of these costs have been drawn very fine, and that they make no provision for a number of items (*e.g.*, compensation for the present inhabitants of an area which will have to be evacuated for a part of the work), the liability for which will actually fall upon the mandated territory. As regards settlement costs proper, the estimate of 20 million francs was for 15,000 persons only, and will have to be proportionately increased if, as seems probable, 20,000 Assyrians have to be catered for. This, together with certain other items in connexion with the present provisional settlement on the Khabur, might, according to the report of the Beirut conversations, bring up the cost of settlement proper to as much as 30 million francs (£400,000). The net result is that the Assyrian Committee might have to find a total of about 70 million francs (£930,000), instead of the 60 million francs (£800,000) previously contemplated.

#### *Line to be taken in Discussions with the French.*

7. Only a part of the report of the Beirut discussions was available in London before I came to Geneva, and the discussions with the Treasury as to the line to be taken were thus on an incomplete basis. In principle, however, it was agreed that an attempt ought to be made to separate the two operations of development (irrigation and drainage) and settlement, the idea being that while the Assyrian Committee should assume complete responsibility for the financing of the settlement operation, the French on their side ought to have complete

responsibility for the drainage and irrigation work, which may be expected to benefit the mandated territory as a whole quite apart from the Assyrian question. The Treasury had in mind that the financial liability of the Assyrian Committee in connexion with the drainage and irrigation scheme should be limited to a fixed contribution, and that the League itself should be involved in no extra liability if the estimates were, in fact, exceeded.

#### *Scope of the Gharb Drainage and Irrigation Scheme.*

8. To understand the drainage and irrigation scheme it must be explained that the River Orontes flows from south to north through the Gharb plain. Its waters spread all over that plain, which is thus at present a vast marsh. The development work consists of a barrage at the southern end of the Gharb plain at Acharné, which will result in limiting the waters flowing into the plain and will form a large reservoir. The Gharb marshes themselves will be drained into the Orontes, and to take the extra water the bed of the river at the northern end of the Gharb plain will have to be deepened and a barrage and tunnel constructed at this northern end at Karkor. After being drained the Gharb plain will be irrigated by a system of irrigation canals.

9. The detailed estimates for this work are as follows:—

	Million francs.
Construction of the Acharné barrage and reservoir ...	10
Karkor barrage and tunnel ... ..	4
Deepening of the Orontes ... ..	18
Drainage canals ... ..	8
Irrigation canals ... ..	22
	—
	62

10. It was understood, when the question of our policy was considered in consultation with the Treasury, that the above works would result in making available 40,000 hectares of irrigated land, of which the French proposed to place at the disposal of the Assyrians 15,000 only. It seemed, therefore, a not unfair suggestion that the fixed contribution of the Assyrian Committee towards the drainage and irrigation work should be in the proportion of 15,000 to 40,000, *i.e.*, not more than three-eighths. It now appears, however, that while the first three items in the above table are essential, whether the eventual area of developed and irrigated land is to be 1,000 or 40,000 hectares, the canalisation contemplated in items 4 and 5 of the table is merely what will be sufficient to drain and irrigate and so make available 15,000 hectares of land. If the French want to use the rest of the 40,000 hectares of the Gharb plain for other settlers than Assyrians, they will have to extend the work of canalisation at proportionate extra expense to themselves. Meanwhile, the contribution of 22 million francs by the State of Lattakia towards the present operation has been calculated by roughly applying the proportion of 15,000 : 40,000 to the first three items of expenditure, leaving the committee to find three-eighths of those items plus the whole cost of canalising the 15,000 hectares for the use of the Assyrians. This is not an inequitable arrangement, but it completely alters the basis on which the Treasury have hitherto considered the problem of procedure.

11. In all the circumstances Mr. Rowe-Dutton and I felt that it was useless to expect a reduction of the Assyrian Committee's share of the total expense from the revised figure of £930,000 to as low a figure as £500,000. In fact, £600,000 represented in our view the *minimum* which would enable the scheme to be carried out in a satisfactory manner and, as explained above, the line of attack would have to be rather different from that suggested by the Treasury.

#### *Discussions with the French Representatives in Geneva.*

12. We opened discussions on the 6th September with the French represented by M. de Saint-Quentin, M. de Panafieu and two experts from the mandated territory, M. Vasselet (Public Works) and M. Hérard (Finance). We took the line that though considerable material progress had been made with the preparation of a plan for Assyrian settlement, the great obstacle was finance. His Majesty's Government had thought it a practical impossibility for the Assyrian



Committee to find as much as £800,000, and we were alarmed to find that as a result of the Beirut conversations the cost now seemed likely to be more than £900,000, apart from the contribution of nearly £300,000 which the State of Lattakia had already promised. His Majesty's Government sincerely desired that the Assyrian scheme should succeed and wanted to do everything in their power to ensure this. They had hitherto taken the view that, apart from the Iraqi and Assyrian contributions, the cost must be borne by the League as a whole. They were now, however, prepared, on purely practical grounds and provided certain conditions were fulfilled, to make an independent contribution in the hope that this would facilitate the financing of the whole affair. That contribution could, however, only be a limited one and no figure could be fixed until various factors had been cleared up and, in particular, until it was known how much the Iraqi Government would in the last resort be prepared to pay. At all events, even assuming an increased Iraqi contribution, an independent British contribution and a League contribution upon which we proposed to insist, the funds at the disposal of the Assyrian Committee would be limited. Without committing ourselves to any figures, we thought that if the cost, so far as the Assyrian Committee were concerned, could be reduced to somewhere in the region of £600,000, there might be a reasonable hope of raising that sum. We did not feel that it would be possible to raise more. We would therefore ask the French to consider the possibility with us of so financing the whole operation that, in effect, the sum which the Assyrian Committee would be expected to find would be limited to about £600,000 (45 million francs).

#### *British Plan.*

13. The French representatives were non-committal, but did not appear unresponsive. They had no suggestions to make themselves, and we put before them, for consideration, the idea that the two operations of settlement and development (drainage and irrigation) should be completely separated. The Assyrian Committee would assume entire financial responsibility for settlement, thus incurring a possible liability of £400,000 (30 million francs). This would leave a balance of 15 million francs (£200,000), and this amount might form a contribution in the shape of a "forfait" towards the drainage and irrigation scheme which would be entirely a responsibility of the mandated territory.

14. We pointed out that the Gharb development scheme had been worked out, long before the Assyrian question was thought of, as a scheme which would be of benefit to Syria as a whole. Presumably, the reason why the scheme had not been proceeded with earlier was because the necessary funds had not been entirely available. We hoped that the French would look at the question from the point of view of the advantage which it would confer upon Syria as a whole. We were, in fact, proposing to provide the French with a population for part of this, at present, undeveloped area—a population which would contribute in various ways to the prosperity of the country. The position appeared to be, in fact, that unless some means could be found of limiting the Assyrian Committee's contribution on the lines we had suggested, there was a danger that the whole scheme might break down, and this would not only affect the Assyrian question, it would also involve, no doubt, a further indefinite postponement of the Gharb scheme. The assumption by the Assyrian Committee of entire responsibility for the actual settlement of the Assyrians, combined with a limited contribution from the same source towards the drainage and irrigation work, might on the other hand render possible an important scheme of improvement otherwise unrealisable at least in the near future.

15. The suggestions we had made would involve the mandated territory in an expense (over and above its present contribution of 22 million francs) of about 25 million francs. We suggested that this might be financed with the help of reimbursements from the Assyrians, *i.e.*, the mandated territory might have a first charge on Assyrian reimbursements.

#### *French Counter-Suggestion.*

16. The French appeared to be ready to discuss the idea in principle. They pointed out at once, however, that Assyrian reimbursements, at all events on the basis recommended in the report on the Beirut discussions, would produce a total sum of less than 25 million francs. The French would, in fact, be left with an uncovered expenditure of at least 8 million francs.

17. In further discussions on the 7th September the French put forward an alternative suggestion. They said that it would unfortunately be impossible for the State of Lattakia to advance the extra amount involved in our plan. They had, therefore, been looking around for other means of bridging the gap. They felt in the first place that the settlement operation was not likely to cost so much as 30 million francs. Taking into account various adjustments of detail in which it is not necessary to enter here, they thought that the total cost, even assuming that 20,000 and not 15,000 Assyrians were transferred in all, could safely be set at 25 million francs. They asked us to consider, therefore, whether the difference of 5 million francs could not be added to the contribution which the Assyrian Committee would make to the drainage and irrigation work. That would reduce the gap in financing the latter scheme to 20 million francs. As the State of Lattakia could not advance this sum, it would have to be raised by means of a credit operation. The question whether Assyrian reimbursements would constitute sufficient security for such an operation was considered, and Mr. Hill, who had just arrived back from Beirut, was consulted on this point. He explained that owing to a recent fall in land values in Syria, he did not think it possible to modify the basis on which Assyrian reimbursements had been calculated in his report. By an adjustment of the number of hectares to be distributed to individual families, the total sum recoverable from the Assyrians could be brought to somewhere in the region of 20 million francs, but precedents suggested that there was serious doubt whether in practice anything like the whole of this total could be recovered.

18. The French representatives suggested that the committee of trustees, in whom it is proposed that the property in the land should be vested on behalf of the Assyrian Committee until its final distribution to the Assyrians, should raise the necessary credit and should be responsible for arranging the reimbursements by the Assyrians. This idea had to be dismissed as impracticable, as the committee of trustees would obviously not be in a position to obtain the credit. The French representatives said that the State of Lattakia was prepared to provide about one-third of the amount required, *i.e.*, 6,500,000 fr., of which only 5 million would be nominally recoverable. This, however, was the maximum to which they could go. We expressed great appreciation of the evident effort which was being made to meet us. We pointed out, however, that we could not honestly suggest to the Assyrian Committee that this credit of 20 million francs could be raised by any organisation other than the authorities of the mandated territory. It was clearly out of the question as a commercial proposition on the security of Assyrian reimbursements alone. It seemed equally out of the question that the League would be in a position to guarantee repayment. The French representatives indicated that it was impossible to expect help on this point from the French Government, seeing that it was a question not of a French Colony but of a mandated territory in which there was no direct French interest. We on our side repeatedly said that we saw no hope unless the Government of Lattakia could find means of obtaining the credit. We pointed out that if that Government were left to carry out the Gharb scheme without relation to the Assyrian question, it would be a very long time before the Gharb area was occupied by settlers who were in a position to pay taxes. What we were in fact doing was to facilitate the settlement, on a considerable part of the area, of a population which would be in a position to pay taxes in a comparatively small number of years. We asked the French whether they could not take this aspect of the question into account and regard the eventual taxes to be collected from the Assyrians as part of the security for a credit. The French representatives could hold out little hope on this score, but they appeared to appreciate that if the gap was to be bridged, the necessary credit would have to be raised somehow by the State of Lattakia and they agreed to consider the point further in consultation with Paris to see whether any arrangement could be worked out. M. de Panafieu threw out a suggestion that perhaps some philanthropic body with a footing in Syria like the Rockefeller Foundation might conceivably be in a position to advance the necessary 13,500,000 fr. (*i.e.*, 20 million — 6,500,000). He also seemed inclined to explore the possibility of securing the credit in the form of a mortgage on other lands in Syria.

19. We are unlikely to hear more from the French until the 9th September at least, and it is still too early to say whether a satisfactory arrangement can



be come to. But it is clear that the French are making a genuine effort to meet us, and at least they appear to have accepted without cavil the position that the contribution of the Assyrian Committee to the whole scheme must by some means or other be limited, if possible, to £600,000 (45 million francs).

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

Geneva, September 8, 1935.

[E 5565/163/93]

No. 110.

Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 470.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit copy of a letter addressed to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting Iraqi railways.

Bagdad, August 31, 1935.

Enclosure in No. 110.

Mr. Bateman to Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.

My dear Minister,

Bagdad, August 31, 1935.

I UNDERSTAND from his Excellency the Prime Minister that the Iraqi Government have now accepted the principles of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the settlement of the railway question, which I outlined at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 28th August last.

In accordance with the verbal arrangement then made, I have pleasure in giving your Excellency the following confirmation:—

(1) His Majesty's Government propose that the Iraqi Government should be placed in absolute possession of the existing railways as a going concern. This means that, on the entry into force of an agreement designed to replace the relevant provisions of the financial agreement attached to the treaty of 1930, the Iraqi Government would take over *inter alia* all railways, lands, reserve and renewal funds, and all railway debts and credits of whatever nature.

(2) In return, His Majesty's Government would require the Iraqi Government to—

(a) Undertake in writing (for example, in an exchange of notes) that, for a period of twenty years, the railways shall be managed by a mixed Anglo-Iraqi board appointed by the Iraqi Government, and that the general managership and a limited number of key posts requiring technical knowledge and experience shall be reserved for British subjects; and also that such other non-Iraqi personnel as may be required for the railways shall (as provided in the third exchange of notes attached to the treaty of 1930) be recruited from amongst British subjects, provided suitable candidates are available;

(b) Make to His Majesty's Government an immediate cash payment of £650,000; and

(c) Assume responsibility for any liabilities connected with the railways which have arisen or which may arise in the future.

The above proposals arise out of the desire of His Majesty's Government to assist the Iraqi Government to the utmost extent consistent with the obligations and interests of both Governments. They should not be taken to mean that His Majesty's Government accept the contention that the arrangements for the future of the railways provided in the financial agreement attached to the treaty of 1930 are impracticable or unworkable, but only that they are willing to meet the objections of the Iraqi Government as far as possible.

As I explained in the course of our conversation, His Majesty's Government will look to the Iraqi Government, if and after the new arrangement comes into force, to give preference as far as possible to British materials for the railways.

I shall be at your Excellency's disposal for the discussion of points which may arise in connexion with the above.

I am sending a copy of this letter to his Excellency the Prime Minister.

Yours very sincerely,

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 5556/2/93]

No. 111.

United Kingdom Delegate, Geneva, to Foreign Office.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 87.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a note addressed to the president of the Assyrian Committee.

Geneva, September 13, 1935.

Enclosure in No. 111.

Sir Samuel Hoare to M. Oliván, President of the Assyrian Committee.

United Kingdom Delegation  
to the League of Nations,

Geneva, September 12, 1935.

Sir,

THE communication circulated in July last to all members of the League, on behalf of the Council Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, with a view to obtaining funds for the financing of the projected scheme of Assyrian settlement in the French mandated territories of the Levant, was supplemented in the case of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom by a special appeal which you addressed to them on the 13th July in the name of all the members of the committee other than the United Kingdom representative. In this special appeal you were good enough to explain the difficult situation in which the committee found itself in its attempts to finance the scheme, and you expressed the view that no adequate solution of the problem was possible unless His Majesty's Government were prepared to reconsider their previously declared attitude and to make a substantial independent contribution.

2. His Majesty's Government have given the most careful and sympathetic consideration to these appeals. They appreciate the efforts of the committee as a whole and the considerable personal effort which you yourself have made to overcome the difficulties with which this problem has been constantly beset. His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that these efforts will be crowned with success, and they have examined the matter with every desire to do their utmost to facilitate a solution.

3. His Majesty's Government recall that it was at the request of the Iraqi Government that the Council agreed to endeavour to find land outside Iraq where those Assyrians who wished to leave that country might settle. It is, therefore, to the Iraqi Government in the first place that the Council looks for the necessary funds. Moreover, it is clearly equitable that the Assyrians themselves should, so far as they are in a position to do so, contribute towards the transfer for which their representatives, in petitions to the Council, have long expressed a desire. But in the view of His Majesty's Government it is appropriate, having regard to the history of the question, that the financing of the scheme apart from these two sources should be a collective liability on the part of the League as a whole. His Majesty's Government cannot accept the special independent liability which has sometimes been attributed to them, but they have frequently made it clear that they are fully prepared to bear their share of a League contribution.



4. It is now clear, however, that a special effort is required and that, if failure is to be avoided, all concerned must take a large and generous view and bring to bear the maximum of practical co-operation in accomplishing what the Council Committee itself has called in its appeal a "work of appeasement and humanity." In this direction His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are ready to take an initiative which they are convinced will find response elsewhere and thus lead to an early solution of the problem. Without prejudice to the views which they have hitherto expressed regarding the collective liability of the League in this question, they are now prepared, on the conditions described below and within certain limits, to contemplate, on purely practical grounds, an independent and substantial financial contribution, in addition to bearing their share of the residuary contribution by the League itself which they hold strongly to be indispensable to success.

5. His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied in the first place that the scheme of settlement to be adopted is satisfactory from the material point of view, that is to say, that it provides adequately for the needs of the Assyrians and is financially well regulated, and that there is a reasonable probability that the funds forthcoming from other sources, when combined with an independent contribution from the United Kingdom, will be sufficient to ensure the success of such a scheme. Furthermore, the action of His Majesty's Government will depend upon the willingness of the Iraqi Government to increase the contribution which that Government have already offered, and on the readiness of the League to provide whatever balance may remain to be found after the contributions from all independent sources have been taken into account.

6. It is only as a result of the recent technical discussions which have taken place in Beirut that it has been possible to gauge the full extent of the financial effort which will be required. Even now there remains much to be done before definite figures can be fixed. In particular, it has hitherto been impracticable, for the reasons stated in your letter of the 13th July, to take steps to ascertain precisely the number of Assyrians to be transferred. Nevertheless, the framework of a financial scheme can now be prepared, and the committee has already been informed of the course of recent informal discussions between the United Kingdom and French Governments, undertaken with the object of seeking a practicable *modus operandi* for the consideration of the Council Committee. The committee will no doubt give the fullest weight to the tentative suggestions which emerged from these discussions.

7. His Majesty's Government do not consider it necessary to await the further detailed elaboration of the scheme before announcing the extent to which they themselves are prepared to contribute, subject to parliamentary sanction. Indeed, they hope and believe that an announcement at this stage of the very considerable contribution which they contemplate will prove decisive in ensuring the successful outcome of the committee's labours.

8. I therefore have the honour to inform you that if the conditions described in paragraph 5 of the present note are fulfilled, and provided, in particular, that the Iraqi Government will contribute to the proposed scheme of settlement in the mandated territories of the Levant at least an equal amount, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be prepared to recommend Parliament to authorise an independent contribution by the United Kingdom equivalent to five-twelfths of that part of the expense of the scheme which the Council Committee may be called upon to cover, subject to the proviso that such contribution by the United Kingdom shall in no circumstances exceed £250,000.

9. The magnitude of this *ex gratia* offer is evidence of the keen desire of His Majesty's Government to see the Assyrian problem settled and the Assyrians themselves assured of a hopeful future. It represents a sincere effort on their part to do everything in their power to avert failure; and they cannot believe that, with so substantial a lead, it will be impossible to find the means necessary to complete the financing of a scheme so eminently worthy of the best traditions of the League.

10. I may add that steps will also be taken to bring the committee's general appeal for funds to the notice of private organisations in the United Kingdom which may be in a position to assist financially in the solution of the question.

I have, &c.

SAMUEL HOARE.

[E 5583/2/93]

No. 112.

Consul, Geneva, to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 71. Saving.)

[By Post.]

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Geneva, September 14, 1935.

ASSYRIAN question.

Following from Mr. Eden:—

"Council considered on 13th September report from Assyrian Committee recounting history of question since last April, *i.e.*, M. Oliván's journey to Syria and Iraq, the committee's appeals for funds, the Beirut conversations and, lastly, His Majesty's Government's offer. Report observed that League financial participation was essential part of this offer, and that as question of such participation lay outside competence of the committee, latter could only report the position for the consideration of the Council.

"The *rapporteur* reminded the Council that on the previous occasion (January 1934), when the question of a League contribution had been raised, the Council had recognised that the League could not incur expense of this kind without a vote of the Assembly. He accordingly proposed that the Council should forward the committee's report to the Assembly and ask the Assembly to place the question on its agenda.

"The Iraqi representative claimed that the Iraqi Government had already spent or committed itself to spend on the Assyrians during the last two years no less than £175,000, apart from the cost of transporting the Assyrians to the frontier, which the Iraqi Government had agreed to bear. He remarked that the total population of Iraq was under 4 million souls and its annual budget under £4 million. He had not had time to examine in detail the committee's report or His Majesty's Government's offer, particularly in so far as it was linked with certain conditions affecting Iraq. He could not therefore do more at that stage than thank the United Kingdom delegate for the sympathetic and practical interest which His Majesty's Government were taking in the solution of a difficult international problem of such importance to Iraq. He would immediately transmit the committee's report to the Iraqi Government for early consideration.

"I then made a speech in which I repeated the offer of His Majesty's Government to seek parliamentary sanction for an independent contribution under conditions already announced. I expressed the view that problem could only be solved by collective action of the League, and that it was indispensable to success that the League should accept residuary liability. If failure was to be averted, all concerned must take a large and generous view and bring to bear the maximum of practical co-operation. This was the spirit in which His Majesty's Government had approached the problem, and they had shown that they were prepared to go to considerable lengths in an effort to help to reduce the residuary liability of the League to manageable proportions. Magnitude of His Majesty's Government's offer was evidence of their desire to see this problem eliminated and the Assyrians assured of a hopeful future, and I felt confident that with so substantial a lead no difficulties would be placed in the way of finding the means necessary to complete the financing of a scheme so much in accordance with the best traditions of the League.

"The Turkish representative, recalling the reservation which he had made on the 17th April last (see my telegram No. 42. Saving) regarding Khabur settlement, expressed gratification that a site distant from neighbouring countries had been chosen for permanent settlement. He associated himself with views which I had expressed regarding cost, which should devolve on the League.

"Italian representative expressed pleasure that question appeared to be on the way to settlement, and the French, Portuguese and Spanish representatives made short speeches indicating their hope that the Assembly would give sympathetic consideration to the matter, and would be able to find the necessary funds.

"The *rapporteur's* report was then adopted."

(Copied to Bagdad and Paris.)



[E 5626/2/93]

No. 113.

*United Kingdom Delegate, Geneva, to Foreign Office.—(Received September 18.)*  
(No. 95.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit the record of the 52nd meeting of the Council Committee, respecting the Assyrian question.

*Geneva, September 16, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 113.

*Record of the Fifty-second Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, held in Geneva on September 10, 1935, at 6.45 P.M.*

THE President said that the committee had to consider both the results of the discussions which had recently taken place in Beirut between Mr. Hill and M. Cuenod, on behalf of the committee and the authorities of the mandated territories, and the replies to the appeals for funds which the committee had made in July last.

The results of the Beirut conversations had been embodied in extensive reports which would have to be studied in great detail, and at the present meeting the president proposed to deal solely with the major question of finance. The five replies so far received to the general appeal for funds had been negative. The Iraqi Government had replied to the separate appeal addressed to them in an inconclusive manner. The special appeal to the United Kingdom Government was still without reply, but he understood that the United Kingdom delegate was now in a position to make a statement on the question, and he would ask him to do so forthwith.

The United Kingdom Representative recalled that the special appeal addressed to the United Kingdom Government on the 13th July, on behalf of all the members of the committee other than himself, had asked for the reconsideration on purely practical grounds of the previous decision of the United Kingdom Government that, while willing to pay their share of a League contribution, they could not contemplate any independent payment. The United Kingdom Government were only too well aware of the difficulties of financing the proposed settlement scheme, and they had considered the president's appeal with every desire to do their utmost to facilitate a solution of the question. The United Kingdom Government still adhered to their view that, apart from the contribution of the Iraqi Government and of the Assyrians themselves, the financing of Assyrian settlement should be a collective responsibility on the part of the League as a whole, and their offer to bear their share of the League contribution, which they still believed to be indispensable, still stood; but, in addition, the United Kingdom Government were now prepared, under certain conditions, to recommend Parliament to sanction an independent contribution. Their change of attitude was based on purely practical grounds, and was, of course, without prejudice to the question of responsibility, on which the views of His Majesty's Government remained unchanged. His Majesty's Government were, in fact, most anxious that the efforts made by the committee, and the considerable personal effort of the president himself, should not end in failure; and if failure was to be avoided, they were convinced that all concerned must take a large and generous view, leaving aside theoretical discussion and bringing to bear the maximum of practical co-operation.

The conditions on which the United Kingdom Government were prepared to contemplate an independent contribution were, in general, that the scheme of settlement ultimately elaborated should be satisfactory from the material point of view, and financially well regulated, and that there should be a reasonable probability that the funds forthcoming from other sources, when combined with the independent contribution from the United Kingdom, would be sufficient to ensure the success of such a scheme. Furthermore, the contribution of the United Kingdom Government must depend upon what the Iraqi Government were

prepared to pay and on the readiness of the League to provide whatever balance might remain to be found after the contributions from all independent sources had been taken into account.

There were still so many uncertain factors that it was difficult to speak of precise figures, and with a view to removing some of the uncertainties and reducing the problem to practical proportions before replying to M. Olivan's appeal, the United Kingdom Government had recently engaged in informal discussions with the French and Iraqi Governments.

The United Kingdom representative then acquainted the committee with the results of these discussions, as set out in the attached record, which had been previously agreed upon with the French representative.

The United Kingdom representative also informed the committee that the United Kingdom Government had approached the Iraqi Government and urged them to double the contribution of £125,000 which they had already offered. So far, however, they were unaware what view the Iraqi Government would take, and it was unlikely that there would be any progress in this direction until the arrival in Geneva of Yasin Pasha, the Iraqi Prime Minister, on the 15th September.

In these circumstances the United Kingdom delegation had not felt it possible to delay any longer in acquainting the Assyrian Committee with the attitude which His Majesty's Government were prepared, in principle, to take up in reply to M. Olivan's appeal. They hoped that the measure in which they were prepared to respond to that appeal would enable further immediate progress to be made in the elaboration of a settlement scheme in which time was an important element. Furthermore, an essential part of the proposal of the United Kingdom was the financial participation of the League. When this question was raised previously—namely, in January 1934—the Council had taken the view that only the Assembly could take a decision regarding the financial participation of the League, and if the question was to be decided by the present Assembly, there was clearly no time to be lost. In these circumstances the United Kingdom representative had been authorised to inform the committee at once that, if the conditions to which he had already referred were fulfilled, and provided, in particular, that the Iraqi Government would contribute at least an equal amount to the proposed scheme of settlement in the mandated territories of the Levant, the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to ask Parliament to authorise an independent contribution by the United Kingdom equivalent to five-twelfths of that part of the expenses of the scheme which the Assyrian Committee might be called upon to find, but subject to the proviso that such contribution by the United Kingdom Government should in no circumstances exceed £250,000.

To prevent any misunderstanding, the United Kingdom representative said that he wished to make it clear that this involved the willingness of the Iraqi Government to double the cash contribution of £125,000 which they had already offered towards the proposed scheme of settlement in Syria. The Iraqi Government were prone to use the argument that they had already been involved in considerable expense in connexion with the Assyrians within Iraq since the troubles of August 1933, and to claim that these expenses should be counted as part of their contribution. It was necessary to make it clear to the Iraqi Government that if this question were to be solved, the contribution of the Iraqi Government must be new money.

The President said that the committee would wish to take note of the offer made by the United Kingdom Government, and to thank the United Kingdom representative for his statement of the position. The committee would also wish to thank the French Government for the attitude which they had taken up in the informal discussions of which the United Kingdom representative had just acquainted the committee.

The committee then discussed procedure. It was realised that as the offer of the United Kingdom Government involved a contribution by the League, the question would have to go before the Assembly. The sooner, therefore, it could be submitted to the Council for reference to the Assembly the better, and it was agreed that without waiting to enter upon the detailed consideration of the results of the Beirut discussions, a report to the Council should be drawn up on the question of finance, with special reference to the possibility of a League contribution.



The general lines of a report to the Council were then discussed. (A report on these lines was subsequently drawn up and approved by the committee at an informal meeting on the following day.)

The President asked at what moment the United Kingdom contribution would be available, assuming the conditions attached to it to be fulfilled.

The United Kingdom delegate said that he was not in a position to answer this question. It was to be hoped that the conditions would be fulfilled during the course of the present Assembly, i.e., that a satisfactory detailed scheme would be worked out and that the Iraqi Government and the League would agree to do what was incumbent upon each of them under the British proposals. But assuming this to be done, the question of when the United Kingdom contribution could be made available depended on parliamentary procedure. The United Kingdom representative promised to obtain such details as might be possible on this point.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

#### Annex.

*Note on Informal Discussions which have taken place at Geneva between United Kingdom and French representatives concerning the Financing of the Scheme for Assyrian Settlement in the French Mandated Territories of the Levant.*

THE United Kingdom and French representatives agreed to discuss this question without commitment on either side at this stage, but with the object of discovering a practicable and mutually satisfactory solution which might be proposed to the Assyrian Committee.

The United Kingdom representatives stated their view that it was impracticable for the Assyrian Committee to raise the sum of approximately 70 million French francs (30 million for settlement and 40 million out of 62 million for the Gharb draining and irrigation scheme) contemplated in the estimates contained in the report by the French High Commission in Syria which has been prepared as a result of the recent discussion in Beirut between representatives of the High Commission and of the Assyrian Committee. The United Kingdom representatives, with all reservation as to whether the Assyrian Committee would be able to raise as much as 45 million francs, thought that this represented the maximum that the committee could reasonably be expected to raise. They asked the French representatives, taking into account the benefits which the Gharb scheme might ultimately be expected to bring to the mandated territories, to consider the possibility of an arrangement which would limit the liability of the committee to 45 million francs. They proposed that the operation of the preliminary drainage and irrigation of the Gharb plain should be separated from that of the actual settlement of the Assyrians, the Assyrian Committee assuming entire responsibility for the latter operation, and the French authorities assuming entire responsibility for the former subject to a fixed contribution to it from the Assyrian Committee and subject to a first charge up to an agreed amount upon Assyrian reimbursements. As the cost of the settlement operation appeared likely to be, according to the results of the Beirut conversations, 30 million francs, the United Kingdom representatives suggested that the contribution of the Assyrian Committee to the drainage and irrigation scheme should be limited to 15 million francs.

The French representatives, while willing to consider this suggestion, pointed out that it would involve the mandated territories in a hitherto unforeseen expense of 25 million francs apart from 22 million francs already promised by the State of Lattakia; and that eventual Assyrian reimbursements on the scale contemplated during the Beirut conversations would be insufficient to cover this extra expense.

After consideration, the French representatives put forward the following counter-suggestion. They cited certain factors and suggested the possibility of certain adjustments which would in their opinion reduce the cost of settlement proper by 5 million francs. They considered that the estimate of 30 million

francs for settlement could thus safely be written down to 25 million francs, and they suggested that the Assyrian Committee's fixed contribution to the drainage and irrigation scheme might be correspondingly raised from 15 to 20 million francs without affecting the principle that the committee's contribution to the whole operation should be limited to 45 million francs. If this suggestion were adopted there would remain 20 million francs to find for the drainage and irrigation scheme. The French representatives declared that the State of Lattakia was not in a position to pay this sum and that it could only be raised by means of a credit operation.

It was recognised on both sides that Assyrian reimbursements were too uncertain a factor to render them an adequate security for such an operation as a commercial proposition. It was further recognised that the League was unlikely to be able either itself to advance the money or, on the basis of Assyrian reimbursements only, to obtain the necessary credit.

The French representatives stated that the mandated territories were prepared to pay 6,500,000 fr. towards the sum required, of which 5 million only might be on a recoverable basis; but it would be necessary to look elsewhere for the remaining 13,500,000 fr., and the only suggestion which the French representatives could make was that some philanthropic organisation might be willing to advance the money.

The United Kingdom representatives, while expressing their appreciation of this effort to fill the gap, urged that further consideration should be given to the possibility of the whole of the necessary credit of 20 million francs being obtained by the mandated territories. They pointed out that if the Gharb scheme were realised, a community would be established there which in a comparatively short space of time would be in a position to pay taxes. They asked the French representatives to take into account this eventual tax yield as well as the Assyrian reimbursements contemplated during the Beirut conversations.

The French representatives have reconsidered the position on this basis, but, in spite of every desire to reach a solution, are unable to depart from their view that it is materially impossible for the mandated territories to do more than indicated above. They pointed out also that, if the figure of 62 million francs were exceeded in practice, the excess liability would fall entirely on the mandated territories.

The United Kingdom and French representatives were accordingly obliged to recognise that they could see no way of raising the credit for 13,500,000 fr. which, assuming that the Assyrian Committee can, in fact, raise 45 million francs in cash, is the only obstacle to the elaboration of a plan on the lines suggested by the United Kingdom representatives. They agreed that they could only report the position to their respective Governments.

It may be pointed out that, assuming the contribution of 20 million francs at the outset by the Assyrian Committee towards the work of drainage and irrigation, and taking into account the sum of 22 million francs originally promised by the State of Lattakia, the credit of 20 million francs, of which the mandated territories would be prepared to furnish 6,500,000 fr., would not be required until the third year of the operation.

[E 5719/2/93]

No. 114.

Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 484.)

Sir,

Bagdad, September 11, 1935.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 219 of the 5th September, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from the August report of His Majesty's acting consul at Mosul concerning the exodus of Assyrians to the Khabour between the 1st and 8th September.

2. In paragraph 138 of his report Mr. Wiltshire confirms what the officer commanding the levies told me at the time when his forty-five soldiers and their dependents were preparing to leave Bagdad for Mosul.



3. It appears that a number of their friends persuaded themselves, despite the warnings and entreaties of both their own leaders and the British officers in the levies, that their chance of leaving Iraq had arrived. They threw up their employment and chartered lorries, at their own expense, to take them to Mosul, where they hoped to attach themselves to one or other of the convoys mentioned in Mr. Wiltshire's report.

4. It is possible that these people may become destitute in Mosul this winter. If this should be the case, they are deserving of no sympathy.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure in No. 114.

*Extract from Mosul and Diana Report No. 9 for August and the First Week of September 1935.*

(A)—Political.

*Assyrians.*

137. By mid-September 1,800 Assyrians will have been transported from Mosul to the Khabour. The first convoy, on the 1st September, contained 303 Assyrians; the second, on the 3rd September, 194; the third, on the 6th September, 333 Assyrians; and the fourth, on the 8th September, 306. Nearly all of these are of the three tribes, Diz, Tokhuma and Upper Tayari; but, owing to the readiness of Assyrians to perjure themselves, a certain number of men or families from other tribes have been transported to Syria under false pretences, including some Persian Assyrians from Urumieh, and even one Tel Kaifi (Chaldean) family. It was harder to check the claims of applicants from among the medley of Mosul Assyrians than in the villages. The three selected tribes were but poorly represented in the Diana-Harir area, not more than about half a dozen houses being eligible; the others showed acute disappointment at being left in Iraq. These few families went in the second convoy. Forty-five levies from Bagdad went with the third; they were mostly the oldest and least useful men, and one fell out of the lorry on the way to Mosul, but escaped serious injury through being drunk.

138. A number of Assyrians have come to Mosul from Bagdad without authorisation, some of them having given up good jobs in the capital. They will probably sit about Mosul all this winter.

139. In October the cattle of those Assyrians of the Dohuk and Amadia qadhas now being transported will be sent across on foot to the Khabour, with some forty single Assyrians as shepherds. If and when money is found for the Ghâb settlement scheme, those of the other tribes who wish to go will be settled there this autumn or next spring, and only then will the Khabour settlers be transferred to the Orontes.

141. Most Assyrians now leaving Iraq have been unable to dispose of their rifles privately, since nearly all of them have Government licences for their rifles. Few Kurds have such licences, and none has been willing officially to buy a rifle; an Assyrian found to have disposed of a registered rifle unofficially is liable to be imprisoned, unless he claims to have given it in during the 1933 disturbances. Some Assyrians in Syria have written to friends still in Mosul telling them not to give in their rifles to the Government, but to smuggle them in their bedding into Syria, where, they say, inspection is lax; in fact, rumour says that 200 have already been so smuggled! Whatever the truth may be of these letters (and the idea is scouted in official quarters), they may have a certain propaganda effect in inducing future Assyrians to try to smuggle rifles into Syria. The Iraq Government is paying only 1½ dinars for each rifle. Some 150 rifles were handed in by the first three convoys.

142. The following is a copy of the newly printed declaration form which all Assyrians leaving the country in the future will be required to sign (those who have already been transported before the preparation of this form made a verbal declaration to the same effect when signing on):—

SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

*Déclaration à faire signer par les Assyriens avant de quitter l'Irak.*

Je soussigné

appartenant à la tribu de

déclare et confirme par ma signature que :

1. Je quitte définitivement l'Irak pour me rendre en Syrie de ma propre volonté et après avoir pris connaissance et accepté les conditions établies pour mon admission.

2. Je m'engage à me soumettre aux lois et règlements de mon nouveau pays de résidence ainsi qu'à toute réglementation découlant de la situation spéciale des Assyriens en Syrie.

3. Je m'engage à acquérir la nationalité syrienne dans les délais qui seront fixés par les autorités compétentes.

4. J'accepte que, outre le syriaque, les deux langues officiellement enseignées en Syrie (français et arabe) le soient obligatoirement dans nos écoles.

\* \* \* \* \*

[E 5720/278/93]

No. 115.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received September 23.)*

(No. 485.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, September 11, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 437 of the 14th August last, I have the honour to inform you that Parliament was prorogued by a Royal Iradah of the 9th September for forty-five days with effect from the 10th September. Should no further Iradah be issued on or before the 26th October next, it is probable that the extraordinary session will be continued for a period of six days immediately before the next ordinary session opens on the 2nd November next.

2. Despite the intense heat of August and early September, the extraordinary session has been one of no little activity in both Houses. Of thirty-four Bills passed through the Chamber of Deputies, the greater number were designed to authorise expenditure on capital works (including the railways and the Port of Basra) and to make provision for financing the public services in the absence of the regular budget, which, presumably, will be passed during the autumn session.

3. But Parliament did not confine itself to routine matters. On the 13th August, an important amendment was introduced into the Customs Tariff Law by a law which formed the subject of my despatch No. 447 E. of the 19th August.

4. By an enactment of the 31st August, the Ministry of Finance was empowered to set up a much-needed board to advise on the date industry with a view to improve upon the present methods of cultivation and marketing. The board is to consist of ten members, of whom three may be foreigners.

5. On the 5th September, the Chamber of Deputies sanctioned arrangements, similar to those outlined in my letter of the 7th August to Mr. Rendel, whereby the Ministry of Finance may raise funds up to a total of I.D. 400,000 for municipal improvements. Half of the total will be devoted to Bagdad and the remainder will be spread over other towns and villages at the instance of the Ministry of Interior. The law provides that the money is to be repaid within twenty years at 4½ per cent. per annum, and I understand that immediate accommodation will be found by an advance from the Eastern Bank up to a total of I.D. 200,000. The Iraqi Treasury will recoup itself from the proceeds of the tax on motor spirit.

6. On the political side, the most important acts of Parliament concerned the Euphrates troubles of last spring. Laws were passed ratifying the



proclamation of martial law and absolving, from civil responsibility, those military and other authorities who were called upon to act in accordance therewith.

7. On the 7th September, the general amnesty law envisaged in the King's speech of the 8th August was passed and was put into effect on the 8th September—the accession day of King Ghazi. It pardoned all those who rose against the Government in the Liwas of Diwaniyah, Diyala and Nuntafiq between the 15th December, 1934, and the 2nd June, 1935, and in the Liwas of Kirkuk and Sulaimani between the 1st March, 1923, and the 15th August, 1935. It included those who, only a few days ago, were still on trial for their share in the Kadhmain riots of last March. Its wide scope, which came as a surprise even to the most optimistic, indicates that it was intended to be a measure of general appeasement and that wise counsel is now prevailing in responsible quarters. It was not passed, however, without a good deal of heated rhetoric and recrimination in both Houses. In the Senate, where a violent controversy occurred between the Prime Minister and Jamal-al-Madfai, accusation and counter-accusation followed in rapid succession and culminated in the resignation of the Prime Minister's opponent, who had only been exalted to senatorial rank a few weeks earlier. He was eventually persuaded to withdraw his resignation. In the Lower House, the efforts of the Minister of Interior to pursue his personal animosities were resolutely met and it can, I think, safely be said that the Amnesty Law has not only cleared the air, but has also enhanced the reputation of the Iraqi Throne. Whether it was altogether prudent to give so soon a free pardon to men who, only a few months ago, were under sentence of death, remains to be seen, but there can be no question that, at the moment, the general feeling is one of great relief.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.  
I have, &c.  
C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 5724/278/93]

No. 116.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received September 23.)*

(No. 489.)

Sir,

Bagdad, September 12, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the second anniversary of King Ghazi's accession to the throne was celebrated on the 8th September. Bagdad was dressed with thousands of national flags during the day, and at night, an attempt having been made to relieve its drabness by gaudy but tasteless illuminations, the native populace gave itself over to the dismal delights characteristic of this part of the world.

2. On the 10th September a military parade, at which His Majesty took the salute, was held on the outskirts of the town. It was attended by members of the Cabinet, the Diplomatic Corps, officers of the Royal Air Force and by the Military Mission.

3. The turn-out of the troops was uniformly good, the artillery (the *corps d'élite*), the King's mounted bodyguard and the mechanised units being exceptionally smart. The marching and line discipline of the infantry, however, left something to be desired, and the officers' general lack of girth control seemed to cause them embarrassment, which increased with the rising of the sun.

4. On the whole, the parade was a distinct advance on that which I attended in 1933, except that there was no attempt to control the activities of the super-exuberant photographers, who, at times, actually interfered with movement of the troops.

5. Twenty-one aeroplanes of the Royal Iraqi Air Force manœuvred in formation and dipped in salutes to His Majesty.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.  
C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 5779/2/93]

No. 117.

*United Kingdom Delegate, Geneva, to Foreign Office.—(Received September 25.)*

(No. 109.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit the record of the fifty-third meeting of the Assyrian Committee.

*United Kingdom Delegation,  
Geneva, September 23, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 117.

*Record of the Fifty-third Meeting of the Assyrian Committee of the Council, held at Geneva on September 18 at 10.30 p.m.*

THE committee met to consider in detail a note which had been prepared on the reports of the French High Commission, and of Mr. Hill and M. Cuénod as a result of the Beirut conversations in August.

The president said that, before proceeding to the examination of this note, he felt bound to acquaint the committee with a communication made to him orally by Dr. Rajchman. Dr. Rajchman was apparently much perturbed by the prevalence of malaria in the region to which it was proposed to send the Assyrians, and he had suggested that, before the plan was proceeded with, a detailed study of the measures to be taken to combat malaria should be made by the Health Section of the League.

Mr. Hill said that the High Commission had given particular attention to this point and had been much preoccupied by the responsibility of putting forward the scheme in view of the situation as regards malaria. It was impressed with its responsibilities not only to the Assyrians themselves but to the neighbouring populations. The medical service of the High Commission had therefore made very extensive provision for meeting the danger and, he might add, at an extremely low cost to the Council Committee.

The general feeling of the meeting was that in view of the care with which the French authorities had evidently gone into this question and of the measures which they had taken, it was unnecessary and inopportune to postpone the scheme for a further detailed study by the Health Organisation of the League.

The committee then passed to the consideration of the note on the financial aspect of the scheme of settlement. This note was eventually approved in the form circulated in document A.VI/5/1935 of the 18th September, 1935.

[E 5836/2/93]

No. 118.

*Consul, Geneva, to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 175. L.N.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Geneva, September 27, 1935.

MY telegram No. 150.

Following from Mr. Eden:—

“Supervisory Committee presented report 25th September recommending total and final League contribution of 1,300,000 Swiss francs, spread over four years, namely, 400,000 for 1936 and 300,000 each for the following three years. Report stipulates that this contribution should not serve in any way as a precedent, and amounts already advanced out of working capital fund for preliminary investigations should be reimbursed from it.

“Fourth Committee considered this report 26th September. M. Nuri, after dwelling on what Iraq had already done, repeated the offer recorded in Geneva telegram No. 25 to Bagdad. United Kingdom delegate pointed out that recommendations of the Supervisory Committee stopped short of assumption by the League of residuary liability which had been a condition of the original United Kingdom offer.



"Nevertheless, the United Kingdom Government, while they could not increase their independent contribution, would maintain their offer subject to other conditions being fulfilled, and in particular subject to the adoption of a satisfactory scheme of financial control which should in practice have regard to the fact that the funds available were limited. The United Kingdom delegate again emphasised that this was not a refugee but a political problem with a humanitarian aspect in which the League was specially concerned.

"After somewhat animated debate in which M. Rappard (Switzerland) quoted Sir F. Humphry's declaration about 'moral responsibility' and British delegate replied by quoting statement on that declaration by the chairman of the Mandates Commission at commission's second meeting of 9th November, 1931, the credit proposed by Supervisory Committee was adopted by 23 votes to 3 with 6 abstentions. Opposition votes were those of Latvia, Greece and the Netherlands."

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 5862/163/93]

No. 119.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received September 30.)*

(No. 502.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, September 19, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 425 of the 1st August, I have the honour to report that Mr. Ashton, the local manager of the British Oil Development Company, having returned from leave in the United Kingdom, called on me yesterday to give me the latest information about his company's activities.

2. He said that the capital necessary for the construction of the company's portion of the proposed railway had now been found. He could not say who the lenders were, but the total amount required would be about one and a half million sterling.

3. The financial group had pointed out that, according to article 35 of the concession agreement, the Government had the right to foreclose and take over the company's property in the event of their defaulting in the payments due to the Government. The group therefore required, as a pre-condition of their loaning money for railway purposes, that the new line should be regarded as distinct altogether from the company's other property, and that it should not fall within the province of article 35 of the concession agreement. They also desired to receive an assurance that the Iraqi Government would not insist on their right to take over the railway if it is not managed to their satisfaction; and also that if for any other reason the Iraqi Government decide to dispossess the owners, it shall be on the understanding that they are adequately compensated. Mr. Ashton has put definite proposals in this sense before the Iraqi Government, who are now considering them.

4. My German colleague (who seems to be *au courant* with all the latest British Oil Development Company's developments) gave me very similar information a few days ago, and the Prime Minister, whom I questioned on the subject, told me that he had temporised with the company until some arrangement was in sight for the future of the existing Iraq railways.

5. Meanwhile, I gather from a letter from Lord Glenconner that agreement was reached in July with the Syrian authorities concerning the rates to be charged for the transport of oil and asphalt from the company's oilfields to Tripoli, and that a group of French refiners had come forward with an offer of additional capital—presumably to help the company's drilling operations.

6. Mr. Ashton could tell me nothing in answer to questions regarding the source whence the material for the construction of the new line would be forthcoming.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 5863/278/93]

No. 120.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received September 30.)*

(No. 503.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, September 19, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Minister of Education—Sheikh Riza-al-Shabibi—resigned on the morning of the 16th September and was replaced by Sadiq Beg Al Bassam, the Director of State Domains and a staunch supporter of Yasin Pasha.

2. The event would be a matter of trifling importance were it not an indication that the Sunni-Shiah cleavage is causing no less trouble to the present Government than to its predecessors. For some years past the Ministry of Education has been a Shiah preserve and latterly has become the subject of much adverse criticism on the ground that each successive Minister has countenanced and condoned wire-pulling and indiscipline to such a point that the whole educational system in Iraq has become disreputable and chaotic. Apparently the outgoing Minister found himself obstructed at every turn by the intrigues of his co-religionists at Nejef and Kerbala and confessed inability to take arms against his sea of troubles.

3. When it became apparent that he was unable or unwilling to end them by opposition, the Prime Minister himself set his hand to the task of cleaning this Augean stable. He attempted to institute a system of dual control. A director of instruction was appointed to collaborate with Dr. Jamali, the present Director of Education—a young man of high ideals, who has carried on nobly in the face of much petty annoyance. The new official, however, was as impotent as his Minister and resigned twice in a fortnight. The Prime Minister then hit upon the expedient of appointing his brother, Taha Pasha, Chief of the General Staff, to restore order and discipline amongst the pedagogues. Taha Pasha has earned the admiration of all the members of the Military Mission (except General Hay) as a conscientious, industrious and intelligent soldier. The appointment was probably a good one. It appears, however, to have been too much for Riza-al-Shabibi, who forthwith retired from the unequal combat. Tradition is still followed in that his successor, of whom little is known, is also a Shiah.

4. The appointment of Taha Pasha to a post under the Ministry of Education may, however, have another significance. For him education is only a part-time job. He still remains at the Ministry of Defence, where he has recently been engaged on a much-needed scheme, suggested by Yasin Pasha and elaborated by Colonel Waterhouse, for decentralising the work of the Ministry and allowing more responsibility to unit commanders in the provinces. This scheme was initiated in the absence of Jaafar Pasha, the Minister of Defence, and when presented to the Council of Ministers differed considerably from that originally put up by Colonel Waterhouse, especially in regard to the Adjutant-General's Department, which was to be put under the direct control of the Chief of the General Staff and not under the Minister of Defence. Had the scheme gone through, it would have meant that the Prime Minister and his brother would have had complete control of army appointments.

5. This, coupled with Taha's additional control of educational appointments, would have been a menace to Nuri Pasha's faction and a very considerable help to Yasin Pasha if, indeed, he has his eye on an eventual dictatorship in Iraq. Whatever the object of the scheme, it had not been passed (in spite of feverish efforts by Taha Pasha) by the time Jaafar Pasha returned to Bagdad. He immediately threatened to resign if it was proceeded with, and so far he seems to have had his way.

6. These indications of trouble beneath the surface need not be too seriously regarded. They are by no means the only ones, and I have no reason to believe that Yasin Pasha's position is in any way endangered by them. Indeed, the struggle for the control of personnel in the employ of the various Government Departments may be nothing more than an effort to monopolise the much-coveted graft which is said to accompany all new appointments in the army and elsewhere.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.



[E 5851/2/93]

No. 121.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received September 30.)*  
(No. 126.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a note from Nuri Pasha to the Secretary-General, League of Nations, dated the 26th September, respecting the Assyrian question.

*Geneva, September 28, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 121.

*Nuri Pasha to Secretary-General, League of Nations, Geneva.*

*Iraqi Delegation to the*  
*League of Nations, September 26, 1935.*

Sir,

IN conformity with my promise made to the Fourth Committee at its meeting of the 20th September, I have now the honour to inform you that my Government, in order to procure a final and definite solution of the Assyrian question, accepts the conditions laid down by the United Kingdom, in so far as those conditions apply to Iraq, in Sir Samuel Hoare's letter of the 12th September, 1935 (Document C. 356.M.181.1935.VII).

It follows that the Iraqi Government will recommend Parliament to authorise it to raise, *pari passu* with the United Kingdom contribution, the contribution which it has already promised towards the proposed scheme of settlement of the Assyrians in Syria, so as to pay to the League for this purpose a sum amounting to five-twelfths of that part of the expense of the scheme, which the Council Committee may be called upon to cover, up to a maximum of £250,000.

I have, &c.

NURI PASHA-AS SAID,  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

[E 6043/2/93]

No. 122.

*Record of the Fifty-Fourth Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, held at*  
*Geneva on September 27, 1935, at 4 P.M.*

THE meeting was attended for the first time by the representative of Ecuador, who has been chosen to replace the representative of Mexico following the replacement of Mexico by Ecuador on the Council.

The President said that the object of the meeting was to exchange views on the procedure to be followed now that it was practically certain that a League contribution of 1,300,000 Swiss francs would be voted by the Assembly. There still remained a gap to be filled of 13,500,000 French francs. It was necessary to consider how to fill this gap and to decide whether the preparatory work in the Gharb area should be begun before the means of filling the gap had been worked out. As the figure of 13,500,000 French francs had been arrived at in discussions between the United Kingdom and French Governments, he would ask the United Kingdom representative whether he had any suggestions to make as to how this gap should be filled.

The United Kingdom Representative said that for the moment he had no suggestions. In view of the substantial amount which seemed likely to be forthcoming from the United Kingdom Government, Iraq and the League, it was possible that the authorities in the mandated territories of the Levant might be willing to reconsider the possibilities of raising the necessary credit, but the committee might consider whether there was any other way of raising the money. He thought that it would be useful to have the views of the League Treasury on this point, and also to know whether there were any other assets which the

authorities of the mandated territories were disposed to make available as security for a credit, additional to Assyrian reimbursements. He felt it would be out of place for him to make any suggestions on this latter point, which was clearly one for the authorities of the mandated territories to consider in the first instance. As to the remainder of the work before the committee, the United Kingdom representative pointed out that the United Kingdom offer had been subject to certain conditions. Two of these conditions seemed likely to be fulfilled, i.e., the contributions of Iraq and of the League. But there were certain general conditions that still remained to be satisfied. The United Kingdom Government has stipulated that the scheme must be satisfactory in itself, and in particular that a proper scheme of financial control should be worked out. They had also stipulated that there must be a reasonable assurance that the necessary funds would be forthcoming to ensure the completion of the whole scheme. The question of financial control turned on the kind of organisation which was to be set up, and this seemed to be a matter on which the committee ought soon to take a decision. When the nature of the machinery had been agreed upon, financial regulations would be easier to draft. The condition about the reasonable probability of sufficient funds being available would depend upon the manner in which it was proposed to fill the gap of 13,500,000 French francs and upon the response of private charitable organisations. There was the further point about the consultation of the Assyrians. At what stage was this to take place? Whenever it did take place it would be necessary for the committee in the first place to draw up a detailed document showing the Assyrians precisely what conditions they would enjoy if they went to Syria.

The French Representative said that, as regards the filling of the gap of 13,500,000 French francs, the authorities of the French mandated territories were prepared to consider any plan which might be suggested, but were not prepared to put one forward themselves. They had already made their maximum offer. In the first place, they had offered 22 million francs, and subsequently they had added an additional 6,500,000 fr., towards an estimated gap of 20 million francs. They had made this additional offer in the hope that the United Kingdom and Iraqi Governments would be prepared to fill the remaining two-thirds of the gap. M. Panafieu pointed out that the authorities of the mandated territories could not accept any further financial liability over and above what they had already offered.

The President expressed the view that, if the United Kingdom, Iraqi and French Governments were not prepared to go further, the money must somehow be found elsewhere, and it seemed desirable to explore in the first place how far it could be raised from private sources.

The United Kingdom Representative pointed out that the United Kingdom and Iraqi offers were conditional upon parliamentary sanction, and this necessarily involved some delay. Furthermore, if an appeal to private organisations were to be successful he was advised that a very carefully planned campaign would be necessary, and this would also take time. The main point at the moment, however, seemed to be that preparatory work in the Gharb area must begin during the coming month unless there was to be a delay of a year. Were the French authorities prepared to begin this work forthwith in the light of the financial offers which had been made?

The French Representative said that recent discussions had drawn a clear dividing line between the preliminary operation of drainage and irrigation and the ultimate operation of settlement. The work which had to be done this year concerned the preliminary operation, and it concerned works which were necessary for the completion of the Gharb scheme whether the Assyrians were ultimately settled there or not. He thought it possible, therefore, that the French authorities might be willing to start work on that part of the scheme provided that the funds required this year for that part were forthcoming without waiting for the funds for the ultimate resettlement of the Assyrians to be assured in full.

The President said that it would be a great advantage if this work could be proceeded with without waiting for the completion of discussions as to how to fill the gap of 13,500,000 French francs. This latter problem and the others which



had been alluded to by the United Kingdom representative could then be discussed at leisure. He raised the point whether it was necessary to have the sanction of the Council before proceeding.

*M. Arocha* said that it would be necessary to consult the League Treasury in the first place, but, subject to their observations, he thought that it was not necessary for the committee to obtain authority from the Council, though it might perhaps be advisable for it to do so if the opportunity presented itself.

*The President* then raised the question of a special appeal to private organisations. He recalled that an appeal had already been made, but it was perhaps unlikely that there would be any response to it except in the United Kingdom, and he wondered whether it would be advisable to send a special appeal to organisations in the United Kingdom.

*The United Kingdom Representative* deprecated any such special appeal. The United Kingdom Government had not so far taken any special steps to bring the matter to the notice of private organisations in the United Kingdom, as they felt that it was desirable to postpone such action until their own offer had been announced. He felt sure, however, that such action as the United Kingdom Government could take in this sense would now be taken. But, although he did not wish to rake up past history once more, he felt that, in the light of all that had been said in the past few days, a special appeal to private organisations in the United Kingdom would be misunderstood and resented in certain quarters. It might not have at all the desired effect. In any case, he did not accept the view that money could not be raised from other countries. He felt that an attempt ought to be made, for instance, to collect money in America, and perhaps the Secretariat could advise how this might best be done. Furthermore, there were various international organisations which might be interested in the Assyrians.

*The Danish Representative* agreed. He deprecated any special appeal to the United Kingdom. He recalled that Professor Keller's organisation had at an earlier stage shown great interest in this matter and might be able to help. There might be other similar institutions to be approached. In any case, he felt that much more was wanted from the committee itself than a mere written appeal or communiqué. The ground ought to be carefully prepared and personal contact established with likely sources of contributions.

*The President* expressed agreement with the views put forward by the United Kingdom and Danish representatives. As regards Professor Keller, he would like to know more about him before getting into touch with him again. He had derived the impression at an earlier stage that his influence was perhaps not as great as it appeared to be. He thought, however, that the whole question of obtaining funds from private sources should be carefully considered by the Secretariat and discussed by the committee at a future meeting.

*Mr. Hill* said that steps had already been taken by the Secretariat to approach the Rockefeller Foundation. The suggestion had been made, and he thought it should be made in any appeal to private organisations, that the plan was likely to break down unless help were forthcoming.

*The French Representative* suggested that it would be advisable, in presenting the matter, not to lay stress on the fact that the money still required was needed in connexion with public works. The public works scheme was, in fact, an essential part of the whole settlement operation, and the money was really necessary to enable the settlement operation as a whole to be put into effect.

*The President* then raised the question of the procedure to be followed in discussing the organisation of the scheme in the mandated territories and the financial regulations which would be necessary.

*The French Representative* said that he did not at present know the views of M. de Martel on these questions, which were obviously delicate ones.

*The United Kingdom Representative* having been invited by the president to express his views, said that he appreciated the delicacy of the questions, and he would like to make it clear at once that the United Kingdom suggestion that

there should be a separation of functions, and that, in the case of the settlement operation proper, entire financial control should be assumed by the organisation to be set up by the League to administer it, implied no lack of confidence in the services of the High Commission. The close co-operation of those services would be not only valuable, but essential. The United Kingdom delegation had merely been acting on a financial principle—that effective control of the finances of a scheme of this sort should be in the hands of those who held in trust money contributed from many sources. They had felt that it was not altogether fair to place upon the French authorities a responsibility which should belong to the League as custodian of the funds. The draft règlement financier gave the League a certain measure of control, i.e., the estimates had to be approved and the budget ultimately audited by the League; but, briefly, the British criticism of the règlement was that it did not give the League effective control over day-to-day expenditure, and the fact had to be faced that M. Burnier, who would have executive authority in the matter of settlement, had sometimes been criticised in the past for a certain disregard of economy. The United Kingdom representative was not yet in a position to put forward definite proposals regarding the local organisation of the scheme. This needed careful consideration in the light of what had passed in the last few days. *Prima facie*, the proposals made in the reports on the Beirut discussions might be taken as a basis, but he thought that the United Kingdom Government might wish to suggest that the representative of the League should be more closely associated with the executive work and should have a closer financial control.

*The French Representative* said that of course the French authorities wished to have absolute control over the public works. The settlement of the Assyrians, however, was an entirely different matter, and he felt sure that they were ready to give all control to the League. The question of control had been placed before the Supervisory Committee, but unfortunately the Supervisory Committee had made no definite pronouncement about it.

*M. Arocha* said that he thought he would be interpreting the wishes of the Secretary-General in saying that League control must be limited, seeing that the financial participation in the League was limited.

*The President* said that the question was obviously a complicated one, which could best be discussed in a small sub-committee. On his proposal it was agreed that a sub-committee, consisting of the United Kingdom and French representatives and a representative of the League Treasury, should consider the whole question of organisation and financial control, and in due course present a report to the committee as a whole.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that this led him to raise the question of the position of Iraq. Iraq was now going to be a substantial contributor, and he thought the time had come to associate the Iraqi representative much more closely with the work of the committee. The Iraqi Government were naturally very closely concerned with the details of organisation and would now be closely interested in the question of financial control.

*The President* entirely agreed, and said that, while there might be meetings at which it would be better not to ask the Iraqi representative to attend, he thought that as general rule the Iraqi representative ought now to be asked to attend each meeting, and should collaborate to the utmost extent in the work of the committee. The Iraqi representative could not actually be a member of the committee without a decision to this effect by the Council, but he thought that the proceedings of the Council themselves provided a precedent, as when a question was being discussed which concerned a State not a member of the Council, that State was usually invited to take part in the proceedings.

The next question discussed was the consultation of the Assyrians. The president mentioned in this connexion that Nuri Pasha had informed him that there was now a campaign being carried on among certain sections of the Assyrians against leaving Iraq.

*M. Arocha* said that long and complicated instructions to the local authority would be necessary, and he understood that some members of the local committee



thought it better to leave the consultation until the beginning of the New Year. There would, therefore, be plenty of time in which to draw up the instructions.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he must reserve his views on the point as to whether the consultation should take place at the earliest possible moment, i.e., this autumn, or should be postponed until the New Year. He thought that this was a matter on which the committee should be guided to a very large extent by the Iraqi Government. Also the views of Major Thomson, the president of the local committee, were not yet known. He thought he might be able to find out privately what Major Thomson's views were.

*M. Arocha* recalled that, in the note which the committee had drawn up for the guidance of the Sixth and Fourth Committees, mention was made of the possibility of certain reductions and adjustments in the estimates. A step which the committee must now take was to ask the High Commissioner of the mandated territories for his consent to the proposed modifications.

A long and somewhat confused discussion followed on the question of procedure. It was agreed that the immediate question was to ensure the commencement of the preliminary work in the Gharb so as to avoid a year's delay in putting the plan into operation. The question was whether 1 million French francs could be placed at the disposal of the French authorities for this purpose.

*M. Arocha* pointed out that sufficient funds were, in fact, at the disposal of the committee in a bank in Syria, but these funds were earmarked for use in connexion with the settlement in the Khabur of those Assyrians who had been recently transferred. He did not know whether the Iraqi Government, who had provided these funds for this purpose, would be prepared to authorise the use of them for another purpose, and in any case, even if the Iraqi Government agreed, the League would be taking a certain responsibility in authorising that the funds should be diverted from their original purpose. If by any chance the scheme broke down, the responsibility of the League might be a serious one.

It was agreed that in the first place the president should approach Nuri Pasha as to his willingness to allow the funds which had been advanced by the Iraqi Government to be used for the preparatory work in the Gharb. If Nuri Pasha concurred, the question would be further discussed with the League Treasury.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

*Foreign Office, October 1, 1935.*

[E 5989/2/93]

No. 123.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received October 5.)*

(No. 155.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from Viscount Cranborne, of to-day's date, respecting League financial participation in the Assyrian settlement.

*Geneva, October 3, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 123.

*Viscount Cranborne to Sir Samuel Hoare.*

*United Kingdom Delegation*

*to the League of Nations,*

*Geneva, October 3, 1935.*

(No. 155.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that, following upon the offer by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to make an independent financial contribution to the Assyrian settlement scheme in Syria, subject to certain conditions, of which one was the readiness of the League of Nations to provide whatever balance might

remain to be found after the contributions from all independent sources had been taken into account, the question of League financial participation in the scheme was referred by the Council to the Assembly, and by the Assembly, in the first place, to its Sixth Committee.

2. The proceedings in the Sixth Committee were opened on the 17th September by a statement made on behalf of the chairman of the Committee of the Council which has been dealing for the past two years with Assyrian resettlement. This statement set out the elements of the problem and reviewed the efforts which the committee had made to solve it. Various schemes, including two in Brazil and British Guiana respectively, which had been subject to detailed local examination, had proved unworkable, and the committee had been compelled to recognise that its task was insoluble unless the French Government, in spite of the difficulties originally foreseen, were prepared to receive the Assyrians in the Mandated Territories of the Levant. Accordingly, the committee had addressed itself to the French Government, which had received the appeal with sympathy, but had stipulated that no financial responsibility should devolve upon the French Government or upon the Mandated Territories. A provisional settlement of limited capacity already existed on the Upper Khabur River in North-East Syria, but for various reasons it was desirable that the permanent settlement should be in the Ghab area, where a detailed scheme had been worked out. The difficulty was finance. The scheme involved preliminary drainage and irrigation operations estimated to cost 62 million French francs, of which the Mandated Territories of the Levant had, in spite of the reservation made by the French Government, now agreed to pay 22 million, leaving 40 million to be found by the Council Committee. In addition, the committee might have to find anything up to 30 million French francs for settlement proper. The United Kingdom Government had made certain suggestions tending to reduce this total liability of the Council Committee from 70 million to 45 million French francs, but the course of discussion had shown that this was only possible if means could be devised of raising, in the third year of the operation, a credit of 20 million French francs on the security, in the main, of Assyrian reimbursements. Towards this credit the Mandated Territories were willing to advance 6,500,000 French francs, leaving a gap to be filled of 13,500,000 French francs. To meet the sum of 45 million French francs immediately required, the committee had only, so far, the contribution promised by the Iraqi Government in May last of £10 a head up to £125,000, and the United Kingdom conditional offer of five-twelfths of the expense of the scheme which the Council Committee might be called upon to cover, up to a maximum of £250,000. The question of the League's financial participation in any scheme of settlement was one which the Assyrian Committee had always held to be outside its competence, and a vote of the Assembly was necessary for its approval. The statement pointed out that a decision was urgently needed. If the transfer of the Assyrians was to be begun in 1936 and completed during that year, no time could be lost in beginning the preliminary work in the Ghab. Unless this work was begun within the next few weeks, there was a risk of a year's postponement of the whole operation, and this risk the Committee of the Council viewed with the gravest apprehension. The committee therefore hoped that the Assembly would consider the question with the utmost sympathy, with a view to finding, if possible, the means whereby the League could participate in the measure necessary to ensure that the efforts which had been made to find a solution should not have been in vain.

3. The United Kingdom delegate, in opening the debate, gave an historical account of the circumstances in which the Assyrian problem had arisen. Lord Cranborne explained that the entry of the Assyrians into the war had not been the work of the British Government. It was with the forces of Imperial Russia that the Assyrian insurgents had joined up. Great Britain had had no independent dealings with the community until two or three years later, when the battered remnants had been saved from annihilation by British forces and brought to safety in 1918 within the borders of what is now Iraq. Having rescued the Assyrians in this manner, the British Government had continued to help them in Iraq from humanitarian motives over a considerable period and at very great expense to the British Treasury. After the war, the Assyrians desired to return to their former homes and the United Kingdom had done its utmost to help them. During the peace negotiations with Turkey, the United Kingdom Government had aimed at incorporating within Iraqi territory the



Hakkari district of Turkey, to which the majority of the Assyrians belonged, in order that they might be established there as an autonomous community under the sovereignty of Iraq. The question of the delimitation of the Iraqi-Turkish frontier had eventually, in virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne, come before the League Council in 1925, and the United Kingdom Government had made it clear that, unless the Hakkari territory were included in Iraq, all hope of a separate homogeneous existence for the Assyrians would be destroyed. Unfortunately, the Council of the League had decided that the Hakkari territory must remain Turkish, and this decision, which had finally separated some 20,000 Assyrians from their original homes, lay, in the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, at the root of the present difficulties. The problem, therefore, had an international character. The Assyrians could not return to their country of origin. They were largely an alien element in the country of their present residence. The régime which brought them into the war no longer existed, and the responsibility for the present situation could not be laid at the door of any single Government. The future of the Assyrians clearly called for collective action and the problem was exactly the kind of problem which the world looked to the League to solve. A special responsibility had often been attributed in the matter to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, but the facts did not justify such a view. His Majesty's Government were, however, most anxious to obtain a satisfactory solution of the problem, and the offer to pay five-twelfths of the cost of settlement, up to a maximum of £250,000, which His Majesty's Government had recently made, showed that they were prepared to bear what they believed to be perhaps even more than their fair share in reaching a solution. They also believed that, for its part, the League would not desire to avoid its share of the consequences of enforcing the Council's Mosul Boundary decision of 1925. In conclusion, Lord Cranborne pointed out that the settlement of the Assyrians was not a refugee problem; it was a political problem which had a humanitarian aspect. The Council, by the creation of its Committee for Assyrian Settlement in 1933, had decided to solve an exceptional problem by exceptional measures. The Council Committee had made great efforts to give effect to that decision. Owing to the action of the United Kingdom, French and Iraqi Governments, a fair prospect for the Assyrians was now opening up, and Lord Cranborne felt convinced that the Assembly would not let the opportunity pass for want of any financial assistance which it was within the power of the League to give.

4. The Iraqi delegate said that, while he had not yet received final instructions from his Government, the generous offer of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had greatly improved the situation, and he hoped shortly to be in a position to make a statement. The Italian delegate expressed satisfaction that the problem of the Assyrians had at last entered on a phase of positive solution. Provided that the financial consequences of the proposed scheme would not make too large a call on the League budget, the Italian delegation would feel very great satisfaction at the scheme.

5. M. Erik de Scavenius (Denmark) was then appointed *rapporteur*, and he presented a report and resolution at the next meeting of the committee on the 19th September. The report pointed out that the Assyrian question was not a refugee problem, but eminently a political problem, which the Council, as early as 1933, decided to consider as exceptional. Its immediate and radical solution would greatly contribute to the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the Near East. Its abandonment would have consequences which would affect not only the Assyrians and Iraq, but also other States, with reactions which would be bound to damage the highest interests of the League of Nations. The resolution, after reciting the various aspects of the problem, declared that the proposal of the United Kingdom concerning the financial participation of the League was worthy of the most sympathetic consideration of the Assembly and that the Sixth Committee consequently referred to the Fourth Committee the question of the provision of the necessary funds.

6. After the Netherlands delegate had declared that he would abstain from voting, the report and resolution were adopted by the committee.

7. In the meantime the Council Committee had been giving further detailed consideration to the plan of settlement and had drawn up a note on the financial aspect of it which was transmitted by the Sixth Committee to the Fourth Committee. This note envisaged certain economies and adjustments which would

bring down the cost of settlement proper to some 24 million French francs instead of 30 million as originally contemplated.

8. The Financial Regulations of the League required that the Fourth Committee should in the first place decide by a two-thirds majority whether it was prepared in principle to authorise a credit for this purpose in the budget for the coming year. The debate on the question of procedure was opened by Dr. Burgin, the United Kingdom delegate, who reviewed once more the events leading up to the present situation and emphasised that the scheme now under consideration represented the last chance of an honourable and permanent solution of the Assyrian problem. Dr. Burgin explained the financial position and pointed out that, on the basis of the latest figures produced by the Council Committee and assuming that the proposed credit operation could be realised, 44 million French francs, or 8,800,000 Swiss francs, remained to be found, after taking into account the contribution of the Mandated Territories of the Levant. The United Kingdom was prepared to contribute up to a maximum of 3,750,000 Swiss francs and it was hoped that the Iraqi Government would do the same, making 7,500,000 Swiss francs in all. Dr. Burgin tabled a resolution recommending the Assembly to undertake to provide the funds necessary to complete the scheme, over and above all independent contributions, including those from private charitable sources, and specifically to approve the insertion towards meeting that liability of a sum in the budget of the League. He pointed out that, so far as the drainage and irrigation works were concerned, the figures were final, as the authorities of the Mandated Territories had assumed liability for any excess, but the cost of settlement was an estimate which might be exceeded. But on the assumption that the estimates were exactly realised and the proposed credit operation successfully carried out, the gap which the resolution asked the League to fill might be 1,300,000 Swiss francs. Dr. Burgin, after showing the need for strict financial control, emphasised the amount of progress hitherto made towards a solution of the problem and drew attention to the hopes expressed by the Council Committee, in the Council itself, and in the Sixth Committee, that the Assembly would not fail to take the necessary measures to complete the task. League assistance was equitable in view of the past connexion of the League with the problem. But he asked the committee to look upon the part to be played by the League not as a liability but as an opportunity to permit the completion of a work which, if successful, would be a brilliant addition to its solid achievements in the humanitarian sphere.

9. After a somewhat lengthy debate, in which considerable opposition was expressed to the assumption by the League of financial liability in a question which several speakers evidently still regarded as an ordinary refugee question, the committee decided by twenty-nine votes to none, with seven abstentions, to refer the matter to the Supervisory Commission for study and report.

10. The meeting of the Supervisory Commission was private, but Dr. Burgin was invited to appear before the commission. He restated the case for League participation and for the assumption by the League of the residual liability. He urged that the League should at all events participate in a manner which would ensure the success of the scheme.

11. The Supervisory Commission presented its report on the 25th September. It pointed out that the estimates for settlement might be exceeded as the number of Assyrians to be transferred was uncertain, and that difficulties might arise in obtaining the proposed credit of 20 million French francs, since no other security than Assyrian reimbursements was at present contemplated. It pointed out, moreover, that League intervention in settlement questions had, hitherto, been confined to obtaining technical advice, providing experts and collaborating in the issue of loans, without any large sums being charged direct to the League budget and without the League's action in the matter exceeding the limits of organisation and co-ordination. The Council had, however, been dealing with the matter for some years past and the commission thus felt obliged to propose that the Assembly should grant financial assistance for this work so far as its budgetary resources would allow. The commission stipulated that its conclusions must not serve as a precedent and that the League could not accept a residuary liability. The League contribution should be clearly fixed forthwith and should in no case be increased later. With these provisos the commission recommended the Fourth Committee to fix at 1,300,000 Swiss francs the final figure of the League's contribution to the work of settling the Assyrians of Iraq in the



Mandated Territories of the Levant. This sum would be spread over four years, namely, 400,000 Swiss francs for 1936 and 300,000 in each of the following three years.

12. This report was discussed by the Fourth Committee on the 26th September. The Iraqi delegate, Nuri Pasha, then announced that the Iraqi Government accepted the conditions attached to the offer of the United Kingdom Government in so far as those conditions applied to Iraq and that the Iraqi Government would accordingly recommend Parliament to authorise, *pari passu* with the United Kingdom, the increase of the contribution already promised by Iraq, up to a maximum of £250,000.

13. The United Kingdom delegate pointed out that the recommendations of the Supervisory Commission stopped short of the assumption by the League of unlimited liability. Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, while unable to increase their independent contribution, would maintain their offer, subject to its other conditions being fulfilled and, in particular, subject to the condition that a satisfactory scheme of financial control was adopted which would, in practice, have regard to the fact that the funds available were limited.

14. A lengthy debate followed in which opposition was expressed by the Latvian and Greek delegates and reservations made by the delegates of Spain (who, however, supported the proposed credit) and Belgium. M. Rappard, the delegate of Switzerland, in his capacity as a member of the Permanent Mandates Commission claimed that Sir F. Humphrys had, before that Commission in 1931, accepted entire responsibility on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the consequences of the termination of the mandatory régime in Iraq and he indicated, without opposing the present credit, that it would have been fitting if His Majesty's Government had assumed entire financial responsibility for the present scheme. Dr. Burgin replied by quoting the words of the chairman of the Mandates Commission itself at a meeting on the 9th November, 1931. The chairman had then, according to the minutes, explained, "with a view to removing any misunderstanding on the subject, that the responsibility retained by the mandatory Power lay in the initiative it had taken in proposing the emancipation of the mandated territory. He thought it was very difficult to impose on the mandatory Power after the expiration of the mandate responsibility for the activity of a State which had become sovereign."

15. To a further remark by M. Rappard, Dr. Burgin replied that if any responsibility had been involved it had been well met by the generous offer of a contribution of up to £250,000.

16. The Supervisory Commission's proposals were then put to the vote and approved by twenty-six votes to three, with six abstentions, the opposing votes being those of Greece, Latvia and the Netherlands.

17. The report and resolution of the Sixth Committee and the report of the Fourth Committee authorising the necessary appropriations in the League budget for 1936 arising out of it were subsequently approved by the Assembly.

I have, &c.

CRANBORNE.

[E 6010/2/93]

No. 124.

Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 505.)

Sir,

Bagdad, September 20, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 484 of the 11th September, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from a confidential memorandum addressed by Major Wilson to the Ministry of the Interior showing how the actual transportation of 2,300 Assyrians to Syria was carried out.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure in No. 124.

Extract from Confidential Memorandum of September 17, 1935, from the Acting President of the Emigration Committee to the Ministry of the Interior.

IT was found that the existing settlements of Tkhuma, Upper Tiari and Diz on the Khabur were capable of very large expansion without the provision of further pumps, "naurs," &c., and that consequently it was far more economical to send as many of these tribes as possible. This policy was followed therefore, and mainly owing to this economy it was found possible to persuade the French authorities to accept 2,301 instead of the originally agreed 1,800. A further 300 are also to be crossed during the winter, being people who have remained behind with animals until climatic conditions permit their being walked across.

This will clear all Tkhuma and Upper Tiari villages in the Qadhas of Dohuk and Amadia. There are no Diz villages.

The details by tribes of those sent across is as follows:—

Tkhuma	...	876	Serra	...	20
Tal (Tkhuma)	...	100	Nodis	...	4
Upper Tiari	...	968	Barwar	...	7
Jilu	...	92	Khananis	...	7
Shemzdin	...	73	Baz	...	28
Gawar	...	15	Lewan	...	4
Diz	...	42			
Marbisho	...	46			
Qochanis	...	19			2,301

It is understood that on arrival at Hassicha it was discovered that twenty people registered as Tkhuma were not in fact Tkhuma, though they had been certified as such by the heads of the Tkhuma in Mosul.

From the beginning it was announced that no one, not even members of the three selected tribes, should come from Bagdad, Kirkuk or other outlying stations unless they had actually been summoned by the committee.

Despite this order, which was circulated through several channels, including Bishop Yusuf (who happened to be in Bagdad) and the levies, Qasha Yukhana, the notorious agitator in Mosul, contrived to persuade many Tkhuma from Bagdad to proceed to Mosul at their own expense. A number of these gave up good appointments to come, and as it was found impossible to include them on the lists for emigration, they now find themselves facing the winter without employment.

Qasha Yukhana also produced a list of "destitutes" of Mosul for emigration, and informed them they would all be included on the list for emigration. It was found possible to include about 100 out of 160 of these people, and it was also discovered that the Qasha had induced people in employment in Mosul to resign.

It was clear from the baggage of the Mosul emigrants that they were in a very much better financial condition than those from the villages.

Qasha Yukhana and his family left Mosul for Syria on the seventh convoy. Forty-five levies (Upper Tiari and Tkhuma) and 209 of their dependants proceeded to Mosul at their own expense and were emigrated in the third convoy.

Attached is a list showing numbers emigrated in each convoy.<sup>(1)</sup>

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 6011/433/93]

No. 125.

Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 512.)

Sir,

Bagdad, September 26, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 475 of the 5th September, I have the honour to inform you that Khalil Khoshawi has escaped into Persian territory with his remaining twenty followers. His family has been captured, and, in all, some sixty-three of his followers have been tried by court-martial. Up to the



present, eight have been condemned to death and hanged. The remainder have been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and have been sent to the dreary wastes of Southern Iraq.

2. In conversation recently, Yasin Pasha told me that the policy of evacuating the villages in the vicinity of Khalil's operation had turned out to be a complete success. It had deprived him of much-needed information and supplies, and as a result he was almost hemmed in by the Iraqi and Turkish units working together when his discretion got the better of his valour and he hopped over into Persia. His Excellency added that the co-operation of the Iraqi and Turkish forces had left little to be desired.

3. Apparently the summary justice meted out under military law has made a deep impression in the affected district and the Prime Minister has given instructions that no more death sentences are to be carried out except by his permission.

4. Another indication of the relative strength of his position is shown by the fact that the recent trouble at Qurna (see my Savings Nos. 22 and 23 of the 29th August and the 4th September) has finally petered out. A fine of 500 rifles has been collected and steps are now being taken to collect the money fines.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul and His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 6140/433/93]

No. 126.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 14.)*

(No. 520.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, September 28, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 512 of the 26th September, I have the honour to inform you that, having received numerous indications from His Majesty's acting consul at Mosul of the existence of unrest amongst the Yezidis in the Jebel Sinjar district, I made enquiries on this subject, both at the Ministry of the Interior and of the acting head of the military mission.

2. It appears that sections of the Yezidis—notably those in villages of Zairwan and Alidina—object to being conscripted on what purport to be religious grounds. It is suspected, however, that the real reason for their objection is not religious scruple but rather that the leaders fear that their influence will be undermined once the younger men come into contact with the outside world. That there may be some truth in this seems to emerge from the fact that the Agha Khudeidah informed the Mutessarif of Mosul that though there were religious grounds for justifying the refusal of his flock to join the Iraqi army, he would consider favourably a proposal to form a separate Yezidi unit.

3. In face of these obstructions, the Kaimakam of the Sinjar Qadha appealed, over the heads of the Yezidi leaders, direct to the rank and file. He gave orders that all Yezidis of military age should come in and signify their willingness to be conscripted. This seems to have been the signal for the inhabitants of the two villages mentioned above to sell up their belongings and take to the hills under Daud-al-Daud of Mahirkan, a notorious scallywag whose anti-Government activities led him into trouble in 1925, when he was detained in Nasiriyah.

4. It should be noted that no opposition whatsoever has so far been experienced from the Yezidis on the east side of the Tigris, though it is said that Said Beg, the religious head of the sect, will shortly come to Bagdad and ask the Government to exempt all Yezidis from military service.

5. The situation is not regarded as being in the least serious, but the Prime Minister has acted with his usual promptitude. In addition to increasing the police forces in the district, he has despatched to Mosul a motor machine-gun company, some field guns and two battalions of infantry. Some flights of the Royal Iraqi Air Force are also standing by in Bagdad. His general plan of campaign will be to use the troops for closing the passes and watching the Syrian

frontier, while a mobile force will endeavour to bring the insurgents out into the open. The air force will be used as and when opportunity offers.

6. It is clear that Yasin Pasha means to show that he will brook no interference or opposition in regard to conscription. He will use force ruthlessly for a time until his strength is realised and then, as at Qurna and Nasiriyah, will show that the quality of mercy is not strained.

7. In a lawless country such as this, his methods have much to recommend them.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 6047/2/93]

No. 127.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 8.)*

(No. 529.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copy of a note dated the 28th September to the Iraqi Prime Minister and of his reply dated the 2nd October respecting the Assyrian settlement.

*Bagdad, October 2, 1935.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 127.

*Mr. Bateman to Iraqi Prime Minister.*

(No. 485. Private and Confidential.)

My dear Prime Minister,

*Bagdad, September 28, 1935.*

IN accordance with a recent request made by your Excellency, I have pleasure in placing on record my understanding of the conclusions reached in regard to the financial aspect of the Assyrian question as a result of our recent discussions on this subject.

2. Your Excellency will remember that, on the 10th September, the United Kingdom representative on the Assyrian Committee at Geneva made an announcement concerning the willingness of His Majesty's Government to contribute, towards a satisfactory scheme of settlement, a sum equivalent to five-twelfths of the amount to be found by the Assyrian Committee of the League, subject to the consent of Parliament and provided that the British contribution should not exceed £250,000.

3. I informed your Excellency of this declaration and, on the 17th September, read urgent messages from His Majesty's Government indicating that, in order to allow of a favourable vote being taken by the Assembly on the question of a contribution from the League of Nations, it was essential that an immediate decision should be taken by the Iraqi Government to double unconditionally the contribution of £125,000 which they had already offered. Failing this, it was generally feared that the last hope of solving this difficult problem would be wrecked.

4. As a result of further consideration, your Excellency agreed that the Iraqi contribution should be raised to a maximum of £250,000 on precisely the same conditions as the corresponding contribution promised by His Majesty's Government, and the necessary instructions were sent to his Excellency Nuri Pasha at Geneva. It was clearly understood that this involved an additional contribution from the Iraqi Government of £125,000 new money, which will not be subject to any deductions in respect of money already spent on the Assyrians by the Iraqi Government since 1933, or in respect of transport expenses within Iraq. The Iraqi Government also agreed to abandon the condition that their contribution should be made on the basis of an expenditure not exceeding £10 per head.



5. I now note with pleasure that his Excellency Nuri Pasha addressed a letter of the 26th September to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in the following terms:—

"In conformity with my promise made to the Fourth Committee at its meeting on the 20th September, I have now the honour to inform you that my Government, in order to procure a final and definite solution of the Assyrian question, accept the conditions laid down by the United Kingdom, in so far as those conditions apply to Iraq, in Sir Samuel Hoare's letter of the 12th September, 1935.

"It follows that the Iraqi Government will recommend Parliament to authorise it to raise, *pari passu* with the United Kingdom contribution, the contribution which it has already promised towards the proposed scheme of settlement of the Assyrians in Syria, so as to pay to the League for this purpose a sum amounting to five-twelfths of that part of the expense of the scheme which the Council Committee may be called upon to cover up to a maximum of £250,000."

6. I have also noted the personal assurance given to me by your Excellency on the 21st September that no difficulty need be anticipated concerning the approval of the Iraqi Parliament to the additional contribution or the conditions on which it will be made.

7. Your Excellency will, of course, appreciate that this question is one between the Government of Iraq and the League of Nations, who are the responsible authority. His Majesty's Government have, nevertheless, entered into the discussions, in view of the interest which they share with the Iraqi Government in ensuring that everything possible should be done to bring about an early settlement of this difficult question. They have noted the understanding reached with the Government of Iraq, since they themselves are making a contribution similar to, and conditional on, the contribution of the Iraqi Government.

8. Your Excellency will, I am sure, agree that the above sets out the present position accurately.

Yours very sincerely,  
C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 127.

*Iraqi Prime Minister to Mr. Bateman.*

Dear Mr. Bateman,

October 2, 1935.

I HAVE received your confidential letter of the 28th ultimo regarding the Assyrian question and agree with you that the contents thereof represent the present position accurately.

Yours sincerely,  
Y. EL HASHIMY.

[E 6048/163/93]

No. 128.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 8.)*

(No. 530.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit to him copies of a note dated the 28th September to the Iraqi Prime Minister and of his reply dated the 2nd October respecting the Iraq railways.

Bagdad, October 2, 1935.

Enclosure 1 in No. 128.

*Mr. Bateman to Iraqi Prime Minister.*

(No. 484.)

Your Excellency,

Bagdad, September 28, 1935.

I REFERRED to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom your Excellency's letter of the 11th September last, together with the explanatory letter from Kamil Beg Al Gilani of the 13th September, concerning the future of the Iraq railways, and have now received a reply thereto.

2. His Majesty's Government are unable to entertain the suggestion, put forward in paragraph 2 of your Excellency's letter, that they should accept, as payment, the reserve and renewal funds at the disposal of the Iraq railways. They observe that whereas they require the payment of a fixed sum, the funds in question are not fixed but fluctuate according to the revenue returns of the railways.

3. In paragraph 1 of your Excellency's letter (as supplemented by the letter from Kamil Beg Al Gilani), two further suggestions were made. The first was to the effect that the period of employment in those posts, which are to be filled by British subjects, should be fixed in accordance with the third exchange of notes attached to the treaty of 1930 and should not exceed fifteen years. His Majesty's Government are unable to concur in this proposal. They point out, *inter alia*, that, as the notes exchanged in 1930 do not provide for the reservation of any specified posts for British subjects, they are unsuitable for the purposes of the agreement in contemplation. Moreover, the suggestion does not accord with the principles outlined in my letter of the 31st August last.

4. The second suggestion in your Excellency's letter concerned the constitution of the mixed Anglo-Iraqi Board of Management. His Majesty's Government have noted the desire of the Iraqi Government that the administration of the railways should be under a department of the Iraqi Government. It is, no doubt, necessary for constitutional reasons, that a Minister should be ultimately responsible for the railways but it is presumed that the mixed board appointed by the Iraqi Government will, in fact, be vested with adequate powers to enable it effectively to control and administer the railways without the necessity, in normal circumstances, for intervention by the Ministry concerned.

5. Since the receipt of the letters under reference, I have had the honour to discuss the whole question with your Excellency and have not failed to report the results to His Majesty's Government.

6. My understanding of the position now reached, which I desire to place on record, is that your Excellency is prepared to accept the remaining conditions set out in my letter of the 31st August to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, if His Majesty's Government, for their part, will agree to a payment of £400,000 for the railways instead of the stipulated sum of £650,000.

7. I lost no time in placing this proposal before His Majesty's Government and am now authorised to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government will accept this reduced payment, provided all the other conditions of a final settlement of the railway question are integrally accepted by the Iraqi Government.

8. In order to avoid misunderstanding, I venture to re-state the remaining conditions on which His Majesty's Government are prepared to sign a new agreement placing the Iraqi Government in absolute possession of the Iraq railways as a going concern (*i.e.*, including all railway lands, reserve and renewal funds and all debts and credits of whatsoever nature).

9. These conditions are:—

- (a) That the Iraqi Government undertake in writing that, for a period of twenty years, the railways shall be managed by a mixed Anglo-Iraqi board appointed by the Iraqi Government.
- (b) That the general managership and a limited number of key posts requiring technical knowledge and experience shall be reserved for British subjects; and that a list of such posts shall be clearly specified in the new agreement.
- (c) That such other non-Iraqi personnel as may be required for the railways shall (as provided in the third exchange of notes attached to the treaty of 1930) be recruited amongst British subjects, provided suitable candidates are available.



- (d) That the Iraqi Government shall assume responsibility for any liabilities connected with the railways which have arisen or which may arise in future.

10. I shall be glad to receive a note from your Excellency confirming that the Iraqi Government accept these conditions. Steps will then be taken to draft a new agreement.

11. As the proposed new agreement will replace the relevant provisions of the Financial Agreement of 1930, and will thus replace a ratified treaty obligation, the new agreement will itself be subject to ratification and will come into force upon the exchange of ratifications.

I avail, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 128.

*Iraqi Prime Minister to Mr. Bateman.*

Dear Mr. Bateman,

October 2, 1935.

I HAVE received your letter No. 484 of the 28th September last regarding the future of the railways and may state that the principles and conditions set forth therein would be suitable as a basis for the final settlement of this question. Furthermore, I would like to add two points upon which we verbally agreed in our discussion, viz.:—

- (a) That the majority of the mixed board will consist of Iraqi members, and
- (b) That in the event of an award being given against the Iraqi Government for the payment of a compensation for acquiring the ownership of the railway line belonging to the old (Bagdad) Company, then His Britannic Majesty's Government will contribute towards such compensation a sum proportionate to her share.

Yours sincerely,

Y. EL HASHIMY.

[E 6199/433/25]

No. 129.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 15.)*

(No. 25. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Bagdad, October 9, 1935.

MY despatch No. 520 of 28th September.

On 7th October Army Air Force and police carried out operations against rebel Yezidis located in eastern end of Jebel Sinjar. Casualties to troops and police were fourteen killed and twenty-nine wounded. Tribal casualties estimated at 100. Daud-i-Daud was wounded and most of his followers dispersed. About 150 insurgents are still holding out, and troops are being concentrated to deal with them.

A third battalion has been sent from Mosul to Sinjar, and a fourth is en route from Kirkuk.

[E 6244/433/93]

No. 130.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 17.)*

(No. 248.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, October 17, 1935.

MY telegram No. 25, Saving.

His Majesty's consul at Mosul reports that Yezidi prisoners who were brought into Mosul in lorries on 12th October were stoned by hostile mob. One died from head-wounds and two or three others are reported to have been stabbed by fanatics amongst the crowd under the eyes of the police.

2. Temper of the people in Mosul has apparently been aroused to dangerous pitch by the injudicious parade of Yezidi prisoners following upon the arrival of considerable number of dead and wounded soldiers and detention of men from Sinjar.

3. I discussed the situation this morning with Nuri. He had had similar reports from his son, who was eye-witness of some of the events in Mosul on 12th October. Nuri was much perturbed and at once saw the Prime Minister, who issued orders for the arrest of those responsible. Events occurred during the absence of mutessarif, whose return may be confidently expected to restore order.

4. I also drew Nuri's attention to report received from His Majesty's consul that some thirty citizens of Mosul, including number of Christian good families, had been suddenly arrested on the charge of complicity in Sinjar disturbances and refused bail. He said that incriminating documents had been found on some of them, but I observed that there were reasons for thinking that persons arrested were those who in the past had been closely connected with the British and that the whole thing looked like a frame up by irresponsible people who lent too ready an ear to bazaar rumours. Nuri, in my presence, telephoned to mutessarif at Mosul to conduct an immediate enquiry.

5. He is particularly distressed that this sort of thing should have happened at a moment when Assyrian question is on the point of liquidation, and he trusts that no exaggerated publicity will be given to these unfortunate events.

[E 6252/2/93]

No. 131.

*Memorandum on the Proceedings of a Session of the Council Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, held at Geneva, October 8-16, 1935.*

(Confidential.)

THE position at the beginning of the session was that—

(a) It was necessary to ensure the transfer before the 15th October to the French authorities in the mandated territories of 1 million French francs to enable certain preliminary work in connexion with the Ghab reclamation scheme to be put in hand, failing which the whole operation might have to be delayed for a year, with political risks which the Council Committee viewed with apprehension. The only money available was the balance of the advance made by the Iraqi Government in August last in connexion with the provisional settlement on the Khabur. This balance was standing in a League account in Beirut, and during the Assembly Nuri Pasha had informed the President of the Council Committee that the Iraqi Government had no objection to 1 million French francs of it being diverted to this new use. The consent of the Secretary-General of the League was, however, required for its transfer, and the League Secretariat were known to be hesitating on the ground that this consent might involve the League in an undesirable responsibility.

(b) A sub-committee of the Assyrian Committee had been set up to consider the question of the organisation of the whole settlement operation, with particular regard to the machinery of financial control. It was believed that the French, while desirous of maintaining entire control, financial and otherwise, of the scheme for the reclamation of the Ghab, were anxious to wash their hands of all responsibility, financial and otherwise, for the control and administration of the settlement operation proper. They were understood to wish to transfer this control to the League, but the League Secretariat were understood to be opposed to the assumption by the League of further responsibility of any kind in regard to the scheme. It had been made clear during the proceedings of the Assembly that the United Kingdom Government considered that the reclamation scheme should be left entirely to the French, and that as the French were assuming the residuary financial liability for this part of the scheme, there was no need for League financial control. As regards the settlement operation proper, on the other hand, seeing that the whole cost would fall on the fund collected by the League, and that that fund was limited, whereas the estimated expenditure could not be precisely calculated, the United Kingdom Government felt that effective financial control ought to be vested in the League. In particular, the United



Kingdom Government desired League control over day-to-day expenditure in the mandated territories themselves, in addition to examination of estimates and eventual audit by the League services in Geneva. As regards the administration of the scheme, other than financial, the United Kingdom Government's view was that it might be advantageous in many ways if this remained, so far as possible, in the hands of the French High Commissioner. Particularly was this the case in matters of health.

(c) It was desirable to take steps without delay to consult the Assyrians regarding their wish to be transferred from Iraq to the mandated territories, and thus to clear up one of the uncertain elements in the financial problem.

2. When Mr. Hale and I arrived in Geneva, we found the most serious misconceptions in the League Treasury and Secretariat regarding the rôle of the League in the Assyrian settlement scheme. The report of the Supervisory Commission of the 25th September, 1935, had drawn attention to the fact that the League had hitherto only intervened in an advisory capacity in settlement questions, and the report had closed with the following observation:—

"In view of the subsidy granted by the League, the latter is entitled to expect, though this does not imply any financial responsibility on its part, that very strict supervision will be exercised over the various parts of the operation."

On the basis of these passages, the report was being interpreted as meaning that the League was henceforth to participate in the execution of the scheme in a purely advisory capacity, and that as regards finance it was to act merely as a banker, *i.e.*, to receive and pay out money without concerning itself in any way as to what was to happen to the money or how expenditure was to be controlled. Control was to be someone else's business. Furthermore, there was a disposition to take the view that the League could not take the responsibility of transferring to the French authorities the 1 million French francs referred to in (a) above until it was clear how the gap of 13,500,000 French francs in the total funds required for the settlement plan as a whole, according to the present estimates, would in fact be filled. We were obliged to point out in private conversations—

(1) That there was nothing in the Supervisory Commission's report to warrant the view that the League's future participation in the scheme must be purely advisory. On the contrary, the Supervisory Commission, after stating that League intervention had been limited in other schemes, had gone on to point out that the League was specially involved in the Assyrian question, and had cited the fact to justify a League contribution. The words "financial responsibility" in the last paragraph of the Supervisory Commission's report clearly meant nothing more than that no action on the part of the League must imply a liability on its part to pay more than the contribution of 1,300,000 Swiss francs now voted.

(2) That the League had the same interest as the United Kingdom Government in insisting on strict financial control so as to avoid as far as possible the situation arising in two or three years' time of an excess over estimates, which would bring up once more the question of who was to be responsible for the residuary liability; and that refusal by the League to exercise that control would involve it in, rather than relieve it of, eventual responsibility.

(3) That the League was already committed to responsibility for the scheme and the financial control of it, both by the activities up to date of the Council and the Council Committee, and by the acceptance by the committee and by the Secretary-General of the "règlement financier" already in force in relation to the provisional settlement in the Khabur. This "règlement financier," though it leaves the day-to-day financial administration of the scheme in the hands of the High Commissioner, makes the League responsible for approving the estimates, controlling the funds in Geneva, and auditing the final accounts.

(4) That the Secretary-General would be taking an impossible political responsibility if he declined to authorise the transfer to the French authorities of the 1 million French francs.

3. These arguments successively convinced all the members of the Secretariat and the League Treasury concerned, but they gave us to understand that the

Secretary-General personally was strongly opposed to the assumption or continuance by the League of any responsibility, financial or otherwise, for the scheme, and they felt that nothing would be gained by attempting to argue with him or, in particular to obtain his consent to the transfer of the 1 million francs to the French authorities until a concrete plan could be placed before him showing precisely how it was proposed to organise the scheme and to ensure the financial control, and, if possible, how it was proposed to fill the gap of 13,500,000 French francs in the funds required. In the circumstances, we agreed to try to work out a detailed plan in the hope that the Secretary-General's opposition could subsequently be overcome.

4. We had been given to understand by the League Secretariat that the alleged French desire to wash their hands of all responsibility for the settlement operation proper was due to pique at the United Kingdom demand during the Assembly for strict financial control over that operation. Conversations with M. de Panafieu, the French representative on the committee, showed that this was not the case. What had impressed the French was the attitude, during the discussion in the Fourth Committee of the Assembly, of certain members of the Mandates Commission, and the French feared, by accepting any considerable degree of responsibility, to lay themselves open to malevolent criticism in that body. One of the recommendations which had emerged from the discussions in Beirut in August last between technical representatives of the Council Committee and the French authorities was that a representative of the League Council should be appointed to supervise generally the whole operation on behalf of the Council and to maintain liaison between it and the French High Commissioner. Having in mind the discussions during the Assembly, the French were in favour of vesting control over and responsibility for the financial administration on the spot in this representative of the Council. They were quite willing, however, to provide such representative with the necessary staff from the services of the High Commissioner to help him in the fulfilment of his financial duties. They were quite willing also that the actual accounting should be done by the French services. As regards the non-financial administration of the scheme, they agreed that health and education should be the care of the French services and that, for the rest, the work should be carried out by an executive committee, which, as contemplated in the Beirut recommendations, would be the agent for carrying out decisions of the High Commissioner reached in agreement with the Council representative.

5. Such was the atmosphere in which the discussions of the sub-committee began under the chairmanship of M. Bieler, the assistant treasurer of the League. M. Bieler was clearly more preoccupied with the problem of filling the remaining gap in the total funds required before authority was given to the French to start the Ghab reclamation work, than with the actual machinery of organisation and financial control. It took some time to convince him that no immediate progress was possible in this direction. We pointed out that the gap would be reduced to more manageable proportions when charitable sources had been tapped, and that if substantial sums were forthcoming from these sources, the raising of the balance by means of a credit, based in the main on Assyrian reimbursements, might become a more practicable proposition. In any case, we pointed out that the proper way to look at the problem was to dwell on the considerable amount of money which was now in sight, *i.e.*, 72 million out of 86 million French francs, and not on the comparatively small balance outstanding; and to bear in mind the very serious political risk involved if the existence of this comparatively small balance were allowed to hold up the beginning of the whole operation.

6. The French, on their side, were clearly not in the least worried at the prospect of starting the operation with the gap of 13,500,000 still unfilled. Their attitude was governed by the fact that the Ghab reclamation scheme is in two sections. Certain preliminary works, *i.e.*, the Acharné dam and reservoir, the Karkor dam and tunnel and the deepening of the Orontes, are necessary before any land in the Ghab can be reclaimed. The extent of this section of the work is a fixed quantity, in that it will not vary proportionately to the area reclaimed. On the other hand, the second section of the work, consisting of the actual drainage and irrigation of the area, is adjustable according to the number of acres of irrigated land actually required for the Assyrians. Provided, therefore, the French were assured of the necessary funds for the first section of the work, they were prepared to proceed with that section without waiting for the gap of



13,500,000 French francs to be filled. This gap they looked upon as relating only to the second section of the reclamation scheme. The French representatives (M. Ehrhardt, the Director of Finances in Syria, was assisting M. de Panafieu) expressed the personal view that if insufficient funds were forthcoming to pay for the drainage and irrigation of enough land to accommodate all the Assyrians who might elect to leave Iraq, the amount of irrigated land taken over might be adjusted to the funds available, and it might be possible to use for permanent settlement part of the adjacent land on which the Assyrians are, under present arrangements, to be temporarily settled, pending the completion of the Ghab reclamation scheme. This area of temporary settlement is not large enough to take all the Assyrians who are expected to leave Iraq, and is less satisfactory in other ways than the reclaimed land is expected to be, but in case of need, some of it, at all events, can apparently be bought at a comparatively low price.

7. The cost of the first section of the reclamation scheme is 32 million French francs. Towards this, the mandated territories are contributing 22 million, though this sum will only be available in instalments of 7,500,000 francs each in 1937 and 1938, and 7 million in 1939. The net result of this position is that, while the League's ultimate contribution to this part of the work is assessed at 10 million francs, the French cannot embark in the near future on anything more than the preliminary studies contemplated for the remainder of the present year unless they can count on receiving from the League 17 million francs in all, of which 7 million would be an advance, repayable from the contributions of the mandated territories when available. The French representatives made it clear that the beginning of the preliminary studies depended only on the immediate transfer of the 1 million French francs already referred to. They pointed out, however, that the payment of this sum would, morally speaking, imply the readiness of the League to advance the remainder of the 17 million, as and when required, and that, in fact, actual engineering work, which is not possible for climatic reasons before March or April 1936, could not begin unless and until the League had bound itself to make the remainder of the advance.

8. Mr. Hale put forward on the 10th October a memorandum outlining tentatively an agreement which might be made between the League and the French, with the object of defining their respective obligations in regard to the execution of the reclamation scheme and safeguarding their respective positions if the gap of 13,300,000 French francs were not eventually filled. Subsequently events made it unnecessary to proceed further at the moment on these lines, but as some such agreement may still be necessary, a copy of Mr. Hale's memorandum is attached as Annex A.

9. The discussion of the question of beginning the reclamation work was interspersed with that of modifying the "règlement financier" now governing the temporary settlement in the Khabur area, so as to make that "règlement" applicable to the Ghab scheme also, and to provide for local financial control by a representative of the League Council in the case of the settlement operation proper. By the 11th October, substantial agreement had been reached on the text of a revised "règlement" on these lines, when an oral message was communicated to the sub-committee on behalf of the Secretary-General of the League (to whom a rough draft of the "règlement" had been submitted by the Secretariat in connexion with a recommendation that he should authorise the transfer of the 1 million francs to the French High Commissioner) to the effect that he could not agree that the League should have any further responsibility for the scheme and that, in particular, he could not accept the idea of local financial control by a representative of the Council. Mr. Walters, who delivered the message, was clearly in personal agreement with the contention of the French representative, that the League was, in fact, already committed and could not evade its responsibility, and Mr. Hale and I made it clear that His Majesty's Government's participation was based on the assumption that this was to be a League scheme. Mr. Walters made a half-hearted suggestion that financial control might be vested entirely in a body representing all the contributors, but Mr. Hale and I took the line that, apart from the extra cost involved, this was unlikely to be acceptable in principle to His Majesty's Government, to whom the idea of League financial control would have considerable parliamentary value.

10. The reasons for the Secretary-General's attitude were not entirely clear. Ostensibly it was based on the passage in the Supervisory Commission's Report mentioned in paragraph 2 of this memorandum. M. Avenol has always displayed

anxiety about the degree of responsibility which the League was assuming from time to time in the Assyrian question, and his natural inclination would, therefore, be to give the widest possible interpretation to the passage in question in the Supervisory Commission's report. It was further suggested to me privately that he was generally sympathetic to those elements which opposed League financial participation during the Assembly discussions, and which, it appears, have not yet resigned themselves to accepting the present position. On the other hand, the Secretary-General's attitude may have been due, not to obstruction for obstruction's sake, but simply to the fact that, owing to his preoccupation with the Abyssinian question, he had been unable to give adequate consideration to the Assyrian question and had not sufficiently appreciated a number of factors. It was, at all events, upon this latter supposition that the sub-committee was bound to base itself. Mr. Walters suggested that M. de Panafieu and myself should get the respective heads of our delegations to bring pressure to bear upon M. Avenol, and to put the matter to him in its proper light. Apart, however, from the fact that the heads of our delegations were otherwise much too fully occupied, M. de Panafieu and I felt that the point of principle at issue was a matter for the Assyrian Committee as a whole to deal with, and that we should place ourselves in a false position by giving the Secretary-General an opportunity to say at a later stage that he had yielded to Franco-British pressure. We agreed that if the Secretary-General persisted in his attitude, the only course was for the sub-committee to report to the full Assyrian Committee that an *impasse* had been reached, leaving it to the full committee to decide what should be done. It was agreed, however, that before we proceeded to action of this sort the officials of the Secretariat concerned should make one more attempt to explain matters fully to the Secretary-General and try to get him into line. This attempt was made and met with partial success.

11. On the 12th October the treasurer of the League, M. Jacklin, explained the Secretary-General's considered views to the members of the sub-committee. It emerged from M. Jacklin's statement that M. Avenol was now prepared to authorise the transfer of the million francs to the French High Commissioner on receipt of a letter from the Council Committee requesting him to do so. (This letter was sent to him on the same day.) Furthermore, it appeared that M. Avenol was willing that the League should continue to exercise the same degree of financial control over the whole operation as is provided in the existing "règlement financier," i.e., the approval of annual budgets, the issue to the French High Commissioner of funds in accordance with those budgets and the ultimate audit of accounts. His view, however, was that the League's direct participation should be limited to this ultimate control in Geneva, and that so far as the mandated territories were concerned, an autonomous body with legal personality ought to be set up "to run the whole show" in the words of M. Jacklin. To vest local control in a representative of the Council might, in M. Avenol's opinion, lead to constitutional difficulties within the League, and there was evidently much to be said for his view that the constitution of an autonomous body was in any case desirable in order to avoid the possibility of the League or its representatives suing or being sued in the mandated territories. Two points, however, were not clear: (a) What would be the relation of the autonomous body to the League; and (b) what precisely was meant by "running the whole show"? As regards (a), the sub-committee was informed that the Secretary-General was prepared to agree that the new body should be set up by the Council of the League, who would decide on its composition and invite the members of it to assume their functions. Furthermore, the new body would send periodical reports to the Council. As regards (b), Mr. Hale and I pointed out that if the new body was to have extensive executive functions, it might be expensive, and I added that in the interests of efficiency, it was better to leave what might be termed the field-work of settlement, as far as possible, to the French services. More particularly I felt this should be the case in health matters. M. Jacklin finally explained that what was intended was that the new body should take over the execution of all those parts of the actual settlement operation (as distinct from the Ghab reclamation scheme) which the French authorities were not themselves prepared to carry out. In effect, it came to this, that the new body would exercise financial control over the settlement operation, i.e., it would draw up the budget and authorise all expenditure, leaving the actual custody and administration of funds in the hands of the French financial services;



health and education services would be carried out by the competent French departments; and what might be called the field-work of settlement would be executed in collaboration between a settlement expert (M. Burnier) appointed by the new body, and the French administrative services.

12. The sub-committee felt that an arrangement on these lines was acceptable. They agreed that the best course would be to set up, at the beginning of the settlement operation, the Trustee Committee which it had been intended ultimately to set up, in any case, at a much later stage, and to entrust it not only with the functions originally contemplated, *i.e.*, the ownership and disposal to the Assyrians of the reclaimed land in the Ghab area, but also with the degree of responsibility for the execution of the whole settlement operation suggested in the last part of the preceding paragraph. The "règlement financier" was further revised accordingly, and the sub-committee also prepared the draft of an explanatory report from the Council Committee as a whole to the Council. When, however, M. Jacklin saw the new draft "règlement," he had amendments to suggest, with the object of safeguarding the responsibility of the Secretary-General himself, by transferring to the Council Committee certain functions, which, under the existing "règlement," are reserved to the Secretary-General. M. Jacklin was, furthermore, very perturbed by the explanatory report. This had been drafted with every desire to meet what were understood to be the Secretary-General's wishes, but M. Jacklin took the view that the whole trend of the draft was to emphasise the responsibility which the League had already assumed and the responsibility which it was assuming for the future. This was on the 14th October, when M. de Panafieu was temporarily absent from Geneva. M. Jacklin discussed the position with me and I pointed out that there was nothing in the draft report which was contrary to the facts, and that the Council Committee, in reporting to the Council, could not be expected to ignore or misrepresent the facts. M. Jacklin admitted this, but said that, if the report remained as drafted, he was quite sure that the Secretary-General would feel bound to make reservations when it came before the Council. It was clearly desirable to avoid a dispute in the Council, if possible, and as M. Jacklin was anxious to be helpful, and thought it largely a matter of presentation, I accordingly suggested, without committing myself to accept any changes, that he should recast the report in a form in which it would be acceptable to the Secretary-General. This he did, and his redraft was placed before the sub-committee on the 15th October. With minor modifications, the sub-committee accepted it, though M. de Panafieu characterised the whole proceeding as absurd. Even that was not the end of our difficulties. The Secretary-General had then just left Geneva, and was expected to be away for at least a week, and M. Jacklin took the line that while he himself was prepared to defend the draft report and the new "règlement" to the Secretary-General, he could not accept them on his behalf or guarantee that they would be acceptable to M. Avenol.

13. The sub-committee felt that it could not delay further in reporting the position to the Council Committee, and this was done at a meeting of the Council Committee on the evening of the 15th October. The draft report and revised "règlement" were then provisionally adopted by the committee, subject to a detailed exchange of views regarding the composition of the proposed new autonomous body in Syria which it is proposed to call the Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board, and regarding the contents of the Statute which would eventually be necessary to set up this body.

14. This exchange of views took place on the 16th October. The exact composition of the Trustee Board was left for further consideration between now and January, though in principle it was agreed that it should consist of three members, *i.e.*, a representative of the High Commissioner, M. Cuénod, who had been originally cast for the rôle of Council Representative in the Mandated Territories, and a third member, who might be either a prominent local resident, or some representative of charitable organisations contributing to the Assyrian settlement scheme. As regards the statute, a number of general principles were agreed upon, and on the basis of the discussion, the legal section of the Secretariat was asked to prepare a draft for circulation to the members of the committee between now and January.

15. After this discussion, the draft report and the new "règlement" were definitely adopted by the committee, with the reservation that they should not be published or circulated to the Council until they had been seen by the Secretary-

General. It was the understanding that the committee would be ready to consider any observations by the Secretary-General, but that if these observations involved unacceptable changes of substance, reference would have to be made to the Council at its meeting in January. Copies of the report and the new "règlement financier" as adopted are attached as Annexes B and C.<sup>(1)</sup>

16. This disposed, as far as possible, of two of the three points described in paragraph 1 of this memorandum. There remained the question of the consultation of the Assyrians. As further progress with the preparation of final estimates and with the elaboration of definite plans of settlement was impracticable until the number of Assyrians who wished to take advantage of the scheme was known, the committee was anxious that the consultation should take place at the earliest possible date. Major Thomson (the president of the Local Committee in Iraq, which is to be entrusted with the work of consultation), who was in Geneva, was of opinion that the work could be proceeded with before winter set in, and recommended that it should start at the beginning of November. The committee adopted this view, and went on to consider the question of procedure. Major Thomson's view at a much earlier stage had been that all the details of the scheme of settlement should be set out in a comprehensive document in the name of the Council Committee, and that the functions of the Local Committee should be confined to placing this document before the Assyrians individually, and asking them whether, in the light of it, they decided to remain in Iraq or elected to go to Syria. The difficulties, however, of producing a comprehensive and self-contained document were found in practice to be very great, and Major Thomson, on reconsideration, felt that it would be better for the Local Committee to base themselves on existing documents in answering such questions as the Assyrians might raise. He felt, however, that the consultation should begin on the basis of some document which had the authority of the Council Committee, as he considered that otherwise there might be a doubt in the minds of the Assyrians as to his own position. It was, therefore, decided that a message should be communicated to the Assyrians by the Council Committee, through the Iraqi Government, giving an outline description of the proposed scheme of settlement in terms in which the Iraqi Government and the French High Commissioner should have previously concurred. The terms of such a message, based on a draft by Major Thomson himself, were adopted by the committee on the 16th October, together with the texts of notes to the Iraqi Government and the French High Commissioner. The note to the French High Commissioner asked him to signify his concurrence in the message as soon as possible, or, alternatively, to furnish the committee with his early observations. The note to the Iraqi Government requested that that Government, if it concurred in the terms of the message, and after the concurrence of the French High Commissioner had been received, should publish the document to the Assyrians and should issue the necessary instructions to the Local Committee to begin its work forthwith, so that the results of the consultation might, if possible, be available in the early part of January. Copies of these notes and of the message to the Assyrians in its present form (except for the addition of a paragraph about health of which I have not yet received the final text) are attached as Annexes D, E and F.<sup>(1)</sup>

17. A letter of instructions to M. Cuénod, the representative of the Council Committee on the Local Committee in Iraq, was also considered by the Council Committee at its meeting on the 16th October. The text of the letter as adopted is not at present available. The only two points in it which deserve mention are:—

(a) *The Method of Consultation.*—The letter laid down that consultation should always be carried out by the Local Committee as a whole, *i.e.*, that members of it should not, as had at one time been suggested, work separately, each taking a particular district.

(b) *The Position of Persian Assyrians.*—On this point the letter laid down that the Council Committee could not concern itself, in any case, with Assyrians of Persian origin who had come to Iraq since the 14th October, 1933 (the date on which the Council Committee was set up), and that its decision was entirely reserved as to whether Assyrians of Persian origin living in Iraq before that date were eligible for transfer. M. Cuénod was told that the Local Committee might prepare, for submission to the Council Committee, lists of those Persian Assyrians

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



living in Iraq before the 14th October, 1933, who might express a desire to go to Syria, but it was to be made clear that the preparation of these lists involved the Council Committee in no obligation and did not prejudice in any way the ultimate decision of that committee.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

Foreign Office, October 19, 1935.

#### Annex A.

Memorandum by Mr. Hale.—(Communicated to the Sub-Committee October 10.)

#### Assyrian Settlement: Suggested Arrangement in regard to Public Works.

So far as regards the public works, the relationship between the League and the High Commissioner seems to be essentially that of a buyer in contract with a seller. That is to say, the arrangement reached makes the position essentially similar to that when a contract is made by which the buyer agrees to pay a certain price (in this case 40 million francs, of which the seller is prepared to advance 6½ million against the proceeds of a further sale of the article provided) for a certain article to be provided by the seller (in this case 15,000 hectares of drained and irrigated land in the Ghab Valley).

The position is, however, complicated by the fact that the buyer does not yet know quite how much of the required article (drained and irrigated land) he will either need, or be in a position to pay for. It is necessary therefore that the contract should provide for the contingency that the buyer may take up less (or more) than 15,000 hectares.

The proposed works are divided into two portions:—

- (1) *Preliminary works* estimated to cost 32 million francs which are necessary to reclaim any land in the Ghab, viz.:—

Construction of the Acharné reservoir.  
Karkor Regulation and Evacuation works.  
Deepening of the Orontes between Rassi and Karkor.

- (2) *Drainage and Irrigation Canals*.—The cost of providing such canals to deal with 15,000 hectares is estimated at 30 million francs.

The arrangements hitherto contemplated have assumed that the League will take up at least 15,000 hectares. But this assumption cannot be made. It is suggested that an arrangement is required which, while assuring the necessary finance for the preliminary works, would admit of adjustment of the League's liability in proportion to the amount of land actually taken up. Under the arrangements contemplated, the cost of the League of 15,000 hectares would be 40 million francs (including the advance of 6½ million francs to be made by the Mandated Territories against Assyrian repayments). This represents 2,666⅔ fr. per hectare, of which 666⅔ fr. is attributable to the preliminary works and 2,000 fr. to the drainage and irrigation canals.

It is suggested that the agreement between the High Commissioner and the League might in outline be as follows:—

In the first instance, the High Commissioner undertakes to carry out the preliminary works, the League for their part undertaking to advance, on engineers' certificates, a sum not exceeding 17 million francs in the following instalments:—

	Fr.
1935	1,000,000
1936	10,000,000
1937	5,500,000
1938	500,000

In certain circumstances these advances would be partly recoverable as provided below.

In return for this assistance, the League shall be given an option, which it shall exercise not later than the end of 1936, to purchase such quantity of drained and irrigated land, not being less than 5,000 hectares, as the League may require,

at a price of 2,666⅔ fr. per hectare, and the High Commissioner shall complete before the end of 1939 the construction of the necessary drainage and irrigation canals to deal with the area required. If the total price of the land required is less than the sum advanced for the purpose of the preliminary works, the High Commissioner shall refund the balance. If the total price of the land required exceeds the sum advanced for the purpose of the preliminary works, the League shall pay the excess in such instalments as may be agreed. If the area required by the League exceeds 7,500 hectares, the High Commissioner will, on the request of the League, advance to the League, on the security of one-third of any repayments made by the Assyrians, one-third of the purchase price of the area in excess of 7,500 hectares, provided that such advances shall not exceed in total the sum of 6½ million francs.

The price of 2,666⅔ francs is based on the assumption that the cost of the preliminary works is 32 million francs and the cost of draining and irrigating is 2,000 fr. per hectare. The price shall be recalculated on the basis of the actual cost. In calculating the effect of any excess or saving on the preliminary works, a variation of 32,000,000/666⅔ fr. shall be deemed to represent a variation of 1 fr. per hectare in the price. The price to the League shall in no case exceed 2,666⅔ fr. per hectare, but if the price as recalculated is less than 2,666⅔ fr. per hectare, the payments made shall be adjusted accordingly.

[E 6287/163/93]

No. 132.

Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Houre.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 542.)

Sir,

Bagdad, October 9, 1935.

IT may be useful, for future reference, if I attempt to summarise the circumstances in which solutions of the separate problems concerning the Iraqi railways and Assyrian settlement came to be sought simultaneously.

2. As regards the Assyrians, it can, I think, be assumed that up to the end of August and beginning of September Yasin Pasha had definitely decided against any increase in the sum of £125,000 which the Iraqi Government had promised to contribute as a result of M. Oliván's visit in May. For the greater part of the summer Nuri Pasha had been absent from Bagdad, and it was therefore impossible to look to him for help in inducing the Prime Minister to change his mind. Indeed, when on the 29th August I communicated to him the news that His Majesty's Government were prepared to make a generous contribution, *pari passu* with the Iraqi Government, in a final effort to liquidate the Assyrian question, his only response was to refer me to Yasin Pasha in the hope that, if this gesture failed to move him, the Prime Minister might be persuaded to go himself to Geneva. At that time, Nuri Pasha was smarting under the unfair criticism that had been levelled at him by his opponents in the Cabinet on his return empty-handed from Tehran, and rumour had it that he was on the point of resigning. He was therefore anxious, for reasons of his own, to get Yasin Pasha to share openly the burden which, up till then, he had borne alone. But to expect the Prime Minister to do so for the sake of settling the Assyrian question was, to say the least, disingenuous.

3. To begin with, there were internal political considerations which gave him pause. If he left Bagdad, Rashid Ali—the Minister of the Interior—would have remained at the head of affairs. This would have been inadvisable for more than one reason. Secondly, it was Yasin Pasha himself who had made the promise to the Council of the League in 1933, and he was well aware that excessive pressure would, on that account alone, be brought to bear on him at Geneva. Resistance would be far easier in Bagdad. If, eventually, the Iraqi Government were forced to capitulate, then the blame would rest primarily on Nuri Pasha. For his part, he had on the 7th August told me quite definitely that his letter of the 26th May to M. Oliván had contained his last word. He had refused to give way, even though there was (as M. Arocha had pointed out from Beirut) a chance of getting some 4,000 Assyrians over to Syria by the autumn, if he would waive the *per capita* condition.

4. Last, but by no means least, he remained unconvinced of the necessity for an increase in the contribution to be made by the Iraqi Government. His line



throughout all my talks with him on the subject was that in 1933, following upon the disastrous events of that unhappy year, he had only offered to help the Assyrians on their way to a new home. It had never been suggested, even when a new habitat was being sought for them in Brazil and Guiana, that Iraq should contribute more than £100,000, and he failed to see why settlement in Syria should be so costly. At the back of his mind there was clearly the suspicion that he was being asked to pay for an enterprise in Syria which would eventually be of benefit to the French alone—an idea which he found most repugnant. When answers were found to these arguments, he would ask me to place myself in his position. Was I not nauseated by the filth, squalor, misery, poverty, and disease in which the greater part of the 3 million indigenous inhabitants of Iraq were eking out a bare existence? Surely his first care was for them. Would I, if I were in his shoes, relish the prospect of having to defend a payment of one-tenth of a year's revenue on people who had come uninvited to Iraq, who had battered on the country, grown fat and lazy (and, in some cases, rich) in the process, and had acquired a nuisance value which they used whenever it suited them to embarrass and vilify the Government? If Iraq was being made to pay for Simel, surely the payment should not increase with every year that passed. There was a limit, and the punishment should be made to fit the crime.

5. There are, no doubt, ripostes to all these thrusts, but I found it by no means easy to persuade Yasin Pasha of the dangers of allowing an Assyrian enclave to remain hostile in Iraq. There is still much of the soldier left in him. Through the force of his own personality he has now established himself, in six months and against odds, in a position which appears to be stronger than that of any of his predecessors. He has set himself the task of establishing firm rule in a lawless country, and to all outward showing he has achieved no little success. A case based on possible danger from the Assyrians comes to him to-day with less force than it would have done a year ago.

6. As regards the railways, he was inclined to regard His Majesty's Government as obstructive and dilatory. He had been given to understand by Nuri Pasha, after his return from London in July, that negotiations to put an end to the present indeterminate status of the system would be opened almost immediately, and, in any case, before the departure of His Majesty's Ambassador on leave. When this was seen to be impossible, he became taciturn, and on occasion disgruntled and querulous. He could not understand why His Majesty's Government should be so long in making up their mind. Had they not, during the Euphrates troubles, stood by and seen their property damaged by the tribesmen without moving a finger? Surely their interest in the railways could not be so great as to necessitate the lengthy cogitation that was holding up his whole development programme. He could not move without coming up against this difficulty. A piece of railway land was badly needed as a new museum site. It could not be handed over until the railway question was out of the way. His scheme for extending the system to Mosul and broadening the gauge would probably mean floating a loan in London. But, without knowing how much he was to be called upon to pay for the existing lines, how could he reasonably approach Parliament? There was, of course, a certain amount of froth in all this, but there was no doubt at all of the Prime Minister's genuine desire to arrive at a settlement as soon as possible.

7. When on the 28th August the proposals of His Majesty's Government were explained to him (in the presence of Nuri Pasha), his whole manner changed perceptibly and it was clear that something in the nature of a *détente* had been effected. Had there been time for leisurely negotiation, it is more than possible that the Iraqi Government would eventually have agreed to the minimum payment of £500,000 required by His Majesty's Government. Mr. Eden's telegram No. 15 of the 14th September from Geneva, however, changed the tempo. Its terms showed that the fate of the scheme of Assyrian settlement in Syria depended upon whether or not Yasin Pasha could be brought, within a few hours, to change his mind and consent to double the Iraqi contribution unconditionally. It was equally clear that His Majesty's Government regarded the matter as one of the most urgent importance, and that a decided final effort would have to be made to bring Yasin Pasha into line.

8. On the 16th September, it seemed to me that the position could be broadly stated in the following way: Yasin Pasha had been favourably impressed with the railway proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government and was

probably willing to close with them, provided he could effect a reduction in the cash payment demanded. In my instructions (your telegram No. 209 of the 24th August) it had been definitely stated that His Majesty's Government regarded this side of the matter as of secondary importance. They were unwilling to see the negotiations fail on financial grounds, and I was given discretion to reduce the amount originally required from £650,000 to £500,000, if necessary, to secure agreement on the remaining conditions of transfer. It so happened that I had an advantage over the Prime Minister in being in possession of the latest available railway returns. Up to the end of July, the deficit in the year's working amounted to nearly £23,000, and I was apprehensive that, if this information came to the knowledge of the Prime Minister, he might be tempted (for all his anxiety to effect a rapid settlement) to adopt the Fabian tactics which had been foreseen as a possibility earlier in the year, in order to bring down the figure of payment to one which would be entirely unacceptable to His Majesty's Government. From this point of view, therefore, there was something to be said on our side also for disposing of the railway question without undue delay.

9. On the other hand, though the urgency of the Assyrian question was patent, there was nothing to show that Yasin Pasha had departed in the slightest from the attitude which he had adopted hitherto. Something more than a honeyed tongue would therefore be necessary to make him give way.

10. Here, then, were all the elements necessary for a transaction which would at one stroke dispose of two outstanding questions. There was no time to consult you in the matter, and I therefore decided that the best course would be to make first a final appeal to the Prime Minister regarding the Assyrians and then, if this failed, to try him out by guaranteeing your acceptance of £500,000 for the railways if he, for his part, would guarantee the necessary Iraqi contribution for Assyrian resettlement.

11. On the 17th September I sought an interview with him and read Mr. Eden's telegram as though it was a personal appeal from the head of the British delegation in Geneva to the head of the Iraqi Government. I said that there was no need to go over all the old ground again. The gesture made by His Majesty's Government had constituted a new "point de départ." It had been prompted by a genuine and urgent desire to break the back of this difficult problem, but it would not succeed unless the Iraqi Government pulled their full weight. It now remained for the Iraqi Government to decide whether, for the sake of £125,000, they would incur the odium of disastrous failure and the possibility of much greater expense and trouble later on. I added that this was an occasion which left no time for anything but a rapid decision, and I begged Yasin Pasha to consider most carefully all the consequences of a blank negative.

12. This message produced some effect, but it was quite clear, from the few remarks which the Prime Minister let fall, that he could not bring himself (and despaired of bringing his colleagues) to go back on all that he had hitherto said.

13. In these circumstances, therefore, I deemed it desirable to offer him something in the way of tangible encouragement. Up to that time, I had given him to understand that the figure of £650,000 required by His Majesty's Government for the railways, bearing as it did a justifiable relationship with the figure of 275 lakhs of rupees mentioned in the Financial Agreement of 1930, was not capable of reduction, and I had vigorously contested the story put about by Nuri Pasha at Geneva to the effect that, at a pinch, His Majesty's Government would accept, as payment, the railway reserve fund. At the same time, Yasin Pasha was clearly out to secure some reduction in this figure. He had said that he had not, at present, got enough in the till to make an immediate payment of this dimension. This seemed to show that if I insisted on full payment, not only would the railway negotiations become protracted, but the opportunity to secure an increased Assyrian contribution would be missed. While, therefore, Yasin Pasha was searching in his mind for the terms of a polite but none the less final negative, I made him the offer reported in my telegram No. 230 of the 17th September.

14. At first he seemed incredulous and went so far as to say that he regretted the connexion which had been made between the two questions. I replied that there was no need for regret, that I had in no way connected them and that all I had endeavoured to do was to indicate, on my own responsibility, a rapid means whereby at one stroke he could dispose satisfactorily of both. If he saw no



virtue in the proposal, then it would be as easy for me to withdraw it as it was difficult to make it. I was by no means wedded to the idea, but the position was such that an immediate decision one way or the other was called for. If he thought the suggestion feasible, I would guarantee my offer as a firm one and one which would be acceptable to you, but if there was to be further argument, time would be lost and no guarantee would be possible.

15. In reply, Yasin Pasha said he would be frank with me. He could not accept without squaring the Minister of the Interior, who had a following and who would need a great deal of persuasion before consenting to an increase in the Iraqi contribution towards Assyrian settlement. The inducement would have to be very attractive. He did not think Rashid Ali would consent to the whole £250,000 in any case, and, even if he could be forced up to £200,000, it would be necessary to reduce the railway payment to £400,000. Could I recommend His Majesty's Government to accept this offer? I declined for the reasons described above, whereupon a long discussion ensued which traversed, *inter alia*, the shortness of Iraq's purse and the difficulties of Iraqi politics. Finally, after again warning the Prime Minister that his suggestion, which savoured of bargaining, would waste most valuable time, I consented to consult you but without leading him to think that there was the slightest hope of agreement, so long as the Iraqi Government made difficulties over the full amount of the contribution required from them for Assyrian settlement.

16. The next day, Yasin Pasha, after repeated telephonic enquiries, called upon me as soon as he heard that your reply had been received. Much of the old ground was retraversed, but finally, when he realised that the *sine qua non* of a settlement of the railway question at his figure of £400,000 was his agreement to pay unconditionally a total of £250,000 for the Assyrians, he gave way with good grace. The rest of the story has, I think, been made clear in my telegrams and despatches.

17. The present position is that the Iraqi Government have bound themselves to double their contribution to Assyrian settlement unconditionally and agreement has been reached in principle regarding the conditions of a railway settlement.

18. From reports which reach me from many sources, it appears that, over the past two weeks, the attitude of the Government, not only towards the railways but to other British interests, has undergone a decided change. There is less desire to obstruct and more to help, and I can only hope that the details of the railway settlement, which remain for further discussion, will do nothing to prejudice what appears to be a most favourable situation.

19. It is, of course, conceivable that by bargaining at the last moment I might have succeeded in splitting the difference and fixing the railway purchase price at £450,000. On the whole, however, I am inclined to think that there may be a very distinct advantage in our being able to point out in the future that the financial transaction was closed at the figure proposed by the Prime Minister himself.

20. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

C. H. BATEMAN.

[E 6298/2/93]

No. 133.

*Record of the 55th Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, held at Geneva on October 15, 1935, at 6 P.M.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 22.)*

THE President recalled that at the last meeting of the committee on the 27th September a sub-committee had been set up to consider the whole question of the organisation of the settlement scheme in the mandated territories, with particular reference to financial control. He asked the United Kingdom representative to give an account of the proceedings of the sub-committee.

The United Kingdom Representative said that a clear distinction had been drawn during the discussions in the Assembly between the Ghab reclamation scheme and the settlement operation proper. It was generally agreed that the

reclamation scheme should be carried out by the services of the French High Commission in Syria, and as the mandated territories were prepared to accept any residuary liability over and above the present estimated cost of 62 million French francs, it was appropriate that financial control should in principle remain with them. The League, however, had a close interest in the progress of the work and a particular financial interest, in view of the fact that the French authorities were prepared to share with the League any savings on the present estimates. Furthermore, the High Commissioner preferred that the contributions of the mandated territories towards the reclamation scheme should be paid into the general fund to be collected by the League for the Assyrian settlement scheme as a whole, and that the annual budgets for the reclamation scheme should have the approval of the League. The recommendations of the sub-committee provided for this and also for eventual audit by the League of the accounts for the reclamation scheme in the same way as for those for the settlement operation proper, but, in the case of the reclamation scheme, local financial control, *i.e.*, responsibility for the authorisation of actual expenditure, remained with the French High Commissioner.

As regards the settlement operation proper, the recommendations which resulted from the discussions at Beirut in August last between representatives of the Council Committee and the authorities in the mandated territories had envisaged the appointment of a representative of the Council to reside in Beirut and to maintain general liaison between the Council and the French High Commissioner. The same recommendations contemplated that local financial control would remain with the French High Commissioner, and that what might be termed the field work of settlement would be carried out by an Executive Committee, on which there would be a settlement expert nominated by the Council. This Executive Committee would carry out decisions of the High Commissioner reached in agreement with the Council representative in Beirut. Furthermore, the recommendations contemplated the ultimate establishment of a Trustee Committee, in which the ownership of the land reclaimed in the Ghab area would be vested pending its ultimate disposal to the Assyrians on the payment by them of a portion of the settlement costs. This Trustee Committee would have the task of collecting the repayments from the Assyrians, allotting land to them and finally handing over to them the title-deeds.

Since the Beirut recommendations were made a good deal had happened which necessitated departure from those recommendations. Financial control had assumed a new importance in view of the fact that the cost of settlement could still not be precisely estimated, while funds were known to be limited. The High Commissioner was still ready to offer the fullest co-operation of his services in the execution of the settlement scheme, and in particular he was prepared to assume entire executive control in matters relating to health and education. As regards finance, however, he was no longer prepared, in view of the circumstances referred to above and the international origin of the funds, to take over responsibility for controlling expenditure. It was his wish that this responsibility should be assumed by the League, acting through the proposed Council representative at Beirut. This seemed appropriate seeing that the League was the guardian of funds contributed from several sources and was itself making a substantial contribution. Against this, however, it had been suggested that the report of the Supervisory Commission of the 25th September precluded the League from further participation in the scheme, except in an advisory capacity, and in particular it had been urged by the Secretary-General that the appointment of a representative of the Council to exercise financial functions in Beirut would give rise to constitutional difficulties within the League, and would be open to particular objection from the legal point of view as it would involve the possibility of the League or its representatives being sued or having to sue in the mandated territories. The sub-committee was faced with the fact that under the existing "règlement financier," which governed the provisional settlement on the Khabur, the League was already exercising a considerable degree of financial control. Under that "règlement" estimates required League approval, the League was the custodian of the funds and issued them to the High Commissioner as and when required, and the eventual audit was in the hands of the League. The sub-committee had felt that the Supervisory Commission's report could not be taken to mean that the League should renounce the control which it already exercised. That control seemed to follow naturally from the part which the League had



already played in the elaboration of the scheme of settlement, and its continuance seemed to be in the best interests of the League with a view to avoiding, as far as possible, an ultimate deficit and a recurrence of the question of responsibility for filling it. On the other hand, the sub-committee recognised the force of the Secretary-General's objections to the appointment of a representative in Beirut to exercise additional financial control locally. The Secretary-General had proposed that an autonomous body with legal personality should be set up by the Council in the mandated territories to exercise this control and, in collaboration with the High Commissioner, to carry out the settlement operation. The sub-committee had considered the best solution to be to advance the date of the constitution of the Trustee Committee contemplated in the Beirut recommendations. The composition of that body and the contents of the statute required to give it personality were matters which would need careful consideration, and lay somewhat outside the competence of the sub-committee. But the financial functions of the new body, which it was proposed should be called the Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board, had been worked out in detail in the revised "règlement financier," which was now submitted for the consideration of the committee as a whole. The sub-committee had further drawn up an explanatory note in the shape of a draft report from the Council Committee to the Council. The United Kingdom representative explained that, while the "règlement" and the draft report to the Council had been drawn up with every desire to meet what were understood to be the Secretary-General's views, the documents had not yet been seen by M. Avenol himself owing to his absence from Geneva. The United Kingdom representative therefore suggested that the committee should, if it adopted the documents, suspend their publication and circulation to the Council until M. Avenol had seen them and had had an opportunity of making observations, which, of course, the committee would always be ready to consider.

The "règlement" and the draft report were then read and considered in detail.

When this was concluded the *President* said that he would personally prefer, before giving his final assent to them, to have a discussion on the composition and constitution of the proposed Trustee Board. He suggested that this discussion should take place on the following day. In the meantime the "règlement" and the draft report could be considered as provisionally adopted.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

October 19, 1935.

[E 6299/2/93]

No. 134.

*Record of the Fifty-sixth and Fifty-seventh Meetings of the Assyrian Committee, held at Geneva on October 16, 1935, at 10.30 A.M. and 5 P.M. respectively. —(Received in Foreign Office, October 22.)*

The *President* explained to Subih Beg, the new Iraqi representative, who had been invited to the meeting of the previous day, but had been prevented from attending, what had passed at that meeting.

The committee then passed to the consideration of the composition and constitution of the proposed Trustee Board.

The *President* asked the United Kingdom representative to explain the views of the sub-committee on this question.

The United Kingdom Representative repeated that the sub-committee had felt that the matter lay rather outside its competence and required detailed consideration by the full Council Committee. As regards the composition of the board, the sub-committee had no definite views except that it would be best to keep the number of the members of the board as low as possible. The sub-committee had tentatively contemplated a board of three members, and it seemed essential that one of the three should be a representative of the French High Commissioner. As regards the functions of the board, the idea of the sub-committee was that in the first stage of the settlement operation, *i.e.*, until the

Ghab area was reclaimed, the Trustee Board should exercise general supervision, that it should appoint a settlement expert to collaborate with the French authorities in the actual execution of the settlement operation and that it should fulfil the financial duties laid down in the "règlement financier" provisionally adopted by the committee at its last meeting. When the Ghab area was reclaimed, the ownership of the reclaimed land destined for the Assyrians should be vested in the Trustee Board, who would be responsible for its ultimate distribution to the Assyrians, the collection from the Assyrians, in the form of a purchase price, of a part of the cost of that settlement and the delivery of title-deeds to the Assyrians when they had paid this price.

A discussion then took place as to whether the board should be limited to three members.

The French Representative recalled that the Beirut recommendations had contemplated a four-member board, consisting of—

- (1) A Council representative;
- (2) A representative of the High Commissioner;
- (3) A representative of the Government of Latakia;
- (4) A member to be appointed by the Council in agreement with the High Commissioner.

The French representative thought it unnecessary that there should be on the Trustee Board now contemplated a representative of the Government of Latakia.

There was general agreement that the board should consist of at least three persons of whom one should be a representative of the High Commissioner; and that another member ought to be M. Cuénod, who is at present the representative of the Council Committee on the local committee in Iraq and who had been thought of as the ultimate Council representative in the mandated territories.

The French Representative suggested that the other member might be a representative of the charitable organisations who might subscribe to the scheme. Another suggestion that was made was that some prominent resident in Beirut might be willing to serve.

The question of the relationship of the board to the League was next considered.

The United Kingdom Representative said that his understanding of the Secretary-General's views was that while the new board should be autonomous after its constitution, it should be constituted by the Council of the League, and its statutes should be approved by the Council to whom it should furnish periodical reports on the progress of the settlement operation.

The *President* then raised the question of the salaries of the members of the board. Were all the members to be paid, and if so were they to receive an annual salary or be paid a fixed sum for every meeting of the board?

It was agreed, in principle, that M. Cuénod, at all events, ought to receive an annual salary and that the salary of High Commissioner's representative might be paid, at any rate in part, from the settlement funds. The question of the payment of the third member of the board was left over for further consideration.

The method of voting on the board was then raised. Were the decisions of the board to require unanimity or to be by majority, and was this a point for the Council to fix or for the board itself to decide in view of its autonomous status? No definite conclusion was reached on these points, but there was evidently a feeling in the committee that the Council had the right in the statutes of the Board to stipulate that decisions on certain points should require unanimity or should be decided by majority. It was further recognised that there might be subjects on which it would be necessary to guard against the possibility of the High Commissioner's representative being overruled. The legal section of the Secretariat (represented at the meeting by M. Habicht) was asked to study the question further in the light of the discussion.

M. Habicht raised the question whether it was contemplated that the new board should be constituted under the local law in the mandated territories, or whether it should have an international status. He pointed out that there were precedents for both methods. The body set up to organise the Greek refugee settlement had been constituted under the local law of Greece, whereas the Nansen Office had been set up by the League of Nations.



*The United Kingdom Representative* expressed the view that it would no doubt be necessary to give local legal status to the new body in whatever manner the local law might require; and the statutes would require careful consideration by the French High Commission in the light of local law. It seemed essential, however, that primarily that body should be set up by the Council of the League.

*The French Representative* pointed out that had it not been for the fact that the Nansen Office was due to expire in 1938, that office would, no doubt, have been entrusted with the settlement operation. What was wanted, therefore, was something on the lines of the Nansen Office, and he suggested that the legal section should be guided very largely by the manner in which the Nansen Office had been set up.

*The President* suggested that the statutes should be divided into two parts to show clearly the functions which the Trustee Board would have to fulfil in the first four years of the settlement scheme, *i.e.*, until the Ghab reclamation scheme was completed, and the functions which it would have to fulfil after that period in relation to the reclaimed land. He asked the legal section to prepare and circulate draft statutes for subsequent discussions by the committee at its next session which would probably be in January.

The President continued that in view of the discussion which had taken place, he was now prepared to accept the "règlement financier" and the draft report to the Council which had been considered by the committee at its last meeting. On his proposal, those documents were definitely adopted by the committee. It was agreed, however, that their publication and circulation should be suspended out of regard for the Secretary-General until M. Avenol had had an opportunity of reading them.

The committee then passed to the consideration of the question of consulting the Assyrians of Iraq as to their desire to take advantage of the proposed scheme. There was general recognition of the fact that it was desirable that this consultation should take place as soon as possible, as until the number of Assyrians to be transferred was precisely known it was difficult to make further progress with the preparation of final estimates or the elaboration of definite plans of settlement.

*Major Thomson*, who was present at the meeting, expressed the view that it was practicable to begin the consultation at the beginning of November with a fair prospect of having the results ready in the early part of January. In reply to an enquiry by the United Kingdom representative *Major Thomson* confirmed that, while he no longer thought it desirable or practicable to include all the details of the settlement scheme in a single comprehensive document to be laid before the Assyrians by the local committee in Iraq as he had originally urged, it was desirable that the local committee's consultation should be on the basis of some document emanating from the Council Committee so as to remove any doubt in the minds of the Assyrians as to the standing of the local committee in this matter. *Major Thomson* suggested that this document might be in the form of a message to the Assyrians from the Council Committee and he had prepared the draft of such a message.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said he thought it important that this document, though in the form of a message from the Council Committee, should have the prior concurrence both of the Iraqi Government and of the French High Commissioner. He suggested that the text of the message, if and when approved by the committee, should be sent in the first place to the French High Commissioner and to the Iraqi Government, and that the latter should be asked, if they concurred, and provided the French High Commissioner had also concurred, to publish the document among the Assyrians and to issue the necessary instructions to the local committee to proceed with the consultation.

This procedure was agreed to and the draft message was then considered and adopted with minor modifications.

A further meeting was held at 5 p.m.

*The President* then referred to a report which had been adopted by the Health Committee of the League, which referred to various questions concerning malaria which might affect the settlement of the Assyrians, and reminded the

Council that the Malaria Commission of the Health Organisation would be prepared to give technical assistance if the Council deemed it desirable.

The President said that it was perhaps premature for the committee to take cognisance of this report at the present stage, since the report was addressed to the Council and would be discussed by the Council in January. At a later stage, however, the President reserved the right to return to this question.

The committee then adopted the texts of notes to the Iraqi Government and to the French High Commissioner, covering the proposed message to the Assyrians. The note to the Iraqi Government asked that Government, provided that it concurred in the terms of the message and that the French High Commissioner had also concurred, to publish it to the Assyrians and issue the necessary instructions to the local committee to begin the consultation. The note further asked the Iraqi Government whether they would be prepared to consider an arrangement for the liquidation of the property of the Assyrians in Iraq whereby the Assyrians would have the option of selling their property to the Iraqi Government at a valuation to be fixed by the local committee, the Assyrians concerned receiving a credit note for the purchase price which would be paid by the Iraqi Government into a special account to be designated later by the Secretary-General of the League.

On *Major Thomson's* suggestion, it was agreed to add to the message to the Assyrians a paragraph about medical arrangements.

The committee then decided to add to its report to the Council a section dealing with the consultation of the Assyrians and a draft of this section was adopted.

A draft of instructions to M. Cuénod regarding the consultation of the Assyrians was next considered. These instructions dealt, *inter alia*, with Assyrians of Persian origin. The committee decided that it could not in any case concern itself with such Assyrians who had come into Iraq since the 14th October, 1933 (the date on which the Council Committee was set up). As regards Persian Assyrians living in Iraq before that date, it entirely reserved its decision and decided to instruct M. Cuénod that while the local committee might draw up lists of such Assyrians if they asked to be included in the settlement scheme, the local committee was to make it clear that the preparation of such lists did not in any way place the Council Committee under any obligation or prejudice its ultimate decision. The drafting of instructions on these lines was left to the Secretariat.

*The Iraqi Representative*, at the request of the President, promised to ascertain from the Iraqi Government at what stage they would be prepared to transfer to the League the balance of the contribution of £125,000 originally promised in Yasin Pasha's letter of the 26th May, 1935. (Of this sum £60,000 was paid by the Iraqi Government in August last.)

On the proposal of Mr. Hill, the *French Representative* undertook to enquire from the French High Commissioner regarding the amount of land which would be made available for sheep grazing on the Jebel Ansariyeh.

The meeting then ended on the understanding that the next session would normally be held in the early part of January prior to the Council meeting, but that it would be summoned by the President before then if occasion arose. It was further agreed that if the Secretary-General had observations to make on the committee's report or on the "règlement financier," and these observations involved amendments, the President would have discretion to deal with the matter as far as possible by means of individual consultation with the members of the committee, in preference to summoning a formal meeting.

J. C. STERNDALÉ BENNETT.

October 19, 1935.



[E 6343/2/93]

No. 135.

*Letter from the Secretary-General, League of Nations, to the High Commissioner of the States of the Levant under French Mandate regarding the Proposed Message to the Assyrians of Iraq.—(Received in Foreign Office, October 25.)*

(C/Min.Ass./148.)

Sir,

Geneva, October 17, 1935.

I AM instructed by the Council Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq to send you herewith a copy of the letter which the committee has to-day despatched to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, concerning the individual consultation of the Assyrians of Iraq, with a view to definitely ascertaining the number of those wishing to leave that country. This letter is accompanied by a message which will be transmitted by the Government of Iraq to the Assyrians on behalf of the Council Committee as soon as your assent and that of the Government of Iraq have been obtained.

The committee hopes that you will let me know as soon as possible whether you agree to this text, or will communicate to me any observations you have to make, in order that the message may be speedily communicated to the Assyrians, the consultation being due to begin early in November.

I have, &amp;c.

AZCARATE,  
Acting Secretary-General.

Enclosure 1 in No. 135.

*Letter to the Government of Iraq concerning the Individual Consultation of the Assyrians.*

Sir,

Geneva, October 17, 1935.

BY direction of the Committee of the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, I have the honour to inform you that the committee has reached the conclusion that the time has now come to proceed to the individual consultation of the Assyrians of Iraq, with a view to ascertaining the number of those who desire to take advantage of the proposed scheme of settlement in the French mandated territories of the Levant. The Council Committee has always held the view that such consultation could not well take place until it was clear that a substantial proportion of the funds necessary for the realisation of that scheme would be forthcoming. It feels that this difficulty has now been removed by the offers of contributions which have been made by the Iraqi Government itself, by the mandated territories of the Levant, by the United Kingdom Government and by the League of Nations. It is in fact impossible to proceed further with the preparation of final estimates or with the elaboration of definite plans for the settlement, without accurate knowledge of the number of Assyrians who will have to be transferred, and the Council Committee therefore considers that the consultation of the Assyrians should take place at the earliest possible moment.

By the courtesy of the Iraqi Government it has had the advantage of discussing the matter with Major D. B. Thomson, the president of the local committee, which, in accordance with the arrangements already agreed upon with the Iraqi Government, will carry out this consultation; and it understands that in his view it would be practicable for the local committee to begin this part of its task at the beginning of November with the object of making the results available to the Council Committee at the beginning of January 1936. It would be most useful if this programme could be carried out.

While the local committee will be generally guided by League documents C.352.M.179.1935.VII, of the 12th September, 1935, and A.VI/5.1935 of the 18th September, 1935, in dealing with the questions which are bound to be raised by the Assyrians, the Council Committee thinks that it would be an advantage if the consultation were initiated on the basis of a document describing in outline the conditions of settlement in the mandated territories of the Levant in terms agreed upon between the Council Committee, the Iraqi Government and the

French High Commissioner. The draft of such a document is enclosed herein for the consideration of the Iraqi Government.

A copy of this draft is being sent also to the French High Commissioner with a request for his early observations, and as soon as he has signified his concurrence, I shall not fail to inform you accordingly. If the Iraqi Government also concurs the Council Committee would propose that that Government, as soon as the concurrence of the High Commissioner has been obtained, should publish the document among the Assyrians and instruct the local committee to begin the consultation on the basis of it. Instructions are being sent forthwith to M. Cuénod, the representative of the Council Committee in the local committee, to hold himself in readiness to take part in the work of consultation at any moment.

It is contemplated that at a later stage, the local committee will concern itself *inter alia* with the liquidation of the property of which it may be necessary or desirable for those Assyrians who elect to leave Iraq to dispose. The Council Committee would suggest, for the consideration of the Iraqi Government, that it would be convenient if an arrangement could be adopted whereby the Assyrians would have the option of selling such property to the Iraqi Government itself at a fair valuation to be fixed by the local committee, the individual Assyrians concerned receiving a credit note for the value of the property sold, and the Iraqi Government paying the sums due into an account to be designated later by myself in consultation with the Council Committee. If the Iraqi Government is prepared in principle to agree to an arrangement of this kind, the Council Committee would suggest that the local committee be entrusted with the task of drawing up detailed recommendations as to its operation for the further consideration of the Iraqi Government and the Council Committee.

I have, &amp;c.

AZCARATE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 135.

*Draft Message to the Assyrians concerning their Settlement in the Ghab.*

THE committee appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to deal with the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq is now in a position to inform them that the French Government has been good enough to agree to receive in the French mandated territory of the Levant such of them as may wish to leave Iraq.

In the message communicated by the Council Committee on the 17th April, 1935, it was stated that land in the vicinity of the Khabur River was under consideration as a possible destination. As a result of further discussion with the French High Commissioner for Syria and the Lebanon, however, it has been agreed that the area known as the Ghab, which lies on the banks of the River Orontes and the slopes of Jebel Ansarieh, is the most suitable for the final settlement.

Considerable preliminary work for the preparation and irrigation of the land will be necessary before the Assyrians can enter on to it, but whilst this work is in progress they can be temporarily settled on other adjacent land.

The French authorities will, moreover, endeavour to arrange that as many Assyrians as possible shall be employed on these preparatory works, and on such other local work as may be considered suitable.

The ultimate intention is to settle Assyrians in organised centres of, say, 2,500-4,000 persons. These centres will be arranged tribally so far as possible.

It is hoped that land may be allotted as far as possible on a basis of 4 hectares of irrigated land per family. In addition, land would be available for villages, grazing, &c. The settlers will be exempt from taxation while the Ghab land is being prepared, and, after their final settlement, for a further period, which will be in principle five years.

The Committee of the Council of the League of Nations has decided that the Assyrians must contribute towards the cost of their settlement. In the first place, 1 Iraqi dinar shall be paid by or on behalf of every Assyrian leaving Iraq for Syria as a contribution to meet preliminary expenses. Furthermore, land assigned to settlers will not become their property until they have purchased it. The "standard plot" will be sold at a low price, based on the local valuation,



according to its quality and position. The purchase price may be paid directly on allotment or else in instalments over a period of fifteen years, but in this case interest at 6 per cent. per annum will be charged. Title deeds will be handed to settlers directly the full payment is made.

The French authorities propose to naturalise all Assyrians after the expiry of a period which, in principle, will not be less than five years from the date of the immigration.

When Assyrians have become naturalised they will be nationals of Syria and as such will be eligible for administrative posts, &c., and enjoy all the rights of minorities in virtue of the mandate. Pending their naturalisation their civil, political and religious status will be as described below.

From the time of their admission to the territory of the Levant status under French mandate until their naturalisation the legal status of the Assyrians will be that of other foreigners, subject to the application of certain special derogations specified below.

They will not enjoy political rights. They will be provided with identity cards.

Decisions regarding any Assyrians who, during their stay in the territory, may render themselves undesirable, will be taken in each individual case by the High Commissioner, after consultation with the body entrusted with the settlement.

They will, in general, enjoy all the public liberties to which nationals are entitled under the organic laws of their place of settlement. One of the most important of these liberties is freedom of conscience and "the free exercise of all forms of worship, which are consonant with public order and morality," in accordance with the provisions of article 8 of the mandate. To these should be added personal security, inviolability of domicile, security of property, and, within the limits laid down by the law, freedom of meeting and association.

They will not, however, be authorised to reside outside the places set aside for their settlement.

In principle, they will enjoy all the private rights of nationals, including the right to inherit movable and immovable property *ab intestato* or by will, due regard being had to their customary law.

In the exercise of their private rights as in police matters, the Assyrians will normally be subject to the local law. In personal matters (civil status, legal capacity, marriage, divorce or separation, affiliation, paternal authority, guardianship, legal position of the insane), the law is determined by the personal status of those concerned—that is to say, by the law of the religious community to which they belong. Respect for the personal status of those concerned is guaranteed by articles 6 and 8 of the mandate.

They will be exempt from taxation until a date to be fixed by agreement between the High Commissioner and the body entrusted with the settlement, corresponding in principle to the expiry of a period of five years following the date of the transfer of land to that body by the Government concerned.

The Assyrians will have free access to the courts, without any restriction upon their right to institute proceedings.

They will be amenable to the jurisdiction of the judge appropriate to their personal status—that is to say, of the court of the religious community to which they belong—in all proceedings relating to their status.

In all matters not connected with personal status, the Assyrians will be subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, to which interpreters are attached.

The mandate further grants every religious community—subject to the supervision of the mandatory authorities—the right to manage the affairs of the community and its educational institutions.

Help will be given to the Assyrian community in the establishment of schools. Syriac and Arabic will be taught, and of these Arabic will be compulsory. At a later date, higher elementary schools may be instituted in which French in addition will be taught.

Several dispensary infirmaries, each of about thirty beds, will be created in the area of settlement.

The staff during the early years of settlement at least, will include three or four doctors and about twenty nurses, male and female; the nurses will be recruited from among the Assyrians.

It is now essential for the purpose of making definite arrangements to know how many Assyrians desire to take advantage of the proposed scheme of settlement in Syria, and a careful count of all such persons will at once be made by the local committee under the presidency of Major D. B. Thomson.

There will be complete freedom of choice for each adult Assyrian to decide whether he will remain in Iraq or elect to go to Syria.

Every adult Assyrian will be consulted individually or through the head of family, and it must be understood that when a choice has been made, it is final.

Each adult Assyrian who elects to emigrate to Syria, must at the time of declaring his intention to do so, inform the local committee fully of his ownership of freehold land, house property and live-stock whether horses, mules, donkeys, cows, sheep, goats, &c.

It is possible that the amount of live-stock which may be transferred to Syria by each family will be limited.

Every adult Assyrian before entering Syria shall be required to sign a declaration on behalf of himself and minor dependants, indicating that the settler:—

- (1) Leaves Iraq for good and enters Syria of his own free will in full knowledge of the conditions under which he is being admitted, which conditions he accepts.
- (2) Undertakes to submit to the laws and regulations of his new country of residence as well as to the regulations arising out of the special position of the settlers.
- (3) Undertake to acquire Syrian nationality at such time as may be fixed.
- (4) Recognises that, in addition to his mother tongue, the two languages officially taught in Syria (French and Arabic) shall be taught compulsorily in the Assyrian schools.
- (5) Agrees that all lands, which may be allotted to him in the mandated territories with a view to purchase will remain the property of the body entrusted with the settlement until such time as he shall have completed the payment of the price, as assessed by the competent authorities, either in one full payment or by instalments.

The Committee of the Council of the League of Nations reiterates the advice which it has already given repeatedly to the Assyrians, namely, that those of them who elect to go to Syria should continue their normal occupations and employments, and sell no household property, land or animals until they have consulted the local committee, who will advise them as to what they should do and give them full warning of the date of their departure from Iraq.

Every endeavour will be made to begin the transfer to the Assyrians to Syria early next year, probably in the month of March, but it must be thoroughly understood that the transfer will be gradual and take several months.

Finally, the Committee of the Council urges on all Assyrians that they should have complete confidence in the local committee, who will always be ready to give the fullest possible information regarding the settlement scheme.

Strict obedience to the instructions of the local committee will facilitate the transfer of the Assyrians not only for the local committee but also for the Assyrians themselves.

Geneva, October 16, 1935.

[E 6514/433/93]

No. 136.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 4.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 28. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Bagdad, October 23, 1935.

Mr. BATEMAN'S telegram No. 248 of 17th October.

Insurrection in the Sinjar now appears to have been crushed, and operations ceased on 16th October. Persons referred to in paragraph 4 of telegram under reference have, with two exceptions, been released.

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Mutessarif of Mosul visited Sinjar on 14th October to ensure that proper precautions were taken to prevent excesses by troops, but there are disquieting rumours that, after fighting reported in Mr. Bateman's telegram No. 25, Saving, of 9th October, savage reprisals were taken by troops in villages from which tribesmen had resisted their advance.

I am asking His Majesty's consul at Mosul to make further enquiries.

[E 6634/433/93]

No. 137.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 11.)*

(No. 584.)

Sir,

Bagdad, October 31, 1935.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 28, Saving, of the 23rd October last, I have the honour to report the following further details of recent events in the Sinjar.

2. On the 18th October an official communiqué was published summarising briefly the causes of the disturbances and the punitive measures taken by the Government against the tribes concerned. It was also announced that all resistance having now been broken the military operations had been brought to an end.

3. The court-martial set up in the Sinjar by Royal Iradah on the 14th October continues, however, to try persons charged with participation in these disorders. I have been unable to obtain accurate statistics of the number of sentences passed, but a Mosul newspaper states that some ninety Yazidis have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment of not less than seven years each, while seven or eight village headmen have been hanged. The trial of a number of others, who were made prisoners during the operations, is proceeding.

4. I am still making enquiries with a view to clear up the uncertainty which covers the facts of the arrests made in Mosul to which Mr. Bateman referred in his telegram No. 248 of the 17th October. Although, as I reported in my Saving telegram under reference, most of those arrested were released a few days later, subsequent news from Mosul, where the Christians appear to be alarmed, suggests that some have again been arrested on the flimsiest evidence and removed to the Sinjar for trial by court-martial. These reports are not yet confirmed and I have asked His Majesty's consul to make further investigations. In present circumstances, however, it is difficult for him to obtain trustworthy information.

5. Mr. Edmonds, the adviser to the Ministry of Interior, who, at my request, has given special attention to this matter, tells me that although in several instances the military and police authorities may have acted hastily and with some severity, he is satisfied that there has been no serious abuse of the powers given to those administering martial law nor any deliberate victimisation of the Christians of Mosul. He has every confidence in the mutessarif, and assures me that the latter is not being overruled by the military commanders, who, it so happens, are his personal friends.

6. Reports of the killing of Yazidi wounded, and even of some of those who surrendered, persist, but there is unlikely to be any opportunity to establish what measure of truth they contain. It appears probable, however, that, during the sharp engagement on the 7th October in which the army and police lost a number of killed and wounded, little quarter was shown to the Yazidis, but in view of the fact that a large number of Yazidis have been brought into Mosul as prisoners, it is impossible to accept as true the story that all who surrendered were put to the sword.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 6771/278/93]

No. 138.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 18.)*

(No. 591.)

Sir,

Bagdad, November 6, 1935.

WITH reference to Mr. Bateman's despatch No. 485 of the 11th September, I have the honour to report that on the 25th October the Iraqi Parliament reassembled after the adjournment of forty-five days ordered by Royal iradah on the 9th September.

2. The first few days were devoted to committee work and the Chamber did not meet until the 30th October, when a Bill was passed empowering the Government to issue regulations giving effect to article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. On the following day the extraordinary session, summoned after the general election of the summer, was prorogued.

3. On the 2nd November King Ghazi opened the ordinary session for 1935-36.

4. A translation of the Speech from the Throne taken from the *Iraq Times* of the 4th November is enclosed herein.<sup>(1)</sup> In accordance with custom, the speech opened with a reference to foreign relations and expressed satisfaction at the progress made at Tehran and Geneva towards a settlement of outstanding difficulties with Persia. This was followed by an appreciative mention of the negotiations for the final transfer to the Iraqi Government of the Iraq railway system and of the happy influence which this event had had on Anglo-Iraqi relations. His Majesty also spoke on the war in Abyssinia and the steps taken by his Government to carry out their obligations under article 16 of the Covenant.

5. Turning to home affairs, the King spoke of the successful suppression of banditry in the Barzan and Zibar areas, and congratulated his army on the fitness which they had shown to maintain the rule of law and order. No direct reference was made to recent events in the Sinjar.

6. The speech concluded with a short catalogue of the more important Bills to be laid before Parliament during the session. Among these were the new Penal Code, the new Electoral Law and the law to restrict certain occupations to Iraqis.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 6978/2/93]

No. 139.

*Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Bagdad).*

(No. 271.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 29, 1935.

YEZIDI rebellion and danger to Christian population.

Full and apparently accurate report of facts, particularly as regards attitude of Iraqi military authorities and danger to Christian population, has now reached Geneva. Account includes credible reports of excesses of Iraqi troops against Yezidi population, and there is evidence that, notwithstanding your successful action in preventing triumphal entry of troops into Mosul, return of police detachments led to anti-Christian demonstrations which have terrorised Christian communities.

Such a development, unless promptly checked, is likely to lead to serious complications as regards arrangements for transfer of Assyrians, since it can hardly fail unduly to swell numbers of those wishing to leave and to increase risk of Assyrians trying to anticipate regular arrangements for their transfer by premature mass movements leading to danger and confusion.

But apart from this, unless immediate steps are taken to remedy situation, effect at Geneva is likely to be deplorable, and Iraqi Government may find themselves next January again pilloried before the League Council either in

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connexion with the Assyrian question or on a new and wider minority issue with unfortunate eventual reactions on Iraq's general relations with the League.

I realise that you have already taken strong and successful action in connexion with measures taken by Iraqi Government for suppression of Yezidi revolt; but it is important that Iraqi Government should give clear and early proof that they are determined to prevent development of a new anti-Christian agitation, and to allay present fears of Christian communities by removing any cause they may have for nervousness as to their future safety. This might perhaps be done by the issue and publication of appropriate circular instructions to the military and civil authorities and police, and possibly by issue of reassuring proclamation; but, whatever precise measures the Iraqi Government may think best, it is clearly essential that prompt and decisive action should be taken which will satisfy Geneva that they are genuinely trying to redress the situation.

Unless you see serious objection, you should immediately take up this question with the Iraqi Government, and make every effort to persuade them to take adequate action.

[E 7068/433/95]

No. 140.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 4.)*

(No. 277.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, December 4, 1935.

YOUR telegram No. 271.

I have discussed the whole matter again with Nuri Pasha and, without revealing the source, given him substance of your telegram in a private letter.

I had constantly warned him and the Prime Minister that, when news reached London and Geneva, effect would be as you describe, and have urged early measures to reassure both Yezidi and Christians.

I think that they realise the necessity for this, for they have taken the following steps:—

- (a) Instructed Mutessarif of Mosul to summon meeting of Moslem and Christian religious dignitaries to warn them that all street abuse of religion would be heavily punished, and to appeal to all to work together as Iraqis in common loyalty. These instructions were carried out on 14th November.
- (b) Termination of martial law with effect from 17th November.
- (c) Prepared amendments to law which will return certain important powers for mutessarif in areas where martial law is declared and make all death sentences subject to confirmation by Government and not local general officer commanding.
- (d) Decided by Cabinet resolution that in future an Act of Indemnity for acts committed by officials in areas where martial law is proclaimed shall not be passed until measures taken by the military to restore order have been made subject of official enquiry and report. This decision will not, however, apply to recent Sinjar operations.

I shall report result of my present representations by telegraph.

[E 7207/2/93]

No. 141.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.—(Received December 10.)*

(No. 285.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, December 10, 1935.

MY telegram No. 277.

Nuri Pasha told me to-day that he had shown my letter to other members of the Cabinet, and that, in order to be in a position to meet criticism, they had decided to send Minister of the Interior to visit Mosul and Sinjar to report on the situation.

He said he had been satisfied by reports of mutessarif that no excesses had been committed by troops or police when suppressing revolt in Sinjar.

Mutessarif had also assured Minister of the Interior that events in Sinjar and Mosul have not in any considerable measure influenced the attitude of Assyrians towards settlement proposals. Steps taken so far by the Iraqi Government give some evidence of their desire to prevent repetition of recent events or development of anti-Christian agitation.

It is more difficult to devise measures to allay fears of Christians and Yezidi communities.

It seems to me that time alone can do this. Both have suffered sporadic persecution at the hands of Moslems for centuries and on this account are prone to easy panic. General instructions to military and civilian authorities on lines you suggest would, I fear, be of little value now even if Iraqi Government were persuaded to issue them. The best hope lies in personality of the present mutessarif (whose high qualities are underrated by Mr. Edmonds), who can be relied upon to do his utmost to restore confidence. Some action by the League designed to impress on the Iraqi Government the deplorable effect of creating incidents of this kind might be beneficial. Greatest care would, however, be necessary to avoid provocative publicity, which would react most unfavourably on minorities in this country. Confidential talk with Iraqi delegation at Geneva is the sort of thing I have in mind.

[E 7251/2/93]

No. 142.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 13.)*

(No. 189.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the fifty-eighth meeting of the Council Committee, held on the 5th December, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

*Geneva, December 11, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 142.

*Record of the Fifty-Eighth Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, held at Geneva on December 5, 1935, at 5-30 P.M.*

The President said that the documents which had been circulated contained a great many details about the preparatory work which was required in the mandated territories before any Assyrians could be received in the vicinity of the Ghab area. The best thing seemed to be to proceed without delay with the appointment of the Board of Trustees, so that the study and preparation of the measures involved could be left to that body. The Council Committee obviously had not sufficient local knowledge. There was a legal difficulty, namely that the Board of Trustees could only be set up by a decision of the Council of the League. If sufficient progress were made, however, it might be possible in a few days' time to ask for a meeting of the Council, profiting by the presence of its members in connexion with the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Eighteen in the Abyssinian question. It would be a great gain of time if the Board could be set up in the near future, and could study the questions at issue; otherwise the Council Committee would itself have to take decisions which properly fell within the competence of the Board, and thus assume an undesirable responsibility. M. Oliván therefore proposed that the committee should first of all examine the draft statute of the Board of Trustees which had been prepared by the Legal Section of the Secretariat.

The United Kingdom Representative said that when he left London he had no reason to believe that the examination of the statute of the Board of Trustees was a matter of such urgency. While ready, therefore, to discuss the statute, he



was not in a position to accept any particular wording on behalf of the United Kingdom Government. Any suggestions which he made must be regarded as purely personal, and he must refer any new text to his Government before agreeing to it.

*The French Representative* said that he was as yet without the observations of the High Commissioner, and could therefore only discuss the draft statute tentatively.

*The Danish Representative* asked whether the committee was legally able to take a decision on the statute.

*The President* replied that the committee could only make recommendations to the Council.

*M. Arocha* observed that it was necessary to explain the present situation, in order to show the urgency of proceeding to a discussion of the statute. The report adopted by the committee at its last session in October had been distributed on the 12th November. Meanwhile, as provided in that report, the Legal Section had drafted the statute of the Board of Trustees. The message to the Assyrians, decided upon at the last meeting of the committee, had been sent to Iraq, and certain modifications had been discussed with the Iraqi Government and with the French High Commissioner. There was now agreement on the text of the message, but it had not yet been published, since the Iraqi Government had accepted it on the assumption that the committee would approve the suggestion made by that Government of putting before the Assyrians during the consultation a definite programme of transfer. The Iraqi Government had been informed that the committee would consider this programme at its present meeting.

The committee had also to take a decision on the request which had been made by certain so-called representatives of Assyrian tribes, that they should be allowed to send a delegation to the Ghab area.

The most important fact, however, for present purposes was that a letter had just been received from M. Burnier, describing the work which had to be done before the Assyrians could be received in the mandated territories.

*M. Arocha* then read M. Burnier's letter, the main point of which was that the necessary preparatory work would take three months. *M. Arocha* remarked on this latter point that, unless the preparatory work were begun almost at once, the whole operation of transfer would inevitably be delayed.

*The President* observed that *M. Arocha's exposé* of the situation only reinforced his view that the first point to be taken should be the draft statute of the Board of Trustees.

*The United Kingdom Representative* asked that, in view of its importance, *M. Burnier's* letter—although a private one to *M. Arocha*—should be distributed. This was agreed to (copy of letter attached as Annex A).<sup>(1)</sup>

*The Danish Representative* said that *M. Burnier's* letter clearly showed the necessity for a Council meeting in the near future, if that could be arranged. Was it certain that all the members of the Council would be in Geneva on the 12th December?

*The United Kingdom Representative* stipulated that the committee should not at the present stage take a definite decision about asking for a Council meeting.

*The President* explained that all that was intended for the moment was to find out whether a meeting of the Council was materially possible, should it be found necessary. He instructed *M. Arocha* to inform the Secretary-General that the committee would probably ask for a meeting of the Council in the near future, but that it had not yet taken a decision.

The committee then proceeded to a first reading of the draft statute of the Board of Trustees (Annex B). A discussion took place on the basis of the French text.

Minor drafting changes were made in article 1.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

As regards article 2, the *President* suggested that there was an apparent conflict between clauses 2 and 3. It was decided that they should be amended on the lines of articles 15 and 16 of the statute of the Nansen Office.

On the proposal of the United Kingdom delegate, it was agreed that article 3 should be expanded so as to emphasise the distinction between the functions of the Board of Trustees during the first four years or so of its existence, and its subsequent activities after the ownership of the reclaimed area in the Ghab had been vested in it.

On article 4, the *United Kingdom Delegate* observed that no provision was made for the payment of the third member of the Board of Trustees. He reserved his attitude on this point.

*The United Kingdom Representative* observed that article 5 seemed to be too widely worded. If taken literally, it would give the chairman power to ignore his colleagues. He suggested that something on the lines of article 9 of the statute of the Greek Refugee Commission would be appropriate. This article provided that the chairman, or in his absence his substitute, would convene all meetings of the Settlement Commission, sign all documents and correspondence, and be responsible for the execution of the decisions of the Settlement Commission. This was agreed to.

It was agreed that article 6, which had been taken bodily from the Greek Statute, was not very happily worded, and, following observations by the French representative, it was decided to amend the article in the sense of making more of the offer of the High Commission to provide personnel and recommending the Board of Trustees to take advantage of that offer.

*The French Representative* reserved his attitude regarding article 7.

Article 9 raised the question whether the proceedings of the Board should be by unanimity or majority. There was a general feeling that the unanimity rule, of which a corollary would be reference to the Council in case of all differences of opinion, might be cumbersome and involve too much delay. On the other hand, it was realised that the majority rule was likely to cause difficulties, and there was doubt as to how it would fit in with the provision that a quorum could be constituted by two members.

*The United Kingdom Representative* pointed out that in the Statute of the Greek Commission provision had been made for any member who could not attend meetings to be represented by a substitute. As the present draft provided for the appointment of substitutes, he suggested that this idea might be further explored, so that there would always have to be three members at every meeting.

It was decided to reserve consideration of this article, the *President* expressing his personal view that decisions by majority should be agreed to, but that the proviso that two members might constitute a quorum should be omitted.

In article 10 it was agreed that the reference to article 2 of the Financial Regulations should be deleted, and that the article should provide simply that the expenses of the Board should be met in the manner provided for in the annexed Financial Regulations.

As regards article 11, the *United Kingdom Representative* pointed out that the similar articles in the Greek Statute had gone on to indicate what the action of the Council should be. Had the Legal Section omitted these provisions on purpose, or not?

*M. Habicht* said that the provision in the Greek Statute that the Council should pronounce on reports of the commission by a majority vote and should, by a majority vote, if necessary, proceed to an enquiry into the Settlement Commission's work was an unusual one, and the Legal Section had not therefore felt it possible to insert it in the present statute without precise instructions to that effect. If, however, the committee decided that the Council was to supervise the work of the Board of Trustees, his personal opinion was that it was advisable to stipulate that the Council should act by a majority vote.

*The President* asked whether the Council had, in fact, taken decisions by majority vote in regard to the Greek settlement work.



*M. Habicht* undertook to look up this point, and meanwhile the question was left open.

*The United Kingdom Representative* pointed out that there was an apparent conflict between article 12 and the annexed Financial Regulations regarding the procedure to be adopted in cases of dispute regarding the interpretation of those regulations. According to article 19 of the regulations, questions which could not be settled under the regulations were to be submitted to the Secretary-General, and by him, if necessary, to the Council Committee. Article 12 of the statute, however, provided that questions regarding the interpretation of the Financial Regulations were to be submitted to the Council itself. He thought that there should be no misunderstanding as to what the procedure should be.

It was agreed that the words "annexed Financial Regulations" be deleted from article 12.

The committee then proceeded to discuss the request made by so-called representatives of certain Assyrian tribes to be sent as a delegation to see the Ghab area before the tribes concerned were called upon to take a decision.

In reply to a question, *M. Arocha* said that subsequent correspondence showed that the local committee thought that the expenses of any such delegation would have to be paid by the Council Committee.

*M. Oliván* recalled that representatives of the tribes concerned had visited him in Mosul. In reply to his question whether they would be prepared to go to Syria, they had stated they could not decide without knowing the conditions of the proposed settlement in Syria. *M. Oliván* had said that he was not then in a position to give detailed information, and the interview terminated, though the representatives concerned had afterwards complained that they had not received a proper hearing. *M. Oliván* thought that it was a delicate matter to allow Assyrian delegates to go to the Ghab area. A visit to land which was to be completely transformed before settlement was not likely to give reliable impressions. Even members of the committee who knew of the improvements projected would find it difficult at the present stage to realise what the land would be like after the development works had been undertaken. He thought also that it was a dangerous precedent to allow a delegation to go to the Ghab, as the committee would be bound to allow other Assyrians to go if they expressed a desire. Moreover, the High Commissioner might have objections. He asked the Iraqi representative what his opinion was.

*The Iraqi Representative* replied that he knew nothing of the matter. He had not been informed of the request of the Assyrians concerned. He would like to know what the views of the committee were, and he would then inform his Government. Personally, he thought the idea of sending a delegation to the Ghab a dangerous one.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he entirely agreed that the delegation should be discouraged. He thought, however, that the matter should be handled very carefully, as otherwise the committee might be severely criticised on the ground that it was obstructing the Assyrians and trying to conceal from them the real situation. He thought that it was important to impress upon the Assyrians not only that the visit was financially impossible, but that it would serve no useful purpose, in view of the fact that the Ghab area was to be transformed by public works before settlement took place. He thought it should also be impressed upon the Assyrians that the French Government were not likely to put forward—nor the committee to endorse—any scheme unless they had reason to suppose that it was likely to offer a prosperous future to the Assyrians. Furthermore, it should be impressed upon them that the prime object of the committee had been to find an alternative home for those who felt it impossible to remain longer in Iraq. The choice, in fact, before the Assyrians lay between accepting the Syrian scheme or remaining in Iraq.

*The Danish Representative* agreed and thought that the committee ought to mark its disapproval of the lack of confidence in the French authorities and in the League Committee which the request amounted to. He entirely agreed that the question ought to be most carefully explained to *M. Cuénod*.

*The French Representative* read a communication from the French High Commissioner showing that *M. de Martel* thought the proposed visit of a delegation entirely out of the question, and recommending that the Assyrians must be told that they must rely upon the French authorities and the League Committee.

It was agreed that it might be preferable, in order to avoid misunderstanding, that the communication to *M. Cuénod* should be in the form of a letter sent by air mail, rather than a telegram.

The next meeting was fixed for the 6th December at 10 A.M. to consider the question of the consultation of the Assyrians and the programme of transfer.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

[Annex A. Not printed.]

#### Annex B.

(First Draft.)

#### *Statutes of the Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board.*

*Article 1.*—There is established in the Levant States under French mandate an Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board (hereinafter called the "Board"). It shall be domiciled in Beirut.

*Art. 2.*—(1) The Board shall be a legal person, competent to sue and be sued in its own name, to hold and alienate property of all kinds, and generally to perform any acts which can be performed by a corporation possessing full legal personality.

(2) The Board shall alone be responsible for liabilities duly incurred by it. Neither the League of Nations nor the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon shall incur any liability as the result of the operations of the Board.

(3) No member of the Board shall be liable or responsible for anything whatever in connexion with the activities of the Board except a breach of trust knowingly and intentionally committed by him.

*Art. 3.* The Board shall perform the functions and exercise the powers attributed to it expressly or by implication in the decisions which have been or may subsequently be adopted by the Council of the League of Nations. In particular it shall be responsible, in the manner provided in the annexed Financial Regulations, for the expenditure on the settlement operation (as distinct from the public works for the reclaiming of the Ghab), and shall collaborate with the High Commissioner in all that concerns the installation and administration of the Assyrian colonies. It shall, in addition, ultimately take over, administer and dispose of the land in the Ghab area when reclaimed.

*Art. 4.* The Board shall be composed of a chairman and two members. The chairman and one member shall be appointed and may be removed from office by the Council of the League of Nations; the other member shall be a representative of the High Commissioner. The chairman shall receive a salary, which shall be fixed by the Council.

*Art. 5.* The chairman, or, if he is unable to act, another member designated by the Board, shall have power to represent the Board and sign all correspondence.

*Art. 6.* The Board shall have power to appoint and dismiss such personnel as it may require for the discharge of its functions, but as far as possible shall utilise personnel placed at its disposal by the High Commissioner.

*Art. 7.* The Board shall be exempt from all taxes and charges, whether general or local, in respect of all operations and property of the Board, and in particular of lands transferred to it or any transactions affecting such lands.

*Art. 8.* Subject to the provisions of these statutes, the Board shall make its own internal regulations and shall have power to delegate particular duties to individual members.

*Art. 9.*—(1) Decisions of the Board may be taken by a majority. Two members may constitute a quorum if the third is prevented from attending.



(2) Substitutes for the members of the Board appointed by the Council of the League of Nations may, if necessary, be appointed by the Council.

(3) Vacancies among the members appointed by it shall be filled by the Council of the League of Nations.

*Art. 10.* The expenses of the Board shall be payable out of the funds from the Assyrian settlement schemes described in article 2 of the annexed Financial Regulations.

*Art. 11.—(1)* Periodical reports on the operations of the Board, the progress of the settlement scheme, the condition of the Assyrian settlers and, in general, all questions relating to the provisional and final settlement shall be made by the Board to the Council of the League of Nations. A copy shall simultaneously be sent to the High Commissioner.

(2) The Board shall be entitled to call the attention of the Council of the League of Nations to any difficulties which it encounters in the execution of its functions.

*Art. 12.* The Board shall be entitled to submit to the Council of the League of Nations any question of interpretation of the present statutes, the annexed Financial Regulations or the decisions concerning the settlement scheme taken by the Council of the League of Nations. The decisions of the Council shall be final and binding for all purposes.

*Art. 13.* The Board may be dissolved by the Council of the League of Nations.

*Art. 14.* The present statutes may be amended by the Council of the League of Nations, on the proposal of one of its members or on the proposal of the Board.

(First Draft.)

*Declaration to be Signed on behalf of the French Republic for the Levant States under French Mandate.*

The French Government, on behalf of the Levant States under French mandate, promises that the necessary measures shall be taken to ensure to the Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board set up by the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of . . . the legal character, powers and privileges set out in the statutes of the Board.

[E 7252/2/93]

No. 143.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 13.)*

(No. 190.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copy of a record of the fifty-ninth and sixtieth meetings of Council Committee respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

*Geneva, December 11, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 143.

*Record of Fifty-ninth and Sixtieth Meetings of the Assyrian Committee of the Council, held at Geneva, on December 6, 1935, at 10 A.M. and 5 P.M. respectively.*

AT the request of the president, *M. Arocha* explained the various amendments proposed by the French authorities and the Iraqi Government to the draft message to the Assyrians. *M. Arocha* said that the Iraqi Government had now agreed to the wording of the ante-penultimate paragraph of the message regarding the time which the transfer was likely to take, but their agreement was on the understanding that the local committee would, during the consultation, place before the Assyrians the definite programme of transfer which the Iraqi

Government had suggested (see Document No. C./Min.Ass./155). *M. Arocha* read a private letter from *M. Cuénod*, according to which the local committee had drawn up an itinerary for its consultation. This itinerary showed the magnitude of the task before the local committee. It provided for some 5,000 miles' travel by motor car, in addition to twenty-four days on horseback. The whole task was likely to take forty-five days, not counting the consultation of the Assyrians in Barwar-i-Bala and Nerva Raikan, who were at present inaccessible owing to snow. (*M. Arocha* added that, according to the latest information, the number of Assyrians in these districts was about 4,000, and it would not be practicable to consult them until April, or perhaps even May.) The letter also gave a provisional estimate which the committee had drawn up as to the numbers of Assyrians in each tribe who might be expected to wish to leave Iraq.

In answer to an enquiry by the United Kingdom representative, *M. Arocha* confirmed that the numbers in this provisional estimate corresponded to those on which the Iraqi Government's programme of transfer was based.

*M. Arocha* then read a telegram from *M. Burnier* to the effect that the accommodation of 20,000 Assyrians was theoretically possible during the year 1936 if the Trustee Board were to begin preparatory work immediately and climatic conditions were favourable, and if, moreover, the immigrants were prepared to work intensively. It would be necessary to begin transfers by the end of March, and *M. Burnier* thought that monthly transfers of 3,000 would be possible if the preparatory works were sufficiently advanced when the first arrivals were transferred. *M. Arocha* added that the Iraqi delegation had received a telegram from the Iraqi Government announcing the readiness of that Government to transfer during 1936 the maximum number that could be absorbed in Syria.

*The President* thought that the main point which the committee now had to consider was the time and manner of the consultation, and the first thing was to decide whether the committee could accept the programme of transfer which the Iraqi Government wished to place before the Assyrians during the consultation, pending a decision on which the consultation was being held up. The main consideration was finance. Even if the French authorities could accept the numbers of Assyrians contemplated in the Iraqi programme within the relevant dates, was the programme financially practicable? The total number provided for in the Iraqi programme was some 21,000, in addition to those already provisionally settled on the Khabur; whereas the estimates on which the committee had hitherto worked were based on the transfer of 15,000 new immigrants, and even for that number the whole of the necessary funds were not yet in sight.

*M. Arocha* said that a suggestion had been made by the Iraqi representative that, even if the whole programme could not be placed before the Assyrians, it might be agreed upon as between the committee and the Iraqi Government, and each Assyrian, when indicating his desire to go to Syria, could be told, in accordance with the programme, the date on which he would be required to move.

*The United Kingdom Representative* pointed out that this involved an equally definite commitment which it seemed impossible for the committee to enter into under present financial circumstances.

*M. Arocha* thought that it might be necessary to fall back on fixing the dates between which the whole move would take place. Even this, however, was difficult in the present situation, and it was possible that the fixing of terminal dates would not prevent the Assyrians from flocking into Mosul.

*The President* suggested that perhaps a programme of transfer might be drawn up for the total number for which the necessary funds were already assured. Then up to that number each individual Assyrian who elected to go could be told the date on which he would go.

*The United Kingdom Representative* recalled that in an earlier message, in which the committee had urged the Assyrians to return to and remain in their villages quietly until the time for transfer came, it had been stated that those who acted in this way would not be prejudiced in the ultimate transfer. The giving of preference to those consulted first, which was involved in the proposal just made, might mean that this pledge was not, in fact, kept.



*The President*, addressing the Iraqi representative, said that the committee fully appreciated the Iraqi Government's preoccupation and would like to assist in overcoming the difficulty. It was clear, however, from the discussion which had taken place that the committee could not take premature responsibility. It had found a place for settlement; it had found a good deal of the money which was necessary; but it was not yet in a position to agree to anything so definite as the Iraqi programme, and he suggested that it was equally in the interests of the Iraqi Government themselves not to have too definite engagements, as if it were found when the time came that these engagements could not be fulfilled, the resulting trouble would recoil as much upon the Iraqi Government as upon the committee.

*The United Kingdom Representative* suggested that the Iraqi Government should be informed that the committee felt unable to agree to the programme of transfer; that it sympathised with the object of the Iraqi Government and would be glad to consider any alternative means of overcoming the difficulty. Through lack of local knowledge, it had not felt able to make counter-proposals, as the Iraqi Government had asked, but would consider any proposals put forward by the Iraqi Government.

*M. Arocha* objected that this procedure would involve delay.

*The French Representative* recalled that the High Commissioner had always made it clear that he was not prepared to take the Assyrians without an assurance that he would not be involved in financial responsibility for them. The financing of the transfer of 15,000 was more or less assured, but the High Commissioner would have difficulty in committing himself to more under present circumstances.

*M. Arocha* observed that the figure of 15,000 had only been taken, both at Beirut and at Geneva, as a basis of discussion. It was always foreseen that more might have to be transferred, and, in fact, the French authorities had fixed a kind of sliding scale. They had said that every 1,000 Assyrians over and above the 15,000 would cost, approximately, an extra million francs.

*The French Representative* said that the exact figure was immaterial. The point was that receipts were limited.

*The President* said that the consultation must, of course, proceed, even though it might result in a larger number of Assyrians electing to go than there were funds to pay for. At the same time, any engagements which the committee entered into must correspond to the money available. The committee could not promise more. In short, all the Assyrians could be consulted, but no promise could be made that they would go at a certain date.

*M. Arocha* thought that in the circumstances it was running a considerable risk to hold the consultation—seeing that it was likely to result in many more Assyrians going to Syria than had hitherto been contemplated.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that there were two kinds of risks. He thought that when the committee agreed to the message in October, all the members had realised that there was a certain risk involved, because the issue of the message to the Assyrians did entail a kind of moral obligation to see that somehow or other all Assyrians who elected to go were eventually transferred to Syria. He thought he was interpreting the minds of the members of the committee in saying that the committee had accepted that risk, and he did not think it was a very serious one. Means could no doubt be found to raise extra funds as and when needed. On the other hand, the Iraqi programme of transfer involved a much more definite risk. It was, to his mind, quite out of the question that the committee should promise at this stage that the transfer should take place on definite dates, or within definite dates. However, the question to be decided was not necessarily concerned with the dates of transfer. The Iraqi Government had suggested two alternatives—either to fix the time which the whole transfer would take or to publish a detailed programme. But both alternatives were only the means to an end. The whole difficulty was to prevent the Assyrians from leaving their villages and leaving their work prematurely

and going into Mosul. The Iraqis had suggested means of preventing this which the committee could not accept. Was there any alternative which the committee could suggest?

*The French Representative* said that apart from financial reasons it was impossible to fix a definite programme, because it would be dependent on climatic conditions. But might not the order in which the various tribes would be transferred be established? The remnants of those tribes now represented among the Assyrians in Syria might be taken first.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that perhaps some such programme might be combined with a programme of transfer by villages, such as he had suggested in correspondence prior to the present meeting, so that there would be no incentive to concentration in Mosul.

*The President* said that it might be possible to work out some combination of this sort. It was essential, however, to avoid any definite commitment. Could the Iraqi representative give any advice? He appreciated the fear of the Iraqi Government that the Assyrians might flock into Mosul, but might not the Iraqi Government be creating even greater difficulties by trying to fix a definite programme which it might be impossible to carry out?

*The Iraqi Representative* said that the local committee and the Iraqi Government were in close touch with the Assyrians, and were in a better position than others to realise the difficulties. There was no doubt, however, a danger in fixing dates and numbers.

*The President* suggested a procedure in two stages. There might be a preliminary consultation, during which the Assyrians would simply be asked to say "Yes" or "No" as to whether they wished to go to Syria. The local committee, having got all replies, could then study the list and work out the order of departure. The second stage would be the announcement of a definite programme of transfer.

*M. Arocha* doubted whether this would meet the difficulty. The Assyrians would, during the consultation, be required to sign the declaration, of which the text was given in the message to the Assyrians, and it was at that point that the danger of flocking into Mosul would arise.

*The United Kingdom Representative* thought that this was a misinterpretation of the procedure hitherto proposed. He pointed out that the message contemplated that the declaration should be signed by individual Assyrians, not during the consultation, but before entering Syria. The message, in fact, did propose the procedure which the President had just suggested.

*The Danish Representative* agreed with this view. As *M. Arocha* said that he did not think that this was what the local committee would understand from the message, the *United Kingdom Representative* proposed, and it was agreed, that the distinction should be made quite clear to *M. Cuénod*. Once the declaration was signed, there was a definite obligation to transfer the Assyrians who had signed it to Syria, and it seemed important at the present stage to avoid any such definite commitment.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that as the discussion had so far produced no result, it was for consideration—though he himself did not yet wish to propose it—whether the whole plan hitherto contemplated should not be changed. When the committee had decided to embark upon the consultation in October, it had been thought that the consultation could be completed in time to have the results available for the January Council. Major Thomson had thought this possible, and it would in fact have been possible, but for the unfortunate delay which had occurred in setting the consultation going. It was now, in any case, impossible to have the results in time for the January Council, and, in fact, if the committee adhered to its original view of establishing the total number of Assyrians to be transferred and thus fixing the limits of the problem before any transfers were undertaken, transfer could not begin until May, or perhaps even June, of next year, since 4,000 of the Assyrians at least could not



be consulted owing to climatic conditions until April or May. In these circumstances it was for consideration whether the committee should not proceed piecemeal, i.e., that it should make up its mind that however many Assyrians elected to go would, in fact, have to be transferred sooner or later, and that it should fix with the Iraqi Government the order in which tribes should be transferred. This would not necessarily be published, but the local committee would then be instructed to go to each tribe or area in turn, and in each area carry out not only the consultation, but the actual transfer, before proceeding to the next. This might involve a postponement of the beginning of the consultation until February or March, but it would not involve any delay in getting the transfer started.

A discussion on this suggestion revealed a general disinclination to take so definite a step in present financial circumstances and a preference for attempting still to get a general idea of the total number to be transferred, before transfer took place. It was accepted, however, that the impossibility of consulting the Assyrians in Barwar-i-Bala and Nerva Raikan should not be allowed to hold up the beginning of the actual transfer operation.

*The Danish Representative* said that what the Iraqi Government wanted was that the Assyrians should not leave their villages for Mosul in the belief that they would thereby obtain earlier transfer. It seemed, therefore, that the difficulty might be overcome by impressing on the minds of the Assyrians the idea that they would be transferred not from Mosul, but from the village in which they were living. When the consultation took place, the local committee might say that as soon as the results were known a plan of transfer would be established, and the Assyrians in that particular village would then be informed of the date on which their village would have to move. It might be stipulated also that the necessary declaration would have to be signed in the village. An incidental suggestion was that the committee, when carrying out the consultation, ought to find out how many of those who elected to go were in a position to pay for their own transfer.

*The Iraqi Representative*, asked for his view, said that in point of fact all transfers would probably take place via Mosul, as road conditions made this convenient. At the same time he saw no reason why this should be indicated to the Assyrians.

*Mr. Hill* pointed out that it might be inconvenient to stipulate that the declaration should in all cases be signed in the village of origin. This might add to the burden of the local committee. The Danish representative accordingly withdrew this part of his proposal.

Mr. McKinnon Wood and M. Habicht of the Legal Section entered the meeting at this point, and the discussion was interrupted to deal with certain points about the statute of the Trustee Board. Mr. McKinnon Wood submitted the attached redraft (Annex A) of several articles, in accordance with the discussion at the fifty-eighth meeting. Discussion on article 6 revealed the fact that it was no longer the intention of the High Commissioner to lend the services of his personnel in a part-time advisory capacity. M. de Martel apparently had it in mind to second suitable personnel to the service of the Board of Trustees, but he would expect such personnel to be the employees of the board and paid by the board, in the same way as any other personnel which it might engage. In the light of this explanation, it was agreed that there was no real point in keeping the second sentence of article 6 as in the redraft, and it was accordingly deleted. The other articles in the attached redraft were accepted (*ad referendum* in the case of the United Kingdom and French representatives), with the following amendments:—

In article 2 (3) the word "personal" was inserted before the word "responsibility." The phrase "or their own action as members of the board" added to the words "activities of the board"; and the words "in the case of" inserted before the words "a breach of trust."

The curious wording of the redraft of article 10 was explained as intended to cover all expenditure which the board might incur, and not merely its own administrative expenses.

*The United Kingdom Representative* pointed out that expenditure on the settlement operation was already provided for in article 3, and that if article 10 was necessary at all it should be confined to the administrative expenses of the board. The article was accordingly amended to read: "The expenses of the board shall be payable in accordance with the annexed Financial Regulations."

*Mr. McKinnon Wood* recalled that the President had asked whether the provision that the Council should take decisions on reports by the Greek Settlement Commission by majority vote had ever been operated. The point had been looked into, and there appeared to be no record of it. If the committee desired that the Council should have this power of deciding by majority vote any matters concerning the Assyrian Board of Trustees, it was desirable that it should be inserted in the draft statute, but there had been special reasons for the rule in the case of the Greek Commission, and he doubted whether it was necessary in the present case. It seemed hardly conceivable that the Council should wish to enforce decisions in Syria against the vote of the French Government.

*The United Kingdom Representative* agreed that in the present case there appeared to be no reason for providing for a majority decision of the Council. It was not, however, on that point that the provisions of articles 17 and 18 of the Greek Statute seemed to afford a useful precedent. The point in the present case was that the object of the statute was to set up an autonomous body. At the same time it seemed desirable, in the interests of all concerned, that the Council of the League should retain some degree of ultimate control, and unless the power of the Council was stated in the statute, there might be some doubt as to what the Council could do.

It was agreed that provisions on the lines of articles 17 and 18 of the Greek Statute should be inserted, omitting the provision for majority decisions of the Council.

The committee then returned to the question of the consultation of the Assyrians.

*The President* asked the Iraqi representative for his view on the Danish representative's proposal.

*The Iraqi Representative* said that it seemed to him to come near to meeting the object which the Iraqi Government had in mind when putting forward their programme of transfer. At the same time it would, of course, be much better if it were possible to give an approximate date of transfer.

It was agreed that a draft telegram to the Iraqi Government should be prepared on the lines of M. Borberg's proposal, for consideration at a later meeting.

The meeting was resumed at 5 p.m.

The attached redrafts of the last sentence of article 3; paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 9; and article 11 were submitted (see Annex B).

So far as articles 3 and 11 were concerned, the redrafts were accepted. The redraft of article 9 gave rise to a long discussion. It was objected that the appointment of substitutes by any member unable to sit might involve practical difficulties. The member concerned might not be capable of appointing a substitute, or of consulting his colleagues. A suggestion that permanent substitutes should be appointed at the outset of the board's work—either by the members themselves or by the Council of the League—was put forward, but doubt was expressed as to whether a sufficient number of suitable persons would be available locally. It was pointed out, however, that to provide for a quorum of three, without providing for substitutes, might prove impracticable, and preference was expressed by various members for a return to the quorum of two.

*The United Kingdom Representative* asked what was to happen if the quorum of two were not in agreement. Would it not be better to have the unanimity rule throughout? This would probably not in practice lead to delay. It would, in fact, be an incentive to the members of the board to reach a compromise acceptable to them all, so as to avoid the necessity of reference to the Council of minor points at all events. The majority rule might, on the other hand, lead to friction within the board.



*The French Representative*, on the other hand, said that in the case of the quorum of two it was clear that one of the two would always be a representative of the High Commissioner, and in such a case he thought that a preponderating vote should be given to the other member, since the ultimate responsibility of the settlement operation would lie with the Trustee Board, which was the creation of the Council of the League. As regards the idea of unanimity in all decisions, he thought that the High Commissioner might not like to be in the position of either having to agree with all decisions of the Trustee Board or of provoking a reference to the Council of the League.

*The United Kingdom Representative* asked whether it was not undesirable that the members appointed by the Council should be in a position to overrule the High Commissioner on points which might be of importance to the administration of the mandated territories as a whole.

*The President* expressed agreement with the United Kingdom representative.

*The French Representative* said, however, that he could not think of any question which would be likely to affect the administration as a whole. Of course, it might be possible to stipulate that decisions on certain questions should be by unanimity, but that in the main decisions should be by majority. He agreed that it was difficult for the Council Committee to define the questions on which unanimity was necessary.

As Mr. McKinnon Wood had said that the majority rule was usual in the case of organisations emanating from the League, and as there was clearly no agreement among the members of the committee, it was decided that the best course would be to leave the article as originally drafted, pending at all events the observations of the High Commissioner, and perhaps to allow it to be tested by experience.

The attached redraft of article 9 was therefore not accepted, and the question was left open.

The draft of a telegram to the Iraqi Government about the consultation of the Assyrians was then considered and adopted (see Document C/Min./Ass./161).

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

#### Annex A to Enclosure.

##### *Statutes of the Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board.*

Article 1. There is established in the Levant States under French Mandate an Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board, hereinafter called the "Board," domiciled in Beirut.

Article 2.—(1) The Board shall be a legal person, competent to sue and be sued in its own name, to hold and alienate property of all kinds, and generally to perform any acts which can be performed by a corporation possessing full legal personality.

(2) The Board shall alone be responsible for its own activities. Neither the League of Nations nor the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon shall incur any liability as the result of the operations of the Board.

(3) The members of the Board shall incur no responsibility, either jointly or severally, in respect of the activities of the Board, except a breach of trust knowingly and intentionally committed by them.

Article 5. The chairman or, if he is unable to act, his substitute will convene all meetings of the Board, sign all documents and correspondence and be responsible for the execution of the decisions of the Board.

Article 6. The Board shall have power to appoint and dismiss its personnel. It shall utilise, as far as possible, the personnel which the High Commissioner might place at its disposal.

Article 10. The expenses made by the Board shall be paid according to the annexed Financial Regulations.

#### Annex B to Enclosure.

##### *Redrafts of Certain Sentences and Paragraphs.*

###### *Article 3.*

Substitute for the last sentence:—

"As and when the land in the Ghab area is reclaimed, the ownership of such parts of the reclaimed land as are destined for the Assyrians shall be vested in the Board, whose duty it shall be to arrange the distribution of the land to the Assyrians, settle finally the price and conditions of its purchase by them, and transfer the property therein to them on completion of the payments due."

###### *Article 9.*

New draft of paragraphs (1) and (2).

(1) Decisions of the Board may be taken by a majority. The presence of three members shall be necessary to constitute a quorum, but if unable to sit a member appointed by the Council of the League of Nations shall appoint a substitute after consultation with his colleagues, and the representative of the High Commissioner shall be replaced by a substitute appointed by the High Commissioner.

(2) If a member appointed by the Council of the League of Nations is likely to be unable to act for more than three months, the appointment of his substitute shall be a matter for the Council of the League of Nations to decide.

###### *Article 11.*

The Board shall communicate every three months to the Council of the League of Nations a report on its activities, the progress of the settlement scheme, the condition of the Assyrian settlers, and in general all questions relating to the provisional and final settlement. A copy shall simultaneously be sent to the High Commissioner. The Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to consider the reports of the Board and to take such measures thereon as it may consider proper.

(2) The Council of the League of Nations may at any time enquire by such method as it determines into the manner in which the Board is discharging its functions.

(3) The Board may call the attention of the Council of the League of Nations to any difficulties which it encounters in the execution of its functions.

[E 7279/2/93]

No. 144.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 16.)*

(No. 193.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the sixty-first meeting of the Council Committee on the 7th December, 1935, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

*United Kingdom Delegation,  
Geneva, December 13, 1935.*

Enclosure in No. 144.

*Record of the Sixty-First Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, held at Geneva on December 7, 1935, at 5-30 P.M.*

*Perso-Assyrians.*

M. Arocha recalled that in the instructions sent to M. Cuénod regarding the consultation of the Assyrians (document C/Min.Ass./151) the committee had expressed its point of view about the Persian Assyrians. This had occasioned a

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letter from the Iraqi Government (document C/Min.Ass./154), in which the Iraqi Government had made it clear that, in their view, the committee's task was not concerned with Assyrians of Persian origin.

*The President* thought that the committee was still not in a position to reach any definite decision on this point, and he suggested that it could only be left open for the time being. He asked whether, according to present instructions, the Persian Assyrians were actually to be consulted or not.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that, according to the instructions sent to M. Cuénod, the local committee was not to take the initiative in consulting Persian Assyrians, but if such Assyrians presented themselves and expressed a desire to go to Syria, the committee was not precluded from taking particulars about them. It was, however, to make it clear that the taking of particulars involved no obligation and did not prejudice in any way the ultimate decision of the Council Committee. There seemed, therefore, no alternative but to leave the question open for the moment. He personally, however, entirely agreed with the point of view of the Iraqi Government.

*The Danish Representative* said that he also agreed. He thought it difficult for the committee to interpret its terms of reference in the sense that it had the power to deal with Assyrians of Persian origin.

#### *Liquidation of Assyrian Property.*

*M. Arocha* recalled that in its letter of the 17th October to the Iraqi Government the committee had enquired whether that Government was prepared to facilitate the liquidation of Assyrian property by purchasing such property, at a price to be fixed by the local committee. *M. Arocha* read extracts from document C/Min.Ass./157, showing that the Iraqi Government regretted their inability to accept any further liability by undertaking itself to purchase Assyrian property. The Iraqi Government were prepared, however, to give all possible help in ensuring a satisfactory liquidation of the property.

*The President* suggested that the local committee should be asked to give their views as to how this point was to be dealt with.

*The United Kingdom Representative* said that he thought it was a very important point, to which the committee ought to give most careful consideration. It was clear that, unless some satisfactory means of disposing of property at a fair price were arrived at, the Assyrians would be the losers, and it seemed necessary to guard against this. In reply to an observation by *M. Arocha*, he agreed that the committee had already dealt with it in connexion with the transfers of Assyrians which had already taken place; but those transfers were on a comparatively small scale, and the Assyrians concerned were for the most part taken from the more destitute members of the community. What was now contemplated was an operation on a much larger scale, and the committee would have to deal with Assyrians who were more firmly established and who had possibly a considerable amount of immovable property, besides a greater number of sheep and cattle than they might be able to take with them to Syria. If no arrangements were made, the Assyrians might either dispose of their property at ridiculous prices, or, if they found themselves compelled to do so, might be influenced in their choice about going to Syria. Furthermore, there was the question of crops. Assyrians in the villages who had sown crops might be unwilling to move until they could harvest them, unless some arrangements were made for selling the crops unharvested. The question was a difficult one, and he thought it was important that the Iraqi Government should be asked what they proposed as an alternative to the suggestion already made by the committee. The views of the local committee should also be obtained.

*The President* agreed. The local committee might be asked to report on the nature of the property, its estimated quantity and the ways and means of disposing of it.

*The French Representative* thought it might be difficult for the local committee to make a report until the consultation was completed and the quantity of the property affected was approximately known.

*The United Kingdom Representative* suggested that the importance of the matter ought nevertheless to be impressed upon the local committee and their preliminary views obtained without loss of time.

*The Danish Representative* agreed. Apart from safeguarding the Assyrians against loss, it was in the interest of the Council Committee that the financial position of the Assyrians and consequently their power of maintaining themselves in Syria should not be impaired. He thought that the actual amounts concerned did not matter much. The question of the principle involved should be referred to the local committee.

This was agreed to.

#### *Finance.*

At the request of the President, *Mr. Hill* explained the present situation. The basic figure for the cost of the whole operation was 86 million French francs. This was composed of 62 million French francs for public works and 24 million French francs for settlement. The last figure was based on two assumptions: (a) that the number of Assyrians to be provided for was 15,000; and (b) that certain reductions proposed by the Council Committee were approved by the High Commissioner. Both these assumptions seemed now likely to be affected, and the figure of 24 million might thus be exceeded. The Iraqi Government thought that more than 15,000 Assyrians would go. The reductions proposed by the committee had been referred to the High Commissioner for approval, and the High Commissioner, who was then in Europe, had approved a reduction of 500,000 French francs out of the 2 million French francs proposed. The remainder, he said, would have to be referred to Beirut. The High Commissioner, on his return to Beirut, had taken the line that no further reductions could be agreed to until the Board of Trustees had been set up and had examined the position.

*M. Burnier*, for his part, however, had stated that he could not accept reductions in the figures for maintenance and equipment. *M. Burnier* had, of course, no authority to accept or reject, but his view would probably be decisive with the Board of Trustees when set up.

*Mr. Hill* suggested incidentally that it ought to be impressed on the Assyrians that they would be expected, so far as possible, to pay for their own maintenance in Syria. This was implied in various documents but had never been made clear.

*Mr. Hill* concluded by saying that to meet the total estimated cost the amount promised was approximately 72,500,000 French francs. The Secretariat was in communication with the United Kingdom and Iraqi Governments in regard to the amounts required for the coming year.

*Mr. Bieler* said that the only funds in hand at the moment were the remainder of the £60,000 advanced by the Iraqi Government. Out of this sum 50 per cent. of the total estimated cost of settling the Assyrians transferred last summer had been paid to the French authorities, and this payment represented, in fact, an excess of 540,000 French francs over the estimate since drawn up for 1935. The sum of 540,000 francs thus represented an advance on the budget for 1936. On the other hand, the sum of about 700,000 French francs provided in the estimate for 1935 in respect of the arrears of expenses in connexion with the Khabur settlement had not yet been paid to the French authorities. Allowing for this payment it was anticipated that at the beginning of 1936 there would be about 150,000 French francs in hand. The Secretary-General would be ready to advance at the beginning of 1936 the whole of the League contribution for that year, and the Committee would have to look to the United Kingdom and Iraqi Governments for the rest of the expenditure anticipated for 1936. He understood that the United Kingdom Government had it in mind to arrange for an advance of £60,000 so as to equal the amount already paid by the Iraqi Government, and that the intention thereafter was that the two Governments should contribute equal and parallel amounts.

*The French Representative* said that the French High Commissioner was ready to agree that the amount of 705,000 French francs payable to him in 1935 on account of the Khabur arrears should be paid at the beginning of 1936; and that the similar amount payable in 1936 should be paid in 1937.



*The United Kingdom Representative*, with reference to M. Bieler's last remarks, said that no definite decision as to figures had yet been come to by the United Kingdom Government. The matter was still under consideration.

*The French Representative* asked what the position was as regards the budget for 1936.

Mr. Bieler replied that if the Trustee Board were constituted by the 1st January it would have to study the whole question, and he presumed that it would address the Secretary-General, as soon as possible, with regard to the budgetary provisions for 1936. The amount for the necessary preparatory work was, however, assured.

#### *Contributions by Private Organisations.*

*The United Kingdom Representative*, in reply to an enquiry, said that he had good reason to suppose that a genuine effort was being made for a campaign among private organisations in the United Kingdom. The collection of funds from these sources was, however, bound to be a gradual process, and those who were organising the campaign must be left to work it out in their own way. He asked whether there was any news of efforts in other countries, and what was being done *vis-à-vis* of international organisations.

M. Arocha said that there was nothing to report except a letter from Professor Keller to M. Burnier, in which Professor Keller had said that certain organisations with which he was in touch, including organisations in the United Kingdom, were contemplating the raising of funds—not, however, for settlement work but for the religious needs of the Assyrians when they arrived in Syria. As Professor Keller's letter indicated that the appeal which the Archbishop of Canterbury had in mind to launch had this limited object, the *United Kingdom Representative* said that he thought he could say definitely that the idea was erroneous. The Archbishop fully understood that money was necessary in considerable amounts for settlement.

*The President* said that he had received a visit from Professor Keller, who had repeated to him much the same as had been included in his letter to M. Burnier.

M. Arocha said that tentative approaches to American and other international organisations had, so far, produced no result, and he wondered whether the organisations in the United Kingdom should not be pressed to bring international organisations within the orbit of their campaign.

*The United Kingdom Representative* protested against this being left to organisations in the United Kingdom. He felt that altogether too much onus was being placed on them, and that no real effort was being made to work for international action.

M. Borberg agreed. He thought that every effort should be made to set up an international committee to centralise funds.

*The President* thought that the Secretariat ought to study M. Borberg's proposal.

M. Charron thought that the committee should not be discouraged by the lack of response from international organisations. His own experience in refugee questions led him to believe that there was more chance of collecting money from private sources once the work of settlement had actually begun and some results could be shown. He believed also that there was more chance of obtaining a banking credit towards filling the present gap when some actual results had been obtained.

*The President* agreed, but thought that the problem of centralising private efforts should nevertheless be studied forthwith.

M. Borberg said that the danger was that private organisations, unless guided aright, might be inclined to subscribe for some definite object, like the construction of a church or a hospital, instead of for general settlement work. This would not necessarily be helpful.

M. Charron said that this was particularly the case with the Rockefeller Foundation, which always tried to give money for some definite object, rather than to help a general cause.

It was agreed that the Secretariat should give further study to the organisation of international effort.

#### *Assyrian Delegation to the Ghab.*

A draft letter to the local committee in Iraq explaining why this suggestion could not be accepted was considered and adopted. It was agreed that it was preferable to send this letter to the local committee as a body rather than to M. Cuénod as originally proposed, but it was also agreed to send it through the Iraqi Government under a short covering note.

#### *Future Procedure.*

*The President* said that the next step was to obtain the approval of the Council for the statutes of the Trustee Board, and if possible for the appointment of the members of the board. The alternative practicable dates for a Council meeting were the 10th December and the 17th December. The terms of the statutes were not yet fixed. The views of the United Kingdom Government on the draft were not known. The observations of the French High Commissioner had not yet been received, and in any case the French High Commissioner had not yet seen the latest draft of the statutes. The appointment of the third member of the proposed board required some discussion, and a report would have to be made for the Council. In view of all that had to be done, he was accordingly in favour of asking the Secretary-General that a Council meeting should be arranged for the 17th December.

This was agreed to.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

[E 7395/2/93]

No. 145.

*United Kingdom Delegate to Foreign Office.—(Received December 19.)*

(No. 198.)

THE United Kingdom delegate to the League of Nations presents his compliments, and has the honour to transmit copies of a record of the sixty-second meeting of the Council Committee, respecting the Assyrian question, of which a copy has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad.

Geneva, December 18, 1935.

Enclosure in No. 145.

*Record of the Sixty-second Meeting of the Assyrian Committee, held at Geneva, on December 16, at 5.30 P.M.*

#### *Consultation of the Assyrians in Iraq.*

THE secretary read a letter which had just been received from the Iraqi delegate (Document C/Min.Ass./171), reporting that the message from the committee to the Assyrians had been distributed, and that the actual consultation had begun on the 14th December at Dohuk. The letter added that the additional warning to the Assyrians not to leave their villages pending definite arrangements



for their transfer, which had been decided upon at the fifty-ninth meeting and embodied in the telegram to the Iraqi Government on the 6th December (Document C/Min.Ass./161), had also been published.

*The President* expressed satisfaction, and thanked the Iraqi delegate for the assistance which he had given in the matter.

#### *Statute of the Proposed Trustee Board.*

*The President* asked the French representative whether he had any further information as to the attitude of the High Commissioner for Syria towards the draft statute.

*The French Representative* regretted that he had no new information to give the committee. He recalled that the original draft statute had been sent to M. de Martel, whose only amendment had been to propose an addition at the end of article 7 to make it clear that the freedom of the Board from local taxation would not apply to expenditure incurred by technical operations necessary for the registration in the archives of the State of Latakia of lands eventually assigned to the Assyrians (Document C/Min.Ass./163). The French Government had subsequently forwarded to the High Commissioner the revised draft of the statute resulting from the discussion at the fifty-eighth, fifty-ninth and sixtieth meetings of the committee, and had asked him at the same time for an estimate of the additional cost which would be involved by his proposed reservation in regard to the cost of the cadastral registration of the lands. M. de Panafieu expected a reply at any moment, but in the meanwhile, as he was practically certain that M. de Martel would not have any further points to raise, he suggested that there would be no reason to delay circulation of the final draft of the statute in anticipation of the council meeting on the 18th December, and that his own position might be covered by adding a footnote to the draft to the effect that, while in general agreement with the draft, the French representative had not been able to give his definite approval, pending a further communication from the High Commissioner at Beirut which was expected at any moment. (This procedure was subsequently rendered unnecessary by the receipt of M. de Martel's concurrence in the revised draft.)

*The United Kingdom Representative* raised the question whether the addition proposed by the High Commissioner to article 7 was really relevant, since it appeared that these cadastral charges might not in fact come within the meaning of the phrase "impôts et taxes," from which article 7 specifically exempted the operations of the Trustee Board. He suggested that it might be more appropriate to deal with the matter in a letter from the French Government to the Council Committee, rather than in the statute.

*The French Representative* replied that he was under the impression that according to the law of the mandated territories, these cadastral charges would, in fact, come within the meaning of the word "taxes"; and he thought that it would therefore be necessary to include the High Commissioner's proposed addition. He pointed out that in any case these charges would not arise for some years, until the reclaimed land was finally being made over to the Assyrians.

*The United Kingdom Representative* stated that in the light of this explanation he would be prepared to accept the addition, since it was clearly for the High Commissioner to decide what facilities he could or could not grant free of charge.

The committee decided to adopt the High Commissioner's addition to article 7.

#### *Composition of the Trustee Board.*

*The President* then read to the committee the draft of the report which he proposed as *rapporteur* to present to the Council and also the draft resolution which he would submit to the Council. Turning to the question of the composition of the Trustee Board, he said that it would clearly be necessary to have somebody with financial experience at Beirut when the Board began its work. As the committee was aware, there were objections to any member of the League

Secretariat being actually appointed a member of the Board, even as a temporary measure; but the Secretary-General had agreed to allow Mr. Bieler, Assistant Treasurer of the League, to proceed immediately to Beirut to help with the constitution of the Board, the establishment of an accounting system in accordance with League practice, and other points of detail. Mr. Bieler would, however, have to be back by the middle of next month in order to be available for the January meeting of the Council.

*The President* then referred to the efforts which had been made to discover a suitable person to act temporarily as third member of the Board until it had been possible to select a permanent third member—possibly from among candidates who might be forthcoming in the mandated territories themselves. The difficulty might have been met by simply proposing to the Council the immediate establishment of a Board of two members, and to ask at the same time for authority for the committee to appoint the third member; but he thought that it would be preferable to set up the Board with its full personnel in the first instance. He had himself proposed to the Secretariat for the post of temporary third member the name of Sr. Barcenas, a member of the Spanish Diplomatic Service, who had had experience in the League financial section and who had been seconded for the last three or four years to work under Dr. Rost van Tonningen, the adviser whom the League maintained in Vienna to assist in the financial rehabilitation of Austria. M. Oliván said that he thought he had persuaded Sr. Barcenas to accept the post for a period of about two months, but there might be difficulty in his being able to leave his present work so as to reach Beirut in time to consult with Mr. Bieler and to attend the opening meeting of the Trustee Board, which should take place at the latest in the first days of January so as to be able to authorise the preliminary settlement measures which would be necessary if the Assyrian emigration from Iraq were to begin in the spring. M. Oliván thought that Sr. Barcenas was a most suitable candidate, and he hoped that it would be possible to induce his present chief to allow him to get away in time to reach Beirut about the 1st January.

*The United Kingdom Representative* mentioned that he had had an opportunity of meeting Sr. Barcenas with M. Arocha, and that he too had come to the conclusion that he would be a most suitable person to act as a temporary third member until it had been possible to select a permanent incumbent, possibly in the light of the recommendations which Mr. Bieler would be able to make on his return from Beirut. He thought that there was considerable advantage in not filling the third post permanently at the outset. The appointment needed careful consideration and might be important in connexion with the attempt to obtain funds from private charitable sources; it might, for example, be possible to find an American who would serve in an honorary capacity, and would at the same time be able to exercise influence upon charitable bodies in the United States. On the other hand, if the third member were selected from among local candidates in the Levant, he thought it would almost certainly be necessary to offer him a salary.

Replying to a question from the Danish Representative, *M. Arocha* explained that the actual appointment of members of the Board would be by the Council, but that suggestions would, of course, come from the committee. *The rapporteur* would invite the Council in his report to nominate two members of the Board, and the names of the actual candidates would finally be included in the resolution put before the Council.

*The President* expressed the opinion that it would be necessary to pay a salary to the third member, but that the question might be left open until Mr. Bieler had returned and was in a position to make recommendations on the subject.

At this point a message was brought to the President from Mr. Walters of the League Secretariat to the effect that Dr. Rost had agreed to release Sr. Barcenas as soon as he was required for his post on the Board. It was accordingly decided that Sr. Barcenas's name should be put forward definitely to the Council for nomination as third member, and that M. Arocha should get in touch with him with a view to his making arrangements to arrive in Beirut not later than the 1st January.



The President then raised the question of the date for the entry into force of the financial regulations which would be attached as an annex to the statute of the Trustee Board.

After some discussion it was decided that Mr. Bieler should be asked to advise on this point when he reached Beirut, and the committee agreed to delegate authority to the President to take the necessary action for bringing the regulations into force in the light of Mr. Bieler's recommendation without calling the committee together again.

M. Arocha then raised the question of the instructions to Mr. Bieler for his mission to Beirut. He had already prepared a draft of a letter to Mr. Bieler from the Secretary-General, and he suggested that the committee might like to discuss its contents in the first instance, so as to ensure that the instructions were on the right lines and covered all the necessary points before the draft was actually submitted to M. Avenol. The President, however, said that he preferred that the discussion of the draft with the League Treasury and with the Secretary-General should precede its consideration by the committee.

The United Kingdom Representative pointed out that while the committee naturally could not adopt officially the text of what was after all instructions from the Secretary-General to a member of his staff, it would nevertheless be useful if the broad lines of those instructions were to be considered informally by the committee before the draft was submitted to the Secretary-General.

The French Representative thought, however, that it was not a matter for the committee at all, and that the Treasurer could probably issue all the instructions necessary to a member of his own staff.

After further discussion the President agreed to the suggestion of the United Kingdom Representative, and the draft instructions were then circulated to the members of the committee and received general approval, subject to an amendment proposed by the President which would make it clear that the possibility should not be excluded of finding a third member of the Board who would be prepared to serve in an honorary capacity.

M. Arocha undertook to take the necessary action for instructions to be issued to Mr. Bieler on the lines of the draft. (They were eventually issued, without further discussion in the committee, in the form of a minute by the Secretary-General.)

The United Kingdom Representative then raised the question of the position of M. Cuénod in his dual capacity of member of the local committee in Iraq and president of the Trustee Board in Beirut. It would clearly be necessary for M. Cuénod temporarily to leave the work of consultation in Iraq, which would be likely to take at least another two months, in order to proceed to Beirut to consult with Mr. Bieler and to preside over the opening meetings of the Trustee Board. The time-table would have to be worked out very carefully, and consideration might have to be given to the question of finding someone to take M. Cuénod's place on the local committee in Iraq during his absence in Syria.

The President pointed out that the time-table was a matter for the Secretariat to arrange direct with M. Cuénod. It was accordingly agreed that the secretary should prepare a letter to M. Cuénod as soon as possible, informing him of the latest developments and inviting his own suggestions as to the best way in which his time could be divided between Iraq and Syria.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

[E 7396/2/93]

No. 146.

(C./89th Session/P.V.8(1).)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS: EIGHTY-NINTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL.

*Minutes of Eighth Meeting (Private), held on Wednesday, December 18, 1935, at 11 A.M.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 19.)*

3657. *Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq: Progress Report on the Work of the Council Committee.*

M. SABIH NEJIB, representative of Iraq, came to the Council table.

M. López Oliván presented the following report<sup>(1)</sup>:—

"On the 12th November, 1935, the Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq submitted to the Council a report on the scheme for settlement in the French mandated territories of the Levant, amended in accordance with the decisions reached by the last Assembly (document C.454.M.236.1935.VII).

"In that document the committee announced that it was in communication with the Iraqi Government and the High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon with a view to proceeding, in the early days of November, to the individual consultation of the Assyrians in order to ascertain the exact number of those who desire to take advantage of the settlement scheme. These negotiations, however, have had to be prolonged until a few days ago, as it was impossible to arrive any sooner at an agreement on certain points concerning the details of organisation and the message to be addressed to the Assyrians. The consultation began on the 14th December, 1935.

"An urgent question was laid before the committee in connexion with certain preparatory works to be started immediately in Syria with a view to the reception of the Assyrians in the spring, as contemplated in the scheme.

"These preparatory works—not to be confused with those for the reclamation of the Ghab, for which the High Commissioner is responsible, and which have already been begun—include the renting of land for the provisional settlement and the putting of that land into condition, more especially as regards the supply of drinking-water and water for buildings and irrigation of crops; the selection of sites for temporary and permanent villages, and the preparation of shelters to be used while the houses are being built; the purchase of material and equipment which must be already available when the first party arrives, so that they may not be left idle; the signature of contracts with suppliers of building materials and food, the preparation of stores of provisions, &c.

"In the opinion of the experts on the spot, these works will take at least three months. They must therefore be begun forthwith, since any delay might seriously imperil the ultimate success of the operation. According to the arrangements contemplated in the committee's report of the 12th November, 1935, however, these works require the co-operation of a Trustee Board, to be set up by the Council, and involve decisions of a financial nature which can only be taken by the board. For that reason the committee has been obliged to ask that the present Council meeting be called, so that the Council may give its opinion on the documents submitted to it and take the consequential decisions, more especially in regard to the constitution of the Trustee Board.

"The board would be an autonomous body with legal personality. It would undertake financial responsibility for the settlement operation, as

<sup>(1)</sup> Document C.488.M.262.1935.VII.



distinct from the public works for the reclamation of the Ghab, and, in collaboration with the High Commissioner, the administration of the settlement. It would, in addition, eventually take over, administer and dispose of the land in the Ghab area. The financial functions which the Trustee Board will have to perform are set out in the financial regulations appended to the committee's last report. The statutes which would give it legal personality have been carefully drafted in consultation with the High Commissioner and have been submitted to the Council on the 16th December, 1935 (document C.485.M.261.1935.VII).

"As regards the composition of the Trustee Board, the committee does not think it should have more than three members—a chairman, a representative of the High Commissioner, and another member. The High Commissioner will, of course, appoint his own representative.

"If, as I hope will be the case, the Council approves the report of the 12th November, 1935 (document C.454.M.236.1935.VII), and its conclusions, together with the financial regulations appended thereto and the statutes of the Trustee Board, it will then have to appoint the chairman and the third member of the board."

M. López Oliván added that, before submitting the draft resolution, he desired to give the Council a few particulars concerning the candidates proposed by the committee.

As chairman of the Trustee Board, the committee recommended to the Council M. Henri J. Cuénod, of Swiss nationality, engineer and a former factory manager and owner. As far back as 1920 M. Cuénod had had to organise and direct, for various countries, the exchange, transfer or repatriation of over 120,000 prisoners of war. He had also had to visit camps and distribute relief to the populations who had suffered from the war.

In 1924 he had been entrusted with a mission to Albania, on behalf of the League, for the revictualling of Northern Albania.

From 1925 to 1935 he had undertaken a mission of enquiry to Japan and China concerning the refugee situation, and, until May 1935, had acted as agent in China of the League of Nations Refugees Section, subsequently converted into the Nansen Office.

M. Cuénod was at present acting as the representative of the Council Committee on the local commission in Iraq, where his services had given the committee entire satisfaction.

The committee was not at the moment able to submit a final candidature for the other post to be filled by the Council.

It recommended the appointment of M. Juan de las Barcenás as temporary member of the Trustee Board until the 29th February, 1936.

M. Juan de las Barcenás held the degree of Bachelor of Arts at Oxford University and a legal degree at the University of Madrid. After a period in the League of Nations Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Madrid, with the rank of second secretary, he had been appointed a member of the Financial Section of the League Secretariat, and from November 1931 he had acted as assistant to the Financial Committee's representative in Vienna, a post he still held.

As, however, M. Juan de las Barcenás's temporary contract would terminate on the 29th February, 1936, when his successor would take over his duties, and as the Council's ordinary session would not take place before May, M. López Oliván, speaking on behalf of the committee, would request the Council to authorise the committee to make in due course a final appointment to the post in question.

The salaries and allowances of the permanent members and of the temporary member would be determined by the Council Committee, with due regard for the provisional budget and in conformity with the Financial Regulations.

M. López Oliván informed the Council that, over a certain period of time, M. Cuénod would have to discharge two important functions, one as chairman of the Trustee Board at Beirut, and the other as representative of the committee on the local commission in Iraq. It seemed highly desirable that he should be able to hold these two offices at once, and the committee had instructed M. López Oliván to ask the Council to authorise it to appoint a substitute for one or other of those offices or for both simultaneously.

The *rapporteur* therefore proposed the following resolution for adoption by the Council<sup>(1)</sup> :—

"The Council,

"(1) Approves the report, dated the 12th November, 1935, of its Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq (document C.454.M.236.1935.VII) and the Financial Regulations annexed thereto (Annex 1);

"(2) Approves the statutes of the Trustee Board established by the Council Committee in collaboration with the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon (document C.485.M.261.1935.VII) (Annex 2);

"(3) Notes the declaration, signed in the name of the French Republic on behalf of the Levant States under French mandate, whereby that Government promises that the necessary measures shall be taken to ensure to the Trustee Board the legal character, powers and privileges set out in the statutes of the board;

"(4) Decides that the Trustee Board shall enter upon its functions as soon as the three members have been appointed;

"(5) Appoints M. Henri J. Cuénod chairman of the Trustee Board;

"(6) Appoints M. Juan de las Barcenás temporary member of the Trustee Board until the 29th February, 1936;

"(7) Requests the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon to appoint his representative on the Trustee Board as soon as possible;

"(8) Authorises the Council Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq to appoint the titular member on the expiry of M. Juan de las Barcenás's temporary contract;

"(9) Authorises the Council Committee for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, if it thinks fit, to appoint a substitute for M. Cuénod. The substitute thus appointed may, if the committee so decides, replace M. Cuénod in his capacity as member of the Trustee Board, in his capacity as representative of the committee in Iraq, or in both these capacities simultaneously. The substitute shall not replace M. Cuénod in his capacity as chairman of the Trustee Board except by decision of the Trustee Board."

M. Massigli, in accepting the *rapporteur's* proposal, said that the High Commissioner of the French Republic for the Levant States under mandate would give his whole-hearted assistance to the Trustee Board, so as to ensure the complete success of the important task entrusted to it.

The resolution was adopted.

#### Annex 1.

#### FINANCIAL REGULATIONS FOR THE CONTROL OF THE FUNDS.

##### I.—Preamble.

The financial administration of the plan for the settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in the Levant territories under French mandate shall be governed by the following provisions :—

*Article 1.*—In the text of the present regulations, the special committee set up by the decision of the Council at its seventy-seventh session, or any other body which may be set up by the Council to follow the execution of the settlement scheme, is hereinafter referred to as "the committee"; the autonomous body constituted by the foregoing statutes<sup>(2)</sup> as the "Trustee Board"; the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon, as "the High Commissioner"; the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, as "the Secretary-General"; the whole operation of settlement, including the

<sup>(1)</sup> Document C.488.M.262.1935.VII.

<sup>(2)</sup> These statutes, which are at present under consideration, will be submitted to the Council at a later date.



public works scheme, as "the scheme"; the settlement operation proper, as "the settlement"; and the public works scheme to be undertaken with a view to reclaiming the area in the plain of the Ghab to be placed at the disposal of the Assyrians, as "the Ghab reclamation scheme."

## II.—Receipts and Custody of Funds.

*Art. 2.*—The funds for the scheme shall include:—

- (a) The amounts subscribed or to be subscribed by the Government of Iraq in virtue of the communications from that Government of the 26th May and the 26th September, 1935.
- (b) The amounts to be subscribed by the United Kingdom Government in virtue of the communication from that Government of the 12th September, 1935.
- (c) The amounts to be subscribed by the Levant territories under French mandate, in accordance with the offer contained on p. 25 of the detailed plan submitted by the French Government.<sup>(\*)</sup>
- (d) The subsidy voted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on the 28th September, 1935.
- (e) Any contributions from other Governments and private organisations received in answer to the appeal made by the Council on the 19th January, 1934, and by the committee on the 16th July, 1935.
- (f) Funds raised on a recoverable basis from various sources, in particular, the supplementary contribution from the mandated territories mentioned in the report to the Council by the committee of the 12th September, 1935.
- (g) In the event of the cost of the reclamation scheme exceeding 62 million French francs, the funds paid by the mandated territories to cover such excess.
- (h) Miscellaneous receipts from other sources.

*Art. 3.*—The funds, excluding payments made by the Assyrians on account of the purchase of their land, shall be paid to the Secretary-General, who shall keep them in a special account separate from the ordinary funds of the League of Nations, or in a bank account, which shall be at his sole disposal. The said funds shall be used exclusively—

- (1) For the refund of advances which have been made by the League of Nations.
- (2) For the refund of expenditure incurred by the High Commissioner up to the 30th June, 1935, for the provisional settlement of the Assyrians in the Khabur.
- (3) For defraying the expenditure involved for the settlement, including the cost of the Trustee Board and its staff.
- (4) For the Ghab reclamation scheme, the cost of which, in so far as it may exceed 62 million French francs, shall be an additional charge on the mandated territories.
- (5) For defraying the expenditure involved in the examination and audit of accounts.

*Art. 4.*—Payments made by the Assyrians on account of the purchase of their land shall be paid into a special account opened in the name of the Trustee Board.

## III.—Administration and Appropriation of Funds.

*Art. 5.*—(a) As regards the carrying out of the Ghab reclamation scheme, the High Commissioner shall prepare the draft annual budget, incur expenditure, administer the funds advanced by the Secretary-General and keep the accounts.

(b) As regards the settlement, the Trustee Board shall prepare the draft annual budget and incur expenditure. The funds advanced by the Secretary-General shall be kept in the custody of and shall be administered by the High Commissioner within the limits of the available credits. Payments shall be made

(\*) Document C.352.M.179.1935.VII.

by him on the submission by the Trustee Board of certified warrants (*mandats*). The Trustee Board shall register all commitments to expenditure and the warrants (*mandats*) passed to the High Commissioner for payment shall quote a reference to the registered commitment.

*Art. 6.*—When the High Commissioner submits a request to this effect to the Secretary-General, the latter shall make to him advances out of the funds placed at his disposal, though such advances may not at any time exceed the amount of the balance available.

*Art. 7.*—Except for the subsidy referred to in article 2 (d) above, the funds belonging to the League of Nations itself shall not be drawn upon either for recoverable or irrecoverable advances.

*Art. 8.*—Subject to the provisions of article 2 (c), (f) and (g), the High Commissioner may not at any time be placed under an obligation to make advances out of his own funds.

He shall not at any time be bound, owing to the fact of having regularly undertaken any particular section of work, to continue such work out of his own funds, should the funds placed at his disposal by the Secretary-General prove to be insufficient.

*Art. 9.*—In regard to the Ghab reclamation scheme, the High Commissioner shall not be under any obligation to put in hand a particular section of the work (1) unless he is satisfied that the necessary funds for carrying out in its entirety this section of the work contemplated will be available in due time; (2) until a working capital fund, representing 10 per cent. of the total cost of the section of the work contemplated, has been constituted with the High Commissioner.

*Art. 10.*—The financial rules in force in the Levant States under French mandate shall be applied as regards both the administration of the funds placed at the disposal of the High Commissioner by the Secretary-General and the incurring of expenditure by the High Commissioner or the Trustee Board.

## IV.—Estimates of Expenditure.

*Art. 11.*—Without prejudice to the modifications which may later be approved by the committee, the general estimates of expenditure, and the distribution of this expenditure year by year, given in the annex, are considered as the financial bases of the scheme.

*Art. 12.*—There shall be drawn up each year for the Ghab reclamation scheme and for the settlement separate budgets, expressed in French francs, covering the whole of the operations contemplated during the year in question from the 1st January to the 31st December. These budgets shall be divided into two parts, corresponding to the two half-years.

These budgets shall be submitted to the committee through the Secretary-General.

When the annual budgets have been approved by the committee, the Secretary-General shall forward them to the High Commissioner; he shall also forward to the Trustee Board the budget relating to the settlement.

*Art. 13.*—At the beginning of each half-year, the Secretary-General shall advise the High Commissioner and the Trustee Board whether the budget estimates of the said half-year for the reclamation scheme and the settlement respectively have been approved by the committee. He shall also inform them of the amounts of the funds available, and for this purpose he shall take into account the undertakings entered into by the Governments and further sums, if any, which he is due to receive within the same period.

*Art. 14.*—Transfers from one chapter to another of the annexed general estimate of expenditure and of the annual budgets shall require the approval of the committee.

## V.—Accountancy and Audit of the Account.

*Art. 15.*—The High Commissioner and the Trustee Board, in so far as each is concerned, shall draw up and submit to the Secretary-General the monthly, quarterly and annual statements contemplated in the following articles.

*Art. 16.*—Monthly appropriation statements and monthly cash statements shall be drawn up both in regard to the reclamation scheme and the settlement.



(1) The monthly appropriation statements shall be drawn up on the model of the budget estimates and shall indicate—

- (a) The original budget credits.
- (b) The expenditure incurred.
- (c) The amounts for which warrants have been issued.

(2) The monthly cash statements shall be drawn up on the model of the budget estimates and shall indicate—

- (a) The actual receipts.
- (b) The payments made on the basis of warrants issued.

These statements shall be examined monthly by the treasury of the League of Nations.

*Art. 17.*—Every quarter, the High Commissioner shall submit to the Secretary-General a recapitulatory statement of the monthly cash statements of the previous quarter, and shall attach thereto all the relevant documentary evidence, including payment warrants, invoices, schedules, counterfoils, &c. These documents shall be submitted to the treasury of the League of Nations for preliminary audit.

*Art. 18.*—After the close of each financial period and on the completion of the scheme, recapitulatory statements of the monthly statements provided for under article 16 shall be submitted to the Secretary-General.

These accounts shall be subjected to comprehensive audit by the auditor of the League of Nations in accordance with the rules regarding the financial administration of the League.

#### VI.—General Provision.

*Art. 19.*—Any question which cannot be settled in accordance with the provisions laid down in the present regulations shall be submitted to the Secretary-General, who will refer it to the committee, if necessary.

*Art. 20.*—The present regulations may be amended and completed by the committee in agreement with the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner and, in so far as the provisions relating to the settlement are concerned, in agreement with the Trustee Board.

*Art. 21.*—The committee shall fix, in agreement with the High Commissioner, the date on which these regulations shall come into force either as a whole or with regard to such of its provisions as it may think fit.

Annex to the Financial Regulations.  
Table showing Estimated Expenses on Account of the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq in Syria.  
(French francs).

	1935.	1936.	1937.	1938.	1939.	1940.	Subsequent years.	Total.
<b>A. Ghab Reclamation Scheme—</b>								
Total expenditure	1,000,000.00	10,000,000.00	21,000,000.00	20,000,000.00	10,000,000.00	...	...	62,000,000.00
<b>B. Settlement Operations—</b>								
Expenses—								
(a) Payment of arrears of expenditure in respect of the provisional settlement in the Khabur	705,198.50	705,198.50	...	...	...	...	...	1,410,397.00
(b) Completion of the work of settlement on the Khabur of 3,000 Assyrians	1,752,000.00	1,577,000.00	141,000.00	140,000.00	140,000.00	...	...	3,750,000.00
(c) Settlement of 2,000 fresh arrivals on the Khabur	390,000.00	780,000.00	390,000.00	260,000.00	130,000.00	...	...	1,950,000.00
(d) Cost of settlement and maintenance of 15,000 Assyrians in the Ghab	...	7,170,700.00	4,655,950.00	2,353,700.00	1,513,450.00	1,006,700.00	1,184,103.00	17,889,603.00
(e) Administrative expenses—								
(i) Expenses already incurred by the League	...	525,000.00 <sup>(1)</sup>	250,000.00	250,000.00	250,000.00	250,000.00	250,000.00	525,000.00
(ii) Salaries, &c., of certain officials	...	250,000.00	250,000.00	250,000.00	250,000.00	250,000.00	250,000.00	1,500,000.00
Total expenditure	2,847,198.50	11,007,898.50	5,436,950.00	3,003,700.00	2,038,450.00	1,256,700.00	1,434,103.00	27,025,900.00
<b>Incidental receipts—</b>								
(a) From Assyrians before leaving Iraq	...	1,000,000.00	...	...	...	...	...	1,000,000.00
(b) Deductions from wages in respect of maintenance	...	500,000.00	500,000.00	500,000.00	500,000.00	...	...	2,000,000.00
Total incidental receipts	...	1,500,000.00	500,000.00	500,000.00	500,000.00	...	...	3,000,000.00
Net expenditure	2,847,198.50	9,507,898.50	4,936,950.00	2,503,700.00	1,538,450.00	1,256,700.00	1,434,103.00	24,025,900.00
Total expenditure (A + B)	3,847,198.50	19,507,898.50	25,936,950.00	22,503,700.00	11,538,450.00	1,256,700.00	1,434,103.00	86,025,900.00

(<sup>1</sup>) Approximate figure.



## Annex 2.

*Statutes of the Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board and Draft Declaration to be signed on behalf of the French Republic for the Levant States under French Mandate.*

## I.—Statutes.

*Article 1.*—There is established in the Levant States under French mandate an Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board, hereinafter called the "Board," domiciled in Beirut.

*Art. 2.*—(1) The Board shall be a legal person, competent to sue and be sued in its own name, to hold and alienate property of all kinds, and generally to perform any acts which can be performed by a corporation possessing full legal personality.

(2) The Board shall alone be responsible for its own activities. Neither the League of Nations nor the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon shall incur any liability as the result of the operations of the Board.

(3) The members of the Board shall incur no personal responsibility, either jointly or severally, in respect of the activities of the Board or their own action as members of the Board, except in case of a breach of trust knowingly and intentionally committed by them.

*Art. 3.*—The Board shall perform the functions and exercise the powers attributed to it expressly or by implication in the decisions which have been or may subsequently be adopted by the Council of the League of Nations. In particular, it shall be responsible, in the manner provided in the annexed Financial Regulations, for the expenditure on the settlement operation (as distinct from the public works for the reclaiming of the Ghab), and shall collaborate with the High Commissioner in all that concerns the installation and administration of the Assyrian colonies. As and when the land in the Ghab area is reclaimed, the ownership of such parts of the reclaimed land as are destined for the Assyrians shall be vested in the Board, whose duty it shall be to arrange the distribution of the land to the Assyrians, settle finally the price and conditions of its purchase by them, and transfer the property therein to them on completion of the payments due.

*Art. 4.*—The Board shall be composed of a chairman and two members. The chairman and one member shall be appointed and may be removed from office by the Council of the League of Nations; the other member shall be a representative of the High Commissioner.

*Art. 5.*—The chairman or, if he is unable to act, his substitute, shall convene all meetings of the Board, sign all documents and correspondence, and be charged with the execution of the decisions of the Board.

*Art. 6.*—The Board shall have power to appoint and dismiss its staff.

*Art. 7.*—The Board shall be exempt from all taxes and charges, whether general or local, in respect of all operations and property of the Board, and, in particular, of lands transferred to it, or any transactions affecting such lands, to the exclusion, however, of expenditure assigned by States to the execution of technical or topographical operations necessitated by their registration in the Land Register.

*Art. 8.*—Subject to the provisions of these statutes, the Board shall make its own internal regulations, which it shall communicate to the Council of the League of Nations, and shall have power to delegate particular duties to individual members.

*Art. 9.*—(1) Decisions of the Board may be taken by a majority. Two members may constitute a quorum if the third is prevented from attending.

(2) Substitutes for the members of the Board appointed by the Council of the League of Nations may be appointed by the Council.

(3) Vacancies among the members appointed by it shall be filled by the Council of the League of Nations.

*Art. 10.*—The expenses of the Board shall be payable in accordance with the annexed Financial Regulations.

*Art. 11.*—(1) The Board shall communicate every three months to the Council of the League of Nations a report on its activities, the progress of the settlement

scheme, the condition of the Assyrian settlers, and, in general, all questions relating to the provisional or final settlement. A copy shall simultaneously be sent to the High Commissioner. The Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to consider the reports of the Board and to take such measures thereon as it may consider proper.

(2) The Council of the League of Nations may at any time enquire by such method as it determines into the manner in which the Board is discharging its functions.

(3) The Board may call the attention of the Council of the League of Nations to any difficulties which it may encounter in the execution of its functions.

*Art. 12.*—The Board shall be entitled to submit to the Council of the League of Nations any question of interpretation of the present statutes or of the decisions concerning the settlement scheme taken by the Council of the League of Nations. The decisions of the Council shall be final and binding for all purposes.

*Art. 13.*—The Board may be dissolved by the Council of the League of Nations.

*Art. 14.*—The present statutes may be amended by the Council of the League of Nations, on the proposal of one of its members or on the proposal of the Board.

## II.—Draft Declaration.

The French Government, on behalf of the Levant States under French mandate, promises that the necessary measures shall be taken to ensure to the Assyrian Settlement Trustee Board, set up by the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of.....the legal character, powers and privileges set out in the statutes of the Board.

[E 7376/2/93]

No. 147.

*Consul, Geneva, to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.—(Received December 19.)*

(No. 262. L.N.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Geneva, December 18, 1935.

FOLLOWING from Mr. Eden:—

"Assyrian question.

"At a private meeting, 18th December, Council: (a) Approved Assyrian Committee report of 12th November and attached financial regulations; (b) approved statutes of Trustee Board at Beirut; (c) appointed M. Cuenod as president and M. Barcenas (Spain) as temporary member (until the end of February) of Trustee Board; (d) decided that board should enter upon its functions as soon as French High Commissioner had appointed his representative; and (e) provided for the appointment in due course by the Council Committee of titular member in place of M. Barcenas and, if necessary, of a substitute for M. Cuenod, either on local committee in Iraq or on Trustee Board.

"Early constitution and meeting of Trustee Board is imperative if delay in the beginning of transfer in 1936 is to be avoided. M. Barcenas will arrive Beirut 1st January, and arrangements are being made for Mr. Bieler, assistant treasurer of the League, to be in Beirut between 24th December and 14th January to assist in setting up the board. It is desirable, in the interest of the whole scheme, that M. Cuenod should be present in Beirut for as long as possible between 1st and 14th January. Council Committee has telegraphed accordingly to Iraqi Government expressing the hope that to permit this they will arrange short interruption of consultation of Assyrians by local committee in Iraq. Telegram asks Iraqi Government to take appropriate steps to guard against any local misapprehension which such interruption might cause."

(Repeated to Bagdad and Beirut.)



[E 7394/2/93]

No. 148.

Consul, Geneva, to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.—(Received December 19.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 136. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Geneva, December 18, 1935.

BAGDAD telegram No. 285 to Foreign Office of 10th December: Effect on Assyrian question of measure taken to suppress Yezidi revolt.

Following from Mr. Eden:—

"President of Assyrian Committee of Council had confidential talk with Iraqi permanent delegate on 17th December. After referring to uneasiness here at reported state of alarm among minorities in Northern Iraq resulting from aftermath of Yezidi affair, M. Oliván pointed out that in advising Assyrians in recent message to remain quietly in their villages pending transfer, Council Committee relied implicitly on Iraqi Government to ensure their security so long as they remained in Iraq and to allay any alarm among them.

"In subsequent conversation with United Kingdom representative on committee, Iraqi delegate showed tendency to take this *démarche* lightly and to question right of committee to concern itself with Yezidi affair. He was left in no doubt as to seriousness and relevance of M. Oliván's action, and eventually undertook to impress on his Government anxiety caused here by recent events and special importance of guarding against repercussions on Assyrian question."

(Repeated to Bagdad, in cypher, No. 30.)

[E 7470/278/93]

No. 149.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 645. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bagdad, December 6, 1935.

IT is now some four weeks since the Iraqi Parliament reassembled after the short extraordinary session that followed the general elections and the time has probably come to review the present position of Yassin Pasha's Government and the situation in the country generally.

2. So far the session has passed without incident, and there has been no sign of any concerted opposition inside the Chamber. Nevertheless, the *Wihdah-al-Wataniyah*, the party of which Nuri Pasha was at one time a leading member, has been stirring with new life. At the end of October it held its first general meeting under the chairmanship of Sheikh Ahmad Daud, a restless politician, who has more than once held office. Details of what passed at this meeting did not reach me, but it seems that a new executive committee was elected to oppose the Government in Parliament. At the same time leave was sought to found a newspaper to be edited by Jamil Baban, a Kurdish lawyer, who has from time to time served in Cabinets under Nuri and his friends. Meanwhile, Jamil Madfai was rallying the party in the Chamber and Senate and seeking, apparently with some success, for support amongst the officers in the army. He appeared also to be casting his net over Kurdistan and to be drawing in a good many notables.

3. This show of activity, coming as it did at a moment when there were persistent reports of differences within the Cabinet between Nuri and Yassin, gave colour to the belief that Nuri had only been biding his time to break with the Prime Minister and was now gathering his forces together for an attempt to supplant him.

4. When, in the early spring, Yassin and Nuri decided to put the past aside and to throw in their lot together, it was the fashion to say that so unnatural a partnership must of necessity be short-lived. There were many who affirmed that Nuri's loyalty to his chief could not outlast the rising on the

Euphrates, where the claims upon Nuri of old and deep-seated political friendships would be bound to bring about a clash. Nevertheless, from this ordeal the alliance seemed to emerge unshaken. It also survived some differences on points of policy and procedure during Nuri's absences in Geneva and Tehran in the late summer, and it has been strong enough to withstand the sustained efforts of Jaafar Pasha, who is foolishly outspoken in his wish to wean his brother-in-law from his allegiance to Yassin. And thus, as time went on, there appeared to be good ground for the hopes of those (and I was amongst them) who saw in this alliance the best, if not the only present, chance of an escape from the party strife and personal jealousies which had long tormented the political life of the country and stood in the way of much-needed progressive reforms.

5. I was therefore perturbed to hear, some time after my return from leave in October, of rumours that pointed to an early breach between the Prime Minister and his Minister for Foreign Affairs and to see these rumours apparently corroborated by the fresh activities of the party to which Nuri had in the past belonged. In the belief that, in the long run, it was in the best interests not only of Iraq, but of His Majesty's Government also, to see the partnership of Yassin and Nuri prolonged and to avert a relapse into the painful squabbles and uncertainties which must follow a break-up, I determined to do what I could to prevent it.

6. I thought it probably best to address myself direct to each one of them and a series of private conversations followed. The first of these was with the Prime Minister one night when he came to dine quietly with me. I told him of the rumours that had reached me and I said that I should be sorry to see come to an end a union which seemed to hold so much promise for the future welfare of Iraq. I asked him to tell me frankly what the facts were and what he felt about the position of his Cabinet and about the situation in general in the interior of the country. He began by saying that on the whole he was by no means dissatisfied. The position of the Government was strong and well supported in a Parliament which could fairly be called representatives. When they had come into office they had found that the authority of Government in the provinces had fallen into contempt. (I need not say that he made no mention here of the share he had had in bringing about this unhappy state of things.) As I had seen, they had successfully re-established their prestige. In doing so they had had to be severe, but their severity had been softened by a wide amnesty and they were now doing their best to redress all genuine grievances. He could not say that they had made no mistakes. For instance, the recent executions in the Sinjar had probably been hasty and ill-considered, but he was taking steps to see that such things would not happen again. He hoped and thought that the country realised that the Government meant to assert their authority and that they would now be left in peace and quiet to carry out their programme of reforms. In order to be able effectively to do this the Government needed a long life and he did not know whether they could rely upon that. As I was well aware much depended upon whether he and Nuri continued to work together. Frankly, he was not sure whether he could still count upon Nuri. If I had heard that there was any palpable dissension between them that was an exaggeration. There had, indeed, been some slight differences on points of policy, but these had been disposed of and I need not fear that any move to get rid of Nuri would come from him, for without Nuri he clearly could not stand. So far as he knew Nuri had been loyal to him, but he felt that he was now drifting away from him and towards old associations and this was causing him anxiety. It would be a help to him if I would speak to Nuri in the same sense as I had spoken to him, and try to dismiss from Nuri's mind any impression he might have that the Prime Minister was in any way dissatisfied with his Minister for Foreign Affairs.

7. I said that it seemed to me that such things as this should rather be the subject of a frank and free talk between Nuri and himself, but I gathered from the nature of his reply, which was, I am bound to say, confused, that in Iraq it was difficult, if not impossible, for such relationships to be freely discussed between a Prime Minister and a member of his Cabinet, and in the circumstances I thought it best to undertake to speak to Nuri. Some days later an occasion offered itself for a private conversation which ranged over all the ground I had covered with Yassin. I found Nuri disposed to talk quite frankly. He said that he had the impression that Yassin believed that he (Nuri) wanted to be Prime Minister. That was quite wrong. He had had enough of being Prime



Minister. He was content with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where he knew that he could do his best work. Yassin, on the other hand, was useless and even truculent in any subordinate post. He had to be at the head of the Government or in opposition, and in opposition he was damaging to the best interests of the country. Yassin believed that all men were like himself—eager to be at the top—and most of all he believed this of Nuri. There would be much to be gained if I could rid Yassin of this belief. At present Yassin was the only man in Iraq who was fit to be Prime Minister and I could tell him that Nuri had given me his personal guarantee that he would be loyal to Yassin. As to the new activities of the *Wihdah-al-Wataniyah*, Yassin need have no anxiety. He (Nuri) had nothing to do with them. It was true that Jamil Madfai had recently approached him with an offer of support and had asked him to put himself at the head of this party, but he had replied that he was a member of Yassin's Administration and was going to be loyal to it. Jamil Madfai had been much annoyed with him.

8. Nuri went on to say that I must not assume from what he had told me that he was satisfied with the present state of the country. Far from it. The Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior liked to claim that all was well, but had they not been obliged to have recourse four times to martial law in nine months of office? This showed that the country was in a grave state of discontent. Another insurrection, which might at any time break out over some small incident connected, for example, with the application of conscription, might well destroy the Government. There were two main difficulties in the present situation. The first was the personality of the Minister of the Interior and the second was the absence of palace influence, which, in the past, had been so useful in keeping the tribes in check. As I must realise it would be a long time before the young King was likely to take interest in anything but shooting gazelles and driving his motor car. As for the Ministry of the Interior he was uncertain whether Rashid Ali was more to blame than the Prime Minister himself for what he described as the present "lack of balance." He was inclined to think that more than half of the blame lay with Yassin. In any case it was essential that the balance should be redressed, and he begged me to tell Yassin that, while the Prime Minister could count upon his loyalty, something would have to be done to keep the balance even. He was referring to cases of land settlement, mainly on the Euphrates in which Rashid Ali had allowed his personal and political prejudices to twist the course of justice. Yassin was well aware of the failings of this Minister, but was afraid of him. He had recently made a half-hearted attempt to persuade Rashid Ali to move from the Ministry of the Interior to that of Justice, but on meeting with resistance Yassin had decided to leave things as they were. This had been a mistake, for so long as Rashid Ali held his present post there would be no real peace in Iraq.

9. Nuri then reverted to the weakness of the palace and said that he was seeking a means to give it some strength. He had hopes in Rustam Haidar, the head of the King's *diwan*, but at present probably all that Rustam Haidar could do was to tip the scale in a doubtful situation. That was not enough. What was wanted was a show of strength and the exercise of direct influence upon the tribes. Rustam Haidar was probably the best man in Iraq to whom the King could go for advice, but he was handicapped because of the dislike and mistrust that the Prime Minister felt for him. If I could see my way to persuade Yassin to have confidence in Rustam Haidar, much good ground would be gained.

10. Nuri then spoke a little of the Prime Minister's character and said that the general belief that Yassin was a strong man was a mistaken one. He was only strong when things were going well and when he felt that he could count upon support from all sides, more especially upon the support of the Embassy. He was at his best and most useful when he felt strong, and he must be kept strong, for his best was needed now. It would be of great value, therefore, if I could assure Yassin of my support. Nuri then contrasted his own character with that of Yassin. When things were not going well, he said, Yassin's methods became tortuous ("he make zig-zag" were the words that Nuri used), while, as I must by now have come to perceive, he (Nuri), in good times and in bad, could be relied upon to keep on a straight line. I did my best to conceal my surprise. Nuri ended by saying that he must have made it clear to me that he was by no means happy, but he wished me to understand that he saw no combination that could be better for Iraq than the present one and that there

was no question of his deserting Yassin until something better was in sight, and that would be unlikely for a long time to come.

11. Shortly after I was able to see the Prime Minister again and to pass on to him the appropriate parts of my conversation with Nuri. He was obviously much relieved. He admitted that mistakes had been made by the Ministry of the Interior and that probably Rashid Ali was not the best man for the post, but it was, he said, difficult to make a change. Nuri could, however, feel assured that he would use his influence to keep the balance even. He shared Nuri's regret that the palace did not play a more useful part in politics, and he said that, far from mistrusting Rustam Haidar, he believed him to be the best adviser the King could have. He then said that these conversations must have given me some insight into the weaknesses of Iraqi politics and that he hoped that nothing that I had learned would serve to diminish the support I had afforded him hitherto. I replied that, as I conceived it, all that His Majesty's Government desired to see in Iraq was peace and stability and a faithful observance of the terms of the treaty. On these conditions I would gladly give him all the support I could. He thanked me and said that he hoped that he could promise me peace. As to the treaty, I knew that his views had changed. He now believed in it, and I need have no fears on this score.

12. I hope that these conversations may prove to have served some useful purpose. At the risk of wearying you, I have reported them at some length because they seemed to me to afford a useful background to current events.

13. I have since been able to make some private enquiries of British officials in the Ministry of the Interior and I have learned from them that Nuri's misgivings about the lack of balance are not wholly justified. I am told that, according to his lights, Rashid Ali is doing his best to be just and has been tolerably successful; that the state of discontent amongst the tribes of which Nuri spoke is economic in Iraq and calls for no special anxiety. I am bound to say, however, that I feel some doubt whether his fears can be dismissed so lightly.

14. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 7553/433/93]

No. 150.

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 651.)

Sir,

Bagdad, December 16, 1935.

WITH reference to Mr. Bateman's despatch No. 512 of the 26th September last, I have the honour to report that Khalil Khoshawi has again been raiding in the Baradost *nahiyah*.

2. It appears that so soon as winter obliged the Iraqi and Turkish Governments to withdraw or to disperse the forces which they had concentrated to deal with him, he returned to the village of Zaita (just south of the Govanda plateau) with a following estimated at about sixty men. From this base he has resumed his accustomed marauding. The larger villages are garrisoned by police, but they are unable to move out to pursue him.

3. Meanwhile, the tribesmen and villagers are in a miserable condition. The plundering of Khalil Khoshawi, the presence in this district for several months of large forces of troops and police and the forcible removal of many people from their villages have seriously upset the farming and sheep-breeding which are their means of livelihood, and during this winter they will suffer great poverty and want.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Istanbul and to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.



*Record of Sixty-third Meeting of Assyrian Committee held at Geneva on December 18 at noon.—(Received in Foreign Office, December 31.)*

*Salaries of Members of Trustees Board.*

IN the light of the authority given by the Council of the League at its session that morning, the committee proceeded to fix the salaries of members of the Trustee Board.

*The Secretary* said that the present remuneration of M. Cuénod was a salary of 17,200 Swiss francs, plus 500 Swiss francs per month to cover all expenses, including journeys, which made a total of 23,200 Swiss francs. The Secretariat considered that, in view of the more important office which M. Cuénod would now fill as president of the board, it would be suitable to offer him a salary of 24,000 Swiss francs. They considered that this should include ordinary travelling expenses, but not the cost of long journeys, *e.g.*, between Iraq and Syria, such as M. Cuénod was likely to have frequent occasion to undertake in the near future on account of his double functions as president of the Board of Trustees and League representative on the local Assyrian Committee in Iraq. He thought that it could be left to the Trustee Board to fix the limits between journeys which would fall to M. Cuénod's own charge and those whose cost would be refunded to him. As regards the temporary third member of the board, Sr. Barcenas, it had first been proposed that he should receive his journey expenses, plus the subsistence allowance of 60 Swiss francs per day which was accorded to experts of the League on missions abroad. The League treasurer had, however, suggested that in addition to his travelling expenses, an allowance of 40 Swiss francs a day would be sufficient and Sr. Barcenas had accepted this arrangement. It would fall to the Trustee Board to fix the emoluments of M. Burnier, the settlement expert.

*The French Representative* suggested that it would be embarrassing for M. Cuénod to be obliged to make recommendations about his own travelling expenses. He thought that Mr. Bieler might be asked to study this point and to make recommendations in due course.

The committee agreed to the proposals submitted by the secretary, as modified by the suggestion of the French representative, and it instructed M. Arocha to arrange for letters to be sent by the Secretary-General to M. Cuénod and Sr. Barcenas informing them officially of their appointment and of the emoluments which they would receive.

*Position of M. Cuénod.*

The committee then considered the difficulty created by M. Cuénod's dual rôle as president of the Trustee Board and member of the local committee in Iraq. At the last meeting the secretary had been instructed to prepare a letter to M. Cuénod.

*The Secretary* explained that it was necessary for M. Cuénod to be in Beirut in the early days of January for consultation with Mr. Bieler and for the inauguration of the Trustee Board. There appeared to be no alternative to the temporary suspension of the consultation of the Assyrians in Iraq during this period, and it seemed best in the circumstances to telegraph both to M. Cuénod and to the Iraqi Government. M. Arocha then read the drafts of telegrams. The draft to the Iraqi Government, after explaining the situation and proposing a short suspension of the consultation, requested that Government to take the necessary measures to guard against any false impression being caused by this interruption of the work of the local committee.

*The French Representative* saw considerable danger in interrupting the work of consultation. He suggested that as the Council had that morning granted the committee authority to find a substitute for M. Cuénod, it would be preferable to proceed immediately to find such a person so that he could take M. Cuénod's

place on the local committee in Iraq when the latter was obliged to leave for Beirut. He thought it might be very difficult to make local opinion in Iraq understand any interruption of the work of consultation.

*The United Kingdom Representative* agreed that there might be inconvenience and even danger in interrupting the work of consultation. He thought, however, that it could be left to M. Cuénod or the Iraqi Government to raise objection to the proposed procedure. For his part he did not see why it should not be possible to make a satisfactory explanation of the interruption, particularly as the work of the committee must, in any case, be subject to frequent interruption, since he understood that the committee would normally be compelled to return to Mosul between its journeys to the various districts in which the Assyrians were living owing to the fact that in winter the direct cross-country tracks were mostly impracticable for motor cars. He thought it would be unfortunate, unless absolutely necessary, to replace M. Cuénod on the local committee at all events during the consultation. M. Cuénod had got to know the country and the people with whom he would have to deal and was aware of the ideas of the Council Committee. When the consultation was eventually finished, he thought it might be necessary to arrange for M. Cuénod to be replaced on the committee in Iraq, though the financial aspect of the matter would have to be carefully considered. Meanwhile, he suggested that the action proposed in the draft telegrams should go forward, provided M. Cuénod and the Iraqi Government saw no objection.

*The President* thought that the committee might approve the action proposed in the telegrams, but, at the same time, proceed without delay to look for a satisfactory person to act as a substitute for M. Cuénod. He suggested that it would simplify matters if the Council Committee were to delegate authority to himself as its president to select any suitable candidate whose name the Secretariat might be able to produce. At the same time it would be understood that if there were any difficulty about the choice of a substitute, the committee would be called together again to consider the matter. He agreed with a remark by M. Arocha that it would be much more difficult to find a satisfactory person to replace M. Cuénod on the local committee in Iraq than on the Trustee Board, but there would clearly be no harm in using the Council's authority to try to find one.

The committee then approved the two draft telegrams (see annex and document C/Min./Ass. 172), and it was agreed that Mr. Bieler should be invited to give special attention during his visit to the Levant to the question of finding a satisfactory substitute (or substitutes) for M. Cuénod.

*Declaration of the French Government regarding the Trustee Board.*

*The President* enquired whether it had been decided who should sign the declaration by the French Government appended to the draft Statute of the Trustee Board that they would take the necessary measures in the mandated territories to confer on the board in local law the rights and privileges accorded to it by the Statute.

*The French Representative* said that it would clearly be for the High Commissioner to sign this declaration and he suggested that Mr. Bieler should arrange for this to be done when he arrived at Beirut. The committee agreed to this procedure and the secretary undertook to make the necessary arrangements with Mr. Bieler.

*Question of Contributions from Private Charity.*

*The President* recalled that the Danish representative had undertaken to study this question, and he enquired whether M. Borberg had yet been able to come to any conclusions in the matter.

*The Danish Representative* said that he was still awaiting information which he had asked the Secretariat to collect. He doubted, however, whether the committee as a body could take much useful action. He thought that the initiative in the matter should clearly come from outside the committee, *e.g.*, from charitable institutions themselves or from some special body which might be set up to co-ordinate their activities.



*The United Kingdom Representative* hoped there would be no delay on the part of the Secretariat in sounding international organisations, or on the part of individual members of the committee in exploring the possibilities in their own countries. He would like to be able to tell people in his own country, who were trying to obtain money from private charities, what was being done in the matter abroad. The suggestion had been made in recent private discussions that a meeting should be called in Geneva of prominent persons connected with private charitable bodies in various countries with a view to their subsequently returning to their respective countries with a full knowledge of the question and doing their best to raise funds among their fellow-countrymen.

*The President* thought that the secretary could now be left to proceed with the necessary preliminary work and that a further meeting of the committee might be called, perhaps at the time of the January session of the Council, for the purpose of a further exchange of views.

*The French Representative* thought that the committee should be quite clear as to its aims and should study the matter in a severely practical spirit. Instead of debating general ideas and principles, he thought that it would be preferable to ascertain what persons or institutions were really likely to be of any financial assistance. For example, he understood that the Archbishop of Canterbury was already considering the question of raising funds in the United Kingdom, and he thought that wealthy bodies in the United States, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, should be approached without delay.

In answer to an enquiry by the United Kingdom representative the *French Representative* said that he did not know of any organisation in France which was likely to afford much practical help, or of any organisation particularly interested in social work in Syria.

*The Secretary* said that he had already been in consultation with Mr. Sweetser (American) of the Information Section of the League Secretariat and with other members of the Secretariat who had knowledge of charitable organisations. As a result he was in possession of a list of names of bodies and individuals who might be useful.

*The Danish Representative* said that he understood that Mr. Sweetser had not been optimistic about the prospect of obtaining assistance from the Rockefeller Foundation. It might not prove practicable to establish a special committee as mentioned by the United Kingdom representative, but it was always possible that the various bodies which might become interested in the matter would decide to co-ordinate their activities by means of correspondence. The main point was to know to whom to apply.

*The Secretary* replied that he was already in possession of sufficient information. He suggested, however, that the committee should consider the broad lines upon which private charity should be approached, e.g., he would like further information about the suggestion for a central committee in Geneva.

*The United Kingdom Representative* expressed the opinion that the first thing to do was to enter into personal contact with the various charitable organisations established in Geneva, e.g., the International Red Cross, to see whether any of them were willing to interest themselves. The stage had been reached where every possible source of funds must be explored. Subsequently, the formation of a central committee in Geneva or of local committees in any countries where there was an encouraging response to the appeal could be considered. Meanwhile, it need not be supposed that any action taken in Geneva or elsewhere would interfere with the effort which was being made to raise private contributions in the United Kingdom. The campaign in the United Kingdom could proceed independently, but if there were encouraging signs from individuals or institutions in any other countries, he had no doubt that the interested persons in the United Kingdom would get into touch with them. He did not think, however, that it ought to be left to organisations in the United Kingdom to take the initiative in trying to arouse interest outside the United Kingdom.

*The Danish Representative* pointed out that the Council Committee could not hope itself to work out a definite scheme for tapping the resources of private charity. It would be necessary to leave ways and means to the various individuals

and bodies that might become interested. He recalled, however, that the committee had made an appeal to private charity at an earlier stage, and that the Governments of States members of the League had been requested in the further appeal sent out to them last July to bring the need for funds for Assyrian settlement to the notice of private charitable institutions in their respective countries.

In reply to a question by the President, the *Secretary* said that the League Information Section would very shortly have ready a pamphlet summarising the history of the Assyrian problem and describing the settlement project, which it was thought would be useful as a means of enlightening private charitable bodies.

*The President* enquired how it was proposed to distribute this pamphlet; for example, was it proposed that it should be sent out under a covering letter?

*The Secretary* said that he assumed that the pamphlet would be placed on sale like the analogous pamphlets on questions concerning League activities which the Information Section was in the habit of preparing from time to time.

*The United Kingdom Representative* deprecated any covering letter from the committee as involving it in responsibility for any statements which might be made in a pamphlet on a highly controversial subject regarding which neither the committee as a whole nor individual members had been consulted. He repeated that, in his opinion, the essential thing was now for the Secretariat to establish personal contact with various international organisations in Geneva and see what these organisations were prepared to do.

After some further discussion, it was agreed that the committee would not take any further action in the matter at present, but that the individual members would reflect on the best manner of tapping the resources of private charity, particularly in their own countries. Meanwhile, the committee approved the suggestion that the secretary should proceed without delay to establish personal contact with the charitable organisations domiciled at Geneva, and that the question of a further meeting of the committee on this subject should be left in abeyance for the present and pending any developments.

J. C. STERNDAL BENNETT.

December 18, 1935.

#### Annex.

#### Télégramme à M. H. Cuénod.

Conseil vient d'approuver Conseil Trustees et statut. Etes nommé président. M. Barcenat nommé temporairement jusqu'à fin février comme troisième membre. Conseil espère trustees commenceront activité 1<sup>er</sup> janvier. Barcenat sera Beyrouth cette date. Bieler membre Trésorerie Secrétariat arrivera Beyrouth 24 décembre, sera disposition trustees jusqu'au 14 janvier. Veuillez-vous rendre Beyrouth si possible avant 1<sup>er</sup> janvier et en tout cas environ cette date, afin d'y être le plus longtemps possible entre 1<sup>er</sup> et 14 janvier pour installer Conseil Trustees, prendre mesures urgentes, entrer en rapport avec Bieler et Barcenat. Espérons Commission locale pourra arranger sans inconvénient sérieux suspendre consultation pendant votre courte absence. Télégraphiez accord. Ai télégraphié Gouvernement Irak même sens.—AVENOL.



## CHAPTER III.—GENERAL.

[E 4086/528/65]

No. 152.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received July 2.)*

(No. 344 E.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, June 19, 1935.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 84 E. of the 11th February, I have the honour to report that the extension of the Aleppo-Nisibin Railway to the new terminus at Tel Kotehek, on the Syro-Iraqi frontier, has already had certain repercussions on the trade of Mosul. The Standard Oil Company are now making use of the greater ease of transport to import Roumanian petrol and kerosene into Mosul, while wood, cement and other building materials are also being imported by this route.

2. The local press has quickly seized upon the offer of the Mosul Oil-fields (Limited) (British Oil Development Company) to construct a railway line from their field to the Syrian railhead, and is strongly advocating such construction, urging at the same time that the alignment chosen should provide for the needs of Mosul town. In the meantime, the Public Works Department of the Iraqi Government are improving the road between Mosul and Tel Kotehek, and there is no doubt that the popularity of this new route is bound to increase. Pending the completion of the railway link, the effects of the new traffic upon Bagdad as a commercial centre are, perhaps, not likely to be very great, but it would be imprudent to attempt to prophesy regarding the future.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &amp;c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

[E 5027/5027/89]

No. 153.

*Consul-General Havard to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 61.)

Sir,

*Beirut, August 13, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to report that an official communiqué from the Press Bureau of the French High Commission, which appeared in the local press on the 11th August, announced that a commercial agreement had been signed between the High Commission (on behalf of the French Mandated Territories of the Levant) and the Government of Iran on the 7th August and would come into force immediately.

2. Under the terms of this agreement (1) merchandise originating in these territories will in Iran benefit by the imposition of the normal tariff, on a reciprocal basis; (2) 10 per cent. of the total imports allowed by the Iranian quota system to enter by the way of Kasr-i-Chirin and Khaneh will be reserved for goods either originating in these territories or coming through them in transit; (3) the relative documents, transit or export declarations, will be stamped as follows:—

“Customs Administration of French Mandated Territories—Merchandise destined for Iran.”

3. My Iranian colleague here informs me that the agreement was signed in Tehran. He added, though this fact has not as yet been announced officially, that, as a *quid pro quo* for the benefit obtained under it for Syrian goods, the Iranian Government have secured that in future their subjects engaged in litigation in these territories shall be justiciable before the Mixed Courts, in the

same way as the subjects of ex-capitulatory Powers, instead of the native courts, as hitherto.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade and to His Majesty's representative at Tehran.

I have, &amp;c.

P. T. HAVARD.

[E 5030/32/34]

No. 154.

*Mr. Bateman to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 207.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, August 19, 1935.*

PRIME MINISTER told me to-day that he had received an urgent and personal telegram from Tewfik Aras urging him to seize present opportunity to settle the frontier dispute with Persia.

2. Tewfik Aras said that if as a result of Abyssinian imbroglio Turkey became involved in war with Italy, he wished to be assured of support from both Iraq and Persia, and would propose a tripartite defensive pact as soon as the frontier difficulty was definitely overcome.

3. A similar telegram has been sent to the Shah.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 56, and Angora, No. 1.)

[E 5107/2805/31]

No. 155.

*Mr. Shone to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received August 23.)*

(No. 265.)

Sir,

*Berne, August 21, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 211 of the 14th August last, I attended the opening meeting of the 19th Zionist Congress at Lucerne last night. The meeting was held in a large hall of the new Kunstmuseum and I should estimate that the audience numbered between two and three thousand persons. I was informed that over four hundred delegates from more than forty countries were taking part in the Congress. No other members of the Diplomatic Corps at Berne attended, but a few consular representatives were present.

2. I was grateful for the message from His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Congress which you were so good as to send me in your telegram No. 19 of the 17th August. Before the proceedings opened, I had a brief conversation with Dr. Nahum Sokolow, the President of the Zionist Organisation, who asked me whether I had any communication from His Majesty's Government to the Congress. I showed him Mr. Malcolm MacDonald's message and he expressed thanks in terms which were polite rather than enthusiastic. When I delivered the message in the course of my brief speech to the Congress, it was listened to with marked attention and the reference to the National Home for the Jewish people was greeted with applause. The remainder of my speech was devoted to associating myself with the welcome extended to the delegates by Dr. Walther, National Councillor for Lucerne, and to wishing the Congress success in its deliberations. It was well received and I think there is no doubt that the Congress were gratified by the presence of a representative of His Majesty's Government. Nothing was said to me regarding the attendance of His Majesty's Minister or myself at the meeting of the Council of the Jewish Agency on the 4th September next.

3. The proceedings opened with a speech by Dr. Sokolow, for the most part in Hebrew; in a passage delivered in English he referred with satisfaction to the economic and cultural progress in Palestine since the last Zionist Congress two years ago, and emphasised the need for developing education. The Jewish National Home had been partly achieved; the New Israel had no thought of dominating the Arabs, with whom good relations, in accordance with the terms of the mandate, must be cultivated and established on a firm footing. The Mandatory Power must be urged to open up the country more fully to Jewish



immigrants and to further the development of regions suitable for the Arab population. Dr. Sokolow then expressed his full confidence in the wisdom of the Mandatory Power and in the sense of justice of the British people.

4. After Dr. Walther and I had spoken, Mr. James McDonald, Commissioner of the League of Nations for Jewish refugees from Germany, who received a particularly warm welcome from the audience, made a short speech in the course of which he expressed appreciation of the assistance which he had received from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Administration in Palestine. The Congress was then addressed in German by Herr Erlanger, municipal councillor of Lucerne, in the name of the Jewish community in Switzerland; by Herr Cohn, a Bâle lawyer, in that of the Swiss Zionists; and, in English, by Mr. Leville-Laski, who referred to the need for developing Transjordan.

5. Dr. Sokolow then surveyed, in a speech lasting over an hour and delivered in Hebrew, the principal developments in the Jewish situation and Zionism throughout the world during the past two years. I will forward an English version of his speech as soon as copies can be obtained. He also read out messages from Mr. Lloyd George and the Executive of the Parliamentary Palestine Committee. The former, which congratulated the Congress on the progress already made and expressed satisfaction at the fact that when the Jews were once more facing persecution a refuge was available in the land of their forefathers, was greeted with considerable applause.

6. So far as I am aware, the question of the Legislative Council, referred to in the article in the *Times* of the 15th August last, was not raised during the proceedings. The only other matter which is perhaps worth mentioning is that Mr. Ben Gurion, who sat next me on the rostrum and who is, I am told, a person of some importance in the Zionist movement, expressed satisfaction at the progress which had been made in Palestine during the last four years and referred to the present Administration in appreciative terms.

7. I hope to be able to report further on the Congress at a later date.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

[E 5512/2805/31]

No. 156.

*Sir G. Warner to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received September 13.)*

(No. 281.)

Sir,

*Berne, September 4, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, in obedience to the instructions contained in your despatch No. 211 of the 14th August last, I to-day attended the inaugural meeting of the Jewish Agency for Palestine at Lucerne, at which some 200 persons were present.

2. Prior to this meeting, I had an interview with Dr. Weizmann and Dr. Brodetsky and asked whether I was expected to speak. Dr. Weizmann replied that it would give satisfaction if I made a short speech and suggested that in the course of it I should state that a settlement of the problems existing in Palestine would contribute to the stability of the Near East, which is an important British interest. I saw no objection to this and after referring to the interest taken by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the welfare of the Jews and to Mr. Shone's presence at the inaugural meeting of the Zionist Congress at which he delivered a message from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and after expressing my personal pleasure at being present, I spoke in the sense suggested by Dr. Weizmann. My presence at the meeting was clearly appreciated. Speeches were also made in German by Dr. Rothmann, who introduced Dr. Weizmann, who has now become chairman of the Jewish Agency on his election as chairman of the Zionist Organisation, Dr. Weizmann on taking office, Dr. Zimmerli, the Mayor of Lucerne, and a member of the Federal National Council, Dr. Ruppin, a member of the executive and one of the pioneers of the settlement of Jews in Palestine, and Miss Henrietta Szold, who has worked for some thirty years in Palestine amongst women and children. The session is expected to last two or three days. After the morning's proceedings I was invited

to a lunch party, at which Lady Erleigh, Mr. Sokolow, Professor Brodetsky, Mr. Ben Gurion and Mr. Laski, amongst others, were present.

3. I understand that the relations between the Agency and the Government of Palestine are now on a friendly footing and much appreciation was expressed of the High Commissioner, who, I was told, constantly visits the different parts of the country and is deeply interested in all its problems. I had anticipated criticism of the restrictions placed on immigration, but Dr. Ruppin appeared to be well satisfied with the number of German Jews admitted this year. The number was, I think, 35,000.

4. I shall have the honour to forward a report on the meetings of the Zionist Congress and Jewish Agency in due course.

I have, &c.

G. R. WARNER.

[E 5969/2805/31]

No. 157.

*Sir G. Warner to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 4.)*

(No. 314.)

Sir,

*Berne, September 30, 1935.*

IN his despatch No. 265 of the 21st August last Mr. Shone had the honour to report on the opening meeting of the Nineteenth Zionist Congress which has just been held at Lucerne, and in my despatch No. 281 of the 4th September I reported on the inaugural meeting of the Council of the Jewish Agency, which took place after the congress. The following further report on the congress of the council is compiled from material supplied to me by a member of the Jewish agency, and from the accounts of the proceedings in the press. On previous occasions when the congress was held in Switzerland, at Zurich and Bâle, His Majesty's consular officers were able to furnish reports on the proceedings, but that has not been possible in the present case, as there has been no British consular officer at Lucerne this summer.

2. The congress seems to have been more tranquil than previous ones, largely, no doubt, because the "Revisionists," who were responsible for many acrimonious disputes in recent congresses, had decided to secede from the Zionist organisation and to hold a rival congress in Vienna. There were some 2,000 participants in the Lucerne Congress, at which 468 elected delegates were present from the following political groups: Left party (Labour), 229; left group of Zionists, 101; right group of Zionists, 50; Mizrahi group, 75; extreme right group (Jewish State party), 13. The Jewish State party were unable to agree to the election of Dr. Weizmann as president of the congress on the ground that he had stated in 1930 that the Jewish State could not be the goal of the Zionist movement. The Mizrahi group and a few other delegates abstained from voting in the election. The principal "scenes" were provided by these two parties; the Jewish State party, who may be regarded as the successors to the seceding Revisionists, attacked the present executive of the Jewish agency, while the Mizrahi group declined to take part in the general debates unless and until the congress agreed to the observance of Sabbath rest. Agreement on this point was reached on the 27th August, and a member of the Mizrahi group was eventually appointed to the Executive. The Jewish State party remains in opposition, together with some of the extreme left wing, who did not approve of the appointment of a member of the Mizrahi group to the Executive.

3. Satisfaction is expressed that the new Executive will contain representatives of more parties than before; it will consist of seven Zionist members in addition to the president, Dr. Weizmann, and three non-Zionist members. Labour which, as mentioned above, was the dominating party at the congress, adopted a conciliatory attitude to the other parties, believing it to be in the interests of Labour immigrants as well as of the Zionist movement as a whole that the Executive should for the present have a coalition character. M. Ben Gurion, whose efforts are said to have largely contributed to the understanding with the other groups, M. E. Kaplan and M. M. Shertok remain in the Executive as representatives of Labour; Professor Brodetsky and M. I. Gruenbaum also

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retain their positions as representatives of the so-called A group of the General Zionists; the two new members are Rabbi J. L. Fishman, of the Mizrahi group, and M. F. Rottenstreich, of the so-called B group of the General Zionists. The non-Zionists will be represented in the Executive by Dr. M. Hexter, Dr. W. Senator and Dr. M. Karpf; they pressed for a larger representation, but the Zionists declined to concede it.

4. Dr. Sokolow will in future be honorary president of the Zionist organisation and of the Jewish agency, in place of the late Baron Edmond de Rothschild, and he will also be president of the Keren Hayesod, the central fund for the reconstruction of the Jewish National Home. M. Ussischkin succeeds the late M. Motzkin as president of the Zionist General Council, and Dr. Arthur Ruppin has been appointed director of the new Department of Economic Research. M. L. Lipsky will represent the Executive in the United States of America, and Dr. Nahum Goldmann, the Zionist Organisation at the League of Nations.

5. More than thirty delegates from Germany attended the congress with the permission of the German Government, who presumably favour Zionism as a stimulus to the exodus of Jews from the Reich. Dr. Sokolow and the American Zionist leader, Dr. Wise, did not hesitate to denounce the Jewish persecution by the Nazi régime in scathing terms, and the congress also organised a silent protest against it. Objections are reported to have been raised in regard to German attempts to evade the terms of an arrangement made some two years ago, whereby Jews emigrating to Palestine from Germany are enabled to take with them a certain amount of money, through the export of German goods to Palestine.

6. Political issues dominated the deliberations of the congress, which as usual covered a wide range of subjects. The congress unanimously reaffirmed its uncompromising opposition to the proposed Legislative Council in Palestine at the present stage of development of the Jewish National Home, on the ground that any such scheme on the present basis of population could only be regarded as an infringement of the provisions of the mandate. In other respects the congress reaffirmed its anxiety to co-operate with the mandatory Power and to live and work in harmony with the Arab population. In addition to a resolution opposing the establishment of the Legislative Council, the congress passed resolutions calling upon the Palestine Government to revise the present legislation and practice with respect to land holdings and to assist Jewish agricultural settlement; urging the Government to admit Jewish labour immigrants to the full extent of Palestine's absorptive capacity; recommending steps to ensure that Jewish labour received its due share of employment in public and municipal works under fair conditions; noting with satisfaction the progress achieved by Jewish industry in Palestine and urging the systematic encouragement of local industries by reform of the tariff system and the conclusion of trade agreements with other countries; pressing for a reconsideration of the basis on which Government grants are made to Jewish public institutions, particularly for purposes of education and health; supporting the Va'ad Leumi in its representations to the Palestine Government regarding the levying of taxation, and appealing to the Government to facilitate the passage of by-laws enforcing the public observance of the Sabbath and Jewish Holy Days as days of rest. Copies of these resolutions are enclosed together with copies of the confidential "Internal Resolutions" adopted by the political commissions of the congress and the council relating to immigration,<sup>(1)</sup> the extension of Jewish settlement to Transjordan, and the utilisation of the large surplus of Government funds to further Jewish agricultural colonisation. I am informed that these resolutions have been transmitted to the Colonial Office.

7. The congress also resolved to send greetings to the Zionists in the Soviet Union, persecuted because of their adherence to Zionism.

I have, &c.

G. R. WARNER.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 6178/528/65]

No. 158.

Consul Mackereth to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 72.)

Sir,

Damascus, October 7, 1935.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 14 of the 16th February, 1934, on the subject of trans-desert traffic, I have the honour to inform you that the Acting High Commissioner issued on the 26th September last "Arrêté" No. 221/LR, a copy of which I enclose, together with a copy of its complementary operating regulation.<sup>(1)</sup>

2. It will be observed that this ordinance, which annuls all previous ones in the same matter, limits fiscal subsidies to carefully selected carriers and increases their amount by including in the exemptions all internal taxation on fuel and matériel. Passenger carriers are required to take out adequate third-party insurance and all licensed hauliers to deposit a surety with the customs in a sum of not less than 30,000 Syrian pounds (about £8,000).

3. The sum to be refunded to each carrier will, as in the past, be regulated by the extent of his traffic. It will be calculated on a sliding scale (article 4 of the "arrêté"). Although the scale is not made public, and neither the "arrêté" nor the "règlement" provides for a subvention greater than the amount of the customs dues and other taxes that would normally be payable, I am told that the trans-desert carriers concerned received a definite, if verbal, assurance that the sliding scale was the ruling factor. Its application, Mr. Lagarde is alleged to have said, might well result in a carrier receiving a subvention far greater than would be represented by the sum of remitted taxation. Concealment of this kind, which is not a novelty in French mandatory administration, appears to be of doubtful value.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to Aleppo, Bagdad, Beirut, Jerusalem and the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

GILBERT MACKERETH.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 6259/6259/89]

No. 159.

Consul-General Havard to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 75.)

Sir,

Beirut, October 14, 1935.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a cutting from the Beirut newspaper *Commerce du Levant* of the 27th September, reporting the formation of a company called "La Lainière nationale," with the object of fostering the manufacture of woollen goods in this country.

2. You will observe that the direction of the company is stated to have petitioned the mandatory authorities to impose protective duties on woollen piece-goods, and that Japan and the United Kingdom are the two countries from which it is alleged that protection is required. The customs statistics for 1934 show that, in fact, pure wool piece-goods to a total value of £Syr. 760,855 were imported during that year, and that the following were the principal supplying countries:—

	£ Syrian.
United Kingdom ... ..	393,453
France ... ..	158,801
Italy ... ..	136,163

whereas the value of Japan's imports was only £Syr. 3,436. It would appear, therefore, that any measure of protection eventually accorded will primarily penalise British trade.

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3. According to my information, the capital of the company is actually some 95 per cent. Italian, the remaining 5 per cent. being furnished by certain Lebanese in order that the company may have the appearance of a local enterprise. The Italian promoters have, it appears, for some time now been in touch with the French authorities with a view to the imposition of a protective tariff. Should they succeed, the British trade in these goods cannot but be most seriously affected.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosure to the Department of Overseas Trade and the acting commercial agent at Haifa.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

Enclosure in No. 159.

*Extract from the Commerce du Levant of September 27, 1935.*

L'ASSEMBLÉE générale constitutive de la Lainière nationale réunie le 9 septembre courant a déclaré cette société définitivement constituée.

Cependant, avant d'entreprendre leur programme industriel, les dirigeants de cette société ont cru devoir demander aux autorités la protection de leurs produits.

Le tarif douanier actuellement appliqué aux tissus de laine est loin d'apporter en effet à l'industrie locale la protection efficace et nécessaire lui permettant de lutter contre le produit étranger et principalement contre le Japon et l'Angleterre qui, l'un par son "dumping," l'autre par la dévalorisation de sa monnaie, accaparent à l'heure actuelle les marchés des pays sous mandat.

Les tissus de laine sont imposés d'un droit de 25 pour cent *ad valorem* alors que d'autres articles textiles sont imposés d'un tarif bien plus élevé (les cotonnades payent un droit spécifique correspondant à 60-80 pour cent environ *ad valorem* et les soieries à 100-180 pour cent).

La Lainière nationale compte doter les États sous mandat d'une installation des plus modernes d'une valeur effective d'environ trois millions de francs et qui peut être considérée de beaucoup comme la plus importante du Proche-Orient.

Ses cent métiers rapides pourront assurer normalement, et avec une seule équipe de travail, une production annuelle d'environ 700,000 mètres, avec deux équipes la production atteindra et même dépassera immédiatement 1,250,000 mètres, c'est-à-dire environ 400,000 kilos de tissus.

Or, en considérant que l'importation totale des tissus de laine (draperies et lainages) a été ici dans les meilleures années, c'est-à-dire en 1932 et 1933, respectivement de 361,294 kilos et 467,074 kilos, on peut estimer que l'industrie projetée par les dirigeants de la Lainière satisfera largement les besoins du pays.

La teinturerie de la Lainière, pourvue d'un outillage moderne tant pour la teinture en fil qu'en pièce, sera unique dans les pays du Proche-Orient et garantira en même temps qu'un travail complet une capacité de production d'environ 4,000 mètres par jour.

Par ailleurs, le fonctionnement de son usine influencera avantageusement d'autres industries du Liban. En effet, cette usine consommera annuellement environ 600,000 kilowatts d'énergie électrique, 900,000 m<sup>3</sup> d'eau et 1,500 tonnes de charbon.

Elle aura à faire transporter dans le pays, tant par camions que par chemin de fer, plus de 2,500 tonnes de marchandises et fournira un travail constant à 300 ou 600 personnes suivant l'emploi d'une ou de deux équipes.

Dans la requête qu'ils viennent d'adresser aux autorités, les dirigeants de la Lainière se défendent de demander une protection outrée ou même irrationnelle.

Ils ont tenu à ménager les intérêts des importateurs en ne réclamant aucune surtaxe sur les tissus de laine qui restent en dehors du rayon de leur fabrication.

C'est pourquoi on doit espérer que le Haut-Commissariat donnera suite à leur demande et fournira tous les encouragements dus à leur louable initiative.

[E 6616/6042/89]

No. 160.

*Consul-General Havard to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 8.)*

(No. 80.)

Sir,

*Beirut, November 1, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, in virtue of Decree No. 218/LR of the 19th September, which appeared in the local press of the 29th October, Iranian subjects are, in future, to be regarded as foreigners within the meaning of the 1928 decree on judicial organisation and are therefore justiciable before the Mixed Courts in the same way as the subjects of ex-capitulatory Powers.

2. This concession, which was foreshadowed in paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 61 of the 13th August, is operative as from the 7th August, the date of signature of the Franco-Iranian Customs Agreement.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to His Majesty's consuls at Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

G. T. HAVARD.

[E 6911/6911/31]

No. 161.

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Sir Samuel Hoare.—(Received November 25.)*

(No. 597.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, November 13, 1935.*

I HAVE the honour to report that his Highness the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan arrived in Bagdad on the 5th November to attend the circumcision of the Crown Prince and to take part in the entertainments arranged to celebrate this event. He was accompanied by his son, the Amir Naif.

2. I learned nothing of interest from the Amir on the occasions of the visits which I exchanged with him, but shortly after his Highness's arrival, Nuri Pasha broached a subject of some significance during one of my routine calls upon him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

3. He began by explaining that some years ago, when the Bagdad-Haifa Railway scheme was under active discussion, the possibility of the union of Transjordan with Iraq had also been considered. At that time, however, the Amir Abdullah had been opposed to this idea and it had consequently been dropped. Since then the Amir had changed his views and would now welcome the union of his country with Iraq. Nuri Pasha went on to say that what had been in mind was a sort of federation which would preserve a very wide measure of autonomy for Transjordan and leave unaltered its existing relations with Great Britain. He asked me whether I thought the scheme feasible.

4. I said that this was the first I had heard of it and that I was reluctant to express any opinion before I had had an opportunity to study it carefully. At first glance, however, there seemed to me to be almost insuperable difficulties in the way of its realisation.

5. To begin with, Transjordan was a mandated territory and its status could not be altered without the agreement of the Council of the League of Nations, and I much doubted whether the Council would agree to the change of which Nuri Pasha had spoken. The French Government, for example, would certainly oppose it.

6. Moreover, I felt that the scheme had not been very closely thought out even in Iraq. How, for instance, would it be possible to unite Transjordan to Iraq without encroaching on the autonomy which Transjordan at present enjoyed? How could the two countries be united without altering the relations established by treaty between the Transjordan and British Governments? Was it possible, for example, for Transjordan as part of Iraq to remain under a British mandate?

7. I found that Nuri Pasha had no suggestions with which to dispose of these obvious difficulties and he did not press me further for my views on this



very impracticable project. It is possible, however, that he may revert to it in the future and, although I do not believe that the idea of the union of Trans-jordan to Iraq has yet been taken up seriously by the Iraqi Government, Nuri Pasha's conversation indicates that the ideals of the Arab revolt are not yet dead.

8. The Amir Abdullah left Bagdad on the 11th November on his return journey to Amman.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR.

END